83d Congress, 1st Session - - - House Document No. 83-239, Vol. XI
83d Congress, 2d Session - - - House Document No. 83-509, Vol. XI
84th Congress, 1st Session - - - House Document No. 84-235, Vol. XI, pt. 1

Foreign Relations
# of the
United States
1952-1954

Volume XI

Africa and
South Asia

(in two parts)

Part 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE · UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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H920-1.1

United States
Government Printing Office
Washington : 1983

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9280

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PREFACE

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government.

The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

This volume was initially prepared under the general supervision of Fredrick Aandahl and, at a later stage, of William Z. Slany, his successor as General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Ralph R. Goodwin provided an initial review of portions of this volume. John P. Glennon and Paul Claussen provided detailed review and, with the assistance of Stanley Shaloff, were responsible for the final stages of publication.

The following members of the Office of the Historian prepared sections of this volume: Joan M. Lee (general policies with regard to North Africa; relations with Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan); Stanley Shaloff (relations with Tangier, Sub-Saharan French Africa, the Gold Coast and Nigeria, the Central African Federation, British East Africa, the Belgian Congo, and Liberia); William Z. Slany (general policies toward Africa); Nina J. Noring (the Union of South Africa); Carl N. Raether (general policies with respect to South Asia; relations with India); Paul Claussen (the Kashmir dispute); Louis J. Smith (the Pushtunistan dispute); David W. Mabon (Afghanistan); and William F. Sanford (Ceylon). David H. Stauffer and, at a later stage, Nina J. Noring assisted in the clearance of this volume.

Joann G. Alba performed most of the technical editing on this volume. The work was completed under the supervision of Margie R. Wilber in the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief). Francis C. Prescott compiled the index.

WILLIAM Z. SLANY
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

A–, airgram
ACEP, Advisory Committee on Export Policy
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Office of African Affairs, Department of State
AF of L, American Federation of Labor
AFP, *Agence France Presse*
agrmt, agreement
Amb, Ambassador
AmEmb, American Embassy
ANC, African National Congress
AP, Associated Press
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARC, Air Resupply and Communications
ASAF, Asian-African
AV, Aviation Policy Staff, Department of State
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BFC, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
BOAC, British Overseas Airways Corporation
BOT, Board of Trade (United Kingdom)
Brit, British
C, Office of the Counselor, Department of State
CA, circular airgram
CA, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State
CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CCTA, Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara
CDA, Combined Development Agency
CGT, *Confédération Générale du Travail* (General Federation of Labor)
Chi, Chinese
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
C.I.D., Criminal Investigation Detachment
C.I.F., cost, insurance, and freight; the cost paid for goods plus freight and insurance charges
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Europe
CINCNELM, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, United States Armed Forces, Europe
circ, circular
COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group of nations working to control export of strategic goods to Communist countries
Con, Consul; Consulate
Cong, Congress; Congressional
ConGen, Consul (Consulate) General
Contel, Consular telegram
CP, Commercial Policy Staff, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State
CPC, Communist Party of Ceylon
CPP, Convention People's Party, a Gold Coast political party
CRO, Commonwealth Relations Office (United Kingdom)
Def, Department of Defense; defense
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
Depreftel, Department of State reference telegram
Dept, Department (usually the Department of State)

Dept Agri, Department of Agriculture
Deptel, Department of State telegram
des, despatch
dipl, diplomatic
divn, division
DMPA, Defense Materials Procurement Agency
DMS, Director of Mutual Security Agency
dol, dollar
D.O.T., Dependent Overseas Territory
DRN, Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Department of State
DSB, Department of State *Bulletin*
DYG, Director General
E, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
EA, Ethiopian Airlines
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council, United Nations
ED, Investment and Economic Development Staff, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
EDAC, Economic Defense Advisory Committee
EDC, European Defense Community
EDS, Economic Defense Staff, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
Emb, Embassy
Embdes, Embassy despatch
EmbOff, Embassy officer
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EPU, European Payments Union
ESCOM, South African Electricity Supply Commission
ETD, estimated time of departure
Ethio, Ethiopia (n)
EUCOM, European Command, United States Army
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Europe; European
EUR/P, Public Affairs Office, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/UN, Office of the United Nations, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Excon, designation for telegrams dealing with the export control program; export control
ex dock, delivered at dock
EX-IM, Eximbank, Export-Import Bank of Washington
FADRL, Algerian Front for the Defense and Respect of Liberty
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice
FCN, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (treaty)
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Far East
FE/P, Public Affairs Office, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FEA, French Equatorial Africa
FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
fon, foreign
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FonSec, Foreign Secretary
FonSecy, Foreign Secretary
FSO, Foreign Service Officer
FSS, Foreign Service Staff
FWA, French West Africa
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Deputy Under Secretary of State; Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
G–2, Army general staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional or higher level
GA, General Assembly of the United Nations
Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GADel, United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GA Res, General Assembly resolution
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GOA, Government of Afghanistan
GOC, United Nations Good Offices Commission

GOC, Government of Ceylon
GOE, Government of Ethiopia
GOI, Government of India
GOP, Government of Pakistan
GovGen, Governor General
GSA, General Services Administration
H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
HICOM, High Commissioner
HM, Her Majesty
IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IBS, International Broadcasting Service, United States International Information Administration, Department of State
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
ICFTU, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICJ, International Court of Justice
IIA, United States International Information Administration
IMC, International Materials Conference
IMF, International Monetary Fund
Ind, Indian
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
instrs, instructions
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IPS, International Administrator for the Press Service, United States International Information Administration, Department of State
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
JAS, Joint Administrative Services
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
KAU, Kenya African Union
KLM. Royal Dutch Airlines
L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/EUR, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State
L/NEA, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
L/T, Office of the Assistant for Treaty Affairs in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/UNA, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State
LA, Latin America
Leg, Legation
Legtel, Legation telegram
l.t., long ton
MA, Military Attaché; also Military Adviser (of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan)
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MATS, Military Air Transport Service
MD, Munitions Division, Department of State
MDAA, Mutual Defense Assistance Act
MDAC, Mutual Defense Assistance Control
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
ME, Middle East
MEA, Ministry of External Affairs of India
MEDO, Middle East Defense Organization
MinAgri, Minister of Agriculture
MinComm, Minister of Commerce
MinDel, Minister Delegate
MinFin, Minister of Finance
MKA. Morrison-Knudsen of Afghanistan, Inc.
MP, Member of Parliament
MS, Mutual Security
MSA. Mutual Security Agency; Mutual Security Act of 1951
msg, message
MSP, Mutual Security Program
MTLD, *Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (Algeria)
mytel, my telegram
NA, North Africa
NAC, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems
NAT(O), North Atlantic Treaty (Organization)
NCNC, National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
ND, Néo-Destour

NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Near East
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NEA/AF, Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NEA/EX, Executive Director, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NEA/P, Public Affairs Office, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NNRC, Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
noforn, no foreign dissemination
Nor Afr, North Africa
NR, Northern Rhodesia
NSC, National Security Council
NYHT, *New York Herald Tribune*
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
ODA, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OFD, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
OIT, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce
OMP, Office of International Materials Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
ourtel, our telegram
PAA, Pan American Airways
Pak, Pakistan
PAO, Public Affairs Officer
Parl Secy, Parliamentary Secretary
Perm Sec, Permanent Secretary
PlebAd, Plebiscite Administration
PM, Prime Minister
Pres, President
PriMin, Primo Minister
QC, Queen's Counsel
RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
RAF, Royal Air Force (British)
RCA, Radio Corporation of America
RDA, *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*, a nationalist political party in French West Africa
re Deptel, regarding Department of State telegram
ref, reference
reftel, reference telegram
REP, Division of Foreign Reporting, Department of State
Res Gen, Resident General
reurtel, regarding your telegram
Rs, rupee
S/ , designation for documents issued by the United Nations Security Council
S/A, Office of the Ambassador at Large, Department of State
S/AE, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs
S/MSA, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S–PR, Protocol Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SC, Security Council of the United Nations
SE, Special Estimate
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOA, Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State
SoAfr, Union of South Africa; South African
Sov, Soviet
SY, Division of Security, Department of State
SYG, Secretary-General
TCA, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State

TCA/NEADS, Near East and African Development Service, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State

TCM/I, Technical Cooperation Mission, India

TCO, Technical Cooperation Officer

Telac, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington

TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State or his delegation in connection with conferences of Foreign Ministers

TRC, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State

TUC, Trade Union Congress

Tun, Tunisia

Turk, Turkey

TWA, Trans-World Airlines, Inc.

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State

UDMA, *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto)

UGTT, *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (General Union of Tunisian Workers)

UKHC, United Kingdom High Commission; Commissioner

UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State

UNCIP, United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan

UND, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

UNE, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNP, United National Party; Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

UNRep, United Nations Representative

UNRIP, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan

UNTA, United Nations Technical Assistance

UP, United Press

urdes, your despatch

urinfo, your information

urtel, your telegram

USA, United States Army

USAF, United States Air Force

USAFE, United States Air Force, Europe

Usfoto, series indicator for telegrams from the Foreign Operations Administration in Washington to its missions abroad

USG, United States Government

USGADel, United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

USIA, United States Information Agency

USIE, United States Information and Educational Exchange Program

USIS, United States Information Service

USMOK, United States Military Observer Group in Kashmir

USOM/L, United States Operations Mission in Liberia

UST, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*

USTT, *Union Syndicale des Travailleurs de Tunisie* (Syndical Union of Tunisian Workers)

USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

VOA, Voice of America

WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State

WE/P, Public Affairs Office, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State

Weeka, weekly, interagency summary analysis from United States diplomatic missions

WFTU, World Federation of Trade Unions

Wirom, series indicator for certain Department of State administrative telegrams

YMCA, Young Men's Christian Association

LIST OF PERSONS

The identification of the persons in this list is generally limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. Historical personages alluded to in the volume, officials noted in documents but not actively participating in substantive discussions, and individuals only mentioned in passing are not identified here.

Abbas, Ferhat, Algerian nationalist leader; Secretary General of the *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto) (UDMA).

Abdullah, Moulay, second son of Sultan Mohammed V of Morocco.

Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir; member of the Indian Constituent Assembly.

Acheson, Dean G., Secretary of State until January 20, 1953.

Achilles, Theodore C., Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council until April 1, 1952; Deputy Chief of Mission in France, April 1, 1952–September 18, 1952; Chief, September 18, 1952–August 25, 1954; thereafter, Minister in France.

Adams, J. Wesley, Jr., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Egypt until April 1, 1952; thereafter, Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in India.

Adams, Joseph, member of the Civil Aeronautics Board.

Adams, Robert A. W., Second Secretary and Consul of the Office of the United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers at Tokyo until April 28, 1952; Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Japan, April 28, 1952–October 14, 1953; Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in India, October 14, 1953–September 27, 1954; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul.

Adams, Russell B., Vice President of Pan American World Airways.

Aklilou, Ato Abte-wold. *See* Habtewold.

Ali, Mohammad, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, February 12, 1952–April 17, 1953; Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, April 17, 1953–October 27, 1954; thereafter, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Ali, Syed Amjad, Pakistani Delegate to the United Nations, 1952–1953; Delegate to the United Nations Board of Governors, 1954; Ambassador to the United States from September 25, 1953.

Ali Mohammad Khan, Afghan Foreign Minister.

Allen, George V., Ambassador to Yugoslavia until March 11, 1953; Ambassador to India and Nepal, May 4, 1953–November 30, 1954.

Allen, Ward P., United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

Alvapillai, K., Food Commissioner of Ceylon until June 30, 1953; Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food from July 1, 1953.

Amar, Tahar ben, President of the Tunisian Chamber of Agriculture; former President of the Tunisian Section of the Grand Council.

Ambegoakar, K. G., Secretary for Economic Affairs, Indian Ministry of Finance.

Andrews, Stanley, Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration, June 20, 1952–1953.

Aneizi (al-Unayzi), Dr. Ali, Libyan Minister of Finance from September 20, 1953.

Anschuetz, Norbert L., First Secretary of the Embassy in Greece until February 2, 1952; Special Assistant to the Ambassador to Greece, February 2, 1952–February 16, 1954; Political-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, February 16, 1954–October 28, 1954; thereafter, Attaché of the Embassy in Thailand.

Anthis, Colonel Rollen H., USAF, Commanding Officer, Wheelus Air Force Base, Libya, from July 1952.

Arden-Clarke, Sir Charles N., British Governor of the Gold Coast and Trust Territory of Togo.

Armstrong, Willis C., Special Assistant, Office of International Materials Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until August 4, 1952; Deputy Director, August 4, 1952–May 19, 1954; thereafter, Acting Director.

Arneson, R. Gordon, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs until April 11, 1954; Deputy Science Adviser, April 11, 1954–December 6, 1954; thereafter, detailed to the Imperial Defense College at London.

Auriol, Vincent, President of France until January 15, 1954.

Austin, Warren R., Permanent Representative at the United Nations until January 22, 1953.

Ayyangar, N. Gopalaswami, Indian Minister of Defense, May 13, 1952–February 10, 1953.

Azad, Maulana A. K., Indian Minister of Education, Natural Resources, and Scientific Research from 1952.

Azikiwe, Dr. Benjamin Nnamdi, leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons; member of the Western Region House of Assembly until May 1953; thereafter, Chief Minister and then Premier of the Eastern Region of Nigeria; publisher of the *West African Pilot*.

Baccouche, Salaheddine (Salah al-Din), Prime Minister of Tunisia, April 12, 1952–March 2, 1954.

Badoux. *See* Baudouy.

Badra, Mohamed, Tunisian Minister of Social Affairs until April 12, 1952.

Baeyens, Jacques, French Ambassador to Chile, February 18, 1952–May 23, 1953; thereafter, Chief of the Information and Press Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Bajpai, Sir Girja S., Secretary General, Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs until May 1952; Governor of Bombay State from May 1952; Representative of India at the United Nations Kashmir talks at Geneva, February 1953.

Balafrej, Ahmed, Secretary General of the Moroccan Independence Party (Istiqlal); exiled in August 1953.

Ball, William H., Special Representative with rank of Minister appointed by the President to the Rhodes Centenary Exhibition at Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, August 1953; Vice President, Ball Brothers Manufacturing Company, Muncie, Indiana.

Ballusek, Daniel J. von, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands at the United Nations.

Bancroft, Harding F., Deputy Representative on the United Nations Collective Measures Committee, 1952.

Bandaranaike, Solomon W. R. D., founder and leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Opposition Party in Ceylon.

Banerji, Brigadier P. C., Naval and Air Attaché of the Indian Embassy in the United States until May 1953.

Banjelloun, Abdelkadar, Interim Secretary General of the Moroccan Democratic Independence Party.

Barbara de Labelotterie de Boisséson, Robert, Office of the French Residence General in Tunisia until 1954; Consul General at Tangier from 1954.

Barnes, Robert G., Deputy Director of the Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until April 2, 1952; Attaché of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, April 2–May 12, 1952; thereafter, Attaché of the Embassy in France.

Barringer, John Paul, Deputy Director, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State, until July 6, 1952; thereafter, Director.

Bartlett, Frederic P., First Secretary and Consul of the Legation in Vietnam until September 1, 1952; loaned to Mutual Security Agency as Chief of the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) Mission at Saigon, September 1, 1952–July 5, 1953; detailed to National War College, July 5, 1953–June 20, 1954; thereafter; Counselor of the Embassy in India for Economic Affairs; also Counselor of the Embassy in Nepal for Economic Affairs from September 21, 1954.

Basdevant, Jean D., Chief of Bilateral Treaty Services, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs until August 2, 1952; thereafter, Chief of Protectorates Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Baudouy, Robert, Chief of the Diplomatic Cabinet of the French Residence General in Morocco.

Beard, John K., Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Belcher, Ronald H., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States until August 1953.

Benson, Ezra Taft, Secretary of Agriculture from January 20, 1953.

Berry, Burton Y., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until June 25, 1952; Ambassador to Iraq, August 11, 1952–May 3, 1954.

Bey, Prince Chedly, eldest son of the Bey of Tunisia.

Bhabha, Dr. Homi J., Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission.

Bhatnagar, Dr. Shanti S., Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Education, Natural Resources, and Scientific Research; Member-Secretary of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission.

Bidault, Georges, French Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense until March 8, 1952; Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 8, 1953–June 19, 1954.

Birch, John A., Attaché of the Embassy in the Union of South Africa until December 15, 1954; thereafter, Political Officer of the Consulate General at Istanbul.

Bishop, Max W., Consul General at Dhahran until January 4, 1954; Staff Member of the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), January 4–November 2, 1954; thereafter, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.

Black, Myron L., First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Ceylon until April 20, 1953: Consul at Halifax, April 20, 1953–November 1, 1954; thereafter, Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in Canada.

Blake, Monroe W., Consul General at Dakar until December 29, 1953; thereafter, Consul General at Manchester.

Blankenheimer, Bernard, Chief of the African Section, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce.

de Blesson, Jacques, assigned to the French Residence General in Morocco until December 1, 1952; thereafter, Director of the Office of American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Boegner, Jean-Marc, Assistant Director for European Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs until January 2, 1952; thereafter, Assistant Director for Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

de Boisanger, Claude. *See* Bréart de Boisanger.

de Boisséson, Robert. *See* Barbara de Labelotterie de Boisséson.

Bokhari, Ahmad Shah, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the United Nations.

Bolster, Edward A., Chief of the Aviation Policy Staff, Department of State, June 26, 1952–November 7, 1954; thereafter, Chief of the Aviation Division.

Bolté, General Charles L., USA, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations until August 1952; Commander of the 7th Army in Germany, August 1952–April 1953; Commander in Chief, U.S. Army in Europe, April–October 1953; thereafter, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

Bolton, Frances P., Republican Representative from Ohio; Member of the Delegation to the Eighth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1953.

Bonbright, James C. H., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until April 15, 1954; thereafter, Special Assistant to the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty and European Regional Organizations (NATO and USRO) at Paris.

Bonnet, Henri, French Ambassador to the United States.

Bonsal, Philip W., Counselor of the Embassy in France with personal rank of Minister until March 20, 1952; Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, March 20, 1952–September 9, 1954; thereafter, Far Eastern Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly.

Boudali, Nouri, Assistant Secretary General of the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens*.

Bourgerie, Elmer H., Director, Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State until June 8, 1952; thereafter, Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in Mexico.

Bourguiba, Habib Ben Ali, founder and leader of the Tunisian Néo-Destour Party.

Bovey, John A., Jr., Vice Consul at Casablanca until February 21, 1952; Consul, February 21, 1952–April 25, 1954; thereafter, Public Affairs Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Bowie, Robert R., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, and Department of State Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board from May 18, 1953.

Bowles, Chester B., Ambassador to India until March 23, 1953.

Bréart de Boisanger, Claude, Director of the American Affairs Section of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs until October 13, 1953; thereafter, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador to France until March 10, 1952; Under Secretary of State, April 1, 1952–January 20, 1953; Consultant to the Secretary of State, January 20–February 19, 1953; thereafter, Political Officer and Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community at Paris, and Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community at Luxembourg.

Bryan, Belton O'Neal, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs until June 7, 1953; Liaison Officer, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, June 7, 1953–May 9, 1954; thereafter, Director, Office of Munitions Control.

Byington, Homer M., Jr., Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1, 1953; thereafter, Counselor of the Embassy in Spain.

Byroade, Henry A., Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State until April 14, 1952; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

Caffery, Jefferson, Ambassador to Egypt.

Carey, Archibald J., Alternate Representative at the Eighth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1953.

Chenik, Mohamed (Muhammad), Tunisian Prime Minister until April 12, 1952.

Chevallier, Jacques, French Secretary of the Army from June 19, 1954.

Childs, Archie W., Consul General at Lagos until March 25, 1952; Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, March 25, 1952–September 27, 1953; thereafter, assigned to the Department of Commerce.

Childs, J. Rives, Ambassador to Ethiopia until January 19, 1953.

Choiseul-Praslin, René, Attaché of the French Embassy in Belgium until March 1, 1952; thereafter, Chief of the Diplomatic Cabinet of the Resident General in Tunisia.

Clark, Lewis, Consul General at Algiers from December 28, 1953.

Cole, William E., Jr., Consul at Accra until February 5, 1954; Consul at Jerusalem, February 5–July 28, 1954; thereafter, Consul General.

Corea, Sir Claude Stanley, Ceylonese Ambassador to the United States until February 1954; thereafter, High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.

Corrigan, Robert F., Consul at Dakar, also assigned to British Gambia, Portuguese Guinea, and the French Territory of Togoland, January 3, 1952–April 8, 1954; Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Chile, April 8–September 27, 1954; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul.

Corry, Andrew V., Attaché of the Embassy in India until June 1954; also assigned to Colombo, Kabul, Karachi, and Katmandu.

Cory, Thomas J., Adviser on Security Council and General Assembly Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations, until February 28, 1954; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Austria.

Cowen, Myron W., Consultant to the Secretary of State until May 10, 1952; Ambassador to Belgium, June 11, 1952–June 8, 1953.

Crain, Mary G., Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Crawley, Desmond J. C., Principal First Secretary of the British Commonwealth Relations Office until February 18, 1952; Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, February 18, 1952–September 14, 1953; thereafter, First Secretary for Commonwealth Relations Office Affairs of the British Embassy in the United States.

Crowe, Philip K., Ambassador to Ceylon from September 19, 1953.

Cutler, Robert, Administrative Assistant to the President, January–March 1953; thereafter, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Cyr, Leo G., Officer in Charge of Northern African Affairs, Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until June 22, 1952; thereafter, Deputy Director, Office of African Affairs.

Daridan, Jean, Minister of the French Embassy in the United States until July 1954; thereafter, Deputy Commissioner-General in Indochina.

Daspit, Alexander B., Political-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until January 30, 1954; resigned, January 30, 1954; reappointed as Attaché of the Embassy in Pakistan, April 15–September 27, 1954; thereafter, First Secretary.

Daud, Sardar Mohammad Khan, Afghan Minister of National Defense until September 20, 1953; thereafter, Prime Minister.

David, Wilmot A., Counselor of the Liberian Embassy in the United States from July 1952.

Davis, Vice Admiral Arthur C., USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations until March 1952; Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group, March 1952–November 1953; Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, November 1953–August 13, 1954; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Davis, Colonel John J., USA, Army Attaché of the Embassy in the Union of South Africa until April 8, 1952.

Davit, Alexander J., Second Secretary and Consul at Tangier until December 1, 1952; Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, December 1, 1952–December 1, 1954; thereafter, Liberian Desk Officer, Office of African Affairs.

Dayal, Rajeshwar, Permanent Representative of India at the United Nations; Alternate Representative on the Trusteeship Council, 1954.

Delany, Peter H., International Economist, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Denny, Harmar D., Republican Representative from Pennsylvania until January 1953; thereafter, Acting Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board.

Desai, Chandulal C., Secretary of the Indian Ministries of Works, Housing, Supply, and Production until 1954; High Commissioner in Ceylon from 1954.

Deshmukh, Sir Chintaman, Indian Minister of Finance.

Dillon, C. Douglas, Ambassador to France from March 13, 1953.

Dorman, John, Consul at Rabat until November 10, 1953; First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Ethiopia, November 10–30, 1953; thereafter, Counselor.

Dorros, Leon G., Vice Consul at Algiers until February 21, 1952; thereafter, Consul.

Drew, William J., Vice Consul at Leopoldville from November 5, 1953.

Drumright, Everett F., Counselor of the Embassy in India until November 24, 1952; Consul General at Bombay, November 24, 1952–October 31, 1953; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, October 31, 1953–November 1, 1954; thereafter, Consul General at Hong Kong and Macao.

Dudley, Edward R., Ambassador to Liberia until June 15, 1953.

Dulles, John Foster, Consultant to the Secretary of State and Personal Representative of President Truman for the Japanese Peace Treaty negotiations until April 1952; Secretary of State from January 21, 1953.

Dunn, James C., Ambassador to Italy until March 17, 1952; Ambassador to France, March 27, 1952–March 2, 1953; Ambassador to Spain from April 9, 1953.

Durnan, James J., Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Eden, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., USA, Supreme Commander in Europe until May 1952; President of the United States from January 20, 1953.

Elting, Howard, Jr., Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, until January 3, 1953; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Egypt.

Emmerson, John K., Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until July 28, 1952; thereafter, Counselor of the Embassy in Pakistan.

Erasmus, François Christiaan, Minister of Defense of the Union of South Africa.

Ernst, David H., Vice Consul at Bombay until April 27, 1953; thereafter, member of the Aviation Policy Staff, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State.

Espy, James, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Austria until June 25, 1952; Consul at Salzburg, June 25, 1952–October 15, 1953; thereafter, Counselor of the Embassy in Ceylon.

Evans, Barbara, Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State until January 1953.

Exter, John, Governor of the Ceylon Central Bank until July 1, 1953.

al-Fassi, Allal, one of the leaders of Istiqlal, the Moroccan Independence Party.

Faure, Edgar, French Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, January 22–March 8, 1952; President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly; Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs from June 28, 1953.

Feld, Nicholas, Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs, Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until August 2, 1954; thereafter, Consul at Singapore.

Ferguson, C. Vaughn, Jr., Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until August 1, 1952; detailed to National War College, August 1, 1952–September 1, 1953; Consul at Dakar, September 1, 1953–July 26, 1954; Consul General from July 26, 1954; also assigned as Consul General at British Gambia, Portuguese Guinea, and French Togoland from October 26, 1954.

Ferguson, John H., Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until August 12, 1953.

Finletter, Thomas K., Secretary of the Air Force until January 20, 1953.

Fisher, Adrian S., Legal Adviser of the Department of State until January 27, 1953.

Fisher, William D., Second Secretary and Vice Consul of the Embassy in France until February 21, 1952; Second Secretary and Consul, February 21–December 21, 1952; thereafter, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

FitzGerald, Dennis A., Assistant Administrator for Supply, Mutual Security Agency until May 19, 1952; Associate Deputy Director, May 19, 1952–October 12, 1953; thereafter, Deputy Director for Operations.

Fleming, Robert I., Vice Consul at Accra until October 15, 1954.

Fluker, J. Robert, Acting Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until October 12, 1952; thereafter, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs.

Forsyth, Douglas D., Secretary for External Affairs, Union of South Africa.

Foster, William C., Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 20, 1953.

Fouchet, Christian, Deputy of the French National Assembly; Minister for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs from June 1954.

Fouchet, Jacques, Office of Economic and Financial Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1954; Chief of the Civil Cabinet of the Residence General in Morocco from 1954.

Francis, Clarence, Chairman of General Foods Corporation; Special Consultant to the President on Surplus Agricultural Products.

Frechtling, Louis E., Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs from June 30, 1952.

Gadgil, N. V., Indian Minister of Works, Housing, and Supply until May 1952.

Gallman, Waldemar J., Ambassador to the Union of South Africa until August 15, 1954; Ambassador to Iraq from November 3, 1954.

Garbay, General Pierre, French Army; Commander of French troops in Tunisia until 1954; Commander of the Armies of Defense for French West Africa and Togoland from 1954.

Gatewood, Richard D., First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Ethiopia until January 28, 1954; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Greece; also Special Assistant for NATO Affairs of that Embassy, from October 26, 1954.

Gerig, O. Benjamin, Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (Bureau of International Organization Affairs after August 25, 1954), Department of State; Acting Representative on the Trusteeship Council, June 1, 1952–June 15, 1953; thereafter, Deputy Representative.

Ghulam, Mohammed, Governor General of Pakistan.

Gifford, Walter S., Ambassador to the United Kingdom until January 23, 1953.

Giri, V. V., Indian Minister of Labor, May 1952–September 1954.

el-Glaoui, Thami, Pasha of Marrakech.

Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

González, Dr. César, Representative of Venezuela with rank of Ambassador at the United Nations; Ambassador to the United States from December 1952.

Gorlitz, Samuel J., Assistant Chief, Public Loans, Investment, and Economic Development Staff, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until August 21, 1952; detailed to Industrial War College, August 21, 1952–June 18, 1953; Trade Agreements and Treaties Division, Bureau of Economic Affairs from June 22, 1953.

Graham, Dr. Frank, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan.

Green, Joseph C., Envoy to Jordan, July 31–September 23, 1952; Ambassador to Jordan, September 23, 1952–July 31, 1953.

Gross, Ernest A., Deputy Representative at the United Nations and Deputy Representative on the Security Council until January 1953.

Gufler, Bernard A., Counselor of the Embassy in Ceylon until October 15, 1953; Foreign Service Inspector, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, from January 1, 1954.

Guillaume, General Augustin, French Army; Resident General in Morocco until May 20, 1954; thereafter, Inspector General of French Forces in North Africa.

Habtewold, Aklilou, Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Hached, Farhat, Secretary-General of the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (UGTT); assassinated on December 5, 1952.

Hadsel, Fred L., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until February 28, 1954; thereafter, Acting Special Assistant, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

Halaby, Najeeb E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Halim, Sayyid Mustafa ben, Libyan Prime Minister and Minister of Communications from April 12, 1954.

Hamilton, J. Bruce, staff member of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs.

Hammerton, Albert, Representative in West Africa for the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

Harriman, W. Averell, Director for Mutual Security, Department of State, until January 1953.

Hassan, Prince Moulay, eldest son of Sultan Mohammad V of Morocco; exiled by the French in August 1953.

Hauteclocque, Jean de, Comte, French Resident General in Tunisia until September 2, 1953.

Havenga, Nicolaas C., Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the Union of South Africa until November 30, 1954.

Henderson, Loy W., Ambassador to Iran until December 30, 1954.

Hewitt, Warren E., Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State.

Hickerson, John D., Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs until July 27, 1953.

Hilaly, Agha, Joint Secretary, Pakistani Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations until 1954; Acting Secretary from 1954.

Hildreth, Horace A., Ambassador to Pakistan from May 19, 1953.

Hinke, Frederick W., Consul at Victoria until November 21, 1952; First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France, November 21, 1952–December 17, 1953; thereafter, Counselor and Consul of the Embassy in Liberia; also assigned as Consul in Sierra Leone from October 26, 1954.

Hoffman, Paul G., President and Trustee of the Ford Foundation until March 1953; Special Emissary of the President to India and Pakistan from March 1953.

Hoover, Herbert C., Jr., Consultant to the Secretary of State, October 14, 1953–August 18, 1954; thereafter, Under Secretary of State.

Hoover, John P., Assistant Chief, Division of Foreign Reporting Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, until August 20, 1952; Consul General at Salisbury, August 20, 1952–June 4, 1954; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul General of the Embassy in Cuba.

Hoppenot, Henri, Permanent Representative of France at the United Nations; Representative on the Security Council; Chairman, in the absence of the Foreign Minister, of the French Delegations to the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Regular Sessions of the General Assembly, 1952, 1953, and 1954.

Horner, John E., First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Afghanistan until July 19, 1953; detailed to National War College, July 19, 1953–June 21, 1954; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France.

Huggins, Sir Godfrey M., Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs, and Minister of Defense of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from September 7, 1953.

Hughes, Morris N., Counselor and Consul General of the Legation in Iceland until June 22, 1953; thereafter, Consul General at Tunis.

Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury from January 21, 1953.

Husain, M. Azim, Deputy Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs until 1952; Indian Consul General at San Francisco, 1952–1954; Joint Secretary, Indian Ministry for External Affairs from 1954.

Idris I, King of Libya. *See* al-Sanussi.

Jacquin de Margerie, Roland, Deputy Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Jain, Lakshmi C., Director General of Indian Civil Aviation.

al-Jabbi (Jerbi), Ali, Libyan Minister of Defense until February 18, 1954.

Jayawardene, Julius R., Ceylonese Minister of Finance until October 14, 1953; thereafter, Minister of Agriculture and Food.

Jernegan, John D., Consul General at Tunis until May 16, 1952; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs from June 26, 1952.

Jessup, Philip C., Ambassador at Large, Department of State, until January 2, 1953.

Jha, Bhola N., Secretary, Indian Ministry of Communication.

Johnson, A. M. Ade, Alternate Representative at the Ninth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1954.

Johnson, Jesse C., Director of Raw Materials, Atomic Energy Commission.

Jones, J. Jefferson, III, Deputy Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, until May 20, 1952; First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, May 20, 1952–June 1, 1953; Counselor of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, June 1, 1953–November 22, 1954; thereafter, Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Jooste, G. P., South African Ambassador to the United States until October 18, 1954; Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, 1952–1953; Chairman of the Delegation to the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Regular Sessions of the General Assembly, 1952, 1953, and 1954.

Josif, Harold G., Vice Consul at Madras until September 1, 1953; thereafter, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Joyce, Robert P., Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State until December 22, 1952; thereafter, Counselor of the Embassy in France.

Juin, General Alphonse P., French Army; Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, until June 1953; thereafter, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe.

Jurgensen, Jean, Acting Deputy Director for African-Levant Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until June 19, 1953; thereafter, Deputy Director; also Chief of the French Delegations to the Commission on Technical Cooperation in Africa for the years 1952 and 1953.

Kalijarvi, Thorsten V., Staff Associate and Consultant, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, until September 1, 1953; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Katju, Dr. Kailas N., Indian Minister of the Interior.

Kaur, Rajkumari A., Indian Minister of Health.

Keeler, Erwin P., Counselor of the Embassy in Israel until October 6, 1952; Principal Officer, Consulate General at Lagos, October 6–24, 1952; thereafter, Consul General at Lagos.

Kekhia, Dr. Fathy, Libyan Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Justice until February 15, 1954.

Kelakos, Michael G., International Economist, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until June 4, 1954; thereafter, Attaché of the Embassy in Greece.

Kennan, George F., Ambassador to the Soviet Union, May 14–September 19, 1952.

Kennedy, Donald D., Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until June 24, 1954; Attaché of the Embassy in India, June 24–July 26, 1954; Counselor, July 26–29, 1954; thereafter, Counselor with personal rank of Minister; also Counselor with personal rank of Minister of the Embassy in Nepal from August 30, 1954.

Kennedy, Major General Sir John Noble, Governor-General of Southern Rhodesia until November 1954.

Keskar, Dr. Balkrishna Vishwanath, Indian Minister for Information and Broadcasting from May 1952.

Key, David McK., II, Consultant, Department of State, October 11, 1952–December 18, 1953; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (International Organization Affairs after August 25, 1954).

Khan, General Muhammad Ayub, Commander in Chief of the Pakistani Army until October 27, 1954; thereafter, Minister of Defense.

Khan, Chaudhri Sir Muhammad Zafrullah. *See* Zafrullah Khan, Chaudhri Sir Muhammad.

Kidwai, Rafi Ahmad, Indian Minister for Food and Agriculture from May 1952.

Kilcoin, William L., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1, 1952; thereafter, Foreign Service Inspector, Bureau of Administration.

Kirkpatrick, Helen P., Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Assistant Chief, Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until May 26, 1952; Acting Chief, May 26–November 9, 1952; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, November 9, 1952–January 23, 1953; Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, January 23, 1953–October 10, 1954; thereafter, Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

Knight, Ridgway B., Acting Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until July 7, 1952; Deputy Director, July 7, 1952–August 12, 1953; Acting Director, Office of Western European Affairs, August 12, 1953–January 16, 1954; thereafter, Deputy Assistant to the United States High Commissioner for Germany at Berlin.

Koenig, General Pierre, Deputy of the French National Assembly; Minister of National Defense, June 19–August 19, 1954.

Kotelawala, Sir John Lionel, Ceylonese Minister of Transport and Works until October 12, 1953; thereafter, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and External Affairs.

Kripalani, M. K., Minister of the Indian Embassy in the United States until January 1952.

Krishnamachari, Tiruvallar T., Indian Minister for Commerce and Industry from May 1952.

Kyes, Roger M., Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 2, 1953–May 1, 1954.

Kyrou, Alexis, Permanent Representative of Greece at the United Nations until 1954; Chairman of the Delegation to the Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1953; Representative, and also Chairman in the absence of the Foreign Minister of the Delegation to the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1954; Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 3–December 30, 1954.

Lacoste, Francis, Alternate Permanent Representative of France at the United Nations and Alternate Representative on the Security Council until March 1, 1953; Central Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1, 1953–May 20, 1954; thereafter, Resident General in Morocco.

Ladejinsky, Wolf, Attaché, Office of the United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Japan until April 28, 1952; thereafter, Attaché of the Embassy in Japan.

Laethem, Gabriel van, First Secretary of the French Embassy in the United States until June 1954; thereafter, Counselor-Adviser attached to the Commissioner General in Indochina.

LaMacchia, Frank R., Consul at Salisbury, June 25, 1952–July 4, 1954; thereafter, International Economist, Economic Development Division, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State.

Lamm, Donald W., Consul at Lorenço Marques until June 25, 1952; Consul General, June 25, 1952–October 15, 1954; thereafter, Consul General at Accra.

Laniel, Joseph, Prime Minister of France, June 28, 1953–June 19, 1954.

Larabee, Byron H., Vice President of Firestone Plantations Company of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.

Lavallee, Jerome R., Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Lawton, Frederick J., Director of the Bureau of the Budget until 1953; thereafter, member of the Civil Service Commission.

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

LeBreton, David, Consul General at Tunis until April 1953.

Lee, Armistead M., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until March 15, 1954; thereafter, Consul at Kingston.

Léonard, Roger E. J., French Governor General of Algeria.

Le Roy de la Tournelle, Guy, Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until November 1954; Ambassador to Spain from November 6, 1954.

Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistani Prime Minister, assassinated on October 16, 1951.

Lie, Trygve H., Secretary-General of the United Nations until April 10, 1953.

Lind, Lewis M., Economic Attaché of the Embassy in India until September 11, 1953; thereafter, International Economist, Office of German Affairs, Department of State.

Litsey, Weldon, Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Liberia until March 25, 1952; First Secretary and Consul, March 25, 1952–October 14, 1953; thereafter, Consul at Vigo.

Locker, Jesse D., Ambassador to Liberia from October 16, 1953.

Lockett, Thomas H., Consul General at Algiers until December 23, 1953.

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., Republican Senator from Massachusetts until January 1953; Permanent Representative at the United Nations from January 26, 1953.

Loftus, John A., Attaché of the Embassy in India, January 24–April 10, 1952; Counselor for Economic Affairs, April 10, 1952–October 30, 1953; also for the Embassy in Nepal, April 3, 1953–October 30, 1953; thereafter, Counselor of the Embassy in France.

Longanecker, David E., International Economist, Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until July 29, 1952; thereafter, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of African Affairs.

Lourie, Donold B., Under Secretary of State for Administration, February 16, 1953–March 5, 1954.

Louw, Eric H., South African Minister of Commerce until November 30, 1954; thereafter, Minister of Finance.

Lovett, Robert A., Secretary of Defense until January 20, 1953.

Ludin (Louddin), Mohammad Kabir, Afghan Ambassador to the United States from November 1953; Permanent Representative and Chairman of the Afghan Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly from November 1952.

Lynch, Andrew G., First Secretary and Consul General of the Embassy in Libya until September 11, 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in Jordan, September 11, 1952–September 9, 1954; thereafter, Consul General at Bremen.

Lyttleton, Oliver, British Secretary of State for the Colonies until July 28, 1954.

MacVeagh, Lincoln, Ambassador to Spain, March 27, 1952–March 4, 1953.

Malan, Dr. Daniel F., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa until November 30, 1954.

Malenkov, Georgiy Maksimilianovich, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers until March 1953; Chairman from March 1953; Member of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Politburo (later Presidium); Secretary of the Central Committee until April 1953.

Mangano, Philip A., Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (Bureau of International Organization Affairs after August 25, 1954), Department of State.

Marchal, Léon, French Representative on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine until February 29, 1952; Central Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 29–November 17, 1952; Officer in Charge of African-Levant Affairs, November 17, 1952–September 21, 1953; thereafter, detailed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.

Margerie. *See* Jacquin de Margerie.

Marshall, General of the Army George C., USA, former Secretary of State and former Secretary of Defense.

Martin, Edwin M., Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until September 28, 1952; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs, September 28, 1952–June 25, 1953; thereafter, Attaché of the Embassy in France.

Martin, Sir John M., British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs for the Pacific, Mediterranean, and Far Eastern Departments of the Colonial Office.

Matthews, H. Freeman, Deputy Under Secretary of State until October 11, 1953; Ambassador to the Netherlands from November 25, 1953.

Mayer, René, French Minister of Finance until January 20, 1952; Prime Minister, January 8–June 28, 1953.

Mayo, Charles W., Alternate Representative at the Eighth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1953.

McBride, Robert H., Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

McConaughy, Walter P., Consul General at Hong Kong and Macao until June 23, 1952; thereafter, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

McGhee, George C., Ambassador to Turkey, January 15, 1952–June 19, 1953.

Meeker, Leonard C., Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State.

Mehta, Gaganvihari L., Indian Ambassador to the United States from September 26, 1952.

Meier, Oscar W., Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until March 10, 1952; thereafter, Foreign Affairs Officer, Technical Cooperation Administration.

Meloy, Francis E., Jr., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until January 10, 1953; Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France, January 10–July 24, 1953; Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Vietnam, October 29, 1953–May 21, 1954; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul.

Mendès-France, Pierre, Prime Minister of France from June 19, 1954.

Menon, V. K. Krishna, Representative of India at the Seventh and Eighth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952 and 1953; Chairman, except for the opening meeting, of the Indian Delegation at the Ninth Regular Session, 1954; Representative on the Trusteeship Council, 1954.

Merchant, Livingston T., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs until March 24, 1952; Deputy to the Special Representative in Europe at Paris, March 24, 1952–March 11, 1953; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Merrell, George R., Ambassador to Afghanistan until May 8, 1952.

Metcalf, Lee E., Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan–Afghanistan Affairs, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until September 25, 1954; Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Greece, September 25–27, 1954; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul.

Meyers, Brigadier General Harry F., USA, Commander of the 56th Anti-Aircraft Brigade until February 1954; Commanding General, Eastern Army Anti-Aircraft Command, Stewart Air Force Base, New York, February–June 1954; thereafter, Commanding General, 56th Army Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Ft. Totten, New York.

Middleton, George H., Counselor of the British Embassy in Iran until October 31, 1952; also Chargé d'Affaires, January 28–October 31, 1952; Deputy High Commissioner in India from April 1, 1953.

Mills, Sheldon T., Counselor of the Embassy in Brazil with personal rank of Minister until July 31, 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in India, September 19–October 2, 1952; Counselor with personal rank of Minister, October 2, 1952–July 2, 1954; Ambassador to Ecuador from August 19, 1954.

Mirza, Major General Iskander, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defense of Pakistan until 1954; Governor of East Bengal, May 30–October 27, 1954; thereafter, Minister of the Interior.

Mitterand, François, Deputy of the French National Assembly; Minister of State, January 20–March 8, 1952; Minister for Council of Europe Affairs, June 28–September 3, 1953; thereafter, Minister of the Interior.

Mohammed al Amin, Sidi (Sidi Mohammed Lamine Pasha), Bey of Tunisia.

Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa, Sidi, Sultan of Morocco from August 1953.

Mohammed ben Youssef, Sidi (Sidi Mohammed V), Sultan of Morocco until August 1953.

Moline, Edwin G., Petroleum Attaché of the Embassy in the United Kingdom from January 4, 1952.

Monnet, Jean, French Chairman of the Schuman Plan Conference; President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community from July 24, 1952.

Moore, Charles R., Acting Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until May 28, 1952; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France.

Moran, William E., Administrative Officer, Foreign Operations Administration, from July 10, 1952.

Morgan, George A., Assistant Director, Psychological Strategy Board until 1952; Deputy Director, 1952; thereafter, Acting Director.

Mulcahy, Edward W., Consul at Asmara until October 27, 1952; thereafter, Office of Personnel, Bureau of Administration, Department of State.

Muntasser (Muntasir), Mahmud, Libyan Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs until February 18, 1954; Ambassador to the United Kingdom from August 5, 1954.

Murphy, Robert D., Ambassador to Belgium until March 19, 1952; Ambassador to Japan, May 9, 1952–April 28, 1953; Political Adviser to the United Nations Command on the Korean Armistice Negotiations, April 28–July 11, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, July 28–November 30, 1953; Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 30–December 18, 1953; thereafter, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Naegelen, Marcel E., Member of the French Chamber of Deputies; Minister of Education.

Naim, Sardar Mohammad, Afghan Ambassador to the United States until May 1953; also Representative at the Ninth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1954.

Nanda, Gulzarilal, Indian Minister for Planning, Irrigation, and Power.

Nash, Frank C., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 10. 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, February 10, 1953–February 28, 1954.

Nazimuddin, Kwaja, Prime Minister of Pakistan until April 17, 1953.

Nehru, Brij K., Financial Counselor of the Indian Embassy in the United States; Executive Director for India on the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Joint Secretary in Charge of External Finance Division, Indian Ministry of Finance.

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Indian Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs; Minister of Defense, February 10–March 15, 1953, and from December 7, 1954.

Nehru, Raton K., Indian Special Secretary for United Nations Affairs and Commonwealth Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, until 1952; Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, from 1952.

Nitze, Paul H., Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State until April 1953.

Nixon, Richard M., Republican Senator from California until January 1953; Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1953.

Nkrumah, Kwame, Leader of Government Business in the Gold Coast National Assembly until March 21, 1952; thereafter, Prime Minister.

Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State until August 4, 1953; Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs, August 4, 1953–January 4, 1954; thereafter, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs.

Nouira, **Hedi**, Assistant Secretary General of the Tunisian Néo-Destour Party.

O'Connor, Roderic L., Assistant to the Secretary of State, January 21, 1953–February 21, 1954; thereafter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

Ohly, John H., Assistant Director for Policy and Program Development, Foreign Operations Administration, until April 17, 1952; Assistant Director for Programs, Office of the Director for Mutual Security, April 17, 1952–March 23, 1953; Deputy to the Director for Program and Coordination, Mutual Security Agency, March 23–October 1, 1953; thereafter, Deputy Director for Programs and Planning, Foreign Operations Administration.

Olmsted, Major General George H., USA, Director, Office of Military Assistance of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until 1953.

Olympio, Sylvanus, Leader of the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* in French Togoland.

Panafieu, François de, French Consul General at Tangier until 1954; Central Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1954.

Pandit, Madame Vijaya L., Chairman of the Indian Delegations to the Seventh and Eighth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952 and 1953; President of the General Assembly, Eighth Regular Session; Chairman, first meeting only, of the Indian Delegation to the Ninth Regular Session, 1954.

Paul, Norman S., Deputy Assistant for International Security Affairs, Office of the Director for Mutual Security, Mutual Security Agency, until October 26, 1953; Officer in Charge of Asia, Africa, and Latin America Program Affairs, October 26, 1953–February 1, 1954; thereafter, Regional Director for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Foreign Operations Administration.

Peck, Walter R., Member of the Civil Aeronautics Board.

Perkins, George W., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until January 31, 1953.

Pick, Charles F., Jr., Deputy Executive Director, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, from March 27, 1953.

Pillai, Sir Narayana R., Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs from 1952.

Pinay, Antoine, French Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, March 8, 1952–January 8, 1953.

Pleven, René, Prime Minister of France until January 20, 1952; Minister of National Defense, March 8, 1952–June 19, 1954.

Plitt, Edwin A., Member of the Delegation Staff of Advisers at the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952; Senior United Nations Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, until October 19, 1953; Member, Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board at Bonn, October 19, 1953–October 27, 1954; thereafter, Chairman.

Popper, David H., Deputy Director for International Organization Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of United Nations

Affairs (Bureau of International Organization Affairs after August 25, 1954), Department of State, until October 24, 1954; thereafter, Director.

PORTER, William J., Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until November 13, 1953; Consul at Rabat, November 13, 1953–September 27, 1954; thereafter, Consul General.

POWER, Thomas F., Jr., Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Libya; Principal Secretary of the United Nations Mission in Libya until 1952; Resident Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board in Libya from 1952.

PRASAD, Rajendra, President of India.

PUAUX, François, Deputy Director for African-Levant Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until November 1952; Second Counselor of the French Embassy in Lebanon from November 7, 1952.

RADFORD, Admiral Arthur W., USN, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands until July 10, 1953; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 15, 1953.

RADHAKRISHNAN, Dr. Sarvapalli, Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union until 1952; Vice President of India from April 26, 1952.

RAFIQ, Mohammad Atiq, Afghan Minister in Pakistan from January 1954.

RAJAGOPALACHARI, C., Chief Minister of the Indian State of Madras from April 1952.

RAM, Jagjivan, Indian Minister of Communications.

RATNAYAKE, R.W.A., Ceylonese Minister of Food and Cooperative Undertakings until June 2, 1952; thereafter, Minister of Home Affairs.

RAU, Sir Benegal N., Permanent Indian Representative to the United Nations.

RAU, Sir Rama, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India.

RAYNOR, G. Hayden, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

REDDY, Kyasambally C., Indian Minister in Charge of Production from May 1952.

RICHEY, Earle, Jr., Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until September 13, 1953; Political Officer of the Consulate General at Tunis, September 13, 1953–January 13, 1954; Vice Consul at Casablanca, January 13–December 3, 1954; thereafter, Consul.

ROBBINS, Robert R., Officer in Charge of Non-Self-Governing Territories Affairs, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, until April 11, 1954; thereafter, Deputy Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs.

ROBERTSON, David A., First Secretary of the Embassy in the Union of South Africa until February 1, 1953; Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, from March 9, 1953.

ROOSEVELT, A. Eleanor, Representative at the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952.

ROOT, John F., Second Secretary and Vice Consul of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until February 21, 1952; Second Secretary and Consul, February 21–June 25, 1952; thereafter, Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Ross, Emerson A., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until February 1, 1953; thereafter, Chief of the Investment and Development Staff, Bureau of Economic Affairs.

Ross, John C., Deputy Representative on the United Nations Security Council.

Ross, Robert W., Vice Consul at Lagos until September 23, 1953; Vice Consul at Naples, September 23, 1953–May 21, 1954; thereafter, Consul.

Runyon, Charles, Office of the Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State.

Salem, Mohammed ben, Tunisian Minister for Public Health; son-in-law of the Bey of Tunisia.

Sanders, William, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Planning Adviser of the United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, until October 11, 1953; thereafter, Counselor of the Embassy in Chile.

Sandifer, Durward V., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs until February 28, 1954; Attaché of the Embassy in Argentina, February 28–May 23, 1954; thereafter, Counselor.

Santa Cruz, Hernán, Chilean Representative at the United Nations; Chairman and *Rapporteur*, United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa, 1953–1954.

al-Sanussi, Sayyid Idris (Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Sanussi), King Idris I of Libya.

Saqisli (Saqezli, Saqizli, Saghisli, Saquizli), Muhammad, Libyan Minister of Education and Governor of Cyrenaica until August 1953; Head of the Royal Cabinet, August 1953–February 18, 1954; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, February 18–April 12, 1954.

Sarper, Selim R., Turkish Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

Sastroamidjojo, Dr. Ali, Indonesian Ambassador to the United States until July 1953; also Ambassador to Canada, March–July 1953; Prime Minister from July 30, 1953.

Satterthwaite, Joseph C., Ambassador to Ceylon until July 25, 1953; thereafter, Diplomatic Agent with rank of Minister and Consul General at Tangier.

Sauer, Paul O., Minister of Transportation, Union of South Africa, until November 30, 1954; thereafter, Minister of Lands and Irrigation.

Sawyer, Eugene D., Assistant Attaché of the Embassy in India until February 7, 1952; Public Affairs Officer of the Consulate General at Bombay, February 7–April 10, 1952; Vice Consul at Bombay, April 10–November 7, 1952; thereafter, Vice Consul at Accra.

Sbihi, Mrs. Batoul, confidential emissary of the Sultan of Morocco.

Schuman, Robert, French Minister of Foreign Affairs until January 8, 1953.

Schumann, Maurice, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until June 19, 1954.

Sears, Mason, Representative on the United Nations Trusteeship Council from June 12, 1953; Representative on the Committee on Information for Non-Self-Governing Territories, 1953; Member of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1954.

Sebald, William J., Political Adviser with personal rank of Ambassador to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers at Tokyo until April 25, 1952; Ambassador to Burma, July 12, 1952–July 15, 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from November 1, 1954.

Sen, Binay R., Indian Ambassador to the United States until September 26, 1952; thereafter, Indian Ambassador to Italy and Yugoslavia (concurrently).

Senanayake, Don Stephen, Ceylonese Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs, and Minister of Defense until March 26, 1952.

Senanayake, Dudley S., Ceylonese Minister of Agriculture and Lands until March 26, 1952; Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister of External Affairs, March 26, 1952–October 12, 1953.

Sexton, Brigadier General William T., USA, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Pakistan from July 1954.

Seydoux de Clausonne, Roger, French Consul General at New York until February 28, 1952; Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States, February 28–December 24, 1952; Minister, December 24, 1952–September 1954; thereafter, Deputy Minister of the Residence General in Tunisia.

Shah, Colonel A. S. B., Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan from September 1952.

Shastri, Lal Bahadur, Indian Minister of Railways from May 1952.

Shullaw, J. Harold, Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, Department of State, until July 1, 1952; thereafter, First Secretary of the Embassy in the Netherlands.

Shulman, Marshall D., Member of the Delegation to the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952.

Simpson, Charles L., Liberian Ambassador to the United States from May 1952.

Sims, Harold, Consul General at Salisbury until September 15, 1952; Foreign Service Inspector, Department of State, September 15, 1952–July 18, 1954; Political Adviser to the Commander of the British-United States Zone, Free Territory of Trieste, July 18–October 26, 1954; thereafter, Representative at Trieste.

Singh, Sardar Baldev, Indian Minister of Defense until May 1952.

Singh, Sardar Swaran, Indian Minister of Works, Housing, and Supply from May 1952.

Smith, Douglas B., International Economist, Investment and Economic Development Staff, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until March 1954.

Smith, Gerard C., Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs from April 12, 1954.

Smith, Henry T., Second Secretary and Consul at Naples until July 17, 1952; Deputy Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, August 22, 1952–July 16, 1954; thereafter, Director.

Smith, General Walter Bedell, USA (Ret.), Director of Central Intelligence until February 8, 1953; Under Secretary of State, February 9, 1953–October 1, 1954.

Soulbury, Viscount (Sir Herwald Ramsbotham), Governor General of Ceylon until July 17, 1954.

Sprague, Governor Charles A., Alternate Representative at the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952.

Staats, Elmer B., Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget until 1953; Executive Director of the Operations Coordinating Board from 1953.

Stanton, Edwin F., Ambassador to Thailand until June 30, 1953.

Stassen, Harold, President of the University of Pennsylvania until 1953; Administrator of the Mutual Security Agency, January 20–August 1, 1953; thereafter, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

Steadman, Robert F., Controller of the State of Michigan until 1953; thereafter, Chairman, Department of Public Administration, Wayne University.

Steere, Loyd V., Counselor with personal rank of Minister of the Embassies in India and Nepal until August 20, 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in Poland, August 20, 1952–May 18, 1953; Director, Office of Political Affairs, United States High Commissioner in Germany at Bonn, May 18, 1953–September 27, 1954; thereafter, Consul General at Salisbury.

Stein, Eric P., Acting Officer in Charge of Pacific Settlement Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (Bureau of International Organization Affairs after August 25, 1954), Department of State.

Stokes, William N., Second Secretary and Vice Consul, Office of the United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers at Tokyo, until April 16, 1952; thereafter, Vice Consul at Rabat.

Stott, Charles E., Director, Foreign Expansion Division, Defense Materials Procurement Agency (DMPA).

Summers, Lionel M., Attaché of the Embassy in Italy until June 26, 1952; Counselor of the Legation at Tripoli, August 20, 1952–September 25, 1954; thereafter, Counselor of the Embassy in Libya; also Consul at Benghazi from February 15, 1954.

Sweeney, Joseph M., Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State.

Talbott, Harold E., Secretary of the Air Force from February 4, 1953.

Tate, Jack B., Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, until July 8, 1954.

Taylor, Clifford C., Counselor of the Embassy in India and Attaché of the Embassy in Nepal.

Taylor, Paul B., Officer in Charge of General Assembly Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State; Adviser to the Delegations to the Seventh and Eighth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952, 1953; also Principal Executive Officer, 1952–1953.

Thacher, Nicholas G., Consul at Calcutta and Katmandu, February 21, 1952–February 16, 1953; Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, February 16, 1953–August 26, 1954; thereafter, Acting Officer in Charge of Afghanistan–Pakistan Affairs.

Thayer, Robert A., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until October 14, 1952; thereafter, Attaché of the Embassy in Lebanon.

Thompson, Charles O., Consul at Johannesburg until October 27, 1952; thereafter, Assistant Chief, Private Investments, Investment and Economic Development Staff, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State.

Thoreson, Musedorah W., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

Thorp, Willard L., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until November 15, 1952.

Tibbetts, Margaret J., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until September 20, 1954; thereafter, Consul at Leopoldville, the Cameroons, and French Equatorial Africa.

Tipton, Stuart G., General Counsel of the Air Transport Association.

Trudeau, Major General Arthur G., USA, Deputy Commandant, Army War College, until 1952; Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, 1952–1953; Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Korea, 1953; Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Intelligence, Department of the Army, from 1953.

Truman, Harry S., President of the United States until January 20, 1953.

Tsiang, Tingfu F., Permanent Representative of the Republic of China at the United Nations; Chairman of the Delegation to the Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1953.

Tubman, William V.S., President of Liberia.

Turner, General Howard M., USAF, Commanding General, 1st Air Force.

Undén, Bo Östen, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma.

Utter, John E., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France until February 21, 1952; First Secretary and Consul, February 21–March 20, 1952; Department of State, March 20–September 2, 1952; Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, September 2, 1952–November 22, 1954.

Vaithianathan, Sir Kanthiah, Permanent Secretary, Ceylonese Ministries of Defense and External Affairs until October 14, 1953; thereafter, Minister of Industries, Housing, and Social Services.

Vallat, Francis A., Legal Adviser of the British Embassy in the United States and also of the Delegation at the United Nations until January 15, 1954; thereafter, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office.

Varma, Wing Commander J.C., Indian Air Force; Air Attaché of the Indian Embassy in the United States until March 1953.

Venkatachalam, K.V., Deputy Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Communications.

Verwoerd, Hendrik F., Member of the South African Nationalist Party; Minister of Native Affairs.

Villard, Henry S., Minister in Libya, March 6, 1952–June 24, 1954; Member of the Delegation to the Ninth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly from September 26, 1954.

Vimont, Jacques, First Secretary of the French Embassy in Brazil until March 31, 1953; Assistant Director of the Cabinet of the Minister, March 31, 1953–June 1954; thereafter Minister-Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States.

Vincent, John Carter, Diplomatic Agent with personal rank of Minister and Consul at Tangier until January 1953.

Wadsworth, George, Ambassador to Turkey until January 2, 1952; Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, April 19–October 8, 1952; Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, December 29, 1952–October 30, 1953; Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from January 9, 1954 and to Yemen from September 13, 1954.

Wailes, Edward T., Acting Director of the Foreign Service Inspection Corps, Department of State, until June 4, 1952; Chief Inspector, June 4, 1952–May 26, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, May 29, 1953–March 26, 1954; Assistant Secretary of State for Administration and Personnel, March 26–June 22, 1954; Ambassador to the Union of South Africa from November 29, 1954.

Wainhouse, David W., Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, until February 28, 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, February 28–August 25, 1954; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

Ward, Angus, Consul General at Nairobi until June 20, 1952; Ambassador to Afghanistan from November 8, 1952.

Warren, Avra M., Ambassador to Pakistan until November 26, 1952; Ambassador to Turkey from September 17, 1953.

Waugh, Samuel C., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from June 5, 1953.

Webb, James E., Under Secretary of State until February 29, 1952.

Weil, T. Eliot, Deputy Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until August 22, 1952; detailed to National War College, August 22, 1952–June 15, 1953; thereafter, Counselor of the Embassy in India; also of the Embassy in Nepal from July 28, 1953.

Wellons, Alfred E., Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until June 22, 1952; thereafter, Officer in Charge of North African Affairs.

White, Emmett Lamar, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until November 1953.

Wilkins, Fraser, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in India until October 28, 1952; Counselor of the Embassy for Political Affairs, October 28, 1952–August 2, 1953; Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, August 2, 1953–August 15, 1954; thereafter, detailed to National War College.

Will, Ralph R., Country Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Mission in Pakistan from November 5, 1952.

Williams, William L.S., Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until November 23, 1952; thereafter, Officer in Charge of India, Nepal, and Ceylon Affairs.

Willson, Clifford H., Director of the Technical Cooperation Administration Mission in India.

Wilson, Charles E., Secretary of Defense from January 28, 1953.

Witman, William, II, Officer in Charge of India, Nepal, and Ceylon Affairs, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until November 8, 1952; Counselor of the Legation at Tangier, November 8–24, 1952; thereafter, Counselor and Consul General.

Wright, Vice Admiral Jerauld (promoted to Admiral April 1, 1954), USN, Deputy Representative, NATO Standing Group, until February 1952; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic, and Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, February–June 14, 1952; Commander, June 14, 1952–April 12, 1954; thereafter, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, and Commander in Chief of U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

Yenchius, Mildred M., Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Youseff, Salah Ben, Tunisian Minister of Justice until March 1952, Secretary General of the Néo-Destour Party.

Zafrullah Khan, Chaudhri Sir Muhammad, Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.

LIST OF SOURCES

The principal source of documentation for this volume was the indexed central (decimal) files of the Department of State. Documents from the central files were supplemented by materials from Department of State "lot" files (retired decentralized office files) and post files (records retired by United States missions overseas). The editors made limited use of Presidential papers in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library at Abilene, Kansas, and the Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Missouri, which became available only after this volume had been compiled.

A list of files used in the preparation of this volume follows, with information concerning their origin, scope, and size.

Department of State

Accra Consulate Files, FRC Acc. No. 59 A 543

Central files for the years 1950–1952, as maintained by the Consulate in the Gold Coast. The files are located in the Federal Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. (1 foot)

AF Files, Lot 56 D 412

Consolidated political and economic files on Africa, primarily pertaining to East Africa, South Africa, and Liberia, for the years 1931–1955, as maintained by the Office of African Affairs. Combines Lots 56 D 412, 58 D 562, 56 D 418, and 56 D 271. (1 foot)

AF Files, Lot 58 D 459

Files created by the Office of West African Affairs for the years 1950–1955. (1¾ feet)

AF Files, Lot 58 D 562

Multitopic files on South Africa, British East Africa, the Central African Federation, and Mozambique for the years 1943–1955, as maintained by the Office of South and East African Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Consolidated with Lots 56 D 412, 56 D 418, and 56 D 271. (1 foot)

AF/AFN Files, Lot 58 D 786

Contains subject files and country files for Morocco, Tunisia, Tangier, and regional North Africa, for the years 1941–1956, as maintained by the Bureau of African Affairs. (¾ foot)

AF/AFN Files, Lot 60 D 577

Moroccan Desk files, including Tangier, for the period 1941–1957, as maintained by the Office of Northern African Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

Atomic Energy Files, Lot 57 D 688

Consolidated collection of documentation in the Department of State on atomic energy policy for the years 1944–1962, as maintained principally by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs but also by other offices of the Department of State. (202 feet)

Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on official visits by European heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences, including North Atlantic Council sessions, attended by the Secretary of State during the years 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (18 feet)

Hickerson–Murphy–Key Files, Lot 58 D 33

Files of Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs John D. Hickerson, Robert D. Murphy, and David McK. Key in the years 1948–1954. (2 feet)

INR–NIE Files

Files of National Intelligence Estimates and Special Estimates retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.

IO Files

Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State, comprising the official UN documentation and classified Department of State records on United States policy in the UN Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and *ad hoc* committees for the period from 1946 to date. (More than 100 feet)

IO Files, Lot 71 D 440

Master files of classified records and correspondence of United States Delegations to sessions of the UN General Assembly for the years 1945–1965, maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. (48 feet)

Jessup Files, Lot 53 D 65

Files of Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup relating to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly held in Paris 1951–1952 (Palestine question only), and deliberations at the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly in 1952, as maintained by the Office of the Ambassador at Large. (1½ feet)

Karachi Embassy Files, FRC Acc. No. 59 A 543

Contains classified central files for the years 1950–1955, as maintained by the Embassy in Pakistan. These files are located in the Federal Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. (8 feet)

Karachi Embassy Files, FRC Acc. No. 68 A 5159

Contains top secret correspondence for the years 1947–1955, as maintained by the Embassy in Pakistan. These files are located in the Federal Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. (1 foot)

Monrovia Embassy Files, FRC Acc. No. 62 A 308

Central files for the years 1953–1955, as maintained by the Embassy in Liberia. These files are located in the Federal Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. (6 feet)

NAC Files, Lot 60 D 137

Master file of documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems for the years 1945–1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of State. (15 feet)

OCB Files, Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained in the Operations Staff of the Department of State. (25 feet)

OCB Files, Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (17 feet)

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Subject files of the Office of Dependent Areas concerning trusteeship and dependent territory matters for the years 1946–1958. (4 feet)

ODA Files, Lot 62 D 225

Master subject and country files of the Office of the Dependent Areas for the years 1953–1959. (13 feet)

Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and the heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (9 feet)

S/P–NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff. (17 feet)

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (20 feet)

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State for the years 1947–1963. (9 feet)

Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609

Chronological collection of the records of the Secretary of State's daily meetings with top Department of State officials for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. (5/12 foot)

Secretary's Letters, Lot 56 D 459

Serial master file of correspondence of the Secretary of State for the years 1945–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. (3⅓ feet)

Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444

Comprehensive chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda and memoranda of conversation for the years 1947–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (15 feet)

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (7 feet)

SOA Files, Lot 54 D 341

Consolidated files of the Office of South Asian Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs comprising memoranda, correspondence, and other documentation concerning relations with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Nepal, and the South Asian region generally for the years 1947–1952. Combines Lots 54 D 341, 54 D 40, 55 D 219, and 57 D 259.

State–JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

Top secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the period 1951–1959, and selected problem files on the Middle East for the period 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (3 feet)

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237

Subject files of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs covering the years 1946–1957. (3 feet)

UNP Files, Lot 60 D 268

Records of the Sixth and Seventh UN General Assemblies as well as various files concerning South Africa, Berlin, Korea, Kashmir, Burma, Cuba, Central America, and China, as maintained for the years 1945–1954 by the Office of United Nations Political Affairs. (1½ feet)

United States Mission at the United Nations, New York

USUN Files

Files of the United States Mission at the United Nations, 1950 to date.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Eisenhower Library, Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri

Truman Library, President's Secretary's File

Papers as President of the United States, President's Secretary's Files, 1945–1953.

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[illegible] Files: Lot [illegible]

Consolidated files of the Office of [illegible] Affairs [illegible] [illegible]

State-JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

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[illegible] Files: Lot [illegible]

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AFRICA

GENERAL POLICIES TOWARD AFRICA; REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES [1]

811.05170/2-2052

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld)

[WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1952.

Participants: Ford Foundation—Mr. Carl B. Spaeth
Mr. John Howard
Mr. Howard Tolley
AF —Mr. Bourgerie
Mr. Feld
Mr. Meier
DRN —Mr. Brown
NEA/P —Mr. Fisk
Mrs. Sloan

Messrs. Spaeth, Howard and Tolley of the Ford Foundation came to the Department on Wednesday, February 20, 1952, to discuss in general terms the Foundation's interest in extending its overseas activities to Africa.

Mr. Bourgerie began the discussion by pointing out that, due to political considerations and suspicion of American motives, it appeared unlikely that much could be done in Portuguese possessions, and perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent, in Belgian and French possessions, although in each case for slightly different reasons. Broadly the Portuguese have not favored our sending American government or private experts to Angola and Mozambique for fear of the effect of their presence on the native populations, and it was for this reason that the Portuguese were not particularly interested in technical assistance programs. The French have also been suspicious of Point 4, and although they have accepted a considerable amount of ECA assistance in their African territories, they have been extremely reluctant to give the United States credit publicly in these territories for this assistance. The political situation in French North Africa is such that American technical assistance programs are not particularly desired. The Belgians feel they do not need American technical assistance for the Congo and have already done more than almost any other government in Africa to provide vocational training, public health facilities, etc. in the Congo. They have, however, requested ECA aid and World Bank *loans*.

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[1] For previous documentation on these topics, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1199 ff. For additional documentation, see vol. III, pp. 1075 ff. Of particular relevance is the documentation on the U.S. attitude on the colonial question and on the underlying issues at the United Nations and diplomatic exchanges between the United States and other administering authorities regarding certain issues, including the status of dependent territories in Africa.

This leaves only the independent countries, namely, Libya (which has virtually no resources and needs every kind of help, public and private), Ethiopia, Liberia, the Internat'l. Zone of Tangier, where the French cannot interfere with outside efforts, and the British territories, particularly British West Africa (the Gold Coast and Nigeria) and, to a lesser extent, British Central Africa (the Rhodesias and Nyasaland), and East Africa (Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika). In Ethiopia, Liberia and Libya we have Point 4 programs but there are many opportunities for further assistance from private sources.

Mr. Bourgerie then specified certain general fields of activity which the Departmental officers concerned believed the Foundation should consider if it decided to extend assistance to the more promising and receptive African countries. Among these, Mr. Bourgerie mentioned vocational training, especially at the lower level, community programs for urban and rural populations, the great need for elementary and secondary schools throughout Africa, the need to support research institutions, especially in the British territories and Liberia, where research institutions exist but in most cases are completely inadequate in staff and funds to do the important work required.

In response to Mr. Bourgerie's suggestion Mr. Spaeth then proceeded to outline the type of activities in which the Ford Foundation has been engaged in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan) and gave some indications of the Foundation's general policies in these areas. He stated that the Foundation was supporting in India a wide scale program of agricultural extension at the village level, a woman's college in Pakistan, a community project for untouchables at Delhi, a project to train industrial workers in Pakistan, etc. The Foundation is also generally interested in community development work in South Asia, as well as in the Students' Exchange Program everywhere, especially in technical and vocational fields.

The Foundation is now on the point of sending a team to the Middle East to survey the countries in that area with the idea of undertaking projects similar to those in South Asia, but, looking ahead, it also wants to find out what it can do in Africa. It is convinced of the urgency of getting started in all these areas as soon as possible in view of the political and social tensions which recent events clearly indicate have been building up against the West, and which are spreading in Africa, having already erupted in French North Africa. Mr. Spaeth mentioned in this connection that whenever the Foundation's officials discussed programs in various parts of the world they were constantly asked, "What do you have in mind for Africa?"

Mr. Spaeth also indicated the relationship of the Foundation's activities to governmental programs, such as Point 4, MSA, etc. He stated that generally the Foundation does not normally wish to duplicate or to be too closely involved in the work already being undertaken by these programs in such areas as South Asia, the Near East and Africa; however, it judges individual projects on their merits. In certain instances in India the Foundation has provided assistance to projects in which the American and Indian Governments are also participating. Mr. Spaeth explained that although the Foundation normally does not provide funds for the purchase of capital equipment, the construction of buildings to house projects, etc., it *will* do so if necessary to assist in bringing worthwhile projects to fruition. He cited instances in India where the Foundation has in fact assisted by providing funds for capital expenditure.

In response to a question from Mr. Howard regarding the work of the Educational Exchange Program, Mrs. Sloan outlined in considerable detail the system now in effect with regard to West African students in the United States and indicated that these sudents are now being carefully selected to receive a certain type of education in the United States with certain definite job requirements in mind in their home territories after they have finished their studies abroad. The jobs are usually connected with the development schemes of the countries concerned, namely, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and, to a lesser extent, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Mrs. Sloan defended the procedure of bringing West African students to the United States for advanced technical training on the grounds that the countries from which these students come are desperate for specialists and that these specialists, once trained, will be able to assist greatly in the development of technicians at a somewhat lower level when they return to their home countries.

In the discussion that followed, the Departmental officers present described to the Foundation representatives the special needs and requirements of various African territories, it being generally agreed that the approach that the Foundation was taking in other areas, such as South Asia and the Near East, was a sound one for Africa as well. The Departmental officers indicated that developments in Africa were such that persons trained in vocational and in technical fields and in community development in its broader aspects could be fully utilized throughout Africa and would be in a position to make an important contribution to the development of their respective territories. However, it was pointed out that the contribution the Foundation could make in these particular fields would probably be limited in certain of the African territories because of sensitivities involving political and other considerations.

At the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that the Department would supply the Foundation with a statement which would outline in somewhat greater detail the types of activity and the countries of Africa in which the Foundation could make the most suitable contribution.[2]

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[2] A statement of the sort described here has not been found in Department of State files.

120.4345A/3–1452 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

SECRET CAPETOWN, March 14, 1952—4 p. m.

32. Part one.

I feel that three-day conf held Capetown eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth (Deptel 191, March 3[1]), with participation diplomatic and consular officers from Union, Salisbury and Lourenco Marques was highly constructive and threw much light on principal problems confronting this area. All participants contributed ably with candor and keen sense appreciation situation southern Africa.[2]

I opened conf stressing need for perfecting plan for maximum interchange info and coordination work. I referred to importance attached to mission here as stressed in Dept discussions preliminary to my departure last Sept and that our needs for funds, personnel and

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[1] Not printed; in it the Department approved the dates and agenda for the proposed consular conference at Capetown and suggested a few additional points for discussion at the conference. (120.4345A/2–1152)

[2] The conference was formally designated the Consular and Administrative Conference at Capetown, Union of South Africa, Mar. 11–13, 1952. The following officers participated in the conference:

Waldemar J. Gallman, Ambassador to the Union of South Africa
Col. John J. Davis, Military Attaché at the Embassy in the Union of South Africa (Pretoria)
Col. E. A. Bland, Jr., Air Attaché at the Embassy in the Union of South Africa (Pretoria)
Marselis C. Parsons, Jr., Supervisory Consul General, Johannesburg
Harold Sims, Consul General, Salisbury
Donald W. Lamm, Consul, Lourenco Marques
John F. Stone, Consul General, Capetown
Paul C. Seddicum, Consul, Durban
Harold D. Robison, Consul, Port Elizabeth
Joseph Sweeney, Attaché at the Embassy in the Union of South Africa (Capetown)
John A. Birch, Commercial Attaché at the Embassy in the Union of South Africa (Capetown)
Chester R. Chartrand, Public Affairs Officer, Pretoria
Bryan R. Frisbie, Minerals Officer, Johannesburg
David A. Robertson, First Secretary of Embassy, Pretoria

facilities cld only be appreciated in Wash on basis of our giving Dept full picture of conditions under which we are working.

All participating officers ably presented problems confronting Amer interests in their respective fields and outlined manner in which others cld assist.

Cols Davis and Bland portrayed scope and effects political intrusion into South Africa armed forces.

Parsons emphasized need for additional courier services, more frequent visits of officers between consular establishments, respects in which reporting from subordinate consulates cld support and strengthen reporting supervisory consulate general, effect of delayed assignment personnel on operating efficiency his office and steps taken for guidance to subordinate consulates. Sims covered underlying forces supporting opposing federation, complexity Rhodesian racial problems, need for assignment roving regional officer primarily concerned with native problem south of Sahara, need for econ officer commensurate with importance US attaches to Rhodesian strategic minerals and area receptivity to constructive USIE program.

Lamm stressed need for periodic visit mineral's officer Johannesburg, complexity Mozambique racial and transport problems.

Stone dealt with difficulties lack Amer secretary and funds for maintenance custody govt-owned properties, and need for more central location USIE library accessible Cape coloreds.

Seddicum pictured Indian conflict with natives and Europeans, Communism in Indian organizations and European-Indian opposition implementation group areas act in natal.

Robison dealt with port congestion and important Amer capital investment, particularly in motor industry, Port Elizabeth. Session on admin and consular questions approved centralization three protectorates in Johannesburg district, survey US leased facilities Capetown by Cairo security officer, and guard detail for Chancery security, in absence suitable quarters Pretoria and Capetown.

Sweeney penetratingly analyzed conflict between Afrikaner and Black African nationalism with impact on Africa south of Sahara and susceptibility resulting tensions to Commie intrusion. He elaborated need for collating info previously submitted on native problem from entire area south of Sahara through research project, assignment specially qualified roving officer on native problem within this area and policy planning staff guidance to meet potential eventualities, stressing lack contact with native and non-European leaders throughout area.

Birch analyzed major aspects South Africa industrialization and limitations posed by inadequacies of water, transport, skilled labor, capital, and emphasized Union's efforts achieve greater national self-sufficiency. He praised consular contributions to requirements and econ reports.

Chartrand reviewed scope, targets, effectiveness USIE exchange persons and info programs and needs for USIE program Durban mobile unit, suitable office Johannesburg and support for USIE program Salisbury.

Frisbie described utilization individual strategic materials in war effort and impact thereon if South Africa sources not available, and need for potential mineral survey Rhodesias and additional personnel and funds to cover extensive area assigned.

Full report fols by air.[3]

Part two.

Fol constitutes summary conf recommendations:

1. Assignment qualified officer with [apparent garble] experience cover native affairs with special attention devoted rising nationalism throughout area south Sahara. Such officer wld coordinate present loose coverage this all-important subj. He wld have roving assignment and headquarters shld be centrally located. Preparatory such assignment Dept undertake basic research study African nationalism this area as guide. Furthermore, that policy planning staff provide field guidance this subj.

2. More adequate funds, deputy and Amer clerk be provided enable mineral's officer discharge increased responsibilities in adjacent areas and Union in view growing importance strategic minerals these areas.

3. Assignment labor attaché and additional junior econ officers for Emb and Salisbury in view increased activity and importance to US of labor and econ fields.

4. Strengthening security Chancery premises Pretoria and Capetown, including assignment security guard detail. Security ConGen Capetown requires assignment Amer clerk.

5. Improvements to USIE physical facilities Johannesburg, Capetown and Durban and appointment librarian Capetown. Extension USIE facilities to Rhodesias.

6. Adequate courier service requires establishment courier based Johannesburg to service Union, Lourenco Marques and Salisbury plus increased service from Paris and Cairo to three trips monthly on which couriers wld proceed only to Johannesburg. Also provision for more frequent travel for Emb and Consular officers within area to supplement regular courier service.

7. Deterioration govt owned properties requires sending FBO rep to Union soonest for purposes survey and rehabilitation properties.

8. Authorizing central fiscal office Johannesburg make suballotments fiscal year basis of funds for operating expenses consular establishments.

9. Reapportionment consular districts to include all high commission territories under ConGen Johannesburg.

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[3] The full report of the Capetown conference was transmitted to the Department as despatch 90, Apr. 18, 1952, from Capetown. The report comprised 106 pages. (120.4345A/4–1852)

As Dept will see from full report of conf, some time wld be needed adequately to analyze and evaluate wealth of info made available and to formulate suggestions based on it. Because of nature of much that was brought out in this conf, I strongly favor holding another conf within six or seven months. Breadth of discussions accentuated need expanding scope future confs to representation from all offices south Sahara.

We all regretted no one from Dept able to attend and hope Dept will be represented next conf.

GALLMAN

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Miscellaneous"

The Consul General at Salisbury (Sims) to the Director, Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie)

CONFIDENTIAL SALISBURY, March 18, 1952.

OFFICIAL INFORMAL PERSONAL

DEAR AL: By now you have seen the telegram sent from Capetown embodying the highlights and recommendations of the Consular Conference.[1] I enclose herewith copy of my paper which I presented on the first day. Since there was not sufficient time to submit this paper to you for review prior to the Conference, I trust that what I said meets with your approval.

I am of the opinion that the Conference was highly successful, and, in so far as our operations here at Salisbury are concerned, it was very useful. All of the Officers in the Union having anything to do with Central Africa were unanimous in contending that the pressure of their own work in the Union precludes proper coverage of activities and developments in Central Africa. In other words, the Minerals Attaché, Economic and Agricultural Officers, say they cannot cover both the Union and Central Africa and do a proper job.

You will observe that the first recommendation of the Conference deals with the question of Native Affairs. It was agreed by all, with the exception of Don Lamm, that this question is the most important that faces us in this region. You will observe that I dealt with this in my paper, and unbeknownst to me the same thoughts had been occupying the attention of Ambassador Gallman, Joe Sweeney, and Dave Robertson. I do not know what the prospects are for assigning an officer to undertake this important work, but if the recommendation of the Conference is acted upon I would like to submit the following ideas for your consideration.

First, it occurs to me that there are two eminently qualified men for the job of covering Native developments (nationalism) in this region.

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[1] See footnote 3, *supra*.

They are Joe Sweeney who returns shortly to a desk job in the Department, and the other one is "Bill" Brown of DRN.[2] Either one would do a top-notch job. Under any circumstance the appointee must not be a "long-haired" guy with no knowledge of Africa. You will observe we recommend such an officer be centrally located. In this connection, I refer you to my observations on pages 7 and 8 of my paper,[3] which I believe are sufficiently self-explanatory.

I firmly believe that the appointment of such an officer would be one of the most important contributions the Department could make in our efforts to understand the race problems which presently beset this part of the world. If, at any time in the future our inquisitive Congressional Committees should look into our policies toward this race-torn continent, and review our efforts to be one step ahead of developments, I am certain they would applaud the appointment of a Native Affairs Officer.

Ambassador Gallman is anxious that the next Conference be a combined one, including the Union and West Central and East African posts. I presume he will make the necessary recommendations concerning this.

There was considerable informal discussion which emanated voluntarily from the key officers in the Union concerning the desirability of transferring South Africa to your shop and everyone seems to be agreed that it is the proper thing to do. The Ambassador told me he was going to study the matter and would then probably approach the Department informally on the subject. They all felt that they would get a better deal administratively and also receive more attention from the Political Office.

At your convenience, I would appreciate having your reaction to my paper and the Conference's recommendations.

With all good wishes,

As ever, HARRY

[Enclosure]

Statement by the Consul General at Salisbury (Sims) to the American Consular Conference, Capetown, March 11–13, 1952

CONFIDENTIAL [CAPETOWN, March 11, 1952.]

REVIEW OF PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AFRICA

MR. AMBASSADOR:[4]

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[2] Not further identified.

[3] The reference here is to the concluding paragraph of the enclosure to this letter.

[4] Waldemar J. Gallman, Ambassador to the Union of South Africa.

GENTLEMEN:

The importance of Central Africa, consisting of the self-governing country of Southern Rhodesia and the two British Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, lies in its centralized geographic position; its economic and political relationship with contiguous territories, South African, Belgian, Portuguese and British; its native problems; its role as an area of European settlement in which problems of development and race relations are crucial; and the significance of its strategic raw materials to the Free World.

Stated more specifically, but without attempting a comprehensive formulation, the following constitute the major problems for analyses in Central Africa.

Economic

Aside from routine reporting on economic affairs, it is essential to the welfare of the Free World that basic analyses of the economic potentialities of the region be undertaken, with emphasis on the fundamental factors in economic developments such as capital available, transportation facilities, the quality and character of technical and managerial personnel, volume and productivity of the labor force and government policy toward economic development. Careful studies of the prospects for farming—European and Native—mining and industry are required. We hope to initiate detailed studies of such projects as the Sabi-Lundi irrigation scheme and the possibilities inherent in the Kariba Gorge hydroelectric scheme. Economic relations with contiguous territories, the United Kingdom, the United States and other non-African countries should be carefully reviewed.

Significant of the development which has taken place in Southern Rhodesia in recent years, is the statement released by the World Bank when it granted a 28 million dollar loan to the country on February 28.[5] The Bank said: "Southern Rhodesia has grown at one of the most rapid rates of economic expansion to be found anywhere in the world."

With the limited staff which we have in Salisbury it is apparent that proper coverage of this fast growing area is not possible. We are fortunate, however, to have the assistance of Mr. Frisbie, who has been given the task of covering the basic mineral reporting for Central Africa. In view of the rapid expansion now taking place throughout Central Africa in the base mineral industry and the importance of these raw materials to our rearmament program, I would like to suggest that this Conference review the present arrangement for reporting on this subject to determine whether it is adequate for our purposes. Traditionally, officers in Pretoria and Johannesburg assigned to cover Central Africa have been forced, by the pressure of their own work in the Union, to give only summary treatment to the problems in Central Africa. This is no reflection on either the offices or officers in the Union, because there is certainly a limit as to how much work can be performed in the course of a working day, week or month. Therefore, I would like to suggest that the Conference review this matter and give consideration to ways and means by which greater coverage can be accorded the important developments now taking place in Central Africa's mineral industry.

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[5] **For documentation on economic developments in Southern Rhodesia and the whole of British Central and East Africa, see pp. 296 ff.**

Political

Apart from routine political reporting, we are following very closely the movement now under way to unite Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland into a "Central African Federation."[6] Many schemes and efforts have been put forward in recent years to bring about some form of economic and political unity in Central Africa but none of these have succeeded. However, current prospects for achieving federation, possibly this year, are good. There has been for some time a widespread belief among responsible white leaders that federation in Central Africa must be speeded up for the reasons that a more rational economic and political set-up would help to expand trade and development and reduce the sterling area's adverse balance of trade. It would also help to underpin the defense of the British Commonwealth against the confusion in the Middle East. Furthermore, there is a belief among the white elements in Central Africa that unless some form of closer association is achieved for the three territories, there is a chance that the two Rhodesias might eventually join the Union of South Africa in some form of political federation. At present the majority of the white population is flatly opposed to any political link-up with the Union, and is outspoken in its dislike of the apartheid policy of the Nationalist Government in the Union.

A conference will be held in London in April to formulate a constitutional document which will probably emerge as a draft constitution or a "definite scheme" for federation. Another conference will be held in July to produce a "final result."

If federation does materialize, there is a very strong possibility that the natives in Northern Rhodesia, principally on the copperbelt, and the natives in Nyasaland, will stage general strikes as measures of protest. If a strike develops on the copperbelt, it will definitely impair the production of copper, and could possibly lead to a serious breakdown in this vital industry. The leading Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are opposed to federation believing that a new federal government dominated by the white man would treat them no better than they are treated at present. In fact they are apprehensive that under a federal government they might lose some of the political gains which they have achieved in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Also they claim that since their territories are Protectorates, the proposed federation is merely a scheme to hand over control of the Protectorates to the white man.

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[6] For additional documentation on the interest of the United States in the emergent Central African Federation, see pp. 296 ff.

One feature of federation has interested us very much. This is a general puzzlement among the people as to how to really make federation work—in other words, how to reconcile the differences of the white and black. There is evidence of a genuine desire on the part of many responsible Rhodesians to establish a workable political alignment with the natives. In this struggle, these people, both white and black, are looking to the United States for examples as to how we achieved harmonious relations with our own Negro race. Britain has never had a racial problem hence she is not much help in the present situation. It is obvious, therefore, that we are in an excellent position to make some worthy contributions toward the establishment of a new democratic state in Central Africa. Present budgetary reductions prevent the establishment of a USIE office for Central Africa which is the proper medium for giving assistance in the field of race relations. I regard the abandonment of a USIE program in Central Africa as tragic, because if there is a land today where the responsible people desire to make a multi-racial society work with due recognition accorded the dignity of man regardless of color, it is Central Africa. The same cannot be said for the Union or East Africa.

Central Africa is today facing very fateful decisions. On the adoption of the correct racial policy to be embodied in federation may depend the fate of future generations not only in Central Africa but elsewhere in Africa south of the Sahara—perhaps the survival of the influence of the Western World in Africa. It is in this region, therefore, that the white man has a golden opportunity to really make his concept of a Free World work successfully.

I would like to suggest that this Conference give consideration to ways and means by which the USIE facilities in the Union can be more effectively applied to Central Africa until such time as a permanent USIE Office is established in Central Africa.

Native affairs

It is my personal belief that despite the tremendous significance of the federation movement in Central Africa, the issues and developments concerning the native peoples are by far the most important problems facing the Free World in this region. With no intention of being presumptuous, I would say that the foregoing applies in equal degree to South and East Africa. Viewing this important problem on a regional rather than a provincial basis, I would like to pose the question as to whether we are "on top" of what is happening or likely to happen to the people who constitute the majority populations throughout South, Central and East Africa? In the face of World communism, rising nationalism, and the dormant strength of a subjugated people who invariably rise to revolutionary heights, can we afford *not* to be abreast of native and colored developments throughout this vast region so vital to our own industry and well-being? I do not think so. I would venture to say that there is not one man in this room, including myself, who can name from memory the present and potential African leaders in South, Central and East Africa today. Admittedly, it is not absolutely necessary for us as individual officers to know what is happening beyond the borders of our own districts, but since African nationalism has the same goal throughout South, Central and East Africa, does it not make good sense for someone to observe this important activity on a wider scale and bring about coordination of the loose ends of our present individual coverage?

African nationalism in this region is a universal problem, and is not confined to any one locality; the reason for this is the people who constitute present and future nationalist groups are all Africans with one goal between them—greater freedom. Therefore, geographical boundaries will be of no consequence to any future concerted drive toward achieving nationalist goals. True, there are a host of diversities which characterize the Africans, but basically they are one race with one goal.

I would like to suggest, therefore, that this Conference give consideration to the assignment of an officer to cover native affairs in their entirety throughout South, Central and East Africa. This officer should be experienced in African affairs, and if possible, should have a good grounding in social science. His assignment should be a roving one, and he should be responsible for the complete coverage of native developments throughout South, Central and East Africa with special attention devoted to the rise of nationalism in all sections of this region. I would suggest further that such an officer be provided with a full time American stenographer, and that he make his headquarters in Salisbury because of its central location in relation to both South and East Africa. Moreover, I believe the liberal attitude of Central Africa contrasted with the anti-racial one in South Africa and East Africa would afford such an officer a better locality from which to project his objective study of the racial problems in this region. Also, from such a vantage point as Salisbury, where we have access to certain reliable Intelligence services, I believe such an officer would find a wider field of information on nationalist and racial problems throughout the region.

511.70/6–352

The Ambassador in Liberia (Dudley) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL MONROVIA, June 3, 1952.

No. 384

Reference: Department Airgram A–146, February 29, 1952 [2]

Subject: A Revised Information Program for Africa, West Africa In Particular

I. *Purpose of this despatch.*

The reporting officer, presently Assistant Public Affairs Officer for Liberia and Sierra Leone, was assigned by the Department in the reference airgram to two weeks of duty in Accra, Gold Coast, and Lagos, Nigeria. Together with Monrovia these posts make up all the present U.S. Information Service operations in West Africa. The officer departed Monrovia April 18 and returned May 9, 1952.

The Department stated the purpose of this trip was to study and make recommendations on USIS West Africa with special attention to 1) the nearly complete Voice of America outlet for Africa in Liberia 2) cooperative forging of closer links among the African posts. It was suggested by the Department that at least in the Radio and Press media, West Africa might serve as a base for African* regional production of broadcasts and printed material.

In this report the officer discusses changes in the present Information program in the light of whether they seem to officers in the field 1) advisable 2) possible. The field has not disagreed with any Department suggestion without giving full reasons in this report.

All officers felt that great improvements can be made, but that expansion alone will not be improvement unless it is in the right places and the right way. Some media are intrinsically local. Others for greater efficiency and consistency can at least begin to be regionalized.

This report is a condensation of a much larger body of information gathered by the reporting officer. For clarity and brevity, conclusions are stressed here. Arguments and evidence are not extensive, due to the paper shortage and other more important calls on the Department's time.

Therefore it is suggested that the Department ask all posts concerned for more details on any points not adequately covered. The officer's added information goes particularly into Gold Coast and Nigerian radio, but this can also be supplied by the two missions in those countries.

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[1] This despatch was prepared by George B. Pettingill, Assistant Public Affairs Officer at the Embassy in Liberia.

[2] Not printed.

*Africa in this despatch means that part south of the Sahara Desert in which skins are black or dark brown and the old pattern of life is tribal. North Africa is more linked to Europe and the Near East. [Footnote in the source text.]

II. *Radio.*

A. The Present. The Department has taken steps to increase VOA coverage of West Africa and perhaps all of Africa. A 10 kilowatt transmitter has been provided by VOA to the Liberian Government with the intention of relaying and locally producing VOA and USIS programs. This should be in operation before the end of calender 1952.

In addition, receivers have been sent to the three West African posts for distribution: Lagos 200; Accra 150; Monrovia 100. These battery-110v–220v sets can pick up both VOA and local programs.

VOA–USIS use of local radio is already great in Liberia with 15–20 hours a week of transcriptions and live programs over ELBC, the Liberian Government station (and the only one). Lagos has ½ hour and Accra 1 hour weekly, Lagos being live news and recording time, and Accra unidentified VOA transcriptions only, on the respective monopoly government stations.

Although Nigeria and the Gold Coast are each putting about $1 million capital expansion into their radio systems—both rediffusion or single station wired radio, and short wave—officers do not see immediate prospects of more U.S. radio time over these local stations.

Lagos feels local power rationing is the chief block to more USIS time in Nigeria. Accra places radio last among its five media in priority, because it feels other media reach the same people with less money and less government opposition.

B. Receiver Distribution. Accra has distributed about half its sets to legislators, community centers, and schools. Lagos proposed sending receivers to the national legislature, but the government has suggested secondary schools instead. Monrovia is working through the Education Department in an information-education-literacy by radio plan, into which VOA programs will be fitted. In this connection, Liberia has been persuaded to buy 100 added sets out of its own budget.

The officer heard both Moscow in English (Red Square parade) and VOA Tangier (Songs from the Prison Camps) on May Day over one of these small USIS Riviera receivers in Lagos. Reception was fair from both Tangier and Moscow, even without adding an aerial or ground. Liberian and Gold Coast reception are roughly parallel.

A stronger VOA signal would be welcomed and listened to. The present BBC and local programs from the Gold Coast and Nigeria are already loud and clear. But Nigerians and Gold Coasters will sometimes turn away from their local stations, and if they don't get a better VOA signal than now, USIS will be in the position of subsidizing Moscow listening. This danger is clear and present.

It is assumed that VOA into Africa through Liberia will materialize, but if not Communist converts could be won conceivably over

USIS sets. The officer feels firmly that this danger cannot be played down. Long term distribution of these sets without much stronger VOA–USIS broadcasting than now would be a serious mistake, in the officer's opinion. When strong VOA–USIS radio is a reality, receiver distribution will be a calculated risk in U.S. favor.

The community-type receivers promised the posts had not arrived at any of the three places by May 10. All the smaller sets had. Nearly half these Riviera portables had faults which required repair before they could be sent out. The Petratrix 110 volt battery is short in life, and often low in original potential. The Emce low-voltage battery is good. Many voltage selection and off-on switches have been bad. No aerial or ground wire or plugs were sent. General quality of the sets for wet tropics: fair. New supplies of batteries will be needed every 4–6 months.

C. VOA Relay and USIS Regional Radio. When the new VOA relay in Liberia goes on the air, Monrovia will need a radio officer and a Technician. Possibly all or part of the latter's pay may be paid by the Liberian Government, but he must be an American or a European with professional transmitter tuning, repair, and operating skill.

(The Radio Officer's job will be to supervise regional radio for West Africa (ultimately perhaps for Africa), mainly in the production of programs from Liberia. He will have to depend on a steady flow of Press Officers' items from the other posts, which they will be turning out for local use but mailing him. He will need guidances periodically from each PAO in the listening area. Copies of all these guidances should go to the Department.)

Stories from the Gold Coast for example could be sent Restricted if needed for covering guidances, provided this plan is approved by the Regional Security Officer in Cairo.

PAO's should remain, in consultation with their mission chiefs, top USIS–VOA field authorities. Regional media heads, in Radio as in other media, where they exist, should be steadily in consultation with the PAO's from whom they would take any needed field guidance. Regional Media Heads should not have overall authority or responsibility; they should advise but not control, lest they interfere between a post and the Department.

Africa finds some topics more appealing than others. All officers agreed that the following list of themes are some of the more appealing to Africa, and must be constantly used to reach an African audience and affect their actions through their attitudes. Although this list appears under Radio, it should also be a helpful key to African motivations for the use of Press, Motion Pictures, Information Center, and Exchange of Persons divisions as well.

Good Recurrent Themes

1. Good color relations.
2. News: U.S., world, and African. Especially West Africans in the U.S., and U.S. activities in West or all of Africa.
3. African history and culture, including art and music, and interest shown in them by Americans.
4. Sports. American Negro and other Negro figures especially. USIS was never able to explain why the Robinson–Turpin fight was not broadcast.
5. News, fast and feature, on U.S. aid (including through the UN) to strengthen the world's recently independent peoples. Those of color especially. Iran, India, Liberia.
6. Refutation of West African press distortions. Press errors cannot be corrected fast enough by mail. News is dead when answers arrive. Fast radio correction could be followed by a second punch: the scripts if transcribed by the post could go right to the local press within 24 or 36 hours of the original distorted story, and would be printed. Color line distortions, promoted by Communist stories in from N.Y. and Europe, above all need this fast radio service to balance the fast press turnout.
7. Jazz of all types. Afro-Cuban music of the Caribbean and the U.S. Cowboy music.
8. Interviews with people interested in Africa. Travelers, leading Negroes.
9. African record request programs, requests going to the Voice of America, Monrovia. Tangier does this very well.
10. Negro history and cultural research. This once neglected field is growing slowly. It would incidentally bring strong support to VOA–USIS from Negro newspapers and organizations in the U.S.

The question arises whether these programs should be done from New York or Monrovia. The answer lies in whichever could give closer attention to the production of the above types of tailored radio. The answer is probably a combination of both.

The Middle East beam, the officer feels, could provide daily news and other necessarily U.S.-based programs like the elections, UN, U.S. sports, or a talk by Negro Federal Judge William Hastie. Slow trend (rather than fast news) items could be airpouched as now and transmitted at any time as regular programs from Liberia. If reception of Tangier's relay is good, (or the U.S. beam is that to be used), the Radio Officer can gradually evolve a schedule for taking some programs right off the air to relay, including features.

Exact hours must await experiment, but Monrovia believes that two hours' USIS local production and two hours' VOA relay could be used daily to start. This would probably include the morning, afternoon, and evening news by relay. Accra and Lagos monitor it, for example if they wish, and this news might well fill the gap which they now experience in fast news by not monitoring the Wireless Bulletin. Details of relayed and local radio must be hammered out as time goes on.

D. A[illegible] Languages and Areas. The Department has asked if vernaculars should be used on the Radio. USIS in the field unanimously feels they should not, unless reasons arise which are more apparent than now. Apart from the great cost of multiple West African languages on the air, there is an almost total absence of persons who can read scripts in these vernacular tongues.

The audience to be reached by any one tongue is small, almost negligible. There are probably more than 100 West African tongues alone, and even the largest of these reach only a few percent of the relatively powerless tribal people. Most tribal people who do not use English have neither the interest nor the skill (to Africans radio tuning is a skill) to keep a set running or even try with regularity to tune in.

It is a safe axiom that if an African in Liberia or British Africa listens to a radio—in West African at least—he speaks English. Accra does not include illiterates and semi-literates in its target groups. While Lagos and Monrovia do to some extent, they feel vernacular radio in this area would have high cost and low priority.

The Nigerian and Gold Coast Governments are reaching some regional language groups to solidify national opinion at an annual budget cost of some $300,000 on top of $1 million each of capital radio investment. This education will tend to gradually increase interest in the U.S., but it is a rare case where vernacular peoples can yet see to their national borders. Against this organized and controlled opposition, officers feel vernacular radio would probably fall by the wayside.

The person with modern education in British Africa and Liberia has it in English. Liberia forbids vernacular teaching in school, and British schools teach it only in the lowest grades as a transition to English. Only straight English programs, perhaps later sprinkled with Arabic and French, can win the full support of the Liberian Government, over whose station all this radio will be going. Locally this is an emotional political issue. USIS thinks it can persuade some Liberian money into vernacular radio in connection with the Liberian radio literacy campaign, but this because the goal is literacy in English.

The reliable "West African Review" of April 1952 points out that though a quarter-million mostly illiterate people in the Accra area speak Ga, "These people will have to decide whether they want their literature to grow up in Ga, Akan, or English. If they do not decide and let things slide, English will win." He calls for an African language crusade, but there is division and English is the compromise. What is true of literature is true of community and national influence and politics. English is the language of power in West Africa.

This means USIS–VOA hit hardest at a selected audience. Italy's USIS recently threw its efforts toward converting a limited group, pro-Communist labor, in an election campaign, and the results were good. West African USIS, with limited resources, hits mainly those who have some education for this reason: Change is in the air and it is shifting power to African hands, specifically, educated hands. Many times illiterate tribal people try to form a coalition with colonial rulers as two groups of conservatives who want to stop change.

But change will continue—it is the guaranteed element in African life today. It is vital for USIS–VOA to try and guide these educated leaders who have a strong hold on political power, into democratic channels. In today's situation it is not essentially possible or useful to IIA aims to try and influence the great bulk of the people. They cannot be reached securely; and if they could they have not yet much of grip on their nations' destinies. The English-speaking, educated leaders have.

USIS can hope to influence these leaders, especially if it is given the green light to concentrate on them. The situation is somewhat parallel to 1789 in the U.S., except that African leaders today in West Africa have a stronger hold—this because African peoples have had less experience than the American States had in regional self-rule. British are putting a forced draft under local self-government measures to build the democratic base, but it is a rather latter day push, one which has not even generally started in Central and East Africa.

In 1789 Washington and Jefferson might have had an aristocracy—they even had at times mob encouragement of such a development. But they chose to give the country back to the people after they got it from Britain.

USIS today in West Africa, above all, has the job of influencing public opinion and political leaders to likewise create a democratic structure. Another way the U.K. is helping to do this today is in trying to nourish political opposition parties to keep criticism and orderly change in the national structures in West Africa.

Britain sees it must help be midwife to self-government, but wants it safely within the British Commonwealth—an aim to which the U.S. might well give its support. But in all this development, it is not in the cards today for the uneducated to play a part. Change is fast, time is short, and priorities must be set.

This has been both a general discussion of USIS thinking in West Africa, and a justification for opposing vernacular radio in this area. There is no parallel to East Africa's Swahili, except English.

[Here follow 8 of 16 typewritten pages comprising the source text, presented under the following headings: III. Press and Publications; IV. Motion Pictures; V. Information Centers; VI. Exchange of Persons; VII. Recommendations for All Media.]

VIII. *Winning Africa to the free world.*

This section represents the reporting officer's impressions of what USIS is really up against in Africa, and how he feels the impact of the Information program over that continent could easily be doubled without any increase in the foregoing technical machinery of the USIS–VOA set up. It seems to him particularly significant with the coming of radio to the program in growing strength.

There are two great threats to Africa, if you happen to ask Africans. The one the U.S. sees most clearly is Communism, which for the most part does not now have a strong hold on Africa.

The other threat, which to Africans is closer at hand because they are living with it, is colonialism, European style, and the more ruthless Russian style colonialism is still to them the more remote.

Under the present colonial system, there is generally no majority rule. A few white Europeans govern Africans whom they are likely to refer to as "natives" or "boys".

Native is defined by Webster's Collegiate Dictionary in part as "Specif., of the non-Caucasian people or peoples inhabiting a colony, dependency, or the like; as, to use native troops in India".

The lack of dignity or equality attached to these words is clear enough, so clear than the U.K. in some areas has made use of "native" taboo.

It is even more clear to Africans, who know too that white persons no longer can "use native troops" in India unless they have the voluntary loyalty and affection of those people.

The literate African studies the use of the term "free world" with equal interest, but if this means support of colonial rule in Africa he is against it.

U.S. cooperation with France and Europe is clearly essential, but the African asks if under the heading "European Foreign Policy" the U.S. must support the principle and full practice of colonial rule.

The situation is similar to the color line in the United States, where the U.S. Government cannot solve the whole thing right away but by taking a stand where it can (has) helped to speed the solution and win powerful American Negro good will without annoying the opposition too much. But much more is at stake in Africa.

Africans recall the Monroe Doctrine, and then a little closer to home for them, the "Monrovia Doctrine"—support without domination in Liberia. Here the U.S. ruling favored the Negro in Africa, and Point Four gives it latter-day continuity.

But what about African dependencies, colonies and protectorates. One Nigerian expressed the view that Nigeria needs protection only from the British—an unfair charge since British policy in West Africa is probably granting self-rule faster than any other place or time in history except where there was war. But it expresses the yearning which now are becoming American headlines for self-rule which is becoming vocal and gradually political all over Africa.

USIS has a hard time claiming the U.S. is even neutral (a status which U.S. foreign policy hardly advocates today in the struggle with

Russian imperialism) when a reported $3 million in gold has been going from white supremacy South Africa to the U.S. on recent Pan American planes through Nigeria, the Gold Coast, and Liberia—generally believed to be in payment for arms the U.S. agreed to sell this government. Africa knows that more arms can prolong white rule of Africa. Fortunately this story has apparently not hit the press to date, although the explanation of guards was given to the reporting officer at the Accra airport by several persons in the area.

If this kind of U.S. practice represents American policy toward the white-black balance in Africa, USIS is up against it trying to justify U.S. neutrality in Tunisia or Central Africa. Neutrality is taken by the African for either indifference or approval of the *status quo*, a status which is changing. Africa asks whether U.S. favors this change, and in this situation support of the *status quo* looks like endorsement of colonial rule. Africans see a new threat in the Central African Federation which looks like self-government "for whites only" to them. It is worth noting that none of the three countries, Northern and Southern Rhodesia or Nyasaland, has as much as one African in an Executive Council (cabinet), and Southern Rhodesians to vote must have £250 in a country where African annual income is about £10.

Does the U.S. favor rule "of" the majority "by" the majority in Africa as it does in Europe, the U.S., or Communist areas? One African told the reporting officer the only way to get a "strong policy" out of the U.S. was to provoke a crisis. These will probably be delivered with some violence and little good will in coming years, if more effort is not put into easing their birth. But if these things happen without U.S. support, they will end with ill will toward the U.S.

Aspirin can do a lot now because Africans today want to believe the U.S. is on their side. If cynicism sets in, penicillin later will be too late.

USIS is an arm of U.S. foreign policy. The reporting officer in this section is stating what seems to him the albatross around the neck of USIS.

USIS is what the U.S. says. But in the last analysis, it can only hold off public opinion so long if this is counter to what U.S. does in Africa. African eyes are getting keener to the fact that there sometimes is a difference.

They want to know whether a partially color-conscious U.S. favors black men or white men as ultimate masters of a black continent.

One writer on Africa recently expressed it this way:

"The African will join the 'free world' only if he, too, feels free."

The stand the U.S. takes on this issue can very well decide the success or failure of USIS in Africa—the main subject of this despatch.

If USIS should fail in the coming few years, it will mean Africa has turned its face away from the United States.

Perhaps toward the Communist orbit.

EDWARD R. DUDLEY

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Miscellaneous"

The Consul General at Salisbury (Sims) to the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld)

CONFIDENTIAL SALISBURY, June 16, 1952.
OFFICIAL INFORMAL PERSONAL

DEAR NICK: Thank you for your letter of May 5,[1] which contained a very interesting analysis of the Capetown conference recommendation concerning a Native Affairs Officer for this part of the world.

I agree wholeheartedly with you that Bill Brown is the premier choice for this type of work but I am unable to go along with the proposal that Bill undertake the mission for one year only. African Nationalism is not going to lie down and die after the expiration of one year. On the contrary there is every indication that it will grow and grow. Consequently, while Bill would make some great contributions to understanding this problem it would be a shame to discontinue the work after only one year. In all frankness I am somewhat surprised to learn that the Department is not willing to accord greater consideration to the Conference's recommendation on this matter. After all, it is not the proposal of one officer but the consensus of all officers (with the possible exception of Don Lamm) South of the Zambesia that this is a paramount need in this area.

While I agree with your analysis of the situation as existing in the Union, I am inclined to believe that any study of Native developments must include the Union as it is there that the spark of blind Nationalism may ignite spreading to the Rhodesias and other neighboring territories. While it is true that *Apartheid* is unworkable, it is also true that our people in the Union have very little contact with the Native leaders and are completely dependent on white sources for their information as to what is really happening among the Native elements. Even the USIS group work only with the white elements which I always thought were already on the Free World side. Insofar as I can learn USIS is making no headway in reaching the Natives who are over-ripe for communism.

Our stake in this part of Africa is surely sufficiently important to warrant the small expenditure necessary to support one full time position in an endeavor to learn what goes on inside the Native mind.

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[1] Not found in Department of State files, but see Sims' letter of Mar. 18 to Bourgerie, p. 7.

Let me say that we shall be happy with any arrangement you make to meet this problem but I urge you to give full consideration to providing some arrangement which will be a continuing one rather than a temporary one.

All the best,

As ever,
HARRY

120.4345A/4-1852: Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 4, 1952.

A–3. Ur despatch 90, April 18, 1952.[2] The Department appreciates receiving the report of the Consular and Administrative Conference.

With regard to the conference recommendations, the Embassy realizes that the Department has already replied to most of them. The following comments however, are provided in the order listed in the Embassy's despatch:

1. The Department does not believe it feasible to assign an officer to work on native affairs throughout African areas south of the Sahara. Among the factors leading to this decision are (1) the differences in the problems in the countries involved; (2) the size of the area would not permit effective coverage by one man in that visits to each country necessarily would be infrequent and brief, making it difficult to establish and maintain essential contacts and confidences; (3) the impracticability of accrediting any one officer to the several governments concerned; and (4) the suspicion with which such an assignment would be regarded by those governments. It is believed preferable to continue to rely on the established posts and missions and for the posts in the area to augment their local information through interchange of reports and discussions at consular conferences.

2. The Department's position on Mineral Attaché Frisbie and his responsibilities is contained in OM of May 22, 1952,[3] subject; Administration: Mineral Attaché Frisbie.

3. Consideration will be given to the Embassy's request for a Labor Attaché when the American complement for FY 1953 is established.

4. (*a*) Reply to the Embassy's request for a security guard detail was made in OM dated February 5, 1952.[3]

(*b*) The additional position at Capetown was authorized by Department's A–75 of March 18, 1952.[3]

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[1] This airgram was drafted in the Bureau of European Affairs and was cleared by the Diplomatic and Courier Branch, the Division of Foreign Building Operations, and the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.

[2] Not printed. It comprised the complete report of the Consular and Administrative Conference at Capetown, Mar. 11–13, 1952; for a summary report, see telegram 32, Mar. 14, 1952, from Capetown, p. 4.

[3] Not printed.

5. The prospects for improving USIS establishments in South Africa are very remote. The appropriation for Fiscal Year 1953 is not expected to be large enough to permit expansion of existing facilities.

6. With reference to the recommendation for increased courier service throughout the Union, it is believed the suggestions and recommendations made by Mr. Jack Grover and the implementation thereof will satisfactorily meet your needs.

7. FBO contemplates sending Mr. Roland P. Amateis to make an inspection of the Government-owned properties in the Union of South Africa as soon as his services are no longer required for the construction work now underway at Monrovia.

8. The recommendation that the Central Fiscal Office in the Consulate General at Johannesburg be authorized to make such allotments on a fiscal year basis cannot be approved. Centralized fiscal offices operating throughout the world have proved to be more economical and efficient.

It is believed that the objectives of the recommendation may be achieved through use of the provisions of Paragraphs 3.61 and 3.62, Finance Circular 5. Under 3.61, the central post is expected to advise each constituent post of the types of recurring expenditures and special items for which payment will be made by the central post. This should cover practically all charges under object classes 01, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08 and 09, except for petty local purchases. As for 02, travel orders for within country travel may be issued by the Embassy (in consultation with Johannesburg as to funds available for the purpose) and sent to the consulates, thus informing each principal officer periodically of travel expenses he may incur. Under 3.62, the central post should advise constituent posts periodically of the amount made available to each for petty local expenditures. Through these measures each post will be informed, in effect, of the total funds available to meet the expenses of that post.

The Department deduces that a major reason for the feeling reflected in the recommendation is in reality traceable to the tightness of funds this fiscal year. When funds are short, total flexibility in their administration is impracticable making it difficult to set aside funds for the use of subordinate posts without reference to the central controlling post. In other words, the smaller the total resources, the less practicable it becomes to subdivide the funds among users, resulting in several instead of a single reserve for contingencies. It is believed that it will be possible to make field allotments in FY 1953 earlier than was the case in 1952; this should permit sounder financial planning and permit telling each post within a country what its own fund prospects are earlier in the year.

9. The Consulate General at Johannesburg was given jurisdiction over the territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland in Department's A–109 of April 8, 1952.[4]

BRUCE

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[4] Not printed.

870.00/8–2152

Memorandum of Conversation, by John W. McBride of the Office of African Affairs

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1952.

Subject: African Economic Development

Participants:[1] Eximbank—Mr. Johnson
MSA—Mr. Anderson
Mr. Moran
Mr. Gordon
SRE—Mr. Bayne
DMS—Mr. Gordon
Mr. Ohly
Mr. Hendricks
Mr. Newman
AF—Mr. Cyr
Mr. McBride

Mr. Bayne led off the discussion with a detailed exposition of the need for the creation of an agency in the Federal Government to handle the problems of the Dependent Overseas Territories. He indicated that Africa is the focal point of this problem and stressed its importance both from the standpoint of strategic reserves and as a military bastion. He stated that it has been conceded that most of the areas adjacent to the Iron Curtain would be untenable in the event of a war, that North Africa might be lost, *according to our military authorities*, and that Africa south of the Sahara would possibly constitute one of the reserve areas for the Western Powers. Mr. Link Gordon observed parenthetically that our military authorities would hardly make such an estimate re North Africa now, if even they may have in the past.

Mr. Bayne indicated that Africa needs at least 2,000 miles of railroad, 10,000 miles of highway and many millions of dollars in improved port facilities to comply with the minimum supply needs. He stated that African needs could be summarized under three headings: (1) substantial technical assistance for developing a middle class of technically skilled workers who could support the industrial and commercial facilities required for African development; (2) working capital, particularly for public improvements such as railroads, highways, water supply and harbor facilities, etc.; and (3) private enterprise capital to build up small industrial and commercial enterprise throughout the area.

Mr. Bayne stated that our primary motivation would be keeping Africa within the orbit of the Free World. He was critical of the indeterminate policy which the United States had taken with respect to Africa in the past. The Foreign Economic Administration had a staff of more than one hundred technicians in Africa studying various phases of the economic problems. This staff was disbanded after the war and a limited number of experts have been recruited under the Marshall Plan to carry out the overseas development program. As in the past, it appears that this accumulated experience may be lost if some definite action is not taken to recognize the importance of African development.

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[1] It has not been possible definitely to identify the participants in this meeting from outside the Department of State, except William E. Moran, Jr., of MSA and John H. Ohly of DMS.

Mr. Bayne urged that we give recognition to the needs of African development by creating an institution or agency which would give continuity to our efforts to develop the area. He suggested that the African needs could absorb at least one billion dollars over a 4-year period which he felt would be the minimum requirement for an acceptable program. He felt that neither the World Bank nor the Eximbank were adequate to meet the African needs. He felt that our efforts in recent years were so directed as to make the United States vulnerable to the charge that we were interested only in what we could get out of Africa in the way of strategic materials. He stated that the urgency of economic assistance varies from colony to colony. He felt that American aid was most needed in British territories where the British colonial policy has resulted in the creation of a small educated "leader" class with no provision for a middle class of semi-skilled workers. This he contrasted with the Belgian system which has provided a substantial number of technically trained workers in the Congo but with no natives having college education.

Mr. Bayne was somewhat critical of the British investment policy, mentioning the Owens Falls project as providing excess power for which no market would be available. He also criticized the slowness with which the British were moving forward on the Volta River project which they have been studying since 1939.[2] He stated that during the past several years the ECA has contributed approximately one hundred million dollars to African development with no means of checking on the actual progress that has been made achieving the proposed goals.

While Mr. Bayne recommended an African development fund of approximately one billion dollars to be used primarily for loans to the various areas, he pointed out that it would be practically impossible to make such loans in terms of dollar repayments. It would, of necessity, be set up as a revolving fund in the soft-currency area with no immediate prospect of repayment other than interest in dollars. He had no specific suggestions regarding the agency to handle this fund but seemed to feel that it did not fit very well into the TCA picture.

In the subsequent discussion, an effort was made to clarify just what objectives would be set up for the proposed new agency. It was pointed out that the limitations on current financing for Africa were a result of the legislation accompanying the appropriations and would not necessarily reflect the wishes of the various agencies involved. It was suggested that Mr. Bayne draw up a proposal which might be submitted for budgetary consideration not later than September 15.[3]

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[2] For additional documentation on developments in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, including the projects under reference here, pp. 261 ff.

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[3] A proposal of the sort referred to here has not been found in Department of State files.

Editorial Note

United States and United Kingdom representatives, headed by John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, and Sir Gladwyn Jebb, United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations, held an informal conversation in Washington on September 25, 1952 regarding general colonial policy. While the talks were focused on the colonial question in the United Nations context, some attention was paid to various aspects of specific African matters including the Gold Coast and Kenya. For the minutes of the conversation pertaining to the Central African Federation, see page 310. For the full text of the minutes, see volume III, page 1258.

700.5 MSP/12-352

Memorandum of Conversation, by David E. Longanecker of the Office of African Affairs

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1952.

Subject: Survey of British Government Development Programs for the DOT's with a View to Determining the Need for U.S. Government Financial Assistance.

Participants:[1] MSA—Mr. William E. Moran, Jr.
AF —Mr. Longanecker
Mr. Feld
Mr. McBride
DRN—Mr. Brown
Mr. Gordon
Mr. Desdier
BNA—Mr. Lewis
ED —Mr. Smith

The meeting was held to discuss the subject about which Mr. Moran had sent Mr. Utter a memorandum under date of November 25.[2]

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[1] Officers from the Division of Research for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (DRN) were William O. Brown, Robert L. Gordon, and Desdier (who cannot be further identified); James H. Lewis represented BNA; Douglas B. Smith represented Investment and Economic Development Staff (ED).

[2] Moran's memorandum to Utter under reference here has not been found.

Mr. Moran was asked to open the meeting with a statement summarizing his views with respect to the scope and objectives of the proposed study. He stated that as the ECA, now MSA, program for the DOT's has progressed it has become increasingly desirable and necessary to examine the economies of recipient areas with regard to their relation to the metropole economy with a view to more clearly demonstrating the need for and determining the most effective application of U.S. Government assistance. Definition of the current role of the DOT's in achieving the objectives of the Mutual Security Program is important and requires a study of the financial and economic relations between them and the metropoles. It is even more important, however, to endeavor to project the future role the DOT's can be reasonably expected to play as reservoirs of economic and political strength for the Mother Countries and the Western World, and the long range plans of the Mother Countries for achieving a well-balanced development of the human and economic resources essential to achieving this objective. Under the impact of World events in recent years, the DOT's have grown tremendously in importance not only as reservoirs of critically needed raw materials for the Western World's defense program but also as peripheral bastions of military operations. Africa is referred to as the last great natural resources "Frontier", and the DOT's embrace most of the continent. Furthermore, as economic recovery has taken place in the Mother Countries and approaches full employment of their human and economic resources without achieving either a favorable trade balance or the financial ability to meet their defense as well as ordinary budget needs, the Metropoles must look more and more to the DOT's to help achieve national solvency. By developing in their DOT's the production or exportable products the Metropoles can both save and earn needed foreign exchange, the first by importing more and more of their own needs from the DOT's and the second by exporting such products to other countries.

Up to the present time, we have been concerned mainly with accelerating the production of basic materials and foodstuffs needed by the Western World. Unfortunately, this concentration on developing the output of export items has used up generally the marginal elasticity of the basic sectors of the relatively underdeveloped DOT economies. More attention must now be given to planning and carrying out a balanced development. Agricultural productivity, particularly of foodstuffs for local consumption, must be improved in order to overcome the chronic shortage of native labor which can be diverted to mining and other non-agricultural productive enterprises. More attention must also be paid to the other basic facilities essential to economic growth, including power, highways, railways, river transportation, ports, etc. The basic Government services must be given equal attention, especially those relating to health, education and housing which are essential to improving the productivity and well-being of the people and the political as well as economic progress and stability of the DOT's.

Under the stimulus of their need for the economic contributions of the DOT's and realization of the political ferment going on in them, the metropolitan governments have been giving greater and greater attention to long range and well-rounded development programs for the overseas territories. In general, they have been handicapped in carrying them out through lack of resources in both money and technically qualified manpower. U.S. assistance in the DOT's must be meshed into the long range development plans of the metropolitan governments in the amounts and of the nature required to enable the governments to fully implement them to the extent that these are programs which the U.S. can support. Such assistance is conceived as a composite of loan aid, grant aid, and technical assistance, with major emphasis on the first and third types. Prior to 1952, MSA assistance to the DOT's was confined primarily to (1) grant aid funds allocated to the metropoles, some of which were re-allocated (mainly by France) to the African DOT's; (2) the use of counterpart funds; (3) loan funds for developing the output of strategic materials and for general economic development; and (4) a small amount of technical assistance. Beginning with 1952, the strategic materials activities were taken over by the DMPA. MSA has, however, not been able to set up a fund to support general economic development but has a small fund to be used to develop increased production of basic materials in short supply in countries receiving U.S. assistance. The public services are taken care of by the ordinary budgets established by the governments involved. Development in the economic sectors, however, must be taken care of in the long range plans with which the MSA is concerned.

Tentative consideration was given some months ago to requesting the establishment of a fund of $1 billion to finance basic materials development in the underdeveloped areas over a four year period. A second tentative proposal involved in the neighborhood of $110 million for world wide Basic Materials development as a loan fund for fiscal year 1954. This would be supplemented by a $75 million dollar fund for general economic development in the DOT's; this fund would be used partially for loans and partially for grants. These proposals are in the MSP budget for FY 1954. In considering these proposals, exceptions were taken to the fact that while it was characterized as a loan fund qualifications were made to the effect that it may be illogical to expect repayment in dollars, that it might be possible to obtain permission to accept repayment in local currencies, and finally, even in this case, that the repayments probably ought to be used as a revolving fund. Some agencies felt that calling this a loan program would be misleading. Furthermore, the illustrative projects presented in support of establishment of such a fund were said by some agencies to be of a bankable character which could be taken care of by existing institutions such as the Export-Import Bank and the IBRD.

MSA has clarified the repayment feature and has explained the relation of these proposed programs to the operations of the Banks. In collaboration with the appropriate governments, the MSA would prepare and/or consider projects for assistance from the proposed fund. These projects would be screened first with the Ex-Im Bank and the IBRD to determine which, if any, of these agencies would consider financing. The MSA would then consider the remaining projects for financing from the proposed MSA fund. In preparing to carry out such a program in the DOT's the MSA considers that it should have a survey of the financial and economic relations between the metropoles and the DOT's, and of the long range development programs of the metropoles. The first survey is to be made of the U.K. and its DOT's, dividing the latter into British East Africa, British West Africa and British Central Africa (and if possible Malaya and the Carribean territories) in order to deal with the subject on a regional basis. The study would deal primarily with an examination of the ordinary budgets, as well as the funds proposed for the long range development programs in relation to the needs of the DOT's, the balance of trade with the Mother Country and with the World, the current and potential production of not only strategic materials but also foodstuffs and other commodities essential not only to meet the expanding local requirements but also to contributing items important in the export to the U.K. and other western nations, and finally to an analysis of the long range development programs in relation to a sound pattern of social and economic development in the DOT's with a view to determining whether the programs are adequate, and the types and amounts of assistance, if any, needed from the U.S. and other external sources.

After some discussion it developed that Mr. Brown's office in DRN has been doing some work with MSA on various aspects of this subject and has fairly complete files of available information. It was felt that in view of this circumstance, Mr. Brown and his staff are in the best position to assume primary responsibility for undertaking the proposed study. In view of the time element involved, Mr. Moran having stated that it would be necessary to have such a paper by the middle of January, Mr. Brown expressed the opinion that it would be possible to have only a rough draft prepared by that time. It was agreed that both Mr. Longanecker and Mr. McBride would be glad to cooperate with Mr. Brown's staff and assist in the preparation of the study.[3]

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[3] No further documentation has been found on the study discussed here.

870.411/1-1953

The Consul General at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Department of State[1]

RESTRICTED LEOPOLDVILLE, January 19, 1953.

No. 118

Subject: The Central African Congress, a New International Organization of White Colonists

I. *Summary*

Representatives of organized Belgian, British, French and Portuguese colonists of Central Africa recently assembled in Bukavu, Belgian Congo, to consider certain problems common to the various colonies in this part of the world. Some of the problems to be considered were: the vast numerical disproportion between the white and black populations (400 thousand against 45 million), the potential danger to racial peace posed by Communist propaganda, the UN's "dangerous meddling" in colonial affairs, and the alleged indifference and misunderstanding on the part of some metropolitan countries toward their colonists in Africa.

Most of the delegates read previously prepared monographs on one or another aspect of colonial problems, none of which provoked much discussion. After a debate which disclosed a certain measure of disagreement among the several national delegations, the Congress passed five moderately worded resolutions recommending, *inter alia*, an increase in white immigration, timely and measured promotion of the natives' progress, loyal cooperation between blacks and whites, non-interference by backward countries of the UN in colonial matters. Most importantly, the assembly created a permanent international organization of colonists called the "Central African Congress" which is to work for unity of action among white settlers in this region.

It is manifest that many British and Belgian colonists want to make the new organization a "White International", capable of influencing the colonial policies of the metropolitan countries, and eventually serving as the base for a political federation of the various territories in this region. It is likely that the Congress will be influenced in this direction by the Capricorn Africa Society, an enthusiastic member group. However, it seems improbable that the French and Portuguese colonists, whose participation is lukewarm and perfunctory, will support any movement tending to weaken the control of their metropolitan governments.

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[1] This despatch was drafted by Vice Consul Joseph P. Nagoski.

II. *Congress organized on Belgian colonists' initiative*

FEDACOL, the federation of associations of Belgian Congo colonists initiated the Congress. It invited the representatives of organized colonists in Central Africa to meet at Bukavu on January 4 at a "Congress for the Development of Civilization in Africa". The assembly was to be held in connection with the lavish "Festival of Kivu", a provincial fair advertising the commercial and touristic opportunities of the Eastern Congo.

To discover FEDACOL's motives, it is worthwhile to consider the state of mind of the Belgian Colonists. Generally the 7,000* permanent white settlers of the Congo are a dissatisfied and frustrated group, despite their large share in the fruits of the current economic boom. They are unhappy over the political and social aspects of Belgian colonial policy. In particular, they deplore the rigid limitation on white immigration into the colony, the absence of any trace of self-government for the white colonists, and the Government's policy of simultaneously "coddling" the natives (institution of family allowances at employer's expense) and pushing them ahead too fast ("artificial" and "premature" creation of labor unions). More than anything else, they—permanently rooted in Africa—abhor the very suggestion of eventual Belgian withdrawal and native assumption of control.

The colonists are frustrated over their impotence to change and, in most cases, even to influence colonial policy. As a political force or even as a pressure group, they are negligible. None of the three large organized forces in the Congo—Government, "Big Business", the Church—do they consider as their ally.

In recent months, several events have upset them further. In October, Colonial Minister Dequae, then visiting the Congo, replied to certain demands of a colonists' delegation in a manner which he later described as "frank and cutting", but which the angered colonists termed "rude and arrogant". In the same month, Honorary Vice Governor Marzorati, a member of the *Conseil Colonial*, publicly reprimanded them for wanting to place their own interests above those of the native population and Belgium's international responsibilities. Shortly afterward, Monsignor Bigirumwami, the first native Catholic bishop, returned from a visit to Belgium and Rome and spoke to the press of the necessity for consolidating further the Catholic position among the natives; he wanted an increase in the number of native priests before a "critical period" of an unspecified nature which he estimates will occur in about ten years, as well as an accelerated development of civilized social institutions among the natives. The most recent blow to the colonists was the failure of their "favorite son", Emil Dehoux, to get appointed to the *Conseil Colonial*. With the appointment of Louis De Wilde to the vacant seat, pro-colonist newspapers here charge that the interests of the colonists are still unrepresented on the *Conseil Colonial*.

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*The figure refers to heads of households. [Footnote in the source text.]

It was inevitable that sooner or later the white colonists in the Congo would start looking for allies among their own kind in neighboring colonies.† This was FEDACOL's main purpose in convoking the "Congress for the Development of Civilization in Africa".

III. *Delegates to the Congress*

An officer of the Consulate General who attended the Congress as an observer was unable to obtain a complete list of the fifty-odd delegates present. Among the more prominent persons from Belgium were: Former Colonial Minister Godding; Senators Van Remoortel, De Bruyne, Buisseret; M. Dubois, the representative of FEDACOL at Brussels; Emil Dehoux, the colonists' favorite spokesman in Belgium. The Capricorn Africa Society Delegation was headed by Mr. N. H. Wilson and Col. David Stirling. They appeared to be working closely with Sir Archibald James and Mr. Stokes, delegates from the "Rhodesia Party". Kenya sent, among others, Mr. Lipscomb and Mr. Megson, both of the European Agricultural Settlement Board of Nairobi, and Lord Portsmouth. M. Garcin, President of the Chamber of Commerce at Pointe Noire, headed the small delegation from French Equatorial Africa. Senhor Antonio Carreira, of the Portuguese Guinea Chamber of Commerce, was the sole Portuguese attending. From the Congo, M. Maleingrau, President of FEDACOL, as well as the leaders of the subsidiary organizations composing FEDACOL were active participants.

IV. *Opening session. Keynote speech*

Although FEDACOL represents a discontented group, it was plain from the beginning that the general tone and atmosphere of the Congress were meant to be moderate and restrained. The Congress was placed under the chairmanship of M. Godding, a man admired as much in the Congo as in Belgium. He was assisted by two of the Belgian

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† Reportedly, some of them are looking even further afield. A few days ago, Mr. I. E. A. De Villiers, Colonial Africa Desk Officer of the Foreign Office at Pretoria, temporarily on duty at Leopoldville, told the writer: "You'd be surprised to see the amount of fan mail from Belgian Colonists that crosses my desk in Pretoria. They all say that only South Africa has the right slant on race relations in Africa. They say that some day their country is going to pull out of Africa, leaving them high and dry among 16 million natives and, when that day comes, they hope South Africa will step in and save them."

In a conversation with Mr. de Villiers and the wartime Belgian Minister of Colonies, M. De Vleeschawer, the principal officer was surprised to hear the latter endorse the policies of the South African government. For decades, Belgians have been vaguely apprehensive over the possibility of a new northward trek, and *apartheid* is still almost a dirty word in the Congo. [Footnote in the source text.]

Senators. Representatives of the Catholic Church, which does not see eye to eye with the colonists on native policy, were invited to assist at the Congress; one priest did participate slightly in the meetings.

The Governor General, the Apostolic Delegate, and many other prominent colonial personalities attended the inaugural session to hear M. Godding deliver the keynote speech. It was noncontroversial from the Belgian colonial point of view. M. Godding declared that the primary concern of the colonists must be for the permanent presence of western civilization in Africa, a presence indispensable to blacks and whites alike. The natives must be absorbed into this higher civilization, but it is dangerous to try to rush the process. Western civilization took two thousand years to evolve; one cannot implant it into savage masses in a couple of generations, for "the human mind cannot be improved as rapidly as an airplane engine". The obstacles to a peaceful cooperation between whites and blacks do not come from within Africa, said M. Godding; they stem from external sources: Communist propaganda, half-baked theoreticians and ideologists, and the United Nations. He sharply criticized the "hypocrisy" of some of the more ardent of the anti-colonialist nations in the UN. M. Godding concluded that the European Colonists of Central Africa, who share common interests and problems, should unite to try to find a solution to their difficulties.

V. *The Themes of the Congress*

The sessions until the fourth and last day of the Congress were devoted mainly to the reading of papers and monographs prepared beforehand by the various delegates. The studies, many of them scholarly and well-reasoned, were concerned with one or another aspect of the racial problem in Africa and the outlook for the performance of European presence in Central Africa. The following are summaries of the dominant themes which appeared time and time again throughout the Congress:

A. Central Africa's Role in the World Crisis

Central Africa is a land of unlimited promise. Although its immense resources have scarcely been tapped, it could, with proper policies, experience a rapid and profound progress, comparable to that of the United States.

Central Africa can be an emigration outlet to relieve the social pressures in the overpopulated countries of Europe. Its economy would be complementary to that of Western Europe. In close association with Western Europe, it could form a powerful new bloc in world affairs, capable of tipping the balance against Communism.

B. Massive White Immigration Indispensable

Central Africa, now largely a demographic vacuum, can be conserved for the free world only by a massive influx of European settlers. Most of the immigrants should be agriculturists but there is need for colonists engaging in all forms of human activity. The children of these immigrants will consider themselves Africans. The natives' climb toward civilization will be assisted and accelerated by the presence of a large mass of whites.

C. Necessity for Greater Measure of Self-Government

The political disfranchisment of the white populations of the Central African colonies is incompatible with democracy. Too often the government policies and public opinion of the metropolitan countries show a lack of understanding of colonial problems. The colonists themselves are best equipped to run the affairs of the territories.

D. UN "Meddling and hypocrisy" Condemned

One of the chief dangers to peace and cooperation in Central Africa is the UN's constant interference in colonial matters. This interference stems mostly from the Arab, Asiatic and Latin American countries which themselves have backward populations and underdeveloped economies. The UN representatives of the European colonial powers must stand firm against such attacks; the metropolitan governments should retain freedom of action with regard to participation in the UN.

(*Comment:* At no time during the Congress did Communist propaganda receive more than a brief, almost casual mention. It appears that the leaders of the white settlers regard the UN as a subversive danger more immediate than Communism. (See despatch 88 dated December 13, 1952.) [2]

E. Need for Greater Understanding and Unity among White Colonists of Central Africa

Colonists in this part of the world share many common interests, problems, and aims. It is imperative that they unite for common action. The trend in Western Europe is toward unity; this trend should have its counterpart in the African colonies. Only a union of some kind can bring about the transformed Central Africa (item *A*, above) which the world so urgently needs.

Perhaps because of the limited time available there was scant discussion of any of the papers.

VI. *Debate on resolutions*

The main work of the Congress was the formulation of resolutions. Despite all the talk about community of interest it proved surprisingly difficult to agree on the phraseology of the resolutions. The debate on a set of proposed resolutions, submitted by a special committee, revealed some interesting points of difference among the various national delegations.

The delegation from FEA strongly protested against a proposal to recommend a "massive white immigration" into Central Africa. The French held that there is little scope in FEA for agriculturists and that their colony neither needs nor wants a large white proletariat "which might become disappointed and start forming Communist organizations". At the insistence of the French, the first resolution calls for an "important" instead of a "massive" increase in European immigration.

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[2] Not printed.

The Rhodesian delegation, supported by the French, vetoed a proposal to recommend a greater measure of self-government for the colonies.

The Rhodesians explained (and here the spokesman asked the newsmen present not to transcribe his remarks) that, while they are ardent advocates of colonial autonomy, they are obliged to soft-pedal this angle at the present time in order not to prejudice public opinion in Britain and in the colonies against the proposed federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. After the federation is a *fait accompli*, said the Rhodesians, they will be in a better position to demand a "considerable measure of self-government".

Bitter feelings flared among the Belgians over a proposed "congratulations" to the UN delegations of the colonial powers on their firm stand against the attacks of the anti-colonialist nations. The Ruanda-Urundi delegation protested vociferously against any phraseology that might be construed as a felicitation to Belgium's Pierre Ryckmans. They considered his rebuttals in the UN councils to be "too little and too late" and charged that he is plotting to sacrifice Ruanda-Urundi to the anti-colonialists in order to save the Congo for Belgium. In the course of their denunciations of M. Ryckmans the word "traitor" was used. At this point, M. Godding lost his temper and threatened to walk out of the Congress if the word was not retracted; M. Ryckmans, he said, is his good friend and was a great and patriotic Governor General of the Congo. The word was withdrawn but the Ruanda-Urundians remained in a sullen mood. To appease them, the specific congratulations were changed to a general expression of approval for the "resistance now being opposed in UNO" to the attempts of the anti-colonialists. However, the Ruanda-Urundi delegation abstained from the vote approving this resolution.

VII. *The resolutions*

There follows the official English language text of the amended resolutions passed at the conclusion of the Congress:

"The first Congress for the Development of Civilization in Africa, which met at Bukavu from the 4th to 7th of January 1953 and which included delegates coming from French Equatorial Africa, Portuguese Guinea, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, concludes its labours with the following resolutions:

> "1—It proclaims the supremacy of the ideals of Western Civilization and affirms that an important increase in European immigration representing all spheres of human activities is indispensable to the development of Central Africa.
>
> "2—It declares itself hostile to all discrimination amongst men which may be based on race and stresses the necessity of promot-

> ing, without neglecting the time factor, first of all the cultural, economic and social, and then the political progress of indigenous Africans in proportion to and to the full extent of their capacities.
>
> "3—It declares itself convinced that under these conditions a sincere collaboration between the inhabitants of Africa, black and white, is not only possible but indispensable for the moral and material progress of Africa and to the development of its immense latent resources of which the world has the greatest need.
>
> "4—The Conference takes a firm stand against the pretension of states, many of whom are themselves underdeveloped, to interfere—notably for example, at UNO—in the administration of African territories carried on by powers whose traditions of humanity, liberty and long-standing and constantly progressing civilization are the best guarantees of the fidelity with which they carry out their mission and trustees.
>
> "It applauds the resistance now opposed in UNO to the unjustified and repeated attempts made to overstep the bounds of the San Francisco Charter.
>
> "5—The Congress considers it highly desirable that the wide measure of common principles, sentiments and interests existing amongst all the countries of Central Africa will lead them to a closer association and to common and concerted action.
>
> "It has decided to create under the title of 'Central African Congress' a permanent organization, to meet in general once a year, composed of delegates from the countries named in the preamble and any other country declaring itself an adherent to the above principles and to nominate a committee to prepare for this organization a draft constitution to be submitted with any other opportune proposals at the next general meeting in 1954."

VIII. *The future of the Central African Congress*

The principal achievement of the "Congress for the Development of Civilization in Africa" was the resolution of its own permanence; henceforth, as the "Central African Congress", it will meet annually. As far as is known, the constitution-drafting committee mentioned in the final resolution has not yet been formed. Presumably, this will be done before the general meeting next year.

Now in its embryo stage, the Congress is little more than a kind of study group for the consideration of political and racial problems in Central Africa. But it is clear that many of its organizers want to make it into a real political movement. During the sessions there were repeated references to the "momentous importance" of the gathering. Various speakers pointed out that many of the decisive political movements in history had similarly modest beginnings, and several Belgian delegates assured M. Godding that he would be known in history as the first chairman of the Central African Congress.

A good guarantee that the Congress will take on a political complexion is the interest and enthusiasm brought to the project by the African Capricorn Society. Mr. Wilson and Colonel Stirling told the writer that they were overjoyed at the opportunity to gain a permanent audience among Belgian Colonists. That the Society envisages the inclusion of the Belgian Congo in its plan for a federated Central Africa is now known (despatch No. 110 dated December 12, 1952 from the American Consulate General at Salisbury). Although the Belgians appeared only mildly interested in the details of the Capricorn plan, it is possible that the Society will play a dominant role in the new Congress since nobody else appears to have any counterproposals to the Capricorn Declarations.

Finally, it appeared that the French and Portuguese colonists will not go along in any political movement of this nature.

The sole Portuguese delegate, who came all the way from Portuguese Guinea, appeared only at the inaugural session where he read an innocuous paper extolling the beauties of the Congo. He subsequently sent word that he was too sick to participate further in the work of the Congress. Appearances may have been deceptive; he may really have been interested in the Congress; he may really have been sick. But the possibility cannot be excluded that, after a look around, he became nervous that the Congress might become a colonial separatist movement or that it might be so regarded by the Salazar Government. Also conspicuous by their absence were any representatives of Angolese and Mozambique colonists. Almost certainly they were invited but, perhaps unlike their compatriots in Guinea, they are well aware of the state of mind of the neighboring Belgian colonists.

French reserves about the direction of the Congress were apparent all through the sessions. Notably, the FEA representation was the only national delegation which made no criticism of its metropolitan country. On the contrary, the FEA delegates repeatedly extolled the "wise and benificent" French rule in Central Africa, voiced their great pride over France's position in the UN, and asserted the integrity of the French Union (FEA officials and businessmen have a discernibly RPF tinge). As mentioned previously, they disagree, at least as far as FEA is concerned, with the British and Belgian position that a massive immigration of whites is desirable.

It appears that the French think that the Congress should be primarily a kind of colonists' united front against UN "encroachments". If and when it becomes a political movement with colonial separatist tendencies, the FEA members will probably drop by the wayside.

Patrick Mallon

AF files, lot 58 D 549, "Memoranda 1953"

Memorandum Prepared by the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld)[1]

[WASHINGTON, March 12, 1953.]

VIEWS OF MR. C. L. SULZBERGER OF THE *NEW YORK TIMES* REGARDING "DEMOCRACY" AND "CHRISTIANITY" IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

In his letter of February 24, 1953 to the Secretary Mr. Sulzberger raises a question concerning the logical soundness of the policy of assuming "that democracy, more or less as we know it, is the best *initial* form of government for the various African peoples as they gain their freedom". He then asserts that "their long—if unwritten—traditional history has no experience of this" and also that "the traditions of practically all the native peoples south of he Sahara desert have always been founded upon a system based upon the authority of a local chief (sometimes hereditary and sometimes elected) and a council of elders; in other words, a type of semi-authoritarian government . . ."

This is a subject which has engaged the attention of many authorities on African affairs, and it might be well to refer to their views in this regard since the whole subject is highly debatable. For instance, in his recent work "Native Administration in the British African Territories (4 volumes, HM Stationery Office, London, 1951) Lord Hailey, the distinguished British authority, took a contrary view to that advanced by Mr. Sulzberger when he stated, *inter alia:*

"African sentiment attaches special importance to the due observance of the procedure by which all members of the community concerned are able to have some voice in determining issues which are of major interest to it. It is rare to find in British Colonial Africa any instance in which the indigenous form of rule previously in force could be described in a strict sense as authoritarian. It was a prevailing characteristic of the indigenous system of rule that whether power was vested in the hands of individual Chiefs or of a ruling class, these had

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[1] The source text is included as an annex to the following memorandum from Assistant Secretary Byroade to Secretary Dulles, dated Mar. 11, 1953 and drafted by Feld:

"NEA is very glad to have Mr. Sulzberger's views on 'democracy' and 'Christianity' in Africa south of the Sahara, as set forth in his letter to the Secretary, dated February 24, 1953. It is also the feeling of NEA that the series of articles which he wrote for the *New York Times* during the course of his recent two-months' trip to Africa were generally excellent and of the greatest value in acquainting the American public with the problems and future prospects of this increasingly important area of the world.

"There is attached an annex which discusses Mr. Sulzberger's points in greater detail."

A copy of Sulzberger's letter has not been found in Department of State files. For an account of his travels in Africa, see C. L. Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries [1934–1954]* (Toronto, The Macmillan Company, 1969), pp. 807 ff.

(unlike the absolutist regimes of a certain stage in European history) no machinery by the use of which they could enforce obedience to their orders. They may in many cases have been able to rely on the support of religious sanctions, but in the last resort the real sanction lay in their ability to secure the acquiescence of their traditional advisers and ultimately of the community itself." (p. 2, Part IV)

With regard to replacement of traditional African institutions of government by more modern forms, Lord Hailey has this to say:

"All observers are agreed that modifications in the form of indigenous political institutions, if they do not offend any deep seated sentiment based on the past history or the religion of the community, are readily accepted for practical purposes, even though they may not secure the same instinctive respect as custom with a long history behind it. Innovation is therefore always feasible so long as it can command general assent. Though native Africa is by instinct conservative, its respect is shown far more in its respect for the customary law regulating matrimonial relations or the holding of land than in the value it attaches to the preservation of institutions of a political or administrative character." (*ibid.*, p. 10)

Although students of African affairs may differ wth this interpretation in certain respects, it is probably the general consensus that the question raised by Mr. Sulzberger may be somewhat more apparent than real. In any case, the British and French, who govern the bulk of the population of Africa south of the Sahara, in their respective and different ways, have adopted the policy of building up a system of government beginning at the local level, in order to prepare the mass of the people for eventual full participation in government at all levels. It would appear that this decision is based on their experience after thorough consideration of alternative systems of government for dependent peoples in an evolving status.

With regard to the question of the confusion caused in the African mind by the differences and contradictions within Christianity which are exhibited in doctrinal conflicts and varying attitudes towards racial questions, it is generally recognized that this is one of the most disturbing aspects of the western impact on Africa. It was, in a sense, the theme of the Conference on African Affairs held in June 1952 at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, under the auspices of the Africa Committee of the Division of Foreign Missions, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. Almost all Christian organizations working in Africa are acutely aware of these contradictions which are so intimately bound up with doctrinal differences in the West itself. Progress in this field seems very slow and it would probably be somewhat optimistic to expect drastic changes in outlook in Africa until there is more unanimity in the Western Countries.

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Memoranda 1953"

Memorandum by Douglas B. Smith of the Investment and Economic Development Staff to the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1953.

Subject: Status of Eximbank Loan in Africa South of the Sahara

The status of loans as of April 30, 1953, were [*was*] as follows:

Regular Eximbank Loans: $4 million loan to Liberia Mining Company for iron ore production authorized 4/27/49. The entire amount has been disbursed. Principal repaid $600,000. Interest paid thus far $418,205.

$5 million loan to the Republic of Liberia for highway construction authorized 1/11/51. Amount disbursed $400,000. Nothing has been repaid on the principal but $3,049 in interest has been collected. $1,350,000 to the Republic of Liberia for water supply and sewerage system authorized 6/14/51. Amount disbursed $817,000. No repayment of principal thus far although $11,356 has been repaid in interest to the bank.[1]

$17 million loan to Republic of Portugal for the construction of the Pafuri railway link[2] authorized 8/28/52. As yet no funds have been disbursed. $867,000 loan to the Republic of Portugal for port handling facilities at Lobito authorized 8/28/52. As yet no funds have been disbursed under this loan.

$300,000 loan to Charles B. McDaniel for port facilities at Cabinda[3] authorized 3/6/42. $65,000 of this loan has been disbursed while $235,000 was cancelled. $33,495 of the principal has been repaid leaving $31,505 outstanding. Interest collected thus far is $12,704.

DMPA Certified Loans: $7,500,000 loan to the Kilembe Mines Ltd. for the production of copper and cobalt authorized 8/21/52. As yet no loan agreement has been signed and it appears likely that this credit will be cancelled. $21 million loan to the Baluba Mines Ltd. for the production of copper and cobalt authorized 9/18/52. This credit was cancelled 4/24/53 at the request of the mining company. $22,400,000 loan to Northern Rhodesia Power Ltd. for the expansion of facilities authorized 1/8/53. As yet no funds have been disbursed.

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[1] For documentation regarding the conclusion of the loans cited in this paragraph, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1274 ff.

[2] In Portuguese East Africa–Mozambique.

[3] In Portuguese West Africa–Angola.

Editorial Note

John E. Utter, Director of the Office of African Affairs, carried out a trip to more than 20 Foreign Service posts in Africa and 4 metropolitan capitals in Europe during the period May 21 to August 1,

1953. Utter's intent was to consult with principal officers, members of their staffs, and key government officials regarding the general situation in each area visited. No comprehensive record or report of the Utter trip has been found. A few documents on the arrangements for the trip and summary accounts of visits in Addis Ababa, Benghazi, and Casablanca are included in file 110.22 AF. A few additional papers on the arrangements for the trip also are included in AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Correspondence 1953".

745G.00/5-2253

The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State

SECRET ACCRA, May 22, 1953.

No. 151

Reference: Department's Airgram A-46, May 5, 1953 [1]

Subject: Conference of West African Nationalists

I discussed the question of the proposed "conference of West African Nationalists" with Reginald H. Saloway, Minister of Defense and External Affairs on May 20. He was most cooperative in supplying information about the conference, much of it classified, which is thus far available to the Ministry. The following is a summary of the information obtained.

The idea of such a conference is not new. One was to take place in December 1951. However, it either did not materialize or fizzled out at an early stage. It is correct that Nkrumah has called for another conference, which was supposed to take place in August 1953. The date has now been put forward to October.[2]

Mr. Saloway showed me a list of some twenty "delegates" from the British and French possessions in West Africa and Liberia. He said two were outright communists (one from Senegal and one from French Guinea) but was not especially informed about the others, except that they were generally of leftist or strong nationalist persuasion. The conference is being encouraged by Fenner Brockway and the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialist Oppression. There has been some talk to the effect that the conference set for October will be followed by a larger "Pan-African" conference, but it appears doubtful that the latter will progress beyond the talking stage. Lack of funds alone would probably prevent it's taking place.

According to Saloway the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism is composed not of real communists, but, for the most part of vague leftists or "fellow-travellers." He added that real communists would regard the leaders of the Convention Peoples Party as "bourgeois nationalists" despite their tendency to propaganda utterances incorporating some of the stock communist jargon. In any event, Nkrumah does not take the proposed conference very seriously, but evidently considers it a useful way to build up his stature as a great leader in the eyes of African nationalists. Other C.P.P. officials, likewise, have but a slight interest in the matter. Their viewpoint is too parochial to sustain any genuine enthusiasm for wider concepts like West Africa or Pan-Africa.

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[1] Not printed; it requested information about a proposed conference of African nationalists. (745F.00/5-553)

[2] The conference was again postponed until early December 1953; for accounts of the conference, see telegram 48, Dec. 8, 1953, from Accra, p. 68 and despatch 107, Dec. 9, 1953, from Accra, p. 69.

The Colonial Office seems quite concerned about the conference, however, evidently considering it a misuse by Nkrumah of his official position as Prime Minister. Also, such activities on Nkrumah's part tend to complicate relationships with the French, whose well-known sensitivity on colonial matters is thus a factor in the situation. The Colonial Office has addressed a number of inquiries to Accra to obtain details about the subject, having expressed in a secret communication to the Governor an obligation to keep the French fully informed of developments.

Saloway considers that it would be a mistake to show too much concern over the affair which he does not consider of any great importance. Should Nkrumah see that he had the British worried over the conference, it would perhaps assume increased significance in his mind through the possibilities, for instance, of its nuisance value. Accordingly, Mr. Saloway has merely pointed out in a mild way that such activities in the field of political agitation are inappropriate to one holding his position and would in any event interfere with the attention which he should devote to the forthcoming question of further constitutional changes in the Gold Coast. Nkrumah has already postponed the conference until October, and it is hoped that he may forget it entirely. In conclusion, Mr. Saloway pointed out that should Nkrumah insist on having the conference, the British would take no steps to prevent it. He offered to inform me of any future developments.

A complete list of delegates scheduled to attend the conference is not available at the present time. From a glance at the list I would say that it includes most of the leading political figures in West Africa today. It would, however, mean bringing together at one conference a group of individuals who for many years have been struggling against each other for supremacy in their respective areas. Some of the delegates mentioned include Gabriel d'Arboussier, Abdoulaye Diallo, I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson, Dr. Bankole Bright, Dr. Obafemi Awolowo, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, and the Gold Coast's Dr. J. B. Danquah. An interesting point here is that both d'Arboussier and Diallo, thanks to Nkrumah and his cabinet members, were placed on the Gold Coast's Prohibited Immigrants List in 1952. Another problem will be getting people like Azikiwe to take a back seat at the conference as, of course, Nkrumah will insist on being the top man. There are quite a number in this list of delegates who will undoubtedly balk at such a suggestion.

WILLIAM E. COLE, JR.

Editorial Note

A consular conference of officers from the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia was held at Pretoria and Johannesburg on May 26, 27, and 28, 1953. G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, was present for the conference, which was largely given over to a review of current problems of mutual interest, particularly in the light of expected reductions in staff and operating expenses. A two-page summary report on the conference was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 470, June 9, 1953, from Johannesburg. (120.4345A/6-953)

For an account of the previous consular conference in Africa, see telegram 32, March 14, 1952, from Capetown, page 4. No other consular or diplomatic conference of American officers serving in Africa appears to have taken place in Africa during the 1952–1954 period.

770.00/6-1753

International President, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (Randolph) to President Eisenhower [1]

CHICAGO, June 17, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Because as supreme commander of Allied forces in the last world war, you were charged with the monumental responsibility of executing Operation Overlord, the invasion of the Fortress of Europe under the Wehrmacht of Adolf Hitler, across the English Channel; and your responsibility as President of the United States, which history has chosen as the leader of the democratic forces of the world in this hour of crisis, eminently equip you to grasp the magnitude and immediacy of the danger of Africa, blazing with the fires of nationalism to world peace and democracy, I wish, respectfully, upon the eve of your departure to the Bermuda Conference, to enlist your friendly offices to raise the question of Africa, its present status and future, to the leaders of the great colonial powers of the world, Great Britain and France.

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[1] This letter was referred to the Department of State by Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, on July 9, 1953.

On July 28, 1953, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jernegan addressed the following reply (drafted by Feld and Hadsel) to Randolph:

"After it became clear that the Bermuda Conference would not be held as originally planned the White House referred your letter to the President, dated June 17, 1953, to the Department of State.

"The recent talks which the Secretary of State held with the Acting British Foreign Minister, Lord Salisbury, and the French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, did not deal with problems raised in your letter. The Department of State, nevertheless, appreciates the opportunity to receive an expression of your views, and I have circulated your letter to those Departmental officials who are concerned with African affairs in general and in particular with the problems alluded to in your letter." (770.00/6-1753)

The Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, originally scheduled for July 1953, was postponed until December 1953. The American, British, and French Foreign Ministers held meetings in Washington, July 10–14, 1953. Africa was not discussed at either of these conferences. For documentation on both conferences, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff. and 1582 ff., respectively.

On account of the accelerated march of the forces of a color war across the African continent which, if unchecked, may engulf the African and Asian countries, rivaling, if not dwarfing, perhaps, at least, in portent of hatred and devastation, even atomic warfare between Communist Russia and her satellites with the United States and the United Nations, and since it appears quite evident that the raging tempest of Africanism will never subside while the peoples of Africa are plagued with the abominations of colonialism, I want to urge and request that you, the only world leader whose voice against the cruelties and crimes of colonialism will be heard and respected, warn and demand as a part of the price of continued aid by the United States, that the colonial metropolitan government take cognizance of the fact that:

1. That African reserves are not only inadequate in area but comprise the least desirable land in every African community which is invariably beset by the menace of the tsetse fly, be reevaluated with a view of African natives being given access to the more profitable, arable lands that have been unjustly appropriated through force and deception by European white settlers.

2. That British military forces immediately cease dropping bombs upon the peoples of the Kikuyu tribe of Kenya, East Africa, the uprising of whom, through the secret order known as Mau Mau, against the exploitation and insults of British settlers; for while the methods of murder are deplorable, they are an inevitable expression of desperation, cradled and created in the bowels of ruthless colonialism. Certainly, the leaders of African natives must be prevailed upon to see that violence and bloodshed cannot constitute a solution of their social, economic and political problems. By the same token, British and South African white leaders must be made to see that violent and bloody suppression of African natives will not wipe out bitter resentment against misrule of white rulers.

3. That the starvation wage system which gives rise to malnutrition, disease and pauperism, be discontinued and African labor be granted the right of self-organization and collective bargaining; and that African workers be given equal pay for equal work with white European labor.

4. That the color bar, an affront to the dignity of the human personality of Africans and a travesty upon the faith of free men, in hotels, residential areas, labor unions, jobs and government, be abolished.

5. That African natives, Indians and colored people be given the right to vote and be voted for, and that the British system of "indirect rule", a form of political flattery of African chiefs, giving them a false sense of possession of power, since it is but the shadow and not the substance of power, be reexamined, from the point of view of the final control of African political and governmental affairs being in the hands of Africans.

6. That the hated and hateful segregated school system, providing separate schools for African natives, Indians, colored and Europeans, with the least part of the funds created through head and hut taxes of the natives and income of other inhabitants and industries, going for the schools of Africans, the largest single group in every African area, with the lion's share of taxes provided for the white European children who represent but a small fraction of the population of school age in Africa.

7. That the "Color Pass", an institution which is a mark of servitude which tends to insult and enrage Africans, the possession of which by African natives, may be determined and demanded by any white person at any time, anywhere; the lack of which may mean jail, be completely discontinued.

8. That the whole Central African Federation scheme, composed of Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, be postponed and referred to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations for study and appraisal, since it is bitterly and practically universally opposed by African chiefs of these territories.

9. That the banishment of Seretse Khama, African prince, from his tribe and people, Bamangwato of Bechuanaland, merely because of his marriage to a white English girl, be rescinded on the grounds that it is an intolerable denial of a basic human and democratic right of the Bamangwato people to exercise the privilege to choose their paramount chief; besides, it involves the future of the protectorate of Bechuanaland, adjacent as it is to the racist territory of the South African Union, and is an unwholesome species of autocratic paternalism. While the exiling of the African prince, Khama, by the British government, from his tribe, involves the fate of one man, in the light of the African crisis, he should be considered as a symbol of race equality and liberty, and his exclusion from his own country and from the fulfillment of his responsibilities to his own people is a challenge to our democratic faith and our moral principles, both Christian and humanitarian.

10. That the pledged word of Great Britain to grant independence to Nigeria in 1956 be kept and that the apparent policy of pakistanization of Nigeria, sometimes called the India of West Africa, because of incidental internal conflicts of recent occurrence in Kano between Moslems of the North with Christians and pagans of the South, be not used as rationalization for the alleged incapacity for self-rule by Africans, and, hence, good grounds for delaying independence of Nigeria.

11. That Fascist Malanism in South Africa, which brutalizes and humiliates African Bantus, Cape Coloreds and Indians, be made the subject of investigation by the United Nations because of its menace to world peace and democracy.

May I urge that you be not deceived by the cry of Communism as a cause of the violent unrest and uprising, revolt and revolution of the black man against the white man in Kenya and South Africa. While it is undoubtedly true that agents of the Kremlin may be swarming over Africa plying their destructive trade and tactics of infiltration and subversion, with a view to capitalizing upon the flagrant grievances of Africans without, of course, the slightest interest in actually helping Africans, the hard fact is, we are now witnessing in Kenya and South Africa an awakening, aroused and enraged, oppressed mass of black men bent, not only upon reaching for bread but also freedom, justice and equality, and a disturbed, desperate and frightened group of white oppressors, at war; a condition which is certain to worsen unless some authentic voice of power and goodwill is raised in the interest of humanity, democracy and peace, which can give hope to the Africans for protection of their life, land, labor and liberty from the avarice, arrogance and attacks of armed bands of white settlers backed by the British government, police and military forces.

I have written you at length because the outrages perpetrated upon African natives, especially in South Africa and Kenya, as well as in Southern and Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Uganda and practically every area of African life, constitutes one of the most inhumane chapters in ancient and modern history and represents a throwback to the dark ages of social, intellectual and [illegible]ous obscurantism.

May I say that Africans are on the [illegible] self-determination, freedom and justice which no force on earth can stop, and they must be made to see and feel, by deed, that Russian Communists are not the only champions of revolutions for nationalism and revolt against landlordism, poverty, disease, illiteracy and tyranny, but that the leaders of the Western democracies and, especially, the United States, a power which possesses no colonies and seeks none, stand definitely against colonialism and all its evil works, and for a moral order of dignity and decency for all mankind, regardless of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry.

This philosophy of freedom, fraternalism and friendship alone can prevent the teeming millions of black men whose backs are burdened by the weight of centuries of oppression from being lured into the orbit of world Communism and keep them in the family of free men.

Very truly yours,

A. PHILIP RANDOLPH

870.00/7-1653

The Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Tibbetts) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, July 16, 1953.

No. 325

Subject: Lisbon Meeting of the CCTA in June 1953

There are summarized below the informal comments of an officer of the Colonial Office about the meeting of the CCTA (Commission on Technical Cooperation for Africa) in Lisbon in June 1953. This officer said that this meeting was more constructive than usual, although undramatic, and the British were pleased with its outcome. The next meeting is scheduled to be held in London in January 1954.

1. *The Constitution:* Agreement was reached on the document giving formal status to the CCTA, and it is to be signed next January in London by representatives of governments. No changes of substance were made, and the final agreement confirms the existing situation. The major advantage in having a final and formal constitution will be to put the Secretary General of the CCTA in a stronger position to deal with the various specialized agencies of the UN.

2. *The CCTA and the CSA:* Slight progress was made in the problem of bringing the CCTA and the CSA (Council on Scientific Cooperation in Africa) more closely together. Some CCTA members insist on integration of the two, but, since the CSA is shortly to move from Nairobi to the Belgian Congo, the difficulties of integration are obvious. It was agreed that the two secretariats would exchange information and work together closely.

It was also decided to cut the CSA Budget by about £2000. The CSA has not accomplished as much to date as hoped and in the opinion of the member governments needs tightening up from the administrative point of view. The budget cut will not affect its substantive work but may induce more caution in the Secretary General.

3. *The Labor Bureau:* The African Labor Bureau was thoroughly discussed also; it too has been disappointing. It was decided to give it more money and to assist it in the securing of better personnel. If the necessary talent can be recruited, it is hoped that a study of labor techniques and productivity in certain sections of Africa can be launched. It was emphasized that an organization so limited in resources must work on small scale and can accomplish more in basic research than in trying to make sweeping studies of continent-wide problems.

4. *The International Research Bureau:* Discussion also took place about setting up a Research Bureau to which non-CCTA members such as the Carnegie Foundation could contribute. The hope is that, if an international research (scientific) bureau is created, the charitable and wealthy foundations will find this a convenient way to contribute to worthy causes. Governments, of course, can also contribute. Privately the British think it is unlikely that "much game will be caught by this bait" since in their experience private organizations

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[1] This despatch was approved by the First Secretary of the Embassy in London, Benjamin M. Hulley.

prefer to be sole or major sponsors in order to get the lion's share of the credit. The British have in mind as the first project the preparation of a climatology atlas.

5. *Administrative Arrangements:* The schedule of meetings for the next two years was discussed with tentative arrangements about expenses, host countries, etc. The meetings are all on technical subjects such as soils, nutrition, and statistics. There was also some discussion as to the possibility of a meeting on Transport the year after next.

There was no discussion of political problems. The British are pleased that they have managed to keep the CCTA confined to technical matters.

MARGARET JOY TIBBETTS

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Memoranda 1953"

Memorandum Prepared by the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld) [1]

[WASHINGTON, August 17, 1953.]

It is necessary, in the budget justification for FY 1955, to say a great deal more about the situation in Africa south of the Sahara than has been said in past years. This is in order to correct the past tendency to understate the problems and needs of this vast, populous, strategic-material producing area, whose requirements are being made increasingly clear by the course of events.

The outbreak of Mau Mau terrorism in Kenya,[2] which after a year of strenuous "Emergency" military measures is by no means under control, has created a dangerous situation in the increasingly important strategic area of British East Africa (population 20,000,000). This area is a highly important British military "flanking" position on the Middle East lifeline and provides the headquarters for the recently reconstituted East Africa Command stretching 2,000 miles from the South African to the Ethiopian border. This Command is being built up to compensate for the expected loss of the precarious Suez base area. The legacy of racial hatred generated by the Mau Mau movement will probably take years to alleviate, but the Free World cannot afford to lose this area.

Throughout the entire area of Africa south of the Sahara there is a very marked increase in racial and political tensions, reflected in some degree of political and economic instability. The opportunity afforded Communism to exploit these tensions to the disadvantage of the Free World makes it very important for the United States to give much more attention to the problems of this area. It should also be emphasized that this same area supplies a long list of strategic materials, such as uranium, cobalt, industrial diamonds, chrome, asbestos, copper, lead, manganese, to mention only a few, to the Free World. Any further deterioration in race relations and in the prospects for long range political stability in this enormous and diverse area would be very adverse to the interests of the United States.

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[1] There are no indications on the source text, a carbon copy, how this memorandum was used or what other Department officers may have read it.

[2] For additional documentation on Mau Mau terrorism, see pp. 346 ff.

It is obvious that the rapidity with which developments are taking place in the British West African territories of the Gold Coast and Nigeria (population 5,000,000 and 30,000,000 respectively), which are entering on the final stages of constitutional reform leading to complete self-government either within or outside the British Commonwealth, makes it important for the Office of African Affairs to pay much more attention to these two countries in particular and to West Africa in general. The recent elevation of the Consulate at Accra to a Consulate General, and the selection of a high ranking Consul General to this post, and the probability that the Consulate General will be elevated to a diplomatic mission in the relatively near future is a case in point.

Even more than has been the case in the post-war years, the increasing complexities of U.S.-Liberian political and economic relations require that more time and fuller consideration be given to them by AF and NEA officers, often at the highest levels. For example, AF and to some extent the highest levels in NEA are closely involved in attempting to work out solutions to the problems besetting the U.S. Point Four and economic loan program, in Liberia, as well as in assuring the best possible operation of the Port of Monrovia, and future financing for Roberts Field.[3]

The establishment on August 1, 1953, of the British Central Federation of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (population 6 million) which will enjoy almost complete autonomy and by the end of this decade is expected to attain full Dominion status in the Commonwealth, underlines the increasing political and economic importance of this area to Africa and the Free World. In recognition of this, the Department has already approved the assignment of a high ranking Consul General to the temporary Federal capital at Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, and this officer is in process of selection. Due to the greater degree of autonomy now enjoyed by the Central African Federation, the Department is also considering elevating the status of its office at Salisbury from a Consulate General to a Diplomatic Agency.[4]

The present staff complement in the section of the Office of African Affairs which handles the countries of West, Central, and East Africa is not adequate. The Desk Officer handling British areas, for instance, alone has four very active areas to backstop, three of which are evolving towards complete self-government and, in time, will each probably require the services of individual desk officers. The areas covered by the officer handling French, Portuguese and Belgian territories are also becoming more active, both politically and economically. In French West Africa (16,000,000 population) political activity is in ferment with political movements taking definite shape and with extremely capable local political leaders coming to the fore. In the Belgian Congo (11,000,000 population) the Belgians, while still pressing forward with the economic development of the country, are giving more attention to the social and political development of the native. In the Portuguese areas (10,000,000 population) there are unmistakable signs of an economic awakening. In fact, there is present in all these areas political and economic dynamism which will no doubt increase with the passage of time.

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[3] For documentation on principal problems and policies in relations with Liberia, see pp. 482 ff.

[4] For documentation on the Central African Federation, see pp. 296 ff.

The Liberian Desk Officer, who handles both political and economic problems, is completely occupied with many active operational and policy problems, which require the close attention of his superiors in AF and NEA up to the Assistant Secretary level.

While it might be possible in FY 1955 to maintain minimum coverage and backstopping for these areas with the present staff complement of the West, Central and East African section of the Office of African Affairs, it is not reasonable to expect that this can be continued in succeeding years. Inasmuch as the clerk-stenographer needs of the Officer in Charge and the four officers (three political and one economic) serving under him in this section who handle eleven field posts (one Embassy, seven Consulates General and three Consulates) in this area are directly related to the officer workload, the increasing responsibilities of these five officers warrant the addition of a file clerk (as previously recommended for FY 1954 but not authorized), to assist the one clerk-stenographer-receptionist actually assigned to this section at present. Before her services were made available on August 19, 1953, to fill a long-standing vacancy, as much as possible of the work of the entire section was done by another clerk-stenographer-receptionist, who is actually assigned to do the work of the Special Assistant for Economic Affairs who advises the Office Director. The only way the West, Central and East Africa section has been able to get all its typing work done during the past eight months was to delegate it on an *ad hoc* basis to clerk-stenographers assigned to the Office Director and to the North African section. Fortunately, these stenographers have had the time to assist the officers of the West, Central and East Africa section on most occasions when they were asked to do so.

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Memoranda 1953"

Memorandum by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter), to the Chief of Protocol (Simmons)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1953.

[Subject:] Recommendations for White House Reply to Mr. A. Philip Randolph.

Reference: Memorandum from S/S–PR of September 3, 1953 attaching White House Correspondence.

In his letter to the President dated July 9, 1953, enclosed with the attached White House correspondence,[2] Mr. Randolph, International President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, suggests that the President receive himself, Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York and three other leading Negro American citizens prior to the holding of the Bermuda Conference to discuss what the United States can do with regard to the problems in Africa and more particularly with regard to the racial situation in Kenya and the Union of South Africa. At the time Mr. Randolph wrote his letter his understanding was that although the Bermuda Conference had been postponed it would take place at some future time.

It is the view of AF that the ideas of Mr. Randolph and his associates insofar as they can be understood from this (and a previous letter to the President dated June 17, 1953, to which the attached reply was sent by the Department on July 28, 1953)[3] do not accord in a number of important respects with the Department's understanding of the complex of factors underlying these issues. AF is, however, fully aware that he and his associates are influential citizens whom it is desirable not to offend.

It is, therefore, recommended that a reply to Mr. Randolph's suggestion be along the following lines: (1) There is no present expectation that the Bermuda Conference will be held or that there will be a meeting involving the same principals at some other place; (2) the attitude of the United States towards African issues is under continuing review by the Department of State and, from time to time, is made public as, for example, by the United States Delegation to the United Nations whenever African problems are under consideration by the United Nations; (3) the President appreciates Mr. Randolph's interest with regard to African affairs and hopes that Mr. Randolph will feel free to express his views to the appropriate officers of the Department of State should the occasion arise in the future.

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[1] This memorandum, drafted by Feld (AF) and presumably cleared by phone in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, was sent through the Director, Executive Secretariat, Scott. The source text is a carbon copy with no identifying marks to confirm that it was actually sent to Simmons.

[2] Neither Randolph's letter of July 9, 1953, nor the attached White House correspondence, nor the memorandum of Sept. 3, 1953 from the Protocol Staff (S/S–PR) was attached to the source text and none has been found in Department of State files.

[3] For Randolph's letter of June 17, 1953, see p. 43; the text of Deputy Assistant Secretary Jernegan's letter of reply of July 28 is presented in footnote 1, thereto.

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Memoranda 1953"

Memorandum by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter) to the Deputy Executive Director, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Moore) [1]

[WASHINGTON, September 9, 1953.]

Subject: Budget Justification for AF Posts South of the Sahara

In the area South of the Sahara, the following information is submitted in connection with the FY 1955 budget.

(1) The Consulate at Mombasa, recently ordered closed,[2] should be reopened as soon as possible. Mombasa is the most important commercial port in British East Africa; through it the major portion of the trade of this area flows, including American imports of strategic materials and exports of finished goods to Kenya, Uganda, the eastern Belgian Congo and Northern Tanganyika. Two important American shipping lines maintain regular schedules between Mombasa and east coast ports in the United States. One other American shipping line operating from Gulf Coast ports also has ships call at Mombasa from time to time. Mombasa was the principal British naval base during World War II in the East African and Indian Ocean area, and is once again assuming great importance in British strategic calculations in connection with the recent reactivation of the East African Command, with headquarters in Nairobi. This Command stretches 2,000 miles from the South African to the Ethiopian border, and is being built up to compensate for the expected loss of the precarious Suez base area. Mombasa is the key to the logistical importance of the area embraced by this Command, which constitutes a military flanking position on the Middle East lifeline. The port has been considerably expanded and modernized in recent years and is now equipped to handle a large volume of traffic. Its facilities are steadily being added to in the general expansion of the East African Railways and Harbors system. In this expansion FOA funds from the U.S. have played some part. The Consular jurisdiction of Mombasa embraces the islands of Mauritius, the Seychelles and Zanzibar, all of which figure in British control of the western Indian Ocean, as well as the Coast Province of Kenya. Its work will be increasingly important in the future particularly if a large oil refinery now being planned is constructed near the port. To accomplish its work the Consulate at Mombasa will require the same American staff complement it had before the recent closing

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Feld (AF). The source text, a carbon copy, bears no marks or endorsements to confirm that it was actually sent to Moore.

[2] The Consulate at Mombasa, Kenya, West Africa, was closed to the public on Aug. 7, 1953. The consular district of Mombasa was transferred to the U.S. Consulate General at Nairobi, Kenya. (Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 16, 1953, p. 689)

of the office, to wit: a Principal Officer (FSO-4 with rank of Consul), a Consular Officer (FSO-6, with rank of Vice Consul) an Administrative Assistant (FSS-11) and a Confidential Clerk-Typist (FSS-14) plus a certain number of local clerical and custodial employees. When the post was closed the Government-owned residence of the Principal Officer was scheduled to be leased, but the lease on the consular office was ordered terminated. The building site for a Government-built consular residence, obtained after much work several years ago, should be retained if possible to avoid embarrassment with the local authorities who made the plot available and to preserve for our use the best residential site on the over-congested island of which the city of Mombasa is situated.

(2) The Consulate General at Salisbury, temporary capital of the new (British Central African) Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, will be at the center of an area which is bound to assume greater political and economic importance as the Federal scheme is implemented.[3] The new Federation is based on the British concept of racial "partnership" and is expected to evolve towards full Dominion status within the Commonwealth by the end of the present decade. One of the principal reasons for the Federation was to provide a broader economic base for the development of the resources of the whole Federal area than was possible under the previous governmental separation of the virtually self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, which enjoyed a type quasi-Dominion status, from the less advanced governmental systems in the Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The pooling of economic resources which will result from the federation of these three separate territories should hasten their political, and social development as well. The area is important as a producer of copper, asbestos, chrome, coal and other minerals and is also a counterweight to the Union of South Africa and to the spread of the Union's racial policies to the adjacent British areas. The staff of the Consulate General should be increased by the addition of an additional reporting officer, probably one with technical knowledge of minerals, as well as by at least one, and preferably two, experienced American clerk-typists.

(3) In connection with the recent elevation of the office at Accra from a Consulate to a Consulate General,[4] it is important that adequate staff be assigned to carry the increasing load of political and economic work which is bound to result from the rapid approach of self-government in the Gold Coast. The near attainment of self-government by the Gold Coast, probably within the British Commonwealth, is already exerting an important political influence on the whole of West Africa, and this will be accentuated in the next year or two if complete self-government is realized. The present staff complement at Accra should be augmented by the assignment of an additional political reporting officer, an experienced administrative assistant, and an additional clerk-steno. Since it is likely that the Consulate General will have to be converted into an Embassy at the

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[3] For additional documentation regarding the Central African Federation concept, see pp. 296 ff.

[4] The Consulate at Accra, Gold Coast, was elevated to the rank of Consulate General on Sept. 1, 1953. For additional information on this change, see Jernegan's memorandum, June 25, 1953, p. 285.

advent of independence, it is felt that these additions will enable the transition to Embassy status to be made more smoothly.

It is felt that the additional positions suggested above for Salisbury and Accra could be made available by reallocation from the positions eliminated at Monrovia, Dakar, Leopoldville and Luanda, as shown on the attached sheet.[5] Thus, Salisbury's need for an additional clerk-typist could be met from the two positions previously assigned to Leopoldville. Similarly, the additional political reporting officer, and administrative assistant recommended for Accra could be met by reassignment of these two eliminated positions from the original Monrovia complement, and the clerk-steno previously assigned to Leopoldville. It should be emphasized that without strengthening the administrative staffs at Salisbury and Accra, much of the benefit of assigning additional reporting officers would be lost. The administrative staffs at most AF posts south of the Sahara are the weakest aspect of our over-all operations at these posts, most of which are hardship posts. Every effort should, therefore, be made to assign experienced administrative personnel to these posts in order to correct this situation.

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[5] No sheet was found attached to the source text.

Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade), October 31, 1953[1]

The subject of this conference is one of great interest to the Department of State, and of particular interest to me personally inasmuch as many of the problems you discuss here fall within my area of responsibility in that Department. I hope to give you as fully as I can the principles which guide the United States in dealing with "colonialism."

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[1] This address was made before the World Affairs Council of Northern California at Asilomar, California. The text printed here is as released to the press on Oct. 30 as Department of State Press Release 605 and as printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 16, 1953, p. 655.

No documentation on the preparation of this address has been identified, and only a few scattered papers on reactions to the address are included in file 110.15 BY. One of these is a letter of Nov. 9, 1953 from Senator Guy M. Gillette of Iowa, member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to Assistant Secretary Byroade which expressed concern that certain news accounts of the address indicated some change in U.S. policy toward colonialism and traditional support of the "principle of self-determination for people everywhere" for the sake of the "interests or wishes of an imperial power". (110.15 BY/11–953) In a brief reply to Senator Gillette on Nov. 13, Byroade sought to explain the intent of his address:

"What I tried to do, essentially, was to reaffirm the basic traditions of the United States toward dependent people. I sought to make clear the fact that there was no easy answer when one seeks to apply these principles to concrete problems. It was with that thought in mind that I quoted Justice Holmes about the danger of applying generalizations to specific cases. In dealing with North Africa, I tried to state clearly and fairly the fact that this area poses a particularly difficult problem for us. The quotation which was brought to your attention refers to some—but not all—of the elements of the situation.

"I am enclosing a copy of the full speech in case you wish to glance over it. Incidentally, the reactions from overseas have so far been most sympathetic." (110.15 BY/11–953)

When we Americans turn our thoughts to international relations, one problem stands out above all others. Our principal concern is the threat of Soviet aggression, which could culminate in the horrible tragedy of atomic warfare. Americans are therefore sometimes surprised to learn that there are vast areas of the world where the Soviet threat is given secondary emphasis. Throughout parts of Africa, the Near East, South Asia, and the Far East, human interests and emotions are focused primarily on such questions as "imperialism," "colonialism," and "nationalism." In many of these areas, the principal motivating force is the desire of dependent peoples to end foreign domination and achieve political and economic self-determination.

This movement toward self-determination is one of the most powerful forces in 20th-century affairs. When the history of our era is finally written it may prove to have been the most significant of all.

There is a paradox in the fact that the upsurge for national self-determination among the dependent peoples comes at this stage of human history. We know that Western nations, which have long possessed sovereign independence, are coming to recognize that self-sufficiency is a myth. We are moving steadily toward increasing association and interdependence among ourselves. In fact, several of the older nations are now engaged in creating new forms of association in which portions of national sovereignty are voluntarily surrendered.

We must frankly recognize that the hands of the clock of history are set at different hours in different parts of the world. We ourselves believe that peace, prosperity, and human freedom can be assured only within a concert of free peoples which transcends national boundaries. However, we must accept the fact that many of our friends in Asia and Africa tend to view national independence as a magic solution to all their difficulties. The problem is to avoid serious conflict between these viewpoints. We hope that the peoples now seeking self-determination will achieve it and exercise it in such a way as to strengthen rather than weaken the bonds of international cooperation. We hope that they will learn at an early stage of their development what we, of the West, have learned so painfully, that all mankind is "one continent" and that no nation is sufficient unto itself.

The movement toward self-determination has recently encountered an even more strange and potentially more tragic paradox. At the same time that Western colonialism of the old type is disappearing, a new form of imperialism has begun to extend a clutching hand to every quarter of the globe. I am referring to the new Soviet colonialism. This new colonialism is more subtle and more poisonous than the old, because it often masquerades under the guise of nationalism itself. In the name of independence it persuades people to surrender all hope of independence. In the name of security and economic progress it succeeds in establishing a system of slavery.

During the last 10 years 600 million peoples have attained full independence in the free world. During these same 10 years approximately 800 million people have been enslaved by the new colonialism centered in Moscow. People who are embittered by their present lot sometimes find it hard to appreciate the significance of these facts. But the facts speak for themselves.

Western nations have undoubtedly made many mistakes in their colonial policies. But the ideals of democracy and human dignity which existed at home within these nations have usually operated to the advantage of the dependent peoples. The new colonialism fostered by the Soviet dictatorship does not contain this quality of mercy. It will be one of the great tragedies of our time if the peoples of Asia and Africa, just as they are emerging from generations of dependence, should be deluded by the fatal lure of the new imperialism and return thereby to an age of slavery infinitely more miserable than they have ever known before.

Since old-style colonialism is on its way out, and nothing can restore it, the real choice today lies between continued progress toward self-determination and surrender to the new Communist imperialism.

Bases of United States Colonial Policy

The policies of the United States Government toward colonial questions have not always been clearly understood. In part this may be explained by the fact that each area of the world presents its own peculiar problems and circumstances. It is not possible to develop any general rule of thumb which will be applicable to all nations and areas. Our basic policy, however, is relatively simple. We believe in eventual self-determination for all peoples, and we believe that evolutionary development to this end should move forward with minimum delay.

Our Government must approach colonial questions in terms of the enlightened self-interest of the United States. We recognize that the disintegration of the old colonialism is inevitable. We believe that much blood and treasure may be saved if the Western World determines firmly to hasten rather than hamper the process of orderly evolution toward self-determination. Moreover we believe that healthy, self-governing societies will prove, in the long run, to be stronger bulwarks in the defense of freedom and the preservation of world peace than weak dependent territories. As Secretary Dulles said last June on returning from his trip to the Near East and Asia, "Without breaking from the framework of Western unity, we can pursue our traditional dedication to political liberty. In reality, the Western powers can gain, rather than lose, from an orderly development of self-government."

We recognize that self-determination will not always be exercised in the form of national independence. Some peoples may choose voluntarily to unite or associate themselves, on a free and equal basis, with the nations which have governed them in the past. The British Commonwealth of Nations and more recently the French Union are outstanding examples of the kind of association which new nations may undertake without impairment of their powers to determine their own destinies. The essence of self-determination is not so much the course of action chosen as the right to choose.

At this point, however, one question inevitably arises. People here and abroad frequently ask: "Why evolution? Why not grant all dependent peoples immediate sovereignty? By what right does one nation continue to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign territory?"

This question cannot readily be answered on abstract ethical grounds. No government has a God-given right to rule peoples other than its own. The old concept of the "white man's burden" is obsolete and provides no valid justification for colonialism. But if the question defies pure ethics, it may nevertheless be answered on practical and human grounds. It is a hard, inescapable fact that premature independence can be dangerous, retrogressive, and destructive.

Unless we are willing to recognize that there is such a thing as premature independence, we cannot think intelligently or constructively about the status of dependent peoples. For example, there are areas in which there is no concept of community relationships beyond the family or the tribe. There are regions where human beings are unable to cope with disease, famine, and other forces of nature. Premature independence for these peoples would not serve the interests of the United States nor the interests of the free world as a whole. Least of all would it serve the interests of the dependent peoples themselves.

Let us now consider some of the factors which cause the United States to stress the evolutionary aspects of the movement toward self-determination.

In the first place, we know that the world is a shrinking community. No territory can escape from this community and isolate itself from mankind. The withdrawal of foreign influence from a territory not yet capable of independent existence does not mean that the area will simply disappear from the world community. Instead, there will be created a power vacuum, an area of weakness which invites internal disorder and external aggression.

Whenever any people attain nominal sovereignty before they are prepared to exercise it, the net result is weakness. There may be weakness in protecting human rights, weakness in maintaining order, weakness in improving social and economic conditions, weakness in preserving independence itself. In this modern world such weakness is usually dangerous, to the strong as well as the weak.

The United States Government is committed to a policy of promoting strength and well-being in other parts of the world. We should be proud that our national self-interest is in harmony with the desire of other free peoples for strength and progress. We have been generous in helping them to achieve these things. Therefore we can be proud of our efforts to prevent the development of new weaknesses which could invite international disaster.

Second, when dependent peoples attain self-determination, we want it to be real, and we want it to endure. If they choose independence, we want them to be able to maintain their independence against the new Soviet imperialism and any other form of tyranny. We do not want the vast labor and pain expended in the struggle for freedom to be wasted by the premature creation of a state which will collapse like a stack of cards at the first hint of difficulty. If, on the other hand, the dependent peoples choose an arrangement other than national independence, such as equal union with their former rulers, this choice should be made freely, without deception or coercion. The peoples making this choice should be prepared to play their proper role in the new relationship. In other words we want these peoples to have freedom of choice and capacity for self-government similar to that possessed by India, Pakistan, and Ceylon when these nations voluntarily chose association with the British Commonwealth. If a few additional years of evolution can make the difference between a self-determination that endures and a reversion to dependency or chaos, the years will not be wasted.

Third, we know that national independence is by no means a cure-all for the perplexing problems of Asia and Africa. Independence, after all, is but a means to an end. The ultimate objective is the welfare of individual human beings. It is important that the dependent peoples develop governments which can truly represent their interests, protect their liberties, and promote social and economic progress.

These people will suffer bitter disappointment if an independent political status offers no hope of solving the age-old problems of poverty, disease, and social discrimination. The peoples of Asia and Africa want more food, better houses, more adequate health facilities, and other concrete human benefits as well as self-government. We want to help them achieve the kind of government which can make these things possible.

Fourth, let us be frank in recognizing our stake in the strength and stability of certain European nations which exercise influence in the dependent areas. These European nations are our allies. They share many common interests with us. They will probably represent, for many years to come, the major source of free-world defensive power outside our own. We cannot blindly disregard their side of the colonial question without injury to our own security. In particular, we cannot ignore the legitimate economic interests which European nations possess in certain dependent territories. Nor can we forget the importance of these interests to the European economy which we have contributed so much to support.

There has been much talk about the "economic exploitation" of dependent peoples. Too little attention has been given to the fact that economic relations between European nations and overseas territories are often beneficial to both parties. Just as Europe needs the raw materials and market opportunities of foreign territories, so do these territories need European manufactured goods, technical skills, and educational facilities. A sudden break in economic relations might seriously injure the European economies upon which our Atlantic defense system depends and at the same time prove equally injurious to the dependent territories themselves. In many instances the sudden withdrawal of European influence would remove one of the major hopes of the dependent peoples for continued economic progress.

Let me make one point very clear. Despite our interest in European economic health, we most certainly do not propose that the rights of dependent peoples should be subordinated to this interest. What we propose is that all parties concerned carefully consider their own interests. This is not a question of preserving Europe's strength at the expense of dependent peoples. It is rather a question of finding ways to increase the strength of both. An evolutionary approach to self-determination can help to preserve legitimate European interests in foreign territories while at the same time giving these territories economic opportunities and benefits which would be lost by a complete severance of relations.

Finally, it is extremely important that the political evolution of the dependent areas follow a course which will permit these peoples to take their place as respected and equal citizens of the free world. Self-determination involves obligations and responsibilities as well as rights and privileges. Statehood in the 20th century is more than a matter of independence. It must include recognition of the obligations of interdependence. It is our earnest hope that the movement toward independence in Asia and Africa will achieve the results expected of it without interfering with a still greater and longer-term trend, the movement toward increasing association and cooperation among all free nations and races.

These considerations should explain the emphasis which we place upon the evolutionary aspect of the movement toward self-determination. At the same time, let me say that it would be contrary to United States interests if these considerations should be used as "excuses" for procrastination or delay. The term "orderly evolution" cannot be translated to mean indefinite prolongation of colonial rule. The continued dependence of people who are ready for self-determination involves dangers to world peace and stability fully as serious as those involved in premature action.

This fact is recognized by almost all nations, including the colonial powers themselves, in the charter of the United Nations. Dependent peoples are no longer exclusively a national problem. Their welfare vitally concerns the peace and welfare of the entire world community. Their right to ultimate self-government is fully acknowledged, and the states which administer the dependent territories have accepted the responsibility of helping to prepare these peoples for the task of self-government. Not only are questions involving the dependent peoples given attention by the United Nations General Assembly, but one of the principal organs of the United Nations is the Trusteeship Council, which supervises and guides the administration of trust territories.

In addition to its concern with the political aspects of evolution toward self-government, the United Nations has contributed to the economic evolution of the dependent territories through its technical-assistance programs, and to educational and cultural development through other United Nations agencies. The facilities of the United Nations are sometimes used to resolve disputes between administering governments and dependent peoples. Finally the United Nations has focused the spotlight of world opinion on many different aspects of the problem of colonialism. I believe I can further illustrate some of America's problems with respect to dependent peoples by turning briefly to some of the areas which are my immediate concern in the State Department.

Africa South of the Sahara

First, let us look at the vast region of the continent of Africa lying south of the Sahara desert. This is a region larger than the United States. Except for the Union of South Africa, Ethiopia, and the Republic of Liberia, it is controlled by colonial powers. Conditions of life in a large part of the region are still primitive, and advancement toward complete self-determination on the part of the local population will require political, economic, social, and cultural development. All these factors are inseparable.

The most populous and varied groupings of central African territories are under the British, who have accelerated their policy of encouraging the devolution of power to the colonial territories. One of their major problems is the fact that many different races, tribes, and religious groups live side by side in the same areas. The British are seeking to remove mistrust and fear between the different groups and to promote a spirit of partnership. They are developing, for example, local parliaments which include representatives of different races. It is also significant that an interracial university is planned for the new federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.

The British approach also takes into account such factors as the wealth of resources in an area, the situation of a territory in relation to its neighbors, and the political maturity of the people and their leaders. I believe this approach is paying dividends. In all British areas there now exists a considerable amount of autonomy at local levels. Nigeria and the Gold Coast, for example, now exercise a large measure of responsible representative government. It is possible to foresee the complete self-government of these two countries within the framework of the Commonwealth.

The French approach in tropical Africa has been increasingly progressive since the end of World War II. The Constitution of the Fourth French Republic confers citizenship on the African inhabitants of French overseas territories in tropical Africa, and these Africans are now brought into political activity at all levels, from the municipal and territorial legislatures to the French Union bodies in Paris. No new measures are effected without consultation with African representatives, although the French High Commissioner still retains ultimate authority to carry out decisions of the French Government. The French have also undertaken important social reforms. One of these is the extension of the social benefits of the French labor code to tropical Africa. It should be noted that measures aimed at the evolutionary development of these territories have been greatly facilitated by the traditional tolerance of the French in matters of race relations.

The policy of the Belgians in the Congo represents still another approach to colonial administration. Primary emphasis is given to economic and social development as a foundation for eventual political evolution. In brief, they believe in building from within by local training and by local institutions. They are seeking to transform the Congo into a great producer of minerals and other natural resources. Meanwhile they are introducing a variety of social measures covering minimum wages, health insurance, etc. They are also instituting a broad system of primary education to be followed by the establishment of higher institutions of learning locally. Much has already been done toward creating an African middle class on a solid economic basis. As this economic base is established, it is anticipated that increasing attention will be given to political development. The best-educated Africans in the Congo are now used in local administration.

Finally, we have the approach taken by the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique. Portuguese policy has never admitted racial distinctions but does recognize a distinction between the civilized and noncivilized portions of the population. Thus tribal Africans who wish to remain attached to tribal traditions and customs, such as polygamy, are refused political rights characteristic of European institutions. On the other hand, when natives meet the standards of citizenship, they are automatically able to participate in the responsibilities of government.

These are but a few of the methods by which the colonial powers are carrying out their responsibilities in Africa south of the Sahara. It is inevitable that there are differences of opinion on the progress being made. But serious observers of the African scene agree that the European governments are making substantial contributions to the evolution of these peoples.

French North Africa

I turn now to a second great area, French North Africa. Here we find some of the most complex issues of current international relations. Disputes between the French and the indigenous populations, composed largely of Arabs and Berbers, have excited interest in many different parts of the world.

North Africa is a region of economic and strategic importance. Trade relations with this area are important to France and to other Western nations, including our own country. In fact, we have had complicated legal disputes with France concerning American rights in this area. Moreover there are American air bases in Morocco which have great strategic value for protecting both Africa and Western Europe. We therefore have a direct interest in North Africa.

In considering the problems of colonialism in Morocco and Tunisia, it is well to remember that the peoples in this region are relatively advanced. These areas are the seat of an ancient Arab civilization, and their people have a sense of historic greatness. Fez, for example, has been a seat of Moslem learning for over 1,000 years. It is also well to remember that, when the French came to Tunisia and Morocco, there were already in existence central authorities (the Bey and the Sultan respectively) based on a long tradition of self-rule. Finally, we must remember that French influence in this region is relatively recent. France established its protectorate over Tunisia about 75 years ago and over Morocco some 40 years ago.

Both the Tunisians and Moroccans today are demanding a greater measure of self-government. The French, however, retain a firm political hold on both countries and maintain that economic development and experience in local government must come before national political development. They argue that neither Tunisia nor Morocco possesses the political skills and economic resources necessary to become truly independent and viable states in the modern world. They fear that early independence would create a power vacuum and thus contribute to international difficulties, rather than promote orderly development in the interest of all parties. They argue that too little attention has been given to the economic work France has done in these two territories.

They also emphasize that the status of Tunisia and Morocco cannot be considered solely on the basis of local interests but also in terms of the common security interests of the entire free world.

The local populations of Tunisia and Morocco, on the other hand, are deeply suspicious of French motives and intentions. Many believe that the French will never voluntarily grant the native peoples internal autonomy or independence. Many maintain that they have already developed to a point which should permit them to govern themselves effectively. They say that the French are using the word "evolution" to camouflage an actual determination to maintain full political control of Tunisia and Morocco.

These basic differences of attitude are reflected currently in the United Nations, where the Tunisian and Moroccan issues are being considered. French authorities have assured the United Nations that they are introducing programs of political reforms which will promote an amicable understanding between France and Morocco and will give the people of that area a larger share in their government. The Arab nationalists, however, claim that the reforms are illusory and only serve to strengthen French control.

The United States Government believes that this complicated problem must be resolved primarily by the parties concerned. There is always a danger that the injection of outside influence into a situation of this kind will make it worse. It is difficult for us as a Nation to understand the extreme emotions on either side. We know of the delicate problem that the Government of France confronts in view of the large French population in this area. We agree that the local system of government in North Africa needs change before it can cope with present world conditions or guarantee social progress. We have important security interests in the strength of the French nation, as well as deep friendship for the French people. We also have a firm policy of supporting the right of dependent peoples to self-determination. We, therefore, understand the desire of the Tunisians and Moroccans for self-government.

It is no secret that these problems confront America with a dilemma. The present situation therefore calls frankly for a middle-of-the-road policy which will permit us to determine our position on practical issues on their merits as they arise. We greatly hope for progress on a bilateral basis with resultant easing of tensions. We do not rule out United Nations discussion if it appears that United Nations discussion can contribute positively to a satisfactory solution. This is one of the many situations in which it is not in our interest to "choose sides" for the sake of choosing sides. Our fundamental interests can be served only by an arrangement which is mutually satisfactory to both the French and the North Africans.

Colonialism and New Nations

I would now like to discuss the problem of "colonialism" as it relates to newly independent states. In certain parts of the world they form the overwhelming bulk of the people. When I accompanied Secretary Dulles and Mr. Stassen to the Near East and South Asia last May, we visited 13 countries. Of these, 10 have either gained or regained their independence in this generation. Resentment of colonialism still dominates the thinking of some of these nations. Perhaps it is appropriate to say that they have a severe "colonial hangover." This "colonial hangover" often takes the form of an intense and, in our eyes, unreasonable suspicion of the policies and actions of Western nations. Some of these countries have a natural jealousy of their newly won independence. They have been preoccupied for long periods with problems close at hand. For years they have been so to speak "in opposition," and they find it difficult to move from this negative to a more constructive approach to world problems.

There is considerable resentment of institutions and customs which developed during the period of dependency. There is resentment even against what we in the West regard as normal international economic relationships. Some of these peoples seem convinced that the Western nations are seeking constantly to restore colonial rule through the back door.

It is important that we Americans keep in mind that the emergence of independence in this area has been accompanied by an extreme nationalism and opposition to foreign influence. Some political leaders attained power largely by fierce opposition to Western influence, and it was inevitable that difficulty would be encountered in changing from this negative course of opposition to a constructive approach.

These new nations are, however, already learning that deep-rooted economic and social problems are not automatically solved by independence. They need the help and sympathy of the Western World in solving these problems. At the same time it is important that our help be given in such a way as to avoid the stigma of "colonialism." In determining our own policies we must frankly recognize that suspicion of the West will probably endure for many years to come. We must do everything possible to prove that this suspicion has no basis. We must be willing to offer capital and technical assistance for economic development without seeking political advantage. We must avoid careless and tactless injury to racial sensitivities. In dealing with their governments we must accord them fully the equal and independent status which they deserve. In brief, we must prove our good faith time and again and must constantly encourage our friends to understand the important interests which Eastern and Western peoples have in common.

When disputes arise between the Eastern nations and our Western allies, we often find ourselves in sympathy with both sides. For example, we recognize the need for keeping the Suez area available for the use of those powers able to assist in the defense of the non-Communist world, which includes Egypt herself. At the same time, we view with the most friendly spirit the aspirations of the Egyptians for complete and indisputable sovereignty. In all differences of this nature, our fundamental problem is to lessen suspicion and encourage agreement between the Eastern and Western powers. By every word and action of our Government, we should make it clear that the old colonial relationship is dead and that it will stay dead. At the same time, we should encourage a better understanding of the possibilities inherent in a new relationship based on voluntary cooperation among independent nations.

In closing, I would like to remind you that there is no single problem which we can call a "colonial problem." Instead, there are many different kinds of problems which exist in many different areas. As a great American statesman once said, "General propositions do not decide concrete cases," and this statement certainly has direct application when related to colonialism. Our Government must ever be alert to the necessity of doing those things which the circumstances of time and place demand.

The clock of history cannot be turned back. Alien rule over dependent peoples must be replaced as rapidly as possible by self-determination. Of this there can be no question. At the same time, we know that the clock of history cannot be turned forward by a mere twist of the dial. The evolution of the dependent peoples toward full self-determination requires patience, imagination, and hard work—hard work by the governing powers as well as the governed—accompanied by sympathy and assistance from all nations.

We as Americans are prepared to do what we can as a part of this effort. Our ultimate objective, to use the words of a former American President, is to attain "such a concert of free peoples as will encircle the globe and make the world itself at last free."

911.5270/11–2053

The Director, Office of Transportation and Communications Policy (Barringer) to the Director, Bureau of Air Operations, Civil Aeronautics Board (Fitzgerald)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. FITZGERALD: I understand your staff is preparing data for the December 14 hearing on renewal of Pan American World Airway's South Atlantic route certificate. In this regard, I wish to record the views of the Department of State.

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[1] This letter was drafted by Feld and Cyr (AF) and was cleared by BNA and WE. Director Joseph H. Fitzgerald acknowledged receipt of the letter on Dec. 14, 1953, but erroneously referred to it as the letter of Nov. 30.

The Department of State considers that the existence of this American link with the continent of Africa has assumed political significance and has greatly enhanced American prestige in Africa. A discontinuance of the route after some seven years of operation would be interpreted as a sign of lessening American interest in the area, and would be contrary to our many professions of faith in the growing importance of Africa. For political reasons, it is desirable that we not create such impressions. More specifically, the following considerations should be taken into account:

(1) The service stops at Roberts Field in Liberia. American influence in Liberia has been predominant and it is in our national interest that this close identification with the United States should be preserved. Continuation of the air service in question will materially serve this end.

(2) The rapidly evolving British West African countries served either directly or indirectly by this route are expected to achieve full self-government in the relatively near future. The American-educated Gold Coast Prime Minister[2] has demonstrated by word and action his deep desire to retain our moral support in the realization of Gold Coast aspirations for complete self-government. He has shown a desire to encourage American investment and technical knowledge in order to lessen the present British dominance of his country's economy. Sudden withdrawal of Pan American's service would be interpreted as an indication of lessening American interest. It would most likely result in an approach to other non-British countries for moral and material support. A similar attitude could be expected in Nigeria and Sierra Leone which are indirectly served by this route.

(3) The Union of South Africa's geographic position has been a factor in the development of its isolation and unyielding nationalism. Air transport is having an important effect in overcoming those tendencies. Direct air service between the United States and the Union has brought the two countries into closer contact and strengthened the American position in the Union. This service is regarded in the Union as an example of our acknowledgement of the Union's importance. BOAC, KLM, Sabena, SAS, Swissair, and Union Aeromaritime de Transport, as well as PAA, operate services to the Union. South Africans are extremely sensitive to actions which they feel tend to diminish the Union's position in world affairs, and withdrawal of PAA would be interpreted as lack of American interest. At the present delicate stage in the political and economic development of South Africa, it is important that American influence be furthered. No United States Government action should be taken which would lower our prestige or cast doubt on our interest in a strong South Africa.

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[2] Kwame Nkrumah.

(4) An increasing number of Americans are using the service as a quick and direct means of traveling to and from the African continent. American investments, especially in the Union of South Africa and Liberia, are already significant.

(5) The route has materially assisted the Department in keeping in close contact with its diplomatic and consular establishments in large areas of the African continent by means of couriers and unaccompanied air pouches. A discontinuance would make the problem of quick communication much more complex from a security and financial point of view.

In view of the foregoing considerations, this Department wishes to record its view that continuance of this route is in the national interest of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

J. PAUL BARRINGER

745G.00/11-2753

The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State

RESTRICTED

ACCRA, November 27, 1953.

No. 99

Reference: Accra's despatch 151 of May 22, 1953[1]

Subject: Conference of West African Nationalists

There follows a summary of information which I obtained about the above subject from the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs on November 26 with regard to the Conference of West African Nationalists convened by Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, to take place at Kumasi on December 4 through 6.[2]

Fenner Brockway, the Leftist Member of Parliament, and the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialist Oppression had some ideas about calling for a "Pan-African Conference". COPAIO itself is not, however, involved in the Kumasi meeting, which may to some extent represent a move on Nkrumah's part to seize the initiative from COPAIO.

So far as the Ministry is aware, Nkrumah has invited some 11 "delegates" from Nigeria; six from Sierra Leone; two from the Gambia; two from Liberia; and about eight persons from the Gold Coast. The invitees are believed to include the following: Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe from Nigeria plus two leaders of the Nigeria branch of the Convention Peoples Party; Bankole Bright and Dr. Margai from Sierra Leone; Sylvanus Olympio from Togoland; and J. B. Danquah, Nii Ama Ollenu, and Kojo Busia from the Gold Coast. In addition to Nkrumah, it is understood that Kojo Botsio (Gold Coast

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[1] *Ante*, p. 41.

[2] For accounts of the conference at Kumasi, see telegram 48, Dec. 8, 1953, from Accra, *infra* and despatch 107, Dec. 9, from Accra, p. 69.

Minister of Education) and K. A. Gbedemah (Minister of Commerce and Industry) will address the gathering.

No especial significance is imputed to the "conference" by British officials here, although possibly the Colonial Office attaches more importance to it as being indicative of a trend or as raising possible apprehensions on the part of certain other colonial powers. The Kumasi conference is a "whittled down" version of the proposed meeting discussed in my despatch No. 151 of May 22 entitled "Conference of West African Nationalists," which was to have taken place about last August. It is thought that Nkrumah is not enthusiastic about the affair, but has to go through with it since there had been so much talk about such a gathering and since his prestige as a nationalist leader depends to some extent upon his posing as the guiding spirit in the concept of a West African federation. According to the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs no delegates have been invited from French territories (other than possibly Olympio) and the French Consul General here has confirmed that such is the case so far as can be ascertained. Nkrumah has not, however, been very specific about whom he has invited, since the nonappearance of prominent individuals would if known detract from his standing as an influential figure. It seems doubtful that such prominent personalities as Azikiwe and Awolowo will appear.

The agenda for the forthcoming conference is likewise understood to be couched in very general terms and to call for discussion of social, educational, and political themes.

WILLIAM E. COLE

745F.00/12–853: Telegram

The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State

ACCRA, December 8, 1953.

48. Reference my despatch 99, November 20.[1] Seventh conference of West African nationalists took place as scheduled December 5 and 6.

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[1] Not printed; it transmitted some recent information on the proposed conference of West African nationalists. (745F.00/11–2053) Subsequent to the despatch, Consul Cole sent telegram 46, Nov. 27, which read as follows:

"Nkrumah convening conference West African nationalists at Kumasi, December 5 and 6. This evidently an abridged version of proposed meeting mentioned my despatch 151, May 22. About 30 persons believed invited from 4 British colonies and Liberia. Amongst invitees are Awolowo and Azikiwe, although their attendance doubtful. Agenda in very general terms covers education, social political matters.

"Saloway states British here regard conference as innocuous. While not enthusiastic, Nkrumah evidently considers move necessary his prestige." (745G.00/11–2753)

According local press accounts, it was attended by delegates from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast and Nigeria, including Azikiwe. Liberian Assistant Secretary State Padmore, attended as observer. Conference proposed formation "West African Congress" with membership consisting political parties and organizations in West Africa and objective of establishing "a federal state".

COLE

745G.00/12-953

The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ACCRA, December 9, 1953.

No. 107

Reference: Accra's telegram No. 48 of December 8, 1953[1]

Subject: Conference of West African Nationalists

During the conversation I had with Mr. Saloway on December 8 (reported in my despatch No. 106 of December 8)[2] he referred also to the Conference of West African Nationalists which took place at Kumasi, in the Gold Coast, on December 5 and 6. Mr. Saloway said that, as he had predicted earlier, the Conference was completely innocuous. He said that Nkrumah had to call the meeting in order to sustain his position as a great leader but that it certainly had done no harm. Nkrumah had not invited nationalist figures from French possessions and that had simplified matters, since possible repercussions in the international field were avoided.

Mr. Saloway added that Nkrumah had taken a poor view of certain remarks made by Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Nigerian nationalist leader who attended the Kumasi Conference at Nkrumah's invitation. On December 7 Nkrumah and Azikiwe spoke before a large audience in an Accra cinema. It appears that Nkrumah announced, *inter alia*, the proposed formation at the Conference of a West African Congress which would have its secretariat in Accra. Azikiwe spoke thereafter, and during the course of a fulsome eulogy of Gold Coast nationalists he included J. B. Danquah, the most prominent leader of any opposition to Nkrumah and his CPP, as among those worthy of especial praise. It is presumably doubtful that Azikiwe intended to give offense, and more probable that he is not entirely up to date on the nuances of Gold Coast politics.

WILLIAM E. COLE

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not printed.

751T.00/12–1853

The Consul at Dakar (Ferguson) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL DAKAR, December 18, 1953.

No. 132

Subject: Conference of West African Nationalists in Gold Coast

Mr. Roger Chambard, Diplomatic Counselor to the High Commissioner, recently returned from his Gold Coast visit during the course of which he attended various sessions of the Conference of West African Nationalists which took place at Kumasi December 5 and 6. He described it as interesting and somewhat boisterous, but of little practical significance.

Mr. Chambard confirmed the report of the Gold Coast Ministry of Defense and External Affairs that no delegates had been invited from French West Africa, but explained that this was due to the fact that the R.D.A. (Houphouet-Boigny) and B.D.S. (Senghor), when they were approached sometime ago with respect to the scheduled October meeting, had indicated an unwillingness to participate. Thus, according to Chambard, invitations which were sure to be refused were not proffered. Chambard said he was quite certain of this because Houphouet, whom he had seen in Abidjan on his (Chambard's) return to Dakar, had told him so. He said that, indeed, Houphouet had indicated a complete lack of interest in the proceedings of the Conference. Chambard said that Houphouet is by all odds the most powerful figure in the Ivory Coast, that he is quite satisfied in such a role, and that it is clearly not to his interest to engage in ambitious foreign ventures such as the type sponsored by Nkrumah which might have the effect of weakening his position at home.

Mr. Chambard said that, according to the language of the resolution concerning the "Federal State," such a development would provide hope and encouragement, or words to that effect, to peoples of African origin the world over. Mr. Chambard said that he was informed by everyone he asked that this was meant particularly for people of negro blood in the Western Hemisphere.

Incidentally, Mr. Chambard said that Dr. Horace Mann Bond, President of Lincoln University, who appeared to occupy a position of respect among the delegates, was rather active at the Conference, even to the point of indulging in frequent oratory more or less extolling nationalism. Mr. Chambard characterized the Institute of African-American Relations, in the interests of which Dr. Bond was traveling, as an organization which favors African nationalism, but as "ideological" only and nothing to cause any worry.

While it is probably true that such Conferences have little immediate effect on the situation in French West Africa, the French, despite their inclination to belittle them, are clearly uneasy as shown by the fact that as high a ranking officer as Mr. Chambard, although uninvited, would physically attend the sessions of the Conference against, it may be mentioned, the advice of his British hosts in Kumasi. Mr. Chambard read a little bit of his report to officers of the Consulate General and it was apparent that this report was long and detailed. The matter would seem to be too important to the French to be left to their Consul General at Accra and it is clear that any further developments of this sort will be carefully watched by an increasingly alert French administration here. In the present instance, however, the French are obviously relieved that there was no participation or even much interest on the part of French West Africans, particularly having in mind, as recalled by Mr. Chambard, that several of their more important African political personalities such as Leopold Senghor and Apithy were present at London in 1946 alongside of Azikiwe, Awolowo, Nkrumah and others under the aegis of the Fenner Brockway group of "Pan Africans." [2]

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[1] This despatch was jointly prepared by Consul Ferguson and Consul Robert F. Corrigan.

C. VAUGHAN FERGUSON, JR.

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[2] In despatch 2113, Feb. 17, 1954, from Paris, Counselor of Embassy Robert P. Joyce reported that during a conversation between Embassy First Secretary Charles R. Moore and Jean Jurgensen, Chief of the African Section of the French Foreign Ministry, reference had been made to the conference at Kumasi. Jurgenson seemed to feel that the conference had been of little significance and produced no unexpected developments. Jurgensen was not, however, disposed to deprecate the significance of growing African nationalism. Despatch 2113 concluded as follows:

"He [Jurgensen] felt that while the Kumasi conference had not produced striking results, subsequent conferences could be expected to assume increasing importance from the point of view of developing solidarity among West African nationalists. (In his personal view, it would be unwise for the British and French to try to prevent such conferences or to prevent the participation therein of African nationalists in their territories.) The Embassy is inclined to doubt, however, that this view is shared by his colleagues in the Ministry of Overseas France." (745G.00/2–1754)

INR–NIE files

National Intelligence Estimate [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 22 December 1953.

NIE–83

CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN TROPICAL AFRICA

THE PROBLEM

To assess the strategic importance of Tropical Africa and to esti-

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[1] National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental work-

Footnote continued on following page.

mate probable long-range trends and developments in the area and their strategic consequences.*

CONCLUSIONS

1. The strategic importance of Tropical Africa arises chiefly from its supply of such materials as uranium, cobalt, diamonds, and columbite; from its location with respect to sea and air lanes in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea areas; and from its potential as a site for LOC, staging, and training facilities.

2. The chief problem in Tropical Africa is that increasing African discontent and demands for self-government, although varying widely in different colonial dependencies, will gradually weaken European control and pose a threat to Western access to Tropical Africa's strategic resources. Over a long period there will almost certainly be an uneven and uneasy transition from colonial to self-rule.

3. Recent and impending political changes in British West and British Central Africa, Italian Somaliland, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan will stimulate elsewhere the growth of African sentiment for self-government. Particularly in the British dependencies, Africans will make increasing demands for self-government without regard for differences in the stages of development of the various territories. Interracial tensions are almost certain to grow, especially in British East and British Central Africa.†

4. Despite the present weakness of the Communists, their influence and numerical strength will increase. As African unrest grows, various African groups are likely to welcome assistance from any quarter. Communist efforts in the long run probably will have greatest effect

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

ing groups coordinated by the Office of National Intelligence Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided political and some economic sections of NIEs.

According to a note on the cover sheet:

"The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 22 December 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction. The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff."

This estimate was published (circulated) on Dec. 30, 1953. It is one of several documents considered by the National Security Council Planning Board at its meeting on Mar. 3, 1954; see the editorial note, p. 101.

*This estimate deals generally with all African territories south of the Sahara Desert and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, except for the Union of South Africa (covered in NIE–72, 20 October 1952). Only the more important territories are considered individually, however. [Footnote in the source text. For the text of NIE–72, see p. 953.]

†British West Africa: the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. British Central Africa: Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. British East Africa: Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar. [Footnote in the source text.]

upon the more advanced Africans—young intellectuals, nationalist activists, and labor group members—to whom Communism might appear as an aid in weakening European control.

5. The breakdown or overthrow of existing authority is nowhere imminent in Tropical Africa. We believe that the colonial powers will undertake the policy adjustments and retain the security capabilities necessary to prevent discontent from erupting in large-scale revolt over at least the next decade. However, such adjustments probably will not keep pace with African demands, and varying degrees of unrest and even sporadic violence are likely, especially in areas of heavy white settlement. Emerging self-governing territories, such as the Gold Coast and Nigeria, probably will also experience considerable instability.

6. Prospective disorders in Tropical Africa probably will require additional commitments of European forces, but not to a degree which would seriously burden the metropoles. Such unrest probably will hamper but will not prevent Western use of military facilities in event of war.

7. In the short run, Tropical African exports of strategic and essential raw materials will increase as development programs are completed. Over the longer run, however, disorder and unrest are likely to impair the production and transport of such materials. Of the important producing areas, the Belgian Congo probably will be the most stable, while British West Africa and probably British Central Africa will become less dependable sources of supply.

DISCUSSION

I. *Strategic importance of Tropical Africa*

8. *Economic.* Tropical Africa is important to the West primarily as a producer of raw materials, particularly minerals.‡ The Belgian Congo, the Rhodesias, and the Gold Coast are the most important producing areas. The most important strategic commodity is uranium, of which the Belgian Congo is a major source. Tropical Africa also supplies over 75 percent of Free World production of cobalt, industrial diamonds, and columbite, and from 10 to 25 percent of manganese, tin, vanadium, copper, chrome, cadmium, and graphite. It provides over 65 percent of Free World requirements of cocoa and sisal, and 80 percent of palm oil. Moreover, the area is almost the sole world supplier of several materials of highly specialized usage, such as strategic-grade chrysotile asbestos. Mineral production in Tropical Africa would become much more important were the Free World denied access to Indian manganese, Turkish and New Caledonian chrome, and Malayan and Indonesian tin.

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‡Appendix A lists Tropical African production of selected commodities. [Footnote in the source text.]

9. Tropical African exports of strategic minerals probably will be increased substantially by new developments either underway or soon to be started. These will enlarge the supply of: (*a*) copper and chrome from Central Africa once the rail link from Southern Rhodesia to Lourenço Marques is completed; (*b*) iron ore from West Africa; (*c*) copper and cobalt from Uganda; and (*d*) manganese from the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa. Most of the aluminum needs of the UK could be met from the Gold Coast if the Volta River project is successfully completed.

10. The major Tropical African colonial powers—the UK, France, Belgium, and Portugal—gain various economic advantages from their dependencies. They enjoy protected markets for their goods and have acquired raw materials and food at advantageous prices. Their Tropical African territories account for about 10 percent of their total foreign trade, except for the Portuguese colonies, which account for about 15 percent of Portugal's combined exports and imports.

11. Among the African colonial powers, the UK and Belgium derive the most substantial economic benefits from their colonies. Since World War II, gold and dollar earnings probably have been the most important of such benefits to the UK. As a result of strict control by the UK of imports into its African dependencies from the dollar area these territories earn annually a dollar surplus equal to the value of one-fourth of all UK imports from the US. The only other net earner of gold and dollars is the Belgian Congo, but its contribution to Belgium is on a much smaller scale. The UK and Belgium, and to a lesser extent the other metropoles, also can save dollars by importing from their colonies goods which otherwise would have to be purchased in hard currency areas. The substantial sterling balances (equivalent to about $2 billion) of the British dependencies—which in effect have been credits extended to the UK and the sterling area—normally would be drawn down by the dependencies but for British exchange and trade control policies.

12. Metropole investments in Tropical Africa—estimated at $5 billion at present value—are only a small percentage of total metropole overseas investments. Loss of their African investments by the colonial powers would not be a critical financial blow, even to Belgium and the UK. However, loss of the resources of the colonies or drastic disruption of their over-all trading pattern would necessitate substantial adjustments, especially in the economies of the UK and Belgium.

13. *Military*. In event of general war, bases in Tropical Africa would be an important factor in the control of the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea, especially if the Suez Canal and Middle East bases were denied the West. In that event Tropical Africa could provide air and naval facilities to support Western lines of communi-

cation and could afford a safe haven for staging, training, and supply bases.§

14. A large reservoir of military manpower exists in Tropical Africa, but its utilization would depend on Western training and equipment as well as on political conditions in the area. We believe that approximately 300,000 troops from French West and French Equatorial Africa could be made available for employment in Africa or overseas in event of general war. About 125,000 British West African troops served during World War II; an equal number probably could be made available in a future war, if newly independent or autonomous territories felt disposed to cooperate with the Western Powers. About 230,000 British East African troops served during World War II; although that number might be available again, a large proportion of these troops might be required to deal with local disorders and to preserve the security of the region. Probably neither British Central Africa nor the Belgian Congo could provide significant forces for use beyond their boundaries. The relatively ineffective Ethiopian army is to be reorganized with the assistance of a US military mission, with the objective of creating an M-Day force of about 53,000 men. In event of war Ethiopia could probably raise additional forces.

15. Native internal security forces, augmented by European officers and NCO's, appear adequate to preserve order in most territories at present. In event of general war or disorders as serious as the Mau Mau outbreak, however, European units would be required in support of local troops in many areas. Some Western forces would almost certainly be needed to protect LOC facilities established in Tropical Africa.

II. *Over-all problems and trends in Tropical Africa*

16. One of the world's least developed areas, Tropical Africa is in process of economic, social, and political transformation, although the pace of this development varies widely in different territories. Nearly all African societies are in relatively rapid transition from isolated subsistence to money economies, and a few are rapidly moving from tribal organization to national states on the Western model. Increasing Western investment in Tropical Africa and the area's expanding contact with Western culture, especially in the postwar period, have upset primitive social and economic organization and are producing native aspirations largely incompatible with colonial status. Growing tension and unrest are gradually weakening European control in certain areas and pose a prospective threat to Free World access to Tropical Africa's resources. The colonial powers are confronted with the major problems of making the adjustments necessary to allay spreading African discontent, and of winning the cooperation of native regimes once they

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§The most important existing military facilities are shown on the attached map. [Footnote in the source text. Map reproduced facing p. 90.]

come to power, while at the same time preserving the degree of control necessary to prevent disorders and continue the flow of raw materials necessary for the well-being of both Africa and the West.

17. Tropical Africa's nearly 8,000,000 square miles (roughly the size of North America) and approximately 135,000,000 people are distributed among more than thirty separate territories administered (except for South West Africa and independent Liberia and Ethiopia) by six European powers.‖ The territorial divisions imposed by European politics bear almost no relation to geographic, social, and economic factors. Political boundaries cut across climatic zones, natural features, language groups, and tribes; the Moslem northern portion of Tropical Africa blends southward into pagan, pseudo-Christian, and Christian areas; peoples with Hamitic blood have migrated into Negro areas and created mixed racial groups. This diversity, added to existing tribal antagonisms and to the ignorance and political indifference of the great majority of natives, retards the growth of sentiment for nationhood in most territories.

18. *Economic Problems.* Tropical Africa is poor in developed resources. The soil is generally low in fertility, and is deteriorating through misuse and natural erosion. Mineral fuels are almost entirely lacking, and the great resources of water for power and irrigation are still largely undeveloped. Access to the interior is made difficult by the scarcity of navigable river routes, of rail and road transport, and of adequate harbors along the West coast. Labor productivity is low because of climate, pests, disease, malnutrition, lack of training, and the reluctance of Africans to undertake regular employment. There is also widespread maldistribution of labor; in several territories the over-concentration of Africans has created serious local population pressures. Over-population in rural areas further impoverishes the soil, since most natives are still engaged in primitive subsistence agriculture.

19. Increase of Tropical Africa's productivity will require costly and time-consuming programs to improve the health and capabilities of the people, as well as large-scale capital investment in transportation and production facilities. Colonial governments are undertaking extensive development programs, and are attempting to avoid the social and economic dislocations which characterized earlier concentration on raw material production. However, the speed with which development can take place will be limited by the deficiencies in physical and human resources described above. Moreover, because of the probable shortage of local funds available for both public and private

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‖Appendix B lists Tropical Africa's territories and their population. The estimated population is about 134,000,000 natives, 675,000 Europeans, and 240,000 Indians; the great majority of non-natives are settled in the eastern half of the area. [Footnote in the source text.]

investment, Tropical Africa will continue to require relatively large amounts of outside capital if the present pace of development is to be continued. The metropoles probably will not be able to increase significantly their current financial contributions because of their own economic requirements. Existing and potential African unrest also tends to discourage investments from other non-African sources. Thus further public and private investment programs will have to be supported largely from additional revenue derived from foreign trade. However, with a continuing fall in world prices of African exports, the outlook for any great expansion in investment programs becomes increasingly dim.

20. *Social Problems.* European efforts to improve communications have ended the isolation of many tribes, and world demands for raw materials have changed the economic pattern of many areas. The enforcement of European concepts of law and order has weakened the authority of tribal government, and artificial political boundaries have been substituted for those based on tribal organization. These developments have increasingly undermined the tribal basis of Tropical African society. A few Africans now live almost entirely according to Western patterns, but large numbers have achieved only a partial transformation and are given support and guidance by neither the old social pattern nor the new. Many of those Africans who so far have been relatively unaffected will be increasingly drawn into new ways of life by continued development.

21. Thus traditional African social relationships centering around tribal organizations are being gradually replaced by new institutions of the Western type, in the direction of which most Africans play little or no part and toward which they feel little or no obligation. The transition is complicated by the mixing in a new political relationship of African societies once isolated from and hostile to each other. The problems of adjustment are especially difficult in those territories, such as Kenya and the Rhodesias, where both Africans and Europeans must be fitted into a single political system.

22. The most disruptive force in this gradual realignment of African society is the growth of new socio-economic classes—wage laborers, cash farmers, and educated well-to-do Africans—which have benefited most in a material sense from contact with the West. In most areas, these groups are dissatisfied with their position vis-à-vis the whites, and with the lack of recognition of their new economic status in terms of social standing and political authority. They will agitate increasingly for greater power and prestige. Those in a position of leadership will influence their illiterate and apathetic fellows to support their demands.

23. *Political and Racial Problems.* One result of these developments has been the growth in many areas of African demands for more self-

government. Africans making these demands have been stimulated by and have found justification in recent and impending political changes in British West and British Central Africa, Italian Somaliland, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. UN consideration of the problems of several Tropical African territories, as well as South African racial issues, gives international publicity to African discontent and encourages further local appeals against the colonial powers. Moreover, nationalist agitation in North Africa, Libya's attainment of independence, and the anti-Western activities in the Middle East all play a role—if a minor one—in arousing the Tropical African's concern with his political and social status.

24. The growth of sentiment for self-government varies widely in Tropical Africa. At present such sentiment is extensive in British West Africa, negligible in the Portuguese colonies and the Belgian Congo, and generally confined to small numbers of educated, urbanized Africans in most other important areas. However, developments in one area rapidly become known in other parts of Africa despite the scarcity of modern communications; for example, the progress toward self-government in the Gold Coast [2] is widely known in the Tropical African territories. Particularly in the British dependencies, Africans increasingly will demand similar advances toward self-government without regard for differences in the stages of development of various territories, or for differences in population pattern. Since a basic principle of British colonial policy is to increase the participation of Africans in their governments, British policy will have an unsettling effect on the dependencies of the other colonial powers.

25. The chief political problem facing the European colonial powers, therefore, will be that of reconciling European interests with increasing African demands for self-government. However, in an atmosphere of growing local pressures for rapid reform, it will be difficult for even the most liberal territorial governments to obtain widespread native understanding and support for their gradualistic policies and programs. In many areas, a few leaders probably will be able to collect substantial followings of politically unsophisticated Africans for sometimes violent demonstrations against the policies of colonial governments, even when those policies are in the interests of the native population. Throughout Tropical Africa political affairs will remain unsettled and local crises, such as the Nyasaland riots and the recent deposition of the king of Buganda (a native kingdom in Uganda) by the British,[3] will continue to occur with little advance warning.

26. An integral part of the growth of African demands for self-government is the increasing dislike of white control and mistrust of

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[2] For documentation on the interest of the United States in the independence of the Gold Coast (Ghana), see pp. 261 ff.

[3] For information on the episode under reference here, see despatch 2044 from London, Dec. 7, 1953, p. 368.

white leadership in much of Tropical Africa. Interracial tension has appeared throughout Tropical Africa, although it varies with the number and power of white settlers and with the degree of social disorganization produced by the impact of Western civilization. The primary attention given in most areas to the development of European rather than African enterprise and the fact that some of the best land is in the hands of white settlers have created animosity, which is greatly heightened by social discrimination, particularly in the British areas. We believe that over the long run interracial tension throughout Tropical Africa will increase.

27. *Communism* so far has had little impact on Tropical Africa. Despite the opportunities presented by the dislocation of African society, racial conflict, and political unrest, Communist influence thus far has been only incidental in the rise of anticolonial sentiment. The principal obstacles to the spread of Communism are: (a) its aspect as a white movement; (b) the small proportion of industrial and urban workers, and the small size of the intelligentsia; (c) the multiplicity of languages, tribes, and cultures; and (d) the opposition and close surveillance of Tropical African governments. Recognizing these obstacles, the Communists largely refrain from attempts to spread Communism per se through ideological conversion.

28. The only organized Communist party is the insignificant one in Madagascar. The only party that was ever an important front (the Democratic African Rally in French West and French Equatorial Africa) openly broke with the Communists in 1950; since then its leadership and orientation have clearly been anti-Communist, although some Communist members remain in this organization. Some active Communists are known to reside in French areas and there probably are a few in urban and mining areas of the Congo, British East and British Central Africa, and Mozambique; their present influence is almost certainly small. The Mau Mau terrorist movement in Kenya presents an excellent target for Communist exploitation; however, we have no conclusive evidence of Communist influence in the movement. Although certain nationalists from several colonies have been exposed to Communist influence, probably none of the principal nationalist leaders is a Party member. Communists have had some success in infiltrating labor unions, especially in French areas, but apparently are not now dominant in union activities in any territory.

29. Notwithstanding the present weakness of the Communists and the many obstacles to their activities, we believe their influence and numerical strength will increase. Their probable short-term aims are to undermine Western prestige in Tropical Africa, weaken and subvert local European authority, and portray Soviet Russia as the champion of Africans in the fight against "discrimination" and "exploitation." As African unrest grows, various African groups are

likely to welcome assistance from any quarter. Communist efforts in the long run probably will have greatest effect upon the more advanced Africans—young intellectuals, nationalist activists, and labor group members—to whom Communism might appear as an aid in weakening European control.

III. *Selected regional problems and prospects*

30. *British West Africa* (the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia). The UK's basic colonial policy of encouraging education and advancing natives toward self-government at whatever pace each dependency appears able to handle has received fullest expression in West Africa. The success or failure of this approach probably will influence strongly political development elsewhere in Tropical Africa. While over the long run probable instability in British West Africa may threaten its pro-Western orientation, in the short run there is no prospect of disturbances seriously inimical to Western interests.

31. In the Gold Coast and Nigeria, the natives have advanced further toward self-government than in other Tropical African dependencies, in large part due to: (*a*) the existence of economic resources especially exploitable by Africans; (*b*) the virtual absence of white settlers; (*c*) relatively long and extensive contact with Western culture; and (*d*) the adaptability of British policy under African pressure for political advance. The UK has allowed far-reaching postwar constitutional revision in response to increasing political demands in all British West African territories, but especially in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, where African capabilities and aspirations have been highest. As Africans in these dependencies move toward independence, they face two major political problems: how to share power among themselves and how to exercise it.

32. The Gold Coast probably will move directly toward full self-government within the next few years because nationwide acceptance of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party leadership gives at least a temporary basis for an all-African government. The party system in the Gold Coast is only partially developed, but has reached the point where even members of the central legislature elected by tribal institutions acquiesce in national party control.

33. In Nigeria, on the other hand, it is unlikely that sufficient national unity will develop within the next few years to make possible a strong central government. Nigeria is four times larger than the Gold Coast and has six times its population. Under the federal constitution, the representation of the Islamic Northern Region is equal to that of the non-Islamic Eastern and Western Regions combined. Strong ethnic, cultural, and political differences exist in the territory. The relatively advanced Eastern and Western Regions believe themselves ready for self-government, while the backward North depends

greatly on the British administration and fears domination by the other two regions if the UK were to grant Nigeria early independence. Thus no national parties have yet emerged in Nigeria. However, in the two southern regions pressure for early self-government is exerted by political parties based on tribal groupings—Azikiwe's National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in the predominantly Ibo Eastern Region, and Awolowo's Action Group in the Yoruba West. The UK is meeting this pressure by granting increased self-government to each of the three Regions, while trying to establish effective federal institutions. The emergence of a unified Nigeria will largely depend on the speed with which the Northern Region can develop a capacity for self-government that will enable it to protect its interests against the Eastern and Western Regions without reliance on the British Colonial Office. However, there is at least an even chance that the southern regions will secure self-government independently of the North.

34. In any case the British West African territories probably will attain self-government before their peoples acquire enough capable administrators and technicians, and funds for social and economic development. Therefore, the effectiveness of their governments will be limited and public confidence in those governments and their leaders will be shaken. When the superficial unity created by nationalist demands disappears, African leaders probably will attempt to explain their difficulties by blaming "foreign intervention." This eventually will almost certainly result in efforts to eliminate the remnants of British influence. However, these territories probably would be willing to remain within the British Commonwealth. They would seek to join the UN, but would avoid membership in any multilateral Western military association. Nevertheless, they might be willing to allow Western economic and strategic use of the area, though only in return for large and immediate benefits.

35. Eager to assert their independence, West Africans increasingly will attempt to develop and control their resources themselves, however incompetently. Expansion of their economies may be hindered by their suspicion of foreign financial interests, and they may finance development with the agricultural stabilization funds which constitute their main protection against a fall in world prices. To the extent that they are willing to accept foreign capital and technical assistance, they will probably seek to minimize the danger of exploitation by a single country by drawing on a number of foreign sources.

36. *West African UN Trust Territories* (British Togoland, British Cameroons, French Togoland, and French Cameroons).[4] A number of proposals have been made to redesign the boundaries of British and

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[4] **For additional documentation on the West African UN Trust Territories, see vol. III, pp. 1075 ff.**

French Togoland and Cameroons in order to: (*a*) create a United Togoland; (*b*) set up a United Cameroons; (*c*) establish a single and united territory for the Ewe tribe now divided between both Togolands and the Gold Coast; (*d*) join British Togoland to the Gold Coast; or (*e*) annex British Cameroons to Nigeria. The last two proposals are the most likely to be carried into effect; each trust territory already is closely integrated administratively with the adjoining British colony. If a self-governing Gold Coast obtains control of British Togoland, it may also demand, with doubtful success, control of French Togoland, thereby embittering its relations with France. The Ewe are not likely to win their territorial demands since they—like all other major groups in these trust territories—cannot agree on what they desire. Moreover, their proposed area does not possess sufficient economic strength to stand by itself. Of the four trust territories, the French Cameroons alone has sufficient economic strength to be self-supporting.

37. *British Central Africa* (Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland). Over a long period the greatest threat to Western interests in Tropical Africa is likely to arise in British Central Africa. This area possesses the largest group of European settlers and is influenced most strongly by racial issues in the neighboring Union of South Africa. Central Africa has become one of the most important African sources of strategic materials. Its rapid economic expansion, involving large-scale white immigration and the formation of a detribalized native urban class, has complicated political development and aggravated labor and racial tensions. The pressure which the white settlers are exerting on the British Government is forcing the UK to tend toward acceptance of settler dominance in Central Africa.

38. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which is expected to be in full operation by early 1954, represents a new form of political organization designed to reconcile the interests of Africans and white settlers. The effectiveness of the Federation in coping with this racial problem will be closely observed both in and beyond Africa as a test of whether a harmonious, self-governing, multiracial society can be created in Tropical Africa. However, it will be difficult to create a feeling of partnership between a dominant minority composed of 200,000 whites and a 6,300,000 African majority which fears exploitation. The federal constitution gives the whites control of the legislature, and British promises that native interests will be protected by the Colonial Office have not been sufficient to reassure the Africans.

39. We do not believe that the Europeans who dominate the federal government will take sufficient action to convince Africans of their good intentions. The Europeans believe the economic advantages brought by federation will benefit the natives to such an extent that Africans will be reconciled to a white-controlled federal government.

However, for the foreseeable future, federation will be of greater benefit to European than African interests. With the main functions of government firmly in European hands, the areas of principal economic development will be those of primary benefit to the white settlers. Africans will benefit somewhat from any increase in general prosperity, but they will almost certainly consider their share negligible compared to that of the white settlers. In any depressed economic situation Europeans would probably use their political power to minimize decreases in their own share of the national income.

40. The Federation's European leaders appear sincere in their desire to avoid a racial policy based on the principle of "apartheid." However, because of self-interest, it is unlikely that racial partnership will ever reach the stage where the senior partner voluntarily grants equal status to the junior. The majority of Africans may temporarily appear reconciled to federation, but a hard core of dissidents probably will continue to agitate against it. Within the next decade the basic African-European conflicts probably will erupt in sporadic violence.

41. *British East Africa* (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar). So long as Tanganyika retains its UN Trusteeship status, no political federation is feasible for these territories, despite white settler demands for closer association. However, a measure of economic union does exist. UK Colonial Office control of East Africa is likely to continue for some years. Racial tensions and the need for economic development are East Africa's major problems.

42. In Kenya, the chief immediate problem is the outbreak of violence perpetrated by the Mau Mau, a fanatic secret society composed of members of the Kikuyu tribe. While the British eventually will suppress the organized terrorist activities of the Mau Mau, Kenya will recover very slowly from the shock of the conflict and a serious native problem will remain. Lands allotted to the natives are inadequate to support the increasing population; many natives are forced to leave these lands and are unable to find other employment. British efforts to make more land available meet the double obstacle of white settler reluctance to yield any of the fertile highlands and the high cost of clearing other land. Thus the Africans in Kenya face a deterioration in their economic situation. Neither Africans nor white settlers are psychologically ready for the adjustments necessary if further friction and violence are to be avoided. Moreover, both groups are suspicious of the intentions of the Indian population. The struggle among these three groups and the struggle of the groups with the UK for a larger share in the colony's government will be prolonged and bitter. Furthermore, because of its limited economic base, Kenya will remain dependent on considerable outside assistance, especially if resettlement and educational programs are to be undertaken on the scale required to solve its long-term problems.

43. Owing in part to less acute economic pressures and the smaller non-native population, there are good racial relations in Tanganyika and Uganda. These good relations are likely to continue unless an economic crisis occurs. However, probable continuing friction in Kenya will test severely interracial harmony in these neighboring territories.

44. The rapid growth of British East Africa's Indian community is regarded by the territorial governments and the white settlers as a menace to European predominance and as a threat to economic opportunities for African natives; many Africans share the latter view. The Indian population in 1948 was 168,500 about four times as large as the European. Its rapid growth is the result of high birth rates and extensive immigration, though the latter has declined following restrictive legislation in 1948. Large numbers of Indians have long been resident in East Africa and are strongly entrenched in the business community. They object to economic, social, and political discrimination in favor of Europeans. However, only a small but probably growing radical group of Hindus is vigorously articulate against the territorial governments on that issue.

45. Most Indians are politically inactive and will continue to avoid close collaboration with dissident Africans. They fear that African anti-European sentiment eventually might become antiforeign and endanger Indian interests. However, the radical Indian elements will seek increasingly to collaborate with Africans to make common cause against white domination, probably on the pattern of South Africa, unless their demands for greater political representation are satisfied. The Government of India has voiced in the UN and elsewhere its intense interest in the Indian community's welfare, and may raise the question in the UNGA. India probably regards East Africa as a future sphere of influence and may increase its attempted intervention in African affairs. It is possible that, as many whites in East Africa believe, New Delhi is providing guidance for local Indian political leaders. Thus the presence of the Indian population complicates solution of East Africa's racial and political problems and creates a source of international friction.

46. *Belgian Congo.* The Congo, under paternalistic Belgian control, is one of the least restive colonial dependencies in Tropical Africa. The racial problem is not yet an issue in the Congo, largely because the government has discouraged both European settlement and political advances for either race. Belgium has instituted relatively progressive economic and social programs for Africans but its policy is to keep the area under close metropolitan control. The Belgian Government has an important influence on all industrial developments in the Congo.

47. However, the administration is aware of growing discontent among detribalized and semieducated Congolese, as well as of the inevitability of local repercussions from events elsewhere in Tropical

Africa. The Belgians therefore are planning to permit limited native participation in local government.

48. In the long run, Belgium is likely to be faced with increased African political and economic demands. The Belgian Government probably would suppress serious political disorders with force. However, if convinced of the strength and inevitability of African pressure, it probably would eventually grant extensive concessions in order to forestall continuing disorders and safeguard Belgium's economic interests.

49. *French West and French Equatorial Africa.*¶ French control of West and Equatorial Africa nowhere appears threatened by the social and political situation. The two federations are members of the French Union and are represented in the French National Assembly and Council of the Republic, as well as in the Assembly of the French Union. However, the territorial governments are controlled by Europeans despite African predominance in the advisory assemblies. France's colonial policy thus far envisages political and cultural assimilation of these territories to the metropole, with only a gradual increase in African participation in local government.

50. The great majority of natives outside the few urban centers in French Africa are illiterate and uninterested in political events beyond their tribal areas. Most politically articulate Africans appear to value their connection with France and to look for further advancement within the framework of the French Union. There are many political parties in these territories but, except in Senegal, they are primarily concerned with local issues. The once pro-Communist Democratic African Rally, which is still an important political factor in the Ivory Coast and perhaps in the French Sudan, is now generally cooperative with the French administration.

51. Nevertheless, as neighboring British West Africa moves further toward independence, small political groups in the French areas are seeking increased local autonomy within the French Union. Over a long period dissatisfaction with French colonial policy may increase to the point where African nationalist leaders will demand full self-government within the French Union, if not complete independence. However, the immensity, isolation, diversity, and poverty of these territories tend to impede the rapid development of any effective independence movement, and encourage regional movements within each federation. Political discontent probably would develop first in relatively accessible and economically important coastal areas of Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and French Guinea, and would spread only very slowly into the interior over a period of years.

¶West Africa: Senegal, French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, French Sudan, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta. Equatorial Africa: Gabon, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Chad. [Footnote in the source text.]

52. *Portuguese Colonies* (Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea). Widespread political disorders among Africans in the Portuguese dependencies are unlikely in the foreseeable future. The rate of social and economic change has been slow, and there has been little or no African political activity. Portugal is not likely to revise its conservative colonial policies. Interracial relations do not appear to be a significant problem, largely because the basis of political and social distinction officially is not race but the degree of assimilation of metropolitan culture. Forced recruitment of native labor in Angola and Mozambique generates resentment, which, however, probably will find no important outlet. Development of native political consciousness will continue to be retarded by illiteracy, tribal ethnocentrism, and autocratic colonial administration. The fact that some Africans can qualify for Portuguese citizenship and the absence of a color bar also will deter the growth of political opposition to European control.

53. *Liberia.* Well into the present century Liberia remained one of the least developed areas in Tropical Africa; the government, controlled by a small "elite" composed of descendants of American slaves returned to Africa, exercised authority over only a narrow coastal strip of territory. In recent years US economic assistance and the development of Liberia's rubber and iron resources through private foreign investment have opened the interior, broadened the economic base, and involved a small though increasing number of natives in a cash economy. On the other hand, pressures for social and political change are growing only at a slow pace, largely because of the cultural and physical isolation of the communities of the interior. Nevertheless, the process of economic change probably will necessitate eventual adjustments in Liberia's autocratic system of government. Although the ruling class itself is likely to become divided over the implementation of even limited reforms, the oligarchic character of the government probably will not be significantly changed, at least in the short term. Over the long term, political instability in Liberia will almost certainly increase.

54. *Ethiopia.* The federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea is leading to widespread dissatisfaction in the latter area due to Ethiopia's tendency to ignore the local autonomy assured Eritrea by the UN. The federation increasingly will be dominated by Ethiopia despite Eritrean protests.

55. The succession to the Imperial throne of Ethiopia traditionally has provoked a dynastic contest, with army control a major determinant of the issue. The chance of temporary disorder whenever the succession question next arises has been reduced, but not eliminated, by the central government's growing power over the provinces. The territorial integrity of Ethiopia probably will remain intact.

IV. *Outlook for preservation of Western control*

56. The breakdown or overthrow of existing authority is nowhere imminent in Tropical Africa. We believe that the colonial powers will undertake the policy adjustments and retain the security capabilities necessary to prevent African discontent from erupting in large-scale revolutionary violence over at least the next decade. However, such adjustments probably will not keep pace with African demands. Territorial governments probably will not have access to sufficient developmental funds to satisfy economic demands. Moreover, the objective of Africans ultimately will be full equality of status, which in practice would mean domination of the whites by the natives. As a result, occasional outbursts and even some concerted violence are probable, especially in areas of heavy white settlement. Such disorders probably would interrupt economic activity and discourage further private investment.

57. Over a long period there will almost certainly be an uneven and uneasy transition from colonial to self-rule. Political control by the European powers already is diminishing in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Italian Somaliland, and similar trends will almost certainly develop elsewhere in Tropical Africa. Nevertheless, if they so choose, the European powers probably can retain control of their dependencies in the foreseeable future.

58. Emerging self-governing areas probably will experience considerable instability. Like many newly independent Middle and Far Eastern states, they probably will adopt anti-colonial policies and neutralist positions in the conflict between the Soviet Bloc and the Western Powers.

V. *Strategic consequences of probable developments*

59. In the short run, Tropical African exports of strategic and essential raw materials will increase as development plans now in progress are completed. However, production costs of strategically significant raw materials will be increased by African pressures for more social benefits and higher wages. In the longer run, disorder and unrest arising from economic and political causes are likely to impair the production and transport of such materials and to decrease the availability of military manpower. Of the important producing areas, the Belgian Congo probably will be the most stable, while British West Africa and probably British Central Africa will become less dependable sources of supply. As the territories of British West Africa move toward political independence they will want to control, or at least obtain a greater share in the management of their own economic resources; attempts to achieve these ends probably will involve a loss of efficiency and production.

60. Prospective disorders in Tropical Africa probably will require

commitments of European armed forces and matériel beyond present levels, but not to a degree which would seriously burden the metropoles. Such unrest probably will hamper but will not prevent Western use of military facilities in event of war.

61. Developments in Tropical Africa also are likely to have some external repercussions. The way in which the Western Powers respond to African aspirations and react to prospective disorders may affect Western relations with Arab and Asian countries. These countries increasingly will regard Western policies toward colonial problems as indicative of the Western attitude toward all underdeveloped nations. India probably will continue to denounce the treatment of Asians in Africa. Moreover, African unrest will be used by the Soviet Bloc as a propaganda weapon against the NATO powers.

Appendix A

1951 Production of Selected Commodities in Tropical Africa

(in thousands of metric tons unless otherwise indicated)

Commodity	*Chief Producers*	*Production of Chief Producers*	*Total Tropical African Production*	*Percentage of Free World Production*
A. *Minerals*				
Columbite	Nigeria	1.097	1.218	94
	Belgian Congo	.095		
Diamonds (Industrial and gem)	Belgian Congo	10,565.0*	14,044.0*	84
	Gold Coast	1,632.0*		
Cobalt	Belgian Congo	5.9	6.6	78
	Northern Rhodesia	0.7		
Manganese	Gold Coast	425.0	487.4	24
Copper	Northern Rhodesia	314.1	519.0	22
	Belgian Congo	192.0		
Chrome	Southern Rhodesia	144.1	149.6	16
Vanadium	South West Africa	0.529	0.616	16
Tin	Belgian Congo	13.9	23.0	14
	Nigeria	8.7		
Cadmium	South West Africa	650.4†	674.7†	12
Graphite	Madagascar	18.3	18.3	11
Asbestos	Southern Rhodesia	70.5	102.6	9
	Swaziland	31.7		
Uranium	Belgian Congo	‡	‡	‡
B. *Agricultural Commodities*				
Palm Oil and Kernels	Nigeria	505.0	961.0	80
	Belgian Congo	214.0		
Sisal	Tanganyika	148.0	245.0	68
Cocoa	Gold Coast	214.0	444.7	66
	Nigeria	107.0		
Peanuts	French West Africa	780.0	1,824.0	26
	Nigeria	470.0		
Coffee			308.7	13
Rubber	Liberia	35.4	72.0	4

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*Thousand metric carats. [Footnote in the source text.]

† Thousand kilograms. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡Not available. [Footnote in the source text.]

Appendix B

Population of Tropical Africa

(in thousands)

Territory	*Total Population Mid-1951 Estimate*	*Non-Native Population*		
		European	*Indian*	*Other and not Stated*
Ethiopia–Eritrea	16, 100	27. 0	*	16. 0
Liberia	1, 600	*	*	0. 5
Belgian Congo and Ruanda Urundi	15, 375	70. 0	2. 5	2. 5
British Territories				
British West Africa				
Gold Coast and Togoland	4, 330	4. 4	1. 0	1. 3
Nigeria and Cameroons	26, 000	7. 0	*	5. 0
Sierra Leone	2, 000	1. 0	*	2. 0
Gambia	280	0. 3	*	0. 1
British Central Africa				
Southern Rhodesia	2, 160	152. 0	4. 6	*
Northern Rhodesia	1, 950	37. 0	2. 6	*
Nyasaland	2, 400	3. 8	5. 2	2. 0
British East Africa				
Kenya	5, 680	30. 0	98. 0	28. 0
Uganda	5, 190	3. 4	35. 0	2. 3
Tanganyika	7, 830	11. 0	46. 0	13. 0
Zanzibar	270	0. 3	15. 0	49. 0
High Commission Territories				
Bechuanaland	290	2. 4	0. 1	1. 1
Basutoland	580	1. 7	0. 3	0. 6
Swaziland	200	3. 2	*	0. 7
British Somaliland	500	*	*	*
Portuguese Territories				
Angola	4, 130	79. 0	*	26. 0
Mozambique	5, 780	48. 0	13. 0	27. 0
Portuguese Guinea	520	2. 3	*	5. 4
French Territories				
French Equatorial Africa and Cameroons	7, 610	28. 0	*	1. 5
French Somaliland	55	2. 0	*	*
French West Africa & Togoland	18, 210	54. 0	*	45. 0
Madagascar	4, 370	57. 0	17. 0	*
Italian Somaliland	1, 250	4. 0	0	*
Rio Muni (Spanish)	135	1. 5	*	*
South West Africa (Union of South Africa mandate)	420	49. 0	*	*
Total	135, 215	679. 3	240. 3	229. 0

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*Not available.

Note: Total population figures are UN estimates published in April 1953. Non-native population figures are based on reported census and official estimates between 1948 and 1952 with the exception of the British High Commission Territories and Rio Muni, which are for 1946 and 1942 respectively. Of the non-native population, European includes Americans, and Indian includes Pakistanis and Goans. [Footnote in the source text.]

770.5/1-1854

The British Ambassador (Makins) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 10

Ref: 1198/2/54

SIR: Her Majesty's Ambassador for the United Kingdom presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to recall that a conference, which was held at Nairobi on the initiative of the Governments of the United Kingdom and South Africa in August 1951 [1] completed a study of facilities for the movement of troops and military supplies on the lines of communication between the south of Africa and the Middle East in the event of the security of the African Continent being threatened. In order to complete this study the United Kingdom and French Governments believe that it would be of value to hold a second conference to cover the western territories of Africa, south of the Sahara, which were not included on that occasion, with particular reference to lines of communication "South-North and West-East". In this connexion it is necessary to include certain territories again which were in the area covered by the Nairobi Conference, in view of their importance for these routes. The area to be covered would include:—

Angola
French Equatorial Africa
French West Africa
Cameroons under British trusteeship
Cameroons under French trusteeship
Belgian Congo
Gold Coast
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Gambia
Portuguese Guinea
Cape Verde Islands
Islands of Principe and Sao Thome
Liberia
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Togoland under British trusteeship
Togoland under French trusteeship
Union of South Africa.

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[1] For a summary account of the African Defence Facilities Conference held at Nairobi, Aug. 21–31, 1951, see the editorial note and telegram 14, Aug. 25, 1951, from Nairobi, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1227 and 1228.



TROPICAL AFRICA

Important airfield
Naval base
COLONIES, PROTECTORATES, ETC.
TRUST TERRITORIES
United Kingdom
France
Belgium
Portugal (OVERSEAS PROVINCE)
Spain
Italy
Union of South Africa
MANDATE
National or colonial capital
Railroad, selected
Scale 1:37,500,000
0
500
1000
1500
Statute Miles
0
500
1000
1500
Kilometers
15
0
15
30
45
30
15
0
15
30
TANGIER (Int. Zone)
SPANISH MOROCCO
MOROCCO
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
LIBYA
EGYPT
CANARY ISLANDS
IFNI
SPANISH SAHARA
FRENCH WEST AFRICA
SENEGAL
Dakar
Bathurst
GAMBIA
Koulikoro
Bissau
PORT. GUINEA
FRENCH GUINEA
Kankan
Conakry
Freetown
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
Monrovia
Roberts Field
IVORY COAST
Bobo-Dioulasso
GOLD COAST
Kumasi
Sekondi
Takoradi
Port Bouet
Accra
TOGO
Lomé
DAHOMEY
Porto-Novo
Lagos
Ibadan
NIGERIA
Kaura Namoda
Kano
Nguru
Maiduguri
Jos
Enugu
Port Harcourt
CAMEROONS
Buea
Douala
Yaoundé
(Spain) FERNANDO PO
Santa Isabel
(Port.) PRÍNCIPE
SÃO TOMÉ (Port.)
RIO MUNI
FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN
ERITREA
Massaua
Asmara
FRENCH SOMALILAND
Djibouti
Hargeisa
BRITISH SOMALILAND
Addis Ababa
Bishoftu
ETHIOPIA
ITALIAN SOMALILAND
Mogadiscio
UGANDA
Entebbe
KENYA
Nairobi
Mombasa
Congo R.
Stanleyville
Ponthierville
BELGIAN CONGO
Kindu
Usumbura
RUANDA URUNDI
Mwanza
Kigoma
Kabalo
Albertville
Kamina
Bukama
Port Francqui
Kasai
Brazzaville
Pointe Noire
CABINDA
Leopoldville
Matadi
Boma
Luanda
Lobito
Benguela
ANGOLA
Elisabethville
TANGANYIKA
Dar es Salaam
ZANZIBAR (U.K.)
SEYCHELLES ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES (U.K.)
COMOROS (Fr.)
Diégo Suarez
NYASALAND
Salima
NORTHERN RHODESIA
Lusaka
Zomba
MOZAMBIQUE
Beira
Livingstone
SOUTHERN RHODESIA
Salisbury
Kentucky
Bulawayo
Beitbridge
Tsumeb
Grootfontein
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
Windhoek
WALVIS BAY (U. of S. Af.)
Walvis Bay
Lüderitz
BECHUANALAND
Mafeking
Pretoria
Johannesburg
Lourenço Marques
Mbabane
SWAZILAND
Hlatikulu
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
BASUTOLAND
Maseru
Durban
Cape Town
Port Elizabeth
WALVIS BAY
Tananarive
Antsirabe
MADAGASCAR
MAURITIUS (U.K.)
RÉUNION (Fr.)

The United Kingdom and French Governments have therefore decided jointly to convene a conference of the interested African powers to be held at Dakar on March 1, 1954.[2]

The United Kingdom and French Governments have considered the problems involved and have prepared the attached list of subjects which they propose should form the agenda of the conference. The agenda is further explained in the accompanying memorandum.[3] As will be seen most of the subjects listed are predominantly technical and such as to give rise to problems largely of a practical nature, which will be of equal interest to the civil and military authorities of the governments and administrations concerned.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France therefore hope that the United States Government will be willing to send an observer to this conference which will do for West Africa what the Nairobi Conference accomplished for Central and Eastern Africa thus making a further contribution to the security of the African Continent and marking the continued co-operation between the African powers. The United Kingdom and French Governments on this occasion intend their delegations to be led by officials. As at Nairobi, they will include in their delegations technical experts and officials from certain of the various territories concerned. If the United States Government agree to send an observer, the United Kingdom and French Governments would be glad to be informed as soon as possible in order to enable accommodation arrangements to be made in good time.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France are sending joint invitations to the Governments of Belgium, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Liberia, Portugal and the Union of South Africa.[4]

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1954.

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[2] The Department of State was informed in early February 1954 that the conference had been postponed until Mar. 11 in order to allow more time for preparation.

[3] The memorandum under reference was not found attached to the source text, and no other copy has been found in Department of State files.

[4] An identical note (in French) was presented by the French Embassy on Jan. 19, 1954.

In identical notes of Mar. 5, the Acting Secretary of State accepted the invitation for American representation at the forthcoming African Defence Facilities Conference. The following individuals were designated as the official observers of the United States:

Brig. Gen. John P. Doyle, Air Force
Col. Edward L. Rehmann, Army
Lt. Col. Ronald D. Bagley, Air Force
Lt. Col. Cecil C. Snoddy, Army
C. Vaughn Ferguson, American Consul, Dakar. (770.5/1-1854)

870.411/2–2354

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister-Counselor at the Embassy in India (Mills)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW DELHI,] February 11, 1954.

Participants: Dr. Max Yergan, American Negro Leader
Sheldon T. Mills, Minister-Counselor
William L. Blue, First Secretary
Andrew V. Corry, Minerals Attaché
American Embassy, New Delhi

Early in February Mr. Minoo Masani brought Dr. Yergan to the Chancery to meet Ambassador Allen. Later that evening Ambassador Allen entertained Dr. Yergan and his white American wife at tea at his residence.

Dr. Yergan left the next day with his wife for a visit to Simla, returning on February 11. The undersigned got in touch with him on his return and invited him to come to the Chancery for a discussion.

Dr. Yergan stated that he had spent some 17 years in South Africa largely in YMCA work and had visited Africa many times since. He also had visited India a number of times, the first visit being in 1928 when he had stayed in Allahabad with Sir Motilal Nehru, the father of the Prime Minister.

The Embassy officers who spoke with Dr. Yergan were primarily interested in his views on Africa. He was of the opinion that the Mau Mau leaders in Kenya were being exploited by Communists. He said that Kenyatta, when in the United Kingdom, associated closely with fellow travelers if not with Communists. He was also of the opinion that Apa B. Pant, now relinquishing his post as Indian High Commissioner in Nairobi, was either utterly naive or very calculating in his relations with Mau Mau leaders. In any case he was very involved in local affairs and Yergan cited as an example of this his attitude towards the school run by the Kenyatta faction. Yergan told Pant that he thought it was a mistake for the government to allow this group to maintain separate schools which concentrated on politics rather than education. Pant took strong objection to Yergan's position. A year or two ago Dr. Yergan was in Kenya and until he could "escape" was a house guest of Mr. Pant. On this occasion the latter organized a reception in his honor. It was postponed in order that Mau Mau leaders might attend, although Dr. Yergan correctly told Pant that they would not come because they disliked his views on Communists, etc.

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[1] The source text was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1326, Feb. 23, 1954, from New Delhi which read as follows:

"As of possible interest to the Department, there is enclosed a memorandum of conversation between Dr. Max Yergan, American Negro leader, and officers of the Embassy."

Dr. Yergan is of the opinion that the Indians in East Africa hope to supplant the whites as the dominant group and that they are cultivating the blacks and trying to identify themselves with the latter party with this principal object in view. Their other objective is to prevent if possible the black majority from turning its hatred towards them. In this connection he noted that the number of Indians killed by the Mau Mau was very small. Without mentioning the recommendations which the Embassy has learned in a confidential manner have been made to the Government of India by Sardar Pannikar, until recently Indian Ambasador in Cairo, namely that India seize the opportunity of building up a new home for its surplus population in Central Africa, an Embassy officer questioned Dr. Yergan regarding Indian ambitions in this area. (The questioner had in mind that vast highland in Central Africa consisting of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as well as the highlands of Uganda and Kenya.) He stated that the Ugandas are very lightly populated and probably could be developed and sustain a much larger population. He did not think of them, however, as a great unoccupied area where Europeans or Indians could build up a great overseas outlet for population (Dr. Yergan did not refer to the Central African Federation for some reason.) With regard to West Africa, Dr. Yergan seemed to feel that both the British and the Belgians are following very enlightened policies and that African leaders increasingly are assuming positions of responsibility.

There was not much talk of South Africa. Dr. Yergan stated, however, that the English element there, which is a minority, had a much more enlightened view of race relations than did the Africans.

It was apparent from the conversation regarding India that Dr. Yergan is much under the influence of Minoo Masani. Like the latter he referred to Mr. Nehru as a semi-dictator and seemed surprised at the view of the Embassy Officers with whom he spoke, namely that Nehru is attempting to make the Parliamentary and Democratic regime of the new constitution work. Although during a visit to India a year or two ago Dr. Yergan had seen Mr. Nehru and a number of other Government of India leaders, he stated that on this visit he was purposely refraining from trying to make such contacts.

Dr. Yergan seemed to be sincere and very knowledgeable with respect to Africa. He stated quite frankly that he had been mislead by the Communists immediately after the war and that when he discovered that they were attempting to use American Negroes merely to advance their own designs, he came out in strong opposition to all Communists and fellow travelers. Dr. Yergan also stated that the United States did not have to apologize to anyone at the present time on the question of race relations for very significant and steady progress is being made in this field. He spoke of his sons who have been in the military service as officers and who assured him that their experience did not include any objectionable discrimination.

SHELDON T. MILLS

770.5/2–1854

The Counselor of the Embassy in France (Joyce) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, February 18, 1954.

No. 2138

Reference: Dakar despatch 156 of Jan 8/54 [1]

Subject: West African Defense Facilities Conference at Dakar

The Paris press has made only brief reference to the West African Defense Facilities Conference, which is to open at Dakar on March 11, stating that its essential objective is to study the possibilities which Central and South African territories offer in the fields of infrastructure—routes, installations, equipment, airdromes—and to draw up a balance sheet of the "facilities" which the participants will ultimately be able to find in the neighboring African territories.

The Embassy understands that the French delegation to the Conference is to be headed by M. Jean Mons, Permanent Secretary of National Defense, and that the leading military representative will be General of the Air Force Piollet, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Zone of Central Africa. The British delegation is to be headed by Sir Harold Parker, Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defense. The principal military representative will be Air Marshal S. E. Strafford, Inspector General of the Royal Air Force. A complete list of the United Kingdom delegation, which this Embassy received from the British Embassy, is enclosed [2] although it has doubtless already been made available to the Department.

Recent conversations on the Conference with M. Jean Jurgensen, Chief of the African Section of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have not yielded any particularly significant commentary. He did, however, advance the view that it would be advisable for the U.S. Government to limit the number of its observers to three or four, pointing out that several of the governments participating fully in the Conference (and not as observers) would be represented by only three or four delegates, with perhaps none having higher rank than Colonel. United States participation on this modest scale, he felt, would find more wholehearted acceptance by the other governments.

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[1] Not printed; it reported preliminary information on the holding of the African Defence Facilities Conference at Dakar. (770.5/1–854)

[2] The list is not printed here; the U.K. Delegation comprised 19 officers.

Jurgensen commented that the French had not been particularly enthusiastic over the participation in the Conference of the Central African Federation but had acceded at the request of the British. More recently, the French had suggested to the British that Brazil be invited, but the British had objected and in view of the rather late date the project was abandoned. Jurgensen implied that when the next Conference on West African Defense is held, the French will certainly press for Brazilian participation.

The question of informing the NATO Standing Group of the results of this Conference will probably arise at the Conference, Jurgensen believes. The French are inclined to the view that the results should be submitted officially to the Standing Group rather than come to its attention through informal channels, a procedure favored by the British. He suggested that it might be useful for the U.S. observers to be prepared to advance the U.S. view on this issue, should it arise at the Conference.

ROBERT P. JOYCE

870.00/2-1954

The Counselor of the Embassy in France (Joyce) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, February 19, 1954.

No. 2142

Subject: Ninth Session of the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa [1]

The Ninth Session of the "Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara" took place in London January 18–26. France was represented by three delegates: M. Jean Jurgensen, Chief of the African Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; M. Lavery, his Assistant, and M. Peyronnet of the Ministry of Overseas France. The report of the work of the Ninth Session was carried in a special bulletin of the Agence France Presse on January 26, a translation of which is enclosed.[2]

In a recent conversation with the reporting officer, Messrs. Jurgensen and Lavery expressed satisfaction over the London meeting and the future prospects of the Commission. They felt that while the latter had gotten off to a very slow start, perhaps inevitable because of the number of countries involved and the novelty of cooperating on a regional basis in Africa, it was now beginning to function more satisfactorily and contained the seeds of a fruitful common activity, limited for the moment to the economic and social fields but with political potentialities for the future.

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[1] For the report of an earlier meeting of the Commission, see despatch 325, July 16, 1953, from London, p. 47.

[2] Not printed.

To date the principal accomplishment of the Commission has been in setting up research bureaus in various fields for collecting and exchanging information on mutual problems encountered in the African territories of the members. Only one project—a Climatological Atlas of Africa—involving joint financing is under way. However, substantial development in the field of joint financing of regional projects can be expected. One project in particular which in the French view should be handled on this basis is a campaign against treponemiosis which is prevalent in French West Africa and adjoining British and Portuguese territories. A campaign carried on alone by France will serve little purpose unless extended to other areas where the disease is prevalent and in the Gold Coast, in particular, this presents a financing problem.

The Ministry officials commented that France would like membership in the Commission extended to include Liberia, Ethiopia and Italy (because of Italian Somaliland) so that it would become a truly regional body and not one made up entirely of the so-called colonial powers. The principal obstacle to such an extension is the Union of South Africa. The problem will perhaps become more acute when the Gold Coast achieves Commonwealth status. As it is, the relationship of Great Britain to its African colonies has complicated the activities of the Commission for, while all matters have to be dealt with through the British Government, the latter is frequently in the position of not being able to reach decisions until consultation with the territories involved. As yet, this situation does not pose a very serious problem but it may become worse as the political status of the various territories undergoes change.

The Embassy assumes that the London Embassy will be forwarding the Department the text of the Convention which was signed by the member Governments on January 18 and which gave legal status to the Commission. The French text has not yet been printed for public distribution.[3]

ROBERT P. JOYCE

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[3] The text of the convention appears not to have been transmitted by the Embassy in London.

S/P-NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Memorandum by Harry H. Schwartz of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director, Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 2, 1954.

Subject: Africa

The subject of "Africa (entire continent)" is on the Planning Board because apparently the Vice President mentioned to General Cutler some time back that he was worried about developments in that area. Cutler has put the item on, then, for discussion tomorrow from two points of view: (*a*) what should be included in a paper on Africa? and (*b*) what are the important problems there about which we might be doing something?

Just about a year ago State drafted a paper on French North Africa and Libya. In August the Planning Board (both you and Cutler were absent that day) discussed the attached draft of August 18.[1] The Sultan of Morocco had just been deposed by the French, and the other members of the Planning Board were irritated by this fact, by the difficulties encountered with the French on EDC and Indochina, and were disinclined to do other than criticize any paper which, like this one, states that our policy must thread its way between general North African interests on the one hand and French interests on the other. The paper has been lying dormant ever since, and I suggest that, although like any other NSC paper its language can probably be improved, the policy itself is good enough until someone produces a better one. Finally, of course, the problems of North Africa have very little connection with Africa south of the Sahara.

With respect to the area south of the Sahara and north of the Union of South Africa there is quite a good National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-83, attached,[2] and NEA has prepared a draft statement of policy—also attached,[3] but less helpful. It is less helpful because, I think, the problems are not the kind which call for NSC policy guidance so much as they do for patience. As you will see from the attached draft, the only policy guidance that has a very clear-cut nature is contained in paragraph 10. This states that while the U.S. believes in eventual self-determination for all peoples we also believe that this development should be both evolutionary and orderly.

In Kenya, British Central Africa, and the Union there are serious racial problems (blacks, whites, and Indians). *If* there is any policy question to which the NSC might profitably address itself, it probably narrows down to this question of the warring races. But even here it is doubtful whether any really helpful policy decisions could be made which would give guidance to people working in the field which they don't already have. At any rate, however, this problem is the most important one for the Planning Board to discuss.

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[1] Not found attached, but see S/P-NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa."

[2] NIE-83, Dec. 22, 1953, was not attached to the source text; for the text, see p. 71.

[3] Not attached, but presumably the same as the draft statement of policy prepared by NEA and printed *infra*.

Looking at the Union of South Africa alone, there is also the problem of the Afrikans vs. the British and the connection between this friction and the continuation of the Union in the Commonwealth. On this problem also I have some doubts about the degree of profit to be extracted from an NSC paper on this subject.

Attached also is a draft on the Union which is fairly informative.[4]

HARRY H. SCHWARTZ

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[4] The draft paper under reference here cannot be further identified. It was not found attached to the source text.

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

STATEMENT OF POLICY PROPOSED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO TROPICAL AFRICA

OBJECTIVES

1. The objectives of the United States with respect to the area comprising Tropical Africa* are:

a. The social, political and economic advancement of the people of Africa has rapidly as practicable—as an end in itself and also as a means of convincing them that their individual and national aspirations can best be achieved through continued association with the free nations of the world.

b. The assurance of political and economic stability and flexibility sufficient to prevent its domination in whole or in part by unfriendly movements or powers through subversion.

c. Maintenance of the strategic interests of the U.S. and its allies, including access to strategic raw materials, as a means of strengthening the free world.

d. Advancement of U.S. business interests, including the securing of non-discriminatory treatment for U.S. nationals.

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[1] The editors have been unable to determine the authorship and other circumstances attending the preparation of this paper. It is presumably the same paper submitted by Schwartz to Bowie and cited in Schwartz' memorandum of Mar. 2, *supra*.

*For the purpose of this paper, Tropical Africa includes the 32 countries (excluding Madagascar) listed in Appendix B of NIE–83 of December 22, 1953. [Footnote in the source text; for the text of Appendix B to NIE–83, see p. 89.]

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. The strategic importance of Tropical Africa arises chiefly from its supply of such materials as uranium, cobalt, diamonds, and columbite; from its location with respect to sea and air lanes in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean and Red Sea areas; and from its potentials as a site for lines of communications, staging, and training facilities.

3. Tropical Africa is of considerable economic value to the major African colonial powers, especially the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Portugal. Loss or disruption of the resources and trade of Tropical Africa would not be catastrophic but would necessitate substantial adjustments in their economies.

4. The political importance of Tropical Africa to the nations of the free world lies in the value to be derived from having its population of 135,000,000 Africans associated with the free world in its present and continuing world-wide struggle against the Soviet bloc.

5. The above strategic, economic and political factors are important enough to the over-all position of the free world to require that it is in the security interest of the United States to take whatever appropriate measures it can, in the light of its other global commitments, to assist in the achievement of the objectives stated above.

6. At present, the danger in this area to the security of the free world arises not from the threat of direct Soviet military attack, but from (*a*) rising African dissatisfaction with the rate and manner in which their growing aspirations are being realized, (*b*) the instability of native institutions resulting from the impact of Western technology and culture, and (*c*) the effect of political, economic, and social developments in the area on the attitude and policies of other countries, particularly those of the anti-colonial Arab-Asian and Latin American groups.

7. Current acute or critical situations affecting free world and, therefore, United States interests are (*a*) the influence of South African white supremacy doctrines on political developments throughout the area, (*b*) the growth of African nationalism, particularly in British West Africa, and its effects on the neighboring territories, (*c*) African-white settler tensions, such as the British-Mau Mau racial struggle in Kenya, and (*d*) the future political status and orientation of the UN Trust Territories and the continuing consideration thereof by the UN Trusteeship Council and the UN General Assembly.

POLICIES AND COURSES OF ACTION

The Area as a Whole.

8. The United States should seek to create an atmosphere which will assure it continued access to the strategic materials and logistical resources of the area, and upon the threat of and during general hostilities, the right to avail itself of these raw materials and resources in

the conduct of military operations, either in the area itself or in areas proximate to it.

9. As a means of diminishing the threat to Western interests posed by nationalist demands and by political instability in the area, the United States should make the most practicable use of economic, technical and, where applicable, military assistance so as to influence the process of political change to effect the best compromise of Western interests and to offer the maximum promise of stable non-Communist regimes.

Dependent Tropical Africa.

10. The United States policy towards dependent Tropical Africa should take into careful consideration the continuing ferment and widespread instability as well as the differing rates of political, social and economic progress already attained or likely to be attained in the relatively near future in the countries comprising this area. While the United States believes in eventual self-determination for all peoples, and believes that evolutionary development to this end should move forward with minimum delay, it should strive to insure that this development is, in fact, both evolutionary and orderly. These considerations should guide U.S. actions in the United Nations Trusteeship Council and General Assembly committees and in the UN specialized agencies when the non-self-governing territories of Tropical Africa are under consideration. They should also guide the actions of the United States in its bilateral dealings with the metropolitan powers.

11. The United States should continue to recognize the valid elements in the policy and approach taken by each of the metropolitan powers towards its dependencies in Tropical Africa, and should seek only to insure that each of these powers continues to discharge its obligations and responsibilities as set forth in the United Nations Charter. While the United States should be much concerned about the direction, pace and rate of advance of these dependencies towards greater autonomy and self-determination, it should not dogmatically lend its support to any arbitrary timetable for the more or less uniform attainment of self-government in widely differing territories. The United States should avoid the extremes of either pressing for demonstrably premature and not solidly-based independent or self-governing status for them or of lending support to demonstrably inexcusable procrastination by the metropolitan powers, regarding the pace of their advance.

Independent Tropical Africa (Liberia, Ethiopia–Eritrea)

12. The principal objectives of United States policy towards the independent countries of Tropical Africa should be to continue (*a*) to try to influence their governments towards the building of sound

democratic and integrated societies, (*b*) to support and assist, as appropriate, their governments in their political relations with other countries, (*c*) to help further their economic development in a balanced, orderly manner, (*d*) to encourage private investment and commercial activities in them by Americans, (*e*) to assist their governments in their social, educational and vocational development programs, and (*f*) to insure itself the use of their strategic facilities, especially in times of national emergency or war, and to assist their governments to improve the training and preparedness of their present military forces.

Editorial Note

"U.S. Security Interests in the continent of Africa" was the heading of the third of three subjects discussed by the National Security Council Planning Board at its meeting on March 3, 1954. The Board had before it a memorandum of March 4, 1953, for the Senior Staff of the National Security Council on North Africa; NIE–83, December 22, 1954, page 71; NIE–69, not printed; and NIE–72, October 20, 1952, page 953. According to the Record of Meeting of the Planning Board, the following agreement was reached:

"*a.* Planning Board Members should submit check-lists of the more important U.S. security interests in Africa.

"*b.* On the basis of such lists, the Planning Board should prepare an agreed list of subjects relating to Africa to which further study should be devoted.

"*c.* The Department of State should revise the draft staff study on North Africa dated March 4, 1953." (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Planning Board Records")

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the National Security Council Planning Board [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

AFRICA

MAJOR U.S. INTERESTS

1. Security of actual and potential U.S. military bases in the area,

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[1] This paper was transmitted to the NSC Planning Board by NSC Executive Secretary Lay on Mar. 17, 1954 under cover of a memorandum which read as follows:

"The enclosed list of major U.S. interests in Africa, prepared in the NSC Staff, is transmitted for the use of the Planning Board in its discussion of the subject scheduled for Monday, March 22.

"It is anticipated that various Planning Board Members will submit similar lists, pursuant to the agreement in the Planning Board meeting of March 3."

Regarding the Planning Board meeting of Mar. 3, see the editorial note, *supra*.

and of free and uninhibited U.S. military access to Africa as required in time of war.

2. Security of adequate U.S. access to, and utilization of, the strategic raw materials of the area in time of peace and war.

3. Support of the colonial powers' presence in the area and of their responsibility for the security, political and material progress of the African peoples, and the latters' adherence to the free world.

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Memorandum by Harry H. Schwartz of the Policy Planning Staff to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Lay)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 19, 1954.

Subject: NSC Consideration of Africa

I submit herewith a list of African problems which have a bearing on United States security interests in that Continent. This list is applicable to Africa as a whole, but, as was brought out at the Planning Board meeting of March 3, United States policy problems with respect to this extensive Continent should at least be broken down into three main areas: North Africa (French North Africa and Libya), the Union of South Africa, and the area between those two.

HARRY H. SCHWARTZ
NSC Planning Board Assistant
Department of State

[Enclosure]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State[2]

LIST OF AFRICAN PROBLEMS

1. Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Time Factor in Africa (subtitle: The Problem of Determining the Proper Rate of Advance in the Development of African Territories Towards Democratic Self Government)

2. Africa's Strategic Importance, Viewed in Relation to the Defense of the Free World

3. Africa's Importance to the Free World as a Source of Strategic and Industrial Raw Materials

4. Economic Development in Africa

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[1] Lay transmitted this memorandum and the enclosed list to the NSC Planning Board on Mar. 19, 1954.

[2] This paper is a slight revision of a list of topics, drafted by Cyr (AF) and sent from Utter (AF) to Schwartz on Mar. 10, 1954. (S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa")

5. The Extent of Communist Infiltration in Africa
6. The Extent of Asian Influence and Penetration in Africa
7. Racialism in Africa (subtitle: The Problem of Multi-Racial Societies in Africa)
8. Regional Differences in Africa (subtitle: Their Influence on the Future Development of the Continent's Principal Regions)
9. The Relationship between the Metropolitan Powers and their African Dependencies (subtitle: An Assessment of the Actual Intrinsic Importance of African Territories to the Metropoles)

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Council Affairs [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, 19 March 1954.

AFRICA

MAJOR U.S. MILITARY INTERESTS

1. *Base and transit rights*

The issue: The possession of necessary military bases and transit rights throughout the area.

The facts: Present and planned U.S. military bases in the area, exclusive of Egypt, total 94 facilities in 55 locations within 6 countries. This includes both peace and war requirements. Negotiations for base and transit rights with Libya are now in progress. The defense of U.S. bases in Morocco is a French responsibility which to date has not been adequately met. Bases and transit rights in addition to those already planned may be required in time of war.

2. *Strategic raw materials*

The issue: The availability of critical strategic materials of the area to the United States in time of peace or war.

The facts: Uranium, cobalt, diamonds and columbite are examples of strategic raw materials which the U.S. secures from Africa. The uranium deposits found in the Belgian Congo and the Union of South Africa are of particular military importance. The JCS consider that these sources of atomic weapon material will continue to be available to the U.S. in the event of a war with the USSR.

3. *Manpower*

The issue: The availability of African manpower to the Free World in the event of a long war with the Soviet Union.

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[1] This paper and those prepared in the Foreign Operations Administration (*infra*), the Department of Defense (p. 105), and the Central Intelligence Agency (p. 107) were presumably prepared in response to the NSC Planning Board decision of Mar. 3, 1954; see the editorial note, p. 101.

The facts: As an example of this potential it is estimated that approximately 300,000 troops from French West and French Equatorial Africa alone could be made available for employment in Africa or overseas in event of a general war.

4. *Use of Africa for national redoubts*

The issue: The use of portions of Africa as national redoubts by free nations forced from Europe by Soviet aggression.

The facts: The Belgian Government, as an example, has planned to use the Belgian Congo as a national redoubt in the event Belgium is overwhelmed by the Soviets.

5. *Transportation systems*

The issue: The development of transportation systems within Africa to support U.S. bases, aid in the procurement of strategic raw materials, move troops, supplies and equipment, and facilitate the use of selected areas as national redoubts.

The facts: From time to time since 1949, Defense, State, JCS and ECA have assisted in the participation by the United States in international conferences engaged in surveys of the transportation systems of Africa. Some of the recommendations of these conferences have been implemented but a vast relatively untouched field of development remains. From political, economic and military viewpoints has the time arrived for the Free World to take action?

6. *Soviet capabilities against the African continent*

The issue: The determination of Soviet capabilities against Africa to include political, economic, psychological and military actions. What courses of action to counter these Soviet capabilities shall the U.S. take?

The facts: At present Communist influences are not strong in Africa. However, the rising fight by native groups against colonialism, exploitation and racial discrimination is rapidly increasing the vulnerability of the entire area to the same Communist pressures which brought the downfall of China, which now threaten Indochina and which continue to peril Indonesia.

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Paper Prepared in the Foreign Operations Administration

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1954.

AFRICA

The following checklist of major U.S. interests in Africa is suggested for Planning Board consideration:

1. *Direct and vital interest to the U.S.*

a. Access to strategic materials. Africa is an extremely important source of strategic minerals. The most important of these are *uranium, cobalt, industrial diamonds, manganese, copper, chrome,* and *graphite.*

b. Access to air and naval bases in the event of war. Importance of such bases in French North Africa, Libya, Kenya, etc. Problem of possible British withdrawal from Egypt.

c. Long-range importance as a potential market for the U.S. and potential area for private capital investment.

2. *Importance of Africa from the standpoint of NATO and Europe.*

a. Source of military manpower.

b. Source of raw materials and markets for manufactured products.

c. Strategic and political value to the metropoles.

3. *U.S. interests can best be protected and furthered by satisfactory solutions to:*

a. Orderly transition from colonialism. The chief problem in Africa is that increasing discontent and demands for self-government will gradually weaken European control and pose a threat to Western access to African resources and facilities. Political importance of gradual and orderly transition to self-government without undue strife.

b. Racialism. This question and method of handling it seriously affects attitudes of wide portions of the free world (Asia, Middle East, Latin America) to the U.S. Growing Indian-African relationships. Acute problem of South Africa.

c. Dangers of Communist subversion.

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 March 1954.

SOME BASIC U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

The following points for discussion are submitted to the NSC Planning Board as additional to those outlined by the JCS Adviser in his paper entitled "Africa, Major U.S. Military Interests",[1] with which we agree:

1. *Retention of an Africa oriented towards the U.S.*

The U.S. Interest: An insurance, in the long range, that the manpower of the African Continent remains oriented towards the U.S. and that African resources remain available.

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[1] Dated Mar. 19, p. 103.

The Facts: If the conflict between Soviet-Communism and the U.S. is not resolved satisfactorily within the next decade or so, the importance of Africa in the world balance of power will increase. If Asia should fall more and more under Communist domination, and Europe veer toward compromise with Communism, it will be all the more necessary that the U.S. have followed policies which have not turned Africa against us.

2. *Peaceful politico-economic evolution*

The U.S. Interest: A peaceful politico-economic evolution of Africa into a region of stable strength, contributing to and willingly pursuing the objectives of the free world.

The Facts: The inevitable, though slow, evolution of Africa from colonialism and paternalism to a situation which satisfies the aspirations of the rising black races therein for independence contains elements of danger to the free world. The methods by which this evolution can be kept peaceful and orderly vary from area to area. The ability of the United States to influence the situation is not great. The politico-economic interests of the colonial powers must be taken into account, in light of U.S. "coalition" strategy.

3. *Economic development*

The U.S. Interest: An orderly development of African agricultural and mineral resources to the mutual benefit of non-African free world countries and of the local inhabitants of the African regions involved; and the concurrent development of markets.

The Facts: Most of Africa is today divided into "economic spheres of influence," controlled by the European colonial powers involved. Development programs exist in most areas, but, in most cases, they are in line with narrow economic policy of the colonial power involved, inhibit private investment from other nations, and are "paternalistic" rather than designed to develop minor industry locally or in other ways to create slowly expanding markets.

4. *Relative urgency of North Africa problems*

The U.S. Interest: An avoidance of violence and disruption in French North Africa, combined with progress towards a solution to the French-Arab dispute.

The Facts: French North Africa contains important U.S. bases, whose continued use by the U.S. must not be prejudiced. Additionally, any greater exacerbation of Arab feeling against France wherein the U.S. is identified as blindly supporting the French, can adversely affect the U.S. position in the Mid-East and among underdeveloped areas generally.

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] 22 March 1954.

MAJOR U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

*indicates those of greatest importance.

A. *Strategic:*

*1. Resources—Uranium, manganese, chrome, asbestos, corundum, diamonds, palm products, sisal, tin, rubber, cobalt, copper.

*2. Military—Air and naval bases, manpower, ship repair and supply, staging areas.

B. *Economic:*

1. Mineral and agricultural production—cocoa, iron ore, spices, phosphates.

2. Support of European economies—dollar earners such as cocoa, products supplied within own currency area.

3. In the distant future—expanded market for US investment capital and exports; now limited due to colonial policies, difficulties in repatriation of earnings, small market.

C. *Political:*

*1. Keeping Africa stable and on the free world side for its strength and so that it does not impair European strength.

*2. Minimizing differences over colonial policies which affect U.N. actions, and tend to separate US from Western European allies.

3. Meeting potential communist threat.

4. Gradual solution to racialism, which handicaps free world unity especially with color conscious East and Latin America.

Editorial Note

At its meeting on March 22, 1954, the National Security Council Planning Board considered "U.S. Security Interests in the Continent of Africa" as one of its agenda items. Under consideration by the Board for the meeting were the NSC Staff memorandum of March 17 and State, JCS, FOA, Defense, and CIA papers concerning United States interests in Africa (for texts, see pages 101 ff.). The Planning Board reached agreement on the following two points:

"*a.* The NSC Staff should prepare a consolidated statement of major U.S. security interests in Africa.

"*b.* The Planning Board should consider the revised Staff Study on North Africa now in preparation in the Department of State before determining the form and scope of a report on Africa." (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Planning Board Records")

For text of the Staff Study on North Africa, which became part of NSC 5436/1, see page 174.

770.5/3-2454

The Consul at Dakar (Ferguson) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL DAKAR, March 24, 1954

No. 200

Subject: Some Thoughts on International Cooperation in Africa Arising Out of the Dakar Conference on Defense Facilities [1]

The Department will by this time have received the official report on the African Defense Facilities Conference which took place at Dakar from March 11 to March 19, 1954, prepared by the United States team of observers headed by Brigadier General John P. Doyle, USAF.[2] The following observations of a more general nature are submitted separately since they may be of more particular interest to the Department than to the Defense Establishment and since they are not confined strictly to the actual working of the conference. The preamble to the agreed Report of the Dakar Conference is enclosed in reproducible form and the entire document in single copy.[3]

The Department may have noted from the official report that the Conference largely achieved what it set out to do, that it took place in an atmosphere of great cordiality, and that most of the countries involved considered it a success. The essential questions, in the Consulate General's opinion are, however, (*a*) what did they want to achieve? and (*b*) what factors make for a "successful" international conference on African affairs? The answers I fear are fairly obvious: (*a*) little, if anything of a specific nature; and (*b*) as few positive commitments as possible. This may seem a little brutal but it is believed that an objective study of the various conference documents attached to the official report will bring most readers to the same conclusion.

Before pursuing this general train of thought further, it might be well, at the risk of duplicating certain portions of the official United States report, to review the attitudes of the various countries represented as shown in committee meetings throughout the eight day conference:

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[1] Regarding the conference, see also the note of Jan. 18, 1954 from the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State, p. 90 and despatch 2138, Feb. 18, 1954, from Paris, p. 94.

[2] No copy of Brigadier General Doyle's formal report on the conference has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Only the "preamble" to the formal report of the conference was attached to the source text; regarding the text of the report as a whole, see footnote 5 below.

1. France

The French seemed the most conciliatory and open minded of all the delegations although this impression no doubt arose in part from their desire, as host country, to have everything sweetness and light. Furthermore, the French having prepared the agenda in advance with the British knew that little was apt to be proposed to which they could reasonably object. However, the French position probably is, in fact, capable of more flexibility than the narrow self-interest of the Portuguese and the Belgians on one hand and the broad desire for something positive in Africa on the part of the British and South Africans on the other. The French do not feel that any sort of Pan-Africa is either necessary or desirable but are willing, if the others are, to go along with Africa-wide technical, sanitary, military and other non-political arrangements. If the others desire an agreement on certain very broad platitudes such as were agreed upon in Dakar, they have no objection and similarly, they in all probability would have gone along with a more forceful and positive commitment up to a certain point. The latter contingency the French at Dakar never had to face since it was clear from the outset that neither the Portuguese nor the Belgians would conceivably agree to any document that in any way infringed or gave the implication of infringing on their sovereign rights in Africa. Possibly their awareness of this may have accounted for some of the broadmindedness exhibited by the French delegation.

The French did have one favorite project they attempted to put through with somewhat lukewarm results, namely to establish some sort of link to NATO but had to be content with the curiously worded paragraph 8 of the Report of the Conference which provided that the participating countries would be obliged to consult with each other in advance before communicating to an "Atlantic Regional Defense Organization" any information other than objectives and general results. While a statement like this unquestionably can be all things to all men, the French were apparently satisfied that a link, however tenuous, to NATO was included while the Union of South Africa, a non-NATO country was equally satisfied that the provision really meant nothing and could not be construed as extending the influence of NATO to the African continent.

Aside from the above consideration and a few minor arguments of a technical nature in the subcommittees, the French throughout the Conference sought to conciliate—to compromise—to make everyone feel happy and were successful to a rather remarkable degree. The administrative arrangements for the meeting were admirable and the senior members of the French delegation, particularly M. Jean Mons its chairman, were extremely competent negotiators.

2. The British

The large British delegation included every conceivable sort of expert and apparently hoped for a more tangible, if still generalized, result to the Conference although realizing full well that this was probably impossible. The head of the delegation, Sir Harold Parker, Permanent Undersecretary of the Ministry of Defense, showed some impatience from time to time at the endless quibbling of the Portuguese over what did or did not constitute a threat to the latter's sovereignty. Sir Harold was particularly annoyed at Portuguese insistence that all fixed installations built by one party on the national territory of another automatically became the legal property of the latter with the nation providing the facility "allowed" to use them on a temporary basis. Some satisfactory wording (Paragraph 2(*j*)) was at last found to get around this point, but Sir Harold made no attempt to conceal his irritation at the whole thing.

In the work of the subcommittees, however, the British position more often prevailed than otherwise principally because their technical experts were more qualified than those of the other participants, with the possible exception of the French, and such positive agreements as were obtained were in great part the result of British (and occasionally South African) persistence. In the broader field, of course, nothing could be done nor was much tried to alleviate Portuguese (and Belgian) suspicion and determination not to let their African territories become a base for anyone else's operations or, for that matter, a subject of anyone else's interest.

3. Portugal

The general attitude of the Portuguese delegation has already been indicated. They made no attempt to conceal the unwillingness of their Government to enter into any concrete agreement nor to extend facilities to other African powers except under conditions which they, and they alone, would determine. The members of the delegation were all highly competent negotiators, they were extremely well prepared for the meeting, and they had a fairly substantial advantage over most of the other delegations, in that most of them spoke both French and English fluently. In most of their objections, the Portuguese were successful. They resisted the creation of a central information pool; they blocked the creation of a permanent secretariat; and they repeatedly made the point that all arrangements concerning the facilities to be accorded another power would be decided at the time they were requested.

4. The Belgians

With the exception of the Liberian delegation, the Belgian representatives had less to say than any other country represented at Dakar.

This was due in part, according to the delegation's chairman, Mr. René Van Ros, Belgian Consul General at Dakar, to the fact that the Portuguese were saying so much with which the Belgians agreed that there was no real need for them to press home their own points. It was also due in part, again according to Mr. Van Ros, to a lack of preparation on the part of most members of the delegation who were given only very brief notices of their appointment and no clear instructions. The Belgians did occasionally serve a useful purpose in several of the Committees in alleviating unjustified Portuguese suspicions. One got the impression, however, that most of the Belgian delegation was more interested in having a good time than in really working out an agreement on African defense facilities.

5. The South Africans

The South Africans had a small but able delegation headed by Mr. H. Cuff, Permanent Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense. Possibly more than even the British, the South Africans seemed to hope for some really tangible results of the conference. They had a tendency to quibble over minor matters such as drafting and were most active in putting forward new proposals, few of which were accepted.

6. The Liberians

The Liberian delegation seemed to have little conception of the purpose of the conference and played an entirely negative role throughout. They gave the appearance, however, of being willing to go a long way in cooperating with the colonial powers in Africa and they conducted themselves with dignity and reserve. I am inclined to question the wisdom of an American adviser in uniform sitting with a foreign delegation in meetings of this sort. Colonel Randall, the officer concerned, however, sought and obtained guidance from General Doyle on the extent to which he should participate in the discussions.[4]

When one considers the conflicting interests of these six powers (I have included the nominally separate delegation from the British West African Territories for the purpose of this report in the overall British representation), it is really not surprising that nothing very startling was achieved at the Dakar conference. Where one is forced to be critical, however, is in discussing the attempt made to make the conference appear more important than it actually was. As indicated in the official American report, rigid security regulations were imposed on everything connected with the Conference with the result that the local press (and presumably the press elsewhere) was able to speculate darkly on military secrets being exchanged behind locked doors. I do not know, of course, that this security was designed to create the impression of great achievements but the assumption that this was the case is hard to escape. Another factor may have been a reluctance on the part of some of the conferring powers, particularly the British, to let it become public knowledge that they were agreeing to commitments for the distant future for areas such as the Gold Coast which they may no longer control. In the opinion of the American military personnel attending the conference, there were no military grounds for this excessive security and probably a combination of several factors made the convening powers decide to proceed in an atmosphere of secrecy.

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[4] On Feb. 17, 1954, the Liberian Chargé Wilmot David urgently inquired on behalf of his government whether the U.S. Government had any objection to having Colonel Randall, Head of the U.S. Military Mission in Liberia, serve as adviser to the Liberian Delegation at the Dakar Conference. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Feld (AF), Feb. 17, 1954; 770.5/2–1754) No additional documentation on the issue has been found.

One feature of this Conference, or indeed any international conference on Africa which follows the same policy, which may lead to trouble in the future was the exclusion of indigenous leaders. True, Liberia as a sovereign nation was represented but in light of their oft proclaimed intentions of leading their African peoples towards self-government, it seems a bit strange that neither the British nor the French included any native leaders in their delegations, even if only for appearances' sake. The French did, in fact, have one or two African technicians sitting in the background but they were there solely to provide purely technical information on such matters as the port of Dakar. The British, despite the size of their delegation brought no Africans with them.

Turning to the actual document agreed on at the Dakar meeting, it will be noted that it closely follows the Nairobi Report of 1951, the principal differences having been noted in the official report of the United States observers. For the purposes of this discussion, the technical appendices may, I believe, be ignored since they are of somewhat limited interest and are, in any event, of a fairly obvious nature. The meat of the report is in the preamble and it was in preparing this document in the Steering Committee that most of the arguments arose.

Paragraph 2 (*c*) which states that information called for in the technical appendices should be made available within a reasonable time is a far cry from the South African request for an information pool and it seems from the amount of heat this subject generated that the determination of what constitutes a "reasonable time" will vary markedly between the participating countries. Similarly Paragraph 2 (*d*) provides that any further information must be obtained through diplomatic channels merely confirming an existing situation.

Paragraphs 2 (*h*) and 2 (*i*) typify the type of language the Conference found it necessary to employ to obtain agreement. While there is nothing particularly wrong with these paragraphs, such phrases as "it is desirable," "wherever possible," and "should be a matter for determination between the countries concerned" all tend to give the document an air of vagueness and lack of direction which seemed to characterize the conference as a whole. The commitment regarding the greatest possible use of local labor resources was the result of a strong stand by the Portuguese who showed themselves firmly opposed to the concept of the introduction of both skilled and non-skilled labor from other areas in Africa. This stand may arise from the facts that the Portuguese still conscript labor in their territories, that Trade Unionism has made little or no progress in Portuguese Africa in comparison with British and French Africa and that labor from other areas, particularly British, might carry nationalist doctrines with it.

The Department's particular attention is called to Paragraph 2 (*l*) which for the sake of convenience I shall quote in full:

> "The practical application of recommendations made by the Conference and accepted by the Governments should, particularly in regard to facilities, be subject to prior agreement between the countries concerned."

I have read and reread this provision and, although I am convinced from the discussions that led to its drafting that it was not deliberately so designed, I cannot see how this is anything but a complete escape clause. The British and South African delegations were opposed to this particular clause but finally accepted it with some grumbling rather than have the Conference bog down on this point. The inclusion of such a provision in an agreement of this kind would appear to negate the entire work of the conference. Paragraph 2 (*n*) is cut from the same cloth:

> "It should be within the discretion of each participating country to decide when the occasion and the circumstances are of such a nature as to justify the grant of any facilities desired."

While possibly even more generalized in its provisions, the Nairobi Report of 1951 contained no such qualifications.

Paragraph 3 was included at the insistence of the French delegation which thought that the Conference at least ought to go on record as encouraging improvement which could be made in existing facilities in the future. The French here would have preferred a more positive commitment on the part of all concerned to accelerate work on their respective facilities but they did not make an issue of it. Paragraph 4 repeats verbatim a similar provision of the Nairobi Report and was so worded at both meetings because of strong objections by the Portuguese and others to any sort of permanent organization. Paragraph 5 is identical with a similar provision of the Nairobi Report and requires no comment. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are self-explanatory, and paragraph 8 has been mentioned earlier when discussing the French delegation.

It is hoped that the comments set forth above will not be regarded as unduly critical or carping. Any conference of African powers which can in eight days time agree on a rather long document of this nature must be regarded as a success. What is clear, however, is that the interests of the powers concerned and their general policies with respect to their African territories are so varied that agreements of a concrete nature are virtually impossible under any circumstances at the present time. This need not necessarily be regarded as something wrong or reprehensible in itself. The French in West Africa are wont to point out what they feel is a common American failing in lumping large geographic areas together and expecting a common policy to fit the assembled mass. They do not believe that a common policy is any more desirable for all of Africa south of the Sahara than for, say, the "Middle East" or "Southeast Asia" and, while they are willing to cooperate in many fields with the other African powers, they certainly have no intention of following the policies of the others, particularly the British, merely for the sake of working together.

As far as military facilities are concerned, it is doubtful that anything more specific than the Nairobi and Dakar Reports can be expected on an Africa-wide scale. The major African powers, the British and the French in this area, can be expected to continue bilateral cooperation as they have been doing for some time. It may be worthy of note that no provision was made in the Dakar agreement for any future conference of this nature nor was any mention ever made in the various meetings of any further gatherings of this nature. Further international work on military matters in West Africa, at least, will in all probability be done quietly and with fewer participants.

Regardless of the actual achievements of the Dakar Conference, the impression has been given that the six powers were able to assemble together in a cordial atmosphere and plan for the future. This impression alone, I believe, justifies the Conference and the obvious cordiality in which it took place may encourage further meetings on other subjects. We may conclude that although agreements on specific policies are unlikely in the foreseeable future in West Africa, the powers concerned realize that there are areas in which they can work together and they may attempt to do so more often with the passage of time.

C. VAUGHAN FERGUSON, JR.

[Enclosure 1]

DRAFT REPORT OF THE DAKAR CONFERENCE ON AFRICAN DEFENCE FACILITIES[5]

1. The representatives of the Governments and of the various Administrations of Belgium, British West African territories, France, Liberia, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the Union of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as "participating countries") with the United States of America and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland present as observers, have met at Dakar for the purpose of securing an agreement in principle on the facilities that would be required in time of war or international emergency for the movement of troops and military stores on the lines of communication from south to north and from west to east, across the western part of the African continent south of the Sahara. In drawing up its recommendations the Conference has been guided by these terms of reference, as set forth in the invitations[6] of the convening Governments and has assumed that the facilities envisaged will be granted on a reciprocal basis.

2. The Conference recommends that:

(*a*) Participating countries accept the recommendations contained in the reports of the Committees on Land Transport, Air Transport and Meteorology, Sea Transport, Telecommunications and Postal Facilities, and the Movement of Personnel and Stores, as set out in the Appendices A to E respectively.[7]

(*b*) The Governments of the convening Powers enter into consultation with the Governments of participating countries in order to work out with them the necessary procedure for putting into effect the recommendations of the Conference.

(*c*) Information specified in the Appendices A to E of the Conference should be made available within a reasonable time by each participating country to all other participating countries.

(*d*) Any participating country desiring additional particulars of existing or proposed facilities in the territory of another (within the geographical limits of this Conference) should consult such other country directly, through diplomatic channels, indicating the nature of the information desired.

(*e*) Any information of general interest supplied by one country to another under the terms of (*d*) should also be conveyed to every other participating country.

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[5] The entire conference report entitled "African Defence Facilities Conference. Dakar—Mar. 1954" and comprising 41 pages in typescript was included as enclosure 2 to despatch 200 from Dakar. The entire report, with the preamble no longer designated "draft", printed and issued by the British Ministry of Defence in June 1954, is filed separately in Department of State files. (770.5/3–1854) This latter printed version, in the final page of the preamble and following the list of delegation heads, bears the dateline "School of Medicine, Dakar, 18th March, 1954".

[6] For the text of the note from the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State, Jan. 18, 1954, see p. 90.

[7] None printed here.

(*f*) Any classified information supplied under the terms of the foregoing should continue to be treated as such by all receiving powers.

(*g*) In considering the conditions governing the grant of facilities, distinction should be made in particular between:—

(i) the use by any participating country of existing services and installations in the territory of another;

(ii) the improvement or extension of existing services and installations in the territory of a participating country at the request of any other country or countries;

(iii) the establishment of new services and installations in the territory of a participating country at the request of any other country or countries.

(*h*) Participating countries should accept in principle the obligation to bear the cost of all existing facilities made available to them in the territory of another participating country in accordance with financial arrangements to be settled by agreement between the countries concerned. It is desirable that these agreements, wherever possible, should be negotiated in advance.

(*i*) Where one participating country requests the improvement or extension of existing facilities or the establishment of new facilities for its use within the territory of another participating country and the latter country agrees, the financial, technical and other terms governing the provision of such facilities should in each case be a matter for determination between the countries concerned.

In respect of labour the greatest practicable use should be made of local resources.

(*j*) In the negotiation of any agreement for the extension of existing installations or the establishment of new ones it should be open to a host country to propose the incorporation in the agreement of such arrangements as may seem desirable to it in regard to ownership and ultimate user.

(*k*) As it may be necessary for certain facilities to be made available prior to an international state of emergency or a state of war, it should be open to any country which so desires to enter into direct negotiation for this purpose with another country.

(*l*) The practical application of recommendations made by the Conference and accepted by the Governments of participating countries should, particularly in regard to facilities, be subject to prior agreement between the countries concerned.

(*m*) Other participating countries should as far as practicable be informed of the opening of negotiations between participating countries and of their outcome.

(*n*) It should be within the discretion of each participating country to decide when the occasion and the circumstances are of such a nature as to justify the grant of any facilities desired.

3. The Conference considers as desirable any improvement that can be made to existing logistical resources in its geographical area.

4. It would be open to the convening Governments to retain the services of the Conference Secretariat on a provisional basis.

5. The Conference points out that certain of its recommendations contemplate action necessary in time of war which might not be completely in accordance with international conventions governing such matters, to which the participating Governments are parties. The Conference, however, assumes that the participating Governments will give such consideration as may be required to the legal problems which may arise from any undertaking in the above recommendations involving a derogation in time of war from obligations accepted under international conventions.

6. The Conference agrees that the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, as convening Governments, should submit this report to the participating Governments for their consideration. The Conference considers it of great importance that the participating Governments should communicate their decisions on the Conference recommendations to the convening Governments at the earliest possible date, and expresses the hope that all interested Governments will accept its recommendations.

7. As soon as the recommendations of this Conference have been approved by the Governments concerned they will become applicable to the territories of participating countries. They will also be applicable to the territory of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland after approval by the Government of the Federation.

8. That the participating countries should consult one another before communicating to an Atlantic regional defence organisation any information concerning the conclusions of the present Conference and their implementation other than those regarding the aims and general results of the Conference.

President of the Conference
Leader of the French Delegation
J. MONS

Vice President of the Conference
Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation
HAROLD PARKER

Leader of the Belgian Delegation
VAN ROS

Leader of the British West African Territories Delegation
A. N. GALSWORTHY

Leader of the Liberian Delegation
N. T. MILTON

Leader of the Portuguese Delegation
VASCO LOPES ALVES

Leader of the South African Delegation
H. J. CUFF

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, April 27, 1954.]

U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE CONTINENT OF AFRICA

MAJOR U.S. INTERESTS

1. Possession of necessary U.S. military bases and related rights in time of peace and war.

a. Adequate provision for the security of these bases.

2. Adequate access to the critical strategic raw materials of the area in time of peace and war.

3. Promotion and maintenance of political stability within the area, and of effective contributions by the African peoples to the strength of the free world in time of peace and war.

a. Availability of African manpower to the free world in the event of war.

b. Support of policies and actions by the responsible European governments designed to promote acceptable solutions of the problems of colonialism, nationalism and racial relationships.

c. Better development of the economic potential of the area.

d. Reduction of Communist, or Soviet, influence within the area.

e. Reduction of the tensions and divisive differences between the U.S., the colonial powers and other nations which arise over African problems.

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[1] This paper was transmitted to the NSC Planning Board by NSC Executive Secretary Lay on Apr. 27, 1954 under cover of a memorandum which read as follows:

"The enclosed list of major U.S. security interests in the Continent of Africa, prepared by the NSC Staff, is transmitted for Planning Board discussion. It will be scheduled for the same meeting at which the Planning Board discusses the staff study on North Africa."

This paper appears not to have been considered further until early September 1954. It was considered by the NSC Planning Board at its meeting on Sept. 2, 1954 at which time the Board decided that the subject of U.S. security interests in the continent of Africa "did not lend itself to treatment in a single policy report." (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Planning Board Records")

770.5/4–2954

The Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Rutter) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, April 29, 1954.

No. 3586

Reference: Despatch 200, March 24, 1954, from Consulate General, Dakar.[2]

Subject: British Comment on Dakar Defense Facilities Conference.

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[1] This despatch was approved by Counselor of Embassy J. K. Penfield.

[2] *Ante*, p. 108.

The strict security precautions surrounding the African Defense Facilities Conference, which met at Dakar from March 11 to 19, probably served to eliminate all but the barest references to the meeting from the British press. The Government did, however, express satisfaction with the results of the Conference in the House of Lords on April 14. Moreover, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense seemed satisfied with the limited results achieved and now wish to press forward with their implementation.

In the House of Lords Lord Ogmore, who led the British delegation at the 1951 Nairobi Conference, asked the Government for a statement on the Dakar Conference. Earl Alexander of Tunis, the Minister of Defense, replied as follows:

> "The Conference was called to reach common agreement on the use, in time of war or international emergency, of existing and projected facilities for communications and the movement of military forces and supplies in the Western Territories of Africa South of the Sahara. In its general aims, it was complementary to the Conference held at Nairobi in 1951 on the initiative of the United Kingdom and South African Governments, which made a similar study of movement facilities and communications between the South of Africa and the Middle East. On that occasion, the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, led the British delegation and was elected Chairman of the Conference, and he will remember the great variety of subjects discussed and agreed so successfully under his chairmanship. It should suffice for me to say, therefore, that the Dakar Conference was equally successful. The recommendations of the Conference are now being studied by Governments."

Lord Ogmore then asked a supplementary question regarding the Government's intention to tie up the loose ends between the two conferences and to hold another conference. To this Earl Alexander replied:

> "My Lords, until this week not all the countries attending the Conference of which the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, was Chairman, had accepted the recommendations. It was only last week that the last country accepted those recommendations, but now that they have all done so, action has been taken to devise the best measures for implementing them. As regards the present Conference, we shall have to wait until the countries concerned have accepted the recommendations made, of which there are quite a number, and when we receive those acceptances we can again see how those recommendations can best be implemented. As regards a third Conference, I would not say it has been thought of. I have not immediately thought of it, but suggested it, because I think these Conferences can do nothing but good. A good deal of information has been gained, useful recommendations have been made, and, if we can implement them, a great deal will have been done. Therefore we will bear in mind the noble Lord's suggestion about a third Conference."

According to an officer in the African Department of the Foreign Office, Alexander was caught a bit off guard by the question about another conference. In this officer's opinion, the Government is unlikely to take any initiative to convene another similar conference. As the Foreign Office anticipated, the Dakar Conference indicated the considerable reluctance of several representatives, particularly the Portuguese, to commit themselves on the use of facilities under conditions which now cannot be foreseen. In this connection the British view is that it is enough for the time being to reach agreement in principle on the lines of the draft report. If this can be ratified by the several Governments and implemented, the British will be satisfied for the time being.

On other aspects of the Conference the Foreign Office was somewhat disappointed that agreement could not be reached to establish a small permanent secretariat and to achieve more precise arrangements for the exchange of information. Whereas the British had expected the French to press strongly for a more distinct link between NATO and the African facilities under consideration, at the Conference the French Delegation contented itself with only a mild effort in this direction.

The Foreign Office representative emphasized that in no way did the Dakar Conference represent a British attempt to organize an African regional security organization. Future efforts would continue to center on technical aspects, and any move toward the assumption of broader military and political engagements would be resisted.

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:
PETER RUTTER

751T.00/5-1354

Memorandum of Conversation, by Jerome R. Lavallee, Office of African Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1954.

Participants: Mr. John Utter—AF—Chairman
M. Jean Jurgensen
M. François de Quirielle
M. Gabriel Van Laethem
Mr. Nicholas Feld—AF
Mr. J. R. Lavallee—AF
Mr. Robert Baum—DRN

Subject: Political Discussion Concerning French Territories in Africa South of the Sahara

M. Jurgensen opened his remarks by referring to 1946 as the year the new French Constitution was established and the French Union was born. He further stated that two important developments had taken place recently which could profoundly affect the evolution of the French Union. These developments were (1) the recent declarations of the Minister of Overseas France, M. Louis Jacquinot, on French Colonial Policy[1] and (2) the Bill which is now before the French Parliament regarding modifications to certain institutions in French Togoland.

The essential points made by M. Jacquinot in this recent speech are as follows:

1. The powers of the Local or Territorial Assemblies should be broadened. In addition to dealing with questions relating to local territorial budgets the Assemblies should be empowered to deal with matters of substance.
2. The establishment of Executive Councils in each territory in order to assist the Governor of the territory. It is possible for instance that one half of the membership of the Council would be elected by the Local Territorial Assembly and one half would be appointed by the Local Governor.
3. The powers of the Assembly of the French Union should be revised. While the National Assembly and the Council of the French Republic must, of course, retain their entire sovereignty, the Assembly of the French Union should be empowered to enact measures in certain defined fields as distinct from its present role of simply giving advice.
4. An Economic Commission dealing with economic matters in the Overseas Territories should be established. The function of this Commission should be one of coordination and should concern itself with such questions as duties, customs, common markets, etc.

With regard to French Togoland, M. Jurgensen stated that the proposed Bill, which he hoped would be acted on by the National Assembly within the next two months, made provisions for the following features:

1. The powers of the Local or Territorial Assembly would be broadened.
2. An Executive or Government Council would be established in the Territory in order to assist the Governor; fifty percent of the membership to this Council would be elected by the Territorial Assembly and the other fifty percent would be appointed by the Governor of Togoland.[2]

M. Jurgensen stated that the French would like our assistance in support of these proposals during future Trusteeship Council meetings. He added that the French may find it necessary to request the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. In this connection he referred to the events now taking place in British Togoland and the indications that this area may very soon be joining the Gold Coast.

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[1] The reference here is presumably to the discussion in the French National Assembly, Apr. 6–10, 1954, regarding French governmental policies in the overseas territories and to Minister for Colonies Jacquinot's response to interpolations on those matters. For a summary account of Jacquinot's statement, see *L'Annee politique, 1954*, p. 210.

[2] French Togoland and French Cameroons were the subjects of a separate meeting on the afternoon of May 14 of most of the officials attending the meeting recorded in the memorandum printed here. (Memorandum of conversation by Lavallee, May 14, 1954; 751T.00/5–1454)

M. Jurgensen summarized his remarks on the French Union by stating that the French wished to go in the direction of decentralization and Federation. Unlike the British idea of creating autonomous states, the French scheme might be based on the idea of a Federal Republic.

The following remarks were made by M. Jurgensen, in a personal capacity, in reply to specific questions which were posed by Mr. Utter:

1. The members of the Independents d'Outre-Mer, by banding together and voting in a bloc in the French National Assembly, could be a dangerous thing. This is especially true concerning matters dealing with Metropolitan France. He thought it would be best that these I.O.M. members confine themselves to problems related to Overseas Territories. In this connection, M. Jurgensen in his previous remarks said the French were not happy over the fact that delegates from Overseas Territories had, among other things, a hand in making laws for Metropolitan France itself. This was another reason for favoring a revised Assembly of the French Union which would become the Federal Assembly in the French Federated Republic.
2. The RDA under Houphouet-Boigny was now a respected member of the community since its re-orientation in the fall of 1951. D'Arboussier, and whatever splinter groups may still be in existence, for all practical purposes, no longer exerted much influence.
3. One third the population of French West Africa are Moslems. However, the religion of Islam in Black Africa has become diluted with fetishism and, as a result, is different from that practiced in Arab countries. M. Jurgensen stated that at Bamako, and in another French West African center, the French were teaching the tenets of Islam in French. In this way, or if taught in the vernacular, the Islamic religion is less dangerous than if it comes directly from Cairo or other Arab areas. It is based on charity and other virtues which are closer to Christian ideas than to the fanatical Near Eastern Islamic philosophy. M. Jurgensen concluded by stating that Islam was still in a fluid state in Black Africa.
4. There are no important repercussions from occurrences in the neighboring British Territories. M. Jurgensen believed that this might be due in part to language barriers. In any event, there is more interest in French internal affairs than in events in neighboring areas.
5. Communism in French Tropical Africa is no longer of any significant importance. The CGT is its last remaining important vehicle.

Editorial Note

For an account of a visit in early 1954 of United States Representative to the United Nations Trusteeship Council Mason Sears to West

Africa including the Belgian Congo, French Equatorial Africa, French and British Cameroons, Nigeria, French and British Togoland, and the Gold Coast, see Sears' memorandum of June 3, 1954 to Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs David Key, volume III, page 1383.

770.00/8–654 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (McGregor) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LEOPOLDVILLE, August 6, 1954—2 p. m.

12. Following thoughts offered view upcoming Byroade address:[1]

US dilemma is to find policy re Africa that is at same time realistic and to encourage natural aspirations peoples this backward area for eventual self-government. Primarily we must have order in Africa. If self-government in North Africa will restore order there we should favor it and speedily. But if to encourage rapid progress towards self-government in Central Africa at this time will bring disorder we should recognize this and play down theme. In Congo there is order because there is hope and prosperity which all levels population increasingly share. There is tranquility because Belgian motives are not suspect to indigenous peoples.

For us to imply that Belgian policy is founded on old order of colonialism would do an injustice and if done publicly would only sow suspicion among Africans. We would thereby play into hands Soviet propagandists. If at any time we feel Belgians are too slow to grant franchise we might say so privately but publicly we should credit them with this goal. Belgians averting issue of nationalism by holding reins of political authority closely while concentrating energetically on raising level of education and welfare of masses on theory that public welfare is basis good government and when Africans get franchise they will insist on no less. Belgians have no intention to colonize Congo; their trade policy is based on open door under Berlin, St. Germain treaties making mother country merely most favored nation. We can expect nothing better from Central Africa under present conditions than that we continue have steady [access?] its strategic materials and that as rapid progress as possible be made toward increasing measure self-government for Africans. These are also Belgian objectives.

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[1] Telegram 527, Aug. 10, 1954 from Paris, not printed, commented: "Embassy understands Byroade making important speech August 13 on colonialism with particular reference to Africa." The message went on to request an advance text or indication of its general line. (770.00/8–1054) Neither the telegram printed here nor the message from Paris was answered, and there is no indication in Department of State files or in official Department announcements regarding any Byroade speech in August 1954, or later, on Africa or any other topic. See, however, telegram Usito 96, Sept. 14, 1954, *infra*.

We would raise our stock with Belgians and enlightened Africans alike if we recognize the great and good work being done here. Respectfully suggest careful analysis Consulate General despatch 57, August 2[2] and pages 35, 36, 41, 47 of Governor General's annual address June 6 for present Belgian thinking re eventual self-government here. No one doubts sincerity these motives. Byroade's speech October 6[3] did much dispel uncertainty American position re African policies metro-powers. Suggest all further references to colonialism be limited describe Soviet enslavement processes. To use word colonialism in referring present day Africa is to furnish propaganda material our adversary. Can we not proclaim colonialism dead in Western world and prove it by citing positive evidences rather than pointedly refer its remaining vestiges. This will make our policy dynamic, forward looking and encourage metro-powers whose assistance is cornerstone our national security.

McGregor

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[2] Not printed. This 10-page despatch transmitted a summary and quotations from the annual address of the Governor General of the Belgian Congo, delivered on June 7, 1954. The despatch indicated that the 47-page text of the address had been sent to the Department earlier. (755A.11/8–254)

[3] The reference here is presumably to Byroade's address of Oct. 31, 1953; see p. 54.

110.11/9–1454 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Leopoldville[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 14, 1954.

Usito 96. Department sees no objection giving publicity usually accorded Secretary's statements but does not feel it appropriate give any undue emphasis in your area to Secretary's remarks re self determination or give them any special play inconsistent with present country directives which remain unchanged.

FYI—Note also that while remarks have certain general implications full context refers to Asian peoples and draws distinction between assisting new nations and promoting "processes whereby others become capable winning and sustaining independence they desire".[2]

Dulles

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[1] This telegram was also sent as 18 to Accra, 39 to Casablanca, 18 to Lagos, 29 to Nairobi, 11 to Rabat, 35 to Tangier, and 7 to Tunis. This telegram was drafted by John A. Bovey, Jr., of NEA/P; was cleared by AF, EUR, the Bureau of Public Affairs, and USIA; and approved for transmission by Assistant Secretary Byroade.

[2] The quotation is from Secretary Dulles' statement made before the opening session of the Southeast Asian Conference at Manila on Sept. 6, 1954; for the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 391.

770.5/12-254

The Consul General at Dakar (Ferguson) to the Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DAKAR, December 2, 1954.

No. 107

Reference: CG's Despatch No. 200, March 24, 1954.[1]

Subject: Interallied General Staff Committee Meeting in Dakar.

As a regular part of the existing broad program of international military collaboration in West Africa, a meeting similar to one held last year in Accra [2] took place in Dakar from November 23 to November 26. Representatives from the staffs of the senior European military commanders in West Africa, namely France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Portugal were present under the presidency of Colonel Husson, French Chief of Staff for Central Africa.

The Consulate General has been informed that the meeting largely consisted of taking an annual inventory of the various "facilities" discussed and agreed upon at the two conferences at the Governmental level, Nairobi in 1951 and Dakar in 1954.[3] The latter conferences, it will be recalled, made provision for exchanges of broad general information of such matters as roads, telegraph lines, airfields, port facilities et cetera. It may be, however, that at this lower and more professional level, more positive work was done than at the formal large conferences where the powers agreed on little more than amiable platitudes. As a matter of fact, the Consulate General understands that the committee meeting in Dakar last week exchanged information of such matters as field maneuvres in their respective countries with the object of informing their "allies" of any useful lessons applicable to Africa learned therefrom.

The delegations were small and the only general officer present was Brigadier Spurling, Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief, British West Africa. France was represented, as mentioned earlier by Colonel Husson, although Major General Garbay, Commanding, French West Africa-Togo addressed the opening session, Belgium by Lieutenant Colonel Danloy and Portugal by Major Fonseca. Army, naval and air problems were all discussed although not all three services were represented in every delegation and logistics capabilities in each field in their respective territories were reported closely examined. The delegations were appropriately wined and dined and treated to the usual sight seeing visits to the Port of Dakar and the Island of Goree.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 108.

[2] No documentation on the meeting at Accra in 1953 has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Regarding the Dakar Conference of March 1954, see despatch 200 from Dakar, p. 108.

The Consulate General doubts that this meeting was anything to get very excited about but it is interesting as an example of the fact that the colonial powers in Africa, where political problems are not involved, are occasionally capable of sitting around the table and trying to work together.

C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr.

GENERAL UNITED STATES POLICIES WITH REGARD TO FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

771.00/5–852 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET CAIRO, May 8, 1952—8 p.m.

1963. From Byroade.[2] Fast schedule I am on will preclude any lengthy reporting of impressions while en route. As study is now under way in Dept on North Africa, however, will give you what I can now of conclusions for that area. In gen they will include little that is new as I have found situation closely in line with NEA briefing prior to my departure.

On Morocco, in gen believe situation, while calm at the moment, may be slightly more serious as to potential trouble than Dept is aware. Firm impressions are difficult as thinking of Amers in area differs widely. Most extreme view held by several is that situation has drifted so far that Fr by themselves will not be able to maintain stability regardless of what course they take. This group considers that Fr promises of reforms, regardless of specific program put forward, will no longer be accepted in good faith in view of past Fr failure to produce. Therefore they conclude that any action by Fr wld have to have public guarantee, or at least backing, of US or possibly internatl agency. Others consider that specific program put forward by French would suffice but only if Fr are able and willing to first obtain public support for program from the Sultan. They doubt, however, that Sultan can any longer publicly agree with moderate program and doubt as well that the Fr wld turn to the Sultan as a true rep of all Moroccan people. Fr informed me that they saw little possibility of using Sultan in this manner as they wld by this approach let down strong groups who had supported them, at times against the Sultan. Still others see hope in moderate elements in both the Fr and the Natlists and consider support cld be obtained from a middle-of-the-road program if advanced by the Fr. Alert businessmen I saw took an alarmist view in gen but this must be tempered due to their gen lack of objectivity and emotionalism. Some of them seem completely pro-natl.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Paris.

[2] From the middle of April until early June, Byroade was on a visit to U.S. Missions in the Middle East, in connection with his new duties as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. For additional information on his trip, see volume IX. Additional documentation is in Department of State file 110.15 BY.

It seems to me that each of the above groups have about equal basis for their views, when one confines his thinking to Morocco alone. Which line turns out to be correct will probably depend to a great extent on events from outside. If solutions in Iran, Egypt and Tunis are found which dampen extreme Natlism in Arab world in gen, situation in Morocco can undoubtedly be kept stable. On the other hand if these cases remain unsolved or further deteriorate more extreme group will probably be correct. Events in Tunisia of course have the greatest effect as there is constant communications between Natlist of these two areas.

Unlike Tunisia, our direct stake in Morocco is high. I spent considerable time becoming familiar with the air base project and seeing the fields at first-hand. In spite of construction difficulties of which you are aware, a base system that surpasses anything I saw in the war is already partially operable. The significance of this lay-out can hardly be appreciated without seeing it first-hand. There seems to be little danger that the fields themselves cld not be kept secure in event of trouble. Operation cld, however, become most difficult from sabotage of outlying installations and gen local non-coop.

The gap between the Fr and the Natlists seems to be slowly but definitely widening. Events in Tunisia have probably caused both sides to harden their positions. No one expects immed trouble. On the other hand all agree that unless the trend is reversed trouble will probably come later on this year. Many of the Fr seem honestly concerned and somewhat jittery over the prospects. Some say that the recent increase in Fr troops was for moral effect on Fr citizens as much as for handling local disturbances.

In long talk with Gen Guillaume I had impression that I was talking to a man who was about to retire. There is no doubt that his rumored illness is authentic. He seemed somewhat depressed in gen and lacked his characteristic energy and conviction. Altho I had arranged to see him alone we were joined by De Blesson who practically took over the conversation for him. I detected a hardness in De Blesson's views that did not seem apparent in the Res Gen.

Believe time has come when the US must have a definite position as to what we believe shld be done in Morocco. Our middle-of-the-road course automatically makes us somewhat unpopular with both sides. It seems to me that the only course to be considered at the moment is for us to line up solidly behind the Fr after they have agreed to a polit reform program sufficiently advanced as to be acceptable by the Moroccans under the pressure of US-Fr solidarity. While the US must be cautious against accepting any direct responsibility in Morocco, time has come for us to have definite views as to type of reform program which cld succeed in Morocco and manner in which we believe the Fr shld proceed to reach agreement. The Secy or whoever presents our views to the Fr can hardly hope to succeed if we only have gen vague ideas as to what the Fr must do. We shld proceed with this planning in both Wash and in the field and, of course, quietly. I presume your study in Wash will cover adequately the gen situation. On the more specific questions, such as type and timing of reforms I shld think the field shld be given responsibility to produce the first plan. Such a study shld be directed from Wash with considerable thought given to the terms of reference for Vincent. Unless you see reasons to the contrary, suggest you issue such instrs, allowing a reasonable time for submission of their views to the Dept. This shld place us in a position to deal with the Fr on a more intelligent basis. Whether we decide to put direct pressure on the Fr to accept our conclusions can be decided at a later date. My own view at present is that we shld lay our suggestions before the Fr at a fairly high level to see if we cannot get together before trouble starts in Morocco.

I am somewhat surprised that my concern over possible later trouble in Morocco is greater than my immed concern over situation in Tunisia. My visit to Tunis reminds me of trips to Berlin in 1947 where local concern and excitement were far less than in Wash. While one cannot know in a short visit to these countries what is going on in the minds of the people, I am somewhat reassured from my short visit here.

I found De Hauteclocque a strong individual but seemed to have moderate views. He also gives the impression of considerable ability. He seems understanding of situation saying that if he were a Tunisian he wld be a Natlist. He seems prepared to recommend to his govt sympathetic consideration of the attitude of the Natlists as long as they refrain from violence. I have reported separately his decision to release prisoners and the time schedule he envisages for negots.

Though nature and inclinations of the present Tunisian Cabinet are well known to us, and I was prepared I think to undergo somewhat of a snow job, I was surprised at lack of sensitiveness of Fr in our relations with Tunisians. There was no hesitancy about calling on the Bey. In appointement arranged by the Fr with Baccouche I was recd by him in his home alone without any Fr being present. Dinner given for me last night by Res Gen included Tunisian officials.

Both De Hauteclocque and Baccouche stated that the press and radio had made conditions in Tunisia appear much worse than they really were. Both stated to me separately that world pressures were causing undue and unwise haste in the negots. They both felt that chance of success wld have been greater if they cld have waited until after the coming of the religious holiday of Ramadan. Baccouche stated that we were correct keeping the Tunisian matter out of the UN. Also that the statements of the Secy and Gross had been helpful as far as the Tunisian people were concerned. He seemed fairly optimistic of successful negots but added that the Fr wld have to go much farther in the way of concessions than they have offered to date. I was unsuccessful in obtaining the names of either the Fr or Tunisian dels to the mixed commission. Baccouche wld go no farther than telling me that the Tunisian delegation wld be a representative one. The Bey incidentally seems to be very much less of a factor than do his several sons and daughters, who drive wildly through the crowded streets. Prince Chedly Bey, his eldest son, and daughter Princess Zakia, wife of former Min of Public Health are considered by Fr to be extreme Natlist tools.

As an example of situation Min of Commerce, a Tunisian Natl of Fr education, last night attempted to convince me that the Fr were in fact moving far too rapidly in granting freedoms to local populace. The Mayor of Tunis told me at dinner that he was optimistic as to coming negots. Later he sent me word that those were not his true feeling but that there were so many "ears" at dinner he was unable to speak frankly.

I feel unable to analyze what may happen in Tunisia. In retrospect it is feeling that the Fr cld have deposed and arrested Cabinet mins of local govt without greater resort to violence than has occurred. Whether the Tunisian Natlists, who have been somewhat disorganized by the above move, can accept the results of negots steered by the present pro-Fr regime is impossible to know. I do not believe that the extent of our contacts with Natlist leaders is good enough to provide the answer to the question. Altho the Neo-Destour, and other Natlist, have refused in advance to accept any Baccouche–Hauteclocque reforms, my feeling is that they take as much as is given, stall a while, and then start agitating for a new wave of reforms.

I see nothing, therefore, for us to do at the moment but to watch the coming negots and situation here as closely as possible.

In the meantime we shld continue efforts here and in Paris to obtain details of positions taken by both sides so that we can be in position momentarily to exert influence if that shld be necessary in the negots. At the airport upon my departure Fr officials promised to send their detailed plan of reforms at once to our counsel. Before all this is finished the US probably will be forced to get into the details as we have already had to do in Iran and Egypt.

Had a chat with Lockette on airfield at Algiers. Problems there, of course, quite different as Fr are so numerous and so spread throughout entire area as to be in fairly firm control. He wld expect trouble in Libya only in event conditions on both sides of country get considerably worse.

In Libya one wonders if the experiment will really work or whether the present form of govt will gradually become a complete facade with real control assumed by a few behind the scenes. Understand there is little and often no interest among the people for procedures of new govt. Most officials consider their job in govt merely part time. The Parl, for instance, meets at 5 in the afternoon after business hours. There is resentment at Brit who have lingered on in position of control even if without [omission] Libyans cast a watchful eye towards Egypt and the Egyptian press and radio is a disturbing factor.

Point IV people seem to have good grasp of local situation and are popular at moment. They feel, however, time has come to really produce or TCA will come to be regarded as ineffective as UN program turned out to be. Their plea is for bodies and equipment long since ordered to actually arrive on spot.

In gen we seem to be popular in Libya. Altho while USIS [*airbase*] depriving Libyans of much of best farmland conduct of local reps such as Col. Easley has been such as to turn project into an asset locally. In gen the Libyans depend on us to somewhat embarrassing extent and it is necessary to gently remind them that our resources are not unlimited. I see no policy change to consider in Libya. We shld do more I think to help the govt succeed, perhaps by exchange of persons program and US technicians and advisors in key positions.

Arrived Cairo on schedule.

CAFFERY

INR–NIE files[1]

Memorandum for the National Security Council Senior Staff[2]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 12, 1952.

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA

TUNISIA

1. The Moslem population of Tunisia is politically and culturally the most advanced in North Africa, and constitutes a relatively homogeneous society. Since 1881, when France established its protectorate, the French have followed a policy of "association" rather than assimilation which has not altered the nature of this society. Well defined cultural and social barriers exist between the 3,100,000 natives and the 153,000 "colons" of French descent (there are also 88,000 Italian settlers in the north). The proportion of native illiteracy is high, but less so than in other North African areas. Owing largely to

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[1] Files of National Intelligence Estimates retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

[2] The source text was prepared as a supplement to NIE–69, "Probable Developments in North Africa," Sept. 12, not printed; but see NIE–71–54, "Probable Developments in North Africa," Aug. 31, 1954, p. 153, for a later estimate of the North African situation.

According to a note on the cover sheet, "this supplement was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency in consultation with the member agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee."

a growing and influential French-educated group, the Tunisians have shown substantial capacity for self-government.

2. *Political Structure.* Tunisia is legally a sovereign state under the rule of the Bey of Tunis, but the protectorate treaty and a modifying convention of 1883 give France control of defense and foreign affairs and the right to propose internal reforms. In practice, the French Resident General exercises almost total control of Tunisian affairs. The "colons" and officials from the metropole play a major role in the government, holding almost all civil service posts of any consequence. Despite their small numbers, the "colons" also dominate the Tunisian economy. French commercial interests are allowed special advantages. The French-dominated protectorate government enjoys majority participation in public utilities, railroads, and airlines and holds various other monopolies.

3. Since World War II the French have allowed increased Tunisian participation in the government, although the natives are unable to make policies or pass laws. There is an equal number of French and Tunisian cabinet members, with the former holding the important portfolios. In 1951 France started a program for expanded Tunisian participation in the civil service, though its impact was largely vitiated by French use of political patronage. Municipal reforms have been blocked by Tunisian refusal to agree that the "colons" should participate in local government, as demanded by the French. The Tunisians insist that the "colons," as French citizens, cannot be allowed to vote or hold office in another sovereign state. Native participation in elective governmental assemblies is mostly on the local advisory council level. Even at this level only a small proportion of natives is enfranchised.

4. The Bey of Tunis, while sympathetic toward the aspirations of his people, holds his position only with French concurrence and finds it difficult to oppose the French. France has used the nominal ruler as its instrument of power. The present ruler, despite fitful periods of stubbornness, has generally yielded to French coercion and threats of deposition.

5. *Nationalism.* Nationalist activity in Tunisia dates roughly from 1907, but the first effective nationalist party, the Destour, was formed only after World War I. In 1934, stimulated by the Pan-Islamic revival in the Near East, the radical element in the party broke off and formed the Neo-Destour. The Old Destour has since declined into relative unimportance, but the Neo-Destour Party, led by Habib Bourguiba, became sufficiently prominent by 1947 to be offered cabinet posts by the French. In 1950 the nationalists entered the government after the French promised to institute reforms.

6. Before the present crisis the French-educated leadership of the Neo-Destour was essentially moderate in outlook. Although request-

ing French recognition of Tunisian internal autonomy and initiation of a program leading gradually to independence, the Neo-Destour leaders aimed chiefly at winning greater participation in the government.

7. The relatively well developed native Tunisian labor movement, primarily the influential UGTT (General Union of Tunisian Workers) led by French-trained Farhat Hached, has given the Neo-Destour increasingly effective support. While the UGTT affiliated with the Communist-sponsored World Federation of Trade Unions in 1949, it soon withdrew and joined the anti-Communist ICFTU. Its new affiliation has given the UGTT and Tunisian nationalism important contacts with organized labor in Europe and the US, and has lessened the possibility of Communist influence over nationalist labor. The Communist Party itself probably has less than 4,000 members. Its chief source of strength lies in its control over a smaller union, the USTT (Syndical Union of Tunisian Workers), which has steadily declined in influence and may eventually be absorbed by the UGTT. French efforts to identify the Neo-Destour and UGTT with a Communist conspiracy are not supported by the available evidence.

8. *The Current Crisis.* The present tension in Tunisia followed a French note of last December which the Tunisian nationalists considered a refusal to accept their reform proposals. Bourguiba's subsequent attempt to put pressure on the French by demanding UN consideration of the Tunisian case led to his arrest and an outbreak of strikes and riots in mid-January. Confronted with the need for quick action the French embarked on a policy of force, combined with new reform proposals. When the pro-nationalist Chenik ministry refused to negotiate on these terms, the French arrested its members late in March, and induced former premier Baccouche to form a cabinet which could negotiate reforms. This attempt to present the UN with a *fait accompli* was nullified by the inability of the new prime minister to secure the support of influential Tunisians for these reforms. The French have moved in substantial forces, however, and kept Tunisia under firm control. A state of siege has been fully implemented and Moslem males over 18 have been made responsible for sabotage in their localities. While terrorism has not been eradicated, the 9,000 French and 13,000 native troops in Tunisia can almost certainly control any nationalist uprising.

9. The most significant result of the French policy of force has been greatly to stimulate Tunisian nationalism. As a result of French repression, the majority of Tunisians now sympathize with the nationalist movement, currently led by Farhat Hached. The nationalists have become progressively more intransigent and have come to demand complete and immediate independence.

10. *French reform program.* Though the French reform program is

still flexible in its details, it appears to call for: (*a*) creation of an appointed consultative assembly with one all-Tunisian chamber to deal with all but financial and economic matters, which are reserved to a second French-Tunisian chamber; (*b*) French representation on elective local councils only when there is a large French element in the local population; (*c*) a majority of Tunisian members in the Cabinet; (*d*) gradual creation of an all-Tunisian civil service except for a certain number of key posts; and (*e*) the creation of an administrative tribunal of appeal headed by a French official, to replace the Resident's veto over administrative regulations. Eventually the consultative assembly would become an elective legislature. However, France would retain indefinitely control over foreign affairs, security and finance.

FRENCH MOROCCO

11. The French protectorate over the Sherifian Empire of Morocco dates from the treaty of Fez in 1912. The population of French Morocco is roughly 8,600,000, including almost 350,000 French nationals and about 60,000 others of European descent. The native population is three-fifths Berber and two-fifths Arab in ethnic derivation.

12. French financial interests were firmly implanted in Morocco well before the protectorate was established and France now completely controls the economy. Morocco is the third most important producer of phosphates in the world, and the source for about half the French steel industry's manganese. By 1937 the French had succeeded in abolishing all important foreign capitulatory rights with the exception of the US privileges, which are based on an agreement last renewed in 1836.

13. *Political Structure.* France governs the protectorate through a separate administration, headed by a Resident General, which functions beside that of the Sultan and exercises almost complete control. The relative importance of the two governments is illustrated by the fact that the French administration's budget (largely provided by France itself) is almost eighty times greater than that of the Moorish government. There is little coordination between the dual administrations. Virtually all officials in important posts are French. Almost the only native participation in the protectorate administration is in the advisory Council of Government which assists the Resident. Legislation is promulgated by decree. Refusal to sign French-sponsored decrees has been the Sultan's chief means of opposing French domination. France also enjoys extraordinary disciplinary powers through a state of seige which has been in force since 1912. Military censorship has been the rule since 1939. Four of the seven Moroccan regions are administered by military officials, and the presence of 54,000 troops (one-third of them native) guarantees control of the zone.

14. While French controls have left the Sultan at the head of only

a shadow government, recent events have greatly increased his prestige and diminished French ability to coerce him. More vigorous and able than his Tunisian counterpart, he has openly supported nationalism and has close connections with several leading nationalists. His demands for French reforms in October 1950 and March 1952 have made him a symbol of Moroccan nationalism and even appear to have brought many Berbers to recognize his leadership. However, the French colons have in large measures blocked such reforms.

15. The French have traditionally followed a policy of "divide and rule" in Morocco by capitalizing on the historic antipathies between the Berbers and the Arabs, but these groups are very slowly being welded into a single people. In fact, a recent French attempt to pit Berber against Arab appears to have backfired, and the French have had to suppress several local anti-French Berber uprisings. However, despite growing Berber association with Moroccan nationalism, the French may still have some success with this policy. As a further counter to nationalist support of the Sultan, the French have favored the old religious fraternities and the urban and rural native aristocracies. Berber chieftain el Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakech, has received special attention.

16. *Nationalism.* Nationalist sentiment, relatively dormant before World War II, has grown rapidly since the war. The chief nationalist parties, the Istiqlal (Independence) and the Shoura (Democratic Independence) are technically outlawed, but are allowed to function except in areas controlled by pro-French Berber chieftains, where they have been sternly repressed. The Istiqlal is by far the more important, Shoura opportunism having incurred the charge of collaboration with the French. Estimates of Istiqlal membership vary widely because of the semi-clandestine nature of the Istiqlal and its cellular structure; some 200,000 members plus a much larger number of sympathizers appears the most reasonable guess. Party strength is strongest among the expanding middle class and other urban groups. The two Istiqlal leaders, Allal el Fassi and Ahmed Balafrej (internal dissension has prevented the naming of a single leader), are opposed to violence, partly because of the risk to the very limited group of educated leaders. However, a growing faction of young extremists presently threatens to overcome the restraining influence of the party heads. The Istiqlal has no use for the Tunisian experiment of native participation in the French administration and instead demands acknowledgement in principle of Moroccan independence. A pact of unity was signed in 1951 between the various nationalist parties in French and Spanish Morocco and Tangier, but dissension between moderates and extremists has prevented extensive cooperation.

17. The Communist Party has had little success among the natives except in a few industrialized areas like Casablanca. Membership is

estimated at about 20,000. Communists dominate the largely French UGSCM, the only Moroccan labor union. Since the French do not permit separate native unions, Istiqlal has sought to penetrate the UGSCM and has recently taken control of its Executive Committee, following the deportation of several non-Moroccan Communist leaders. There is no evidence that the Istiqlal has cooperated with the Communists despite the latter's attempts to identify themselves with nationalist aims. On the contrary, it has vigorously denounced Communism.

ALGERIA

18. Algeria is unique among the North African territories in that it has a large population of French descent and is administered as an integral part of metropolitan France. French penetration has made Algeria the most developed and Europeanized part of North Africa. French nationals number 1,200,000 out of a population of some 9,300,000. They completely dominate Algerian economic and political life.

19. Although France has politically assimilated Algeria, there has been little social or cultural assimilation of the native population, and a sharp differentiation exists between the European and Moslem communities. The inadequacy of modern educational facilities for the Moslems and consequent reliance on antiquated Koranic schools has only confirmed this division. On the other hand, the forces of Islam and nationalism are slowly tending to submerge cultural and linguistic distinctions between Arabs (about 60 percent of the native population) and Berbers.

20. *Political Structure.* The three Algerian departments (Oran, Algiers, and Constantine) elect representatives to the National Assembly, the Council of the Republic and the Assembly of the French Union. Their administration, however, is markedly different from that of metropolitan French departments. A Governor General appointed by the French Cabinet and responsible only to Paris is interposed between the Algerian departments and the Paris government. He has broad authority, both legally and in practice, and completely dominates the local scene. There are also a separate Algerian Assembly, which first met in 1948, and a separate Algerian budget. While the Assembly has limited fiscal and budgetary powers, its "decisions" are mostly subject to ratification by Paris, which remains the principal legislator for Algeria. The vast Southern Territories remain under military control pending assimilation into the existing departments.

21. Moreover, within the Algerian government itself, the French minority exercises a wholly disproportionate political influence. Although the Algerian statute of 1947 makes all Algerians legally French citizens, the French have failed to implement the voting rights of the bulk of the natives. The total registered electorate, including

the French residents, is only 1,800,000. Native voting is further limited by ballot-stuffing and other practices. In addition the French residents and pro-French Moslems hold a preponderant number of seats in the Algerian Assembly, the departmental general councils, and the various municipal councils. Algerian access to posts in the civil service and in industry is severely limited by inability to meet the educational requirements for higher positions. Extensive native participation is found only in the *djemaas*, the elective assemblies of the rural villages.

22. *Nationalism.* There are two important nationalist parties in Algeria. The MTLD (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties), led by Messali Hadj (now under surveillance in France), is an extremist movement recruited primarily from the laboring classes. It advocates systematic violence in order to win complete independence from France. Party membership is unknown, but was estimated at 150,000 in 1945. The UDMA (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto) includes better educated natives of the professional and small business classes. Its leader, Ferhat Abbas, appears to favor gradual evolution toward an Algerian republic within the French Union. UDMA membership is probably less than 100,000.

23. Although not now an organized political force, the *ulema*, Moslem teachers and religious figures, appear to be the natural leaders of the masses. Many of them support the nationalist movements and have been endeavoring to reconcile the aims of the MTLD and UDMA. They have also shown willingness to ally with the Communists to further their own ends.

24. The Algerian Communist Party numbers only about 15,000. Its potential strength lies in its ability to identify itself with the Algerian nationalist movements, in which it has had some limited though probably superficial success. Communist domination of the CGT (General Federation of Labor), by far the strongest labor group in Algeria, has provided the party with a useful vehicle for propaganda and action. In July 1951 the Communists played a major role in forming the FADRL (Algerian Front), which includes the *ulema*, UDMA and MTLD. The Communists have since played the leading part in this committee. So far, however, FADRL activities have not led to much unity of action among nationalists and Communists, or among the nationalists themselves.

25. Since the uprising in 1945 in the Department of Constantine, Algeria has been relatively quiet. Last April, however, the trial of several Communist and nationalist leaders in Algiers led to demonstrations and sporadic clashes with the police. Tighter governmental restrictions have since been enforced against free assembly and movement and against the nationalist press. France unquestionably can maintain order with the 56,000 troops now in Algeria.

SPANISH MOROCCO AND TANGIER

26. Spain's "zone of influence" in Morocco, roughly one-twentieth the size of French Morocco, derives from Franco-Spanish agreements of 1904 and 1912. Of an estimated population of almost 1.2 million, about 7 percent is of Spanish descent. Only one-third of the zone is considered arable and the only important raw material is iron ore, exported mainly to the UK, Spain, and Germany. The zone is a drain on Spain's economy. Although there are limited possibilities for mining development, Spain lacks the necessary investment capital. Spanish Morocco is administered by a High Commissioner who exercises almost dictatorial powers, and is responsible directly to Generalissimo Franco. On the Moroccan side, the Sultan's deputy, the Khalifa, is the native ruler. Reforms of 1946 and 1948 provided the Khalifa with a premier and ministry but gave him little power. In addition to the large Spanish ground forces of about 60,500, there are approximately 7,500 Khalifian troops which are under Spanish control.

27. *Nationalism.* The chief nationalist party, the Islah, has about the same proportionate strength and influence in the Spanish Zone as the Istiqlal in French Morocco. The minor Wahda Party is almost defunct. Spain is sponsoring a new Al Maghreb Party, designed to give the impression Spain is receptive to nationalism, but this party probably will be no more successful than previous ones sponsored by the Spanish. The Islah and Istiqlal cooperate in seeking a re-unified and independent Morocco. In view of Spain's attitude toward Communism and its tight control of the region, organized Communism is virtually nonexistent.

28. Spain has recently modified somewhat its hostile attitude toward local nationalism, after a long period of repression. As part of Spain's current policy of endeavoring to win favor in the Arab world, it has undertaken a *rapprochement* with the nationalists. Islah leader Abdelkhalek Torres has been allowed to return from Tangier, and Islah has been allowed to hold political meetings and to publish its newspaper, supposedly free from censorship. There is no indication, however, that Spain intends to grant more than civil rights or that the conflict of nationalist and Spanish interests will be resolved.

29. *Tangier.* The International Zone of Tangier is geographically an enclave in Spanish Morocco. Of the estimated population of roughly 110,000, some 45,000 are Europeans, over half of them Spanish. The zone has become an entrepot for European transit trade, smuggling and financial dealings because its statutes permit uncontrolled re-export of commodities and a free currency market. During World War II Spain unilaterally assumed a dominant position in the Tangier administration. In 1945 England and France, with the support of the US and USSR, ousted Spain from this position and forced her to accept even less than her prewar role. A new committee of control was

formed to represent the US, UK, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal, and the USSR. However, the USSR has so far not exercised its right to participate. There are an international administration, a Mixed Court, and an appointive Legislative Assembly representing the participating powers. The administration is headed by a "neutral" Administrator, at present a Portuguese. In practice France plays a dominant role in the Zone. Owing to French control of the Sultan of Morocco's appointive powers, the Sultan's representative (the "Mendoub") and the Moroccan members of the Assembly are predisposed toward France.

30. Tangier has become a focal point for North African nationalist activities and a headquarters for exiled nationalists. All the important Moroccan parties and the French Zone Communist Party have branches in Tangier (the Communists have only a few hundred members and no real importance). The French and Spanish have taken sporadic repressive measures against the nationalists without reference to the other participating nations.

31. Nationalist riots broke out in Tangier on 30 March 1952, the fortieth anniversary of the Treaty of Fez. Although responsibility could not be determined, Spain has used the riots as a pretext to request increased participation in the Tangier administration through a return to the prewar agreements of 1923 and 1928. Specifically, it requests appointment of a Spanish Police Commandant and Assistant Administrator for Public Order, and reinstitution of the Mixed Bureau of Information (i.e., intelligence) under a Spanish director. The other powers are concerned lest reopening the question of Tangier's administration lead the USSR to assert its right to participate. They appear willing to grant at least a portion of the Spanish demands, but intend to devise a procedural method which will not stimulate the USSR to take an active interest in the Zone.

LIBYA

32. The new United Kingdom of Libya, which became independent in December 1951, is composed of three provinces—Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the southern desert area of the Fezzan. The sparse populations of these areas are widely separated from each other by the Sahara (which comprises almost 95 percent of the country), and have accordingly developed strikingly different attitudes and characteristics. There are: (*a*) 800,000 Tripolitanians who are partially detribalized and sedentary and divided by conflicting urban and rural interests; (*b*) over 300,000 seminomadic Cyrenaicans who, on the other hand, are united by tribal bonds and still widespread allegiance to the orthodox Moslem Sanusi religious brotherhood; (*c*) roughly 50,000 Fezzanese oasis-dwellers and nomads, who have little contact with the coastal regions; and (*d*) 46,000 Italians settled in Tripolitania, who play a

leading role in its economy. The vast majority of the population are illiterate and politically apathetic.

33. Libya is extremely poor and lacking in most natural resources. Fuel is practically nonexistent, although oil may be found along the Cyrenaican coast, and the French have reportedly discovered iron ore (and perhaps oil) in the Fezzan. Agriculture supports over three-quarters of the population and with fisheries contributes over 90 percent of the country's exports, mainly to Italy and Greece. These cover at present only 45 percent of Libya's imports, creating a payments deficit which has fluctuated between two and eleven million dollars since 1946. Even with foreign help the Libyan standard of living is one of the lowest in the Arab world.

34. Because of its economic weakness, Libya is almost wholly dependent on foreign aid. Great Britain has been Libya's main support since it occupied the area in World War II. In return for various concessions, Britain underwrites the major part of Libya's budget deficit (currently about $3–5,000,000) and its adverse balance of payments. France does the same on a much smaller scale for its sphere of influence in the Fezzan. These powers and Italy have donated limited sums to a Libyan Development and Stabilization Agency and a Finance Corporation which were set up by the UN Commission for Libya to help the new state. The US gives a large amount of separate assistance, which may reach $5,000,000 in 1952; it consists of direct payments for the US bases, technical assistance, local US expenditures, and UN technical aid contributions.

35. *Political Problems.* Six months of independence have brought little change in the fundamental disunity of the Libyan kingdom. While Tripolitania adhered to the concept of a united kingdom through fear of renewed domination by Italy, the Cyrenaicans have been largely separatist in outlook, fearing domination by more populous Tripolitania. After the UN decision of 1949 in favor of a unified Libya, Tripolitania reluctantly accepted as monarch the Amir Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi of Cyrenaica, who was almost equally reluctant to head the new state. Time has only widened the breach between the two areas; King Idris I constantly reasserts his preference for Cyrenaica, and the Tripolitanians show increasing distaste for their "Shepherd Chieftain."

36. The separatism of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica is expressed in the nation's political forms and the provision for two capitals. At the insistence of Idris, supported by the Fezzanese, a federal form of government was adopted which insured that the Tripolitanian majority would not dominate. The elective lower house of the Assembly recognizes the numerical superiority of the Tripolitanians (by a seating ratio of 35:15:5), but the three provinces have equal seats in the royally appointed senate. In the nation's first elections last February

pro-government candidates gained at least 46 of the 55 seats in the lower chamber; only 7 seats (including all those from the City of Tripoli) went to presumably hostile candidates. The able and pro-Western Prime Minister, Mahmud Muntasir, gives Tripolitania high level representation in the government, but he has little support either from his province or the king in his efforts to strengthen national union. Except for Muntasir and the able Cyrenaican Defense Minister, Ali Jarbi, few of the ministers have the capacity to view Libyan affairs from a non-provincial standpoint. Most members of the legislature also are politically inexperienced, and there is a serious lack of trained administrative personnel.

37. The chief opposition to the government comes from the Tripolitanians, who desire a dominant influence in the kingdom. While Tripoli is the center of agitation, the Cyrenaican coastal towns of Bengazhi and Derna are also opposed to royal conservatism and royal control over their economic interests. The Tripolitanian opposition was seriously crippled when its leader, Bashir Bey Saadawi, was deported after the elections. His Congress Party immediately lost most of its strength, merging into a heterogeneous group of opposition parties. There is no recognized Communist Party; pro-Communist leader Enrico Cibelli and several of his lieutenants were deported in 1951. Several trade unions and a large number of anti-foreign malcontents in Tripolitania supported Cibelli, but the government appears determined to suppress any renewed Communist activity.

38. In view of the present weakness of the potential opposition to the government, the Libyan police (over 1,900 in Tripolitania and almost 1,000 in Cyrenaica) would be able to control any outbreak short of a major revolt. In the unlikely event of such a revolt, the British garrison probably would assist in its suppression. Libya wants its own national army of about 3,000 and is negotiating with the British for military assistance and advisors. The British consider 1,000 sufficient for the near future, however.

39. *External Relations.* The new Libyan government, and especially King Idris, are strongly pro-Western in their orientation, owing both to Libya's need for foreign aid and the strong ties developed with UK during the war. Since then, British influence has been predominant in Libya; the UK provides the bulk of Libya's outside economic assistance, UK advisers are the backbone of the administration, and roughly 9,000 British troops stationed in Libya provide the country's chief security force. Perhaps as a reaction to British influence, the Libyans are now more strongly pro-US. The US has a major airbase in Libya, as does the UK. France remains in *de facto* control of the Fezzan, which it occupied in World War II, and has 400 troops as well as French advisers there. Italy still maintains substantial interest in its

former colony and is anxious to reassert its influence in Tripolitania, where the dominant Italian commercial interests are expanding.

40. Libya has only slight relations, at present primarily cultural in nature, with Egypt and the Arab states. The King and most Cyrenaicans fear the ascendancy of adjacent Egypt and have shown little desire to join the Arab League. Egypt itself apparently has ambitions to dominate the new kingdom, though its influence has declined with the expulsion of the pro-Egyptian Saadawi. However, various Tripolitanian urban elements and a few politically conscious Cyrenaicans still regard Egypt as their champion against Sanusi conservatism and Western "imperialism" and call for closer ties with the Arab world.

320/12–1752

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 17, 1952.

Subject: Conversation with Secretary Dulles on Morocco and Tunisia

The paper on France which was prepared in late November for your conversations with Secretary Dulles[2] is still largely current with the exception of the section on North Africa where of course events of major significance have occurred both in the area and in the UNGA in New York.

In Tunisia, the situation has remained uneasy, and indeed became aggravated when, on December 5, the Secretary-General of the UGTT (anti-Communist Tunisian labor union), and the leading nationalist still operating in Tunisia, Ferhat Hached, was found murdered near Tunis.[3] There is still no proof as to the identity of the murderers, but the event has redounded to the disadvantage of the French Protectorate in Tunisia even though French officials had no part in the assassination. Since then, French security measures have been tightened but minor incidents continue, and the atmosphere remains hardly conducive to the resumption of Franco-Tunisian negotiations which we desire to see. On December 15 it was announced from Paris that the Bey of Tunisia would that day sign some sixty miscellaneous dahirs (decrees) which had been awaiting signature, some for as long as two years, and in addition would approve the first two of the seven major dahirs of the French-sponsored reform program submitted last spring and heretofore resisted by the Tunisians. However, in fact the

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[1] This memorandum was prepared by McBride.

[2] Not further identified.

[3] For documentation on this topic, see pp. 852 ff.

Bey did not sign these measures, and relations now appear worse than ever. Rumors of French plans to depose the Bey are unconfirmed, and we have indicated to the French that we are pleased to note from their public statements that they do not plan action of this nature, which we believe would further worsen the situation.

In Morocco, on December 8 there occurred the most serious disorders in forty years of the French Protectorate, during which at least eight Frenchmen were brutally murdered, and an unknown number of Moroccan rioters shot by police and troops.[4] The reports of the Moroccan dead vary from fifty to several hundred with the lower figure probably much more nearly accurate. Following the restoration of order in Casablanca, where the major riots occurred, Morocco remains in a state of uneasy calm. The French have blamed the riots on the nationalists acting in collusion with the Communists, and have arrested a very large number of persons of both parties. The Independence Party, principal nationalist group, always technically illegal though formerly tolerated, has now been banned and is in the process of being driven underground. There have likewise been wholly unconfirmed rumors in Morocco of French plans to depose the Sultan, a step we consider would be an irretrievable error on the French part.

Events in Tunisia and Morocco are undoubtedly closely linked with UNGA consideration of the North African items in New York, and the latter is responsible for the disorders in the area in the French view. During the debate on both cases in Committee 1, from which France was absent, the United States Representative, Dr. Jessup, indicated our confidence in France's intentions to bring the Tunisian and Moroccan peoples along the road to self-government in accordance with her declared intentions. While the entire question of UN discussion of the North African question is anathema to the French, and they do not accept UN competence in these matters, they nevertheless have been pleased with Dr. Jessup's speeches, and with the United States position in general.

On the question of resolutions, the French Government cannot of course support any resolution. However, the French Delegation in New York agrees with our estimate that it is inevitable that some resolution will be approved, and accordingly they have tacitly agreed that the United States should support a mild resolution, and seek to obtain the support of others. Accordingly in both cases we have backed a moderate Latin American resolution calling on the two parties to resume negotiations, and have opposed stronger Arab-Asian proposals (in the Tunisian case proposing the creation of a good offices commission of the UN to investigate conditions in that Protectorate). In both cases Committee 1 approved the Latin American text (as of this moment plenary action has not taken place on either case). In the case of the Moroccan resolution, unfortunately from our viewpoint, a Pakistani amendment was passed which went somewhat further than we wished by placing Morocco in exactly the same category as Tunisia (the French position, in which we concur to a limited degree, is that Morocco is less ready than Tunisia to take on self-government at this time). This resolution was passed over our opposition in committee, but we are considering the possibility of supporting it in the plenary.

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[4] For documentation on this topic, see pp. 604 ff.

During the UN debates on these items, the United States Delegation has done everything possible to be of assistance to the French, and has materially aided France especially with the Latin American Delegations. There is considerable evidence that the French in Paris and in the United States realize and appreciate what has been done. Perhaps because of the explosive local situation, however, United States policy and motives continue to be viewed with suspicion by the French on the spot, especially in Morocco, and it has accordingly been suggested to the Secretary that he might care to mention to Foreign Minister Schuman in Paris that we consider such an attitude anywhere unfortunate.

320/12–1852

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Intelligence, Department of the Army[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, [December 18, 1952.]

EVALUATION OF NORTH AFRICAN MANPOWER POTENTIAL

1. As of 1 August 1952 there were approximately 93,000 North Africans in the French Army, which represents 13 percent of the total Army strength. Air Force and Navy strengths are not known to G–2.

2. According to French standards for colonial troops, there are a total of 2,290,000 physically fit natives of military age in French North Africa, distributed as follows: Morocco—940,000; Algeria—950,000; Tunisia—400,000.

3. The North Africans are among the finest fighting men in the French Army, and in small unit combat operations in Indochina are rated second only to the Foreign Legion. The French, in recruiting North Africans, generally prefer Berbers to Arabs because they believe

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[1] A memorandum by Ruth Torrance, of the Division of Research for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, to Bernard Dorr, Acting Chief of the Military Liaison Branch, Division of Acquisition and Distribution, dated Dec. 2, 1952, informed him that UNP had requested an evaluation of North Africa's importance to France as a source of native manpower. In a memorandum dated Dec. 3, Dorr transmitted the request to Col. Harvey H. Smith, Chief, Production Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army. The source text, marked "Special Handling Required. Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals", was attached to a memorandum by Smith to Dorr, dated Dec. 18. Smith's memorandum stated that the attachment was an answer to Dorr's request of Dec. 3, that had been prepared by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Intelligence. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 320.

that the Berber makes the better soldier. Qualitatively, the Moroccan Berbers (Goums) are the best, the non-Berber Moroccans are next, the Algerians are third and the Tunisians come last. While the Tunisians are not up to the level of the other North Africans, they still make very satisfactory soldiers. In Indochina, there are 15 Moroccan, 12 Algerian and 2 Tunisian infantry battalions out of a total of 92. Of the 8 armored battalions in Indochina, 2 are Moroccan. Moroccans comprise 4 of the 19 artillery battalions in that theater. We believe that North Africans are capable of performing all tasks except the most technical ones in the combat arms, including armor, artillery and engineers. However, in order to reach the same level of proficiency as European troops they require at least twice the time in training.

The French Forces in North Africa are so organized that the technical services are composed almost entirely of Europeans; they also man most of the heavy equipment. Furthermore, with rare exceptions, all officers above the grade of captain are Europeans. Less than 1 percent of the officers in the French Army are North Africans.

For security reasons, the French are reluctant to exploit fully the ability of the North Africans, hence it is difficult to assess their potential and/or limitation to perform highly skilled, "technical" jobs. The French do not want native-dominated armored or artillery units in North Africa because they might be difficult to control in case of widespread disorders.

The following statement by the United States Army Attaché, Tangier, Morocco, illustrates both the potential of North African troops and the French reluctance to train them:

> "The support platoons of the 12th Regiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique, the only medium tank unit in Morocco, are Moroccans and it was stated by the Regimental Commander that they became very satisfactory drivers of everything to include half-tracks, but did not drive tanks. It is believed none are in any of the tank crews, another example of the reluctance to use Moroccans in any technical specialty. This practice is universal in the French Forces of Morocco."

This is also true in Algeria and Tunisia.

4. There are three major factors which might adversely affect the reliability and loyalty of North African troops: (1) Active support of the nationalists by the native leaders, the Sultan of Morocco and the Bey of Tunis; (2) assumption of control by the younger and more violent factions of the nationalist parties; and (3) Communist success in subverting the population. The nationalists are capable of producing violence and mob action at will and on very short notice.

At the present time North African troops are believed to be completely reliable. In the event of hostilities, however, the native troops in North Africa could pose a grave security problem for the French.

In general, the Berbers are much more friendly to the French than are the Arabs, and the French count heavily on them in time of trouble.

With regard to disorders or uprisings, two hypothetical cases may be considered:

a. A simple widespread disorder among the populace, caused by hunger, Communist plotting, political agitation by native nationalists (which would be unorganized and relatively ineffective) or any similar activity affecting stability. Should disturbances reach such a stage that troops would be required to assist the police, it is believed that all troops could be relied upon with complete confidence. There might be isolated cases of infractions of discipline, but no mass disloyalty.

b. The other extreme situation which might impose a strain upon the loyalty of the native troops and affect their fighting value, would be that of a general mass uprising organized and led by the nationalist parties and with the sponsorship of the Bey in Tunisia and the Sultan in Morocco. If such should be the case, it is very doubtful if the native infantry units (Tirailleur) would be completely reliable. At present there is a critical shortage of French noncommissioned officers in these units. Therefore, unless this deficiency is remedied, the control and reliability of these troops would be adversely affected in time of trouble. On the other hand, the Goums are completely loyal and probably could be counted on in any eventuality.

5. There are now approximately 74,000 French nationals in units in all of North Africa. A breakdown by area is not available.

It is estimated that the following numbers of non-native North Africans are fit for military services: Morocco—50,000; Algeria—200,000; Tunisia—45,000; total—295,000.

Editorial Note

In the fall of 1951, the French had suggested that the United States agree to an exchange of letters with the French in which the United States would point out that it supported the French position in Morocco and had no interest in internal political affairs there. For documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume V, pages 1368 ff., in particular, the memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, October 9, 1951, page 1389.

During the United States-French political talks in Washington in March 1953, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs gave the Secretary of State two draft letters stating a United States position of noninterference in North Africa, in particular with regard to Morocco. Copies of the letters were attached to a memorandum by Jernegan (NEA) to MacArthur (C), dated April 21, 1953. The memorandum stated that the Secretary of State had expressed the desire to have a counter-draft prepared in the Department of State on the same topic, and the counter-draft was also attached. (French North Africa files, lot 58 D 786, "Bipartite Talks") For the substance of the position paper, see airgram A–2237 to Paris, May 27, page 148.

711.56371/5-1353 : Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Dorman) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET RABAT, May 13, 1953—6 p. m.

129. Reference Paris telegram 5875, May 9[2] to Department pouched Tangier, Rabat.

We feel any statement noninterference French policy North Africa would prejudice our interests Morocco. We unable differentiate between noninterference statement and giving blank check to France in North Africa however successfully latter might be disguised. Noninterference statement would not only be tacit admission interference in past but would negate economic, political and moral influence deriving from our special treaty rights Morocco.[3] Such statement would convince majority Moroccan opinion that US had washed hands of Moroccan question in exchange for military concessions. Presumably Department has considered unfavorable repercussions any statement along lines suggested by French would have on Arab-Asiatic bloc.

We strongly feel US should refrain from unnecessary intervention North Africa but to tie our hands in advance with public statement seems unwise. Our declaration in UNGA was public recognition by United States of France's primary responsibility in North Africa.

Apparent French attempts to link our political position Morocco to airbase agreements appears to us undesirable. Presumably Article XVI paragraph 1 of technical agreement number 1 between military forces specifying noninterference military personnel in political activity Morocco would enable French Government meet extremist criticism mentioned reference telegram if Department really believes this should be primary consideration in determination our Moroccan policy.

French still bitter our caution and moderation when Sultan's position threatened in 1951 crisis and apparently construed our apprehensions concerning consequences Sultans removal as interference. Possibly French insistence noninterference statement this time is more than coincidental since protectorate authorities continue build up Glaouis prestige at expense of Sultan and consulate receiving persistent reports of petitions being circulated by pro-French elements demanding Sultan's abdication.

DORMAN

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Tangier, Cairo, Tunis, and Casablanca.

[2] Not printed; it reported an official of the Foreign Ministry had again raised the topic of a U.S. noninterference statement covering French North Africa. According to the Embassy, the Foreign Ministry attached considerable importance to the statement. If the Department of State agreed to the idea in principle, the Embassy offered to work with the French to develop a mutually acceptable draft statement. (711.56371/5-953)

[3] For documentation on this topic, see pp. 189 ff.

711.56371/5–953 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 27, 1953.

A–2237. Reference Embassy's telegram 5875 of May 9, 1953 [2] regarding French desire for US statement on non-interference in political affairs of North Africa.

The Department's position on this matter was set forth in a position paper prepared for the Secretary's use during the bipartite talks with the French in Paris last month.[3] It will be recalled, however, that this subject was not discussed during these talks. The substance of the Department's position as contained in this paper is set forth hereunder for the information of the Embassy:

"*Probable French Position*

"French want to exchange letters with us calling for non-interference in political affairs of North Africa. Recent Washington talks left matter for further staff study. French may expect report from us.

"*U.S. Position*

"1. As a matter of principle we do not consider agreement to such an exchange of letters desirable. We should be glad, however, to consider any possible alternatives the French might care to suggest.

"2. We unequivocally support continuation of French presence, but

"3. Most difficult to agree not to be interested in North African political affairs because of

"4. UN interest, particularly in Arab-Asian bloc

"5. Moreover we cannot give French blind support this matter because

"6. French policy heretofore has contributed little to solution nationalist problem.

Caveat "7. Unless French have made real progress instituting agreed reforms in Morocco and Tunisia before 8th UNGA, it will not be possible to avoid full discussion in Assembly and we are not sanguine this year's moderation can again prevail."

It will be recalled that the French first raised this matter in September of 1951 ostensibly because of their concern for the large number of Americans stationed in North Africa under military agreements. At that time in a bipartite meeting with the French we agreed that the United States and France had common strategic interests in North Africa; that Tunisia and Morocco were not ready for independence; and we informed the French that we did not wish to undermine their position in North Africa. We also stated that we believed that nationalist forces in Africa merited careful consideration. Subsequently we agreed to consider an exchange of letters embodying the foregoing.

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[1] This airgram was drafted by McBride (WE), Richey (AF), and Wolf (RA) and was repeated to Rabat and Tangier.

[2] Not printed; but see footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] See the editorial note, p. 146. A copy of the position paper, entitled "Exchange of Letters re North Africa," is in the French North Africa files, lot 58 D 786, "Bipartite Talks".

Within a few weeks the French submitted a draft letter which this Government found to be unacceptable, among other reasons, because some of the language therein could be interpreted as a commitment by the United States to underwrite French policies in North Africa in the future.

The draft letters mentioned in Embtel 5875 prepared by the French and left with Mr. Byroade both contain the statement that the United States "has no intention of interfering in the relations between the French Government and the Sherifian authorities." This statement appears to embody the objective which the French hope to achieve by the proposed exchange of letters. For this Government to commit itself to such a statement would be tantamount to a blanket endorsement of present and future French policy in North Africa which as a matter of principle this Government cannot do. For example, US acceptance of a statement of this kind would presumably render improper any US expression of views on Moroccan political problems, such as a deposition of the Sultan.

It follows from the foregoing that the Department is not willing in principle to make a statement along the lines the French desire either through an exchange of letters or by unilateral declaration. Furthermore it is believed such a statement, concurred in by us, might imply that we admitted to previous interference in North African political affairs. This is of course not the case. Rabat telegram No. 129, May 13,[4] brings out this point.

We fully appreciate the importance the French attach to this subject, as re-evidenced by your telegram 6105, May 26.[5] However, we tend to believe that any attempt to arrive at any mutually satisfactory draft would be fruitless unless French would be willing to drop statement quoted above in any form or guise. As discussions on issue of drafting of such a statement therefore do not appear to us to provide means for moving negotiations for base rights forward with reasonable speed, but rather to provide pitfall of getting engaged in lengthy and nonproductive discussions which would indeterminably delay base rights negotiations, we would prefer your pursuing following tactic: Advise French of problems which we have with their statement. Refer to Article 2 of proposed Status of Forces Agreement for Morocco, state that we consider this Article should provide every assurance which French public could expect its government to obtain concerning stationing of further forces there and see if French cannot be persuaded that problems should be pursued within framework of that article. We can envisage no situation which French Government could not explain to its people by means of that article, and request you advise French that we consider that article to be in effect our counter-proposal to document left with Byroade.[6]

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[4] *Supra.*

[5] Not printed; it reported the Foreign Ministry had again asked when the Embassy might be able to discuss the noninterference statement. The Embassy, while saying it did not minimize the importance of the reservations expressed in Rabat's telegram 129, believed it would be desirable to get together with the French to see if a mutually acceptable statement could be drafted. (711.56371/5-2653)

SMITH

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[6] Despatch 2814 from Paris, June 10, 1953, informed the Department of State that the Embassy had discussed this airgram with the Foreign Ministry. When told that the United States could not give blanket approval in advance of French actions in North Africa, the Foreign Ministry said what was really needed was a U.S. statement to discourage the Sultan of Morocco and the Bey of Tunis from believing the United States would assist them in achieving independence. The Embassy suggested that it might be possible for the United States to make its position clear to those rulers privately and directly. The Embassy also made some other suggestions for a written statement. Airgram 2438 to Paris, June 25, authorized the Embassy to carry on discussions along the lines suggested in despatch 2814. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 711.56371.

Airgram 520, Oct. 9, 1953, to the Embassy in Paris, informed the Embassy that events in Morocco had caused the Department of State to reconsider its instructions to continue negotiations on the noninterference statement. It said U.S. public statements at the United Nations should be more satisfactory to the French than any carefully worded private statement. In addition, the Department preferred to avoid making a statement because of the implication that the United States had previously been guilty of interference. (320/9–1653)

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the National Security Council Planning Board[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 18, 1953.

STATEMENT OF POLICY PROPOSED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO NORTH AFRICA*

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. North Africa is of great political and strategic importance because of its geographic position, its sites for military bases, its position with respect to transportation routes, its natural resources, its manpower, its special relationships with Western powers and the Moslem world, and the possible impact of its problems on the future of the United Nations organization.

2. These political and strategic factors are so important to the over-all position of the free world that it is in the security interest

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[1] This paper was transmitted to the NSC Planning Board by NSC Executive Secretary Lay on Aug. 18, 1953, under cover of a memorandum which indicated that it was a revision by the NSC Staff Assistants of a policy statement dated Mar. 16, 1953.

*For the purpose of this paper, North Africa includes French Morocco, Spanish Morocco, Tangier, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. [Footnote in the source text.]

of the United States to take whatever appropriate measures it can, in the light of its other commitments, to assist in the achievement of its objectives in the area.

3. Currently, the danger in this area to the security of the free world arises not from the threat of direct Soviet military attack but from instability arising primarily from the conflict between native nationalism and the French position, coupled with the effect of political developments in the area on the policies and actions of other countries, particularly in the Moslem world.

4. Current acute situations affecting United States interests are: (*a*) the controversy between France and Tunisia, (*b*) the controversy between France and Morocco, and (*c*) the present weakness of the Libyan Government.

OBJECTIVES

5. The objectives of the United States with respect to the area comprising North Africa are:

a. To insure that the area and its resources are available to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the free world.

b. To prevent the extension of Soviet influence and communist ideology within the area.

c. To increase political stability within the area.

d. To insure the association of the peoples of the area with the free world.

COURSES OF ACTION

The Area as a Whole

6. The United States should seek to create an atmosphere which will facilitate obtaining base and transit rights where required within the area, and upon the threat of and during general hostilities, the right to conduct military operations in the area.

7. As a means of diminishing the threat to Western interests posed by nationalist demands and by political instability in the area, the United States should make the most practicable use of economic, technical and military assistance in Libya, and, through the French, in Tunisia and Morocco to influence the process of political changes in a manner that will effect the least compromise of Western interests and will offer the maximum promise of stable non-communist regimes.

French North Africa

8. The United States policy toward Morocco and Tunisia should not envisage premature self-government but continue to be a "middle-of-the-road" policy, designed (*a*) to avoid undermining the position of responsibility to our NATO partner, France, in this area; (*b*) to prevent threats to our own security interests there; (*c*) to retain

the respect of the North African peoples; and (*d*) to avoid damage to our position with the Arab and Asian states.

[8. The United States policy towards Tunisia and Morocco should be designed with the primary objective of preserving our security interests in those areas. Such a policy would not envisage the premature establishment of self-government. It would avoid undermining the position of responsibility to our NATO partner, France. Insofar as consistent with these priority elements of policy, the United States should take steps to retain the respect of the North African peoples and to avoid damage to our position with the Arab and Asian states.] †

9. The United States should continue to support the French presence in French North Africa and should make every appropriate effort to dispel unfounded French suspicions that United States policy involves the displacement of French interests by American interests.

10. Such United States support for France in French North Africa should be qualified by continued insistence that France, in its proper role under existing treaties, should implement adequate reforms which do not threaten essential French interests yet ease the nationalist pressure in the area.

11. The United States should take the position that reforms are primarily a matter for settlement between the parties and should continue to urge the parties to the Tunisian and Moroccan controversies to pursue settlements on a bilateral basis. Furthermore the United States should continue to support the principle that the United Nations is competent to discuss such problems.

Libya

12. The United States should (*a*) try to avoid actions which might weaken the British and French positions in Libya; (*b*) concert with the United Kingdom and France to the greatest practicable extent; and (*c*) be prepared to assume an increased share of responsibility towards Libya, particularly where this appears necessary to safeguard the substantial United States security interests in that country.

13. The United States should be ready to provide promptly appropriate economic, technical and possibly military assistance, if necessary to prevent the development of any political vacuum that might result from failure or inability of the interested Western European powers to assure the Western orientation of Libya.

14. Correspondingly, the United States in its relations with the Libyan Government and the Western Powers should exercise its influence so as to prevent the weakening or disintegration of the unity of the Libyan state achieved by United Nations decision.

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† Defense–JCS alternative par. 8. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

INR-NIE files[1]

National Intelligence Estimate[2]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1954.

NIE-71-54

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA[3]

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable developments in North Africa.*

CONCLUSIONS

1. The chief problem in North Africa is the growing state of tension created by the unresolved conflict between France and the rapidly growing nationalist movement in French possessions, especially in Tunisia and Morocco. While nationalism has nowhere yet developed the strength to present a serious threat to over-all French control, an increasing number of North African nationalists have adopted extremist tactics as the path to independence.

2. The nature of ties between France and its North African possessions and France's determination to maintain these ties make extremely difficult any reconciliation between French interests and nationalist desires for complete independence. At the same time, the French recognize the necessity for further reforms, and over the next few years will probably grant a degree of internal autonomy, first in Tunisia and later in Morocco. However, in the short term, the French will not make concessions which will endanger their strategic control of the area or destroy the privileged economic position of the settlers of French descent (*colons*).

3. Despite any short-term accommodation between the French and the Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists, we consider it almost certain that opposition to remaining French controls will continue to grow at

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[1] Files of National Intelligence Estimates retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

[2] According to a note on the cover sheet, this estimate superseded NIE-69, "Probable Developments in North Africa," Sept. 12, 1952. NIE-69 is not printed, but see the memorandum for the NSC Senior Staff, Sept. 12, 1952, p. 131.

[3] According to a note on the cover sheet, this estimate was "submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 31 August 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF.; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission, Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

*The term North Africa, as used in this paper, means French North Africa, Spanish Morocco, Tangier, and Libya. [Footnote in the source text.]

an increasing rate, although temporary periods of quiescence will occur. Limited and gradual French reform programs are unlikely to reduce tension more than temporarily or to keep pace with increasing nationalist demands. Extremists are likely to gain effective control over the majority of politically active Tunisians and Moroccans within the next few years, except in the unlikely event that moderate nationalists are able through negotiations to make progress clearly leading toward ultimate independence for the two protectorates.

4. As the strength of the nationalists increases, they will, in the absence of adequate French concessions, almost certainly resort to violence. They will intensify their terrorist guerrilla-type activities, and might eventually organize a large-scale uprising. They would anticipate that a campaign of violence would arouse favorable world opinion and result in political intervention, probably through the UN. However, so long as French military capabilities are not seriously reduced, we believe that the nationalists, because of their insufficient organization and their military weakness, will not be able to oust the French by force.

5. Nevertheless, increasing native resistance will probably—within the next decade (possibly even within the next three to five years)—create a serious drain on French resources, strain the determination of the French to maintain their dominant position, and impede use of the area as a base by France and by the US. In the long run France will probably either have to grant independence voluntarily or resort to increasingly costly military repression. In the latter case France may eventually be presented with problems insoluble short of complete withdrawal from Tunisia and Morocco.

6. Increasing nationalist resistance to French control in North Africa might constitute a serious threat to the security of US bases in the area, particularly if the nationalist movements should establish a common front with the Communists. As long as nationalist leaders continue to hope for US support they will try to restrain their followers from attacks on the bases. However, some extremists may not obey their leaders, and, as the situation deteriorates, sporadic demonstrations and raids against the bases will become increasingly likely.

7. The growth of organized nationalist activity in Algeria will probably lag behind that in adjacent areas. The objectives of many Algerian nationalists are likely to remain moderate in the next few years, with emphasis on removal of discrimination and on greater Moslem participation in government. However, because of the large French population and the fact that Algeria is technically part of metropolitan France, the French almost certainly will not grant any considerable degree of autonomy. French concessions are therefore unlikely to be sufficient to prevent the further growth of the nationalist movement.

8. We believe that the Communists are unlikely to capture control of the nationalist movements. However, once the main body of nationalists has come to accept the strategy of violent action, the Communist parties—now small, weak, and with little influence—are almost certain to coordinate activities with the nationalists, and may come to be accepted as allies.

9. The efforts of both sides to secure US support confront the US itself with major policy decisions and the prospect of a serious strain on its relations with many nations in the Free World. If the US appeared to favor the North African nationalists, it would probably succeed in deterring nationalist-Communist collaboration and in assuring the physical security of its present North African bases for a longer time. By doing so, however, the US would invite serious complications in its relations with France and in its utilization of these bases. On the other hand, if the US strongly supported its NATO partner, it would almost certainly lose influence among the Near and Far Eastern states, as well as be subjected to interference at the Moroccan bases. Sharp differences between the Arab states and the Western Powers over North Africa would almost certainly lessen the possibility of Arab cooperation with the West in Middle East defense.

10. Libya will probably remain oriented toward the West, but its economic weakness, political immaturity, and unresolved Tripolitanian-Cyrenaican differences create problems which may threaten its future stability. Such increased internal instability might impede, but almost certainly would not preclude, use of Libyan bases by the US and the UK.

DISCUSSION

I. *Strategic Importance of North Africa*

11. North Africa is of major strategic importance chiefly because of its geographic location and its extensive military base network. North Africa provides a base for: (*a*) control of the Western Mediterranean and its Atlantic approaches; (*b*) invasion operations within the Mediterranean basin; and (*c*) air operations against Europe, the European USSR, and the Middle East.

12. *Military.* French North Africa, with its population of well over 20,000,000,† is important to France in particular as: (*a*) a reservoir of military manpower; (*b*) the site of major bases and training areas; and (*c*) a place to which the French and others could retreat, if necessary, in event of war. Spain utilizes Spanish Morocco as a source of native troops and as a training area.

13. According to French standards for colonial troops, there are 2,700,000 physically fit natives of military age in French North Africa. There are at present over 95,000 North African natives in the French

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†See appendix for population figures. [Footnote in the source text. The appendix, entitled "Population of North Africa by Ethnic Groups," is not printed.]

Army (approximately 14 percent of total French forces). Of these, some 45,000 are in North Africa and about 35,000 are in Indochina. Important French naval bases exist at Casablanca, Mers-el-Kebir, Bizerte, and at Algiers, which is the headquarters of the NATO Western Mediterranean Command. Morocco is the chief basic training area for the French air force. The US has completed three of the four Moroccan strategic air bases provided for in the 1951 agreement with the French. It also has expanded the naval air base at Port Lyautey, which is operated jointly with the French. For at least the next 3 or 4 years the strategic importance of these Moroccan air bases probably will not decrease, even though similar base facilities in Spain are developed for US use.

14. Libya's location in the Eastern Mediterranean region gives it considerable military importance. The US and the UK each operate a large air base there. Libya also serves as a British garrison area, the importance of which has increased as a result of the Suez settlement.

15. *Political.* North Africa is politically important because it is the scene of a growing conflict between native nationalists and the French. The French believe that their power position depends largely on their ability to retain North Africa. French efforts to retain their position, however, will vitally affect native reactions toward the West and will have major repercussions upon US–French relations. They will also influence Western relations with the Arab-Asian countries, since colonialism in North Africa is a source of great concern to these governments.

16. *Economic.* The predominantly agricultural economies of North Africa are relatively poor and underdeveloped, and the area's resources developed thus far are not of major economic importance except to France. The chief minerals—phosphates, iron ore, manganese, lead, and zinc—constitute a relatively small portion of Free World supplies but are of importance to France. About 10 percent of French imports (mainly wines, cereals, vegetables, vegetable oils, and minerals) come from North Africa, while about 20 percent of French exports go to that area. France provides about 70 percent of North Africa's imports and receives about 60 percent of its exports. On the other hand, French North Africa's postwar budgetary and trade deficits have been a burden on France. The French have developed excellent port facilities and a good transport network.

II. *Current Problems in French and Spanish North Africa*

17. *The French Position in North Africa.* Although the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco are nominally sovereign states under their own native rulers, the Bey and the Sultan, in practice France controls and administers each country. Algeria is administered as an integral part of France. French security control of the three

regions is maintained by a garrison of some 141,000 troops ‡ and 6,500 *gendarmérie.* At the same time, French ability to control Tunisia and Morocco through pro-French native elements is likely to become weakened: (*a*) as a result of terrorist activities, native officials are likely to attend to their duties with increasing fear and reluctance; (*b*) French-supported Moslem religious confraternities are likely to lose their fervor and influence as modernism spreads; (*c*) outlying Berber tribes will be drawn increasingly into the mainstream of nationalist action as more and more of their members migrate to the cities.

18. The French Government and the roughly 1,400,000 residents in North Africa of French descent (*colons*) dominate the administration and the economy in all three areas; most technical and supervisory positions are held by the French. A large majority of these *colons* strongly oppose concessions to local nationalists, advocate severe repression of nationalism, and have shown a growing disposition to undertake vigilante retaliation against terrorism. They have considerable influence on the French Residencies in Tunisia and Morocco and on Paris because of their French citizenship and political and financial connections in the metropole. This group thus constitutes a major impediment to the formation and implementation of a liberal French policy for North Africa.

19. *The Rise of Nationalism in French North Africa.* The most serious problem in North Africa is the growing state of tension created by the postwar growth of nationalist sentiment, especially in Tunisia and Morocco. In Algeria nationalist sentiment is less intense. Among the Arab and Berber population, especially the small educated classes, there has been a steady increase in political consciousness and sense of national identity, largely as a result of the continuing impact of Western political, social, and economic concepts and institutions, and the concomitant weakening of belief in the traditions and social institutions of Islam. The nationalists in general look toward ultimate independence, but they are split into moderate and extremist factions which vary in their immediate demands. Moreover, the nationalist movement in Algeria is still internally divided and in some areas of Tunisia and Morocco it has been deprived of effective leadership through arrests. However, the nationalist parties in the protectorates are developing a considerable degree of organization, especially in Tunisia. Because of French suppression of nationalist activities, the leading parties have been forced to operate on a clandestine basis.

20. Although nationalism has nowhere yet developed the strength to present a serious threat to over-all French control, the inability of moderate nationalists in either Tunisia or Morocco to secure substantial concessions from the French has led to the growth of extremism

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‡Includes two infantry divisions now being transferred from France. [Footnote in the source text.]

and to terrorist activities which the French have been unable to repress. The nationalists have been encouraged to press their demands more actively by developments in Iran and Egypt, and by the external sympathy and support they have received. In particular, Arab-Asian efforts to secure them a UN hearing have served as a major stimulus to their cause. Furthermore, France's defeat and loss of prestige in Indochina have encouraged a growing number of nationalists to regard extremist tactics as the path to independence. And, while some nationalist leaders may believe that the outcome in Vietnam demonstrated the dangers of being swallowed up while collaborating with the Communists, many of their followers probably believe that events in Indochina demonstrated the effectiveness of Communist aid.

21. *Terrorist Activities.* Organized terrorist campaigns have developed during the past two years in Tunisia and since mid-1953 in Morocco. The rise of terrorism has largely been due to: (*a*) the inability of moderate nationalist leaders to win concessions from the French; (*b*) the reaction in Morocco to the Sultan's deposition; (*c*) French arrest of the recognized nationalist leaders, leaving the field clear for more extremist elements; (*d*) repressive actions which drove the nationalist parties underground; and (*e*) the utility of violent tactics as a means of attracting international attention. There have been increasing indications that moderate leaders who have rejected violence as their major instrument of political action are losing control over extreme nationalists. Terrorist operations in both protectorates indicate a considerable degree of general guidance and coordination on at least a regional level, but specific actions and tactics do not appear to be coordinated and some actions probably are spontaneous in character.

22. In Tunisia, the terrorist activities of extremist nationalists in the cities have been supplemented with raids by organized bands. These *fellagah* § bands, probably totaling about 1,200 men, are directed by leaders who show evidence of considerable skill and training. Apparently Libya and the Arab League are playing only a minor role at present in supplying and training these terrorists. The *fellagah* have assumed a measure of importance out of proportion to their numbers because they represent the first nationalist attempt to create organized armed forces to combat French control of North Africa.

23. In Morocco, the terrorists initially attacked pro-French natives, and turned against French nationals only as their campaign expanded. Similarly, terrorist activities at first were concentrated mainly in the cities, but they spread to rural areas last spring with the burning of crops and properties. No hostility toward the terrorists on the part of the native population has thus far been evident.

24. Nationalists in both Tunisia and Morocco have also succeeded to a considerable extent in enforcing boycotts against European or mod-

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§ An Arabic term for bandits and outlaws. [Footnote in the source text.]

ern goods, dress, and methods of farming. This development is in sharp contradiction to the Western-oriented program generally advocated by dominant nationalist groups in North Africa. It is possible that the expansion of such a movement could lead to religious fanaticism and indiscriminate hatred of the West, further exacerbating the problem of North African nationalism.

25. *Tunisia.* The native society in Tunisia is politically and culturally the most advanced in North Africa and has been allowed, since World War II, some participation in government by the French. The principal Tunisian nationalist party, the Neo-Destour, has long had substantial support in rural as well as urban areas, and appears to have a large measure of control over nationalist activities. The Bey is a less influential factor in the nationalist problem than the Sultan of Morocco. Thus the nationalist problem in Tunisia, although as acute as that in Morocco, is less complex and lends itself more readily to negotiation.

26. The Mendes-France government is dealing first with Tunisia. The program offered Tunisia is based upon: (*a*) the grant of internal autonomy, to be implemented within a determinate period; (*b*) insistence on the maintenance of France's control over foreign affairs, defense, and for some time, finance; and (*c*) guarantees to protect the position of the *colons*. A new Tunisian Government, including several Neo-Destour ministers, formed as a result of the offering of this program, is to negotiate its implementation with the French.

27. *French Morocco.* French difficulties in developing a *rapprochement* with the nationalists have been greatly increased by the continuing storm of controversy over France's deposition of the popular, pro-nationalist Sultan Mohammed V in the summer of 1953. His pliable relative, the present Sultan, has not been accepted by most Moroccans. Moreover, the reforms imposed on Morocco by the French after the Sultan's deposition have been discredited, and there has been a further increase in mutual mistrust between the French and the nationalists. On the other hand, the *colons* and the Berber chieftain, the Pasha of Marrakech, are demanding that France stand firm with the present Sultan and refuse concessions to the nationalists. Much more numerous than their compatriots in Tunisia, the *colons* in Morocco also have more extensive economic interests and play a larger role in French political and economic control of the area. The Pasha cannot claim the allegiance of most Berbers, who constitute about half the population. Many of them appear to have been attracted to the predominantly Arab nationalist cause. The Pasha has consistently collaborated with the French and has aided them to marshal considerable numbers of his tribesmen for "spontaneous demonstrations" to give a semblance of native support to French policies.

28. Support for the Istiqlal, the leading Moroccan nationalist party,

until recently consisted of an educated middle-class minority, with a popular base largely in urban laboring groups. The Istiqlal is now gaining support in the countryside. In general, however, the illiterate rural bulk of the population, while it has been aroused by such a dramatic event as the Sultan's deposition, is not easily brought into organized opposition.

29. *Algeria.* In contrast to the situation in the protectorates, Algeria has been relatively tranquil since the large-scale uprising in 1945, and there is no indication of impending violence. Longest under French control, Algeria has the largest population of French descent. The indigenous population is permitted French citizenship, though participation in government is severely limited by various devices which insure the political predominance of the French residents. The nationalist movement is still largely factionalized: an extremist faction favors violent action to achieve independence, while a moderate group appears to favor gradual evolution within the French Union. A third group, composed of *ulema* (students of Moslem law and traditions) but with a rather modern outlook, has been increasingly active in trying to unify nationalists under its leadership and may well have growing success. The Algerian nationalists on occasion cooperate with the Communists on tactical issues, but the latter's frequent attempts to bring about a closer relationship have consistently failed.

30. *Spanish Morocco and Tangier.* Close Spanish controls and some 50–60,000 troops maintain order in Spanish Morocco. The nationalist Islah Party has developed some strength but lacks widely based support in a poor region which has had little exposure to Western ideas and technology. As part of its policy of wooing the Arab States and embarrassing France, Spain has made gestures favorable to native nationalism, but has not materially relaxed its control. While Spain may soon introduce reforms which give titular administrative positions to nationalist leaders, there is no indication that it intends to grant any significant degree of self-government. However, it probably will continue its attempts to embarrass the French through an ostensibly lenient attitude toward the natives in Spanish Morocco.

31. Spain's demands for restoration of its prewar role in the administration of the International Zone of Tangier have been largely satisfied by the other participating powers. However, Tangier is likely to remain an arena for French and Spanish disagreements. France would like to see stronger measures taken against nationalist activities in Tangier, but Spain will probably seek to use the Zone as a safe haven for non-violent, anti-French, nationalist operations.

32. *Cooperation between the Nationalist Movements.* Prior to 1954 the nationalist movements in French North Africa made only limited efforts to coordinate their activities, largely confining themselves to sympathy strikes and "days of mourning" designed to show Moslem

solidarity. However, under the sponsorship of the Arab League, a new Committee for the Liberation of North Africa was founded in Cairo early in 1954 to supplant an earlier organization which had been seriously weakened by personal rivalries and disregard of its directives. Political and personal differences and conflicts between moderate and extremist elements are likely to continue, but the long-term likelihood of increasing French repression and the need for coordinated action in the UN probably will produce greater cooperation among the nationalist movements.

33. *Communist Influence.* The Communist parties of Algeria, French Morocco, and Tunisia maintain close liaison with, and are directed and partially financed by the French Communist Party. The Communist aim since 1946 has been the formation of a united front with the nationalists, but to date the small North African Communist parties (about 15,000 members in Algeria and 2,000 in each of the protectorates) have had only limited influence on the nationalist movements. With the exception of a limited temporary alliance in Algeria during 1951–52, the known nationalist leaders have consistently refused to accept any political working relationship, largely because: (*a*) they realized that such ties would alienate many sympathizers in non-Communist areas; (*b*) the local Communist parties are known to be subject to control by Frenchmen; and (*c*) nationalist financial support comes chiefly from the anti-Communist native upper middle class.

34. There is no reliable evidence so far that the North African Communist parties have organized or joined in terrorist activities. The Communists apparently desire to lead a widely-based nationalist movement rather than "adventurist" factions. They are also probably anxious to avoid arousing antagonism in France by supporting terrorism in North Africa at a time when they are advancing the united front theme emphasizing the benefits of negotiations with the USSR, and the USSR is attempting to separate France from the Western Alliance. There is extensive cooperation between the French Communists and the North African workers resident in France who are affiliated with the extremist faction in Algeria. This cooperation probably results in the conversion of many Algerian workers to Communism, but so far it does not appear to have facilitated closer relations between the nationalists and Communists in Algeria itself.

35. Direct Soviet activity in North Africa remains limited, and the USSR has never claimed its seat in the Committee of Control at Tangier. However, although Radio Moscow is still giving little attention to North Africa, greater Communist interest in the area is indicated by the recent inauguration of a new quasi-clandestine radio station which transmits in Arabic to North Africa via Budapest. This station has given more attention and support to nationalist movements than has the official Soviet radio.

36. *Economic Problems.* Large-scale industrial development in North Africa is limited by the shortage of fuel resources and investment capital, by low native purchasing power, and by the low productivity and lack of skill among workers. The growth of secondary industries has been seriously hampered by high production costs and the competition of foreign products on both local and external markets. Roughly a quarter of the arable land is under relatively efficient European cultivation, but native agriculture generally is less than half as productive as European. The population of North Africa is increasing more rapidly than the indigenous food supply. If the present rate of food production is not substantially increased, French North Africa will be faced with a serious reduction in already low levels of consumption.

37. The French have substantial investments in North Africa which represent an important source of income for a few French banks and corporations and for the *colons*. The bulk of private investment in North Africa, whether from France or from local sources, is almost entirely French, and only small amounts of foreign capital other than French are entering the area. Both political and economic pressures for more rapid development are steadily mounting. Therefore, the French have been contributing larger amounts of public investment funds in the post war period. The first French government development plan emphasizing large-scale public works projects is being followed by a project—still in the planning stage—directed toward native agriculture and social improvements. The new program, estimated to cost $1.6 billion, represents almost 10 percent of the public investment program of France and its overseas possessions. The benefits of past programs have largely gone to the *colons;* the lot of most North Africans has not improved materially during the past six years. The new emphasis of the proposed second French plan probably has come too late to enlist the sympathy and cooperation of the native population, whose discontent stems less from poverty than from the economic and social inequalities between the natives and the *colons.*

38. Growing insecurity and the accompanying decline in industrial and commercial activity have resulted in a decline in private investment in Tunisia and Morocco. Public expenditures will have to increase considerably if they are to make up for decreased private investment, and to avert the consequences of growing population pressures. Heightened French interest in developing the African territories as a base for French power probably will stimulate further increased expenditure of public funds. But such an increase will depend on the outcome of forthcoming negotiations between the French and the nationalists and probably would not survive a resumption of extremist actions.

III. *Probable Developments in French North Africa*

39. *International Pressures.* External support is playing a major and growing part in the development of the nationalist movements in North Africa. The chief source of this support has been the Arab-Asian nations, which not only sympathize with national independence movements, but in the case of the Arab states have ties of cultural, racial, and religious kinship as well. The Arab and Asian states will almost certainly increase even further their efforts to obtain favorable UN action on the Tunisian and Moroccan cases. While the small resources of the Arab states will limit their capabilities for material assistance, they will probably help nationalist exiles, provide increasing financial aid, and assist in smuggling arms. Over the long run, the USSR may apply greater pressure in the area through Bloc action in the UN and clandestine support to nationalist activity. The US has not supported North African nationalism in the UN, but both the nationalists and the Moslem countries will increase their efforts to secure some form of US action which can be construed as support for the nationalists.

40. It will probably become increasingly difficult, particularly if North African disorders continue, for the UN to withstand Arab-Asian pressures for concrete UN recommendations on the protectorates. France probably will not retreat from its basic position that UN consideration of the Tunisian and Moroccan problems is an unwarranted interference in French domestic affairs. France probably will ignore or reject any UN recommendations relating to the protectorates, though it will attempt to forestall such recommendations through real or ostensible reforms on its own.

41. *French Policy.* The proximity of North Africa to France, the large and well-entrenched population of French descent, and the extensive French investments in the area have created a unique relationship between metropole and colonial areas and make retention of these possessions a major objective of France. Moreover, the contraction of the French position in Indochina and the increased violence in Tunisia and Morocco over the past year have focused French attention on the importance of holding North Africa. The "Eurafrique" concept of France's international power position, according to which the resources of France must be concentrated on strengthening its Europe-Africa power complex as the means of matching a resurgent Germany and of retaining a respected voice in the policies of the Western alliance, has become a fixed element of France's foreign policy. The collapse of French power in the Far East has increased support for this concept in all French political parties except the Communist. The unique ties between France and North Africa and France's determination to maintain these ties make extremely difficult any reconciliation

between French interests and nationalist desires for complete independence.

42. At the same time French governments have recognized the necessity for further political reforms in North Africa; French policy for the past two years has been based officially on previous pledges to extend "internal autonomy" gradually to the protectorates. In practice, this policy has combined suppression of nationalist activities with limited reform programs imposed on the protectorates. These reform programs have been particularly unacceptable to the nationalists because they provided for participation of the *colons* in the newly created Tunisian and Moroccan elective bodies under the principle of "co-sovereignty." The present French government has shown unusual initiative in attempting to satisfy moderate nationalist aspirations. However, it is unlikely that this policy will be continued indefinitely, and future French governments will probably continue to act belatedly in response to external pressures rather than try to reduce the threat of local nationalism by fore-handed reforms.

43. French policies will vary in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria because of the differing French ties with these areas and their different stages of political development. The program which Mendes-France has proposed for Tunisia envisages a substantial degree of internal autonomy, and he probably would accept such nationalist proposals as: creation of a single, elected all-Tunisian Assembly; the end of certain direct political controls; and "Tunisification" of the civil service. Such a program arouses intense opposition not only among the *colons*, but among many of the Independent-Peasants and Radicals and some of the ex-Gaullists in the French Assembly. However, Mendes-France, if he stays in office, is likely to secure a compromise settlement which will attract broad Assembly support and remove the more immediate causes of nationalist violence, while holding out the prospect of further negotiations on nationalist demands. Such a compromise probably will bring about at most a temporary respite from nationalist disorders.

44. France probably will also propose new reforms for Morocco in the near future, though on a more modest scale. There are indications that Mendes-France intends such action prior to the scheduled autumn session of the UN General Assembly. We believe that the French will first have to remove the present unpopular Sultan because the installation of a Sultan satisfactory to the majority of Moroccans is essential before a program of reforms can be negotiated. However, the need to uphold remaining French prestige probably precludes the return of the former Sultan. The enthronement of one of his sons may be the only feasible alternative, provided that the Moroccan populace is convinced that the ex-Sultan favors such action. Furthermore, some of the discredited reforms imposed on Morocco after the last Sultan's

deposition will have to be repealed or revised. If these conditions are fulfilled, and if the French have demonstrated good will in the Tunisian negotiations, we believe that at least a temporary halt in nationalist violence will also be secured in Morocco.

45. Over the next few years France will probably grant a degree of internal autonomy, first in Tunisia and later in Morocco. However, we believe that future French governments will insist at a minimum on retaining certain key controls over the protectorates, particularly in the fields of foreign affairs and defense, and to some extent public finance and justice. Control of defense forces would also give the French a legal basis for acting in the field of internal security. In addition, France probably will insist on protecting the legal rights and economic interests of the *colons* through special agreements. France apparently hopes that in the very long term Tunisia and Morocco could be persuaded to become Associated States in the French Union, or some variant of that status. The French do not contemplate granting autonomy to Algeria, but rather completing the integration of Algeria into the metropole. Finally, whatever the extent of French concessions, France probably will not hesitate to use force to control any further nationalist outbreaks.

46. *Probable Further Growth of Nationalism in Tunisia and Morocco.* Despite any short term accommodation between the French and the nationalists in Tunisia and Morocco, we consider it almost certain that nationalist opposition to French control will continue to grow at an increasing rate, although periods of quiescence will occur. As the French allow greater native participation in local administration, both nationalist desires and capabilities for self-government will almost certainly increase. Limited and gradual French reform programs are unlikely to reduce tension more than temporarily or to keep pace with increasing nationalist demands.

47. Moreover, the very success of their recent terrorist tactics will present a constant temptation to the nationalists to revert to violence in order to gain their objectives. Resort to terrorism is likely to increase if moderate nationalist leaders are unable through negotiations to make progress clearly leading toward ultimate independence for Tunisia and Morocco.

48. If the French should soon grant independence (which we consider highly unlikely), the nationalists would in return almost certainly accept close military and economic ties with France, although they would not join the French Union as presently constituted. However, unless such a settlement were made within the next several years, the nationalists would accept such ties only with great reluctance and would probably repudiate them as soon as feasible. If the deterioration in French and nationalist relations continues, even the nationalist leaders who have been relatively moderate probably will in time refuse

to seek complete independence by peaceful and gradual means. They would probably join the extremists in further periodic sabotage and terrorism calculated to attract international attention and put pressure on the French. French countermeasures might temporarily put down aggressive nationalist activity but would probably lead to its eventual resumption in even more violent form.

49. As the strength of the nationalists increases they will, in the absence of adequate French concessions, almost certainly resort to violence. They will intensify their terrorist guerrilla-type activities, and might eventually organize a large-scale uprising. They would anticipate that a campaign of violence would arouse favorable world opinion and result in political intervention, probably through the UN. However, so long as French military capabilities are not seriously reduced, we believe that the nationalists, because of their insufficient organization and their military weakness, will not be able to oust the French by force.

50. *Probable Growth of Nationalism in Algeria.* The growth of organized nationalist activity in Algeria will probably lag behind that in adjacent areas. The objectives of many Algerian nationalists are likely to remain moderate in the next few years, with emphasis on removal of discrimination and on greater Moslem participation in government. However, ties with France are so close that the French almost certainly will not grant any considerable degree of autonomy. French concessions are therefore unlikely to be sufficient to prevent the further growth of the nationalist movement. The conflict between the French and the nationalists in Algeria may in the long run prove most difficult to resolve, particularly if Tunisia and Morocco receive a considerable degree of independence.

51. *Communism and Nationalism.* The Communists will probably continue their efforts to exploit nationalist desires for independence by attempting to capture the nationalist movements, but we believe they will be unlikely to succeed. While Communist-nationalist collaboration may increase, particularly if France adopts repressive policies and extremists gain control of nationalist parties, such collaboration on the part of the nationalist groups will probably be undertaken to further their own aims and not because of any basic sympathy for Communism. However, once the main body of nationalists has come to accept the strategy of violent action, the Communist parties—now small, weak, and with little influence—are almost certain to coordinate activities with the nationalists, and may come to be accepted as allies. In that event, Communist sabotage capabilities would be increased and opposition to the presence of Western troops and bases in the area would be strengthened.

52. *Effect on French and US Positions.* In the light of the above factors we believe that the outlook remains one of growing instability

in North Africa, characterized by sporadic crises and disturbances created by the growing nationalist opposition to French control. While we believe that the nationalists cannot oust the French by force alone, increasing native resistance in Tunisia and Morocco will probably—within the next decade—create a serious drain on French financial and manpower resources and strain the determination of the French to maintain their dominant position. This in turn will impede use of the area as a base by France and by the US. Moreover, the reliability of French North African troops might decrease under the stimulus of nationalism, reducing the value of this major military asset. In the long run France will probably either have to grant independence voluntarily or else resort to increasingly costly military repression. In the latter case the time may come when a combination of nationalist insurrections and external pressures will present France with problems insoluble short of complete withdrawal.

53. Increasing nationalist resistance to French control in North Africa might constitute a serious threat to the security of US bases in the area, particularly if the nationalist movements should establish a common front with the Communists. As long as nationalist leaders continue to hope for US support they will try to restrain their followers from attacks on the bases. However, some extremists may not obey their leaders, and, as the situation deteriorates, sporadic demonstrations and raids against the bases will become increasingly likely.

54. If France were involved in war, the nationalists would probably take maximum advantage of the situation. Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists would demand a guarantee of complete independence from France. If they should fail in their demands, they would probably resort to violence and undertake sabotage of North Africa's highly vulnerable communications, though they would probably stage a general revolt only as a last resort.

55. *International Implications of North African Developments.* The growing conflict between the French and the nationalists in North Africa will also have important international repercussions. Differences over North African issues are likely to become a source of increasingly serious friction among the non-Communist countries. We believe that North African development will exert a strong influence on Arab and Asian attitudes toward the West both in the cold war and in event of global conflict. Many Latin American countries are also anti-colonial in outlook and might support the North African nationalists.

56. Differences between the non-Communist powers as a result of North African developments will come to a focus in the UN. Further Arab-Asian efforts to secure UN intervention on North African questions might lead to a split in the Western-oriented UN majority which could be exploited on this and other issues by the Soviet Bloc.

57. The efforts of both sides to secure US support confront the US itself with major policy decisions and the prospect of a serious strain on its relations with many nations in the Free World. If the US appeared to favor the North African nationalists, it would probably succeed in deterring nationalist-Communist collaboration and in assuring the physical security of its present North African bases for a longer time. By doing so, however, the US would invite serious complications in its relations with France and in its utilization of these bases. On the other hand, if the US strongly supported its NATO partner, it would almost certainly lose influence among the Near and Far Eastern states, as well as be subjected to interference at the Moroccan bases. Sharp differences between the Arab states and the Western Powers over North Africa would almost certainly lessen the possibility of Arab cooperation with the West in Middle East defense. The US might also prejudice its prospects for subsequent influence in any North African state which might ultimately receive its independence.

IV. *Prospects for Libyan Stability and Pro-Western Orientation*

58. *Prospects for Internal Stability.* Libya, independent since December 1951, has thus far been unable to establish firm foundations for political and economic stability. The poverty and economic underdevelopment of the country, the unresolved Tripolitanian-Cyrenaican differences, the weakness of the parliament and the bureaucracy, and the limited support for the ruling dynasty, all make for an unstable future. Most important of these factors is the continued cleavage between the Cyrenaicans, who presently dominate the federal government, and the more advanced and numerous Tripolitanians, who constitute two-thirds of the population. However, the Tripolitanians have not united to form a strong opposition party, and they are not able to challenge the present regime.

59. Despite his failure thus far to resolve provincial differences and unite his kingdom, King Idris is the strongest political force in Libya. The incapacity of the Libyan Parliament, the political indifference of the people, and the recent resignation of able Prime Minister Muntasser have all strengthened the King's hand. The transformation of the Libyan Government from a constitutional to an absolute monarchy will probably continue over the next few years, provided King Idris remains on the throne. Libyan political loyalties, instead of crystallizing around national groupings and issues, probably will follow the traditional Arab pattern of shifting personal and family alliances.

60. However, the king is 64 years of age, and his designated successor has neither much political support nor ambition. While accepting Idris, many Tripolitanians and some Cyrenaicans only reluctantly pledged allegiance to his dynasty as well. Unless the king survives long enough to consolidate his power, his death might be followed by a

period of intrigues during which the kingdom might be dismembered. Such increased internal instability might impede, but almost certainly would not preclude, use of Libyan bases by the US and the UK.

61. The Libyan economy relies heavily upon agriculture to maintain present bare subsistence standards, and is extremely limited in other resources. Large-scale exploration for oil is about to be undertaken, but the prospects for extensive discoveries remain unknown. Consequently, Libya has to rely almost wholly upon foreign financial aid and technical assistance in order to carry out even a minimum development program. The UK at present provides over ten million dollars annually to Libya, which also receives some technical aid from the UN and the US.

62. *Probable Trends in Libyan External Relations.* Strong Western influence in Libya, based mainly upon direct financial assistance, is likely to persist for at least the next several years. This influence would probably continue in the separate provinces even if Libya should be dismembered during that period. On the other hand, UK influence, though still paramount in Libya, has declined appreciably, and the Libyan Government has discharged a large number of its British advisors. British policy at present is to remain aloof from Libyan domestic politics. Should the UK continue that policy, a partial vacuum in Western political and economic influence might develop. However, as a result of its need to station in Libyan bases some troops formerly in the Suez Zone, the UK might increase its interest in Libyan affairs. A UK–Libyan base agreement has been concluded. At the same time, King Idris has expressed a desire for closer relationship with the US, and has indicated that he would prefer the US to assume the role of chief benefactor and "protector".

63. The USSR has not yet attempted to open diplomatic relations with Libya. There are virtually no Communists in Libya.

64. US–Libyan air base negotiations, virtually completed, but not yet approved by Libya's parliament, will provide Libya $40 million over the 20 year period of the agreement, with $4 million to be paid for the use of the base each year from 1954 through 1960, and one million dollars annually thereafter. In view of exaggerated Libyan expectations, parliamentary disappointment over the size of the US financial contribution may result in delay of ratification, scheduled for the fall of 1954. However, Libyan Government pressure probably will overcome parliamentary opposition.

65. Because of strong Libyan resentment over French influence in the province of Fezzan and French repression of the Moroccan and Tunisian nationalist movements, there will probably be increasing difficulties with France in the near future. Many Libyan officials have shown open sympathy and tacit encouragement for the Tunisian terrorists. However, France may succeed in its efforts to obtain a base

agreement with Libya, provided its financial contribution is sufficiently attractive to overcome anti-French sentiment.

66. Libya's inclusion in the Arab League early in 1953 has not resulted in any fundamental change in its pro-Western orientation. Libya uniformly endorses the Arab League's pronouncements on Israel and on North African nationalism, but plays only a secondary role in the League and has frequently adopted an independent attitude. Libya has not signed the League's collective security pact. However, growing Libyan political and cultural ties with Egypt constitute an increasing challenge to the Western position. Nevertheless, Libya will remain fearful of Egypt's greater power. During the past year, Libya has also developed diplomatic and military connections with Turkey, which may come to overshadow its liaison with the Arab League and Egypt if sufficiently attractive inducements are offered. Further growth of Turkish influence would probably help to strengthen Libya's pro-Western orientation. In the long run, however, Libya is likely to follow the lead of the other Arab states.

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa"

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 18, 1954.

NSC 5436/1

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA (TUNISIA, MOROCCO, ALGERIA)

(*Note:* Reexamination of this paper would be required in the event of a basic change in U.S. policy toward Europe)

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. French North Africa is of particular importance to the U.S. because:

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[1] The source text was part of a document originally circulated as NSC 5436, dated Oct. 5, 1954. It was considered by the National Security Council in NSC Action No. 1242 at its 217th meeting on Oct. 14, 1954. At that time, NSC 5436 was adopted subject to amendments in four places, which are noted in footnotes to the relevant paragraphs in the text below, and redesignated NSC 5436/1. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, "Record of Actions by the NSC, 1954")

Also included in NSC 5436/1 were a note by the Executive Secretary, James S. Lay, Jr., to the NSC, dated Oct. 18, and the Financial Appendix and Staff Study on North Africa that were originally contained in NSC 5436. According to Lay's note, on Oct. 16 the President approved the amended statement of policy and directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies. He designated the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

The Financial Appendix is not printed, but some sections of the Staff Study are printed below.

An earlier draft Statement of Policy prepared by the NSC on the Position of the United States With Respect to North Africa, dated Aug. 18, 1953, is in S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "North Africa."

a. It is of great strategic significance in U.S. and Western military planning, especially as a site for military bases.

b. The conflict between French interests and North African nationalism:

(1) Is widely regarded, especially in Asia and Africa, as a test of U.S. and Western intentions with respect to self-determination of dependent peoples.

(2) Involves the danger of serious damage to U.S. relations with France if U.S. policy appears to the French to jeopardize vital French interests.

2. The danger in this area to the security of the free world arises not from the threat of direct Soviet military attack, but from instability resulting primarily from the conflict between native nationalism and the French position, coupled with the effect of political developments in the area on other countries, particularly in the Moslem world. Free world interests have been menaced by the inability or unwillingness of succeeding French governments and Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists to resolve their conflicting interests by compromise.

3. It is a fixed tenet of French policy that France's power position in Europe and the world requires retention and control of North Africa as part of the French community. Political pressures both in France and by the approximately 1.5 million French inhabitants of North Africa have inhibited successive French governments from dealing effectively with North African nationalism. Until the recent French initiative in Tunisia, reform programs have been proposed by France but on the basis of unilateral imposition rather than bilateral negotiation. Furthermore, these measures have had the air of being stopgaps which did not tackle the fundamental problem of placing the peoples of Morocco and Tunisia "in a position to manage their own affairs," as promised by the present French Prime Minister.

4. The Mendes-France Government has recently concentrated on a reform program for Tunisia and has activated negotiations on basic agreements which may produce a new accord on Franco-Tunisian relations. While the outcome of the negotiations cannot be predicted, present French activities vis-à-vis Tunisia have revived mutual confidence between French and Tunisian nationalists, and hope prevails concerning reforms for Tunisia. In Morocco, however, France has not yet proposed any real remedies for the problem.

5. It can be safely concluded that unless reforms in both Tunisia and Morocco are implemented at a pace satisfactory to the moderate nationalist groups, who have heretofore controlled the nationalist movements, the moderates will lose their control and terrorist elements will predominate and augment their campaigns of violence. Unless the French Government follows through promptly on its recently announced intention to grant a greater degree of self-government, the Arab-Asian nations will continue strongly to condemn French policy

and to press for further UN action. Under such circumstances, continued U.S. support for the French position would receive similar condemnation within and without the United Nations. Furthermore, the Tunisian and Moroccan people might harbor such feelings of hostility toward us that our strategic interests (including military bases) in the area might be endangered by local acts of violence. On the other hand, if the U.S. appeared to favor the North African nationalists, it would invite serious complications in its relations with France and in its utilization of North African bases. While there is a better than average possibility that Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists would be willing to cooperate politically and militarily with the West if their independence were granted, there is, of course, no guarantee that they would do so in the long run.

6. It is, therefore, in U.S. interests to promote orderly progress toward self-government in Tunisia and Morocco which would at the same time envisage a new relationship for France with these countries and a continuing place for French residents in them. The time required for the attainment of nationalist aspirations would vary as between Tunisia and Morocco (Tunisia is more advanced politically than Morocco) and would depend not only on local factors but also upon the course of international developments, including the attitude which France may adopt toward its commitments in Europe and toward its overseas areas as a result of its recent experience in Indochina.

7. The rate of increase of the native population of French North Africa is one of the highest in the world. The area is scant in natural resources outside of minerals. Despite a large public investment program over the period 1949–1953, about one-half of the cost of which was financed by France, agricultural output has not risen significantly and has not yet achieved pre-war levels. Per capita food consumption has been maintained by foodstuff imports. The inflation engendered by the investment plan combined with backward methods of production and French commercial policy have increased costs of production to such an extent that French North Africa is finding it increasingly difficult to market her agricultural exports even in the franc-protected market.

8. Spain has been putting pressure on France by making gestures favorable to native nationalism in Spanish Morocco and also wooing Arab states. While the Spanish may desire to annoy the French over the Moroccan question, Spain would doubtless sacrifice her pro-Arab policy to the necessity of remaining in Morocco by force should the situation develop to a point where that choice were necessary.

9. Arab nationalism in Algeria does not represent an immediate threat to French rule or to Franco-American strategic interests there. In the long run, however, there is a potential danger that the inspiration of the pressure of events in Morocco and Tunisia might weld the

now disunited nationalists into a strong national coalition which would draw to it even conservative Moslems and cause serious trouble for France and its allies.

OBJECTIVES

10. The continued availability of the area and its material and manpower resources to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the free world.

11. The association of the peoples of the area with the free world.

12. The prevention of the spread of Soviet influence and Communist ideology within the area.

13. Maintenance of the confidence of the Arab-Asian nations in U.S. intentions and policies in support of self-determination for dependent peoples.

14. Such orderly progress toward self-government in Tunisia and Morocco, including mutually acceptable arrangements for a continuing place in those countries for French residents, as will best contribute to achievement of the above objectives.[2]

COURSES OF ACTION

French North Africa

15. Maintain existing bases and transit rights and, as necessary and politically feasible, seek to obtain additional bases and transit rights.

16. Seek removal of present limitations on force and rotational unit levels.

17. Continue to seek in advance the right to conduct military operations in and from the area during general hostilities.

18. Be prepared to assure the security of U.S. bases and U.S. official and dependent personnel,[3] if French authorities fail to discharge their responsibility in the event of local insurrection.

Morocco and Tunisia

19. Urge the French and the Moroccans and the French and the Tunisians respectively to settle their conflicts on a bilateral basis.

a. Encourage France to offer progressively more self-government to Morocco and Tunisia, and give diplomatic support to that end.

b. If necessary, exert such pressures on France, as may be effective to induce more rapid progress toward self-government in Morocco and Tunisia.

c. Encourage arrangements which will preserve, for as long as necessary in the interest of free world defense, French participation in responsibility for the external defense and foreign affairs of Morocco and Tunisia, and continued French contributions to their economies.[4]

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[2] The first part of NSC Action No. 1242 (*b*) deleted a paragraph that originally concluded this section which had read: "Economic development of the area with a view to enabling it to achieve self-support and, in time, to supplement the European economy and provide the latter with alternate sources of commodities now available only from the Soviet bloc or dollar areas."

[3] The second part of NSC Action No. 1242 (*b*) added the phrase "and U.S. official and dependent personnel."

d. Support the principle of a continuing place for French residents in Tunisia and Morocco in which their political, economic, social and cultural rights are guaranteed by treaty, constitution or other appropriate means.

e. Urge the Tunisian and Moroccan Nationalists to act with moderation.

20. Continue, and if necessary expand, economic and technical assistance for use in Tunisia and Morocco, if it is determined that such aid will assist in achieving orderly self-government and stability in the area.[5]

21. In the event France and the nationalists are unable to resolve their conflict by bilateral agreement, make use, when desirable: (*a*) of UN procedures and activities to further progress toward self-government in Tunisia and Morocco, including the participation of Tunisia and Morocco in some form in the UN, and (*b*) of mediation or arbitration.

22. If circumstances ultimately so require, press for French recognition of the eventual full freedom of Morocco and Tunisia to decide whether or not to continue in association with France.

. . . .

[Enclosure]

National Security Council Staff Study

U.S. Policy on French North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria)

PROBLEM

1. To determine the general course of action required for maintaining and defending U.S. interests in French North Africa without alienating the anti-colonial world or jeopardizing U.S. strategic interests or relations with its NATO allies in this region and elsewhere.

ANALYSIS

Basic Factors Common to French North Africa As a Whole

2. To indicate the forces with which U.S. policy must reckon in French North Africa, and the limits within which it may operate, this study explores the dynamics, strength and purposes of the two chief factors affecting the region's stability—European control and native nationalism—in the context of French North Africa's political, economic and strategic relationships.

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[4] The third part of NSC Action No. 1242 (*b*) deleted a paragraph originally inserted in this section which had read: "Encourage France to adopt such measures as will assist Tunisia and Morocco toward economic self-support."

[5] The fourth part of NSC Action No. 1242 (*b*) added a comma after the word Morocco, and substituted the word "determined" for the word "clear."

3. *Strategically*, North Africa might be required as a new base of Allied operations in the event of World War III. The United States now operates in French Morocco the Port Lyautey Naval Air Station and three USAF air bases, and has a fourth air base under construction. France has both air and naval bases in North Africa. From the technical viewpoint, extensive additional military requirements can be met in North Africa. In the past its population has provided an important reservoir of military manpower for both France and Spain. In the event of a general war, the defense of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia will fall to French forces (including Moroccan, Tunisian, and French Union troops), certain U.S. forces in the area, and possibly, Spanish forces in Morocco.

*4. *Economically*, French North Africa has extensive deposits of lead and phosphates, and lesser deposits of manganese, cobalt and iron-ore. The region's population, less than one percent of the people of the world, is increasing steadily. Food production, however, has not kept pace. The lack of skilled labor, cheap power and adequate transportation facilities retards economic development. All North African countries, except the International Zone of Tangier, have been a financial burden on the Governments of the Western powers controlling or guiding them.

5. *Politically*, *from the perspective of many native inhabitants*, the dominant fact is nationalism. Nationalism, however, is only the symptom of a larger historical transformation in North Africa. For several decades, and in some instances even before French and Spanish conquest, a portion of the Muslim leadership has come to realize that the traditional social system and beliefs of North Africa were inadequate for survival in a modern world. Their impotence to resist European political and economic control and the ensuing supremacy (sometimes even the acknowledged superiority) of Western theories and practices, made this realization an inescapable necessity. Those native groups who were (1) brought into existence through the Westernization of North Africa (students, urban industrial workers, *bourgeoisie*), (2) placed on the defensive by this impact (small farmers, nomads, certain religious leaders), or (3) hopeful of surviving it (certain large landowners, businessmen, feudal lords, and again, certain religious leaders), were henceforth faced by a common problem: how to create new and stronger social and ideological bonds capable of ensuring the survival of their community in a world not only more modern but more powerful than they. They found that the control of the political institutions and economic bases necessary for creating such a new society was in the hands of foreigners. Hence, many North Africans narrowed this larger search into "nationalism",

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***Also see Economic Annex attached. [Footnote in the source text. The Economic Annex is not printed.]**

for the presence of the foreigners was the most obvious and the most frustrating fact. Naturally, the groups newly brought into existence by the Westernization of North Africa, having the least to lose in the death of the old society and chafing most in the half-way house of the present *status quo*, have provided the leadership for the nationalist movement.

6. Though the peasantry still remains largely passive, foreign rule—because it has often become direct rule—is simply an additional fact in their already poverty-stricken and frustrating existence. To the extent that the Western foreigner educates them, improves their health, develops their means of communication, draws them into a modern economy and political state, and thus generally raises their aspirations, this group is increasingly drawn, not to the foreigner who promises gradual and orderly progress, but to the leaders of their own community who promise a new world. A significant portion of the leadership of the traditional society in all of French North Africa is joining the new intellectuals and the new middle class. North African nationalism, which seems most likely to increase in number of adherents through the tendency of the traditional society to deteriorate and the spread of Western ideas, has achieved its initial goals only in Libya. In Morocco and Tunisia its intensity is growing because of increasing frustration resulting from continued Western dominance. In Algeria the intensity of nationalism at least at the present time is not growing, and there are few signs of increasing frustration. Nevertheless, nationalism seems likely to grow in Algeria almost regardless of French action, because of the influence of Moroccan and Tunisian nationalism.

7. *Politically, from the perspective of France*, the dominant problem is security and continued control. The varying legal, political, economic and military controls which France exercises in North Africa are intended to help maintain its status as a world power, especially in the Atlantic and European communities, and to serve as a base for the security of its empire as well as the free world generally. For similar reasons, the UK and other European colonial powers support the French position vis-à-vis the North African protectorates.

8. *Politically, from the perspective of the UN*, and especially the Arab states and a large group of anti-colonial states in Asia, French North Africa has been a test of the intentions of the principal Western nations toward dependent peoples generally. With respect to Tunisia and Morocco, the inherent anti-colonial sentiment of the Latin American states tends to associate them to some extent with the impatience of the Arab-Asian states over the slow rate of progress of dependent peoples. On the problem of North Africa, however, the attachment of the Latin American states for France tends to render their position on Tunisia and Morocco more restrained than it would be otherwise.

9. Unless the Soviet rulers have decided to initiate general war, there is little danger of direct Soviet attacks upon the area. North Africa is not of paramount importance in overall Soviet strategy, and is, moreover, comparatively inaccessible to Iron Curtain countries. The chief Soviet interest in the region is probably to prevent—by means other than war—its use by the West as a base from which to launch an air attack on the USSR, as well as generally to disrupt public order and security as much as possible. The Communists will probably continue their efforts to exploit nationalist desires for independence by attempting to capture the nationalist movements, but they will be unlikely to succeed.

10. It is the interaction of these factors which seriously affects the degree of political stability necessary for maintaining and defending Western interests in this area during the cold war. In the foreseeable future, the question is not whether Western powers can maintain their strategic control of North Africa, but rather under what conditions and at what price they may be able to do so.

[Here follows a section, paragraphs 11 to 18, on the French position in North Africa.]

The North African Issue in the East–West Conflict

19. Nonetheless, the situation in French North Africa already affects the broader issues and strategy of the cold war since political stability must be assured, if possible, without the use of armed force. North Africa is now an important source of military manpower for France, North African soldiers comprising about fifteen percent of the French Army prepared to defend Western Europe in accordance with over-all NATO strategy. The full realization of the major goal of making Western European armed forces sufficiently formidable to discourage Soviet aggression may be threatened if and when France's hold on North Africa is withdrawn. Should conditions in North Africa threaten its position in the protectorates, France would face the necessity of finding adjustments to new relationships in Europe and the world at large. Recognizing these prospects, France considers North Africa as vital to its world position and is capable of devising the means that, in the immediate future (the next five years), will keep its North African territories under French control, although this may require the use of extensive repressive measures.

20. The tensions between the French and the nationalists in North Africa also bear upon the prosecution of the cold war in the Near East and parts of Asia because of the repercussions which occur in these Moslem and/or newly independent areas. U.S. unwillingness to support North African nationalism is a cause of irritation and disillusionment, even though it may not seriously undermine the confidence of non-European countries in U.S. world leadership. The governments of these countries are probably hesitant to join the Western powers for

more fundamental reasons of policy and attitude than the North African issue. Nevertheless, dependent as they are for their continued existence on strongly nationalist popular opinion in their own countries, most of these governments will find it increasingly difficult to take moderate positions in the UN in the face of continuing tensions in North Africa. In the event of major uprisings there, at least the Moslem nations would find it difficult to cooperate consistently with the U.S. or any other power that supports the French position.

21. While there is a better than average possibility that Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists would be willing to cooperate politically and militarily with the West if their independence were granted, there is of course no guarantee that they will do so in the long run. However, in contrast to their steadily waning hope in the French liberals, the faith of the Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists in the basic, anti-colonialist, good-will of the United States persists. Their faith in the U.S. tends to be correlated with their antipathy to the French, their relationship with France, and their hope that the United States will ameliorate that relationship, and is not an indication that they are taking sides in the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, some Arab nationalists have shown themselves to be neutralists in the East–West conflict, and might consider their newly granted independence endangered by opening their territories again to the Allied powers, although they may favor close relations with the West in other fields.

22. Already certain problems arising from U.S. aid and defense programs have reflected and contributed to political tensions in North Africa. Thus, nationalists considered that U.S. economic aid should have been allocated directly to Morocco and Tunisia instead of sub-allocated from France's allotments; the nationalists regard the exercise of French controls without native consent as an infringement of their basic sovereignty and they fear its cumulative effect.

23. The failure of France to consult the former Sultan before granting military base rights to the United States in Morocco also aroused resentment among Moroccans, although nationalists say he would have given consent. At the insistence of France, the Metropolitan Departments of Algeria were included in NATO; however, Morocco and Tunisia were not because of the fears of other NATO powers that this extension would lead to the inclusion of still other parts of Africa. The nationalists insist that Moroccan and Tunisian membership in NATO, if any, should be in their own name, not as dependent territories of France. However, the NATO conference in Libson in February 1952 contained the following provision for administrative arrangements in time of war :

"3. The control and the defense of the zones of the interior, including French North Africa, is the direct responsibility of the National

Authorities concerned, who will grant the Allied Commanders under SACEUR all facilities necessary for the efficient conduct of their operations. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe shall have authority to conduct such combat operations in these zones, including French North Africa, as he deems necessary for the defense of Western Europe."

[Here follows a section, paragraphs 24 to 40, on the North African Issue in the United Nations and Special Problems in Tunisia, French Morocco, and Algeria.]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Threats to Western Interests

41. North Africa is of great importance to the United States and its allies as a base of Allied operations in the event of World War III and as a source of raw materials and manpower. Western interests generally are menaced by the inability or unwillingness of French and North African nationalists to resolve their conflicting interests by compromise. The impact of Western ideas is producing a new middle class which has little to lose in the death of the traditional social system and which is providing the leadership for the nationalist movement in French North Africa. A significant portion of the leadership of the traditional society in French North Africa is joining the new intellectuals and the new middle class. Because of its dynamics, the nationalist movement seems likely to grow almost regardless of French actions. To the Asians, Near Eastern, and, to a less extent, Latin American states, French North Africa has been a test of Western intentions toward dependent peoples generally.

42. In the foreseeable future the question is not whether Western powers can maintain their strategic control of North Africa but rather under what conditions and at what price they may be able to do so. Prolonged nationalist opposition in Morocco to the recent French actions in support of their imposed reform program of 1953 has tended to weaken France's position in Morocco. It is in the United States interest to prevent conditions from reaching the point at which a very substantial portion of the Moroccan and Tunisian people harbor such feeling of hostility toward us that our strategic interests in the area could be seriously endangered by local acts of violence. Such a course is advisable, since the peoples of North Africa are not prepared to govern themselves in a Western-type democracy, and if they are to do so, they must pass through a period of gradual evolution in which they may need our assistance if our strategic interests are to be preserved.

43. As a means of diminishing the threat to Western interests posed by nationalist demands and by political instability in the area, the United States should make the most practicable use of technical and economic assistance through the French in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. The United States should seek to create an atmosphere which

will facilitate obtaining base rights where required within the area, and upon the threat of and during general hostilities, the right to conduct military operations in and from the area. The United States should also be prepared to assure the security of U.S. bases, if French authorities fail to discharge their responsibility in the event of local insurrection.

Tunisia and Morocco

44. Tunisia is more politically and culturally advanced than Morocco, and France has long accepted the idea of the ultimate development of some form of autonomy for Tunisia. In 1954 France announced a program intended to give internal autonomy to Tunisia and which would gradually increase Tunisian participation in the Government. It is not expected, however, that the new program will terminate the ultimate control which France exercises over Tunisian affairs. The French will, in any event, retain control over the defense and foreign affairs of Tunisia. The French Government takes the position that these proposals represent a politically feasible program for Tunisia. The Neo-Destour Party is cooperating with the French in negotiating a series of conventions which will establish new French-Tunisian relations. After October 1950 the Sultan of Morocco rejected French proposals of reforms on the grounds that they would violate Moroccan sovereignty. The French, therefore, deposed the Sultan in August 1953, and initiated reforms which relieved the Sultan of his governmental powers and made existing local, regional, and national advisory councils elective instead of appointive, gave French nationals full rights of participation in all of them, and reformed the judiciary. The nationalists have resorted to violence which has given a setback to this French program. To date the Moroccan nationalists have resisted the blandishments of the Communist Party.

45. The United States should continue to support the French presence in French North Africa only so long as such presence conforms to United States interests and objectives. The United States should make every appropriate effort to allay French fears that the United States is trying to supplant France in French North Africa. The United States should qualify its support by insistence on the implementation of adequate reforms which hold the prospect of easing the nationalist pressure in the area. The United States should be prepared, in case French control really began to break down in Morocco, to consider in the light of its over all foreign relations the abandonment of its present middle-of-the-road policy and try to salvage as much as possible by a drive in support of North African independence. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to urge the parties of the Tunisian and Moroccan controversies to pursue settlements on a bi-

lateral basis, but should continue to support the principle that the United Nations is competent to discuss such problems.

Algeria

46. In Algeria the situation is complicated by the fact that Algeria has been a part of France for nearly a century and contains about 1,000,000 Frenchmen who also own over one-third of the farm land. Arab nationalism in Algeria does not represent an immediate threat to French rule or to Franco-American strategic interests there. In the long run, however, there is a potential danger that the inspiration of the pressure of events in Morocco and Tunisia might weld the now disunited nationalists into a strong national coalition which would draw to it even conservative Moslems.

[Here follows the Economic Annex, entitled "The Economic Structure and Problems of French North Africa," prepared by the FOA.]

751S.00/11-2254 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 22, 1954—3:49 p.m.

1876. Re: Mendes-France Talks:[2] North Africa:

Re Cairo, Tetuan, Budapest broadcasts, Mendes requested US good offices in persuading Egypt and Spain cease inflammatory propaganda directed North African nationalists. Secretary stated our Ambassador Cairo had twice spoken to Egyptians and received assurances that tone of broadcasts would be moderated, but agreed to repeat admonition.

Mendes stated he would appreciate allusion in communiqué to mutual concern this situation and US intention to help. Mendes proposed reference to examination North African problem in spirit Article 4 NATO pact and decision to concert on matter, Secretary not disposed mention third countries this connection, even in general way, and believed prior consultation member states necessary before submitting question outside interference North Africa to NAC.

Secretary hoped early determined effort would be made by Mendes to conclude Tunisian negotiations and asked what plans he had for solving Moroccan problem. Mendes replied French had political, economic, social reforms prepared, but admitted speedy solution impossible because of crisis based on dynastic problem which would take time to solve. Reforms, he stated, would not be enough to stop unrest and Moroccan situation must mature.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Utter (AF) and cleared in S/S and WE. It was repeated to Cairo, London, Algiers, Casablanca, Tunis, Tangier, Rabat, and Madrid.

[2] French Premier Pierre Mendès-France arrived in Washington on Nov. 17 for talks with the President and Secretary of State. For additional documentation on his trip, see volume VI.

Upon query, Mendes stated he had no intention referring to NA question in speech before UNGA November 22, since he did not wish give impression of being on defensive. Added he might mention outside provocations, if he touched on subject at all.

During lengthy discussions on communiqué Nov. 20, Mendes persevered in attempt include statement placing US in position of supporting France against outside intervention NA affairs. Mendes referred his commitments in recent parliamentary debate to raise with US. Secretary remarked that by bringing US into picture, French would transform NA to international problem instead domestic one as previously they maintained it to be. Secretary noted French had long considered Indo-China policy decisions purely domestic problem, but had sought international aid, which had not been satisfactory to US. He emphasized US could not give French blank check re NA policy, since we did not know French plans for area. If France expected allies to rally to support, Secretary asked why Arabs could not rally in opposition. It could not be international matter for one group alone.

To Mendes prolonged discussion on dangers to NATO security presented by NA crisis, Secretary reiterated position it unwise submit subject NAC without prior consultation other member states particularly since undoubted strong opposition certain member states might result in rebuff to French. French action would require careful study all members.

Following is original French proposal for NA section communiqué:

"The situation in NA was reviewed in light recent events, which have created obstacles to liberal policy inaugurated by French Government which it intends pursue.

External malevolent influences affecting situation NA and which compromise security this region were examined and it decided that two governments would study together means for combatting them. The question will be brought before NAC by French Government."

Following is final language communiqué agreed after three hours discussion:[3]

"5. The Prime Minister reviewed the recent events in NA which created obstacles to the policy inaugurated by French Government. He nevertheless expressed the hope that proposals already made would lead to a prompt solution. He stressed external influences have affected situation in NA and compromised security this region. Secretary of State declared he would give serious consideration to the matter."

DULLES

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[3] For the full text of the communiqué issued at the conclusion of Mendès-France's visit, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 29, 1954, p. 804.

771.00/11-2354

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 23, 1954.

Subject: North Africa

Participants: The Secretary
Dr. Farid Zeineddine, Ambassador of Syria
NEA—Mr. Byroade
AF—Mr. Utter

Dr. Zeineddine, as representative of the eight Arab Missions in Washington, called at the Secretary's request to receive a report on the Mendes-France conversations regarding North Africa, as follows:[1]

The Secretary stated that Mendes-France had sought support for his policy in North Africa and was told that we could not commit ourselves on this. He hoped that Mendes-France would take a liberal attitude in line with the Pacific Charter regarding self-determination and independence. The Secretary felt that we did not know enough about the situation or details to enable us to have enough confidence to be publicly or privately identified with what was going on in North Africa. These conclusions, he stated, were not readily accepted by Mendes-France.

The French Prime Minister complained strongly against propaganda attacks from outside which made it difficult to solve the North African problem. He cited especially Radio Cairo which he said was using about the same line as Radio Budapest.[2]

The Secretary expressed the hope that as long as Mendes-France showed good faith in working out conclusions with Tunisian leaders, external elements would not be allowed to aggravate the situation. He made it clear, however, that he was not passing judgment on these elements.

The Secretary felt that the Arab countries for whom Dr. Zeineddine spoke should give Mendes-France a fair chance to deal with the North African matter since he was convinced that Mendes-France was anxious to reach a satisfactory solution. While Mendes-France had no specific plan as yet for Morocco, he believed that success regarding Tunisia would furnish a pattern for Morocco. Mendes-France, the Secretary added, was under heavy attack from the French Parliament and faced a difficult situation on his return to Paris. We who want peace and freedom in North Africa should give Mendes-France a fair chance.

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[1] Circular telegram 265, Nov. 24, transmitted a summary of this conversation to the posts in Tripoli, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Amman, Paris, Tunis, Algiers, Tangier, Rabat, and Casablanca.

[2] Telegram 810 to Cairo, Nov. 23, instructed the Embassy to inform Nasser that the United States considered Mendès-France's efforts to solve the North African problem sincere and deserving of support. It hoped the Egyptians would desist from actions, primarily the Arab broadcasts from Cairo, that might increase his risk of failure. (751G.00/1-2354)

Mr. Byroade pointed out that opposition had arisen in France from those elements unsympathetic to Mendes-France's policy who claimed uprisings in Algeria resulted from Mendes-France's liberal attitude toward Tunisia. He believed that we should give support to Mendes-France's efforts in Tunisia and hoped that outside inimical broadcasts could be moderated, at least during the critical stage of negotiations. He remarked that if Mendes-France falls, it is likely that his successor would not be as liberal toward North Africa and mentioned again the impression of sincerity which Mendes-France gave.

The Secretary recalled that he had spoken with Mendes-France last July in Paris about Indochina and North Africa and how impressed he had been with the attitude shown by the Prime Minister with regard to these questions before the National Assembly. The Secretary believed that Mendes-France takes a more liberal view than his predecessors or those who might follow him. In reference to the communiqué, the Secretary pointed out to Dr. Zeineddine that he had tried to hold an even balance and hoped that results would justify this.

Dr. Zeineddine expressed gratitude for the Secretary's summary and said that he would convey it to his colleagues. He stated that he thought that they would share his view that the Secretary had done all he could do at this stage. He then remarked that the Damascus Radio would soon begin broadcasts similar to those from Cairo since it was felt that if the North African Arabs listened only to Radio Budapest without hearing from the Arab states that they would turn inevitably toward the Soviet orbit. He felt it was, therefore, better for the Arabs to take some action to keep the North Africans from falling completely under the influence of the Communists. He also added that he felt that if the French stopped repressive measures in North Africa that it would have a salutary effect. He concluded by saying that he had recommended to his Government that it was essential to give Mendes-France help since he was about the best hope that they could have at present.

751S.00/12–1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS, December 10, 1954—10 a. m.

PRIORITY

2471. North African debate got under way in Assembly last night with six interpellations critical of government. Four were unimpressive and in two cases representative of constituents' interests in North

Africa. However, Bidault and Rene Mayer were listened to attentively.

Bidault's speech was not violent and was slightly marred by altercation with Mitterand. Principal points he made were :

(1) There is only one legitimate sovereign of Morocco, Ben [Moulay Arafa] and Assembly must be consulted if any change envisaged.

(2) Normally there should be three debates, one on each of three territories because of different juridical situation in each.

(3) It is recognized solutions in all three territories should be harmonious and certainly not contradictory.

(4) Government seems to have failed to realize whatever is done in one territory has repercussions in others and there is striking disparity between treatment given outlaws in Tunisia and in Algeria.

(5) France must never forget her Moslem friends in North Africa.

(6) Government should state clearly where its North African policy is leading.

Rene Mayer spoke in low, measured tones and was applauded on occasion by all elements Assembly except Communists. Mendes-France applauded some of his statements and shook his hand following speech. His main points were :

(1) He believes in autonomy for Tunisia but not independence while Bourghiba has clearly stated in appeal to neo-Destour Congress and elsewhere he considers any negotiations with French merely interim measures leading to independence.

(2) "I have always feared negotiations with the Tunisian Government would begin on basis of comfortable misunderstandings".

(3) *Fellagah* problem is one of maintenance of order, and it is impossible to explain French residents North Africa and pro-French Moslems why French Government welcoming *Fellagah* back as conquering heroes in Tunisia and pursuing them vigorously with troops in Algeria.

(4) Return of expeditionary corps from Indochina should permit establishment stronger military force in North Africa.

(5) France must face frankly fact Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are only remaining Moslem territories still in dependent status.

(6) Speaking of Algeria, French Republic is indivisible but not necessarily uniform and there is no harm in having different statutes covering different parts of Republic.

(7) Peace in North Africa is essential element of world peace and government should define broad and non-contradictory policy for this vital area.

Despite critical nature of interpellations, not unusual in debate of this nature, consensus of opinion seems to be Mendes-France will obtain passage motion approving government's policy at end of debate which will continue today and tonight probably until early tomorrow morning. While great majority Social Republicans and Independents oppose Mendes-France North African policy, it is not believed they desire (especially Social Republicans) upset applecart before debate on ratification Paris agreements.

DILLON

751S.00/12–1154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 11, 1954—4 p. m.

2499. As anticipated, North African debate proved rough going for Government. Although halfway through it appeared that chamber was determined make Government sweat for its final approval and would hold down favorable majority to safe but narrow margin, there was at no time in either deputy or journalist corridor groups any serious expectation that Government would not emerge successfully at end.

Final vote speaks adequately for success of assembly in carrying out intentions. Analysis of vote gives evidence of "dosing" by floating vote, largely by means of switching from cons to abstentions and vice versa, as means achieving purpose.

Interpellations were numerous and represented all shades opinion among and within parties. Most notable that of Rene Mayer which was, unlike virtually all others, constructive and had strong influence on governments replies and position. (Mendes not only applauded portions of it during delivery but referred to it in his own statement.)

Government moved in its heavy artillery in combating critics. First Fouchet who gave a detailed account of the Franco-Tunisian conventions now under negotiation in support of his principal theme which may be summarized as, "the government is trying to build a solid edifice in North Africa which is demonstrated by the conventions now under negotiation. They will be submitted to the Parliament for discussion so will you not be patient?" Effectiveness of Fouchet's presentation reduced by MRP heckling which consisted in part of embarrassing quotations from Fouchet's own former denunciations in the assembly of the Neo Destour and terrorists.

Mitterand followed confining himself to Algeria and basing his argument on fact that Algeria is not associated territory but part of France itself—"France is second Moslem country of world after Pakistan having 7 million Moslems among her citizens". Mitterand gave his account of reasons for disorders—foreign propaganda and agents and "certain" nationalist movements. He emphasized need for repressive measures in order to preserve unity of "patrie" of which Algeria is a part. Mitterand's intervention was logical, precise and delivered in his usual self-assured, authoritative style. We had impression that it was a bit too slick for present tempers of chamber who still have a hangover from the Dides case debate and its anti-Mitterand aspects. We were impressed by extent anti-Mitterand feeling during interpellations preceding and during Mitterand's own speech. There is no doubt that Mitterand has become a highly controversial figure in chamber. At end of speech he was applauded only by socialists, UDSR, some radicals and few Gaullists with others audibly silent in their disapproval.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Bonn and London.

Mendes own speech was only fair success. Main theme was, as expected, that government was keeping her promises for "autonomy but not independence" and must not be prevented from carrying out the job. His account of government's position was well organized and delivered in customary board room manner. Mendes's airs of self-assurance which assembly used to find agreeable following upon Laniel's "false modesty" now appear to irritate them. What they considered his exaggerated vaunting of success of *Fellagah* amnesty program was, for instance, greeted with cries of "allons, allons" (are you kidding?). He pleased right by citing repressive measures for terrorism and non-Communist left by promising carry out program for autonomy which "ten previous governments had promised but not lived up to". At end applause was good but limited by Mendesian standards.

Final vote evidence that Mendes margin of safety is being whittled away but that if a serious attempt is to be made to unseat him it is not on North Africa and not at this time. We think debate should have little effect one way or another on forthcoming Paris agreements ratification debate. Result should, however, serve notice on Government that honeymoon with assembly is now really over.

DILLON

751S.00/12–1554 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 15, 1954—1 p. m.

2549. Fezzan situation discussed again with Foreign Office and following appear principal elements present French position:

(1) Clear evidence unpopularity Mendes-France liberal North African policy as shown in last weeks' Assembly debate has reinforced his determination follow fairly firm line for Fezzan. Foreign Office says possibility government might fall on this issue. Right wing attacks taking line Mendes-France is following up loss of Indochina, evacuation of French establishments India and weak-kneed policy Tunisia with evacuation of Fezzan and calling him "Prime Minister of desertion".

(2) In any event French not now planning any new moves on Fezzan. Foreign Office says Mendes-France has decided to sit tight until termination present NATO meeting and he gets debate on ratification Paris agreement out of way next week.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli.

(3) Long-term French position obviously not worked out though Foreign Office reiterates that while French Government will not evacuate Fezzan on December 31 there is possibility departure French forces could be worked out in negotiation. Acceptance of principle Libyans have right expel French might also be accepted.

(4) Mendes-France position made somewhat more difficult by interview with Libyan Prime Minister appearing tonight's *Le Monde* in which latter quoted as saying Libya has no need of alliance with France since it already has one with UK. Foreign Office fears this interview will give rise Assembly interpellation regarding French policy Fezzan from right wing deputies.

(5) Other French sources here admit problem relatively secondary in importance to France but like North African problem touches French sensitivity especially since Fezzan remembered as dramatic conquest of Marshal Leclerc during war.

DILLON

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH REGARD TO CHANGES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL STATUS OF TANGIER[1]

771.00/5-752

Memorandum by Mary G. Crain of the Office of African Affairs to the Officer in Charge of North African Affairs (Cyr)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1952.

Subject: United States Interests in International Zone of Tangier.

The interests of the United States in the International Zone of Tangier are entirely political and arise from the strategic position of the Zone in the world at large, and its special status in Morocco. Trade with the United States and American economic investments there are negligible, which is inevitable because of the size of the Zone (144 square miles).

Tangier occupies the northwest corner of Africa, within the Moroccan Empire, where the Straits of Gibraltar join the Atlantic Ocean. The Power or Powers controlling it are, therefore, in a position to prevent rather easily the passage of ships between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and to cut off the shortest sea route between the Western Hemisphere and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Near East and South Asia on the other. This fact has long been recognized, and underlay the jockeying between various European Powers for possession of the area which led finally to the international agreements which established the neutrality of the Zone and its international administration. Although the advent of aerial navigation has decreased the relative strategic value of Tangier, its power over Atlantic–Mediterranean sea traffic mentioned above remains undiminished.

Although the United States has from its beginnings maintained a special position and friendly ties with Morocco, it is only since the end of World War II and the assumption of an increased role in the Mediterranean that we have taken an active part in the affairs of Tangier. This increased interest was evinced by our acceptance of the invitation extended to the United States by the United Kingdom and France to participate in the provisional administration set up in 1945. Our participation in the administration affords us the opportunity to exercise a certain amount of authority in the affairs of the Zone, and constitutes a recognition by the other Powers involved that the United States has assumed a more active position in the area.

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[1] Regarding the background of the issues discussed here, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 601 ff.

The international administration of the Zone, together with the special rights of the United States in Morocco, make it possible for us to maintain our prestige, which is under more or less constant attack in the French Zone. An American School has been established in Tangier, which is looked upon with great favor by native Moroccans, and which is an excellent means of putting across American ideas. These factors also make it possible for us to use the Zone with practically no restraints as a telecommunications base. Two American companies[2] operate relay stations there, on which our radiotelecommunications with the greater part of the Eastern Hemisphere (except the Far East) depend, and one of the more important relay stations of the Voice of America is located there.

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[2] Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company and the Radio Corporation of America.

771A.00/5–1452

Memorandum by Smith N. Crowe of the Office of the Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to the Assistant Legal Adviser of That Office (Maktos)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1952.

Subject: The Rights of the United States and Other Powers Under the Anglo-French Agreement of 1945 Relating to International Administration in the Tangier Zone of Morocco.

Approximately three weeks ago the Spanish Government presented to the Governments represented on the Committee of Control in Tangier a note[1] suggesting that the international administration of the Zone be returned to its status under the agreement relating to a statute for the international administration of the Tangier Zone signed by France, Spain and Great Britain in 1923, as amended in 1928,[2] at which time Italy was also a party. In making this suggestion, the Spanish attacked the Final Act agreed to by the United States, Great Britain, France and Russia in 1945 and the Anglo-French Agreement of that year which re-established an international administration in the Zone.[3]

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[1] Not printed; the Spanish *note verbale*, dated Apr. 7, 1952, addressed to Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United States, and the United Kingdom, was an enclosure to despatch 1042 from Madrid, Apr. 10, 1952. (771.00/4–1052)

[2] The text of the Statute of 1923 can be found in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, p. 541. For the amended Convention of 1928, see *ibid.*, vol. LXXXVII, p. 211.

[3] The text of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1945 is printed in 98 United Nations Treaty Series 250. The text of the Final Act of the Conference with regard to the re-establishment of the international regime in Tangier, signed Aug. 31, 1945, may be found in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 21, 1945, p. 613.

The 1945 Anglo-French Agreement was adhered to by a number of other countries, excluding the United States and Russia. The Final Act consisted of recommendations in the form of resolutions, among which were those stating that the United States and Russia, in view of their interests in the Zone, would be invited to participate in the international administration, and the resolutions provided that the Anglo-French Agreement of 1945 was to constitute an Annex to the Final Act. The Anglo-French Agreement provided that invitations of this nature should be sent to the United States and Russia. It provided further that the international administration was to be re-established on the basis of the Statute of 1923, as amended in 1928, except as modified in the Anglo-French Agreement. Among others, these modifications consisted of changes in the police force operating in the Zone. It was provided in Article VIII of the Agreement that it could be amended by the unanimous vote of the Committee of Control.

The Spanish Government stated that the 1945 Agreement should not be considered in force and referred as substantiation for this position to the fact that Spain had not been included in the 1945 arrangements and that a convention was not held within six months after the new regime became effective, as was provided in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1945. A meeting was held by representatives of WE, AF, and L/NEA, in which it was decided that the Spanish note should be answered by a statement that the problem should be handled at Tangier by the Committee of Control operating under the 1945 Agreement. It was further decided that this could be accomplished through the utilization of Article VIII of the 1945 Agreement. The Spanish were notified in accordance therewith.

A second Spanish note [4] was recently received which indicated substantially the same position as was stated in the first note. In connection with discussions of this note, the thought was presented that it might be desirable to clear up the situation at Tangier by excluding the Soviet Union from participation in the administration. Initially, the suggestion contemplated an international conference to accomplish this. More recently, consideration has been given to attaining the desired goal either (1) within the framework of the 1945 Agreement through the Committee of Control at Tangier, or (2) by the issuance of a Dahir by the Sultan of Morocco [5] which amends the Dahir of September 22, 1945, to exclude Russia from the Committee of Control and the Legislative Assembly of the Zone. It, thus, became desirable to review the legal basis of United States rights as well as Russian rights to participate.

It is believed that United States rights emanate from acceptance of the invitation extended by France pursuant to the 1945 Agreement.

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[4] Not printed; dated Apr. 21, 1952, the text was transmitted in telegram 1128 from Madrid, Apr. 22, 1952. (771.00/4-2252)

[5] Mohammed V.

The Agreement itself contemplated that affirmative rights accrued to all participants in the regime and each assumed the obligation to the other to guarantee the operation of the international administration in accordance with that Agreement. While the fact that the French could compel Morocco to pass the necessary Dahir implementing the Agreement may have been a basis for handling the matter in this fashion, this does not mean that the authority to participate results only from the approval by the Sultan of that participation as evidenced by his Dahir. The particular form of carrying out action in Morocco should not obscure the actual origin of rights regarding the international administration. It is, therefore, difficult to see how the United States could agree to a modification of the administration solely on the basis of the issuance of a new Dahir without acknowledging that its right to participate does not depend upon the 1945 Agreement and without admitting that it has no affirmative rights thereunder.

There has been presented the theory that the legal situation consists of two primary factors. The first is that the 1945 Agreement created rights between the parties only, and secondly, that legal rights to participate in the Tangier administration result from the Dahir issued by the Sultan of Morocco in implementation of the 1945 Agreement. It is reasoned that this Dahir could be modified to exclude the Russians, which would be consistent with the second portion of the legal analysis just mentioned. It seems difficult to accept this separation of legal authority when considering the question of United States rights of participation. This type of analysis seems to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the 1945 Agreement does not create rights against the Sultan and further that all rights of a substantial nature in Tangier are dependent upon the Sultan's Dahirs. As stated above, this seems to ignore the practical aspects of the Agreement in that parties must have intended to create rights and obligations which could be enforced, and, therefore, even though it might have been contemplated that they were to be enforced through the channel of French authority in Morocco, the basic rights of the parties do fundamentally rest upon the 1945 Agreement. In addition, if it is assumed that legal rights come from the Sultan, it must follow that the rights between the parties to the 1945 Agreement are merely nominal. This creates two possible difficulties. It is not believed that the French Government would wish to state a legal theory which would imply such an independent authority residing in the Sultan. A reliance on Tangier administration authority based on Dahirs would leave open the possibility of independent action by the Sultan with respect to Tangier affairs which would not only be embarrassing to the French, but inconsistent with their long stated position of control and influence over Moroccan foreign policy. On the other hand, the French would find it difficult in view of the practical situation existing to deny responsibility for the Sultan's action against a Russian objection. The French could be accused of breaching their Agreement with the Russians in 1945, and there appears to be no reasonable explanation for this except to deny French authority and responsibility for the Sultan's action, a position which the French could not very well take in view of the ICJ case[6] and the general policy in Morocco. It is also interesting to note that in the 1945 Agreement the Committee of Control was given authority to amend the 1945 Agreement, but in the Sultan's Dahir of September 22, 1945, implementing the 1945 Agreement, this provision was not included. The parties to the Agreement must, therefore, have contemplated that authority independent of the Sultan was established by the 1945 Agreement. It also follows that, for the Committee of Control to take any action modifying the Agreement under Article 8, it is not acting pursuant to the authority granted to the Sultan.

Since the Sultan's Dahir of September 22 places both the United States and the Soviet Union on the Committee of Control, the Russians could argue that the United States should be left off that Committee as well in view of the fact that the rights of both stem from the Agreement made in 1945. The United States answer to this made on the basis of authority in the Sultan would mean a denial of United States rights under the 1945 Agreement and would constitute an implied rejection of the right of the French to control Moroccan foreign policy. In this connection, it is also useful to note that if this Government took this approach, it would be in a difficult position to later object to French actions which brought about changes in United States rights as the result of Dahirs issued by the Sultan.

It is true that to exclude the Russians by a Dahir of the Sultan and to then reply that the Sultan's authority is supreme would somewhat minimize a Russian charge relating to the breach of the 1945 Agreement, but in view of the legal problems mentioned above, it seems that this is not a great enough advantage to warrant its utilization to explain the action of excluding the Soviet Union. This seems particularly true in view of the fact that Article 8 of the Agreement places modification power in the Committee of Control. Action in accordance with this Article can be taken which would place it within the framework of the 1945 Agreement, thus obviating the necessity of relying on the legal fiction of the authority of the Sultan and thereby also denying United States rights as a result of the 1945 Agreement. Under this procedure the Russian objection can be answered on two grounds. One, the Russians have not accepted the invitation to join in the administration of the zone under the terms of the 1945 Agreement, and, not presently having rights as the result of an acceptance, they cannot interfere with action taken by the Committee of Control under that Agreement. Two, the Russians have not participated in the Committee of Control, and, since Article 8 may be reasonably interpreted as requiring the unanimous consent of only those parties participating, the Russians may not object to appropriate action taken by that Committee. The only difficult problem in handling the matter in this way would seem to be that which arises from the possibility that the Russians might become aware of the action contemplated and demand to take part in the determinations of the Committee of Control. In view of the political circumstances, it is doubtful that the Russians could accept an invitation and proceed to carry it into effect in time to forestall prompt and efficient action taken by the Committee of Control after agreement by the powers concerned. Furthermore, the Russians have indicated no desire to participate in the administration as long as Spanish representation remained and there is no reason to believe that this fact would be altered by Russian knowledge that an attempt would be made to formalize their *de facto* absence. The Russians would most surely be required to retreat from the position often emphasized in the past with respect to their relations with Franco Spain.

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[6] This involved an adjudication of U.S. treaty rights in Morocco and arose out of French trade controls which discriminated against U.S. nationals. The decision was handed down on Aug. 27, 1952.

While the various legal factors involved in this question indicate difficulties with any suggested course of action, on balance it would seem that the protection of United States rights not only with respect to Tangier but also vis-à-vis the French, as well as the possibility of defending the action on legal grounds against Russian propaganda, point to the utilization of the established Committee of Control procedures within the framework of the 1945 Agreement rather than the use of a legal fiction resting upon the theory of a unilateral amendment of the 1945 Dahir by the Sultan of Morocco.

It is believed the most legally proper procedure would be to modify the administration through the Committee of Control operating pursuant to Article VIII of the 1945 Agreement. The Agreement of the members of the Committee as constituted presently could be had with respect to modifications desired by Spain, and at the same time Russia could be excluded from participation. Following this a Dahir could be issued by the Sultan in accordance with the Committee of Control's decision.

It is suggested that L's position be that any modification, including the exclusion of the Russians, should be handled through Article VIII of the 1945 Agreement and that care should be exercised not to take the position that our rights do not originate in that Agreement or to adopt a procedure which, if challenged by the Russians, would require admission that we had no rights thereunder.

771.00/5-1552: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, May 15, 1952—6 p. m.

1824. Deptel 788.[2] Not having access to actual documents and hence not knowing precisely what is involved, find it difficult make firm recommendations. In view fact Sov Govt has never heretofore made any move to participate in Control Comite, it wld seem unwise at this point disturb dormant situation by excluding Sovs. When fact became known, Sovs might feel forced into position of having to assert past rights, even though unused, as means of saving face, if for no other reason. In any event seems unlikely they wld overlook such action and not exploit it fully. Also we are not sanguine as to possibility maintaining secrecy under circumstances. Would therefore think it better pass over this point if possible at present juncture. Should Sovs unexpectedly intervene, would think other powers wholly warranted in taking position that Sov Govt after neglecting Russia's responsibilities in Tangier for 35 years could hardly expect suddenly enter upon enjoyment Russia's rights there.

KENNAN

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Tangier.

[2] Not printed; it requested the comments of the Embassy in Moscow to tentative plans to utilize the situation created by the Spanish *démarche* to preclude Soviet participation in the Committee of Control. (711.00/5-1352)

771.00/5-1952

The Ambassador in Spain (MacVeagh) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL MADRID, May 19, 1952.

No. 1162

Ref: Department's telegrams 985 May 15,[2] 997 May 16,[3] and Embassy telegram 1251 May 17.[4]

Subject: Forwarding Text of Note to Spanish Foreign Ministry Regarding Status of Tangier.

In accordance with the instructions contained in the Department's

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[1] This despatch was repeated to Paris, London, Rome, Brussels, Libson, The Hague, and Moscow.

[2] Not printed; it included the proposed text of the note printed here and indicated that the United States wanted no general review of the Tangier situation

Footnotes continued on following page.

above-mentioned telegrams, the following note was delivered at the Spanish Foreign Ministry at 6 p. m. on Saturday, May 17, 1952, and the Department was so informed in this Embassy's telegram No. 1251 of that date:

"The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's notes No. 231 of April 7, 1952 and No. 265 of April 21, 1952.[5]

"After thorough study of the agreements and other documents relating to the administration of the International Zone of Tangier, the Government of the United States has concluded that the 1945 Agreement remains valid and in force until a new agreement in regard to the administration of Tangier is concluded. As Article 1 of the 1945 Agreement indicates, 'From the 11th October 1945 until a Convention drawn up at the Conference referred to in Article 2 below has come into force, the Tangier Zone of Morocco shall be provisionally administered in accordance with the Convention of the 18th December 1923 (and the Agreement of the 25th July 1928 amending the same) as modified by the provisions of the present Agreement', the Government of the United States believes that this Agreement cannot be considered to have lapsed simply because the conference called for in Article 2 has not been convened.

"In the opinion of the Government of the United States the Committee of Control is competent, in accordance with Article 8 of the 1945 Agreement, to make such changes as the members may agree are desirable in the administration of the International Zone of Tangier. The Government of the United States believes, therefore, that the Committee of Control is the appropriate body to consider proposals which the Spanish Government, as well as the other powers responsible for the administration of the Zone, may wish to make. ["]

For the Ambassador:
DANIEL V. ANDERSON
First Secretary of Embassy

Footnotes continued from preceding page.

particularly since the ICJ case, which would determine U.S. rights in the French Zone, was still pending. It expressed the willingness of the United States to make some concessions to Spain in the context of limited talks at Tangier, but in the hope of gaining favorable administrative changes. (771.00/5–1252) It referred as well to four reservations, as noted in telegram 5832 to London, May 10, 1952, not printed, which would limit any U.S. participation in discussions. These were the same as those entered when the United States agreed to participate in the international regime, i.e., "that US participation does not imply adherence to 1923 Statute (as revised 1928) and shall not be deemed modify or abridge in any manner (1) position of US, (2) status of US Reps, (3) establishment, authority and powers of US extraterritorial jurisdiction, or (4) any rights accruing to US and its nationals and ressortisants from treaty, custom and usage." (771.00/5–152)

[3] Not printed; it instructed that the note be delivered in Madrid following confirmation from the Embassy at London. The United States and the United Kingdom worked closely to coordinate their responses. (771.00/5–1652)

[4] Not printed.

[5] See footnotes 1 and 4, pp. 190 and 191.

700.00(S)/5-2952 : Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 29, 1952—6 : 10 p. m.

Ref: 397 to Tangier, May 27.[2]

US VIEWS ON ADMINISTRATION OF TANGIER

In connection with the various suggestions that have been made for changes in the Tangier administration, as a result of the Spanish *démarche* on the subject, we have informed Legation Tangier that we concur in general with its tentative program and statement of US objectives. These were to preserve the international character of Tangier and increase its efficiency, and to make concessions to the Spanish desire for increased participation in the administration, compatible with this aim. We have added "to maintain and strengthen the present position of the US". Because of increased US interests and installations in Tangier, we believe that the time is propitious for us to attempt to obtain representation in the Legislative Assembly on an equal footing with the UK, France, and Spain. We also favor the reform and enlargement of the Mixed Tribunal, and are prepared to give serious consideration to the appointment of an American judge to this body, fol decision ICJ case.

BRUCE

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[1] This telegram was specifically sent to Brussels, The Hague, and Moscow; it was marked "Special State Distribution".

[2] Not printed; it commented upon the proposals of the Legation at Tangier as indicated in telegram 378 of May 15, 1952, not printed, and called for establishment of a new intelligence service, four representatives in the Legislative Assembly including the Vice President, and a seat on the Mixed Tribunal. (771.00/5-1552)

771.00/6-2752 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Tangier[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 18, 1952—4 : 32 p. m.

23. Fol summarizes Dept's position on proposals for reorganization Tangier admin (Legtels 433 June 27[2] and 11 July 10[3] and Deptel 9 July 5).[4]

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Earle Junior Richey of the Office of African Affairs, was repeated to London, Paris, Madrid, Lisbon, and Rome.

[2] Not printed; after prolonged discussion with his British colleague, Thomas Godric Aylett Muntz, the U.S. Representative at Tangier, John Carter Vincent, suggested the positions he thought the United States should take on the controversial issues. (771.00/6-2752)

[3] Not printed; Vincent replied to Bruce's telegram cited in footnote 4 below and noted the positions taken by the Spanish and Italian Representatives at the July 5 meeting of the Control Committee and as well a 10-point proposal, made on July 7, by the French member of a negotiating working group which included the Spanish, British, and Italian Ministers and himself. (771.00/7-1052)

[4] Not printed; Acting Secretary of State David Bruce responded to the points raised by Vincent in telegram 433, cited in footnote 2 above, and stressed the importance to the United States of a vice presidency of the Legislative Assembly. He also wondered whether the United States should support a full reinstatement of Italy's prewar rights in Tangier given the apparent reservations of the French. (771.00/7-552)

1. Admin to be neutral. Administrator and Asst Administrators to be apptd for three year terms.

2. No objection to Span Asst Administrator in charge Public Health and Welfare but with no responsibility for public order. Dept questions advisability giving Span Asst Administrator responsibility over labor matters which we feel shld be responsibility neutral Administrator assisted by neutral labor adviser if such is necessary. Span record on labor hardly lends itself to responsibility for such matters in Internatl Zone.

3. We support English Asst Administrator for Fin.

4. Dept favors selection of Asst Administrators by Comite Control rather than by nomination of interested govt but considers pt relatively unimportant and is willing go along with majority opinion.

5. We support Ital request for Vice President Legislative Assembly: for increasing Ital membership therein to three and for amending Art 11 (*a*) of 1945 Accord.[5] We do not support Ital desire to make Ital legal adviser Asst Administrator and have so informed Ital and Fr Embs here.

6. Believe we shld follow majority lead on matter increased Port Reps Legislative Assembly.

7. We agree that you shld abstain on reestab Mixed Bureau of Info.

8. Dept desires that specific amendment to 1945 Accord be made to provide for Amer Vice Presidency Legislative Assembly.

9. We see no objection limiting period of duration of amendments to five years as suggested by Fr.

10. Dept supports Brit Commissioner for security.

11. Dept concurs Brit suggestion that Art II of 1945 Accord be amended to provide that accord will continue in force until new convention is drafted.

12. Dept supports reorganization Mixed Tribunal.

13. Dept not satisfied with Span and Fr proposals for organization of police. We believe proposal for two chiefs police with equal authority under admin impractical and that we shld insist on one neutral chief of police with Span Deputy in Charge *gendarmérie* (or mobile guard) and Fr Deputy in charge regular police; Span to have Fr Assist Deputy and Frenchman to have Span Assist Deputy. Police Commissioners to be one-third Fr, one-third Span and one-third other nationalities. Deputies wld have equal rank but wld be responsible to neutral chief who in turn responsible to Administrator who has final

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[5] Article 11 (*a*): "The provisions of the Agreement and dahirs of 1928, in so far as they altered conditions in which the Italian Government is entitled to participate in the administration of the Zone, shall cease to operate." The text is from *The International City of Tangier* by Graham H. Stuart (Stanford, 1955), p. 252.

responsibility for public order. Dept sees no reason acquiesce Fr and Span proposals re police and therefore wishes you discuss proposals further with your Span, Fr and English colleagues explaining Dept feels strongly this pt and is considering instructing you vote against this proposal unless satis compromise can be reached. Dept will take same line with interested emb reps in Washington. Since we are mtg Fr and Span on other proposals we fail see why Fr and Span shld not give on this pt. Keep Dept informed your efforts this matter.

ACHESON

771.00/7-2452 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Vincent) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TANGIER, July 24, 1952—6 p. m.

25. Fol receipt Deptel 23,[2] I have consulted with my Belg, Brit, Ital and French colleagues particularly in regard to point 13 in reftel. I have not consulted again with my Span colleague[3] because at our last mtg he made his position clear to me and I mine to him.

The Belg "prefers" solution along line we suggest but his govt is "studying" French police proposal. Brit has instrs from his govt support our posit but he has told me quite frankly that he has informed his govt that insistence on our point of view will surely wreck any chance accord. Ital is of same opinion as Brit. He will abstain shld matter be put to vote but he hopes that we will change our posit.

My French colleague is at great pains explain advantages French proposal. He most anxious avoid having Span in any posit responsibility in "municipal" police particularly with respect to intel-security section which wld be case if there were Span deputy to chief municipal police. Brit and Ital make same point. They do not want Span have access to intel files which contain much material regarding Spans here.

Under French proposal as it has now evolved there wld be neutral chief of municipal police with French dep and English in charge intel. Chief wld be directly responsible to administrator. The gendarmes wld be distinct from police with Span comdr directly responsible to administrator and a French dep. In normal times two forces wld function separately. However, when administrator had reason believe there existed threat public order he wld place comdr of gendarmes in charge of sitn until threat had passed. Under these conditions chief police wld put at disposition of comdr of *gendarmérie* all police that cld be spared.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Madrid, Lisbon, and Rome.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] Cristobal Del Castillo y Campos.

I argued that it would be more in keeping with internal character of zone have neutral chief police in charge during emergencies, and that in a small area such as Tangier it wld be much more efficient and economical have single integrated force. I find agreement with this as theory but others concerned that as practical matter Spans wld never agree having Span comdr *gendarmérie* under neutral chief police. Pressure from Wash might alter Span posit but I doubt wisdom of such action under circumstances.

French Min also refers to the proximity of Span zone, preponderance of Span here among Eurs, and fact that a system much same as he now proposed worked successfully from 23 to 40 as reasons for deferring to Span posit.

At close this morn's mtg of comite control Port Min came forward with instrs requesting increase of Port in assembly, Port judge on mixed tribunal and Port expert on comite to study judicial reform. French Min stated his opposition. Others took no posit but I feel majority shared his views. As result our prior conversations French Min took occasion support our request for vice pres of assembly by amendment of accord. There was no discussion of police or other problems but it was decided have mtg on July 31 at which it was hoped all members wld have final instrs. Incidentally French and Span indicated their intention withdraw guard troops from here on Dec. 31 even tho agreement had not been reached by that time.

I shld appreciate receiving Dept's further instrs re organ police in light of sitn outlined above.

VINCENT

771.00/7–2452 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Tangier

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 30, 1952—4 : 52 p. m.

42. Reurtel 26,[1] suggest you oppose Ital request for Ital Asst Administrator for Judicial Affairs only so long as Fr do. Do not support Ital Asst Administrator for Judicial Affairs in face of Fr opposition. Although Fr may change mind (urtel 26), Fr Emb Rep had informed Dept Fr would oppose Asst Administrator rank for Ital Judicial Counselor on grounds that, unless one of Ital demands were denied, Italy wld have retrieved her pre-war position, thereby justifying Span request that Spain likewise be restored. Dept had concurred this reasoning. If opposition to Ital Asst Administrator for Judicial Affairs

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[1] Not printed; Vincent had indicated his support of the Italian position although the French and Spanish were unenthusiastic. (771.00/7–2452)

prevails, suggest you support Ital suggestion in Deptel 28,[2] i.e., that Judicial Counselor be specifically listed after Asst Administrators with assurance this office reserved candidate Ital nationality.

Re police Dept still feels one force wld be more efficient and questions desirability having Span (urtel 25)[3] take over in case of threat to public order. However, since Administrator wld determine when such threat existed and wld have initiative for giving comdr of gendarmes charge of situation it wld appear that sufficient neutral control wld be ensured. Moreover, believed undesirable to place onus for collapse of negots on US by opposing Fr proposal if all others go along. You therefore authorized in ur discretion to vote for Fr proposal re police. Agree municipal police chief shld not have Span deputy.

Acheson

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[2] Not printed; it indicated that, according to the Italians, the French and Spanish were not opposed to this step. (771.00/6-2652)
[3] *Supra.*

771.00/11-2252 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Vincent) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TANGIER, November 22, 1952—noon.

209. Madrid tel 8.[2] Span unquestionably achieved their objective of increasing their participation and influence in Tangier admin but this was done apparently with approval and at times support of French and in atmosphere gen assent among other members comite control.

Only activities that cld be termed "opposition" were some successful moves to modify Span position. Original Span contention that 1945 agrmnt was inoperative was flatly rejected by all govts. New agrmnt[3] was not at expense of French who in some ways improved their position but not to same extent as Span. Brit and Ital participation in admin was definitely increased.

Gen effect agrmnt is movement away from "internatl" concept of 1945 with "neutrals" having increased influence back to prewar sitn in which Span and French interests were regarded as being more or less on a par and greater than those of other powers. All in all I consider agrmnt reached fairly realistic adjustment of sitn which in itself has many unrealistic features.

Vincent

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Madrid.
[2] Not printed.
[3] For the text of the Protocol amending the Anglo-French Agreement of Aug. 31, 1945, signed at Tangier on Nov. 10, 1952, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2752 or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 4, p. 2861. It entered into force for the United States on July 8, 1953.

771.00/11-2852

The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Vincent) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL TANGIER, November 28, 1952.

No. 199

Ref: Legation's despatch No. 192, November 24, 1952 [1]

Subject: Modifications in the International Regime of Tangier.

Following is an analysis of the changes in the international regime of Tangier which will result from the entry into force of the Protocol modifying the Anglo-French Agreement of August 31, 1945, which was approved and signed on November 10, 1952 by all of the members of the Tangier Committee of Control:

1. *In General.* Articles 2, 4, 5, 6 and 11 of the Anglo-French Agreement of August 31, 1945 are abrogated (Article I of the Protocol of November 10, 1952).

2. *The International Legislative Assembly.* Article 7(*b*) of the 1945 Agreement is amended to provide for three Italian members of the Legislative Assembly, instead of one. The representation of the other nations remains unchanged, except that provision is made for those nations having one member only to designate alternate members. Those nations having at least three representatives on the Assembly (France, Spain, U.K., U.S., Italy and Morocco) are each given a vice president and the others may choose one vice president to represent them collectively (Article II of the new Protocol).

3. *The International Administration.* Article 7(*c*) of the 1945 Agreement is changed to give the Administrator of the Zone sole responsibility for the maintenance of public order, and to provide for:

An Assistant Administrator of Spanish nationality, in charge of hygiene, welfare, and labor.

An Assistant Administrator in charge of Finance of British, instead of Belgian, nationality.

An Assistant Administrator of Italian nationality, in charge of judicial services.

The term of office of the Administrator of the Zone, which had not been defined in the 1945 Agreement, is fixed at three years and is not renewable. The Assistant Administrators and the Engineers of the Zone, on the other hand, are appointed for five years and their appointments are subject to renewal (Article III of the new Protocol).

4. *The Police.* Article 7(*d*) of the 1945 Agreement is modified to provide for the reestablishment of the Mixed Bureau of Information created by Article 10 of the 1923 Statute, as amended in 1928, to be headed by a senior Spanish officer with the title of Inspector General of Security, who will be assisted by a French and a Spanish subordinate officer. The expenses of the Mixed Bureau will be borne by the Spanish and French Governments. The members of the Committee of Control are to have access to its files, as well as the right, at any time to inquire into its functioning.

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[1] Not printed; it transmitted the Protocol modifying the Anglo-French Agreement of Aug. 31, 1945. (641.51/11-2452)

The security of the Zone will be assured by a General Police force and a Special Police, both under the direct orders of the Administrator of the Zone. There are no significant changes regarding the nationality of officers of the General Police, except that the Chief of the Security Section will be of British nationality. The Commandant of the Special Police will be of Spanish nationality and will have equal rank with the Commandant of the General Police. The regulations governing the two police forces are annexed to the 1952 Protocol. They define in detail the organization and duties of the two forces. They provide for a General Police force of from 504 to 525 men. The Special Police force, although given other relatively unimportant functions, is mainly responsible for order at public gatherings, and in case of trouble. It will consist of from 220 to 225 officers and men to be furnished in equal numbers by the French and Spanish Governments. The two Governments will also furnish mobile equipment, radios, and armament for the Special Police, but the cost of maintenance will be borne by the Tangier Zone. The salaries of the officers and troops of the Special Police force also will be paid by the French and Spanish Governments. The personnel of the Special Police will receive an allowance from the International Administration, however, the amount of which will be fixed later by ordinance of the Committee of Control. Provision is made for close liaison between the two police forces (1952 Protocol, Article IV and Annexes).

[Here follows point 5, a listing of the less significant changes.]

6. *Duration.* The protocol was concluded for a period of five years. It will be renewed by tacit agreement for one or more equal periods unless its revision is requested by some member of the Committee of Control at least six months before its expiration. In that event, it will remain in force until a new agreement has been concluded.

Comment: Although the changes in the international regime of Tangier outlined above were agreed upon pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Anglo-French Agreement of August 31, 1945, the members of the Committee of Control, who also had been studying reforms in the Zone's judicial system, decided that Article 8 did not give the Committee of Control any authority to modify the judicial system created by the Convention of December 18, 1923, amended July 25, 1928. It was therefore decided that the judicial reforms would be accomplished by a Four-Power Convention signed by France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy [2] (the original signatories to the 1923 and 1928 Conventions), to be submitted later to the other parties to the 1923 Statute, and the United States, for their adherence. The members of the Committee of Control, however, proceeded to approve and initial a draft of a Shereefian dahir designed to implement the Four-Power Convention on judicial reforms, the text of which draft dahir was annexed to the minutes of the Committee's meeting of November 10. Neither the Protocol nor the Four-Power Convention may become effective until promulgated by dahir of the Sultan. The date for the entry into force of the new arrangments is tentatively fixed for April 1, 1953.

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[2] The text may be found in Stuart, *The International City of Tangier*, pp. 254-264.

Pressure of other work prevents the Legation at the moment from submitting an analysis of the judicial reforms embodied in the new Four-Power Agreement, the French text of which is enclosed.[3]

JOHN CARTER VINCENT

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[3] Not printed.

771.00/2–353

The French Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in France[1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to send to it the enclosed certified true copy of the Convention signed at Tangier on November 10, 1952 by the plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the Spanish State, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland and the Italian Republic. This Convention relates to the reform of the international jurisdiction of Tangier as established by the Convention of Paris of December 18, 1923 modified by the Agreement of July 25, 1952 (*sic*).[2]

This text, which brings to the judicial organization of the Zone various amendments the necessity of which had been recognized by all of the powers participating in the Tangier Administration, was drafted by a Committee of Experts composed of representatives of each of the Governments sitting on the Committee of Control. It was approved unanimously by this latter in its meeting of November 10, 1952.

Articles 55 and 56 of the new Convention provide that the Government of the French Republic will communicate it for adherence to the Governments of the Powers having adhered to the Convention of December 18, 1923 as well as to the Government of the United States represented in the Committee of Control and that it will enter into force as soon as these governments have given their adherence.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, would be grateful to the Embassy of the United States of America if it would transmit to its Government the text of the convention of November 10, 1952 and let it know as soon as possible if the Government of the United States agrees to adhere to the said Convention.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes this opportunity [etc.].

PARIS, 27 January 1953.

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[1] This note was an enclosure to despatch 1620 of Feb. 3, 1953 from Paris. (771.00/2–353)

[2] The actual date was July 25, 1928.

771.00/1-2953 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Tangier

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 18, 1953.

A-66. Reference Legation's Despatch 279 of January 27, 1953 regarding U.S. reservations to the Tangier Protocol of November 10, 1952.[1]

The Legation reports that the minutes of the 174th meeting of the Tangier Committee of Control at which the Protocol of November 10, 1952 was signed do not indicate that this Government abstained in the vote on the re-establishment of the Mixed Bureau of Information, or that the signature of the U.S. to the Protocol was made with the reservation that it did not imply U.S. adherence to the Tangier Statute of 1923 (as amended in 1928). It is further reported that the record does not show any statement indicating that our signature to the Protocol was subject to the reservations that it did not modify or abridge in any manner (1) the position of the United States, (2) the status of the United States Representative, (3) the establishment, authority and power of the United States' extraterritorial jurisdiction, or (4) any rights accruing to the United States and its nationals and ressortissants from treaty, custom and usage. The Legation states that the Portuguese Minister has already stated that it is his opinion that the signature of this Government to the Protocol of November 10 implies U.S. acceptance of the 1923 Statute. The Legation recommends that the U.S. position should be clarified by transmission of a letter to the President of the Committee of Control.

The Department questions whether transmission of the proposed letter to the President of the Committee of Control enclosed with the Legation's despatch under reference would fully accomplish the purpose for which it is intended. It is not clear to the Department how this letter would become a matter of record in the Committee of Control or how the mere transmission of such a letter would preclude other members of the Committee from challenging the U.S. position at some future date. The Department is of the opinion that the desired clarification can best be achieved if the actual minutes of a meeting of the Committee of Control contain a statement by the U.S. Representative setting forth the U.S. position. Accordingly, there are listed below in the order of their preference the procedures which the Department believes should be taken to clarify this matter:

(1) The U.S. Representative should seek to have the minutes of the 174th meeting of the Committee of Control amended to show that the

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[1] Not printed; it included a memorandum from the legal adviser of the American Legation, Edwin L. Smith, to the Chargé, William Witman II, setting forth possible U.S. reservations to the Tangier Protocol and, in addition, the draft of a letter to the President of the Committee of Control, François de Panafieu of France. (771.00/1-2953)

U.S. abstained in the vote on the re-establishment of the Mixed Bureau of Information, and that the signature of this Government to the Protocol of November 10 was subject to the reservations set forth in paragraph two above.

(2) The U.S. Representative should read into the minutes of the next meeting of the Committee the text of the proposed letter to Mr. de Panafieu enclosed with the Legation's despatch under reference. This should be done regardless of whether the Protocol of November 10, 1952 is scheduled for discussion at the next meeting of the Committee.

(3) If the procedures under (1) and (2) above are not feasible, the Legation should transmit the proposed letter to the President of the Committee of Control.

As a further means of assuring that the U.S. position on this matter is clarified, the Department proposes to include a statement in its adherence to the Convention providing for the re-organization of the International Courts of Tangier setting forth the reservations contained in the second paragraph of this communication.[2]

Please report action taken.

Dulles

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[2] This was done on July 8, 1953; for text of the statement, see telegram 16, July 7, p. 222.

771.00/4–1753

The Chargé at Tangier (Witman) to the President of the Committee of Control (Panafieu)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TANGIER, March 3, 1953.

MR. PRESIDENT AND DEAR COLLEAGUE: I have the honor to inform you, with reference to the Protocol modifying the Franco-British Accord of August 31, 1945, which was approved and signed on November 10, 1952, by all of the members of the Tangier Committee of Control, that it was the desire of my Government to abstain from voting on that part of Article IV of the Protocol reestablishing the Mixed Bureau of Information, although the minutes of the meeting of the Committee of Control at which the Protocol was signed, and of those leading up to its signature, apparently do not so indicate. My Government's decision to abstain from voting on the proposal to reestablish the Mixed Bureau of Information was taken on the understanding, however, that such abstention would not defeat the rule of unanimity in Article 8 of the Agreement of August 31, 1945, the United States Government having no desire to veto the entire Protocol merely because it did not view with favor the reestablishment of the Mixed Bureau of Information.

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[1] This note, which was composed by Edwin L. Smith, the legal adviser of the Legation, was an enclosure to despatch 419 of Apr. 17, 1953 from Tangier. (771.00/4–1753) Panafieu was also the French Consul General at Tangier.

Moreover, I have been instructed to state further that at the time of the acceptance by the United States Government of the Joint French-British invitation to participate in the provisional international regime created by the Agreement of August 31, 1945, my Government made formal reservations to the effect that its decision to participate in that regime did not imply adherence to the 1923 Statute (as revised in 1928) and should not be deemed to modify or abridge in any manner (1) the position of the United States, (2) the status of the United States representative, (3) the establishment, authority, and power of the United States' extraterritorial jurisdiction, or (4) any rights accruing to the United States and its nationals and resortissants from treaty, custom, and usage. My Government's signature of the Protocol of November 10, 1952, modifying the Agreement of August 31, 1945, is, of course, subject to those same reservations.

Please accept [etc.] **WILLIAM WITMAN II**

771.00/3-1153 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Vincent) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL TANGIER, March 11, 1953—1 p. m.

417. Although question United States reservations to Tangier protocol (Legtel 407)[1] on agenda committee control meeting March 9 discussion postponed permit representatives consult their governments, French Minister requested views United States Government following questions stressing his government not questioning United States rights Tangier but merely seeking definition United States position.

"1. Reservations having been made long after signature what effect do former have on latter?

"2. To what extent does restated position on United States Government modify status American representation in body committee control? Is he member '*ad hoc*' or does he enjoy exactly same rights as his colleagues? Question is important for quorum.

"3. What is position regarding right of vote for representatives United States in Assembly?

"4. We recognize present status American representation but is it *de facto* situation not *de jure*. If other powers decide once more have legations in Tangier Minister of United States will then be only 'unus inter pares' ".

VINCENT

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[1] Not printed; it indicated that on Mar. 3 Witman had indicated to the members of the Control Committee the reservations of the United States to the Tangier Protocol. (771.00/3-353) See *supra*.

771.00/3–1153 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Tangier

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 18, 1953—5:56 p. m.

403. Dept does not believe it incumbent upon this govt to define its position Tangier under Protocol November 10 by replying specifically to four questions put forward by French Minister (Legtel 417, March 11).[1] Accordingly Dept believes that in answering French Minister you should confine yourself to statement along following lines.

Protocol of November 10, 1952 constitutes only amendment to Anglo-French Agreement of 1945 duly adopted by Committee Control in accordance with provisions Article 8 thereof. In this connection it is to be noted that none of specific amendments to 1945 Agreement included in Protocol modify in any way rights of United States under Anglo-French Agreement 1945. This being case position of United States in Tangier including status of its Representative on Committee Control and its Representatives in Legislative Assembly remain same as that accorded to US by Anglo-French Agreement.

Statement made by US Representative in Committee Control at its March 3 meeting[2] regarding reservation of United States treaty rights was undertaken to preclude possibility of any future misunderstanding arising among the nations represented on Committee regarding continued validity of reservations set forth by the US when it accepted invitation extended under terms of 1945 Agreement to participate in Committee and for purpose of making this fact matter record in the minutes of Committee.[3]

Legation's comments requested.

DULLES

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] *Ante*, p. 206.

[3] Witman formally expressed these views to the Committee on Mar. 24. (771.00/4–1753)

771.00/4–1753

Informal Comment by Way of Explanation by the United States Representative on the Committee of Control (Witman)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [TANGIER, March 24, 1953.]

It was the intention of the United States Government, following its decision in 1945 to participate in the provisional international regime, that the American respresentative take an active part in the work of the Committee of Control and cooperate fully with his colleagues. The American representative has voted regularly in the past and during 1950 assumed the presidency of the Committee. In practice, the

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[1] This comment was an enclosure to despatch 419 of Apr. 17, 1953 from Tangier. (771.00/4–1753)

United States representative may abstain from voting on certain questions governed by the 1923 Statute which might be in conflict with United States treaty rights, and which seem not to have been substantially affected by the 1945 Agreement (such as Article 32). The United States considers that such an attitude is appropriate and reasonable, since its acceptance of the invitation to participate in the provisional regime did not imply adherence to the Statute. As concerns the suggestion in the fourth question posed by the Minister of France that other Powers might decide once more to have Legations in Tangier, I might add that my Government would welcome the reestablishment of diplomatic agencies at Tangier by those Governments now participating in the Committee of Control and would be interested in receiving the views of the other member Governments. If a decision to replace the consulates general by diplomatic agencies were to be taken by the other members, it would seem appropriate that such change be put into effect at the time the Protocol of November 10, 1952, comes into force.

771.00/4-3053

The President of the Committee of Control (Panafieu) to the Chargé at Tangier (Witman)[1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL TANGIER, April 25, 1953.

MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AND DEAR COLLEAGUE: On instructions from my Government, I have the honor to inform you that the Note which you kindly transmitted to the Committee of Control on March 3 evokes the following observations:

The Protocol of November 10, 1952 is an agreement in the sense of Article 8 of the Anglo-French Agreement of August 31, 1945, and its definitive character, counting from the day of its adoption, results from the fact that it was approved unanimously by the Committee of Control on November 10, 1952. The system organized under the Agreement of August 31, 1945 excludes not only reservations upon signature (for there would not be unanimity), but upon ratification or adherence, since the agreement results from the single unanimous vote of the Committee of Control. In these circumstances, the claim of the Government of the United States, a posteriori, to make reservations—which furthermore would not have been admitted even at the time of the vote on the Protocol—can, therefore, only be rejected in the most formal manner.

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[1] This note was an enclosure to despatch 459 of Apr. 30, 1953 from Tangier. (771.00/4-3053)

It is also desirable to refer to the end of the first paragraph of the Note of March 3, indicating that abstention requested retroactively would not defeat the rule of unanimity provided for in the Agreement of August 31, 1945, the United States not wishing to veto the entire Protocol. In this connection, I must make the observation that the United States does not have any right of veto after a vote recorded in the Committee of Control.

Insofar as the second part of the Note of March 3 is concerned, it should be stated that the United States having agreed *de facto* to participate in the provisional regime of Tangier by taking part in the Committee of Control, such participation entails consequences which it is not in its power to modify. In effect the alternative is the following: Either the United States participates in this regime under the conditions reserved to all states members of the Committee of Control, and in equality with its partners, or, going back upon the fact of its participation, it should withdraw completely from the organization.

The four points enumerated in the American Note evoke the following remarks:

1) The position of the United States in Tangier is one resulting from international law. Its rights are those of any state in general, and of any state signatory of the Act of Algeciras [2] in particular.

2) Either the representative of the United States takes part in an ordinary diplomatic capacity, or else he presents himself as the representative of the United States under the provisional Statute.

3) Concerning the establishment, authority and powers of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States, the decision of the International Court of Justice of August 27, 1952,[3] interpreting the Treaty of 1836 between the United States and Morocco, and the body of the treaty rights of the United States, has clearly established that American consular jurisdiction in Morocco was reduced to jurisdiction over litigations between Americans in the cases listed by the Act of Algeciras. On this point my Government believes it should remind you of the necessity, as regards consular jurisdiction, to respect the decision of the Court.

4) As for the rights which the United States and their nationals hold under treaties, custom and usage, the International Court of Justice ruled in its decision of August 27, 1952 that the United States had no rights in Morocco resulting either from treaties other than that of 1836, or from custom or usage.

Please accept [etc.] F. de Panafieu

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[2] This Act, of which the United States was signatory on Apr. 7, 1906, affirmed the independence and integrity of Morocco and asserted the principle of economic liberty without inequality in respect to the treatment of the signatories therein. For documentation regarding the Act, see *Foreign Relations*, 1906, Part 2, pp. 1470 ff.

[3] "Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgement of August 27th, 1952: ICJ Reports 1952," p. 176. For an explanation of this case, consult the Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 20, 1952, pp. 620–623. For further information on this case, see the editorial note, p. 602.

771.00/4-3053

Memorandum Prepared by the Legation in Tangier [1]

CONFIDENTIAL TANGIER, [April 30, 1953.]

INFORMAL COMMENTS ON POINTS RAISED BY FRENCH MINISTER'S NOTE OF APRIL 25, 1953

1. The reservations which it was desired to make at the time of the signature of the Protocol of November 10, 1952, were not new reservations and did not apply to the terms of the Protocol itself. They were a simple reiteration of the formal reservations made at the time of the acceptance by the United States Government of the joint Franco-British invitation to participate in the provisional international regime created by the Agreement of August 31, 1945, to the effect that the United States Government's decision to participate in that regime did not imply adherence to the 1923 Statute (as revised in 1928). It should be clear that if it had been the United States Government's intention to adhere to those Acts or to modify or abridge in any manner (1) the position of the United States, (2) the status of its representatives, (3) the establishment, authority and powers of its extraterritorial jurisdiction, and (4) any rights accruing to the United States and to its nationals and ressortissants from treaty, custom, and usage, the United States Government would clearly have so indicated. In this connection the United States representative also pointed out in his statement to the Committee of Control on March 24 [2] that none of the specific amendments to the 1945 Agreement contained in the present Protocol diminishes in any way the rights of the United States under that Agreement. The position of the United States in Tangier, therefore, remains the same as that which resulted from the acceptance by the United States in September 1945 of the invitation to participate in the provisional regime on the basis of the Agreement of August 31, 1945. Accordingly, it does not appear correct to suggest that there would not have been unanimity, since the signature took place under already-existing and recognized reservations. The same would of course apply to ratification or adherence. Similarly, it cannot be held that reiteration of these reservations, which were unaffected by the terms of the Protocol itself, were made a posteriori, or that they would have been inadmissible even at the time of the vote on the Protocol.

2. The United States reservations as stated on March 3 [3] were not retroactively requested, since they constituted a reiteration of the existing and recognized reservations of the United States Government to the 1945 Agreement, as indicated above.

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[1] This memorandum was an enclosure to despatch 459 of Apr. 30, 1953 from Tangier. (771.00/4-3053)

[2] The text substantially appears in telegram 403 to Tangier, Mar. 18, p. 208.

[3] *Ante*, p. 206.

3. The United States Government is not claiming a right of veto after a recorded vote. On the contrary, it was careful to point out in its Note of March 3 that despite its known objections to the reestablishment of the Mixed Bureau of Information, it had desired to abstain in the vote on that proposal instead of voting against it, which would have had the effect at that time of vetoing the entire Protocol.

4. The statement that the United States accepted *de facto* to participate in the provisional regime of Tangier by taking part in the Committee of Control, and that such acceptance entails consequences which it is not within the power of the United States to modify, overlooks the fact that the United States is not trying to modify its position but merely to maintain the situation as it has existed since 1945. In effect, the United States participates in the provisional regime not on the same basis as other member states, but under the conditions set forth in its acceptance of the invitation extended to it in 1945 by the French and British Governments. This was made clear in the note of the Department of State to the French Embassy at Washington, dated September 22, 1945,[4] and by the letter from the American Diplomatic Agent to the President of the Committee of Control on November 6, 1945.[5] If other Governments participating in the provisional regime had objections to the reservations of the United States, those objections should have been made in 1945, and the United States should have had the opportunity to decide at that time whether it wished to participate on that basis.

5. While the position of the United States in Tangier is acknowledged to be one resulting from international law, it does not follow that United States rights are those of any state in general, and of any state signatory of the Act of Algeciras in particular. The United States has long made formal reservations of all of its rights, whereas other signatories of the Act of Algeciras may have agreed to modify some of their rights when they became parties to the Tangier Statute of 1923. The United States has never adhered to that Statute, or to subsequent revisions thereof.

6. The representative of the United States takes part in the provisional Tangier regime as his Government's representative under the arrangement growing out of the Tangier Conference held in Paris during August 1945.

7. The decision of the International Court of Justice of August 27, 1952 established that American Consular jurisdiction in the French Zone of Morocco was reduced to jurisdiction over civil and criminal disputes between American citizens and/or protégés and to those cases enumerated in the Act of Algeciras. The United States is scrupulously respecting this decision. The decision of the International Court of

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[4] *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 663.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 672.

Justice was limited to the French Zone of Morocco, however, and had no obligatory effect on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States in the Zone of Tangier.

8. Concerning the statement that, according to the decision of the International Court of Justice, the United States has no rights in Morocco resulting either from treaties other than that of 1836,[6] or from custom or usage, it is reiterated that the ruling of the International Court of Justice can have no obligatory effect in the Zone of Tangier.

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[6] The treaty of peace and friendship with Morocco of Sept. 16, 1836 entitled the United States to most-favored-nation commercial privileges and certain rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction. (8 Stat. 484)

271.11/5-753 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 7, 1953—7:35 p.m.

UNITED STATES RESERVATIONS TO THE TANGIER PROTOCOL OF NOVEMBER 10, 1952

Reference is made to the Legation Tangier's Despatch No. 419 of April 17, 1953[2] regarding United States reservations to the Tangier Protocol of November 10, 1952, and adherence by this Government to the Four Power Convention of the same date reorganizing the Courts of the International Zone. The following represents the Department's position on the legal questions raised in the reference despatch. It also outlines, for the Legation's comments, a suggested course of action regarding US adherence to the Convention on judicial reforms which takes into account existing problems relating to telecommunications and consular jurisdiction.

1. *Problem Concerning the Protocol*

On March 24, 1953, the US representative read at the meeting of the Committee of Control the text of reservations concerning his signature of the Protocol on November 10, 1952.[3] These reservations stated that the signature of the Protocol, like the acceptance by the United States of the invitation to participate in the Provisional Regime of 1945, did not imply adherence to the 1923 Statute nor abridgment of the United States position in Tangier, the status of its representative, its rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and other rights acquired by treaty, custom and usage.

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[1] This airgram was addressed for action to Tangier; and for information to Paris, London, The Hague, Brussels, Madrid, Lisbon, Rome, Rabat, and Casablanca.

[2] Not printed; it summarized a number of communications relating to United States reservations to the Tangier Protocol of Nov. 10, 1952. (771.00/4-1753)

[3] *Ante*, p. 208.

The French representative in the Committee of Control took issue with this position, on the basis of arguments prepared by Professor Andre Gros.[4] The gist of the French position is that the United States is either in or out of the Committee of Control, and since it signed a decision of the Committee of Control is bound by it without any claim to a special right to reserve its position, specially as concerns rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction which it is stated the US does not have anyway under the ICJ decision of August 27, 1952.

The legal position, however, presents no real difficulty. The United States in signing a Protocol pursuant to the terms of Article 8 of the 1945 Agreement, could exercise no more powers than are given to it by the specific terms of the Agreement, and the Agreement specifically indicates that the United States exercises a share of administrative power in Tangier, not as a party to the 1923 Statute, but at the invitation of the United Kingdom and France. In signing the Protocol, the United States could act only within the scope of its special position in Tangier, whether it so indicated expressly or not.

Thus the position of the United States in Tangier was not in any way prejudiced by the signature of the US representative to the Protocol of November 10, 1952. As stated by the US representative at the meeting of the Committee of Control on March 24, 1953, the purpose of his statement to the Committee on March 3, 1953 regarding the reservation of the United States rights in the Tangier Zone was to clarify the US position and to preclude the possibility of any future misunderstanding in the Committee regarding the position of this Government. Since in signing the Protocol, the United States representative was acting only within the scope of the special position of the United States in Tangier as defined by the reservations made at the time this Government accepted the invitation to participate in the Committee of Control, no other factor motivated the statement of reservations.

2. *US Consular Jurisdiction in Tangier Under the ICJ Decision of August 27, 1952*

The contention by the French representative that the scope of the jurisdiction of US Consular Courts in Tangier is defined by the decision of the International Court of Justice of August 27, 1952 is refuted by the Court itself in its statement beginning on page 186 of the Decision:

> "It is common ground between the parties that the present dispute is limited to the French Zone of Morocco. It is on this ground that it has been argued. The Court cannot, therefore, pronounce upon the legal situation in other parts of Morocco."

This Government is prepared to argue that the above-quoted portion of the ICJ decision applies to the total findings of the courts regarding US treaty rights in the French Zone and not to only that part of the opinion relating to US consular jurisdiction. Accordingly, the US position is that the ICJ Decision of August 27, 1952 does not apply to the International Zone of Tangier or the Spanish Zone and, can only be extended to those zones by voluntary action on the part of this Government.

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[4] Legal adviser to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. *Problem Concerning Initialing of the Draft Dahir on Judicial Reforms*

At the meeting of the Committee of Controls on November 10, 1952, the US representative initialed a draft dahir, to be signed by the Sultan, putting into effect the reorganization of the courts and incorporating provisions of the proposed Convention on Reorganization of the Courts.

This, however, does not raise any legal problem. In initialing the dahir, our representative simply participated, on the basis of our special position in the administration of Tangier, in one of the normal functions of the Committee—i.e., drafting of legislation implementing a convention. Article 1 of this legislation maintained in effect the previous provisions of Tangier law implementing the 1923 Statute and establishing the jurisdiction of the International Courts over the nationals of foreign powers parties to the Statute. Articles 55 and 56 of the legislation made no reference to adherence by the United States. Our representative properly initialed, by virtue of our special participation in the administration of Tangier under the 1945 Agreement, the text of a dahir which could not affect the treaty position of the United States.

Conclusion re Problems 1 and 3.

It may be concluded from the foregoing that the United States position in Tangier under the Anglo-French Agreement of 1945 has not been affected by either signing the Protocol of November 10, 1952 or initialing the draft dahir which will implement the judicial reforms contained in the Convention of the same date. There remains therefore only the matter of the adherence of this Government to the Convention.

4. *Problem Concerning Adherence to the Convention*

The Sultan has not yet promulgated the dahir relating to the reorganization of the courts of Tangier. The minutes of the meeting of the Committee of Control of November 10, 1952, provide that the dahirs implementing the Protocol and the Convention on Reorganization of the Courts shall go into effect on the same date. The United States is now asked to adhere to the Convention.

The request stems from the presence in the Convention of Articles 55 and 56 providing that the Convention cannot come into force until adhered to by the powers which have adhered to the 1923 Statute and by the United States. The difficulty is that Article 1 of the Convention states that the courts are charged with the administration of justice to the nationals of foreign powers. To adhere to the Convention is to recognize the jurisdiction of the courts and, so far as the United States is concerned, is to surrender all of its rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Yet the Convention, and hence the dahirs implementing both the Convention and the Protocol, cannot come into effect until the United States has adhered to it.

It must be assumed that Article 1 now represents a major purpose of the Convention which was not contemplated during the negotiations and which we cannot satisfactorily fulfill. To adhere to the Convention by Executive action would require us to reserve our rights with respect to Article 1 and thus to defeat a major purpose of the Convention. An adherence to the Convention without reservations could only be accomplished subject to ratification with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, a process that would necessarily entail a long delay and hence, under present circumstances, block the implementation of both the provisions of the Protocol and the Convention. On the other hand the problem of US adherence could be obviated by requesting the signatories to the Four Power Convention to amend Articles 55 and 56 thereof so as not to require US adherence to the Convention before it comes into effect.

Recommended Course of Action re Problem 4.

The Department is of the opinion that of the three alternative courses of action outlined above, i.e., (*a*) requesting that Articles 55 and 56 of the Convention be amended so as not to require US adherence before the Convention comes into force, (*b*) adhering to the Convention without reservations but with the advice and consent of the United States Senate, and (*c*) adhering to the Convention with reservations, the best procedure would be for this Government to adhere to the Convention with reservations taking into account the problems relating to the Tangier radio ordinance and US consular jurisdiction.

Additif No. 1, annexed to the Minutes of the Committee of Control meeting of November 10,[8] provides that the dahir promulgating the Protocol and the dahir promulgating the Convention shall be issued at the same time. It would, therefore, appear that none of the proposed reforms can be accomplished until US adherence to the Convention has been obtained. In view of this circumstance, this Government would seem to be in a good bargaining position to raise the matter of our desire to regularize our treaty position in the International Zone so that it conforms with our present position in the French Zone of Morocco under the findings of the International Court of Justice in its decision of August 27, 1952. At the same time it would, of course, be necessary to obtain enactment, or agreement to enact, a Tangier Radio Ordinance satisfactory to American telecommunications interests in the Zone and which would adequately protect the present and future operations of these interests. In this connection, the Legation is informed that the Draft Radio Ordinance submitted with the Legation's Despatch No. 359 of March 19, 1953,[6] is still under study by RCA and Mackay. Both of these companies have indicated a general reluctance to go along with the Department's desire to regularize our treaty position in Tangier and to subject them to the provisions of a new Radio Ordinance. VOA has examined the draft Radio Ordinance and has taken the position that, as a Government Agency, its operations should be excluded entirely from the provisions of any radio ordinance in Tangier. Alternatively they propose that their operations in Tangier be governed by a Government-to-Government Agreement, negotiated with France as the Protecting Power in Morocco, and which would be similar to agreements covering their operations which have previously been negotiated with Western Germany and the Philippines. Under these circumstances our agreement to extend the provisions of the ICJ decision of August 27, 1952 regarding US treaty rights in the French Zone of Morocco to the International Zone of Tangier would have to be conditioned upon obtaining (*a*) a satisfactory Tangier radio ordinance which will protect the interests of RCA and Mackay and (*b*) a Government-to-Government Agreement covering the operations of the VOA Relay Station at Tangier.

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[8] Not printed.

The Department appreciates that it would require some time to achieve the objectives outlined under (*a*) and (*b*) above, and that therefore it would not appear expedient to make the achievement of these objectives a condition precedent to our adherence to the Convention. Therefore, the best procedure might be for the Legation to approach the various members of the Committee of Control individually and explain our position on the question of our reservations to the Protocol as set forth in the foregoing and state that the United States Government could not adhere to the Convention without reservations except with the advice and consent of the United States Senate, which at best would be a time consuming process. It would have to be explained that this Government has no desire to delay the implementation of the reforms contained in the Protocol and the Convention; that it desires to voluntarily regularize its position in Tangier in conformance with the ICJ decision of August 27, 1952; and that accordingly it would be willing to adhere now to the Convention with full reservation of its present position, after which it would voluntarily extend the provisions of the ICJ decision regarding United States treaty rights in the French Zone of Morocco to the International Zone but only on the condition that such an extension would take place concurrently with the adoption of a satisfactory Radio Ordinance covering the operations of United States commercial telecommunications interests in Tangier and the conclusion of a satisfactory Government-to-Government Agreement covering the operations of the VOA installation in the International Zone. The Department could at the same time inform the appropriate Embassies in Washington of our strong feelings regarding the US position in Tangier under the 1945 Agreement.

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[6] **Not printed.**

Action Requested.

Neither RCA nor Mackay has as yet been informed of the line of action proposed above. However, the Department will approach these companies in an endeavor to enlist their cooperation in this matter during the period that this communication is enroute to Tangier.[7] The Legation is requested to comment fully on the suggested procedure herein outlined after which further instructions will be forwarded by the Department. The Legation is instructed not to take any further action on this problem until it receives these further instructions.

DULLES

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[7] Representatives of these companies were called in for a meeting at the Department on June 11, 1953, and the subject was again taken up over the phone on June 15. A memorandum of the first conversation may be found in AF files, lot 60 D 577, "Tangier Treaties & Agreements, July '28–April 1955, M–19."

371.11/5-2553

The Chargé at Tangier (Witman) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TANGIER, May 25, 1953.

No. 516

Ref: Depcirgram May 7, 1953.[2]

Subject: United States Reservations to the Tangier Protocol and the Four-Power Convention of November 10, 1952

The Legation is in complete agreement with the Department's position on the legal questions discussed in the circular airgram under reference and with the suggested course of action regarding United States adherence to the Four-Power Convention on Judicial Reforms in Tangier. The suggestion in the penultimate paragraph of the circular airgram that the Legation approach the various members of the Committee of Control individually and explain our position on the question of our reservations to the Protocol, as well as our proposal regarding adherence to the Convention, is believed to be the appropriate course of action. This position is likely to gain ready acceptance by members of the Committee of Control once they are aware that the United States is contemplating regularizing its position in Tangier in conformance with the ICJ decision of August 27, 1952. As the matter stands, they have had no indication that the United States contemplates such action and have tended to interpret our reservations as an attempt to perpetuate what they consider to be an anomalous situation. Some of the members of the Committee of Control who accept our legal position as being well-founded do not like it and would support us more actively if we gave evidence of an intention to revise our position. Also, the Department's proposed course of action has the advantage of permitting the United States to make changes in its position in Tangier voluntarily, and will be an effective reply in the event that other governments attempt to blame the United States for delaying or blocking the entry into force of the Protocol and the Convention on Judicial Reforms. Moreover, the Legation believes that such action is desirable in any case in view of the existing differences in the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts at Tangier and Casablanca,[3] and that it would be in our best interests to make the changes proposed by the Department, even if there were no question of United States adherence to the Four-Power Convention.

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[1] This despatch was transmitted with the request that the Department send copies to Paris, Madrid, London, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Lisbon, Casablanca, and Rabat.

[2] *Supra.*

For these reasons the Legation urges that it be authorized as soon as possible to begin discussions with individual members of the Committee of Control along the lines suggested by the Department and that the Department, at the same time, take similar action in Washington with the Embassies of the countries concerned. The Legation believes, however, that we should not condition our adherence to the Four-Power Convention solely upon the adoption of a satisfactory radio ordinance and the conclusion of a government-to-government agreement covering the operations of the VOA installation. It is believed that we also should seek an agreement on certain questions connected with the transfer of jurisdiction over mixed nationality cases. We believe that it is important to have it understood that cases wherein there has been a final judgment of the Consular Court shall be *res judicata*, that the Tangier authorities may not prosecute an action for a cause arising prior to a date to be agreed upon, and that American protected persons shall be inscribed on the master list of protégés justiciable by the Mixed Tribunal. Unless we can have such an understanding, these matters are likely to cause trouble after we have extended the provisions of the ICJ decision to the International Zone.

The Legation also considers that it is important that any government-to-government agreement regarding the operations of the VOA installation be handled in such a manner as not to give the appearance that we recognize the right of the authorities at Rabat to control radio broadcasting in Tangier. We believe that in view of the provisions of Article 5 of the Tangier Statute, the Sherifian Government has delegated its powers in such matters to the International Administration. The Legation is of the opinion therefore that any agreement on this subject concluded with France as the protecting power in Morocco should be submitted to the International Legislative Assembly of Tangier for its approval in accordance with Article 8 of the Statute. If such a procedure is followed, it will be a recognition of the International Zone's authority to regulate such questions.

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[3] By virtue of the decision of the ICJ on Aug. 27, 1952, the broad jurisdiction claimed by the United States over its nationals and protégés in Morocco had been scaled down to what was specifically granted by the Treaty of 1836 and the Act of Algeciras. It was anticipated that should the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the International Zone be brought before the same tribunal that the decision would be likewise.

Inasmuch as the negotiation of a government-to-government agreement regarding the VOA station and the adoption by the Committee of Control of an acceptable radio ordinance are apt to be lengthy procedures, the Legation hopes that both can get underway without delay. It is almost certain that other members of the Committee of Control will find it necessary to consult their governments regarding the radio ordinance, or that they will at least require some time to study the matter, and it is therefore urged that the Department endeavor to furnish the Legation with a draft of such an ordinance as soon as possible.

We believe that when the approach is made to the members of the Committee of Control and to the interested Embassies in Washington, we should be in a position to state that we will enter into negotiations with France immediately regarding the VOA operations and at the same time transmit to the Committee of Control the text of our proposed radio ordinance. We could state further that as these negotiations progress we will also take up with the French Government the three jurisdictional points on which we desire agreement. The Legation reiterates that the Administrator of the Zone should be kept fully informed.

For the Department's information, the following are the most recent developments in connection with the entry into force of the Four-Power Convention on judicial reforms:

At the meeting of the Committee of Control on May 23, 1953, the French representative stated (as reported in Legation telegram 499 of May 25, 1953)[4] that the Sultan's approval of the dahirs promulgating both the Convention and the Tangier Protocol of November 10, 1952, may be delayed because of Ramadan but that it was still expected in the near future. He stated, however, that new complications had arisen which might delay the entry into force of the November 10 agreements. Mr. de Panafieu said that his Government had learned from The Hague that adherence of the Netherlands Government to the Four-Power Convention would require parliamentary ratification. After remarking that the only three outstanding adherences are the Dutch, Belgian, and United States, and that no difficulty is expected in connection with Belgium's adherence, he stated that the French Government was bringing pressure to bear at The Hague with a view to expediting the adherence of the Netherlands Government. The British representative indicated that he would recommend that his Government take similar action at The Hague.

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[4] Not printed.

In response to private inquiries from members of the Committee of Control regarding the status of our adherence of the Convention, the Legation has replied that if the United States reservations of its position in Tangier are not challenged, our adherence could probably be accomplished by executive action, but that our adherence without reservations could only be accomplished subject to ratification with the advice and consent of the United States Senate. (The Legation will not go further in discussion of this question until the receipt of the Department's reply to this despatch.)

Action Requested:

1. That the Department authorize the Legation without delay to enter into discussions with individual members of the Tangier Committee of Control along the lines set forth in the penultimate paragraph of the Department's circular airgram of May 7, 1953, and as recommended in this despatch.
2. That the Department furnish the Legation as soon as possible with a draft of a Tangier radio ordinance for submission to the Committee of Control.
3. That the Legation be authorized to keep the Administrator of the Tangier Zone currently informed of such aspects of these problems as may be appropriate.

W. WITMAN

771.00/6-1953

American Statement Read at the Committee of Control Meeting[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TANGIER, June 18, 1953.

I have been instructed by my Government to state that the United States is anxious to help to bring the Protocol and the judiciary reforms into effect without delay. We therefore support the immediate implementation of the Protocol which would, of course, still leave the judicial reforms outstanding. The United States also supports the idea that the judicial reforms should become effective as soon as the adherence of all powers, including the United States, has been received. The United States intends to adhere to the Four-Power Convention on judiciary reforms with reservation of its present position, but has been studying and is now seriously considering in this connection the principle of revising its jurisdictional position in Tangier to make it similar to its position in the French Zone of Morocco under the decision of the International Court of Justice of August 27, 1952. However, in view of certain practical considerations relating to American private interests in Tangier and the effect thereon of revising its jurisdictional position, the United States will need a short additional time in which to finalize the course of action which is outlined above.

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[1] This statement was an enclosure to despatch 563 of June 19, 1953 from Tangier. (771.00/6-1953)

971.40/7–753 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Tangier[1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, July 7, 1953—7 p. m.

16. In view information contained Legation telegrams five[2] and six[3] Department again urged Radio Companies expedite their review local Tangier laws. Department now informed by Companies compilation local laws received in French but not yet translated. Summary of same from Tangier Manager Mackay indicates Companies "may be able to live with laws." Department has informed RCA and Mackay that in light information reported reference telegrams we feel compelled proceed course action previously outlined to them and which they have approved in principle.[4] Department would have preferred afford Companies opportunity thorough study local laws before acting finally. We have indicated to Companies that if review laws subsequently reveals any intolerable law (which we doubt) Department willing seek obtain appropriate relief. This is all Department could do under any circumstance. Following is verbatim text United States adherence to Convention:

Begin verbatim text. The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has the honor to refer to the note of January 27, 1953[5] enclosing a certified true copy of the Convention of November 10, 1952 relating to the Reform of the International Jurisdiction of Tangier and inviting the United States to adhere to this Convention.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for action to Paris and for information to London, Madrid, and Rabat.

[2] Not printed; it recommended Department adherence with reservations in light of the positive reaction to the statement of June 18. (771.00/7–453)

[3] Not printed; it indicated French opposition to "political" reservations to the judiciary convention, but not to a statement that nothing in the convention was understood to modify the U.S. capitulatory rights and jurisdictional position. (771.00/7–453)

[4] In conversations on June 11 and 15. See footnote 7, p. 218.

[5] *Ante*, p. 204.

The Convention was signed by the plenipotentiaries of the Governments of Spain, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Italy and amends the Statute of Tangier established by the Convention of December 18, 1923, modified by the Agreement of July 25, 1928, between the same parties.

The United States is not a party to the Statute of Tangier. The Convention provides, nevertheless, that it shall be communicated for adherence, not only to the Powers which have adhered to the Statute of Tangier, but also to the Government of the United States which is represented on the Committee of Control of Tangier as a result of the joint invitation from the French and British Governments to participate in the provisional international regime created by the Agreement of August 31, 1945.

The Embassy of the United States, pursuant to instructions of the Government of the United States of America, has the honor to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Government of the United States of America, desirous of supporting to the fullest extent possible the implementation of the program of reforms prepared by the Committee of Control, adheres to the said Convention of November 10, 1952 subject to the following reservations:

1. The adherence of the United States to the Convention does not modify or abridge in any manner the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States in the Tangier Zone;

2. The adherence of the United States does not in any way imply adherence to the Statute of Tangier of December 18, 1923, as modified on July 25, 1928, which the Convention of November 10, 1952, amends. *End verbatim text.*

Department considers two numbered reservations contained in final paragraph note essential fully protect US position, and sees no basis for French or any other member Committee Control object inclusion these reservations in adherence. If Legation has any suggested changes in text note which it deems essential they should be communicated immediately to Dept and Embassy Paris. Otherwise text should be considered final and should be delivered by Embassy Paris to French Foreign Office in present form on Wednesday July 8.

Witman should read text adherence at meeting Committee Control on Wednesday indicating time it is to be delivered to French in Paris. At same time should make statement outlined final paragraph page five Circular Airgram May 7, Control No. 935.[6] Do not include in statement any reference to necessity for agreement regarding questions connected with transfer of jurisdiction as set forth second paragraph Legation Despatch 516.[7] Dept believes these questions can be handled satisfactorily if and when proposed changes in jurisdiction implemented.

DULLES

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[6] *Ante*, p. 213.

[7] Dated May 25, p. 218.

353/8-553

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of African Affairs (Cyr) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1953.

Subject: Regularization of U.S. Treaty Position in the International Zone of Tangier.

The regularization of our treaty position in the International Zone of Tangier, so that it conforms to the position we are now maintaining in the French Zone of Morocco under the decision of the ICJ, involves (1) a cut-back in the scope of the jurisdiction of our consular court, and (2) the relinquishment of our right to assent to Tangier laws before they can be applied to Americans.

Prior to the ICJ decision our Consular Court in Casablanca was exercising exclusive civil and criminal jurisdiction in all cases in which an American citizen was defendant. The ICJ ruled, however, that the scope of our consular jurisdiction was confined to that granted to us in our 1836 treaty with Morocco which gives us jurisdiction only in those cases both civil and criminal where Americans (or American protégés) are both plaintiff and defendant and to those cases specifically set out in the Act of Algeciras (these relate mostly to customs cases). The Court said that we had lost the broader jurisdiction in 1937 when the British surrendered their capitulatory rights in Morocco. Prior to 1937 Britain, under a treaty with Morocco of 1868, had enjoyed the right of consular jurisdiction in all cases in which a British subject was a defendant and we had claimed this right under the most-favored-nation clause in our treaty of 1836.

The ICJ also ruled that we did not have the right to claim that local laws could not be applied to American citizens without the assent of this Government. Our claim to this right was not based on any specific provision in any treaty, but rather was based on custom and usage coupled with the fact that our consular courts in the past simply refused to apply to Americans any law to which this Government had not assented.

The decision of the ICJ does not by its terms apply to the Tangier Zone. However, our rights in Tangier are based on exactly the same treaties as our rights in the French Zone. In order to contend that we still have in Tangier the broader rights which we are now exercising, we could only adduce the same arguments which were rejected by the ICJ in the case concerning our rights in the French Zone. In brief, in the light of the ICJ decision, we are without a legal basis on which to maintain our present position in Tangier. Under the decision of the Court, the International Administration can terminate these rights simply by notifying this Government that it no longer acquiesces in the exercise of such rights. This would cut our position in Tangier back to what it now is in the French Zone under the ICJ decision.

We believe that it is in our best interests to keep the initiative in this problem by voluntarily taking this action. It is hoped that by so doing we will be able to obtain agreement to (1) the enactment of a satisfactory Tangier radio ordinance which will govern the future operations of RCA and Mackay, (2) a government-to-government agreement governing the future operations of our VOA relay station, and (3) agreement to certain technical problems involved in cutting back our consular jurisdiction. This will permit us to regularize our position in an orderly fashion while obtaining maximum protection for our own interests and the interests of RCA, Mackay and other commercial companies. The alternative is to lose these rights by action of the Tangier Administration which would, in the case of RCA, Mackay and VOA subject the operations of their stations in Tangier to the provisions of an existing radio ordinance which gives the Administrator of the Zone almost unlimited control over their activities.

611.71/8-753

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of African Affairs (Cyr) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1953.

Subject: Relinquishment of U.S. Rights in Tangier.

Following our conversation last Saturday,[1] I asked Earle Richey to write up a few comments on the above subject. He has submitted the following:

The relinquishment of our treaty rights in the International Zone of Tangier has been discussed within AF several times in the past few years and has been the subject of two or three despatches from our Legation at Tangier. In many ways such action, particularly at this time, would be tantamount to opening a pandora's box. This is true because action along these lines in Tangier would have repercussions on our treaty position in the French Zone and in turn on our position in the Spanish Zone. Some of the possible ramifications of such action are set forth hereunder.

1. Giving up our treaty rights in Tangier could only be done with the advice and the consent of the U.S. Senate. Even though limited to the International Zone, a proposal to the Senate along these lines at the present time would probably not be favorably received in the light of past and present Congressional interests in the Moroccan trade prob-

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[1] Aug. 1.

lem.[2] Such action would be opposed by Colonel Rodes.[3] and even more important by RCA and Mackay Radio as well as other commercial and business organizations. Rodes would undoubtedly oppose such action on the grounds that it constituted the first step in a concerted move by the Department to surrender our treaty rights in the French Zone of Morocco. RCA and Mackay would oppose the action on the grounds that it would jeopardize their operations in Tangier where they have invested several million dollars as the result of encouragement from the U.S. Government and only because of the favorable situation created by the U.S. treaty position there.

2. Politically, the surrender of our treaty rights in Tangier would constitute a slap at the Sultan of Morocco. The Sultan has made it clear that he wishes the U.S. to hold on to its position in the Sherifian Empire which he considers has long been the one factor which has prevented France from making an outright colony of Morocco. Once we surrender our rights in the International Zone we could anticipate that the French would relentlessly press us to take similar action in the French Zone.

3. Relinquishment of these rights in Tangier would have to be accompanied by adherence to the Tangier Statute of 1923 or by the drafting of a new Tangier Statute (to which we would adhere). If we adhere to the 1923 Statute as it now stands we would have to reduce our office in Tangier from a Legation to a Consulate General and our Principal Officer from a Diplomatic Agent to a Consul General. Such a change is specifically provided for in the Statute. Reducing the status of our representation in Morocco would not seem to be an expedient course of action in the face of political developments there which, generally speaking, are in the direction of eventual independence for this area. On the other hand the drafting of a new statute for Tangier (provided for in the 1945 Anglo-French Agreement) is not desirable at the present time because of the possibility of Russian participation therein (Russia has this right under the 1945 Agreement). Incidentally, the Powers adhering to the 1923 Tangier Statute have not opened legations in Rabat after closing theirs in Tangier as required by the Statute. Sweeney (L/EUR)[4] says he believes it is contrary to custom to have a diplomatic representative in a Protectorate. He will look further into this aspect of the problem.

4. Spain is evidencing more and more interest in Tangier and Franco is at least talking rather loudly about the British giving up Gibraltar to Spain. It may be necessary at a future date to take a firm stand against Spain and her intentions in this area. It occurs to AF that

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[2] When France imposed import controls which discriminated against U.S. nationals in the French Zone, the Hickenlooper amendment to the Foreign Aid Act gave the President discretionary authority to withhold funds from nations not in compliance with treaties.

[3] As commander of the American Legion Post at Casablanca and president of the American Trade Association in Morocco, Robert E. Rodes had waged a campaign against the French trade restrictions.

[4] Joseph M. Sweeney was an assistant in the office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs in the Department and had been counsel to the agent of the United States in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice.

such a stand would be strengthened insofar as Tangier is concerned if we maintain our present treaty rights there, however anachronistic and annoying they may be to us.

971.40/4–1554

Background Memorandum, Prepared by the Legation at Tangier[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [TANGIER, undated.]

The Tribunal of First Instance of the International Jurisdiction of Tangier has recently handed down a decision which is of great interest to the United States Government. On March 9, 1954, in a case brought by two Moroccan subjects against the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company, Inc., the Tribunal of First Instance said that in view of the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the case of *France* v. *United States*, decided August 27, 1952, the United States no longer can claim in the Tangier Zone capitulatory rights greater than those in Articles 20 and 21 of its Treaty of 1836. The Tribunal went on to say that the United States right of consular jurisdiction, therefore, is limited to disputes between American ressortissants, and that the competence of the International Jurisdiction is now incontestable in a civil dispute, such as the one it had under consideration, between one or more Moroccan subjects and an American company.

My Government, which has studied this matter with great care, is of the opinion that the decision of the Tribunal of First Instance was not warranted on the basis of the ICJ decision. Furthermore, it does not appear that the Tribunal had all of the facts before it.

Even after the entry into force of the Tangier Statute of 1923, which entailed the abolition of the capitulatory rights in Tangier of the parties to the Statute, the United States continued to exercise consular jurisdiction in all cases in which an American ressortissant was defendant, without objection from the Moroccan or Tangier authorities.

In connection with the entry into force of the Four-Power Convention on Judicial Reforms of November 10, 1952, the American representative stated in the Committee of Control, on June 18, 1953,[2] that the United States Government intended to adhere thereto with reservation of its position, and that it was seriously studying the possibility of revising its jurisdictional position in Tangier to make it similar to its position in the French Zone of Morocco under the decision of the

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[1] This memorandum was an enclosure to despatch 493 of Apr. 15, 1954 from Tangier. (971.40/4–1554) It discussed the developments in the case of *Fatma Bent Si Mohamed El Khadar and Her Son* v. *Mackay Radio* which threatened U.S. consular jurisdiction in Tangier.

[2] *Ante*, p. 221.

International Court of Justice. This position was accepted by the members of the Committee of Control and the continuation by the United States of the exercise of its consular jurisdiction, unchanged, was thereby given implied assent.

Also, in a note to the French Government of July 8, 1953,[3] the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was notified that the United States Government adhered to the Convention of November 10, 1952, subject to the following reservations:

> "1. The adherence of the United States to the Convention does not modify or abridge in any manner the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States in the Tangier Zone; . . ."[4]

Subsequently a note was sent by the French Government to each of the Governments represented on the Committee of Control calling attention to the United States reservations and stating that, in the absence of objections on their part, the Convention would enter into force as of July 8, 1953. No Government made any observations. (Minutes of the 199th Meeting of the Committee of Control, held July 16, 1953, page 330.)[5]

Thus the acquiescence of the Tangier authorities to the exercise by the United States of jurisdiction in all cases in which an American ressortissant is defendant, acquiescence which is of some thirty years standing, was confirmed by the acceptance of the United States statement in the Committee of Control on June 18, 1953, as well as by the lack of objections on the part of all Governments concerned to the reservations made by the United States regarding its extraterritorial jurisdiction in the United States note of adherence of July 8, 1953, to the Four-Power Convention on judicial reforms. My Government considers that the International Jurisdiction is bound by this acquiescence of the Tangier authorities as much as it would be if the matter had been reduced to writing in an agreement and, the question being one for the interested Governments, the Tribunal of First Instance has no power to terminate it.

It is the view of the United States Government that the decision of the Tribunal of First Instance of March 9, 1954, cuts across and disregards the understandings reached in the Committee of Control last summer. My Government therefore considers that it is fully justified in recording a strong objection to the decision at this time. I am exploring possibilities of having the judgment of the Tribunal of First Instance reversed, including a possible appeal by the *Procureur*. It is not, however, my intention at this time to request the intervention of the Committee of Control.

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[3] The text of this note can be found in telegram 16 to Tangier of July 7, 1953, p. 222.

[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

[5] Not printed.

971.40/11-1554

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Satterthwaite)[1]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TANGIER, November 13, 1954.

Participants: M. François de Panafieu, French Minister
J. C. Satterthwaite, American Minister

Subject: Draft Radio Ordinance

When M. de Panafieu came this morning to make his farewell call, I showed him the letter concerning our draft Radio Ordinance[2] which I am sending him. After he had read it, I remarked that I understood that his Government had had in the past some reservations about the propriety of the appointment of an American to a position of importance in the Administration as long as we did not adhere to the Statute. I said that while we could understand this, I was sure he would appreciate that the appointment of a Director of Radio Communications was the first step toward possible American adherence to the Statute. Once we had completed the Radio Ordinance, there would then remain only a few small details to negotiate before we could accept the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal in mixed cases. After that, I felt that my Government would be willing to consider adherence to the present Statute or to join in the negotiation of a new one.

I realized, I continued, why it might seem strange for the United States to play an active role in the Committee of Control as long as we did not adhere to the Statute. Nevertheless, we had been invited to do so by the French and the British Governments and therefore felt that we had a perfect right to have an American official in the International Administration. I hoped, therefore, it would be possible for him to give his valuable support in Paris to our proposals.

Our draft was, of course, subject to negotiation but I hoped very much that its principles would be accepted by his Government. I could assure him that it was our intention to protect the radio interests of the French Government, which were of next greatest importance here after ours. The acceptance of the proposed Ordinance would be a protection to both our Governments against the possible use of the International Zone by the Soviet Government for the establishment of a radio station. The Ordinance would protect the present interests of all of the governments here and would give us the means of controlling the establishment of any future stations. Without such protection, the Soviet Government might well come in here and disrupt all our present facilities.

M. de Panafieu said he agreed entirely with what I had said and had realized on reading our note that the appointment of an American official might well be the first step toward the adherence of the United States to the Statute. He said he would be very glad indeed to support our proposals in Paris.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was an enclosure to despatch 211 of Nov. 15, 1954 from Tangier. (971.40/11-1554)

[2] Not printed.

J. C. SATTERTHWAITE

971.40/12–854 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Tangier[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 8, 1954.

Subject: Negotiation of a Radio Ordinance.

CA–3757. Reference is made to despatch No. 211,[2] dated November 15, 1954, and enclosures, from the Legation, Tangier, concerning the negotiation of a radio ordinance.

The second enclosure is a memorandum of conversation with the French Minister on November 13, 1954.[3] He was told that once the radio ordinance was completed, there would remain only a few small details to negotiate before the United States could accept the jurisdiction of the International Jurisdiction of Tangier in mixed cases.

This statement was in line with the position adopted by this Government in 1953. At that time, the right of the United States to exercise jurisdiction in mixed cases was formally challenged by the representative of France and also questioned, even though not openly, by other members of the Tangier administration. The International Court of Justice had ruled on August 27, 1952, that the United States had no right to exercise jurisdiction in mixed cases in the French Zone. It was argued that the reasoning underlying this decision applied *mutatis mutandis* to our exercise of jurisdiction in mixed cases in the Tangier Zone. This Government believed it could not adequately defend against this contention. In the light of the legal and political considerations involved, it foresaw it might be compelled to discontinue its exercise of jurisdiction in mixed cases in the not too distant future. On June 18, 1953, the United States representative on the Committee of Control announced that the United States was "seriously considering . . . the principle of revising its jurisdictional position in Tangiers",[4] it being understood its plan would be tentative and dependent upon securing beforehand a radio ordinance adequately protecting the extensive American radio interests in Tangier.

The decision of the Court of Appeal of the International Jurisdiction of Tangier of August 13, 1954, in *El Khadar* v *Mackay Radio* has changed the situation. The tentative plans of the United States for eventual discontinuance of its jurisdiction in mixed cases were the result of necessity. The lack of legal basis for its exercise of jurisdiction in mixed cases put it in an awkward political position where it was restricted to a choice between the prospect of an unsuccessful legal fight which might embitter its future relations in the Zone, and the prospect of a voluntary discontinuance of jurisdiction which would secure the friendly cooperation necessary to the enactment of a radio ordinance favorable to American interests. But the Court of Appeal, the court of last resort, now holds that the United States is legally entitled, under the treaties, to continue to exercise jurisdiction in mixed cases. The Tangier court stated the case for our jurisdiction as strongly as is possible under the peculiar circumstances attending the situation. The United States now speaks from a position of relative legal strength which gives it more maneuvering room and requires reexamination of its political objectives and capabilities.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Casablanca, Paris, and Rabat.

[2] Not printed.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] *Ante*, p. 221. The ellipsis appears in the source text.

The Department is aware of course that the strength of our position is only relative. The decision of the Court of Appeal of Tangier is not based on a distinction between the factual situations in French Morocco and Tangier. It simply took the minority view of the International Court on practically all aspects of the arguments involved in the issue of jurisdiction. Where the majority held that jurisdiction in mixed cases acquired through the most-favored-nation clause was a contingent and not a permanent right, the Tangier court adopted the minority view that it was a permanent right which did not disappear when the states—Great Britain and Spain—to which it was originally granted gave it up. It may be doubted, on close analysis of the situation, that we could expect to induce the International Court of Justice to reverse itself. If possible we should therefore avoid a controversy over our right of jurisdiction to reach a point where we would be forced to submit the issue to arbitration. But at the same time, it is also true that the decision of the Court of Appeal of Tangier puts us in a strong position to meet any challenge to our position by the French or other representative on the Committee of Control. To deny the validity of the decision, and hence put in issue the whole problem of the constitutional relationship between the courts and the Committee of Control, would be a heavy political responsibility to assume for those who challenge our jurisdiction. To try to force us into international arbitration would also involve a willingness to embitter their relations with us in Tangier. Before the decision of the Court of Appeal, we ran the risk of jeopardizing our political relationship by resisting their challenge. It would appear now that they must run this risk if they want to insist on our giving up our jurisdiction.

The Department is also aware that a peculiar situation will arise if the radio ordinance should be completed and we are then asked to give up our jurisdiction on the ground that we morally committed ourselves to such a course of action on June 18, 1953, and accepted the establishment of an American judgeship on the courts of Tangier. Presumably, we could not expect to get away with everything, so to speak: jurisdiction of the consular courts over all American defendants, a judgeship on the Tangier courts and a radio ordinance which, as presently drafted, would give substantial control of radio matters in Tangier to Americans. If we elect to give up jurisdiction in mixed cases, we must face the problem of obtaining congressional assent to this move, and in the present circumstances, such an undertaking might not be opportune and would certainly take time. If we consider joining the statute of Tangier, a move discussed prematurely with the French Minister in the conversation of November 13, we must face an even more difficult congressional problem, since this would involve giving up all of our rights of jurisdiction. There remains the possibility of discontinuing the negotiation of the radio ordinance or of giving it a different orientation with less American control. But the appropriate course of action in this matter depends to a large extent on the reports and estimates which the Legation can furnish on the reaction of the other representatives to the decision of the Court of Appeal of August 13, 1954, and their probable position regarding the maintenance of our jurisdiction. The comments of the Legation on this whole matter are requested.[8]

DULLES

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[8] The Legation's comments were set forth in despatch 289 of Jan. 10, 1955 from Tangier. (971.40/1–1055)

DEVELOPMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN FRENCH AFRICA OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES

Editorial Note

French possessions in Sub-Saharan Africa, exclusive of Somaliland (Djibouti) and Madagascar, consisted of two federations and two trust territories. French West Africa included: Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, and the Upper Volta. The American Consul General at Dakar was accredited to this Federation and also reported on the trust territory of Togoland. The American Consul at Accra also reported on this latter territory although not accredited there. French Equatorial Africa was made up of four colonies: Chad, Gabon, Moyen Congo, and Ubangi-Shari. The American Consul at Leopoldville reported on this region and as well on the trust territory of the Cameroons.

751T.00/1-552

The Consul General at Dakar (Blake) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 158

DAKAR, January 5, 1952.

Subject: Conversation with Governor Camille Bailly, Secretary General of the Government of French West Africa

At various social affairs in recent months, I have had several short conversations with Governor Bailly on a number of political subjects. These led to a suggestion by Governor Bailly that we get together at an early date for a serious conversation where we could talk more freely and without interruption. As a result of the Governor's suggestion and by pre-arrangement, I called on him on December 26, accompanied by Vice Consul Birge[1] as interpreter.

Governor Bailly initiated the conversation by saying that he was going to speak frankly, but that the views that he was about to express were his own personal views and not necessarily those of his Government.

With this preliminary statement out of the way, the Governor began his remarks by speaking of the traditional anti-colonial feeling in the

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[1] Walter William Birge, Jr.

United States, which he said he perfectly well understood, but which he felt was not always well-considered from an overall point of view, and which, when translated into terms of American policy, had sometimes had unfortunate results, as recent events in the Far East, he believed, had abundantly shown. While undoubtedly having French North Africa in the back of his mind, he did not specifically refer to it at this point in his remarks, but went on to state that he believed that recent history has shown that it was extremely dangerous to cut colonial territories adrift before they were ready for independence and strong enough to be able successfully to resist Communist propaganda and infiltration tactics.

While the United States, he said, was, of course, by far the strongest power in the anti-Communist bloc, he stated that he felt that we should not lose sight of the fact that our strongest and most reliable allies, whether we liked it or not, were colonial powers, and that any encouragement, or seeming encouragement, of nationalistic aspirations at this particular time in our allies' dependent territories could not help but result in situations which Moscow would know very well how to exploit to its advantage and to our, the West's, disadvantage.

Governor Bailly then turned to the situation in French West Africa and, speaking of Communism, stated, as this Consulate General has frequently reported, that there is absolutely no Communist danger here at the present time; that the RDA's recent alliance with the Communist party, now happily broken off, had, it turned out, been only tactical in nature.[2] This was not to say, he went on, that there are no Communists in French West Africa. There are a few, he said, most of them French from the Metropole who had come out to French West Africa in minor Government jobs. As these were discovered, however, they were, he remarked, immediately sent back to France where they could be more effectively watched, and where their capacities for making trouble would be less than in an overseas territory.

As for racial problems, the Governor stated that, while racial consciousness, of course, existed in French West Africa, this had not, so far at least, resulted in a feeling in the black population of hostility to the French, but rather in efforts on the part of black political leaders to secure equality of treatment for their fellows. (The so-called Lamine Guèye law [3] might be cited as an instance of efforts of this kind.)

The real danger to the security of French West Africa, Governor Bailly stated, was not Communism, at least not at present, and not racial troubles, but the spread from North Africa and the Near East of nationalist and Pan-Islamic ideas. This danger, he said, was, happily, not immediate; there had been detected, so far, only a very few feeble attempts at effecting political liaison between the Arab nationalists in French North Africa and their co-religionists in French West Africa. The danger existed, however, and could, the Governor emphasized, become almost overnight a very serious threat to the security of French West Africa and its continued existence as an integral part of the French Union.

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[2] The *Rassemblement Démocratique African* ended its affiliation with the Communists in October 1950. For information, see despatch 156 from Dakar, Jan. 19, 1951, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, p. 1211.

[3] This law, which became effective on June 30, 1950, provided for equality in pay, promotion, and recruitment of Africans and European civil servants working in the colonies.

The Governor added that, in his opinion, British policy in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, and the UN's action in encouraging and facilitating the establishment of Libya as an independent state,[4] were cardinal mistakes, which would be bound to have an adverse effect on the stability of all of the dependent African territories. The stability and security of these territories should, he thought, be something which the Western allies, at this particular time especially, should be striving to insure.

M. WILLIAMS BLAKE

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[4] Libya achieved its independence on Dec. 24, 1951.

Accra Consulate files, lot 59 F 7, "350–Political Affairs"

The First Secretary of the Embassy at Paris (Moore) to the Consul at Accra (Cole)

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

PARIS, August 20, 1952.

DEAR MR. COLE: Some days ago one of the officials in the Central and South African Section of Afrique-Levant in the Foreign Office asked me to call on him on a problem relating to your recent trip to Lomé in French Togo.[1]

It appears that the French authorities in Lomé had reported that while in Lomé you met, in a "semi-clandestine manner", with Mr. Sylvanus Olympio, one of the leaders of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise. The Foreign Office official commented that we undoubtedly appreciated that meetings of this nature, irrespective of how worthy the motive and sincere the intention, almost invariably assumed, in the eyes of the natives, a significance out of all proportion to reality. Hence, he wished, not officially but as a friend, to call our attention to the circumspection which is necessary in contacts between our consular officers and native leaders in such backward areas. He also felt that the Department should treat with a certain reserve any report you may have written on French Togo, since you were in contact with only one of the local parties there (although admittedly the most important) and thus your observations might tend to be one-sided.

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[1] Cole made this trip between May 25 and 27, 1952. For further documentation on the subject of French Togoland and as well the issue of Ewe unification, see vol. III, pp. 1075 ff.

I made no particular comment other than to say that I knew that it was not your intention to stir up idle speculation on the part of the native population and that I presumed your interest was in informing yourself of varying viewpoints on local problems; I was sure that our consular officers in that area recognize the problems created by contact with local leaders and that they make every effort to maintain a proper relationship with them.

I plan to make no further reply to the Foreign Office official other than to indicate that I have passed along his comments to appropriate officials. I would, however, appreciate your sending to me a copy of any report which you may have written on your trip to Lomé and your conversation with Mr. Olympio, together with any other comments you may wish to make.[2]

The Foreign Office official's attitude was entirely friendly and he seemed motivated by the desire to eliminate possible sources of friction between our two countries. He appeared fully to recognize that contact between our consular officers and local leaders was inevitable and I surmise that he felt it would be useful to refer to this particular case as a reminder that caution should be exercised in our relationship with the native population.

Sincerely yours,

C. Robert Moore

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[2] Cole replied on Sept. 11 that he had not met with Olympio or any other nationalist leader in the course of his trip. Moreover, he noted that "The administration in French Togoland seems almost psychopathic in their [illegible] about nationalist trends in the area". (Accra Consulate files, lot 59 F 7, "350–Political Affairs")

Accra Consulate files, lot 59 F 7, "350–Political Affairs"

The Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld) to the Consul at Accra (Cole)

CONFIDENTAL PERSONAL WASHINGTON, October 8, 1952.
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

Dear Bill: When John Utter received your recent letter enclosing copies of your exchange of letters with Robert Moore in Paris,[1] he called me in and we talked the whole matter over at considerable length. I emphasized to John the reliance Jim Durnan and I have come to place in your mature judgment, discretion, integrity as a reporting officer, and ability to analyze a complex political situation, without emotionalism or evident bias. I added that, in my opinion, Moore should have been much less inclined to accept as accurate the allegations made by the French Foreign Office official during the interview. In other words, I had no hesitation in fully supporting your conduct during your visit to French Togoland as well as your subsequent actions in Accra and I made my support clear.

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[1] Not printed; Cole had written on Sept. 12 to Utter, who was Director of the Office of African Affairs, enclosing Moore's letter of Aug. 20, *supra*, and his own response of Sept. 11. (Accra Consulate files, lot 59 F 7, "350–Political Affairs")

I explained to John Utter that the hypersensitivity of the French regarding the activities of our Foreign Service officers in French colonial areas, has heretofore been confined, as far as I am aware, to French North Africa, and that the Togo incident was the first indication we have had that this hypersensitivity is spreading to include U.S. Foreign Service officers assigned to non-French posts in Africa South of the Sahara who are responsible for reporting on U.N. Trusteeship territories, including those administered by the French. Furthermore, I pointed out that the United States has never been convinced of the validity of the case for Ewe or Togo unification, as put by extremist Ewe nationalist leaders, but, on the contrary, has considered this as one of those problems for which no really workable solution has been suggested. Consequently, I see absolutely no reason for the representative of the French Foreign Office to have made such allegations regarding your perfectly correct and proper visit to the High Commissioner and Chef du Cabinet of French Togoland at Lomé, which you cleared beforehand with all appropriate authorities concerned.

I trust that this incident will in no way inhibit the fine work you are doing for us in Accra. As I have said previously, for the first time in many years we are receiving really good coverage of political developments in the Gold Coast and the two Togolands. It would be a great pity, therefore, if we were to be denied your careful, well-rounded and objective analyses because of incidents of this kind. In my opinion, we will not get dispassionate and factual analyses of the complex political situation in your areas if you are constrained from even hearing the nationalists state their position by calling on you at the Consulate at Accra on their own initiative. The French are all too ready to assume that we uncritically swallow everything a nationalist has to say. This, of course, is sheer nonsense, but the French seem to believe their own nonsense these days.

I hope, therefore, that you will consider the whole episode closed and will rest assured in the knowledge that we certainly intend to see that your record is kept clear of any criticism in that regard, and I am sure John Utter feels the same way.

I shall look forward to hearing from you personally and also to reading your fine despatches. With all best wishes,

Very sincerely,

NICK

870.411/9-1653

The Consul at Dakar (Corrigan) to the Department of State

RESTRICTED DAKAR, September 16, 1953.

No. 54

Subject: Some Observations Concerning Racism and Politics in FWA

It seems to be a common notion that among white people, and particularly those whose countries have overseas possessions in Africa, the French are the least guilty of racialism. Replying to American charges of "colonialism" and exploitation of autochthonous peoples, the French rather tartly point to discrimination against the Negro in the United States. In fact, even without direct provocation, the French are wont to point the finger of scorn at the many evidences of racism in the great democracy across the sea. And it is doubtless true that the American Negro is much less restrained, and more readily accepted, in Paris than in New York or Chicago, let alone Atlanta or Charleston.

With Black Africa south of the Sahara subject to frequent disorder and sporadically boiling over here and there with often serious consequences, except apparently at the present time in the African extensions of the French Republic and in the Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese colonies, one is induced to reflect on the complexities and implications of the race relations problem and its possible effects on the future.

The writer personally is inclined to agree with the opinion that where, notwithstanding the extent of paternalistic benevolence, the indigenous population has no voice in the conduct of its affairs and in plotting its destiny, as reportedly is the case in the Belgian Congo, "the white folks are building up a lot of trouble for themselves." [*] The subject takes on added importance in the world of today where we may assume that Communist agents and divers malcontents are quite ceaselessly working to fan flames of dissent and discontent wherever found.

Now, it seems to be quite generally acknowledged that a marked change in the status of subject Africans and in the relationship between Whites and Africans has taken place in French Africa. This is true to a certain extent. Since the Constitution of 1946, all of these natives are French citizens [†] and have the right to vote.[‡] And, notwithstanding the favored position of the White Frenchman by virtue of the bi-college electoral system ‡ in all Territories except Senegal, the fact is that 17 out of the Federation's 20 members of the Chamber of Deputies in Paris are Black.[1] Consequently, a certain very small number of natives of this part of the French Republic have real influence in French political life and therefore on the governing of French West Africa. Conceivably, they could wield a balance of power which might, in certain circumstances, decide the fall or retention of a Government of France. Moreover, Africans are in the majority in the Grand Council of French West Africa and in the several Territorial Assemblies and thus have a voice in the conduct of the Territories' fiscal and other affairs even if the functions of these bodies are mainly advisory. This seems to present a picture quite different from that in Belgian and Portuguese Territories.

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[*] Statement made to the reporting officer some months ago by the well-known American Negro educator, Dr. Horace Mann Bond, President of Lincoln University, Pennsylvania. [Footnote in the source text. Blake had cited essentially the same statement in his despatch 186 of Dec. 18, 1952. (032 Bond, Horace Mann)]

[†] There is a Gallic legal subtlety involved here. Article 80 of the Constitution of 27 October 1946 gives the "quality of citizenship" to all nationals of the Overseas Territories, while Article 82 provides for the two kinds of "citizens", those of French civil status (the Whites and many *évolués*) and those of "personal status" who are not bound by certain restrictions of French law such as, for

The question may now be posed. Are the French truly liberal in respect of Africa? Are they, practically alone among Whites, free from the virus of racial prejudice which plagues the relationship between Whites and Blacks the world over? I am afraid not.

Santha Rama Rau wrote concerning Kenya in the July 19, 1953 issue of the *New York Times Magazine* as follows: "These three main population groups—the European, the Asian and the African—live in the same city (Nairobi) with a high degree of mutual exclusiveness or, as a friend of mine described it, as a racial pousse café, each element necessary to the whole, each retaining its separate identity, and, in the opinion at least of most Europeans and some Indians, a disastrous and unpalatable failure when the various elements mix." If *Lebanese* is substituted for *Asian* in the above passage, it gives a rather apt description of the situation in Dakar. There is in this capital of the Federation of French West Africa about as sharp a cleavage between Black and White, in fact if not in appearance, as there is most every place else where the two races live together. French racism is less blatant than, say, the Belgian variety in Leopoldville, where it is under-

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example, the interdiction of polygamy. This was principally to accommodate the many Moslems. Article 82 also provides for the renunciation of the personal status, which would automatically bring about "French civil status." However, everyone is a citizen. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡The first electoral college is composed of electors of French civil status, and the second college or "autochthonous electoral college" is limited to so-called "identified" inhabitants, i.e. those who possess identity cards, civil servants, military personnel, holders of drivers or hunting licenses, heads of families, mothers of two or more infants, etc. There were slightly over 1,000,000 voters in the Federation in 1950 and probably about 2,500,000 today. The first section of the Territorial Assemblies, elected by the first college, has about ½ as many members as the second section, which is elected by the second or native college (e.g. about 18 and 32 respectively in Ivory Coast and Dahomey). [Footnote in the source text.]

[1] For the names of the West African members of the French National Assembly in June 1951, see *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* by Ruth Schachter Morgenthau (Oxford, 1964), pp. 393–394.

stood that curfews and strict residential compartmentalizations are the rule; but I dare say that the basic antipathy of accepting the Negro on a basis of social, economic and political equality is about as strongly developed among Frenchmen, certainly those found generally in French West Africa, as among their White brethren of other nationalities. This assertion is not meant to castigate the French, and there is no disposition to withhold praise for their laudable philosophy and forward steps in the sphere of race relations. But it is important to face realities in order to have a better understanding of our subject and a better appreciation of developments.

In Dakar and the principal centers of the Federation, practically all of the apartments and modern dwellings are occupied by White (French or Lebanese). Outside of the Assemblies, as noted above, practically no position of importance is held by an African (although some "Administrateurs" of Negro heritage, usually West Indian, hold fairly responsible jobs on occasion, generally in the Customs Service or in the judiciary. An outstanding exception, of course, was Felix Eboué, former Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa).[2] Practically no Africans in the Federation are prominent in business or industry, and almost none is an important agricultural producer or big landowner. Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast is a rare exception. Beyond occasional large official gatherings to which the dark-skinned legislators and a few professional people and their wives are invited, or smaller meetings of men for political reasons, there is, practically speaking, no social rapport whatever between local French and the indigenous population, notwithstanding how "evolved" the latter may be. While there are some instances of marriage between African women (often half-castes) and French civil servants, French military personnel and *petits blancs* (low class French workers who come to the Federation seeking work and adventure), such unions are rare and they are definitely frowned on by the French. There were audible utterances of disgust in the almost exclusively White section of a local theatre when the wedding of Cripps' daughter to a Gold Coast Negro was shown on the newsreel.[3] The most noted local Communist, the mulatto Gabriel d'Arboussier, is understood to have been driven into Moscow's arms by a searing hatred of the White man consequent to his having been jilted, at the insistence of her parents, by a White French girl, the daughter of a French official in the interior. The Negro blood was enough to make him unacceptable, even though his father was not only White but a high ranking colonial administrator.

It is of interest in this connection to recall the prominent treatment given a few months ago by *Afrique Nouvelle* to the problem of marriage between Whites and Blacks. *Afrique Nouvelle* is a rather influential Catholic (The White Fathers) weekly newspaper published in Dakar and circulated throughout French Black Africa. An editorial type commentary on the front page quoted a sad letter to her Bishop from an African girl who had married a European and gone to France to live. The commentary pointed out that, while there are no theoretical objections to such marriages, the difficulties of a practical order are well nigh insurmountable. The newspaper commented: "May this cry of alarm calm the intemperate enthusiasm of those girls who dream of the Metropole." The letter itself recounted the failure of the girl's marriage to a Frenchman because of her color. She said her husband's parents reproached him for having married an African and that he became improvident and eventually abandoned her and the children. Her French neighbors, she claimed, were noticeably unsympathetic and unfriendly, giving her the impression that they felt she, a Black woman, should have stayed at home.

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[2] Eboué owed his advancement, in part, to his resistance to Vichy and loyalty to General de Gaulle.

[3] Sir Stafford Cripps had been one of the leaders of the British Labour Party until his death in 1952. His daughter Peggy married Joe Appiah, who became a prominent lawyer and politician in independent Ghana.

A few years ago, the Reverend Père Bertho, head of the Catholic educational system in the Federation and also a member of the Grand Council of French West Africa from Dahomey, in a report to his religious superiors in France, credited the Apostolic Prefect in 1848, the Abbot Arlabosse, with having written as follows with respect to the unwillingness of slave owners to permit education for slaves for fear the latter would become unsatisfied and get ideas of freedom: "It seems to men without intelligence that, if the Blacks are left in ignorance, they will be able the more easily to exploit them." Father Bertho harshly continued: "This judgment remains perfectly true in 1948 and, for a long time in the future, too many Europeans—among them even those who are considered important persons—will continue to consider education for natives as jeopardizing their own selfish interests (which are) cleverly confounded with the interests of the colony and the interests of the Metropole. Also, this is frequently the equivalent to a timid excuse that one will find in the mouths of Governors-General of French West Africa whenever they expose their plans for the development of education. The fear of making the African an *évolué* without social position—*déclassé* as they say—will be the argument put forward by the majority of Metropolitans."

Perhaps Grand Counselor Bertho's indictment is too severe. He may be hypercritical because of the difficulties encountered by private Christian education, both Protestant and Catholic, in getting financial assistance from the Government for its civilizing work. Rather ironically, such subsidies have been appreciably higher since 1946 when they have been voted by the Territorial Assemblies or, in other words, when the Africans themselves have had a part in establishing them.

In any case, it seems to me, any objective observer of the local scene must incline to the viewpoint that the notion of French broad-mindedness and racial tolerance, at least so far as Africa is concerned, is rather largely mythical. I have travelled thousands of miles through French West Africa and have talked with scores of French administrators and businessmen. In great majority, their attitude toward the African is patronizing if not disdainful. Such attitudes can be and are often tempered by affection and a genuine solicitude. But I verily feel that the idea of accepting even the most advanced of them on their own political or social level is downright fantastic to almost the totality of the French Whites.

In most cases, the inferior economic status of the Blacks is enough presently to exclude them from living on the higher plane of the Whites. What about the future? On a tour of Abidjan in the company of a French Administrator, I was shown the beautifully situated new residential area "for Europeans" where only houses of high standards may be constructed. The cost of such dwellings will keep most Africans from the area but I inquired whether any of the few wealthier ones might be expected to reside there. The Administrator said that while of course the district could not by regulation or law be restricted to Whites, they hoped no Africans would move in and, with that idea in mind, they had purposely placed a design restriction on houses which was calculated not to appeal to Africans.

I wish to emphasize that this is not meant as a diatribe against the French. Also, I am not competent to discuss the acceptance or treatment of Blacks in France, although I have a suspicion that while Black students and intellectuals may circulate easily in academic, intellectual and "Bohemian" circles in Paris, they are not readily accepted either by the *bourgeoisie* or "high society", particularly in the provinces. The point I wish to make is that, in Africa, although "free", the Africans are considered neither "equal" nor "fraternal" by their White compatriots. The European worker is paid 2 to 5 times as much as the African worker. A young American student of Africa, who has been studying in Paris and is now observing conditions at first hand here, told me a few days ago that young African fellow students in the Metropole often have complained to him that the French in "the colonies" are obnoxious. While recognizing that the French seem to behave well enough toward the Blacks in the Metropole, they point out that the attitude of the Frenchman overseas is intolerable. For example, they say that the White man's treatment of the Blacks in local markets, say, leaves much to be desired. And they resent the free use of the familiar "tu" form in addressing the Blacks, a form which among the French is used with children and servants. The Frenchman's attitude is one born of deprecation and a conviction of superiority. A renowned Black woman Senator from one of the French Equatorial African Territories told Dr. Rayford Logan § in Paris not long ago, "I become exceedingly anti-French only when I return home."

Seen from here, French expectations for the political evolution of French Africa as an integral part of the French Republic, or at least of the French Union, seem to be predicated on the development and cultivation of a relatively few African leaders such as Léopold Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny, Silvandre, Conombo,[4] etc. and on the evolution and pro-French orientation of a growing electorate. The education and outlook of these African leaders seem to be largely French and they have, presently at least, great influence among a still overwhelmingly uninstructed electorate. Political processes are still rudimentary. With human nature as it is, it would seem at least questionable, in view of these racial feelings noted above and their inexorable influence on the Africans' thinking, whether French West Africa will in fact develop politically as neatly as planned in Paris and Dakar. Actually only a handful of the population knows the French language. Most of the people have practically nothing in common culturally or historically with the French. Few indeed, it cannot be gainsaid, are really imbued with any conviction that their destinies are necessarily allied with the White man's. Liberia, geographically practically a part of French West Africa, remains an example of government by Blacks, and events in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, and perhaps even the (Anglo-Egyptian) Sudan, are bound to have more and more effect in these neighboring Territories. The pattern that may eventually emerge from the interplay of forces is of course unpredictable, but it seems safe to prophesy that there will be changes, and maybe drastic ones. African leaders with quite different ideas concerning French hegemony in this part of the world may emerge. They might be new ones with Nationalist aspirations, they could be Communist inspired and even under Communist influence, or they might be the present leaders who, forced by the necessities of local opinion, would find it prudent to abandon championship of a "made in Paris" program. It is quite likely that not a few of the present leaders are loyal to French viewpoints largely out of self-interest rather than as a result of any great love for France or for Frenchmen. The French are indisputably in control and it would be foolhardy openly to oppose them at this juncture. Moreover, it is definitely to the economic self-interest of the Territories at present to embrace a relatively bounteous France which pours in much treasure for the economic and social development of the region. It has been estimated that the French taxpayer pays about ¾ of the cost of running and physically improving the Federation. And if France didn't take into her protected market practically all of the Federation's exports, like peanuts, a severe depression would probably ensue unless a satisfactory new trade pattern could be fashioned.

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§ Head of the Department of History at Howard University, Fulbright Fellow in Paris a year or two ago. [Footnote in the source text.]

[4] Jean Silvandre represented the Sudan in the French National Assembly and Joseph Conombo was a deputy from the Upper Volta.

In the long run, the attitude of Frenchmen, and their treatment of their African compatriots, will powerfully affect France's position. A perhaps overly pessimistic view was expressed to the writer by the Director of the Lycée Van Vollenhoven in Dakar, the largest in French West Africa, who said he felt his Black students, for whom he had a greater solicitude than for his White students, looked upon him with antipathy. He referred to the substantial contributions made by France toward the improvement of economic, social and health conditions in the Federation but he concluded that, in spite of all this, "We are training enemies of France."

In any event, it would seem to be too pious a hope to expect that some investments and the superimposition of a few liberal French political and social institutions on this vast and backward area will themselves assure a tranquil future "according to plan", especially when there is no well defined plan. In considering this absorbing subject, I am often reminded of what seemed to me a particularly intelligent article by the Rt. Hon. P. C. Gordon-Walker,[6] M. P. entitled "The White Man's Place in Africa—Future Relationship Between White and Black the Most Urgent Problem" which appeared in the April 1953 issue of the "African World." He stated, *inter alia:* "To my mind the most dangerous thing in Africa today is the way in which black Africans who have themselves so developed that they are cut off from the mass of their own race have no social contacts at all with the whites whose social equals they have become. They have crossed the time-gap, but have not safely landed on the other side. If this problem is not solved, these African leaders will inevitably in the end become the spokesmen of a black 'proletariat' in the true sense—that is, an element in society that rejects and fights against society." In conclusion, I don't say that the French are as guilty of racism as some others may be, or that they are less shortsighted than others may be. However, I do confidently believe that the French have not somehow miraculously escaped the complexes of superiority more or less common to the White man vis-à-vis peoples of a different hue; and I entertain the conviction that France is in for many sad disappointments with respect to its future influence in French West Africa unless the quite narrow attitudes of its official and commercial representatives in this part of the world are replaced by broader, more charitable and more realistic viewpoints. I see no imminent prospect of such a transformation, but that does not belie its desirability.

ROBERT F. CORRIGAN

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[6] He had been Commonwealth Secretary in the Labour government which was defeated in October 1951.

350/5–754

Memorandum by the Vice Consul at Leopoldville (Drew) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL LEOPOLDVILLE, [undated.]

MEMORANDUM ON VISIT TO FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA AND FRENCH CAMEROON OF MASON B. SEARS, U.S. DELEGATE TO U.N. TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Mr. Sears visited French Equatorial Africa and the French Cameroon on an informal basis. He indicated to me and to the French that his visit was for the purpose of self-instruction particularly, in regard to obtaining a better comprehension of the native situation; knowledge of the North Cameroon, which he believed very few persons knew; and to obtain the answers to questions he expected would be asked in the Trusteeship Council.

Mr. Sears, his son Philip, and the reporting officer left Brazzaville on April 1 and successively visited in F.E.A., from April 1–5, Fort Sibut, Fort Crampel, Fort Archambault, and Fort Lamy; and in the French Cameroon, from April 5–12, Fort Fourneau, Maroua, Mokolo, Garoua, Ngaoundere, and Yaounde. Mr. Sears and son left Yaounde for Douala by air on April 12 and the following morning for Buea by French official car to the French-British Cameroon border where he was met by the British.

Travel from Bangui to Fort Archambault, was made in the car of the Governor of Oubangui-Chari, because of lack of plane service. Mr. Sears was met at Fort Lamy by the Delegate of the High Commissioner to the Cameroon, Mr. Tirant and by the Chief of External Relations and Cameroon Delegate to the Trusteeship Council last January, Mr. Becquey, both of whom accompanied him throughout the trip from Fort Lamy to Yaounde. The private plane of the High Commissioner was used to travel from Fort Lamy to Yaounde with official cars at each stop in between for local area travel. All other travel was done by regular airlines.

Mr. Sears found the trip in French Equatorial Africa profitable as a point of comparison and preparation for the Cameroon. The Sudan political situation and its possible influence on F.E.A. and the possibility of a Holy War on the part of the Moslems [2] was discussed with French officials who expressed little apprehension on either question.

Mr. Sears was disappointed and felt he had been misled by overenthusiastic officials regarding the facility of hunting game at Fort Archambault. He had considerable physical hardship without seeing any game. This hunting expedition was arranged by the French at the suggestion of the French Delegate to the Trusteeship Council, in a telegram from him to the High Commissioner at Brazzaville.

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[1] This memorandum was an enclosure to despatch 270 of May 7, 1954 from the Consul at Leopoldville (McGregor) to the Department of State. (350/5–754)

[2] Riots, provoked by the Mahdist-backed Umma Party in opposition to the National Union Party's contemplation of unification with Egypt, posed the threat of civil war in the Sudan in the spring of 1954.

In the French Cameroon, Mr. Sears found his trip much more profitable than he had expected. Although he did not see as much of the native life as he desired—lack of time and not the fault of the French whom he found most cooperative—he left with a much clearer picture of the situation than he had on arrival. Throughout the trip he had stressed to the French his desire to see the native life, indicating that much was known of the European but little of the native. French officials had no pre-arranged program and followed Mr. Sears' wishes at each point of the trip in as much as time and circumstance permitted.

Mr. Sears was much impressed with the calibre of the French Colonial official in the Cameroon. He saw a much warmer relationship between the African and the white than he had anticipated. He found the French Colonial official unselfish, enthusiastic in his work, and with a real liking for the native. He thought, however, that he did not have a proper realization of the value of public relations at the Trusteeship Council in New York. (The French agreed that they were lacking in this respect but were working to correct it.) Mr. Sears was not sure if the French were on the right track in their method of bringing the Cameroon to self-government. He felt that timing was most important and that if the French were realistic and used good judgment, there seemed to be no reason why good relations with the African could not be maintained later as they exist now, and that the self-governing African would choose to remain associated with the mother-country.

Mr. Sears often mentioned the danger of Communist penetration through the fractionating of Africa. He found nothing new that he did not already know about Communism in the Cameroon but felt that the shadow of Communism should be watched very carefully during the coming years.

Although not always of the same mind as Mr. Sears, French officials were willing to discuss any question brought up. They stressed that they try to understand the African and his problems, to get close to him but not to the same extent as the Portuguese. They illustrated this with examples of how they were encouraging the native to make better use of his natural environment for housing, food, transportation, etc.

The French expressed little fear of Communism in the French Cameroon. However, they felt that the United Nations was aiding Communism by giving too much importance to minor issues by allowing any petitioner to appear before the Trusteeship Council. They cited as an example the recent elections for the Territorial Assembly which showed a gain for the Communist supporters and which they attributed to the influence Ruben Nyobé[3] has gained through his association with the Trusteeship Council.

They expressed no particular fear for the French Cameroon on the question of fractionating Africa. They maintain that the French Cameroon people desire political independence as a whole; that they would not be influenced politically by neighbors, although they might be affected economically, more by F.E.A. than by the British Cameroon or Nigeria.

Mr. Sears did not get a satisfactory answer to his oft-repeated questions on plans and time element French had for bringing natives to self-government. The French recognized the danger of going too fast or too slow but also stressed their belief that the length of time depended on too many factors of evolution, within and without the territory, for them to make any sort of long-range planning.

Sultans and native chiefs, throughout the trip expressed satisfaction with the French administration although on occasion dissatisfaction with the Trusteeship Council.

WILLIAM J. DREW

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[3] Um Nyobé, the leader of the RDA affiliate in the Cameroons, had not followed Houphouët-Boigny's lead in breaking with the Communists.

811.05151U/5-1454

Memorandum of Conversation, by Jerome R. Lavallee of the Office of African Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1954.

Subject: General Economic Discussion.

Participants: Mr. John E. Utter, AF, Chairman
M. Jean Jurgensen, Chief of the African Section, French Foreign Office
M. Francois de Quirielle, Assistant to M. Jurgensen
M. Gabriel van Laethem, First Secretary, French Embassy
Mr. Moran, Foreign Operations Administration
Mr. Blankenheimer, Department of Commerce
Mr. Gorlitz, ED
Mr. Thompson, ED
Mr. Longanecker, AF
Mr. Feld, AF
Mr. Lavallee, AF

Private American Investments

M. Jurgensen opened the discussion by stating that France is very desirous that foreign capital be invested in its Overseas Territories in

Africa South of the Sahara. At the same time, he was conscious of certain difficulties which stood in the way. According to M. Jurgensen prospective investors are basically interested in political and economic stability. He believed that the French Territories presented a greater degree of political stability than say, the neighboring British Territories. In spite of their progressive decentralization the French Territories form a permanent part of the French Republic. Therefore, they come under French Law. In addition there is no danger of nationalization taking place.

With reference to economic guarantees he listed some of the difficulties as follows:

1. The problem of double taxation must be overcome;
2. The possibility of repatriation of capital or earnings must be established—and this may necessitate the adoption of many lengthy measures;
3. Participation with French capital must be clarified. The French will permit American capital to come into the Territory as a majority holder, except in the few cases where the undertaking would constitute the backbone of the economy of the country and, would, therefore be politically important. In such instances the French Government would insist on at least a 50–50 basis. M. Jurgensen added however that there is no overall fixed policy concerning this matter.

M. Jurgensen went on to list two specific cases which, according to him, are very "interesting":

1. *The manganese deposits at Franceville,*[1] *French Equatorial Africa.*

A company (COMILOG) has been formed to explore further and, perhaps later, to exploit the deposit. United States Steel has a 49% interest in this company. The French are very much interested in the future action which U.S. Steel will take in this matter.

2. *Fort Gouraud*[2] *iron ore deposits.*

These deposits with a potential of 100 million tons of ore which is estimated to be 69% iron, the highest percentage in the world, should prove of interest to United States capital. Since the ore has to be evacuated via Spain's Rio de Oro, a Company has been formed to build a railroad to the Spanish border. This Company includes French, British and Canadian interests and has a capitalization of 15 billion francs. A second company must now be formed in order to build a railroad inside Spanish Territory and in order to enlarge the port of Villa Cisneros. M. Jurgensen pointed out that this was a large undertaking and that only a big American company could do the job. Consequently, the French were ready to do everything possible in order to attract American investors.

Mr. Thompson stated that the idea has grown over the years that France is not interested in receiving American capital. Up to now there is a strong impression that American investments are permitted and not invited. There now seems to be a new point of departure and this fact should be publicized. He went on to state that the question of majority control is very important to American investors. Another complaint has been the centralization of power in Paris. Up to now information on investments in Overseas Territories has to be obtained in Paris and this round-about way constitutes a source of discouragement and difficulties for the interested investor.

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[1] Gabon.
[2] Mauritania.

Mr. Blankenheimer stated that it will be necesary not only to make known this new French policy throughout the country but that it will have to be followed with deeds and acts. He added that the Department of Commerce is equipped to publish and disseminate information regarding business opportunities. Mr. Blankenheimer suggested that it would be helpful if the French issued a Basic Policy Statement and maintained up-to-date information on business opportunities. The point of contact with the Department of Commerce could be either through our Consuls abroad or the French Embassy here in Washington.

M. Jurgensen replied that he did not believe that it would be politic for the French, internally speaking, to give out a policy statement. He added that, of course, they could improve their regulations governing investments and these could be disseminated through publications or other media. He also added, with reference to criticisms regarding centralization of information in Paris, that direct contact with appropriate services in Paris was much better than contact with local people who might be cool to the idea of foreign investments coming into their area. He added that French officials, in Paris, particularly in the Foreign Office could be of much assistance to specific American investors.

Mr. Utter pointed out, however, that those who might be interested in making investments in Africa would be travelling through Africa and would wish to obtain the necessary information on the spot and not be referred to Paris.

Mr. Thompson then made the following points:

1. The problem of double taxation could be overcome;
2. The repatriation and transfer problem could also be solved;
3. The problem of majority control is a very important one and should be further clarified;
4. The impression that the Metropolitan Powers regard their Overseas Territories as private reserves must be corrected. Investments must be welcomed and not merely tolerated.

M. Jurgensen pointed out that the French authorities in the highest circles have always favored foreign investments. Therefore, it is necessary for them to be informed concerning a prospective foreign investor so that, if necessary, they be in a position to prod some of the local people who might be cool or chauvinistic.

Returning to the question of making available as efficiently and quickly as possible the information which the prospective investor might desire, Mr. Moran stated that the small investor, with $200,000 or less to invest, could not afford to run to Paris or to hire agents but had to get action on the spot within a few days. If he has to be "red-taped" through Paris, Mr. Moran concluded, then 90% of the small investors will be lost.

Mr. Gorlitz agreed that time was very important to the small businessman. He added that some countries had established offices in this country for the specific purpose of assisting the prospective investor by giving or obtaining for him the necessary information.

Mr. van Laethem pointed out that M. Massin, an Assistant Commercial Attaché of the French Embassy was stationed in New York and he dealt with economic information concerning the Overseas Territories.

Mr. Thompson made the statement that if the French desired to attract foreign investments it would be necessary for them to do a selling job. He cited as an example the Mission which Puerto Rico sent to Milwaukee and the success it had in obtaining investments.

Mr. Gorlitz agreed with these remarks and emphasized the fact that to be successful this "selling job" would have to reflect a sincere desire on the part of the French to attract investments.

M. Jurgensen concluded his remarks on this subject by stating that they would like to receive our reaction regarding Fort Gouraud and Franceville.

The Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara.

M. Jurgensen in his opening remarks stated that he was specifically addressing his remarks to FOA. He then proceeded to give a short history of CCTA[8] (CTCA); its first meeting held in London in September 1949; the composition of its membership, namely Belgium, France, Portugal, Southern Rhodesia, Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom; and its general functions, which are directed to the coordination of programs and information for the solution of specific common problems of a technical nature.

M. Jurgensen stated that he believed that the French could do one of two things:

1. They could strengthen their links and establish a permanent correspondence between CCTA and private American universities.

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[8] For information on the January 1951 meeting of the CCTA, see despatch 4456 from London, Mar. 20, 1951, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, p. 1216.

2. One of the functions of CCTA is to promote joint schemes to undertake certain common problems in a particular area. This had been discussed in Paris with Mr. Saxe,[4] FOA, who appeared interested in assisting a joint Franco-British-Liberia fight against trypanosomiasis. According to Mr. Saxe, this is one of the schemes to which FOA could lend assistance.

In conclusion, M. Jurgensen stated that the French desire was only for symbolic assistance to be given CCTA. It would then be possible to point to United States participation in these joint schemes.

Mr. Moran stated that, of course, FOA is interested in participating in those schemes which are efficient and in which it would be possible to save time and money by not duplicating action. He said that FOA is prepared to assist CCTA. However, he pointed out that it would be easier for FOA to participate in such schemes if Liberia could be included along with the French and British.

M. Jurgensen assured Mr. Moran that the door is open for Liberia to participate. As a matter of fact Liberia had been asked to join last year.[5] He also pointed out that it is not necessary for Liberia to become a permanent member of CCTA in order to participate in specific schemes on a regional basis.

Mr. Moran added that FOA has 4 technical experts who are now abroad and he believes it would be beneficial for them to sit as observers at some of the CCTA meetings. M. Jurgensen agreed and suggested that the FOA technicians communicate with the appropriate persons.

Mr. Moran pointed out that it would be helpful for the CCTA to receive information on the research which is being done in this country, and indicated that FOA might assist CCTA members who wished to establish contacts with American universities. Mr. Moran suggested that a contract might be drawn up with an American university which could send and receive information, act as a clearing house and arrange for experts to visit CCTA in the field. However, it would be necessary for the British or the French Government to make a firm request to FOA for this type of assistance. He indicated that he would discuss this problem with his people in Washington and would write to Mr. Horace Reed, who is the Chief of the FOA mission in Paris.

M. Jurgensen said that the French were interested in sending to the United States, as it had been suggested, four or five persons to study techniques of public relations in the economic field. Mr. Moran told him that France should make an official request for this.

[Here follows a discussion of surplus equipment.]

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[4] Jo W. Saxe.

[5] Liberia joined in 1958.

103 USIA/5–1454

Memorandum of Conversation, by Jerome R. Lavallee of the Office of African Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1954.

Subject: United States Information Agency.

Participants: Mr. John E. Utter—AF—Chairman
M. Jean Jurgensen, Chief of the African Section, French Foreign Office
M. Francois de Quirielle, Assistant to M. Jurgensen
M. Gabriel van Laethem, First Secretary, French Embassy
Messrs. Nicholas Feld and J. R. Lavallee—AF
Mr. William Lewis—USIA

M. Jurgensen began his remarks by stating that the French appreciated the fact that the various United States Information Service posts abroad were doing their very best in carrying out their tasks. Of course, the French had no intentions of registering any complaints; however, they wished to point out that certain statements made by Mr. Sears in the Trusteeship Council [1] and others could give rise to misunderstanding. M. Jurgensen wished to know whether it would be possible to establish closer liaison between our Information Offices located in the British and French areas in West Africa.

Mr. Utter pointed out that we had no Information Office in French West Africa. However, he was certain that our Consul, Mr. Ferguson, at Dakar would be very glad to forward to our Information Offices either at Lagos or Accra such information as might be transmitted to him by the local French authorities.

According to Mr. van Laethem this problem is essentially one of liaison between the home office and the field offices. He stated that usually the Commercial Press carried bad or negative news items. This should be counterbalanced by Governments which could carry news of a more positive nature. He cited as an example of the latter the 50 million dollar investments which have been made in the Office du Niger project.

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[1] For documentation on the statements by Sears, see vol. III, pp. 1355 ff.

122.51T/7–2754

The Consul at Dakar (Ferguson) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL DAKAR, July 27, 1954.

No. 17

Ref: CG's Despatch No. 8 dated July 15, 1954 [1]

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[1] Not printed; it reported the Consul's preliminary impressions resulting from his travel in French West Africa. (751T.00/7–1554)

Subject: Desirability of an American Consulate at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, French West Africa.

A recent trip by the undersigned to the Ivory Coast served to confirm a previously held opinion that it would be highly desirable to open a Consulate at Abidjan. I realize that the Department has given consideration to this proposal off and on for a number of years and I realize further that it is probably out of the question from a budgetary point of view at the present time. Nevertheless, it seems desirable to go on the record at this time while the impressions obtained during my visit there are still fresh in my mind and to express my sincere conviction that the interests of the United States Government in this part of the world would be better served if such an office were in existence.

The following appear to me to be the more impelling reasons for opening a Consulate at Abidjan:

1. *Economic* As the Department is aware, the Ivory Coast is, for the foreseeable future at least, by far the most important of the eight territories of French West Africa from an economic point of view. Furthermore, it is the only one with substantial trade connections with the United States, principally in the form of exports of cocoa and coffee but with a definite potential for more diverse economic reactions in the future. The Consulate General is able to follow the economic situation in the Ivory Coast by virtue of published material available in Dakar and, infrequently, by brief visits to the area in question. This is not a really satisfactory system and much of the material we process for reporting purposes is incomplete and almost all of it is out of date.

With the certain increase in the economic importance of the territory in the future, the Consulate General doubts that under its present system it can even hope to cover it adequately. The Consulate General will be prepared to support its opinion on the growing economic importance of the Ivory Coast with facts and figures should the Department so desire.

2. *Consular Affairs* While I have not given any extensive thought to the matter, a reasonable consular district for Abidjan would include the territories of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Dahomey in French West Africa and the Trust Territory of French Togoland. The Consulate General's records at the moment show 53 American citizens resident in the Ivory Coast, 68 in Upper Volta, 20 in Dahomey and 6 in Togoland, mostly missionaries. With the economic development of the Ivory Coast and, to a lesser extent, Dahomey, this figure may be expected to increase. Similarly the number of visa applicants will in all probability become greater for the same reason. With the opening of the excellent deep water port of Abidjan and the increase in trade with the United States, shipping and invoice services should also be kept in mind.

3. *Informational Activities* The Ivory Coast with its higher proportion of educated Africans offers a good field for USIA activity and during my visit there, I received several requests for films magazines etcetera. Misconceptions about the United States are prevalent and I believe useful work could be carried on. In a smaller scale the same is true of Dahomey although Upper Volta is probably too primitive for

effective work and the French authorities certainly would not permit it in Togoland.

4. *Political* The Ivory Coast is, of course, the most politically articulate and mature of the eight territories of the Federation and political activity is intense and of growing importance. (Senegal is, of course politically fairly mature but with a French rather than a truly African coloration.) The Territorial Assembly of the Ivory Coast, as previously reported, has already gone beyond the limited powers entrusted to it in the Constitution of 1946 and is acting as a *de facto* legislature with the full approval of the French authorities. It was in the Ivory Coast also that the only serious Communist inspired disturbances broke out and, although there seems little possibility of a recurrence of this type of activity, the fact remains that there exists in the Ivory Coast a potent native political force under the popular leader Felix Houphouët-Boigny which could turn against the French the moment the impression arose that the latter were working against, rather than for, the development of the area towards eventual autonomy. It is most difficult to follow this situation from Dakar and the Consulate General has to rely too often on official sources and material appearing in the press. An officer stationed permanently in Abidjan could undoubtedly establish contacts with important African political figures, impossible from the remoteness of Dakar, which could be of very great value to the Department.

Of equal importance is the question of French Togoland which is now in the Dakar consular district but which might as well be in the upper reaches of the Amazon as far as political reporting is concerned. We have no information here about Togoland and no possibility of obtaining any except by an actual visit to the area. I hope to be able to do this during the present fiscal year but infrequent short visits of this type where the officer concerned would be chaperoned at all times by the French authorities do not, in the final analysis, contribute very much to an understanding of the area. With the Togoland problem a constant thorn in the side of the United Nations and with considerable publicity being given to it,[3] it seems most unfortunate that the United States Government has no facilities for obtaining accurate and timely information. Our trouble in Dakar arises out of the fact that there is no official connection of any sort between French West Africa and the Trust Territory and officials here, even though perfectly willing to provide any information they may possess, know little more about French Togoland than I do and have no facilities for increasing their knowledge. While the Consulate General at Accra is, of course, geographically nearer Togoland than a Consulate at Abidjan would be, there seems little likelihood that the French will reconsider their refusal to grant an exequatur for Togoland to any American official not permanently stationed in French territory. Abidjan therefore which is reasonably near Lomé, the capital of French Togoland, would appear to be the answer and would permit frequent visits, some for protracted periods of time by qualified American officials.

Reverting to the budgetary situation, I do not think that the establishment of a Consulate at Abidjan need be particularly elaborate and, to meet the needs I have in mind, it could be staffed with one Consul (FSO 4 or 5), one vice Consul (FSO 6 or FSS 10), one American clerk and two or three local employees. Furthermore the expenses of running Dakar could be reduced somewhat with a Consulate at Abidjan particularly as our present authorized complement of two economic officers could be cut to one and much of the money we are now spending for publications etc could be transferred to the new office. Dakar's budget for local travel could also be substantially reduced.

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[3] For further documentation on this subject, see vol. III, pp. 1168 ff.

All in all, I am firmly convinced that when financially possible a Consulate at Abidjan would be of great benefit to the United States from the point of view of political, economic and other intelligence, for the promotion of American trade and for the general projection of the United States into an area of Africa which is increasing in importance with every month that passes.

C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr.

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Dakar, Correspondence With"

The Consul General at Dakar (Ferguson) to Jerome R. Lavallee of the Office of African Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL Dakar, October 18, 1954.

OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

Dear Jerry: I have received your letter of October 18 [*11*] concerning Mr. Lamm's reporting on events in French Togo from the vantage point of Accra.[1]

I am somewhat surprised at this since it was my understanding that this arrangement already existed and that staff shortages at Accra in recent months were all that had prevented the continuation of the work in this field that Cole was doing. I have pointed out repeatedly the difficulties involved in getting news of Togo here and I certainly have no objection to the Department's obtaining the information where it can.[2]

A word of caution is, I think, advisable. I have this morning reread all of Cole's reports on French Togo and, while they unquestionably contained a great deal of valuable information, I think you will agree that they represented, by and large, only the nationalist point of view. I hold no particular brief, as you are aware, for the administration of French Togo under its late unlamented Governor, M. Péchoux, but there are two sides to every fight and the information that has come out of Accra in the past has reflected only one side. Secondly, you do not mention whether it is intended that Mr. Lamm visit Lomé from time to time. You will recall the Cole–Moore correspondence of two years ago which certainly pointed out the extreme sensitivity of the French where consular visits to Togo are concerned.[3] I do not think, however, that this should stop us from similar visits in the future and if Mr. Lamm finds it advisable to visit Lomé, I see no reason why he should not do so although his trips had probably better be cleared with the Embassy in Paris in advance and the authorities in Lomé formally notified by me.

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[1] Not found in Department of State files.

[2] See despatch 17 from Dakar, *supra*.

We have not yet received our budget for FY 1955 and I have no way of knowing whether there will be sufficient funds to permit me to visit Lomé which I definitely hope to be able to do. In the final analysis, however, trips by Lamm and myself in addition to reporting from Accra and Dakar will all be inadequate to give a true, current, and analytical picture of what is going on in French Togo. It seems to me that there are other courses of action which have been tried in the past but which might be tried again.

I understand that the French have consistently refused to allow a consular officer accredited to non-French areas in Africa to be similarly accredited to Togo, but there is no harm that I can see in asking again, pointing out to the French that they have from time [to time] asked our support in the UN vis-à-vis the Togo question and that we would be in a much better position to make our decision if we had first hand information from the area from our own official sources. They can be shown the geographic absurdity of distant Dakar being responsible for an area where two full fledged American Consulates General are immediately across the borders. Tactically, it might be better to ask the French to permit Lagos rather than Accra to be responsible for French Togo.

The more logical solution would be to open a Consulate in either Lomé or Abidjan. This would admittedly cost money but if French Togo is of sufficient importance to the Department to require full political reporting, the Department simply will have to pay for it. Sooner or later the growing economic and political importance of all of the French territories along the Gulf of Guinea coast will require American representation of some sort even at the cost, if necessary, of cutting down other operations elsewhere.

I shall, needless to say, be delighted to discuss this with Mr. Lamm when he puts in here but I would like, if possible, to have your reactions to my rather rambling thoughts first. I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to Bob Moore in Paris and hope that he can, in his turn, "react".

Sincerely yours,

FERGY

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[3] In addition to Moore's letter to Cole of Aug. 20, 1952, p. 235, Cole's reply of Sept. 11 and Moore's response of Oct. 8 may be found in the Accra Consulate files, lot 59 F 7, "350–Political Affairs."

AF files, 58 D 459, "Dakar, Correspondence With"

Jerome R. Lavallee of the Office of African Affairs to the Consul General at Dakar (Ferguson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1954.
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

DEAR FERGY: Your letter of October 18, 1954,[1] concerning Don Lamm's reporting on events in French Togoland has just arrived.

I suppose I should have made clear that these arrangements are the very same which had been established during Cole's tour of duty at Accra.

Don is to collect certain information at Accra which might not be available at Dakar. There is no plan to have Lamm visit Lomé. He will submit only that information which may come to his attention at Accra.

You are quite right when you point out that Cole's reports represented, to a large degree, the nationalist point of view. Cole himself made this clear and the interested officers in the Department have always appreciated that fact. They have continually evaluated the material with that in mind.

As stated in your letter, some time ago the French refused to grant permission for the Consulate General at Accra to accept jurisdiction over French Togoland. There is no reason to believe that they would acquiesce today to such a request.

As you know, during the last few years, AF has requested the opening of a Consulate at Abidjan. Again this year this request is included in the Department's "over estimate" budget for 1956. Although the chances of getting Abidjan this year appear slight, it is our hope that opening a Consulate in that City will become a reality within the foreseeable future.

As for your budget for FY 1955, I have been given the following information. Allotments were prepared early during the first quarter of this fiscal year, but they were not sent out because of uncertainties regarding the amounts to be reimbursed for services rendered by the Department to other Agencies. You may expect your allotment within the next few weeks. It can not be determined at this time the amount which will be granted to you for purposes of travel; however, from my understanding of the situation, the funding situation still appears to be tight.

I trust this letter will help clarify my original letter to you. I have again discussed this problem with Don Lamm and I am certain that a discussion between you two, during his short stay in Dakar sometime in November, would be of mutual benefit.

Sincerely, J. R. LAVALLEE

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[1] *Supra.*

751T.00/11-1654

The Consul General at Dakar (Ferguson) to the Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DAKAR, November 16, 1954.

No. 95

Ref: CG's Despatches No. 90,[1] November 5, 1954, No. 87,[2] October 29, 1954 and previous.[3]

Subject: Government Attempts to Relieve the Uneasy Situation in French Guinea.

The Consulate General has reported briefly from time to time during the past few months the restive situation prevailing in French Guinea. Guinea, virtually alone of the eight territories of French West Africa has been a source of uneasiness to the French authorities and events in the past two weeks have shown that the latter have embarked on a policy of attacking this problem forcefully if a bit obliquely.

In its Despatch No. 90 of November 5, 1954, the Consulate General reported that trip to Conakry of the Minister of Overseas France, M. Buron, and the plain words he felt obliged to say to the Territorial Assembly concerning recent political disturbances in Guinea. M. Buron was accompanied on his trip by the High Commissioner of French West Africa, M. Cornut-Gentille who remained on in the Territory for about a week or ten days following the departure of the Minister. The latter, however, is returning to Conakry on November 27 ostensibly to participate in the centennial of an historic event of some sort but probably to continue the present program of high level concentration on Guinea.

While the outward signs of trouble in Guinea have been largely political arising out of the questionable election of Barry Diawadou to the National Assembly last June, the Government feels, or purports to feel, that the economic situation in the Territory is the basic cause of the unrest prevailing there and is attacking the problem almost entirely along economic lines, although at the same time lecturing the Guineans on political maturity and the responsibilities of representative government. Whether the basic causes of the trouble in Guinea are economic or not, the primitive condition of society in that Territory is such that economic improvement cannot help but assuage political unrest.

The principal economic difficulties in Guinea recently have been the almost complete disruption of road traffic by unusually heavy rains cutting off the producer in the Fouta Djallon area and in Upper

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Not printed; it discussed recent political stirrings in Guinea and Senegal. (751T.00/10-2954)

[3] Not printed; despatches 1 and 18 of July 1 and 28, 1954 and despatch 26 of Aug. 4, 1954 discussed the election of June 27. (751T.00/7-154, 751T.00/7-2854, and 751T.00/8-454)

Guinea from their coastal markets and, secondly, unemployment in the capital of Conakry. It is in these two fields that the Administration is making its major assault at the present time. As a first step in alleviating the transport situation, the Government has assigned a road specialist from Dakar to Conakry and has allotted the Territory a special sum of 28,250,000 CFA francs for immediate repairs and improvements. Furthermore a new railway station has been opened at Macenta whence producers who normally truck their products to market can take advantage of rail connections. Furthermore the 40% rail rebates put in effect last month for the interior territories of Sudan and Niger are being extended to Guinea.

To relieve unemployment in Conakry and other urban centers a public works program of unspecified magnitude has been decided upon which will include a new athletic stadium, a new wharf in the port of Conakry etcetera. It is hoped by these programs to give work to at least 2,000 persons in Conakry alone. One difficulty probably should be mentioned in this connection, namely, the almost total lack of skilled or semi-skilled labor in Guinea. As reported once previously by the Consulate General, even automobile drivers have to be brought down from Senegal and the native Guinean to-date has, with few exceptions, shown himself capable of only manual or menial labor.[4] Possibly as an antidote to this situation the Government is urgently studying the possibility of granting Guinea an extraordinary allotment for training equipment.

Not only did the High Commissioner remain in Guinea for some time after the departure of the Minister of Overseas France, but he summoned down from Dakar most of the Directors General and Directors of the principal economic agencies of the Government. It is very questionable whether these gentlemen were actually needed but it made a good show and it seems entirely reasonable to suppose that the Guineans were impressed by this mark of attention. Furthermore, the High Commissioner has announced that he will return for another stay towards the end of the month.

There is some feeling in informed quarters in Dakar, that the situation in Guinea has been exaggerated and that the Governor of the Territory, M. Parisot has been given to needless alarm over both the political and economic situations. While M. Parisot is, from all reports, a very competent administrator, it may be true that he is given to unnecessary moments of panic as seen by his blatantly obvious last minute efforts to defeat the fellow-traveling Sekou Touré in the elections referred to earlier. Recent riots coupled with the troublesome transportation and unemployment questions may have caused M. Parisot to view the situation more seriously than it actually merited. In any event, his concern was soon reflected in high circles bringing on the present intense effort on the part of the Ministry of Overseas France and the Government General in Dakar. It appears from Dakar, although this may well be an exaggeration, that M. Cornut-Gentille while in Conakry virtually took over the running of the territorial Government and it is clear that the conduct of affairs in Guinea will henceforth be given a much greater amount of personal supervision both by the High Commissioner and by the Ministry of Overseas France in the future.

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[4] Despatch 8 from Dakar, July 15, 1954, not printed; it reported on the Consul's travels in French West Africa. (751T.00/7–1554)

While the Consulate General agrees that the economic situation in Guinea is troublesome and that economic remedies in a primitive society can often quiet political complaints, we are inclined to the belief that the current uneasiness in Guinea has more of political nature to it than the Government is willing to admit. In the opinion of the Consulate General, the political unrest arises not so much out of the rigged elections as much as it does out of the lack of any indigenous political leader. Even the more politically mature territories of French West Africa such as Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey confine their political life largely to following one or two well-known political figures and the need for such a person appears even more acute in a more primitive area. Guinea had such a leader in Yacine Diallo but his premature death last spring left a void that has so far not been filled. Barry Diawadou, the deputy elected to replace Diallo is a nonentity and Sekou Touré, while popular with the city masses, has no following at all in the underdeveloped rural areas of the Fouta Djallon and Upper Guinea. Possibly now that Mr. Diawadou's mandate as a deputy has finally been validated by the National Assembly,[5] he can begin to make a name for himself in Paris and eventually achieve something approaching the following of Mr. Diallo back in Guinea. He has a long way to go, however, and at the moment Guineans really have no leader they can look to. Until they do, Guinea may well continue in a state of some uneasiness although the Government's economic measures may serve to bury this feeling for a while.

In conclusion, one must be impressed by the concentration the Government is applying to Guinea even though the permanent value of its present measures may not be all that the Government expects. There is a definite air of bread and circuses about the entire program—in addition to the economic measures mentioned above considerable attention is being paid, as indicated by the stadium project, to organized athletics which the Africans dearly love. No definitive estimate on the success of the program can be made at present and we shall have to wait and see.

C. VAUGHAN FERGUSON, JR.

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[5] The final vote was not until Jan. 21, 1955. Diawadou had joined the Social Republicans whose votes Mendès-France required to remain in power.

REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GOLD COAST AND NIGERIA OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES[1]

745K.00/2-452

The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ACCRA, February 4, 1952.

No. 183

Subject: Interview with Governor of the Gold Coast.

At the invitation of Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, Governor of the Gold Coast, I paid an initial call on him at 9:00 A.M., January 31. A summary of the ensuing discussion, into which he entered very readily, is set forth below:

Present Degree of Autonomy. Sir Charles pointed out that the existing constitution, which came into force on January 1, 1951, gives the Africans more autonomy than is generally realized. He explained that important decisions on government business are now reached through majority vote of the Executive Council, which is the principal instrument of policy. As the Council is composed of eight African Ministers, and only three ex-officio European Ministers, it is obvious that the Africans are in control. The Governor himself, who has no original vote, is obliged to act in accordance with the decisions of the Council. Sir Charles added that, through failure to grasp this point, many observers do not realize the extent to which the Africans had been governing themselves for the past year, and hence are less optimistic about the "experiment in the Gold Coast" than the facts warrant.

Progress During the Past Year. In Sir Charles' opinion, the African Ministers on the whole have begun to show an encouraging sense of responsibility. During the year in which the present constitution has been in force they learned a great deal about the exercise of governmental powers, and avoided several bad pitfalls which could have discredited the "experiment." The great need now was that the Ministers should inculcate a sense of responsibility into their "Back-benchers," who have not made comparable progress.

Sir Charles felt that the need for a more responsible attitude toward public affairs both among the members of the Legislative Assembly and other Africans interested in politics was of fundamental importance to the progress of the Gold Coast. It was unfortunate that for the most part these Africans were still an irresponsible group, doubtless through their lack of experience and feeling that they had been in the position of an exploited, inferior race, but were at last in a position to react.

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[1] For previous documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1199 ff. For additional documentation on this subject, see pp. 1 ff.

Development of Local Government. Sir Charles observed that British colonial policy in the past had failed to develop organs of local government which would give Africans experience in such matters and thus qualify them for more important posts. He regarded this as a serious deficiency, which, however, would be corrected in time through such measures as the local government ordinance and the elections to be held pursuant thereto in April, 1952.

Further Constitutional Changes. Such changes are now under consideration in London. Sir Charles was not free to reveal their details. He said, however, that they were not entirely as described in recent local press accounts to the effect that Kwame Nkrumah, Leader of Government Business and Chairman of the Convention People's Party, will be made Prime Minister and the Executive Council reconstituted without the ex-officio European Ministers. I gathered that something less drastic was contemplated: perhaps the naming of Nkrumah as Prime Minister and retention of the Executive Council with its present membership.

Use of the Reserved Power. In reply to my inquiry as to whether there was any likelihood that he would be obliged to use the powers reserved to the Governor under Article 58 of the constitution, Sir Charles observed that he did not anticipate having to do so. He would, however, take such action under extreme conditions, as for instance if the Assembly failed to pass the budget. He regarded the reserved power as an important instrument nonetheless, since its use would doubtless involve termination of the present Government and necessitate new elections. He felt that the Ministers were so anxious to avoid such an eventuality, which could well mean the loss of their jobs, that they would make every effort to reach a less radical solution of any point at issue. The reserved power thus constitutes a threat and a strong motive impelling the Ministers to keep their "back-benchers" disciplined.

Sir Charles assumed that use of the reserved power might bring about some public disorders. As the Africans are very unpredictable, he could not forecast the form or extent of such disorders.

The Need for Europeans in the Civil Service. The lack of trained administrative and technical personnel among the Africans will necessitate the employment of Europeans in the Civil Service for an indefinite period. The African leaders are thoroughly aware of this fact.

The other Africans are not. Hence the subject has become a serious subject of agitation and dissension. The presence of comparatively highly-paid Europeans with its old associations of inferiority, is a subject of resentment as a matter of principle. Nevertheless, personal relations between the two groups remain generally cordial. To summarize, the Europeans are needed, but not wanted.

The Character of Nkrumah. Sir Charles regarded Nkrumah as a man of great vitality and personal charm, who, with the burdens of government, has shown a growing sense of responsibility and understanding. It is to be hoped that he will overcome the limitations of his past activities as an agitator. In this connection, Sir Charles had "called Nkrumah on the carpet" for the inflammatory remarks which appeared in the latter's "Independence Day" speech (my despatch 174 of January 15, 1952)[3] when the Governor was in London. Sir Charles told Nkrumah: "I cannot help you if you continue to behave in that fashion." Nkrumah defended himself by saying he was moving away from such agitation, but had to do so "gradually."

Sir Charles considered that Nkrumah has not yet learned to manage his Party followers. He made such mistakes as giving important posts to trouble makers in the hopes of pacifying them, instead of rewarding his faithful adherents. He is learning, however, as he gains in experience. Sir Charles wishes to give him any guidance possible.

Conclusions: In the course of the foregoing interview Sir Charles was mildly optimistic toward the chances that the experiment of self-rule in the Gold Coast would continue successful. He thought the fact that the first year under the new constitution had passed off so well was a good omen.

In Sir Charles view, it is necessary to continue giving the Africans increasing responsibilities for the management of their own affairs. Regardless of other considerations, it would, in his opinion, be unrealistic to endeavor to resist the rising tide of national and racial sentiment.

Future political stability and progress appear to depend to an unhealthy degree upon the ability of the key figure, Nkrumah, to control the Assembly, as there is no effective opposition party which could assume direction of the government. The CPP dissidents may, with luck, again support Nkrumah through lack of any rational alternative policy.

WILLIAM E. COLE, JR.

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[3] Not printed; it summarized a discussion with Reginald H. Saloway, Deputy Governor of the Gold Coast, who indicated that Nkrumah's speech included statements such as: " 'We must not forget the blood . . . that flowed on February 28, 1948 as a moment of imperialist atrocities' " and " 'Our . . . determination to remove Colonel Octopus'." (123 Cole, William E.) The ellipses appear in despatch 174.

745H.00/3-1352

The Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Tibbetts) to the Department of State[1]

RESTRICTED LONDON, March 13, 1952.

No. 4146

Subject: Colonial Office Comments on Nigeria.

There are summarized below the comments of Mr. Robert Vile, Nigerian desk officer in the Colonial Office, on recent political developments in that colony.

Mr. Vile said that the new Nigerian Government[2] had been launched more easily than had been expected and that to date affairs have been progressing smoothly. The Governor's report during his recent visit to London had been very encouraging.

Current Colonial Office thinking was that it would be at least ten years, if then, before Nigerian politics began to develop along the same tendencies as those in the Gold Coast, with a strong Party system and a strong leader. The East and the West are mutually antagonistic and the North is different in sentiment and development from either. Under the circumstances, a political leader must first acquire real strength in his region before he can hope to make a showing in national politics, and, Mr. Vile believes, the next few years will see concentration on the development of regional political machines and policies. The North is in a position to check too rapid political advance; the danger will come when the other two regions consider the North too reactionary for further cooperation. Until that point is reached, Government at the center must be carried on through regional coalitions, and the Colonial Office expects this system to work.

. . . In fact, politicians in both the East and the West are making a strenuous effort to become "respectable" and show every sign of being delighted with their new salaries and responsibilities.

The problem of the North is to prevent its falling too far behind. Mr. Vile said that it would be shortsighted to look upon the North's conservatism as a safety valve to keep the other regions in check. In fact, unless the North steps up its pace politically and intellectually it may be the danger spot in the constitution, for the other regions might not tolerate being frustrated by the North. Political developments in the North are not encouraging at the moment but may improve during the next few years.

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[1] This despatch was approved by the First Secretary of the Embassy in London, Benjamin M. Hulley.

[2] The new government was established on the basis of the Macpherson constitution, named after Governor Sir John Macpherson, which went into effect in January 1952. The British hoped thereby to promote the emergence of a unitary state without giving advantage to the more radical politicians of the south. To that end, the conservative, mainly Moslem, north was given representation in the central legislature equivalent to that of the two more Christian southern regions. Moreover, the regional assemblies elected the central ministers and legislature. Thus, most ambitious politicians concentrated on the regions and not the center. The mainly Ibo and Eastern Region party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), led by Nnamdi Azikiwe (Zik), was the most nationally oriented in comparison with the Yoruba-dominated Action Group of Chief Obafemi Awolowo which prevailed in the Western Region, and the Fulani-controlled Northern People's Congress presided over by the Sardauna of Sokoto which prevailed in the Northern Region.

Mr. Vile said that the purpose of the Secretary's[3] proposed visit to Nigeria in the spring was simply for him to look around. At the moment two M.P.s and Lord Clydesmuir are paying a brief visit on a good-will mission, but Mr. Vile was not optimistic about the prospects of increased Parliamentary interest in Nigeria as a result.

MARGARET JOY TIBBETTS

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[3] Oliver Lyttelton.

945H.62/3-1752

The Consul General at Lagos (Childs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS, March 17, 1952.

No. 324

Reference: Condes 189 of Nov. 1, 1951[1]

Subject: Second Interview With Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe Concerning Anti-American Propaganda Appearing in His Press.

Upon consulting reference despatch, it will be recalled that the Consul General and other staff members had a long but friendly interview with Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe at which disappointment was expressed because of the appearance of anti-American propaganda in his "West African Pilot". At that time Zik said that he was out of town so much that he could not control the articles and editorials, either written or approved for publication by his editor, Mr. K. C. Okoro, but agreed to take the matter up with the latter looking toward the elimination of the propaganda in question. It should be remembered that both Zik and Okoro were educated in the United States.[2]

For a week or so no more of the undesirable articles appeared, but as soon as Zik got out of town, at which time he was campaigning vigorously in connection with the recent elections, anti-American articles and editorials began again to appear, and they have continued at intervals ever since. During that time, in the absence of Dr. Azikiwe, officers of the Consulate General frequently discussed the subject with the editor, Okoro, but no satisfaction was ever obtained from him.

Just recently there has been another flurry of front page articles and editorials which were decidedly unflattering to the United States. Two of these (please see enclosures Nos. 1 and 2) [3] had to do with the recent routine visit of an air mission from our Legation in Tangier. The mission was composed of the Air Attaché, Assistant Air Attaché, Military Attaché and Civilian Attaché from Tangier; an Assistant Naval Attaché from Morocco; an Assistant Air Attaché from Paris; and three enlisted men. Their purpose was to check on airport development in this and other areas of Africa and they make the same trip semi-annually. They always call on the Governor, the Commanding General, the Director of Civil Aviation, and the head of West African Airways.

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[1] Not printed; it offered an account of an interview with Azikiwe on Oct. 30, 1951 to protest the anti-American tenor of articles appearing in his newspaper. (945H.62/11-151)

[2] Azikiwe had attended Storer College, Howard University, Lincoln University, and the University of Pennsylvania.

With the appearance of the two articles in question, it was decided that the Consul General should have another conference with Dr. Azikiwe accompanied by the PAO [4] and this was done, on March 7, 1952, in his office. It should be emphasized that this was a completely friendly visit. Dr. Azikiwe guessed the reason for our presence, and stated that the two articles were as distasteful to him as they had been to us. He then displayed three letters he had written to his editor on the subject. In each of these it was pointed out that there was nothing to be gained from such distortions and that, certainly, U.S.-Nigerian relations stood to lose considerably. It is apparent that Dr. Azikiwe wishes, if possible, to maintain the traditional relationship between himself, as publisher, and Okoro, his editor, that is, allow the latter as much freedom as possible to express his own opinions. However, the last of the three letters written to Okoro sounded very much like an ultimatum to desist from publishing distorted anti-American editorials, or other writings. I am convinced that Dr. Azikiwe is serious and honest in this, and that if the articles continue to appear, he will take more decisive action.

The Consulate doubts that Azikiwe can hold Okoro in line, and would not be surprised if articles of the type discussed herein again appear the first time Zik leaves town for a week or more. . . .

It will be seen from the remaining three enclosures (Nos. 3, 4, and 5) [5] as well as the first two, that they follow the regular communist line. Zik personally is not believed to have any communist tendencies.

Dr. Azikiwe appears to be worried about (1) his editor's persistent efforts to portray the United States in a bad light; (2) his own reputation in the United States; and (3) the unfavorable effect of the articles on general U.S.-Nigerian relations. He knows that instances of anti-American propaganda, appearing in his newspapers, are regularly reported to Washington.

A. W. CHILDS

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[3] Neither printed.

[4] John A. Jones, Jr.

[5] None printed.

745K.13/3-2452 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Accra

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1952.

96. Convey fol msg to Nkrumah:

"I have followed with keen interest the able manner in which you have carried out your duties as Leader of the Govt Business since the Govt of the UK initiated its constitutional development program in the Gold Coast more than a year ago.

"It is with great pleasure, therefore, that I learn of your election as the first Prime Minister of the Govt of the Gold Coast.

"I wish you all success and I am confident that the friendly relations which have long happily existed bet the peoples of our two countries will be continued."

Wire date delivery for IBS and IPS.

ACHESON

745K.13/3-2752 : Telegram

The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State

ACCRA, March 27, 1952.

135. Re mytel 132,[1] twenty-fifth. Nkrumah requests following message from him be conveyed to the Secretary.

"I must tell you Mr. Secretary of State, how very much my colleagues and I have appreciated the cordiality of your message conveyed to me yesterday by the American Consul.

"It is with a sober consciousness of increased responsibility towards the Gold Coast and the world outside that I have taken up my duties in this new office.

"I can assure you that I shall always endeavour to foster the friendly relations which exist between our peoples".

COLE

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[1] Not printed; it indicated that the message contained in telegram 96, *supra*, was delivered on Mar. 25. (745K.13/3-2552)

745K.00/4-152

The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ACCRA, April 1, 1952.

No. 217

Ref: Consulate's telegram No. 136, March 28.[1]

Subject: Interview with Governor of the Gold Coast.

Supplementing my telegram No. 136 of March 28, there is set forth below a summary of an interview which I had with Sir Charles Arden-

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[1] Not printed; it briefly summarized Cole's discussion with the Governor on Mar. 26. (745K.00/3-2852)

Clarke on March 26 about current political developments in the Gold Coast. On March 28 Sir Charles departed for England on leave. He expects to return to Accra on May 29.

The Recent Constitutional Amendments: Sir Charles observed that the Order in Council effective March 21, 1952, which amended the Gold Coast Constitution represented a change "more of form than of substance." However, it was also a further move in the direction of dominion status in accordance with the settled policy of the United Kingdom Government that the Gold Coast should become "a Dominion within the Commonwealth." Sir Charles emphasized this point by saying of the Order in Council, "There is nothing phoney about it!" He could not, he added, hazard a guess as to when dominion status might finally be achieved.

The only basic change brought about by the Order in Council was the provision that the Assembly should elect the Prime Minister. The former Leader of Government Business was, of course, elected by the Executive Council. The Governor thought that the next constitutional change would allow the Prime Minister to choose his Cabinet without the need for the election of its members by the Assembly as at present. The Assembly would not at this time have foregone their right to elect the Ministers.

In Sir Charles' opinion the granting of the title of Prime Minister to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was a logical move. Since he had in effect been fulfilling the duties of such a post during the life of the present constitution, there was no substantial reason for denying him the title. In addition, Nkrumah had been agreeable to work with the constitution and endeavor to make it a success, although large numbers of the Convention Peoples Party membership had insisted that it was unsatisfactory, "bogus", etc. The title was thus in a sense a well-earned reward for Nkrumah's faithful services. Moreover, since Nkrumah was obliged to make promises from time to time to his followers relative to the continued advance toward self-government, the constitutional change would lend color to his assertions along those lines, thereby strengthening his position with his Party.

The Opposition: In the Governor's view an opposition party could only gain a following by insisting on more self-government that [*than*] the CPP could obtain. The Governor did not consider the opposition group of Dr. J. B. Danquah as having any substance. The United Gold Coast Convention possesses no following at present, and he doubted that Danquah would ever gain the support of an appreciable number of adherents. He does not have a high opinion of Danquah, whom he regards as extremely self-seeking and unscrupulous.

The Governor told me that "I might assure Washington there was no reason to fear the establishment of a dictatorship in the Gold Coast," regardless of the absence of an opposition party. "The Africans," he said, "will not be dictated to—they are far too undisciplined to accept such an arrangement." In Sir Charles' opinion no individual of sufficient force of personality to become a dictator has thus far appeared on the local scene.

Character of Nkrumah: The Governor regarded Nkrumah as progressing from the status of agitator to that of statesman, "as they all do." He cited Nehru as an instance of a similar progression. Nkrumah, he thought, is sincerely trying to measure up to the responsibilities which are devolving upon him.

Sir Charles considered that the Ministers and members of the Assembly, most of whom were quite inexperienced respecting governmental matters, had learned a great deal in the past year, and had even shown noticeable improvement since January of this year when the situation within the CPP had seemed especially confused. Their advances in parliamentary decorum and ability were substantial. He pointed out, however, that the local political scene had in the past shown wide fluctuations between periods of order and of near chaos. That pattern might be expected to repeat itself despite the tidy appearance of things at the moment.

The Local Civil Service: Sir Charles said that the establishment of a local civil service, which has been decided upon, is of course a step toward dominion status. Obviously, one couldn't have a self-governing state with a public service controlled from outside. The local civil service would at first be under the Governor, working through a commission. The Governor's authority would disappear in time as full powers were turned over to the locals. Africanization could only take place slowly—a circumstance which Nkrumah and his Ministers recognized fully. They would soon so state publicly, although the fact was an unpalatable one for many of their supporters. They would announce that the "expatriate" is necessary to the continuance of governmental functions and that there is no intention of belittling the essential role he plays.

William E. Cole, Jr.

611.45H/5-2152

The Vice Consul at Lagos (Ross) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS, May 21, 1952.

No. 405

Subject: Conversations with Chief Secretary to the Government by Officer in Charge.

The reporting officer has had occasion to talk at some length with Mr. A. E. T. Benson, Chief Secretary to the Government on three recent occasions and it is felt that some of the ideas expressed by him during these conversations may be of interest to the Department.

Mr. Benson is scheduled to go to the UK on home leave at the end of May and will be gone until sometime in August, his place is being taken by Mr. L. H. Goble. Goble has been serving as Administrative Secretary in Lagos, where he had been posted after a stint as Administrative Secretary Northern Region. Benson's leave will not be as long as he could have expected, inasmuch as the Governor is to go on leave in August and the Chief Secretary must return before that time.

The officer in charge mentioned to Benson that he had been more than a little disturbed by two things which have characterized the day to day, lower level relationships between the Consulate General's staff and the local Government: the evident reluctance of many of the lower-ranking civil servants (British) to furnish this office with information which had been previously available without restriction; and the reluctance of a small group of officials to cooperate in the program of sending Nigerian students to the US. This latter is not quite as evident as the former but evidences itself in the form of stalling on action. The Chief Secretary was visibly shocked and immediately asked for the names of the uncooperative officials so that they might be "jacked up". The reporting officer told him that it was not felt necessary to take this step yet, and that our knowledge that such an attitude was completely contrary to the policies of the Governor, the Chief Secretary and the Colonial Office should prove a sufficient weapon to obtain better cooperation. Mr. Benson stated that he could not and would not tolerate lack of cooperation with us on these matters by subordinates; that he would take any steps we might feel necessary to demonstrate his sincerity and/or terminate any stalling. This very heated and sincere statement of position by the Chief Secretary only confirmed the previous feeling of the officer in charge that the uncooperative stand of the lower ranks of the civil servants here was taken without the knowledge of the chiefs and in complete contradiction to Government's real policy.

This particular issue prompted the Chief Secretary to reiterate his statement that he would be satisfied with nothing less than the very closest relations between the Consulate General and the Nigerian Government. He stated, with seeming sincerity, that he believed that it was to the benefit of Nigeria to be completely pro-United States even if they developed a strong feeling against the UK in the future. It is his feeling that, in many cases, British institutions are not necessarily the ones which will contribute the things Nigeria needs in the way of training and outlook and that steps should be taken to facilitate orientation of the people here toward the US. As long as he was in a policy-making position, he said, such steps would be encouraged. Benson also said that if the Nigerians developed a serious anti-US attitude he would consider British administration here a complete failure and would "wash his hands" of the Nigerians and the Colonial Service. Even if some of this is an exaggeration on his part, it is felt that Benson's words do indicate the basic attitude of himself and of the Governor.

The Chief Secretary informed the reporting officer that both he and the Governor were very concerned over the ever-present problem of Nigerian tribalism and its possible disastrous influence upon the operation of the present constitution. The British have been accused, he said, of recently stepping up the "divide and rule" policy in Nigeria under the present constitution. This is exactly contrary to the true situation; he stated that the British would have preferred the preservation of something nearer to the former highly-centralized system of government in force prior to the new constitution but that the most powerful Nigerian groups would not allow any but a "federal" system of government for an independent Nigeria. It is an unfortunate fact that the present constitution encourages the very fractures which were being sublimated previously—there are schisms based upon tribalism, the development of regional "nationalism" not based on tribal lines and upon the economic and social differences among the various regions. Under the present government the great antipathy between the Western Region's largest tribal group, the Yorubas, and the East's Ibos is heightened by the fact that the Action Group political party has a clear majority in the West's government, while their bitter enemies, the NCNC, control the government of the Eastern Region. This situation, of course, only buttresses the much older tribal squabble. The Chief Secretary said that he did feel that if there is one stone on the Nigerian scene which might trip the present constitutional development, it is tribalism—an attitude shared by the reporting officer. The most critical period, he said, was the present one; the period during which demagogic politicians would play upon disunity before time had allowed the development of skilled, responsible politicians to lead the Nigerians to genuine nationality. On this ground he justified and insisted upon "tutelage" by the British for several years to come.

Mr. Benson mentioned that one of the problems he and his colleagues have at the moment is the astounding lack of knowledge of the non-Nigerian world on the part of the Nigerians in the government—from the central Ministers on down. As this lack of knowledge often results in obstruction of constructive policies it is something which must be attacked, and he hopes that the US will assist. Because of the limited budget of local British informational services and because these facilities are sometimes suspect in the minds of the locals, Benson feels that USIS can be of great help in equipping the Nigerians to rule themselves while serving the more selfish objective of telling Nigerians about the United States and the free world.

While discussing British information services, the Chief Secretary stated that he believed that one of the main reasons why people in the United States, and in the UK too, attacked the British system of colonial government today was that they did not understand it. He said that he believed that non-Britishers would not find the colonial policies of the UK nearly so unpalatable if they had full knowledge of these policies. British propaganda had not done its job properly, Mr. Benson said, or the criticism would be much more realistic and much less bitter. The reporting officer is inclined to agree, although part of the trouble also lies in divergence between avowed British policy and the day to day method of administration carried out by less fair-minded civil servants.

The officer in charge feels that these forthright statements by the Chief Secretary, second-ranking local official, indicate a very helpful attitude toward this Consulate General and our government which augurs well for increased effectiveness of US–UK efforts on the Nigerian scene. Every effort will be made by the officer in charge to make this relationship even closer, while not overlooking the importance of preserving our own identity in the eyes of the Nigerian people.

ROBERT W. ROSS

611.45H/6–1852

The Vice Consul at Lagos (Ross) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS, June 18, 1952.

No. 433

Subject: Notes on Some Factors Affecting Relations With the Nigerian Government and People.

The Officer in Charge believes that it may be of interest to the Department to present a few notes concerning some factors on the political and social scene which affect the operation of both the General Program, and even more noticeably, the USIS program at this post.

As far as the USIS program is concerned probably the most important single consideration is the reaction among Nigerians to our position in support of British colonial policy and foreign policy. It is, of course, fully accepted by all members of the staff here that we should and will maintain a firm position alongside the UK in most international questions today. There is no quarrel with this and all operations are based on this premise. It should be noted however, that, this policy of the United States Government carries with it certain strong drawbacks insofar as it concerns our efforts to win friends and influence people in Nigeria. Naturally the British community takes no exception to our wholehearted support to [*of*] the UK policies, but the Nigerians feel quite differently—the degree depending on who the Nigerian is.

It cannot be denied that Nigerians' acceptance of us as a genuine friend is subject to reservations based upon our open and close friendship with the UK. It is very difficult for us, at this post, to present ourselves at the same time as both a friend of the British and a friend of the Nigerians. The reason for this should be obvious to even the most casual observer; the Nigerians do not think too highly of the British Government and they do, therefore, hold back full acceptance of us because we support this often unpopular foreign government. What this amounts to, in actual facts, is that we representatives of the United States Government here must walk a rail which is sometimes very narrow in order that we do not paint ourselves as supporters of all the things the British do. To fall off the rail into this pit would mean that we would lose thousands of friends in Nigeria. This problem is a very real one to USIS and one with which they must grapple daily in their press output, radio show and movie program. We are in a position where we must depend upon the wholehearted cooperation of the Public Relations Office of the Nigerian Government and do not wish to offend them; but at the same time we must assure that the material which we make available to the public does not make us the same kind of "nasty imperialist" as many Nigerians feel the British are. We have to be very careful in our private conversations and information media to steer clear of the blunter, more obvious positive evidences of wholehearted support of British colonial policy. It is true that neither the American Government nor the American people endorse all of Great Britain's overseas policies, and if we were able to remind the local population of this fact, our position in their eyes would be bettered immeasurably, but this cannot be done because of the danger of offending the British officials in the Nigerian Government who have the means at their disposal to present very serious obstacles to the operation of the Consulate General.

Another factor in the picture, which presents all sections of the Consulate General with problems, is the attitude of the lower-level civil servants toward the virtues, or lack of them, of the so-called American way of life. This becomes particularly evident when questions arise concerning visits of Nigerian students or young Nigerian leaders to the United States. It is the avowed policy of the top-level British administrators here that as many Nigerians as possible be given an opportunity to go to the U.S. and observe its society. The trouble arises from the fact that this policy is not sincerely supported by the people further down the administrative ladder and, further, their attitude often becomes downright opposition rather than mere obstruction. We are all accustomed to, though perturbed by, the daily fact of having local British civil servants "drag their feet" on matters such as this one. The Officer in Charge has taken up this matter with the

Chief Secretary to the Nigerian Government[1] and hopes that improvement will be forthcoming, when that official returns from leave in the UK sometime in August. Some improvement has already been noted but the character of the Acting Chief Secretary is not such that the Officer in Charge feels he can press this matter further until the Chief Secretary himself returns to duty.

Prior to his departure the Chief Secretary had asked the Officer in Charge for the names of the individuals who had manifested the above-discussed attitude, but he was informed that it was not felt necessary to put the guilty individuals in line for a personal reprimand yet. The Officer in Charge feels that a general sort of statement from the Chief Secretary to the departments involved will probably suffice, however if deemed necessary, names will be named to the Chief Secretary.

Anglo-American cooperation means something quite different here in Lagos than it does in Washington, D.C. The local British officials still look upon we Americans as children in the matter of colonial affairs and definitely feel that the U.S. is not the senior partner in the Anglo-American partnership. This is not true, again, of the top administrators who admit very frankly that America is the big brother of the family and that the British must conduct their affairs in such a way as to continue to receive complete and whole-hearted support from the American Government. In fact, the Chief Secretary once said that he wanted us to be accepted by both the British and the Nigerians as the most important friend of Nigeria today. He said that he sincerely felt that Nigeria would survive if Great Britain fell, but that it certainly could not survive if the U.S.A. was to collapse as a world power. The failure of the lower-level officials to accept this idea manifests itself primarily in a failure to cooperate except in a bare minimal way with all of the officers at this Consulate General. We all have been confronted with the situation where we have offered to officials here full access to many broad types of official information only to find when we request certain small bits of information from them that it is not forthcoming.

. . . .

It is not expected that the Department will be able to remedy any of these problems and some of them are not capable of resolution by us, but it is felt that a recap of these factors would serve the Department. We are making constant efforts to overcome some of these problems and are gratified to note that our position has been improved in the past six weeks.

Robert W. Ross

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[1] See despatch 405, *supra*.

745K.00/8–2552

The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ACCRA, August 25, 1952.

No. 24

Subject: Interview with Prime Minister of Gold Coast, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.

The following paragraphs summarize an interview which I had with the Prime Minister, at my request, on August 20:

I *Possible Constitutional Changes.*

I asked Nkrumah whether anything is being done to formulate proposals for further constitutional changes which Mr. Oliver Lyttelton indicated would be considered by the British Government (my despatch No. 233 May 14).[1] Nkrumah said that he expects to raise the question in the Assembly when it convenes in September. He will then obtain a wide number of views and recommendations. These will be consolidated into a paper for transmission to the British. Nkrumah emphasized that he and his party are definitely aiming at dominion status within the Commonwealth, and that "It will come!" He would like to see the following constitutional changes made in the near future:

1. All members of the Assembly to be elected by direct popular vote. This of course would require amendment of the constitution to do away with the Rural Members (returned by district electoral colleges); with the Territorial Members (elected by traditional bodies); and with the Northern Territories Members (elected by a Northern Territories Council).
2. Elimination of the three *ex officio* European ministers in the Executive Council. These would be replaced by representative African ministers. As a possible exception, the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs might continue on as at present under an *ex officio* minister.
3. Possible creation of an Upper House to be composed of the leading Chiefs as an entity roughly similar to the British House of Lords.

II *The Opposition.*

I asked Nkrumah if he could comment on Mr. Lyttelton's observation concerning the necessity for "a vigorous and constructive opposition." He replied that an opposition does not exist at the present time. He did not favor the idea of such an opposition under the existing circumstances. He felt that until self-government is achieved, "We must all be united." Otherwise, he explained, the British might not be sure whom they should support as the prospective heir to autonomy. He indicated that the presence of two powerful political groups could open the way for tactics based on the traditional British policy of "divide and rule". In a word, the existence of a powerful opposition party would undoubtedly retard progress toward the goal of self-government. At this point Nkrumah cited the conflict between India and Pakistan, saying that he wished to avoid any such division of the Gold Coast into opposing factions.

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[1] Not printed; it indicated that one reason for Lyttelton's projected visit to the Gold Coast between May 31 and June 6, 1952 might be to reassure African leaders that British colonial policy had not changed with the return to power of the Conservative Party. (033.4145G/5–1452)

III *The East–West Conflict.*

Nkrumah thought the Gold Coast much too small a country to take sides in the differences between the Western democracies and the Soviet bloc. To endeavor to do so "would not be realistic". He recognized however, that the Gold Coast should have much to gain through technical assistance from the United States or through the employment of individual American technicians. He also regarded the American democracy and economic system as examples for his country to emulate.

IV *The Development Plan.*

Nkrumah said that he regards implementation of the Development Plan as a matter of the highest importance. He stated that before enactment of the new constitution, the British officials displayed a leisurely, bureaucratic attitude toward development of the country. When the African ministers took office, however, they immediately began to push a development program as essential to the progress of the country. They got some hundred bills dealing with the matter passed through the Assembly within the first few months.

In Nkrumah's opinion, some of the Americans who would like to come here to see what may be done have been discouraged by the length of time required to obtain an entry permit for the Gold Coast. According to him, such applications are sent to London by the British Embassy in Washington and thence to the Gold Coast authorities for approval. He has recently written to the Colonial Attaché in Washington to ask if the process could be expedited. He thought the applicant in the United States should be allowed to mail his application directly to the Gold Coast authorities.

Nkrumah also observed that he was not satisfied with the procedure whereby the Crown Agents of the Colonies in London will put out tenders for work to be done on development projects in the Gold Coast. He thought it would be better if interested concerns would send their representatives here to look over proposed projects on the spot and simultaneously to discuss terms with Gold Coast officials. He is hopeful that American firms will interest themselves and send some of their officials here to see things for themselves.

Nkrumah asked whether I knew of any American firms which want to undertake any kind of projects in the Gold Coast. I told him that I did not know of any specific instances at present but that, when firm specifications are ready respecting some of the large construction projects contemplated in the Development Plan, American firms would doubtless wish to consider them. He asked me to inform him personally whenever I should learn of any such American interest. In reply, I told Nkrumah that while I should be happy to keep him informed I could not deal with him directly to the exclusion of, for instance, the Minister of Defence and External Affairs. He indicated that he understood my position.

V *Significance of the Experiment in the Gold Coast.*

Nkrumah observed that the "experiment in the Gold Coast" is of fundamental importance to the rest of Africa, since, in his opinion, its outcome will determine to a considerable extent the progress which may be made in other colonial areas. In addition, it will influence the attitude of the United States toward the political aspirations of other dependent areas. He expressed his determination, therefore, that "We must succeed!"

During the above interview, Nkrumah appeared very interested in the topics discussed. He spoke with animation and seemed confident of achieving the aims he has in mind. I gathered that he is hopeful of obtaining American participation in the development of the Gold Coast and is somewhat impatient at what he considers British restraint upon his freedom of action in seeking assistance from sources outside the United Kingdom.

WILLIAM E. COLE, JR.

845K.2614/10–252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Accra

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 7, 1952—6:18 p. m.

35. US Govt not considering extension any loan or grant either directly or thru intermediaries for use implementing Volta project since no request for such loan or grant recd. (urtel 52 Oct 2)[1]

Two avenues approach open Gold Coast Govt if interested. Eximbank wld consider request for loan within limits statutory auth and financial resources on presentation specific proposals. MSA might be able fin certain features project under Basic Materials Program and wld consider request submitted thru Brit Colonial Office where some discussions of Volta project have been carried on.

US Govt interested procurement aluminum under stockpile program for next two or three years by which time anticipated present program plant construction will meet US requirements under conditions of partial mobilization. Doubtful therefore US Govt wld be interested establishing claim eventual Gold Coast production view time element completion Volta project. Possible private Amer interests wld consider specific proposals presented by Gold Coast Govt.

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[1] Not printed; it indicated that Nkrumah wished to know whether or not the United States contemplated extending a loan or grant directly or through an intermediary to the Gold Coast to finance the Volta project. An American promoter, Louis E. Detwiler, in concert with Dr. Horace Mann Bond, the president of Lincoln University, had been trying to interest him in a business arrangement relating to this project by hinting at U.S. financial backing. (845K.2614/10–252)

ACHESON

811.05145K/10–2352

The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast (Nkrumah) [1]

SECRET ACCRA, October 9, 1952.

DEAR DR. NKRUMAH: With reference to our conversation the other day [2] I am now able to inform you that, as an existing program of plant construction will provide sufficient capacity to meet American needs under foreseeable circumstances within a fairly brief space of time, it is considered unlikely that the United States Government would be interested in establishing any claim on the aluminum eventually to be produced in the Gold Coast.

Moreover, the United States Government does not have under consideration the extension of any grant or loan for use in implementing the Volta River project. As a prerequisite to consideration of the matter it would in any event be necessary for the appropriate agency of the British Government to request such financial assistance on behalf of the Gold Coast, putting forward, of course, detailed proposals relative to the developmental work contemplated. In conclusion, the Department of State has pointed out that no such request has been received.

Yours sincerely, WILLIAM E. COLE, JR.

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[1] This letter was an enclosure to despatch 54 of Oct. 28, 1952 from Accra. It discussed in some detail the concession-hunting tactics of Louis E. Detwiler. (811.05145K/10–2352)

[2] Oct. 1.

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Memoranda 1953"

Memorandum Prepared by Douglas B. Smith of the Investment and Economic Development Staff

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1953.

[Subject:] United States Interest in the Volta River Project

United States Interest

The United States interest in the Volta River Development Scheme is based on its importance to the Gold Coast economy and the supplies of aluminum it will provide for the defense effort of the free world. Our interest in the aluminum production is not a direct one since in the foreseeable future the United States will obtain its bauxite and prime aluminum needs from domestic sources and other Western Hemisphere producers. However, we are fully aware of the growing world demand for this metal and the contribution that Gold Coast aluminum can make in assuring adequate supplies. The U.S. Government has been greatly encouraged by the progress that has been made by the Governments of the Gold Coast and the United Kingdom in working out mutually satisfactory arrangements for the development of the Volta River.

This multi-purpose project could be of immeasurable value to the Gold Coast economy. The contributions it can make in the way of irrigation, transportation, navigation and cheap power will provide a substantial base for the growth of agriculture and industry. With this as a start the Gold Coast will be able to develop a diversified economy which will be able to withstand the vicissitudes of world market prices in basic commodities.[1] Furthermore this development will mean rising incomes and increased employment assuring greater political stability.

As the project develops it may be possible to interest U.S. investors in complementary industries and perhaps the U.S. Government can assist in the financing of certain projects. But as to the initial project, it is the Department's view that the major benefits will accrue to the peoples of the Gold Coast and the U.K. If their governments can between them and with the cooperation of the Aluminum Company of Canada find the necessary funds to finance the project, and this appears to be the case, it would be inappropriate and less satisfactory to all concerned to seek financing from some alternative source.

Possible U.S. Financing

Despite satisfaction with present arrangements concerning the financing of the Volta River Project, the Department has carried on discussions with other U.S. Government Agencies which are responsible for foreign aid and lending programs in order to explore the possibility of U.S. Government financing. The reactions of these agencies were as follows:

Export-Import Bank: The Eximbank was set up to finance projects which would encourage the exports and import of commodities into the United States. In performing its lending operations it has adhered to the policy of stepping in to finance projects only where alternative means of financing were not available from private sources and/or from foreign governments. The Bank Staff's conclusion from the British White paper [2] is that these other alternative sources are available. Furthermore, the staff does not see where the Volta River project would directly encourage an increase in U.S. exports or imports. The magnitude of the project is such that, assuming that in other respects it would meet the Bank's criteria, substantial participation by private interests or the governments concerned would be required. In summary it is the view of the Bank Staff that the Volta River project would not be considered favorably for Eximbank financing.

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[1] That was one of the problems with cocoa.

[2] Cmd. 8702, *Volta River Aluminum Scheme.*

Mutual Security Agency: It is the policy of MSA to employ its funds to supplement and encourage the use of those available from other sources and not to replace them. MSA would be unwilling to participate in the financing of a project in such a way as to eliminate or reduce private financing. MSA is interested in the Volta Project and it appears that the project would meet the basic material criteria. If development funds for the overseas territories are available in fiscal '54 MSA is prepared to consider a request from the U.K. for financial assistance in carrying out the Volta River Project. This assistance would be a marginal supplement to funds from other sources.

Defense Materials Procurement Agency: This agency was established to aid in the financing of projects which would produce increased supplies of materials for U.S. industries and stock piling. To aid in a project which would increase supplies solely for other than U.S. needs would be out of DMPA's frame of reference. In addition DMPA has no interest itself in the financing of aluminum products. The responsibility for the procurement of aluminum during the defense build-up has remained with the Office of Defense Mobilization.

Office of Defense Mobilization: In offering government assistance under the terms of its authorizing legislation, ODM is restricted to consideration of only those programs which promise a relatively near-term increase in production or availability of strategic materials. Thus far it has limited its activities in expanding the production of primary aluminum to a guarantee of a market for five years at prevailing market prices, the guarantee of private loans for increased production facilities (one case), and advances on future deliveries of aluminum to be completed within five years. It has not undertaken any loans of the type which would be required for the Volta River scheme. The estimate of the ODM Office of Aluminum is that even under the most favorable circumstances, no aluminum will be produced in the Gold Coast for at least 5 to 10 years.

Long Term U.S. Aluminum Needs

In the Paley Report[8] no fundamental difficulty is seen in meeting the world's demand for aluminum over the foreseeable future, however rapidly that demand may grow. This statement is made recognizing that it is possible that in the next twenty-five years there might be a five-fold increase in consumption demands. To quote from the report.

"If the cost of producing aluminum abroad remains substantially below that in the United States, and if the benefits of such lower costs are made available to American consumers, it will become increasingly economical to turn to aluminum-producing facilities in areas outside the United States, initially in Canada and possibly Alaska, and eventually in those areas where low-cost power is to be found close to the bauxite deposits, as along the northern coast of South America and the western coast of Africa.

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[8] *Resources for Freedom; a report to the President by the President's Materials Policy Commission*, vol. II, *The Outlook for Key Commodities* (Washington, 1952), pp. 65–78.

But if the United States should become increasingly dependent on primary producing capacity outside its borders, serious problems of wartime security will arise. Even at present, in view of normal peacetime dependence on foreign bauxite, measures are required to protect aluminum supplies in case of war."

745H.5 MSP/3–1353

The Consul General at Lagos (Keeler) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS, March 13, 1953.

No. 220

Ref: ConGen's. Despatches No. 623, April 13, 1951;[1] No. 50, Sept. 2, 1952;[2] No. 146, Dec. 18, 1952.[3]

Subject: Visit of MSA Representatives to Lagos; Status of Present MSA Projects in Nigeria; Minutes of Conversations with Nigerian Government Representatives.

Mr. E. A. Bayne, Special Assistant for Overseas Territories, Mutual Security Agency's European Office, Paris, and Mr. W. C. Dechert, Overseas Territories Officer, Mutual Security Agency, London, visited Lagos February 16 to February 19 and conferred with Nigerian Government officials concerning the status of existing MSA (ECA) projects in Nigeria, as well as possible new projects which the Nigerian Government has had under consideration.

There is transmitted herewith a copy of a briefing Memorandum prepared at the request of the Consulate General by Mr. E. E. Sabben-Clare, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry immediately prior to the visit of Messrs. Bayne and Dechert.[2] This Memorandum outlines the history of the two major existing projects (the Kano-Maiduguri-Fort Lamy Road and the Enugu Colliery) and current suggestions regarding these projects. There are further transmitted herewith copies of minutes of the conversations held between the MSA representatives and representatives of the Nigerian Government on February 17 and 18, at which the existing projects and others which the Nigerian Government has in mind were discussed.[2]

Along the lines of the Consulate General's despatch No. 623, of April

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[1] Not printed; it discussed the attitude of Nigerian officials toward ECA. (103.02 ECA/4–1351)

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed; it dealt with coal mining developments at Enugu, Nigeria and the use to which MSA funds would be put. (745H.5 MSP/12–1852)

13, 1951, it may be reiterated that the major problems, with respect to ECA assistance in Nigeria, have apparently been (1) the rather complicated and slow procedure which proposals must go through, e.g. from the Nigerian Government to the Colonial Office (which may have differing views), (2) the fact that projects have been developed at considerable cost of time and money without ECA representatives being on the ground in the early stages, to determine whether the project is feasible, or indeed possible under our legislation, (3) a certain lack of flexibility as projects develop and merit changes, as in the case of the Enugu Colliery project, and (4) lack of continuing contact between ECA representatives and the local authorities carrying forward approved projects.

The visit of Messrs. Bayne and Dechert was extremely useful in clearing up a number of questions in the minds of Nigerian Government officials. It would be very helpful if this type of visit (but with more time for contacts with Nigerian authorities and actual visits to present and contemplated projects) could be repeated periodically. This, we feel, is essential if the frustrations which hard-working local officials feel they have had in connection with ECA projects are not to carry over into and becloud MSA operations in this country.

Erwin P. Keeler

845K.2614/6-1053

The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ACCRA, June 10, 1953.

No. 157

Subject: Discussion with Head of Volta River Preparatory Commission

The following summarizes information obtained from Commander R. G. A. Jackson, Special Commissioner of the Volta River Preparatory Commission during a conversation I had with him on May 28.

Commander Jackson, who arrived in Accra on May 5, said that he is still busy getting organized and has not really settled down to business yet. He expects that the Commission will spend most of the first year of its existence in a "fact-finding" capacity. He explained that the Commission will have to do a substantial amount of research into the Gold Coast economy before endeavoring to prepare estimates of the cost of the various aspects of the project and to offer a definite opinion as to whether it is in fact feasible. In Commander Jackson's view accurate estimates are essential, since, if mistakes were made then the whole economic justification of the scheme would be destroyed. He had in mind a number of other large projects initiated since the end of World War II where the ultimate cost greatly exceeded the original estimates. His task is therefore essentially to answer the question: "Is the project feasible." It will, he believes, be 18 to 24 months before the answer to that question can be ascertained.

Commander Jackson said there was another reason for beginning his work with a considerable period of fact-finding before proceeding to recommend details of a Master Agreement between the parties to the project in compliance with the British White Paper on the Volta Project. He did not want the subject to become a "political football." He therefore thinks it wise to defer submitting recommendations about the project until after the question of further constitutional changes in the Gold Coast has been thrashed out. In other words, he would rather have the project agreed to by the Africans after they are further advanced on the road to autonomy, since he feels there will in those circumstances be less likelihood of opposition to the Agreement as an instrument of "economic imperialism." Moreover, initiation of the Volta Project must await development of port facilities at Tema.

With regard to the fact-finding phase of his work, Commander Jackson expressed great interest in the Private Investment Survey which he understands is to be undertaken here by MSA. In his opinion information which would be developed by such a survey would be useful in connection with his planning for the Volta Project.

The membership of the Preparatory Commission is not yet complete, since the resolution of the Gold Coast Assembly advocating the addition of two members to be nominated by the Assembly remains to be dealt with. Two eminent persons in the engineering field have been mentioned. One of these is Arthur Morgan; formerly chairman of the Tennessee Valley Administration. The other is a Mr. Savage[1] who, I believe, is a Canadian. Jackson said the Prime Minister, Nkrumah, had recently written to Morgan on this subject without informing the British or the aluminum companies of what he was doing. They took a rather poor view of Nkrumah's unilateral approach, and Jackson feels part of his job will be to urge the need for coordination among those concerned. In any event, the desire of the Assembly to nominate two members may well be countered by requests to add other members from the aluminum companies and the British Government. Jackson feels that a Commission consisting of seven or more persons would be too large.

Details regarding the financing of the project are not yet available.

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[1] He was referring to John Lucian Savage, a Wisconsin-born civil engineer.

In Jackson's opinion capital for overseas investment would not be too readily forthcoming from the United Kingdom Government. The latter would be quite happy to have the Gold Coast increase its prospective share of the total investment required, in accordance with the expressed desires of certain African politicians. Jackson has discussed the question of financing with the World Bank, which evidently may make some contribution. He also opined that it would be a good thing if "private venture capital" from the United States and Canada should interest itself in the project. He thought it a mistake for government to have to bear the entire financial burden of such large scale ventures. However, when he discussed the matter in the City (London) the reaction of financiers there was highly discouraging. There [*their*] main concern was evidently with possible future political instability in the Gold Coast.

Commander Jackson expressed the hope that the progress of the Volta Project would not be marred by the vagaries of Gold Coast politics. He has discussed with Nkrumah the possibility of forming a small committee to consider various aspects of the project on a "bipartisan" basis. The group, which would meet occasionally with Nkrumah, would include certain Assembly "back-benchers" and members of the "opposition." Jackson doubted, however, that the Convention Peoples Party would view such an idea with favor. He said he had stated his position in such matters to all concerned: he didn't pretend to understand local politics but considered it his job to act on behalf of the best interests of the Gold Coast in the course of his work here. Since the project is obviously of great importance to the colony, he wishes to proceed carefully and take all steps necessary to assure its success.

I may add that Mr. R. H. Saloway, Minister of Defense and External Affairs, told me recently that Nkrumah had not followed through on his expressed intention to ask that the British Government approach the United States about a loan or grant for use in the Volta Project (my despatch No. 112, March 25, 1953).[2] Mr. Saloway said that he thought that Nkrumah's request would be well received, if and when put forward. He added, however, that Nkrumah frequently expressed such thoughts in an impulsive way, only to forget the matter amidst his other concerns.

William E. Cole

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[2] Not printed; it summarized an interview with Nkrumah concerning the Volta River project. Cole indicated that the United States had not taken a definitive position with regard to a possible loan application from the United Kingdom to help finance the undertaking. Nkrumah expressed interest in such support in the hope that it might expedite the project and as well help to discredit "silly" stories that he was a Communist. Detwiler was too small a man, he thought, to perform such a role. Cole surmised that the Prime Minister coveted the loan, in part, to counter assertions he was submissive to British "economic imperialism". (845K.2614/3–2553)

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Memoranda–1953"

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Under Secretary of State for Administration (Lourie) [1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1953.

Subject: Changing Rank of Accra from Consulate to Consulate General and Assignment of Principal Officer with Rank of Consul General.

Discussion:

A change in the rank of Accra and of its principal officer is proposed at this time because of the rapid approach of self-government in the Gold Coast. This colony, by a series of constitutional reforms since World War II, enjoys a considerable measure of self-government. Next to Southern Rhodesia, it is the most politically advanced of African territories under European rule. A Gold Coast White Paper issued June 20, 1953 proposes further constitutional changes pending action on a request to be made to the British Government for the grant of complete independence within the Commonwealth of Nations. In anticipation of this action, the Acting Governor of the Gold Coast recently informed our Consul at Accra that the constitutional changes would be approved by the British Government and that complete self-government for the Gold Coast would be established in a relatively short time.[2]

The Gold Coast is a bellwether among the African colonies and it is therefore of far-reaching importance to the U.S. that the nationalist movement be directed into constructive rather than destructive channels. The present Gold Coast Prime Minister is American-educated [3] and entertains friendly feelings for the United States. There is every indication that he will look to the United States for guidance and assistance in getting an autonomous government firmly established. Appropriate United States representation at Accra is a very inexpensive way to assure close future relations with the Gold Coast Government and in orienting other new African states towards western democratic ideals and practices. The future importance of this area to the U.S. cannot be overestimated.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Feld and Durnan of NEA/AF and Ford of NEA/EX, and sent through Wailes, the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. The source text, a carbon copy, bears no marks or endorsements to confirm that it actually was sent to Lourie. For additional documentation on raising the rank of the principal officer at Salisbury, see pp. 324 ff.

[2] It is not clear to which conversation this refers. In despatches 113, 127, and 162 of Mar. 28, Apr. 17, and June 17, 1953 from Accra, none printed, Cole indicated that Reginald H. Saloway, the Officer Administering the Government, had revealed that constitutional change would not occur with undue haste (745K.00/3-2853, 745K.00/4-1753, 811.05145K/6-1753). Finally, when they met on June 20, 1953, the day the White Paper on Constitutional Reform was issued, Saloway suggested that Nkrumah would have to stress paragraph 67 which stated that " 'It is the Government's intention to enter into the period of constitution-making by requesting Her Majesty's Government to make a declaration regarding the grant of Independent Status within the Commonwealth . . .' ", if he hoped to win the concurrence of his colleagues in the CPP. This was recounted in despatch 173 of June 30, 1953 from Accra, not printed. The ellipsis indicated appears in despatch 173. (745K.03/6-3053)

[3] Nkrumah had been educated at Lincoln University, Lincoln Theological Seminary, and the University of Pennsylvania.

The Consulate at Accra was established on May 1, 1942, in response to war-time needs. At that time, British West Africa offered the only feasible open-air route from the west to the Near and Middle East. Various allied war-time organizations established headquarters at Accra, including the U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, the Central West African Office of the U.S. Foreign Economic Administration, and the West African Office of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. Should world-wide hostilities erupt again, Gold Coast bases probably will once more become of strategic importance to the United States.

Although prompted by World War II, the opening of the Consulate at Accra was preceded by the development of important U.S. commercial interests. There are approximately 175 United States citizens in the Gold Coast. Several American firms maintain offices at Accra, which is served by three American shipping lines and one American aviation line.[4] The United States takes a major proportion of the Gold Coast production of cocoa, manganese and timber, and supplies a substantial proportion of the territory's import requirements. As the Gold Coast acquires greater control over its own affairs it looks with favor on greater non-British financial participation in its development projects. An example of this is the recent intimation of the Prime Minister that he would seek through British Government channels a U.S. Government loan to speed up development of the vast Volta River Project which, when completed, will revolutionize the Gold Coast economy.[5]

Recommendation:

That approval be given to raising the rank of the post at Accra from a Consulate to a Consulate General, and that a Principal Officer with the rank of Consul General be assigned to Accra.[6]

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[4] Barber West Africa Line, Delta Line, Farrell Lines, and Pan American World Airways.

[5] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[6] The elevation of the post took place on Sept. 1, 1953.

845K.062/1–753

Report by the Vice Consul at Accra (Fleming)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL ACCRA, October 30, 1953.

This report should be read in conjunction with the last Labor Report submitted by this post as Despatch No. 24, dated August 12, 1953.[2]

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[1] This report was an enclosure to despatch 69 of Nov. 7, 1953 from Accra: (845K.062/11–753)

During the past week a number of events have occurred in the Gold Coast with regard to this country's stand in the Cold War which are, perhaps, more significant than any previous development. Though they accord with the consistently neutral position which Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and his Party have maintained, they constitute the strongest denunciation of Communism which the Party has so far expressed. Two leading members of the Convention Peoples' Party, one a member of the Legislative Assembly and the other the General Secretary of the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress, have been suspended from the Party by the Party's Central Executive on the charge that they were servants of the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions. The day following this action, October 24th (United Nations Day), the Prime Minister delivered an important policy statement before the United Nations Students Association, which was holding a national combined meeting at the University College of the Gold Coast, Achimota. In the final paragraphs of his speech he made it clear that though he wished to remain aloof from all international disputes, at least until independence was achieved, he regarded his country as "wedded" to the "friendly democracies". and that he looked forward to the day when the Gold Coast would be an equal partner in the British Commonwealth. On October 28 Turkson-Ocran was relieved of his duties as TUC General-Secretary. Finally, the Ghana Evening News, the official organ of the Party, has in the past several days published its first forthright criticisms of Communist activity and those who indulge in it. Such actions when weighed against the Party's previous, somewhat anti-Western line mark a very significant shift. The events leading to this change were as follows:

On Wednesday afternoon, October 21, the Prime Minister stopped in at the home of the Information Officer, Vice Consul Robert I. Fleming, and in a conversation lasting about an hour, he criticized strongly the conduct of Dr. Cheddi Jagan, former Prime Minister of British Guiana. It was obvious that Dr. Nkrumah and his friends had found food for thought in the recent developments in British Guiana,[3] and that they had regarded them as a warning to curb the irresponsible elements within their own Party. Nkrumah, who has been very indulgent with these wilder elements had apparently begun to realize that he might be judged by their actions and to appreciate the possible consequences.

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[2] Not printed; it transmitted a memorandum regarding the Trade Union Congress meeting at Kumasi which reported the circumstances which led the TUC to decide upon the amalgamation of the government-recognized Gold Coast Trade Union Congress (GCTUC) and the maverick Ghana Trade Union Congress (GTUC). (845K.062/8-1253)

[3] The constitution of British Guiana was suspended and the Progressive Party, which had taken office on Apr. 27, 1953, was dismissed on Oct. 9 because of alleged Communist infiltration.

That same evening at a local "night spot" in Accra, Public Affairs Officer Eugene D. Sawyer met Albert Hammerton, ICFTU representative in West Africa, who told him that he might soon be travelling to Brussels to make his report to the executive body of that organization and that before going he would like an opportunity to consult with the Consul, William E. Cole, with Sawyer, PAO, and with Robert Fleming, the Information Officer. Mr. Sawyer arranged for such a meeting the following morning at which the four men discussed the situation generally.

At the meeting Hammerton stated that he had collected a substantial quantity of documentary proof of Communist activity in the Gold Coast. He said also that while he regarded this as valuable, he feared that to present it at Brussels without at the same time offering some counteracting evidence that Nkrumah's party was not supporting this activity might very possibly lead to serious consequences. Hammerton has not had a pleasant experience in the Gold Coast. Without understanding why, he had aroused the enmity of the Prime Minister, who in a stormy interview last June had told him that he was not wanted in the Gold Coast. This attitude was reflected throughout the Convention Peoples' Party. It found expression in the Party's press, and, of course, was represented in those Trade Unions, whose leaders were CPP adherents. As stated in the last report, it led also to the disaffiliation of the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress from the ICFTU at the time of its last annual meeting, when control of the Congress was captured by CPP supporters. What really set it off was that Hammerton in working with and through the old officers of the TUC seemed to Nkrumah to be supporting his political enemies. Since in this country the leaders are still largely preoccupied with internal struggles, the bigger issues were lost in the face of personal rivalries. Given this experience, and having evidence that the CPP had engineered the shift in TUC leaders, included among whom were certain WFTU supporters, Hammerton felt that his report would make the Gold Coast appear no less Communist than British Guiana. He realized that this did not accord with the larger facts—was in fact a half-truth; yet his own experience supplied him with nothing which would bring the picture into balance. He had sought American assistance to help him acquire a clearer understanding of the real situation. The three Americans replied that they accepted his evidence as perfectly factual, but stated that their wider view of the political aspects had led them to believe that Nkrumah was "neutralist" with regard to the Cold War.

Later in the day, Robert Fleming approached the Principal Officer with the suggestion that he be allowed to talk with Nkrumah on the matter of Hammerton's report in an effort to force some public expression of Nkrumah's real position. The reason Fleming could make this suggestion is that he and his wife enjoy a close, friendly relationship with Nkrumah which would make it possible for him to lay the matter on the line in a frank and firm manner. The Principal Officer approved of this course of action since it seemed possible that if the ICFTU, with its considerable influence, were brought into conflict with the CPP it would not only threaten stability within the Gold Coast, but would obviously greatly complicate the job of guiding Nkrumah and his people into the democratic camp. Fleming then arranged to meet with Nkrumah at the latter's home at 5:00 that afternoon, October 22.

After about an hour's discussion, Nkrumah agreed to meet with Hammerton and to make his peace with the ICFTU. Fleming went for Hammerton immediately and brought him back to Nkrumah's house. They talked for three hours, Fleming acting as a mediator and attempting to clarify positions where it appeared that this might be helpful. During the discussion Hammerton voiced his various grievances; that he had been vilified in the press, abused from public platforms; that his African assistant had been threatened, and that though he and his organization were in full sympathy with Gold Coast aspirations, he had found it virtually impossible to serve the country as he had hoped he might. He also laid his evidence of Communist activity before the Prime Minister and stated what he thought the consequences would be should this be made public without some counteractive evidence that this did not receive Nkrumah's support. Nkrumah agreed finally to give the ICFTU free reign to carry on its activities in the Gold Coast, but said that he could not support immediate reaffiliation lest it appear that he had been "bought." He promised to use his influence to stop abuse in the press and by spokesmen of his Party. He said further that he would call a special meeting of his Party's Central Committee the following morning and that he would urge that known Communists be suspended pending an investigation of their activities. He said also that he would make an addition to his UN Day speech which he hoped would make his position clear.

Fleming saw Nkrumah again the following noon and was informed that true to his promise, he had called the Central Committee together and they had suspended the two men in question. He also discussed with Fleming the remarks which he would include in his speech the next day. Though he would not go nearly so far as Fleming urged him to do, what finally resulted was a considerable improvement over the loose public statements which had been made in the past. As a further step, he had won support for a plan whereby the outlines of all Party speeches must be submitted to Headquarters before they are delivered.

Much of this began to break in the press the following day. The results were electric. The Party papers started a campaign against those with Communist connections. When Hammerton spoke before a large union meeting, the President of the TUC introduced him in glowing terms. The new changes seemed to be the popular topic of discussion in Accra among Europeans and Africans alike.

When it became evident that Nkrumah meant what he had said, Hammerton put through a call to the General Secretary of the ICFTU in Brussels requesting permission to leave Accra by plane on Monday, October 26. This permission was granted. On Sunday, October 25, Robert Fleming assisted Hammerton in drafting a statement for presentation to the ICFTU which describes the general situation in the Gold Coast. Copies of that statement are enclosed.[4]

On October 28 it was announced in the Gold Coast press that Turkson-Ocran, General Secretary of the TUC has disappeared from Accra and that he had been relieved of his duties by the Executive Committee of that organization. Anthony Woode, meanwhile, was in Vienna attending a conference of the WFTU.[5]

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[4] Not printed.

[5] In airgram 27 of Jan. 15, 1954 to Accra, the Department commended Cole, Fleming, and Sawyer for the fine results they had achieved as Nkrumah's action was considered "of the utmost importance to the Free World" at that critical moment of constitutional development in the Gold Coast. (845K.062/11–753)

511.45K/3–2354

The Public Affairs Officer at Accra (Sawyer) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ACCRA, March 23, 1954.

No. 176

Ref: Consulate's Despatches Number 166 of March 5, 1954;[1] Number 160 of February 24, 1954;[2] Number 115 of December 14, 1953;[3] Number 69 of November 7, 1953;[4] Number 41 of September 15, 1953;[5] and Number 24 of August 12, 1953.[6]

Subject: Recent Developments in USIS Labor Contract Program

In no area of activity has there arisen greater danger to the stability of the emerging political independence of the Gold Coast than in the organized labor movement. Though nurtured and guided by the Gold Coast Government's Labour Department, the movement, especially during the past year, provided fertile ground for Communist activity, designed to disrupt the otherwise orderly progress toward self-government.

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[1] Not printed; it sketched the background of the reaffiliation of the Gold Coast TUC with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). (845K.062/3–554)

[2] Not printed; it transmitted an estimate of the current situation in the Gold Coast as regards political and trade union matters which had been prepared by Albert Hammerton, the ICFTU representative in West Africa, on Feb. 22, 1954 and a memorandum by Robert I. Fleming, Vice Consul and Information Officer at Accra, dealing with developments in the Gold Coast trade union movement which he submitted to Cole on Dec. 22, 1953. (745K.00/2–2454)

[3] Not printed; it transmitted a further report by Fleming concerning developments affecting the trade union movement in the Gold Coast. (845K.062/12–1453)

[4] Not printed; it transmitted Fleming's report of Oct. 30, 1953, *supra*.

[5] Not printed; it transmitted a memorandum regarding the Trade Union Conference at Kumasi. (845K.062/9–1553)

[6] Not printed, see footnote 2, *supra*.

A major step in the right direction occurred on Sunday, February 28, during a meeting of the General Council of the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress. This meeting came as a climax to months of effort by the United States Information Service in Accra, the representative of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and those friends whom they were able to win to their side in both the Trade Union movement and the Convention Peoples' Party.

The struggle began last August, when in a resolution couched in Communist jargon, the Annual Conference of the Trade Union Congress voiced their decision to disaffiliate from the ICFTU. From then until October the Gold Coast Trade Union movement seemed to be drifting steadily into the camp of the Communist dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. (Full details of these developments and subsequent events were reported in the Consulate's despatches under reference.) The tide began to turn in October, when following the Prime Minister's historic policy statement on Communism (delivered at the urging of the Information Officer), and the suspension from the CPP of Anthony Woode and Turkson-Ocran, the principal Communist inspired labor leaders, the leaders of the Trade Union Congress were persuaded to take a more friendly view toward the ICFTU. By careful nurturing, by both the ICFTU representative and USIS, this relationship improved steadily. Today the Gold Coast TUC uses the ICFTU's West African Trade Union Information Center virtually as its headquarters, and both organizations use USIS films, pamphlets, and lectures in their worker education programs.

The Prime Minister's speech on Communists in Government Service (reported in the Consulate's Despatch Number 161 of February 26, 1954)[7] delivered in the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly on February 25, set the stage for the TUC meeting of the 28th. The agenda and the tactics to be employed at the meeting were carefully planned with the assistance and suggestions of the ICFTU representative.

The meeting was a stormy one, lasting from nine in the morning until six-thirty in the evening. It was evident that the WFTU crowd had also planned well. The TUC President, Mr. Francis Tachie-Menson, delivered a speech, the text of which was enclosed in the Consulate's Despatch Number 166 of March 5, 1954.[8] The Vice-President, Mr. Isaac K. Kumah, moved the resolution, which read as follows:

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[7] Not printed; it submitted the text of Nkrumah's address to the Legislative Assembly in which he indicated that the government would henceforth not employ active Communists in specified departments. (745K.001/2-2654)

> "Following the statement of the President on the relationship of Gold Coast TUC to international organizations, and in the light of the fact that the Gold Coast TUC believes in democratic trade unionism; this second meeting of the General Council denounces Communism and all its works and, hereby, resolves to rescind the resolution passed at the 10th Annual Conference and to reaffiliate to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions."

The evening of February 28th, the officers of the TUC and their sympathizers on the General Council had supper with the ICFTU representative and the USIS Information Officer and pledged themselves to continue the fight against the WFTU group, especially in the Takoradi port area,[9] where they appear to be strongest.

Other recent USIS activities on the labor front have included a visit to Takoradi by a USIS projection team, who for several nights showed USIS trade union films before large labor audiences. These films were shown following anti-Communist speeches delivered by Mr. Francis Tachie-Menson, President of the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress.

The Information Officer, Robert I. Fleming, has recently completed a series of twelve weekly lectures on American trade union history and organization. The series, which was presented at the YMCA, was sponsored by the Department of Extra-Mural Studies of the University College of the Gold Coast. It was regularly attended by about 30 trade union leaders from the Accra area. USIS films and pamphlets were used to illustrate the lectures.

Just prior to departing for leave on April 11th, Mr. Fleming plans to address the Annual Easter School for Gold Coast trade union leaders, to be held at the University College, Achimota.

The publication of the ICFTU in West Africa, the *West African Worker*, which is published monthly in 50,000 copies and is distributed throughout West Africa from the Congo to the Gambia, has proven an excellent outlet for straight USIS articles and for those which are USIS inspired.

USIS officers maintain a close personal relationship with Gold Coast Trade Union leaders, entertaining them in their homes, attending and addressing the social gatherings of their unions, and accepting their hospitality from time to time.

The Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, who is a close and good friend of USIS in Accra, has expressed his approval and appreciation of USIS activities with Gold Coast labor, and obviously regards them as a valuable adjunct to his own efforts to maintain stability during the current, difficult transition period.

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[8] Not printed.

[9] Anthony Woode was the head of the maritime workers union in Takoradi.

A reading of the Consulate's despatches on the labor situation is suggested for gaining a full picture of the part which USIS has played in the recent important developments in this field.

EUGENE D. SAWYER

745H.00/9–2454

The Secretary of State to Vice President Nixon

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1954.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: Reference is made to the Joint Resolution of the Congress to extend greetings to the Gold Coast and Nigeria[1] (Public Law 667, Chapter 1005, 83rd Congress, Second Session), certified copies of which the Department of State transmitted to the American Consulates General at Accra, Gold Coast and Lagos, Nigeria.[2]

The Department of State has been informed by the Consulate General at Lagos that a certified copy of the Joint Resolution has been forwarded to the Chief Secretary of the Nigerian Government, who is responsible for the external affairs of the territory, with a request that it be transmitted to the appropriate officer of the new Nigerian Federal Legislature in advance of its first meeting.[3]

The new Nigerian Constitution became effective on October 1, 1954. It is anticipated that elections under the new Constitution will be held in November next and that the first meeting of the new Federal Legislature will take place in January 1955. It is expected that the procedure will be for the Speaker of the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives to read the Joint Resolution and for the Chief Secretary of the Nigerian Government to then move a suitable message of thanks to the Congress for adoption by the House.

There is enclosed, as indicative of the favorable reception of the

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[1] Joint Resolution 183, which was passed unanimously by the House and Senate on Aug. 11 and 12, respectively, was signed by President Eisenhower on Aug. 27. Among other things, the Resolution, which appears in the *Congressional Record*, vol. 100 (83d Cong., 2d sess.), pt. II, pp. 14304–14305, stated that it was the policy of the United States "to encourage efforts toward independence and self-government truly expressive of the desires of the peoples and as they show their capacity to establish and protect free institutions." In response to a draft of the Resolution which "Resolved, That the Secretary of State is hereby requested to appoint a United States delegation at the appropriate time to represent the United States at ceremonies marking the achievement of complete self-government for these territories," the Secretary replied that the Department "interprets this provision to mean that such a delegation would be appointed only at such time as the United Kingdom relinquishes its control over the external affairs of those territories." (745K.02/7–3054)

[2] This was done via airgram 8 to Lagos of Sept. 3, 1954, not printed (745H.00/9–354) and airgram 9 to Accra of the same date, not printed. (845K.47411/9–354)

[3] Not printed; it indicated that the time for self-government and delegations to mark same was in the future as the new constitution was not likely to be reviewed until 1956. (745H.00/9–2454)

Joint Resolution in Nigeria, a copy of an editorial from the Lagos *Daily Success* of September 2, 1954.[4]

The Department of State, also, has been informed by the Consulate General at Accra that a certified copy of the Joint Resolution has been transmitted to the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, through the Governor.[5] This procedure was followed as matters relating to the external affairs of the Gold Coast remain in the hands of the Governor until full independence is achieved.

I shall keep you promptly informed of further developments.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
BEN H. BROWN, JR.
Acting Assistant Secretary

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[4] Not printed.

[5] Not printed. The response of the Gold Coast, as expressed by the Legislative Assembly on Oct. 27, was an enclosure to despatch 57 of Oct. 28, from Accra to the Department of State. It stated "'That this Assembly extends its thanks to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States for the greetings contained in the Joint Resolution made at the Second Session of the 83rd Congress, and declares that it would welcome most cordially at the appropriate time a delegation to represent the United States at the ceremonies marking the attainment of independence for the Gold Coast.'" (745K.00/10-2854)

745K.02/12-1354

The Consul General at Accra (Lamm) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ACCRA, December 13, 1954.

No. 75

Subject: Self Government in the Gold Coast

The subject of self government in the Gold Coast was discussed confidentially by the reporting officer with Mr. de Ensor[1] and Mr. Dickson of the Office of the Secretary to the Governer. Ensor stated that no firm decision had been taken as yet. The matter of self government is not a unilateral act and legislation must be enacted in the United Kingdom before self governing status can be attained. The safest estimate of the period in which full self government will be achieved was given as the last quarter of 1956 and the first quarter of 1957. The Prime Minister has indicated to Mr. Sawyer of USIS that December 1956 is the most likely time for full independence.

The detailed program will be worked out during 1955. Informants stated that the Prime Minister had "grandiose plans" for celebrating independence and apparently has issued a number of directives including the construction of a modern luxury hotel to house foreign dignitaries attending independence celebrations, construction of a Prime Minister's residence, a residence for the speaker of the Legislative Assembly and a new building to house the Legislative Assembly itself.

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[1] Michael de Ensor.

The Prime Minister has been extremely talkative on the matter of self government and has referred to it in a number of speeches at CPP rallies. This has led some people to believe that the actual date has already been determined by the Prime Minister. Ensor believes that rumors of June and July 1955 as the time for independence stem from what is referred to as the Operative Date at which time Civil Servants will be given advance notice of termination of their appointments. The June or July Operative Date will be made public on January 1, 1955.

DONALD W. LAMM

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION

AF files, lot 56 D 412, "Southern Rhodesian Correspondence"

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1952.

Subject: The Proposed British Central African Federation

The Rhodesias were originally administered by the British South African Company under a Royal Charter granted in 1889. In 1923, Southern Rhodesia was granted full self government, subject to certain reservations with respect to external and native affairs, and in 1924 the administration of Northern Rhodesia passed to the British Crown. Nyasaland has been a British Protectorate since 1891. The total population of the three territories was estimated in 1950 at about 6.3 million, of whom about 169,000 were Europeans.

Proposals for amalgamation or federation of the British Central African territories have been made periodically since 1915 when the British South African Company suggested a single administration for the Rhodesias. Until recently, these proposals were rejected by the British Government as being neither practical nor expedient, although regarded as desirable in principle. The reasons for this action were the differing native policies and the differences in the degree of political development reached by the three territories.

Southern Rhodesia enjoys a quasi-dominion status. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as protectorates, are administered under authority of the British Colonial Office. Besides the formal distinction in political status is the complete domination of the Government of Southern Rhodesia by the white settlers as compared with the proclaimed objectives of full partnership of Europeans and Africans in the governments of the two northern territories.

The differences in degree of political development have been narrowed somewhat since World War II. In Northern Rhodesia there has been a substantial transfer of power to European unofficial members of the legislature. At the same time Africans have acquired greater political maturity and several have been appointed to membership in the legislative councils of both protectorates. The effect of the increasing political consciousness of the Africans in the protectorates has been to harden opposition to Southern Rhodesia's native policy and to create a new resistance to white domination. These factors, combined with the course of native policy in the Union of South Africa and the growing pressure of Afrikaner nationalism in the Rhodesias, have caused a change in the attitude of the British Government on the question of closer union in British Central Africa.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by James J. Durnan of the Bureau of African Affairs (AF). William H. Lewis of NEA/P, in a memorandum dated Mar. 14, 1952 (AF files, lot 58 D 459), indicated that, as specified in the NEA/P biweekly of Mar. 6, Durnan's background statement was to be used for media guidance.

In November 1950, a conference of senior officials of the British and territorial governments was held in London to discuss the possibility of formulating plans for closer association between the three British Central African territories. The report of the conference, published in June 1951, agreed unanimously that the three territories be federated; that safeguards be instituted for African interests; and that there be federal responsibility for a wide range of regional matters, including defense and economic development. This was followed by a conference of representatives of the British and Central African Governments at Victoria Falls on September 18–21, 1951, to explore the possibilities of a Central African federation on the basis of the London Conference recommendations. The conference adjourned, however, after four days of futile deliberation on the main question of federation. While the European representatives favored federation in principle, the African representatives unanimously opposed it, although those of Northern Rhodesia expressed a willingness to consider federation after the policy of partnership had been defined and put into progressive operation.

There was general agreement in the conference that economic and political partnership between Europeans and Africans is the only policy under which federation could be brought about in Central Africa. It was also agreed that the protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be preserved, and that there could be no amalgamation of the three territories, or any two of them, unless a majority of the inhabitants desired it. It was further agreed that land settlement questions and the political advancement of the peoples of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland must remain subject to the ultimate authority of the British Government and not to any federal authority.

It had been intended that discussions would be resumed in London in July 1952. With criticism of the federation proposals mounting in the three Central African territories, however, an informal meeting was held in London in early February between the Secretaries of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. As a result of this meeting it was decided that the Governments of the three Central African territories would inform the

United Kingdom Government and each other before March 1, 1952, of any modifications of the London Conference proposals which they may deem desirable, and that a full conference, including African representatives from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, would be held in London on or about April 23 to draft a constitution for a Central African Federation which would contain safeguards for African interests. After consideration of the draft constitution in the territories concerned a further conference would be held in London, probably in July 1952, and as soon as possible thereafter the Governments of the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would decide whether or not to accept it. In the case of Southern Rhodesia the question of federation will be determined by a referendum of the electorate.

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Miscellaneous"

Memorandum by the Director of the Foreign Expansion Division of the Defense Materials Procurement Agency (Stott) to the Assistant Administrator for Supply of the Mutual Security Agency (Fitz-Gerald)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1952.

Subject: Shabani–Pafuri–Lourenco Marques Railway [1]

In considering US support of this project, which it is understood would be partially financed by the Southern Rhodesian and Portuguese Governments, DMPA Foreign Expansion Division offers the following comments and recommendations:

1. The chief benefit to be derived by the conclusion of this project is the mobilization of metallurgical chrome which originates along the great dyke of Southern Rhodesia and Selukwe, Southern Rhodesia. Normally, and in past years, this important production has been exported via the Umtali–Beira and Port of Beira route. The total tonnage, based on past production, is from 250,000 to 350,000 tons per year according to demand.

2. Other important production in the order of tonnage is (1) Northern Rhodesia blister and refined copper, 250,000 to 300,000 tons per year, and minor tonnages of asbestos, zinc concentrates, slab zinc, tobacco, etc., all of which are normally exported through Beira.

3. Of the items named in para 2 above, Northern Rhodesia copper and zinc originating in the Belgian Congo and at times shipped through Beira, could very well be shipped through Lobito via the Beseka and Benguela railways in the event of an emergency tie-up of the Port of Beira or the Umtali-Beira rail connection, by accepting the freight differential between N'Dola and Lobito. It should be pointed out that copper and asbestos as well as lead and zinc concentrates, having a much higher per ton valuation than chrome but taking up less

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[1] For previous information on this topic, see despatch 43, dated Sept. 10, 1951, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, p. 1230.

space, do not incur the same storage or shipping problems as bulk chrome ore. There has never been any worry on the part of the copper people on occasional delays in their production reaching its destination. This same applied to the asbestos produced in Southern Rhodesia.

4. Mechanical chrome loading facilities and a new chrome wharf are being completed at Beira; also, ECA has loaned fifteen and a half million dollars to Southern Rhodesia Railways for the purpose of adding to their rolling stock and improving their railway system, which should go a long way toward improving the Salisbury–Umtali branch and enable it to handle more tonnage between these points. It is understood the Portuguese Government financed themselves in providing more locomotives and rolling stock for the Umtali–Beira railroad.

5. The proposed Shabani–Pafuri–Lourenco Marques line will not result in development of new sources of strategic materials unless it is considered that Sabi Valley coal may have marketable possibilities. Of course as an assist in the development of agriculture and possibly other products as an aid to the general economy of that section, the railroad is to be recommended.

6. Any new railroad construction in the general district of Central Africa will result in pulling labor from the mining industry, which is already starved for native labor in such regions as Wankie, the Selukwe chrome and the asbestos mines. Importation of labor for railway construction from other parts of Africa cannot be counted upon to achieve success in overcoming the shortage of labor in the region under consideration. On the other hand, it is a well-known fact that transfer of available labor to the less populated districts has, in the past, met with disastrous results. Some 2,000 natives from the Copper Belt of Northern Rhodesia were sent to the Wankie coal mines during the past year and a half, in order to raise Wankie coal production. As far as we know the project was a failure, as witness the inability of Wankie to even maintain their old production rate, and the return of a great part of the natives to their homes in Northern Rhodesia. At a time when top production is needed at the coal mines as well as the asbestos and chrome mines, it would seem that the initiation of a railway construction project in this district might very well result in decrease in metal production at a time when these metals are badly needed.

In summary, it is our feeling that although the proposed rail line from Shabani through Pafuri to Lourenco Marques would greatly benefit the chrome producers as an alternate route and probably add somewhat to the economy of the region, this railway project is not vital to the mobilization or development of materials and should be viewed as the third car in a family—convenient but not necessary.

In other communications with the UK Mission regarding the matter of railroad links and extensions in Southern Rhodesia, we have mentioned that our present interest is in the early implementation of the presently existing contract with the Southern Rhodesian Government wherein they would allot certain percentages of coal based on Wankie production, these allocations to be to Northern Rhodesia for the copper producers. Our feeling is that Southern Rhodesia has failed to enter into the spirit of the contract by keeping up reasonable allocation of coal to the northern copper producers, even though Wankie production during the past quarter fell slightly below the contract base of 200,000 tons per month. Even when Wankie coal production in September exceeded 200,000 tons, deliveries of coal to the Copper Belt were held back although we have a signed memorandum from the manager of the Southern Rhodesian Railways to the effect that he had capacity to haul 56,000 tons of coal to the Copper Belt per month. It would therefore seem that, if it is contemplated that a loan should be made to Southern Rhodesia to assist them in financing of the railroad to Pafuri, MSA should take a good look at Southern Rhodesian compliance with their present contract with ECA and the spirit of the contract which implied they would transport, within their means, all of the coal allocated to Northern Rhodesia. In other words, any further loans to the Southern Rhodesian Government should have some strings on them which would bring about cooperation on their part in assisting to increase copper production in Northern Rhodesia.

We are currently investigating possibilities of shipping upwards of 20,000 tons of coal from the US to the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia for the purpose of increasing the monthly copper production of those mines by 10,000 to 12,000 tons metallic copper with provision that this additional copper would be purchased by the US for consumption by US industry. However, there is some doubt manifested by the Rhodesian copper producers that should the US coal be imported then Southern Rhodesia would reduce the Wankie coal allotments to the Northern Rhodesian copper mines to the same amount as the US imports, as Southern Rhodesia has done in the past whenever Northern Rhodesian copper brought in extra fuel or substituted with wood burning. If the Southern Rhodesian Government continues such an uncooperative policy in the face of the defense requirements of the Western Europe and the US, then certainly, they should not expect future US assistance in new projects of this type.

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Miscellaneous"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Samuel J. Gorlitz of the Investment and Economic Development Staff

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1952.

Subject: Pafuri Gap Railroad Loan

Participants: DMPA—Messrs. Stott and Keith
AF—Messrs. Bourgerie, Feld and Meier
OMP—Mr. Evans
DRN—Messrs. LaMacchia and Gordon
ED—Messrs. Gorlitz and Smith
TRC—Mr. Kelly

At the request of the Department, a meeting was arranged to ascertain the views of DMPA on the Pafuri Gap Railway project, and to discuss the problems raised in Mr. Stott's memorandum of January 31 to D. A. FitzGerald of MSA.[1] The problems raised by that memorandum were: (1) the relatively few strategic materials that would move over the proposed railroad, (2) the diversion of scarce labor from the copper mines that might be caused by new railroad construction, and (3) failure of the Southern Rhodesians to live up to an agreement with ECA to deliver specified quantities of coal to the Northern Rhodesian copper mines.

Mr. Gorlitz summarized the concern of the Department over the increasingly acute transportation shortage in Central Africa and told Mr. Stott of the need to clarify DMPA's attitude toward the Pafuri project before the Department could take a position on the proposed Eximbank loan. He explained that there was no disagreement in the U.S. Government about the relative priorities of Beira, Lobito and Pafuri. The expansion and improvement of the Port of Beira had top priority and was already under way. Improvement of the Port of Lobito had the next highest priority and the Eximbank has indicated its readiness to finance that work as soon as a proposition is presented to them. The Pafuri Gap route is of a lower priority than either the Beira or the Lobito project but is considered extremely important not only to alleviate the general transportation shortage in this area but to relieve congestion at Beira so that the future flow of copper, chrome and other strategic materials through that port, will not be impeded.

Mr. Stott said that DMPA would certainly go along with that analysis. He stressed the urgency of the Lobito project on the west coast of Africa, but said that as a third line, DMPA favored the Pafuri Gap route to Lourenco Marques over the alternative Beitbridge-West Nicholson route through South Africa. His memo, he said, was based upon his feeling that Pafuri could not be justified solely on direct strategic material grounds since chrome would be the only strategic material that might move in significant quantities through the Pafuri Gap and even that was not certain. With the Beira chrome-leading wharf soon to be in operation, most of the chrome would probably continue to move out of there rather than over the Pafuri Gap. The indirect relation of Pafuri to strategic materials was undoubtedly, Mr. Stott felt, of great importance. He noted that Beira had only limited possibilities as a port and that it was vital to relieve congestion if strategic materials were to come out of that port in the increasing quantities we now looked toward. He agreed that Mr. Bourgerie's point that a chrome loading wharf could not make a great contribution if a vessel could not first reach a general wharf without delay to unload import cargo. Mr. Stott then indicated that his only reservation on the Pafuri project was that MSA in its telegrams had overstressed the direct strategic materials angle.

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[1] *Supra.*

The problem of diversion of labor was not dwelt upon in any detail. It was generally believed that that problem could be handled and should not become involved in this stage of project consideration.

The problem of coal shipments to Northern Rhodesia was then carefully spelled out by Mr. Stott. A steady supply of coal from Wankie—the only colliery in Southern Rhodesia—was vital to a continued high rate of production of copper in Northern Rhodesia. When ECA made a £5 million counterpart loan to the Southern Rhodesian Railways in 19—[*1951*] it tied to the loan a proviso that the Southern Rhodesians would allocate 21 percent of their coal production to the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia when monthly production reached 200,000 tons. This proviso was resorted to only after ECA was unsuccessful in convincing Belgium and Southern Rhodesia to reduce their artificially high freight rates on the rail line to Lobito. The Southern Rhodesians have not made adequate deliveries of coal to Northern Rhodesia under this agreement.

In an effort to keep copper production up, DMPA had thought of delivering up to 20,000 tons of U.S. coal monthly to Northern Rhodesia through Lobito. It had dropped this idea however, on discovering that: (1) the U.K. would not consider the resulting increased copper production as new copper above previous allocations and (2) that Southern Rhodesians threatened to cut back their coal deliveries by an amount equivalent to U.S. coal shipments.

This history on coal deliveries colored DMPA's attitude toward any Southern Rhodesia project. Mr. Stott was very anxious that any U.S. lending to Southern Rhodesia have attached to it a requirement for increased coal deliveries. When asked why a new coal agreement would be effective where the present one had failed, Mr. Stott said that ECA should have asked last time for a coal delivery rather than an allocation agreement. Under the present agreement, it is possible that allocations of coal may not be delivered, on the excuse that railroad cars were not available.

Mr. Stott then asked if the Department could not explore with the Eximbank the feasibility of tying a coal delivery clause into the loan agreement. Mr. Evans pointed out that it might be possible to use the immediate need for coal to increase production of strategic materials as part of the rationale for the Pafuri project. Mr. Bourgerie added that we might consider the possibility of intergovernment negotiations with Southern Rhodesia to obtain a coal agreement as part of a "package deal" involving not only the financing of the Pafuri but also coal deliveries to help keep up copper production and to exploit new cobalt sources. This could, of course, be done only after the Bank had examined the project and was ready to approve the loan.

Mr. Stott then asked why the Bank would be concerned about the relationship of the Pafuri project to strategic materials since it was such an obviously good investment and since there was such great need for more transportation to facilitate the development of this region. It was explained that the Eximbank would usually not be concerned with this aspect. The Pafuri project presented two policy problems, however. Most of the items to be financed were to be procured offshore and the strategic materials to be shipped from the area would not go primarily to the U.S. but to our Western allies. Both these factors presented policy problems to the Bank in view of its statutory authority connecting its lending operations to the facilitation of U.S. foreign trade. In view of these two policy problems, the Department felt that the Eximbank would want to assure itself that DMPA as well as other agencies was solidly behind the project.

In conclusion, the Department representatives told Mr. Stott that this clarification of DMPA's attitude was appreciated and that the Department would explore further the feasibility of tying coal deliveries into any possible financing arrangement for the Pafuri Gap project. It was understood that DMPA would be kept informed by the Department of the Eximbank progress on this project.[2]

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[2] The Export-Import Bank authorized a $17,000,000 loan to Portugal for the construction of the Pafuri railway link on Aug. 28, 1952. For further information, see *Export-Import Bank of Washington, Fifteenth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period July-December, 1952* (Washington, 1953), pp. 14-15.

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Miscellaneous"

The Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld) to the Consul General at Salisbury (Sims)

CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL [WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1952.
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

DEAR SAM: The Department and other agencies have recently been devoting considerable attention to the whole question of the Pafuri railway project, with particular reference to the short and long run strategic material and general economic benefits that the Western powers will derive from the construction of this line linking Southern Rhodesia to the port of Lourenco Marques. In order to iron out certain apparent differences that had arisen with regard to the justifications for American interest in and financial assistance to Southern Rhodesia and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese East Africa in advancing this project, an interdepartmental meeting was held on February 20. I am enclosing for your information a memorandum of conversation which outlines the views of Mr. Stott of DMPA and other officials concerned with this problem.[1]

At the conclusion of the meeting which this memorandum summarizes there was fairly general agreement on the overall merits of the Pafuri scheme. However, Mr. Stott's recital of the problems that have stemmed over a period of years from the shortage of coal supplies from the Wankie colliery and the problem faced by the mines in Northern Rhodesia in getting sufficient coal delivered by the Southern Rhodesian railways to make possible increased copper production in the Copperbelt, posed the question of whether U.S. financial assistance for the Pafuri project should not be tied in some way to increased production and deliveries of coal. There is at least an impression in some people's minds that the Wankie colliery, now operated by the British firm of Powell-Duffryn, for reasons not easy to single out, does not give much future promise of being able to produce sufficient coal to take care of the needs of the Copperbelt and the increasing requirements of industry in general throughout Central Africa. We would, therefore, like to recieve your reaction to the problems presented in the enclosed memorandum, and specifically your reaction to the proposal to tie coal deliveries into any possible financing arrangement for the Pafuri project.

With very best regards,

Sincerely yours,

NICHOLAS FELD

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[1] *Supra.*

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Miscellaneous"

The Consul at Lourenço Marques (Lamm) to the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld)

CONFIDENTIAL LOURENÇO MARQUES, April 11, 1952.
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

DEAR MR. FELD: This is to acknowledge your letter of February 27,[1] with its interesting enclosure of a memorandum of conversation[2] on the Pafuri route. Your letter arrived here today, the pouch service is abominable.

Several comments of possible interest might be made in connection with the conversation. I should mention, first of all, that I am strongly in favor of the Pafuri route, which, long term, seems to be the only way out of the existing impasse. The question of strategic minerals seems to me rather more important than Stott admits. In a recent conversation with a South African engineer who is connected with the African Chrome Mines, he stated definitely that his company plans to send its chrome out by Pafuri. Whether his statement is true or not I do not know, Sam Sims doubtless has the answer to this, and Union Carbide can certainly throw light on the subject. This, of course, presupposes that we are still interested in Rhodesian chrome when the railway is finished.

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[1] Not found in Department of State files, but presumably similar to the letter printed *supra*.

[2] Presumably the memorandum of conversation of Feb. 20, p. 300.

It seems to me that MSA, and other agencies, as well as the Department, are putting unwarranted faith in the port of Beira. I am no engineer, railroad or otherwise, but I have heard the comments of many competent men on the subject of the Beira-Umtali railroad. In this connection, I suggest that, if you have not already done so, you should secure a copy of the report made by the railroad survey team which went over the three routes. I don't know what they wrote, but their private comments were anything but favorable as far as improving that line is concerned. George Clemens (MSA, Paris) also knows the situation. The point is, and this aspect has always been emphasized by the Portuguese engineers, that no matter how many docks you build, the railway is capable of only very limited improvement. The completion of the minerals wharf, late this year, will not prevent goods from piling up on the wharves in Beira because of rail difficulties.

Tied to this point is the fact that, down here, we have been led to believe that foreign trade to and from the Rhodesias is going to increase considerably over the coming years. Beira may be able to limp along, suffering periodic congestions, and handle a bit more traffic than at present. Never in this wide world, however, can that port handle anything like the volume of traffic that the Rhodesians I have met talk about. Here, of course, Sam Sims will know the answer as to whether there is a real prospect of rapid development of foreign trade.

Another aspect of the Pafuri route, which is of direct interest to us, is the shipping side. Every time Beira gets congested (and this will certainly happen again) American ships either have to skip the port, spend up to two months waiting for a berth, or try to get special treatment. Usually they do a little of all three, but it is a makeshift system at best. Moreover, as has often been pointed out, one ship sunk at the proper point in the Beira harbor by enemy action, and all traffic would stop.

The above comments should not be taken to mean that I don't think the Portuguese are doing the best they can with Beira. But privately (they will never admit it officially) they have little belief in its future. As to whether we should help finance the Pafuri route or not is a question on which I am not competent to express an opinion. There are too many factors about which I know nothing. My remarks, therefore, are only intended for background.

Yours sincerely, DONALD W. LAMM

845C.331/7–352

The Consul General at Salisbury (Sims) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SALISBURY, July 3, 1952.

No. 6

Subject: Meeting of DMPA and MSA Officials With Officials of the Southern Rhodesia Government on Transport and Coal Problems.

On June 28, 1952, the following persons attended a meeting in Salisbury at the office of the Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, to discuss problems of transport and coal affecting the production and movement of strategic materials in the Rhodesias.

Southern Rhodesia Government Officials

Sir Godfrey M. Huggins, Prime Minister
Mr. E. C. F. Whitehead, Minister of Finance
Mr. C. A. Davenport, Minister of Mines and Transport
Mr. A. H. Strachan, Secretary of the Treasury
Mr. W. F. Nicholas, Personal Secretary to the Prime Minister.

United States Officials

General T. B. Wilson, Regional Director, Defense Materials Procurement Agency, London.
Mr. G. F. Raymus, Railway Consultant, DMPA
Mr. G. Clemens, Transport Specialist, MSA, Paris.
Mr. F. R. LaMacchia, American Consul

General Wilson opened the discussion by stating that a continuous and smooth flow of materials in short supply to the United Kingdom and the United States was vital to the joint defense effort. He said that the United States Government recognized the serious problems of transport facing the Rhodesias in their attempt to develop and speed the flow of exports and expressed the desire of the United States Government to cooperate fully with Southern Rhodesia toward finding basic solutions to these problems. For this reason Mr. Raymus had been assigned to investigate and report on the rail situation in the Rhodesias.

General Wilson noted that the main problems relating to the production of strategic materials in the Rhodesias involved transport and coal. Pointing out that there were both long and short term solutions to the problem, he cited the Pafuri railway link as a long term improvement. As a short-term means of alleviating the railway situation he urged the adoption by the railways of Diesel locomotives. He cited the fact that six Diesels had been offered for sale to the Southern Rhodesia Government by Union Carbide but they had been refused. He urged the Government to reconsider Union Carbide's proposition suggesting a lease arrangement instead of outright purchase which he felt would be quite acceptable to Union Carbide. A possible objection that the American Diesels had only half the power of those which the Railways were negotiating to buy in the U.K. was resolved by Mr. Raymus who said the American Diesels could be used in pairs. General Wilson pointed out the fact that the Diesels were available immediately from Union Carbide while there was no indication when those from the U.K. could be obtained. The Diesels from the U.K. had not yet been ordered although apparently the Rhodesia Railways were committed to buy.

The Rhodesian officials agreed in principle with the suggestion to lease the Diesels from Union Carbide provided that personnel acquainted with their operation and maintenance were also provided and that there were no overriding technical objections advanced by the Railways' administration. The six Diesels, they observed, could be used on the Salisbury–Umtali line which the government had already agreed to Dieselize in the near future. This section of line had been selected because of its proximity to the port of entry for petroleum and the Diesel oil storage capacity at Umtali.

Mr. Whitehead stated that the "whole of the problem is the railways—the coal can be obtained." He said the railways were now unable to move all coal being produced at Wankie. In outlining the details of the difficulties faced by the railways, he emphasized the fact that railway trucks were being tied up in sidings and used for storage purposes because goods sheds were congested owing to the heavy movements in May of bulk cargoes from Beira and heavy traffic from the Union and locally. Other reasons for the shortage of coal cars include the following: 1) coal cars have been diverted to the heavy tobacco traffic because there were not enough covered wagons available, 2) heavy movements of copper in May (45,000 tons) reduced the number of coal cars available to Southern Rhodesia consumers and, 3) the African labor strike in Northern Rhodesia from the 12th to the 20th of May slowed down railway movements generally with its inevitable effect on the release of cars.

In addition to the shortage of coal cars, during the month of June there developed a serious shortage of locomotive power throughout the system owing to lack of coal at the main depots, excessive engine breakdowns and the near breakdown of the locomotive shed at Bulawayo Mr. Whitehead presented the following figures on locomotives ordered and in use:

Of 20 locomotives ordered from Germany, 19 have been delivered and are in use and one is to come. Of 10 French locomotives ordered, 5 were delivered and in use and 5 more were to come, 48 locomotives on order from the U. K. which were supposed to start arriving in October 1952 are not expected to arrive before January or February 1953. Thirteen South African locomotives which had been leased by the Rhodesia Railways have been returned to the Union. The net additional locomotives in use so far this year are, therefore, eleven and six more are to arrive later in the year. In general, the entire equipment of the railway is being employed to capacity; all locomotives are in use and there are no spares.

The Rhodesians claimed that they had lived up to the ECA allocation agreement but the railways were unable to deliver all coal allocated to the copperbelt. In June coal railings to the copper mines were 46,400 tons, a figure less than originally estimated but 1,630 tons higher than in May. On the other hand, saleable output had declined from the record May figure of 234,314 tons to 218,881 tons. Whereas 17,000 tons of coal had been dumped on the ground at Wankie during May, only a little over 1,000 tons were added to stocks in June for a total of 23,000 tons at the end of June. The Rhodesians said they had also tried to build up stocks of coal at the several power stations in accordance with their agreement with the International Bank but failed to do so. For a short while the stocks had been up to a seven day supply but swiftly fell back to a four days supply. In any case, stockpiling coal at the power stations has not affected the quantity of coal available to the copper mines.

In discussing the restrictions on the movement of copper and chrome the Rhodesian group acknowledged the fact that they had reduced railings of chrome and copper. Chrome was restricted to 20,000 tons a month to make way for the heavy tobacco traffic which is a far greater earner of revenue for the Railways than chrome. There was no possibility that chrome shipments would reach the target of 40,000 tons before March 1953. Copper movement was restricted to 30,000 tons monthly from the Northern Rhodesian copperbelt and 5,000 tons monthly from the Congo in order to provide more empty coal cars at Wankie for coal carriage to Southern Rhodesian consumers, who had apparently suffered abnormally the previous month during the period of heavy copper shipments.

Mr. Clemens and General Wilson reiterated the interest of the United States in cooperating with the Southern Rhodesia Government in solving their knotty railway problems and urged consideration of a technical assistance project under MSA auspices. They suggested that a group of Rhodesian railway personnel could profitably spend several months in the United States studying railway methods. The Rhodesians reacted favorably to the suggestion and noted that Mr. Allen of the Railways was already being considered for such an assignment under the State Department's Educational Exchange Program.

In discussing Southern Rhodesia's long range requirements for coal, General Wilson urged that the strip-mining method be considered as a possible alternative to the present system. Mr. Davenport replied that Powell-Duffryn, the Wankie management, had employed a company of experts on strip mining, the Paul Weir Company, and refused to use this method because they considered it no more efficient than the other. Mr. Davenport also pointed out the fact that Wankie Collieries were about to borrow additional funds locally and any hint that the

Government was considering the adoption of a new method of mining would have an adverse effect on Wankie's ability to obtain financing.

The discussion turned to the Pafuri rail link and Mr. Whitehead declared that the U.K. Government would not guarantee another IBRD loan for Southern Rhodesia because of a £50,000,000 limit on the Treasury's guarantee authority and the U.K.'s desire to spread the guarantee around to other members of the Commonwealth. However, if Northern Rhodesia were willing to undertake the loan (about £8,000,000) to defray the external costs of the project while Southern Rhodesia would pay local costs, the U.K. Treasury would be willing to guarantee the loan.

It appears to the Consulate General as if the United Kingdom is really less interested in spreading the guarantees around the Commonwealth than in spreading the risk, in as much as the loan project would be exactly the same whether Northern or Southern Rhodesia assumed the loan. Northern Rhodesia's financial position, by virtue of the sustained high prices for copper, the large and growing export surplus, and small public debt, is very strong and can easily sustain a loan of the magnitude required for the Pafuri link. Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, has been financing a considerable development program through large and continuous borrowing since 1947. Public fiscal policy in Southern Rhodesia is now one of consolidation and retrenchment rather than continued acceleration of borrowing and investment. This is not to say that the Government could not sustain the burden of further loans or that it does not require more loans but that it is more "loaned up" than Northern Rhodesia and that at present it is a lesser [*greater?*] credit risk than the Northern territory.

When asked what was Northern Rhodesia's reaction to the proposal to undertake the loan, Mr. Whitehead said that it would be referred to the Colonial Office for approval and it would be some time before he would know. (It has been learned since the meeting that a loan request has been submitted to the International Bank on behalf of Northern Rhodesia.)[1] In the meanwhile Southern Rhodesia had gone ahead with Pafuri and has awarded a contract for the construction of culverts on the first section of line (about 50 miles). This will require an expenditure out of general railway funds of £750,000 up to March 1953.

In spite of the obvious concern of General Wilson and his associates over the restrictions on copper and chrome movements, the Rhodesian officials apparently have no intention of removing these restrictions until the railway situation is eased by the arrival of new locomotives and coal cars now on order. Fortunately a quantity of rolling stock is expected to arrive in Beira this month and should help the situation somewhat by late August or September. Another hopeful factor is the improved phasing plan designed to prevent the bunching of bulk cargoes entering Beira. Except for timber there is now practically no bulk traffic destined for Northern Rhodesia at Beira.

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[1] The IBRD loaned Northern Rhodesia $14,000,000 on Mar. 11, 1953, for railway development. For further information, see the *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Tenth Annual Report: Appendices* (Washington, 1954–1955), pp. 18–19.

It is difficult to foresee any real improvement in the rail situation until the large numbers of rolling stock and locomotives on order are delivered and in use and until other parts of the railway rehabilitation program are completed such as the expansion of storage capacity at the goods sheds, enlarged warehouses at private sidings, and replacement of the obsolescent locomotive shed at Bulawayo. The investigation by Mr. Raymus should uncover a number of technical and perhaps managerial deficiencies which, if properly dealt with, would also improve the operation of the Railways.

HAROLD SIMS

ODA files, lot 60 D 512, "US–UK Colonial Talks, 1952"

Extract From Minutes of United States–United Kingdom Colonial Policy Discussions, Washington, September 25, 1952, 3–5:30 p.m.[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Subject:] Central African Federation

Sir John Martin:[2]

Sir John opened the discussion on the Central African Federation by stating that the United Kingdom was concerned over the comment on this matter in the Department's memorandum.[3] He understood the United States position on the competence of the General Assembly in this as in other issues, but he was disturbed by the further remarks in the United States paper concerning the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants. Sir John then quoted the following passage from the United States memorandum, ". . .[4] and we assume that the United Kingdom's traditional respect for the will of the indigenous inhabitants of its territories would prevent it from establishing a federation against the wishes of these inhabitants. We believe that such a step might damage the United Kingdom's reputation for wisdom and justice in its relations with dependent peoples, and might jeopardize efforts of the West to maintain the friendship of Africans". Sir John commented that these were very serious words and, in order to clarify the situation he wished to briefly review the background of this question. He emphasized that what he was about to say was of the most confidential nature, but that among friends he felt that he could speak frankly.

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[1] Regarding these U.S.–U.K. talks, see vol. III, pp. 1258 ff.

[2] British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs.

[3] For text of the memorandum, dated Sept. 20, see vol. III, p. 1245.

[4] The ellipsis appears in the source text.

There were two principal reasons behind the United Kingdom government's plans to establish a Central African Federation. The first of these was economic. A very careful and detailed study had been made of the economic problems of the area by experts acting in a completely objective manner. This study had made a very strong, if not over-whelming, case for federation of the three territories. The principal conclusions of the study had been that rapid economic development of the area would not be possible without federation. Without such economic development, the territories would not be able to finance the social services which were urgently needed and desired.

The second reason concerned the racial problem south of the Limpopo river. Unless Southern Rhodesia could be brought into a larger unit with its neighbors to the north, it seemed clear that South African influence would spread north, eventually overtaking each of the Central African territories and reaching into East Africa. Federation seemed to offer the last chance to stop this trend at the Limpopo.

Sir John went on to point out that the principal opposition to the federation scheme had come from groups whose primary interest was in the welfare of the Africans. These people seemed to believe that federation would result in an expansion of the racial policies of Southern Rhodesia. They maintained that there would be only a technical constitutional check on the domination of the federation by Southern Rhodesia, and as a result they feared that final control from London over Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would come to an end.

The United Kingdom government believes these fears to be unjustified. The form of the federation will leave control of such matters as education and land in the hands of the individual territories. The position of Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia will be safeguarded by the continued control from London over the constitutional arrangements controlling the federation of the three territories.

Sir John then turned to the question of the wishes of the inhabitants as raised in the Department's memorandum. He posed the question as to what these wishes really were. The great mass of Africans, he maintained, do not know the issues involved There was a small, vocal section of the African population which was opposed to the scheme and which had resorted to unscrupulous methods in influencing other Africans.

In any event, Sir John pointed out that the entire matter was to be thoroughly discussed in a conference in London at which all points of view would be represented.[5] Sir John emphasized that London was not lighthearted in considering its responsibilities for the African people. They were not disregarding African interests, and if they decided to go through with their present plan, it would be because the United Kingdom feels it to be in the interest of the inhabitants. He stated that there was no way to determine the wishes of the inhabitants. Some had suggested that, in view of this situation, they should wait until African opinion has developed further; the United Kingdom feels, however, that it cannot wait.

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[5] No Africans attended the conference which was convened at the beginning of 1953.

Mr. Gerig:[6]

Mr. Gerig stated that the clarifying remarks by Sir John were most helpful. He pointed out that the matter had been initially raised by the United Kingdom in its memorandum to the Department.[7] We were, of course, very interested in the problem.

Mr. Hickerson:[8]

Mr. Hickerson suggested that perhaps the phrasing of the Department's comment quoted by Sir John was unnecessarily stiff. The Department was seeking information from the United Kingdom on this matter; it was particularly interested in information concerning the problem of African opinion. He did not wish the United Kingdom to feel that the United States was delivering a lecture on this issue. We were genuinely interested in this difficult question; Sir John's explanations had been most helpful.

Sir John Martin:

Sir John reiterated that whatever was done, there seemed to be no way to determine the wishes of the inhabitants. In a sense he felt that the United Kingdom had made the job harder for itself by taking into account African opinion. At the time that the federation plan was first put forward, the United Kingdom had instructed its officials in the territories to express no opinion either way on the merits of the proposal. They were to take a strictly neutral position in order to permit African opinion to develop by itself. This however had been puzzling to many Africans who were accustomed to seeking advice and counsel on such matters from their District Commissioners. When they discovered that their District Commissioners would not express an opinion on the plan, many Africans concluded that there must be something wrong with it.

Turning to the United Nations aspect of the question, Sir John assumed that the United States would agree to use its influence to keep the matter from arising in the United Nations since the Department's memorandum indicated that the United States agreed that such a discussion would not be useful.[9]

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[6] O. Benjamin Gerig was the director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (UND).

[7] Reference is to the British *aide-mémoire* of Sept. 3 and its annex entitled "Colonial Questions in the United Nations, 1952." (645K.51T3/9–352)

[8] John D. Hickerson was Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

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[9] The actual statement in the memorandum of Sept. 20 read: "With regard to the possibility of a Central African Federation, we note the statement of the United Kingdom that it is by no means certain that a Federal Authority will in fact be set up. This being the case, we agree that the General Assembly should not discuss such hypothetical issues when it has so many real issues to consider. Because of our view of the General Assembly's wide powers under Article 10, however, we could not support the United Kingdom's views that the establishment of the federation is a constitutional subject and thus outside the competence of the General Assembly, or the United Kingdom view that this question is a matter of domestic jurisdiction."

945C.61/10-3052: Telegram

The Consul General at Salisbury (Hoover) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SALISBURY, October 30, 1952—6 p. m.

47. Local press quotes political correspondent *London Times* [1] saying US Govt much interested federation and will send minister when accomplished. Basis US interest said expand private investment.

Publication this item has encouraged federation, undermined neutral position ConGen and weakened ConGen standing US representative.

Whether Rhodesians will approve federation highly uncertain. If Dept wishes remain uncommitted, suggest instruction ConGen give press statement that effect. Advantage remaining uncommitted is possibility influencing SR adopt more liberal race policies event federation successful.

HOOVER

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[1] The story actually appeared in the *Financial Times* of London as Hoover indicated in his despatch 62 to the Department of State on Oct. 31, 1952 (770.00/10-3152).

945C.61/10-3052: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Salisbury [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 4, 1952—5:35 p. m.

32. Dept much concerned effect of reaction to statement attributed to polit correspondent *London Times* [2] qted SR press as reported ConGentel 47 Oct 30.[3]

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London; drafted by Feld of the Bureau of African Affairs (AF); and cleared by the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (BNA), the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (UND), the Economic and Investment Staff (ED), and the Mutual Security Agency (MSA).

[2] The correct reference is the *Financial Times* of London.

[3] *Supra.*

Dept agrees that in order reestablish neutral position ConGen and to remove from minds of gen public in Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the notion that USGovt is not completely uncommitted and neutral on the complex issue federation, ConGen shld issue fol statement to SR press.

"It has come to the attn of the USGovt that the Southern Rhodesian press has recently qted the polit correspondent of the *London Times* to the effect that the USGovt is much interested in federation as a basis for expanding private investment in the proposed federated area and will accredit a dipl representative with the rank of Minister to the fed capital when federation is accomplished.

"In view of the publication of this statement by the Southern Rhodesian press and the attn it may have attracted in Brit Central Africa, the Amer ConGen in Salisbury is authorized to state that the USGovt is maintaining an impartial attitude on the question of federation. The USGovt therefore believes it necessary to emphasize that the statement attributed to the polit correspondent of the *London Times* does not reflect the attitude of the USGovt."

ConGen shld check carefully wording first para above quote to insure it summarizes local press accurately.

Cable reaction to publication above statement.

BRUCE

945C.61/11–752 : Telegram

The Consul General at Salisbury (Hoover) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SALISBURY, November 7, 1952—11 a. m.

52. Although wide publication Cent Afr *Financial Times* story US Govt much interested Federation caused flurry, reaction died down. Had statement (Deptel 32, Nov 4 [1]) been published immed after *Times* story desirable effect would have been achieved. However, publication now would have undesirable effect.

Politically unsophisticated public would probably interpret it as meaning (1) US not impartial but opposed Fed, (2) impartiality a new policy representing views newly elected US admin.

ConGen proposed hold statement for future use should situation warrant.

Meanwhile ConGen has made US position clear to PriMin, is writing Welensky and chief secs NR and Nyasaland that effect, and has instructed staff lose no opportunity present impartial viewpoint in official and private conversations.

HOOVER

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[1] *Supra.*

945C.61/11-752: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Salisbury[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 14, 1952—6:07 p. m.

38. Dept appreciates urtel 52[2] re *Financial Times* story and agrees with your proposal hold text statement contained Deptel 32[3] for future use shld situation warrant. Accordingly shld alleged US position again be referred in press, public speeches, legis debates etc. you are instrd release statement to local press with such minor drafting changes as appear to be necessary. Dept also suggests you incorporate in text statement if released point that USGovt has been closely fol Federation question since its inception as matter gen internatl interest but has consistently felt this complex question for determination by govts and peoples concerned.

In view great effect outcome Federation issue may have on public opinion in Af as well as overseas and in UN where matter recently mentioned[4] Dept considers it very important USGovt's attitude of impartiality be publicized if repetition *Financial Times* incident occurs.

BRUCE

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London; drafted by Feld of the Bureau of African Affairs (AF); and cleared by the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (UND), the Economic and Investment Development Staff (ED), and the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (BNA).

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated Nov. 4, p. 313.

[4] This happened at the Oct. 24, 1952 meeting of the Trusteeship Committee. For further information, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Fourth Committee, Trusteeship*, p. 32.

125.8245/12-452

The Consul General at Salisbury (Hoover) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SALISBURY, December 4, 1952.

No. 96

Ref: Despatches Nos. 87,[1] 90[2] and 95[3] of Nov. 24, 28 and Dec. 30, 1952.

Subject: Government at First Suspicious of Consulate General's Efforts to Establish Direct Contacts with Africans, but is Now Helping.

Believing that it is necessary and in our interest to have direct contact with Africans in order to be able to appraise their feelings, attitudes and opinions, I have endeavored to establish some direct contacts during the past several weeks. From the beginning, however,

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[1] Not printed; it discussed a visit to a "Native Purchase Area" in Southern Rhodesia. (123 Hoover, John P.)

[2] Not printed; it described a visit to Goromonzi School. (123 Hoover, John P.)

[3] Not printed; it included additions to and corrections in the abovementioned despatches 87 and 90. (123 Hoover, John P.)

I was aware that I would have to proceed cautiously and with the utmost discretion if I was not to impair the Consulate General's standing with the local government authorities.

. . . .

About four weeks ago, when seated next to Brigadier J. A. Appleby, commanding officer of the British South African Police, at dinner in Government House I spoke to him of my interest in establishing direct contact with the Africans. Appleby bristled: "For what purpose?" I explained that it would be for the purpose of having first-hand sources of information, on the basis of which I could accurately appraise African opinion. Appleby then said that if I wanted to know what the Africans were thinking, he could tell me exactly and at any time. But, if I wanted to have direct contact with them—well, he thought he'd have to consult the Prime Minister.

Some days later I called on Mr. Lionel Powys-Jones, Secretary for Native Affairs, and, during the course of a sociable chat, mentioned again my desire to have direct contact with Africans. Mr. Powys-Jones was both surprised and suspicious. I explained in some detail why I wanted to talk directly with Africans and he thought it would be a matter both difficult and delicate. Difficult because there were no real leaders of African opinion—"They speak only for themselves, not for masses of followers," he said. And delicate because he was afraid the Africans with whom I talked would misinterpret my purpose, or would think that they had found an ally to help them fight against imagined grievances. However, he said Southern Rhodesia was a free country and if I wanted to go out and talk to people—anyone I chose, including Africans—he supposed there was nothing to prevent my doing so, though he hoped I'd be cautious and discreet.

When I pointed out that it was because I realized that the matter was of some delicacy that I had consulted him before doing anything about my desire, he asked for a few days to "think it over". "This is the first time that any foreign government official has ever asked such a thing of me," he said.

A few days later, Mr. Powys-Jones called me to say that he had thought the matter over and wanted to know if he couldn't arrange for me to visit some of the "Native" areas to talk to some of the Africans. He said I would be perfectly free to discuss any subject with them—though he was confident I'd be discreet and not give the Africans any false ideas. When I accepted his offer, he arranged my trip to the Muda area, and a later one to the Goromonzi School.

I have permitted Mr. Powys-Jones to read the unclassified despatches reporting on the foregoing two trips. He expressed the view that the observations and judgments were "very fair", and offered to arrange another trip (for next Tuesday) to a Native Reserve.

I have made a point to try to convince Mr. Powys-Jones that I think Southern Rhodesia's record in dealing with the Africans is a good one and that it is to Southern Rhodesia's interest to see that the United States Government is correctly informed. He appears to be convinced and is now planning various ways and means of helping the Consulate General accomplish its purpose.

[Here follows a discussion of the objectivity of an American researcher.]

JOHN P. HOOVER

845C.316/12–552 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Salisbury[1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, January 7, 1953.

A–24. Reference your despatch No. 100, December 5, 1952.[2]

Attracting private American capital to Africa has been much discussed in the OEEC and by MSA and the various Metropole governments. The British in particular have indicated their interest in this. They have told our representatives that they are doing everything possible to encourage U.S. investment in the DOT's. When we have told them that interested American businessmen often receive frosty receptions at the hands of colonial officials they have asked for specific examples. Unfortunately although we are aware this is true specific cases are hard to find which cannot be explained away on one ground or other. This is particularly true of Africa, where few Americans have yet ventured. To a large extent the difficulty in finding good examples lies in the fact that few businessmen complain to U.S. authorities of their treatment.

In light of the heightened discussions on encouraging U.S. investment abroad recent examples of where American investors are refused access will be carefully checked. The reasons for rejection should reveal the intentions and sincerity of the Metropole governments. The example of the American brewery in Northern Rhodesia appears to be a case in point. Although it is possible that the fostering of American breweries abroad might not be considered the most desirable type of capital development, it should be remembered that the success or failure of one American investor in an area plays an important role in the decisions of other would-be investors. If an American brewery proves successful in Northern Rhodesia it would tend to attract other investments in other fields of manufacturing.

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[1] The airgram was drafted by Douglas B. Smith of the Investment and Economic Development Staff and was cleared by the Bureau of African Affairs (AF), the Division of Foreign Reporting (REP), and the Commerce Department.

[2] Not printed; it summarized the arguments for and against the opening of an American brewery in Northern Rhodesia. Welensky favored it, but others believed there were enough breweries and that a new one would draw off labor needed in other industries. (845C.316/12–552)

At the present time the Commerce Department has no information on the case cited in your despatch but shares the Department's interest in any available information on the matter. The statement by Mr. Welensky indicates to some degree the reasons why the American investor was refused. Further information is required touching on the validity of the reasons given. These questions bear on the size of the market, whether the price at which beer sells is competitive, whether the establishment of the brewery would involve an exchange problem in Northern Rhodesia and to what extent, and what, if any, role existing establishment played in influencing the rejection of the U.S. proposal. Also would like the name of the American firm involved so that contact can be made in this country if necessary.[3] Priority 3.

ACHESON

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[3] No response to this request was found in Department of State files.

611.70/5–853

The Consul General at Salisbury (Hoover) to the Department of State

RESTRICTED SALISBURY, May 8, 1953.

No. 256

Ref: Despatch 238, April 15, 1953[1]

Subject: United States Policy Toward Central Africa: Facts, Discussion and Recommendations.

I have the honor to submit for your consideration some thoughts with respect to United States policy toward Central Africa. These have been based on what I believe to be the realities of the present situation and the national interest of the United States.

[Here follows a description of the Central African Federation and an expression of personal opinions on related matters.]

III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A. *Importance of Central Africa.* From the viewpoint of the national self-interest of the United States, the importance of Central Africa is based on the:

1. Present large and potentially greater production of minerals (copper, asbestos, chrome, cobalt among others) and the probability of important reserves of uranium.
2. Potential capacity of this large area to provide homes and livelihoods for surplus population from Free World countries, and a surplus of agricultural and industrial production.
3. Contribution that its military forces (land and air) can make to the defense of the Free World.
4. Reasonable hope that the success so far achieved in developing a harmonious multi-racial society may assure political, economic and

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[1] Not printed; it analyzed the vote approving the Central African Federation. (745C.00/4–1553)

social stability in Central Africa, which may serve as an example to other areas where similar problems have been handled less successfully.

5. Possibility that the Federation may become the foundation on which an even larger political unit may eventually be built, thereby offering a reasonable hope that a broader area of political, economic and social stability within Africa may result.

B. *United States Interests in Central Africa.* American interests in Central Africa are represented by the following:

1. An estimated $250,000,000 in private investments, mostly in minerals production.
2. Loans and grants by United States government agencies totalling $30,200,000.
3. United States interest in loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, totalling $42,000,000.
4. The value of Central African exports to the United States and other Free World countries, approximately $425,000,000 annually.
5. The value of imports into Central Africa from the United States, now approximately $20,000,000 annually.
6. The work, activity and financial contributions of American missionary groups operating in this area. (No figure can be given here; but, from a domestic United States political viewpoint, the importance of these groups is suggested by the fact that the Protestant groups represent and are supported by church memberships in the United States totalling about twenty million people. While individual Americans serving here with Roman Catholic missions are not identified separately as "American", it may be assumed that the Roman Catholic population of the United States has an interest in Roman Catholic missionary activities in Central Africa.)
7. The activities of a number of private Americans engaged in farming, ranching, engineering and trade.

C. *Historical Role of the United States with Respect to Central Africa.* While American popular interest in Central Africa probably dates from the Stanley-finds-Livingstone affair in the latter part of the last century, United States official interest was expressed by its participation in the Conference of Berlin and its signature of the General Act of the Conference on February 26, 1885. (This Act and the various so-called "Congo Basin treaties" negotiated there apply to much of the new Federation's territory.)[3] Whether there was any official interest in Empire-Builder Cecil Rhodes' exploits and vision, individual Americans helped Rhodes in his projects from 1889 onwards. Almost immediately thereafter, American missionary groups began moving into the area, and American mining engineers (notably John Hays Hammond) were recruited to help in the development of Southern Rhodesia's mines. American capital and technicians played a primary role in the modern development of Northern Rhodesia's rich "Copperbelt." In recent years, Johns-Manville Corporation has invested substantially in asbestos production, and the Vanadium Corporation of America and Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation have increased investment and activity with respect to chrome. American technicians and specialists have provided technical knowledge and guidance required in the development of the important tobacco industry. An American missionary laid the foundation of the present native agricultural policy of Southern Rhodesia.[3]

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[3] Congress withheld ratification of the General Act of Berlin.

Official acts of the United States since World War II have included loans and grants by Government agencies for the development of minerals production and the improvement of transportation, and United States support in the International Bank for loans for similar purposes.[4]

The most positive expression of United States official interest in Central Africa was the opening of this Consulate General in May 1950.

The already large and rapidly growing number of Americans visiting Central Africa is evidence of a growing interest in this area on the part of private individuals and Government. These travelers include the following principal classes: (1) Government officials, (2) businessmen—mining engineers and executives, tobacco technicians and traders, (3) missionary personnel, and (4) influential tourists. If Latin America may be considered a precedent, the continued flow of such visitors may be expected to result eventually in increased private investment interest.

C. [*D.*] *Objectives of United States Policy.* It is believed that the overall objectives of United States policy toward Central Africa might be stated to be the following:

1. To obtain a continued and increased supply of needed minerals and other materials for the United States and the Free World.
2. To help in the achievement of political, economic and social stability as a basis for further growth and development.
3. To maintain and increase opportunities for American participation in Central Africa's trade and economic development.
4. To make sure that the peoples and governments of Central Africa continue friendly and cooperative with the United States, support the international actions and policies of the United States and become increasingly responsive to United States leadership in world affairs.

IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. *General Recommendations Regarding Central Africa.* The following policy actions and lines of policy are recommended with respect to Central Africa:

1. Through United States Government loans (and grants to a mimimum extent if they are determined to be in our self-interest) and through loans by international agencies, or through providing tech-

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[3] Emory Delmont Alvord was an agricultural missionary who later entered into the service of the Southern Rhodesian Government.

[4] For further documentation on this subject, see pp. 1 ff.

nical assistance, support acceptable projects for increasing production of:

(*a*) minerals and other materials needed by the United States or the Free World, and
(*b*) agricultural, principally food, products.

2. Encourage the development of mineral and agricultural production, the development of secondary industries and the improvement of distribution and merchandising through United States private investment.

3. Encourage and, where possible, assist in the strengthening of political, economic and social stability within Central Africa itself and thereby, by example, elsewhere in the continent.

4. Encourage and, where possible, assist in the accelerated political, economic and social development of the African peoples.

5. View benevolently and encourage the realization of sound schemes for broader political and/or economic association among African territories south of the Sahara, provided such schemes are based on principles which, in the view of the United States, are conducive to the development of a harmonious multi-racial society and are acceptable to the American conscience.

6. Continually seek to develop more intimate relations with the inhabitants of Central Africa through information and cultural exchange programs, directed at both the white and African populations, for the purposes of increasing knowledge and understanding of the United States and what our country stands for, and winning thereby enlightened support for our policies.

B. *Specific Recommendations for United States Official Action in Recognition of the Creation of a Central African Federation.* 1. *Immediate Actions.* It is the recommendation of the Consulate General that the United States take the following actions, which would be regarded as evidence of United States interest in the development of Central Africa:

(*a*) Increase the weight and prestige of United States representation by appointing a Minister to the new Federal Government.

This action is considered desirable in order to place American representation on a par with the representation of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, American interests in Central Africa being as great, if not greater, than the material interests of either of these countries. Whether it is considered appropriate to send a Minister to a country which is not fully sovereign, it is pointed out that both the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa have already established this precedent. By appointing High Commissioners (the equivalent of Ambassadors or Ministers), a type of intra-Commonwealth representation reserved for Dominions, they have recognized the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia as already having the status of a Dominion. If not strictly a Dominion *de jure*, Southern Rhodesia is a Dominion *de facto*. The new Federation will be even closer to full Dominion status than Southern Rhodesia is now. The suggested timing for the appointment of a Minister is immediately following the appointment of a Governor-General by the Crown, probably in July or August.

Prior to the appointment of a Minister, or if the Department should be unwilling to appoint a Minister, a similar effect could be achieved by giving the Consul General at Salisbury the personal rank of Minister, as provided in the *Foreign Service Manual*, Vol. I, Part IV, Subchapter 610, Section 613.2. It is recommended that this be done as soon as enabling legislation, already approved by the House of Commons, has received the approval of the Crown.

(*b*) Provide the Mission, or Consulate General, with a staff commensurate with the work opportunities in this area. Specifically, the following are recommended:

(i) Open a vice-consulate at Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia.
(ii) Initiate a IIA program.
(iii) Add the following positions to the complement at Salisbury:
    1 agricultural reporting officer,
    1 minerals reporting officer and
    1 Defense (air) Attaché.

The above recommendations reflect no desire to build up a local bureaucracy. It is known that in this area, which as far as the United States is concerned is virtually "unexplored", there would be more than enough useful work for all to do. These recommendations are made in spite of known policy for personnel reduction (which the writer heartily approves). It might be, however, that a world-wide reappraisal of Foreign Service personnel needs and a redistribution of personnel resources would make additional staff available for duty here. The development of Central Africa, though remarkable to date, is really only just beginning.

(*c*) Invite the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia (who will certainly be the first Prime Minister of the Federation)[5] to the United States on an official visit. It is known that such an invitation would be pleasing to him and the appropriate time for the visit would be early in 1954.

2. *Longer-term Actions.* It is recommended that the following actions be considered for carrying out as soon as the new Federal Government is sufficiently well organized to enter into negotiations and cooperative arrangements. At the earliest, this time will probably not be prior to late 1954 or early 1955.

(*a*) Invite the Federal Government to enter into negotiations for an Agreement of Commerce and Economic Development, adapted from the pattern of post-war treaties of that type entered into by the United States. The signature of such an Agreement would not only set forth the conditions under which private investment would be stimulated, but would serve as an important means of publicizing the private investment opportunities in Central Africa.

(*b*) Offer to organize, in cooperation with the new Federal Government, and working through MSA, TCA, or international agencies, a survey of the technical and financial assistance requirements of Central Africa.

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[5] Godfrey Huggins did, in fact, become the first Federal Prime Minister.

3. *Other Actions.* During the next few years, give sympathetic consideration to assisting, technically and financially, the following development projects, which fall within the framework of the present policy recommendations:

(*a*) Construction of the Sinoia–Kafue railway link, which would expedite traffic from the Copperbelt by shortening rail distance to the port of Beira by 527 miles.

(*b*) Construction of the Kariba Gorge hydroelectric project (*not* the Kafue Scheme) to provide an important source of cheap power for the further expansion of minerals production and industrial development in both Rhodesias.

(*c*) Development of the Sabi Valley to provide a major new source of agricultural production from an irrigated area of 250,000 acres, and a further source of important minerals such as coal, iron, limestone, phosphates, copper, tungsten, tin and chromite. Within a few years, results from present crop tests in an experimental irrigation area should make judgment possible regarding the practicability of the long-range scheme.

(*d*) Road construction in the three territories to supplement and compete with the railways. Much of the difficulty with transport in Central Africa has been the reluctance of governments to encourage the development of road transport because of their financial interest in the railroads.

(*e*) Specific mining properties which from time to time emerge as important sources of strategic minerals.

(*f*) Development of an over-all program of technical cooperation. Consideration should be given in this connection to the possibility of encouraging certain types of technical assistance through private philanthropic foundations or through missionary organizations. (Whether government-church cooperation is possible is an idea which might usefully be explored. Perhaps the Federal Council of Churches, the American Friends Service Committee, etc., might have some suggestions.)

There being nothing in this despatch which, in the view of the writer, could not bear public examination either here or in the United States, it has been given a low security classification. It is submitted in an effort to contribute to the formulation of United States policy toward Central Africa. This area, it is proposed, is a highly strategic place in which to develop and carry out a constructive United States policy, fulfilling our responsibility of leadership and contributing, in our own national interest, to the solution of problems in Africa South of the Sahara.

John P. Hoover

V. Addendum

A draft of this despatch (Assumption, Sections I, II,[6] III and IV–A only) have been read by and discussed with the following persons in Southern Rhodesia, all of whom expressed agreement with

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[6] Only Sections III and IV are printed.

the contents. All agreed that it was a "fair statement of the position" in Central Africa. It will be observed that these men occupy positions of responsibility and represent different segments of political and religious opinion.

Major General Sir John Kennedy, Governor of Southern Rhodesia.
Sir Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.
Mr. R. O. Stockil, Leader of the Opposition.
Sir Ernest Lucas Guest, prominent non-partisan public figure.
Rt. Reverend E. F. Paget, Bishop of the Church of England.
Rt. Reverend A. I. Chichester, Roman Catholic Bishop.
Rev. J. Kennedy Grant, Church of Scotland.

A draft of Sections I and II of this despatch was read to Apa B. Pant, Commissioner of the Government of India, and formerly, it is understood, a spokesman for India in the United Nations. Mr. Pant also expressed full agreement. He added that there was no conflict here between the interests of the United States (or Western Civilization) and India. He remarked that Civilization, whether Western or Asiatic, could not be indifferent to a state of backwardness or turmoil in Central Africa. He said that Civilization is distinguished by its acceptance of a supernatural source of Authority and makes common cause against Communism, which recognizes no supernatural Authority.

It was emphasized to all that the despatch in no way represented official United States policy, but that it contained only the writer's personal ideas and recommendations. Care was taken, moreover, to avoid raising any false hopes. However, discussion of these matters with the above has unquestionably made the relations of the Consulate General and the local authorities more open and intimate.

In the drafting of this despatch, valuable critical and analytical assistance has been received from Consul Frank R. LaMacchia, who was primarily responsible for the drafting of specific projects listed in Section IV–B–3 (*a* through *f*).

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Memoranda–1953"

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Under Secretary of State for Administration (Lourie)[1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] June 19, 1953.

Subject: Assignment to the Consulate General, Salisbury, of Principal Officer with Service Rank of Minister.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Feld and Durnan of NEA/AF and Sims of NEA/EX and sent through Wailes, the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. The source text, a carbon copy, bears no marks or endorsements to confirm that it actually was sent to Lourie.

Discussion:

Within the next three months a new federal state will be established in Central Africa comprising the present territories of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This new government will be known as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and will have its capital in Salisbury. This decision constitutes one of the most favorable political developments yet to take place in Africa. There is every indication that with proper guidance from the British, as well as encouragement from the United States, this new government will achieve far-reaching benefits in the white man's current struggle to better race relations, enhance economic conditions and stabilize the growing divergent political factors in Central Africa.

As a first step in the formation of this new state, the British Government will appoint a high-ranking Governor General to the federal government, and he is expected to arrive at Salisbury in August 1953 (persons of the prominence of Lord Louis Mountbatten have been mentioned for this post, but not confirmed). It is believed, that the establishment of this new government warrants an elevation in the prestige of our Consulate General. This is consistent with our representation at such posts as Hong Kong and Singapore which are headed by Principal Officers with the rank of Minister and Consul General. Our office at Salisbury will remain a Consulate General, and the assignment of an officer with the rank of Minister will not materially increase the cost.

An American representative with the service rank of Career Minister will demonstrate the importance the United States attaches to the successful implementation of the new federal state, and our sincere interest in Central Africa as an area vital to the welfare of the Free World and one in which the British concept of racial "Partnership" will be given a crucial test.

The new federal state will have a combined area of about 488,000 square miles and a total population of over 6,000,000. The three territories produce large quantities of tobacco, tea, tung oil, cotton and food crops. The area has deposits of virtually every mineral on the United States strategic list. Mineral production consists of gold, asbestos, chrome, coal, iron, copper, lead, zinc and vanadium.

United States interests in Central Africa are represented by the following:

1. An estimated $250 million in private investments, mostly in mining;
2. Loans and grants by the United States Government totaling $30.2 million;
3. United States interest in loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development totaling $42 million;
4. Central African exports to the United States and other Free World countries valued at $425 million annually;

5. Imports from the United States valued at about $20 million annually;

6. Extensive activity and financial contributions of American missionary groups throughout the area;

7. Growing activities of private Americans engaged in farming, ranching, engineering and private trade.

Recommendation:

That a Consul General with the service rank of Minister be assigned to Salisbury as the Principal Officer at such time as a new Governor General is appointed by the British Government.

[Here follows a recommendation of a person for the position who ultimately was not appointed.]

845C.191 BU/7–853: Telegram

President Eisenhower to the Governor of Southern Rhodesia (Kennedy) [1]

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1953—11:07 a.m.

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your very gracious message stating that you and your Ministers would welcome a visit by a representative of the United States Government to the Rhodes Centenary Exhibition at Bulawayo.

It gives me great pleasure to accept, on behalf of this Government, your kind invitation and to inform you that I have designated Mr. William H. Ball of Muncie, Indiana, to attend the Exhibition as my Special Representative, with the personal rank of Minister.

I shall convey to Mr. Ball the generous invitation that he stay with you and Lady Kennedy at Government House in Bulawayo from August 5 to 8 and of your willingness to arrange a tour of Southern Rhodesia for him.

Please accept my sincere thanks for your personal message of greetings and good wishes which I most heartily reciprocate.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Durnan of AF and Muir of S/S–PR and cleared by the White House.

811.05145C/7–2753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Salisbury [1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, July 27, 1953—4:36 p.m.

10. In talks Ball may have Rhodesian officials regarding possibilities private American investment there, he should point out large flow

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[1] The telegram was drafted by Feld of AF and cleared by Thompson of the Investment and Economic Development Staff (ED).

investment should not be expected follow automatically on implementation Federation and volume will depend on attractiveness Federation investment opportunities as against other areas, including United States, and Federation's development of favorable climate for foreign private capital. Ball might inquire as to (1) areas Federal economy welcoming private investment; (2) assurances respecting remission profits, repatriation capital; (3) guarantees of treatment no less favorable than that accorded local capital.

NY Times July 26 carried Albion Ross interview with Prime Minister stating Huggins indicated Federation looking US for "billions of dollars" commercial investment for development. While story may not have reported with complete accuracy Huggins' views and is not of serious concern, Ball should nevertheless emphasize obstacles impeding foreign investment, as counterweight to over-optimistic Rhodesian expectations.[3]

While article avoids question public investment, keep in mind present Congressional attitude will limit foreign aid programs to 1955.

DULLES

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[3] See airgram A-24 of Jan. 7, 1953, p. 317.

745.00/7-3053

The Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Tibbetts) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

LONDON, July 30, 1953.

No. 542

Subject: Central African Federation.

1. *The Order in Council Containing the Constitution:*

The final steps in the creation of the Federation of Central Africa are rapidly being taken and a new stage in the political development of this area will soon be under way. On July 14 Parliament passed the Enabling Bill under which the Order in Council setting up this constitution was to be promulgated. On July 27 the House of Commons and on July 28 the House of Lords agreed to the Order in Council itself.

The Government expects the Queen to sign the Order in Council on August 1. Shortly thereafter the first Governor General, Lord Llewellin, will be named and he is to leave for Central Africa on August 12. During the interim period—August, 1953 to January, 1954— he will take the necessary steps to set the Constitution in motion. These steps are outlined in the first section of the Order in Council, copies of which are enclosed.[2] A considerable number of these provisions have to do with such matters as the transfer of assets to the Federal Government, establishment of a Federal Service etc. During this period he will not be bound by the wishes of the Executive Council but will report to the British Government (presumably the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations). By January, 1954 it is hoped that the permanent provisions of the Constitution will have come in force (by proclamation of the Governor General) and the Federal Elections will be held. The permanent provisions of the Constitution are contained in the Annex to the enclosed Order.

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[1] This despatch was approved by the Counselor of the Embassy in London, James K. Penfield.

The Annex setting out the Constitution closely follows the Federal Scheme (Cmd. 8754) Embdes 3647 of Feb. 10, 1953;[3] on page 55 there is a table showing which sections of the Order refer to the numbered paragraphs of the Scheme.

Of particular interest in the enclosed Order is the item defining "external affairs." The Commonwealth Relations Office anticipates that at an early date the British Government will present the interested Governments, including the United States, with a note officially informing them of the international position of the Federation. The main interest of the United States is as a participant in the Congo Basin treaties. The Constitution places External Affairs on the Federal Legislative List and defines this item as follows:

"1. External Affairs, that is to say—

"(*a*) such external relations as may from time to time be entrusted to the Federation by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom; and

"(*b*) the implementation of treaties, conventions and agreements with, and other obligations towards, countries or organizations outside the Federation affecting the Federation as a whole or any one or more of the Territories, whether entered into—

"(i) either before or after the date of the coming into force of this Constitution, by Her Majesty, or by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on behalf of the Federation or any of the Territories; or

"(ii) after the said date by the Federation with the authority of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom; or

"(iii) before the said date, by any of the Territories with the said authority;

"but not including relations between United Kingdom and any of the Territories."

2. *The Africans:*

The officer who is at present working on Central African problems (a Colonial Office man seconded to the Commonwealth Relations Office) says that there is every indication that the Africans in Northern and Southern Rhodesia will accept the fact of Federation, will run for office under its provisions and will seize the opportunity which it offers for their entrance into political life. Nyasaland is a different story, largely because of Michael Scott [4] and Hastings Banda,[5] and no one can predict what the Nyasaland Africans will ultimately do. The officials are fairly well reconciled to Scott's activities for they consider him a fanatic who, in a sense, knows not what he does, but the results are no less displeasing and difficult.

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[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed; it included the text of the Federal Scheme prepared by the London Conference of January 1953 as published on Feb. 5, 1953 and the text of the supplemental report by the Conference on Federation. (745C.00/2–1053)

3. *Embassy Comments:*

Now that this milestone in the history of Central Africa has been passed, it may be worthwhile to review briefly some of the salient points. Too much of the public discussion on this subject in the UK has been submerged in Party politics and personalities; Labor politicians have exploited Mr. Lyttelton's alleged insensitivity to the limit while Conservatives have replied with diatribes against Mr. Griffiths' "weakness." The fact that Mr. Lyttelton did in the early stages of Parliamentary discussion of this problem handle his case with superb ineptitude and that Mr. Griffiths has conducted himself throughout with at least one eye on the Labor dissidents is not, after all, strictly germane to the question of Federation.

It should not be forgotten that the Colonial Office since early 1951 has been determined to secure Central African Federation. Its reasons were, in brief, (*a*) the "threat" from South Africa, (*b*) the impossibility of making the Central African Council work in the face of Southern Rhodesian opposition, and (*c*) the conviction that the situation in Central Africa could not remain static in the face of steadily mounting pressure from Europeans in the area for increased political rights.

In October, 1951 the then Assistant Secretary in charge of Africa at the Colonial Office told an officer of the Embassy that no matter who won the election the officials hoped that the British Government would make a public statement in favor of Federation. (Embdes 1921, Oct. 5, 1951.) [6] The Conservatives did in fact win, but there is a strong probability that if Mr. Griffiths had been returned to the Colonial Office at that time the Labor Government would have pushed on with Federation. Mr. Griffiths seldom went against the advice of his officials.

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[4] Rev. Michael Guthrie Scott was a strong critic of South Africa's racial policies which he had denounced before the United Nations.

[5] Kamazu Banda received his higher education in the United States and Great Britain and practiced medicine in London and Kumasai before returning to Nyasaland in 1958.

[6] Not printed; it contained a summary of the remarks of Andrew B. Cohen, the British Assistant Under-Secretary of State in Charge of African Affairs, concerning the Victoria Falls Conference which discussed the proposed Central African Federation. (745C.00/10-2551)

He would not, however, have handled his political opponents and the Africans with Mr. Lyttelton's brusqueness and probably would not have consented to a private meeting with the Governors of the two territories[7] and Sir Godfrey Huggins as did Mr. Lyttelton in January, 1952. Colonial Office officials have always felt privately that the Central African Europeans wanted Federation so badly that no real concessions to them were necessary. As it is, they still believe firmly that the concessions made have not wrecked the original plan.

Among non-Governmental people with deep knowledge of Africa the weight of opinion has come down narrowly against Federation. Miss Margery Perham[8] after many months of indecision came to the conclusion that the Government's ruthlessness in pushing Federation through had deeply damaged the United Kingdom's reputation on that continent. Lord Hemingford, a Conservative peer who served for many years as a missionary, is equally critical for much the same reasons. There is a deep distrust of the Southern Rhodesian Europeans in liberal informed circles in the UK; even a Conservative MP who is strongly pro-Federation remarked privately to an Embassy Officer that the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia he knew "were nothing but bloody fascists." Expert opinion is not unanimous, however, for Lord Hailey,[9] after a prolonged silence, said that he had decided to support Federation. The Churches which were for many months vocally anti-Federation modified their stand to qualified support; the qualification was that the Europeans in the area demonstrate their good will and willingness to accept African advance. Much the same point of view has been taken by the independent serious press, notably *The Times*. (The independent *Observer* has remained fiercely opposed.)

The Colonial Office insists, however, that Federation does present opportunities. After all, they point out, it is a tremendous step in that area to permit any African representation in the Central Legislature. Their fear is that there are not enough able Africans to use these opportunities and to exploit them successfully; they admit, however, that in Northern Rhodesia the Africans are learning quickly.

Basically, in the Embassy's view, the Colonial Office has always been motivated by what it considers the policy best suited in the long run to serve the interests of the United Kingdom. More than any other group in the United Kingdom, Colonial Office officials realize the difficulties which Britain is going to meet in holding and developing the

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[7] Sir Gilbert Rennie of Northern Rhodesia and Sir Geoffrey Colby of Nyasaland.

[8] The author of, among other works, *Native Administration in Nigeria*, *Lugard: The Years of Adventure, 1858–1898* and *Lugard: The Years of Authority, 1899–1945*.

[9] The author of the five-volume *Native Administration in British African Territories* and the massive *An African Survey*, which was issued in 1938 and then revised in 1956.

African Colonies. Without these colonies, the British Empire as such will amount to little; furthermore, the loss of one section of Africa would set off a chain reaction in Britain's other African territories. To accuse the Colonial Office and the British Government of sacrificing African interests for the advantage of the few Southern Rhodesian Europeans is to underestimate their intelligence and their devotion to the interests of the Empire. These officials are too realistic—humanitarian principles aside—to believe that a handful of Europeans of uncertain skill and motives could successfully maintain for long a position designed completely to repress over four million blacks. There are no supporters of apartheid in either the Colonial or the Commonwealth Relations offices. They realize that a Central Africa in which the Europeans would have to be constantly buttressed by British troops would contribute little either to Britain's or to Africa's security.

Undoubtedly the officials would feel more confident of the ultimate success of Federation if all of the Rhodesian Europeans had the high ideals and racial tolerance of members of the Fabian Society or if all of the Rhodesian Africans had the sense of responsibility found among leaders of British Labor Party. But deferring Federation will not help either the Europeans or the Africans in the area to the early achievement of these goals. Admittedly Federation is a gamble and there are many rocks in the road ahead. It is the Embassy's conviction, however, that the responsible leaders and officials of the British Government would not have been convinced of its necessity if they had not seen in Federation the possibility of creating in Central Africa a stable society which would ultimately strengthen Britain's position throughout East and Central Africa.

MARGARET JOY TIBBETTS

120.32145A/8–1153

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of African Affairs (Cyr) to the Deputy Executive Director of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Pick)[1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1953.

Subject: Comments Regarding Need for Assigning a Defense Attaché to Cover the Central African Federation Area.

The Department of the Army, G–2, Intelligence, recommends that *if* the Department of State should elect to follow the proposal in despatch No. 256 of May 8, 1953[3] from the American Consul General at Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, that a Defense Attaché be included in the complement of the Consulate General at that post, this should be accomplished by secondarily accrediting to Salisbury the Army Attaché presently assigned to the Union of South Africa.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Feld of AF.

AF is not convinced that the military importance of the Central African Federation area is at present sufficient to warrant the assignment of a Defense Attaché to Salisbury. Under the Federal Constitution responsibility for defense legislation of the Federal area is given to the Federation, with certain powers reserved to the United Kingdom Government, which would probably include Imperial defense requirements. The geographic location and the climate of the land-locked Central African Federation make it primarily important as a safe "back area", useful in time of emergency for training air crews and ground troops. This would be facilitated by the concentration of secondary industries in Southern Rhodesia, and the presence of about 200,000 Europeans in the Federation area who, along with the 6,000,000 Africans, form a reservoir of skills and military manpower.

However, it is to be noted that the recently reconstituted East Africa Command has its headquarters at Nairobi, although the Command embraces the six mainland territories of British East and British Central Africa, its southern limit being the Limpopo River and its northern limit the Ethiopian border. The choice of Nairobi is in recognition of the more strategic position of the Nairobi-Mombasa area, a geographic "flanking" position on the lifeline to the Middle and Far East. This is of increasing importance in Imperial military considerations in view of the weakening British position in the Suez base area. It would, therefore, be more logical to assign a Defense Attaché to Nairobi at the present time than to Salisbury. However, even at Nairobi the need is not at present clearly demonstrable.

In sum, AF believes that *at the present time* it is not necessary to assign a Defense Attaché to Salisbury. If, as is likely, the military importance of the Federation area increases as the Federation develops, AF would be agreeable to a re-examination of the need for a Defense Attaché at that post and, of course, will continue to watch with care the military situation and potential of the area. For political reasons, AF believes that, even if the need can be demonstrated, the Federation area should not be covered by the Army Attaché now resident in South Africa. One of the principal objectives of the Federation is to minimize the influence of the Union of South Africa in the Federation area. It might, therefore, be taken amiss by the Federation Government if the United States should assign the Federation area, as a sort of appendage for military coverage purposes, to the office of our Army Attaché in the Union.

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[3] *Ante*, p. 318.

125.824/8-2753

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of African Affairs (Cyr)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1953.

Subject: U.S. Representation in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.

Participants: Mr. Peter Marshall, Second Secretary, British Embassy.
Mr. Leo G. Cyr, AF.

Several weeks ago I asked Mr. Belcher of the British Embassy [1] to let me know the British Foreign Office's views concerning the desirability of our changing our Consulate General at Salisbury into a Diplomatic Agency as a result of the coming into being of the Central African Federation.

Mr. Marshall came to my office today to report that in the view of the British Foreign Office it would be inappropriate to change our Consulate General at Salisbury into a Diplomatic Agency because of the impression it would create. He went on to explain that the status of the Central African Federation will not be different from that which Southern Rhodesia now enjoys. External affairs will continue to be handled from London and this situation will prevail for seven years. A change in our representation in Salisbury to take care of diplomatic problems is therefore not necessary and would only strengthen the hope and conviction, which exists in some quarters, that the Federation represents "more of a change" than it really does.

While Mr. Marshall did not presume to tell us when we can change our representation in Salisbury, he pointed out that the British would prefer that we not even change our Consul General about September 4 (the change-over date) because in a lesser degree the implications mentioned above would be present.

I thanked Mr. Marshall for his information and said that the idea of a Diplomatic Agency would undoubtedly be dropped and that the tour of duty of our present Consul General would probably not end at a time that would give rise to the implications he had mentioned.

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[1] R. K. Belcher, the First Secretary.

AF files, lot 58 D 562, "Correspondence–1955 : BCA Federation"

The Consul General at Salisbury (Hoover) to the Deputy Director of the Office of African Affairs (Cyr)

RESTRICTED SALISBURY, September 23, 1953.
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

DEAR LEO: I have read with much interest your Memo of Conversation of August 27[1] regarding your and Second Secretary Peter Marshall's conversation about our representation at Salisbury.

When Mr. Ball[2] was here and during his interview with Prime Minister Sir Godfrey Huggins, the latter raised the question of whether our representation in the new Federation might be upgraded. Huggins said there was no reason why the United States shouldn't send a Minister to Rhodesia if it wished to do so. Huggins also mentioned that the Federation would have to give early thought to the question of sending a representative to Washington—although he didn't know what form Rhodesia's representation would take.

This morning I had a conversation with Guy Gisborne, Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who confirmed that consideration was being given to representation at Washington. Gisborne seemed to favor having the Rhodesian High Commissioner at London make trips to Washington whenever special representation should be necessary.

Mr. Ball, I am sure, would like to be American Minister to the Federation. However, I agree with you that we should leave the matter of diplomatic representation here in abeyance for the time being. Mr. Gisborne also thought that the best thing to do—although he made the following points quite clear: (1) Rhodesia does have diplomatic relations with other governments, (2) The United Kingdom does *not* conduct Rhodesia's diplomatic relations, and (3) Rhodesia is a junior Dominion and not a senior Colony. (To support Gisborne's view, I remind you of Article I of the Consular Convention with the United Kingdom, which specifically states that the Convention applies to Southern Rhodesia.[3] As I reported to the Department some months ago, according to the Government of Southern Rhodesia, the Convention does *not* apply to Southern Rhodesia unless ratified by the Southern Rhodesia Parliament. That would suggest a rather broad measure of independence for Rhodesia.)

We have had a most hectic and exhausting year here and I fully believe we have raised American prestige and influence here to a very high point. It is unfortunate that just at this moment we should lose Frank La Macchia. With only 50 percent of our normal complement of 4 on hand, our operations will be severely curtailed. Miss Geoghegan[4] and I will do our utmost to serve the Department as best we can; but please be patient if we can't do everything. I am not complaining—I am aware that the Department is having a rough time and that things are tough all over. Under the circumstances both Miss Geoghegan and I will forfeit our annual leave (which both of us need) and do the best we can.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] For further information on Ball, see President Eisenhower's letter to Governor Kennedy, July 10, p. 326.

[3] The text of the Consular Convention, signed at Washington on June 6, 1951, is printed in Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2494 or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 3 (pt. 3), p. 3426.

[4] Kathryn M. Geoghegan was the vice consul at Salisbury.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely, JOHN

611.45C4/9-2453

The Consul General at Salisbury (Hoover) to the Department of State

RESTRICTED SALISBURY, September 24, 1953.
No. 39

Ref: CA-565, August 6, 1953.[1]

Subject: Possibility of Negotiating Agreement of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In its despatch No. 256 of May 8, 1953,[2] the Consulate General recommended that consideration be given to inviting the government of the new Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to enter into negotiations for an Agreement of Commerce and Economic Development with the United States. It was contemplated that such an agreement would cover much of the scope of the type of treaty described in the airgram under reference. While, as indicated in the Consulate General's despatch, it is too early to think of making any concrete proposal to the new Federal Government, the time may be appropriate the middle or latter part of next year.

It is believed that such a proposal from the United States would be welcome to the Federal Government, and that it would be able independently to enter into such negotiations with the United States.

Entering into such an agreement with the Federation would be one way in which the United States could support the development of Central Africa and encourage the participation of American private capital in that undertaking. That it would be in our national interest to support the development of Central Africa is suggested by the recent report of the Lewis Douglas mission,[3] which indicates that the strengthening of the sterling area is in the national interest of the United States. The development of Central Africa's resources should strengthen the sterling area. Moreover, our entering into such an agreement would be a most effective means of arousing the interest in this area of American private enterprise—which could certainly make a contribution to Central African development.

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[1] Not printed; it discussed Senate approval of recent treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. (611.004/8-653)

[2] *Ante*, p. 318.

[3] Following economic discussions in Washington between representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States in March 1953, Lewis W. Douglas was appointed to investigate dollar-sterling relationships. He submitted his report to President Eisenhower on July 14, 1953. For further information, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 31, 1953, pp. 275-279.

JOHN P. HOOVER

125.824/10–1353

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1953.

Subject: U.S. Representation in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.

Participants: Mr. Desmond Crawley, British Embassy (Commonwealth Relations Office Affairs)
AF—Mr. Nicholas Feld
AF—Mr. James Durnan

Mr. Desmond Crawley, recently arrived British Embassy official who handles Commonwealth Relations Office affairs, called on me today at his own request to reiterate the views of the British Government regarding U.S. representation at Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. These views were previously expressed to Mr. Cyr of AF by Mr. Peter Marshall, Second Secretary of the British Embassy, on August 27, and were summarized in a previous memorandum of conversation.[1]

The reason for the "repeat performance" became clear when Mr. Crawley revealed that the British Government was now cognizant of the fact that Sir John Kennedy, Governor of Southern Rhodesia, had recently sent a letter to President Eisenhower on his own initiative and without apparently first clearing it through London.[2] This letter, which reached the President through Mr. William H. Ball and the Department, had caused the British Government some concern. This was particularly with respect to one paragraph in which the Governor stated that Sir Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister designate of the new Central African Federation, had expressed the hope that the United States would soon elevate the status of its Consulate General at Salisbury to diplomatic status. Mr. Crawley said that this statement was at variance with the view of the British Government on this subject and he wanted to make clear that Sir John's letter did not represent the official British attitude on this matter.

Mr. Feld said that the Department understood what had happened and appreciated the British Government's desire to set the record straight.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 333.

[2] A copy of this letter was not found in Department of State files.

611.45C4/9-2453: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Salisbury[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 22, 1953.

Subject: Possibility of the United States Negotiating an Agreement of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

A-21. Reference is made to the Consulate General's despatch no. 39 of September 24, 1953,[2] concerning the possibility of the United States negotiating an Agreement of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Information presently available in the Department relating to the establishment of the Federation indicates that the Act of Federation makes no change in the prior legal status of Southern Rhodesia as a self-governing colony or of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as protectorates. It is traditional in international affairs that territories having these relationships to the superior power do not have the authority to independently conduct their external relations. It is also necessary to recall that the authority for the present advancement of the relationships between these territories under the scheme of Federation is accomplished only by virtue of authority granted by the United Kingdom. Thus, it must be assumed that all powers not specifically granted to the Federation continue to rest within the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom. An examination of the Federal Constitution and of the British Command Papers relating to the Federal Scheme which preceded the drawing up of the Constitution reveal no grant of specific authority to the Federation to negotiate treaties or, in general, to conduct external affairs without the consent of the United Kingdom.

As a matter of fact, the language of the Constitution clearly indicates the absence of such authority. Article 29 authorizes the Federal Legislature to make laws with respect to any matter included in the second schedule annexed to the Constitution. That schedule includes "external affairs" but defines them as (1) such external relations as may be entrusted to the Federation by the Government of the United Kingdom, and (2) the implementation of treaties, conventions, and agreements, with certain other limitations. The "implementation of agreements" is not the negotiation and signing thereof. As to other matters in this field, the authority must be entrusted to the Federation before it may act.

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[1] This instruction was drafted by Durnan of AF and cleared by the Commercial Policy Staff (CP), the Assistant for Treaty Affairs (L/T), and the Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (L/NEA).

[2] *Ante*, p. 335.

The documents preceding final approval of the Constitution are in agreement with the interpretation that independent constitutional authority does not exist for the general conduct of international relations by the Federation. No where is there an indication that this power was to be included in the grant of additional authority under the Federation Scheme. In addition, much the same language as appears in the Constitution is found in the preliminary documents. The "implementation" of treaties, conventions, and agreements, is referred to in Command Paper 8754, page 7, and the same appears in the list of exclusive Federal legislative functions found on page 10 thereof. At page 22 of Command Paper 8754, it is stated that the Queen of England must sign any Federal bill appearing inconsistent with international agreements of the United Kingdom. The only possible exception to the conclusion of the lack of Federal authority regarding these matters is in connection with the negotiation of tariff rates with the Union of South Africa, mention of which is made in Command Paper 8672, pages 22–23.

No additional authority for such action rests in the Executive Branch of the Government, since under Article 36 (2) of the Constitution the executive authority extends only to execution and maintenance of the Constitution, and to all matters with respect to which the Federal Legislature has the power to make laws.

The above would seem to be confirmed by the reply of the British Foreign Office to the informal request of the Department regarding the establishment of a diplomatic post at Salisbury to the effect that external affairs of the Federation would continue to be handled by the United Kingdom Government. In this connection, the Consulate General is referred to the memorandum of conversation of August 27, 1953,[3] in which the matter was discussed by Mr. Marshall of the British Embassy and Mr. Cyr of the Office of African Affairs. Therefore, on the basis of the information available, it is the opinion of the Department that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland does not have the constitutional authority to negotiate and sign a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the United States without prior authority being granted by the United Kingdom Government, generally or specifically, to negotiate international agreements.

The Department would be glad to give the matter further consideration if the Consulate General is in a position to supply it with any information which appears to be at variance with the above.

DULLES

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[3] *Ante*, p. 333.

645C.00/1-654

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 7, 1954.

Subject: Status of Central African Federation in Conduct of its External Affairs.

Participants: Mr. Desmond Crawley, British Embassy
Nicholas Feld—AF
James Durnan—AF

Mr. Desmond Crawley, who handles Commonwealth Relations Office affairs at the British Embassy, called on Mr. Feld of AF today at his own request to discuss certain matters which he thought would be of interest to the United States Government.

Mr. Crawley began the conversation by referring to his previous visit of October 13, 1953, regarding the constitutional status of the Central African Federation.[1] He stated that, as a result of the "misunderstanding" between the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir John Kennedy, and HM Government, which occurred July–August, 1953, regarding the degree of sovereignty to be enjoyed by the new Federation, HM Government had since taken action to clarify the exact legal position of the Federation with the new Federal authorities, and had decided to inform various foreign governments of the position by diplomatic Note. However, in view of the "special interest" taken by the United States in the new Central African Federation, HM Government had instructed the British Embassy in Washington to convey certain additional information to the appropriate State Department officials regarding the specific powers of the Federation in the field of international affairs, especially in regard to international commercial relations. Mr. Crawley then read pertinent excerpts from the British Government instruction to the Embassy and agreed to supply Mr. Feld, on an informal basis, with a written statement of these excerpts. He then formally handed to Mr. Feld the attached Embassy Note which he had brought with him.[2]

Mr. Crawley, in discussing the commercial aspects of Federal external relations, stated that the Federation would enjoy no greater powers in this sphere than were previously enjoyed by the self-governing (but not fully sovereign) colony of Southern Rhodesia before Federation came into existence. The arrangements previously made with the Government of Southern Rhodesia, he said, were based on the following broad principles:

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Feld, Oct. 13, p. 336.

[2] Not printed; the major points of the note are summarized in this memorandum of conversation.

"(*a*) The United Kingdom Government expressly delegated to the Southern Rhodesia Government authority to negotiate and conclude trade agreements with foreign Governments, so far as these related to the treatment of goods.

"(*b*) In practice it had come to be accepted that Southern Rhodesia might enter into local agreements with neighbouring territories, including the Union of South Africa and foreign colonial territories, and to make appropriate representational arrangements with those territories.

"(*c*) In addition the Southern Rhodesia Government has in the past been admitted to participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and to membership of certain international technical organisations, which by virtue of the terms of their constitutions Southern Rhodesia was eligible to join.

"(*d*) The acquisition by Southern Rhodesia of this delegated authority did not however involve any change in the constitutional position of Southern Rhodesia whereby Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom remained generally responsible for the external relations of the Colony.

"(*e*) It followed from this that there should be prior consultation between the Government of Southern Rhodesia and Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom before the former entered into any commitments under subparagraphs (*a*) and (*b*) and (*c*) above."

Mr. Crawley stated further that it is proposed that the same general principles, as elaborated, should apply in the case of the Federal Government. More precisely it is the intention that the Federation shall have authority to conclude on its own account agreements which fall into any of the following categories:

"(*a*) Agreements of purely local concern with any neighbouring State, Colony or territory in Africa, including arrangements with them for the exchange of representatives;

"(*b*) Trade agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, relating solely to the treatment of goods. This definition would include tariff agreements and customs unions, but would exclude agreements relating to shipping questions (other than those relating to inland transport) and establishment matters (i.e. those affecting the rights of persons and companies of the contracting parties). These would continue to be dealt with in Commercial Treaties negotiated by the United Kingdom Government. Authorities may, however, be delegated to the Federation to conclude individual trade agreements which relate also to establishment matters where the circumstances appear to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to warrant such a course.

"(*c*) Multilateral agreements involving membership of an international technical organisation which the Federation, under the terms of the agreement, would be entitled to join."

Mr. Crawley mentioned that he had previously worked on GATT matters at Torquay and had noticed that Southern Rhodesia often conducted negotiations with foreign countries without prior consultation with the British delegation. He added that the British were at that time anxious to marshal every vote in favor of the Commonwealth preferential tariff system and for that reason interposed no objection to this independent negotiating by the Southern Rhodesian delegation. However, he made it clear that Southern Rhodesia's power to be a member of GATT and to carry on negotiations in its own behalf with other governments had been expressly delegated to it by HM Government and there was a definite understanding that Southern Rhodesia would consult with the British delegation prior to entering into commitments with foreign governments. He indicated that this was an example of Southern Rhodesia's tendency to try to go off on its own even though it did not legally enjoy full sovereignty.

Mr. Crawley promised to keep the Department informed of any further developments regarding the question of the Federation's status in relation to external affairs.

601.45C11/7-2954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY [WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1954.

Subject: Representation in United States for Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Participants: Mr. Desmond Crawley, British Embassy
Mr. Ross, Deputy High Commissioner London for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Mr. Utter—AF
Mr. Feld—AF
Mr. Durnan—AF
Mrs. Thoreson—BNA

Mr. Desmond Crawley, First Secretary at the British Embassy in charge of Commonwealth Relations Office affairs, has on several previous occasions outlined to officers of AF the views of the British Government on the status of the recently established Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the conduct of its external affairs. Yesterday he called on me to introduce Mr. Ross, the Federation's Deputy High Commissioner in London, who has recently arrived in the United States with instructions to canvass the possibility for establishing some form of representation for the Federation in this country, and to discuss this matter informally and in an exploratory manner with the Department. Mr. Ross made it very clear at the outset that, as the Department had already been advised by the British Government, Her Majesty's Government handles the formal external relations of the Federation. However, the handling of many aspects of external relations is delegated in practice to the Federation Government, and is consonant with the Federal Constitution. Mr. Ross was, therefore, interested in obtaining the Department's informal reaction to the Federation Government's idea of sending a relatively high ranking official to handle its affairs in the United States. His Government felt that this official would be mainly concerned with acquainting American financial and industrial circles with investment and development opportunities in the Federation. His Consular functions, if any, would be very limited. He would also be able to handle inquiries from the general public and distribute information regarding the Federation in the same manner as is done by various foreign government information offices in this country.

In order to carry out these functions Mr. Ross felt that the office of such an official might better be in New York City.

Mr. Utter said that, in his view, the United States Government would welcome the establishment of such representation, it being understood that the official in question would be under the British Embassy in Washington. Mr. Ross said that he had discussed with the British Ambassador the question of the diplomatic status and title which would best meet the requirements of this official. He said the Ambassador had suggested that the official might possibly be designated "Counselor for Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Affairs" or some very similar title. Mr. Crawley asked whether AF could ascertain from other appropriate officers in the Department, such as Protocol, if there would be any problem in effecting this representation, particularly with regard to accreditation, location of the office in New York, diplomatic immunities, etc. Mr. Utter indicated that he would discuss the matter with other Departmental officers and would give the British Embassy an indication of the Department's reaction to this exploratory proposal as soon as possible.[1]

If the Department perceives no difficulties, Mr. Crawley indicated that the Embassy would probably communicate the proposal formally to the Department.

Mr. Ross stated that he was examining office space possibilities in New York. If the proposal is agreed to the Federation's representative would probably arrive to establish his office in that city early in 1955.

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[1] No response to this proposal was found in Department of State files for the year 1954.

033.45C11/8-3054

The Consul General at Salisbury (Steere) to the Department of State

SALISBURY, August 30, 1954.

No. 25

Subject: Visit of Federation Finance Officials to United States

The Consulate General has been informed that Federal Finance Minister Donald Macintyre, accompanied by the Secretary of the Treasury, Sir Andrew Strachan, and a junior Treasury official named David Young, is about to visit the United States. They intend to arrive in New York aboard the S. S. *Queen Mary* on September 21, 1954.

According to Sir Andrew, the United Kingdom Government had suggested that the Minister be present at the meeting of the International Monetary Fund to be held in Washington shortly after their arrival. Both the Minister and Sir Andrew have indicated that they are well pleased to make this trip and are looking forward to making contact with the officials of the International Monetary Fund, the Export-Import Bank, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. They will probably be joined in the United States by Mr. A. P. Grafftey-Smith, Financial Advisor to the Federal Government, now on leave in London. During their stay in Washington they will be in the hands of the United Kingdom Treasury official at the British Embassy, Mr. Martin Flett.

This is the first time a Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has visited the United States. In view of the heavy role which Rhodesians expect United States investment to play in the future of their country, the fact that finance officials are to make the first visit is significant.

The Consulate General has suggested that the visitors take full advantage of their stay in the United States to make known to potential investors the opportunities which exist here. They have been told to make contact with the officials of the Office of Trade, Investment, and Monetary Affairs of FOA.

The Department's cooperation in assisting these officials would appear to be useful. It is doubtful that the maximum benefit to be obtained from their visit could necessarily be obtained if they were left wholly the responsibility of the British Embassy.

LOYD V. STEERE

AF files, lot 58 D 562, "Correspondence–1955 : BCA Federation"

The Consul General at Salisbury (Steere) to the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Utter)

CONFIDENTIAL SALISBURY, October 22, 1954.
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

DEAR JOHN: I have been at the new post now for just over two months. That is not very long, yet I think it is time that I pass along to you, while they are still fresh, some of the chief impressions that are beginning to form in my mind.

1. Now that I have seen something of all three territories, I must say that the decision to form a Federation strikes me, above all, as having been a bold and imaginative action aimed primarily, with Southern Rhodesia as an anchor, at preventing Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from going the way of the Gold Coast or Nigeria—or Kenya.

2. The Federation decision is one from which there can be no voluntary turning back—nor is there now any great pressure to do so. Still the Federation leaders really "have a bear by the tail." Fortunately, it is as yet only a cub bear, and therefore manageable. But this bear is growing rapidly, and if he is not subdued or tamed in time, there is going to arise, in my judgment, real danger to the Federation.

The bear the Federation's leaders have by the tail is a territorially large and developing land which lacks the financial strength of its own to build, and build in time, the communications necessary to knit and hold this new country together. Its resources and credit are having to be used largely for other pressing needs on which direct and profitable returns can be demonstrated. It does not have or command sufficient resources to put into longer term projects, such as railroads and roads, the returns from which are largely indirect and lie in the future.

3. The lack of adequate communications constitutes a real jeopardy to the success of Federation. The existing three-year economic plan for communications does not contain provisions for some of the most urgently needed projects, and there appears, as yet, to be insufficient awareness of the urgency of action in these matters. Communications take years to build, and political pressures mount steadily on all sides, notably in the Copperbelt and Nyasaland. The economic benefits on which Federation was sold to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will not be realized in time, in my opinion, if communications are not greatly improved.

4. It seems obvious that additional money is going to have to be put into the Federation—not on a grant, but on a loan basis. What the Federation really needs at this juncture is a long-term foreign loan of, say, $100 million (if possible, at low interest and with repayment to start in, say, 10 years) for the exclusive purpose of putting its main communications in order and building some missing links. Such a loan would also do more than anything else, I believe, to encourage private foreign investors to put capital into this country. Taken together, such a loan, with foreign investments and other

foreign loans which the Government has in view, would seem likely to tip the scales strongly in the direction of success for the new Federation. There is no need for me to say what a successful multi-racial undertaking in Rhodesia would mean for Africa and the West.

5. The Rhodesians, so far as I am aware, are not thinking in these terms at this time. But, I believe that events are likely to push them into recognizing the need for bolder, more foresighted action if the great vision of the Federation is to succeed. It is my hope, in writing in this vein to you, that it may trigger sober consideration on our part as to whether it is not greatly in our national interest, in the development of Rhodesia, to be not only generous in our aid but very far-sighted and prompt to act. It is my view that we should at least begin to plan now.[1]

Sincerely, LOYD V. STEERE

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[1] Utter responded on Dec. 2, 1954. He indicated, in part, that "The Federation's lack of finances to further development projects is appreciated here, and so far, applications for assistance have already received a sympathetic hearing. In the last few years the U.S., either directly through FOA (or its predecessor ECA) and Ex-Im Bank, or indirectly through the IBRD, has loaned to territories now comprising the Federation more than $100 million largely for communications and power development projects. Whether additional loans for Federation projects could be arranged is not certain, but there are no indications that the ceiling has been reached as yet. This is a matter which I feel could be fully explored when the Federation appoints its representative to the U.S." (AF files, lot 58 D 562, "Correspondence–1955: BCA Federation")

DEVELOPMENTS IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES

745R.00/10–1052

The Consul General at Nairobi (Dorsz) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY NAIROBI, October 10, 1952.

No. 81

Subject: Growing Concern over Mau Mau Activities

The wanton destruction of several hundred cattle belonging to European farmers in the Nyeri area and the assassination of a highly respected Kikuyu Senior Chief on the outskirts of Nairobi (Consulate General's despatches No. 70 of October 2 [2] and No. 77 of October 8, 1952) [3] have brought to the attention of the general public in Nairobi the very serious nature of the Mau Mau activities among the Kikuyus. Ever since these events there exists a certain reluctance to face the facts on the part of the population not directly concerned, an attitude which was to a certain degree encouraged by the Government in playing down the importance of the situation when possible to do so.

However, after these two shocking occurrences it is not possible to ignore the growing boldness and defiance of the Mau Mau, and the inability of the Police so far to effectively deal with its anti-European campaign.

Reaction to the new developments among the European community has been varied. A few believe that the situation will continue to deteriorate and contemplate pulling up stakes to move elsewhere. Many of the "old settlers" criticize the Government for having been too easy in its treatment of the Africans. These frequently express the opinion that a sufficient show of force, with curfew restrictions, collective tribal fines and similar repressive measures will frighten the Kikuyus into good behavior. This group may be expected to press the Government more and more toward taking repressive action should conditions worsen—and there is good reason to believe they will. Indignation among this group concerning inadequate police protection in rural areas has led to threats of taking the law into their own hands if necessary.

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[1] Repeated for information to London.

[2] Not printed; it summarized events in British East Africa between Sept. 17 and Oct. 1, 1952 and noted the murder of three headmen in the Nyeri district. (745P.00/10–252)

[3] Not printed; it reported the killing of Chief Waruhieu Kungu. (745R.00/10–852)

As was pointed out in the Consulate General's despatch No. 19 of August 1, 1952,[4] police coverage in Kenya is very thinly spread. It is true that since the date of that despatch authorization has been obtained to increase the regular force by approximately 1,000 men. This will bring the total (of all races) on the force to slightly more than 7,000 when the new men have all been recruited and trained. There are in addition tribal police on the native reserves, but their usefulness in the present crisis is very questionable as those of the Kikuyus are believed to have been infiltrated by Mau Mau to a certain degree. Also there is the Kenya Police Reserve (volunteer and largely amateurs) who have been contributing auxiliary services during the last several months. Many of the Reserves are European farmers who have joined for the purpose of being able better to protect their own property.

In the last several months several hundred police have been transferred to Kikuyuland from quiet parts of the Colony. A large part of these are Somalis from the Northern Frontier District who despise the Kikuyus and enjoy "pushing them around". Their usefulness was soon cut in half when it was found necessary for them to patrol in pairs.

Police efforts have been hampered by the fact that officials have very little information on the Mau Mau society. Even the extent of membership among Africans can apparently only be guessed, with "official" guesses ranging from 10% to 50% of the Kikuyus having taken the Mau Mau oath. Police authorities admit that they have been unable to infiltrate the Mau Mau with informants because of the fear of Kikuyus of being killed if they inform the police. Because the Mau Mau has adherents so widely spread, informers have soon been found out and many have paid with their lives.

Arbitrary methods used by the police are also playing into the hands of the Mau Mau by alienating the good-will of the law-abiding Africans. Several instances of this have come to the attention of the Consulate General. The servant of one Officer was gratuitously knocked about by a European police officer in an investigation of a theft. A Jaluo employee of USIE had his house searched without a warrant (apparently as part of one of the police "drives" through an African quarter). Several of his books, including an American textbook on economics, were temporarily confiscated. The same employee was later stopped and asked to produce the purchase receipt for his bicycle—which he had bought six years before. An old resident of Karen, a Nairobi suburb, states that the Police Inspector there customarily has suspects beaten up a bit before questioning them, in order to "loosen their tongues". A sufficient amount of this type of police action, coupled with the fear of retaliation which Mau Mau has instilled among law-abiding Africans is going to make the work of the police more difficult. On the other hand, the cook of another officer has been convicted of participating in a Mau Mau oath ceremony.

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[4] Not printed.

With regard to the new legislation recently enacted by Legislative Council,[5] it is too early yet to evaluate its usefulness in strengthening the hand of the police. If wisely handled, several of the new ordinances should facilitate the conviction of persons accused of Mau Mau activities. However, by continuing to commit individual criminal acts over the wide area of Kikuyuland, rather than to have a mass type of uprising, the Mau Mau may be able to carry on such a campaign of attrition that the policing task might become so burdensome as to drive out at least part of the European settlement. If the police are able to uncover the top leadership of the Mau Mau and apprehend it, the movement would doubtless wither away to only a nuisance. However, the police have not as yet been able to make any progress in that direction.

There has been speculation concerning the possible tie between Mau Mau and International Communism. Continuous efforts of the Government have not yet uncovered any evidence of such a connection. However, several well informed unofficial Europeans here say they are convinced that such a connection must exist, either through local Asians, by way of South Africa, Great Britain or through other intermediaries. Whether or not such a connection exists, the success of Mau Mau in Kenya works to the benefit of International Communism in creating another focus of unrest in the Western sphere. Likewise, it could be captured by the Communists at a later date.

To date, the vast majority of the Europeans in Kenya have reacted with a remarkable amount of calmness, tolerance and patience to the outbreak of Mau Mau violence. While in our view the Government was complacent until several weeks ago, we are encouraged by the steps the Government is now taking to meet the immediate need of restoring law and order.

The economic conditions existing in the Colony are such as must breed unrest among the Africans. The racial division of the wealth has now been aggravated by an inflationary spiral which only serves to make the division of wealth (European) and poverty (African) more extreme. This is happening at a time when the Kikuyu is in growing numbers becoming a wage earner instead of a subsistence farmer, and with Government encouragement is becoming politically conscious. Certainly agitators of any ability should have good chances of success under these circumstances.

To the credit of the European community as a whole (although it may be a fatal weakness), there is a realization that the African has a number of real grievances and is justified in not accepting the *status*

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[5] The Government introduced nine bills intended to suppress subversive organizations in the Legislative Council on Sept. 25, and of these, eight had been passed and one referred to Select Committee when the Council adjourned on Oct. 1.

quo with complacency. The successful British business man here—the typical member of the 100% European Nairobi Rotary Club—has this on his conscience. Although he is reluctant to admit it to himself (for most "have never had it so good"), he knows that his little Paradise in Africa cannot last for very long, at least in its present condition.

The concern of the European community, both Government and settler—although their viewpoints vary radically—is over the peaceful integration of the Africans into the political and economic life of the Colony. In this they are confronted with the appalling lack of responsible educated leadership among the Africans. They have largely failed to develop a corps of educated leaders to take the place of the illiterate old tribal chiefs who are now becoming obsolete as tribal life and customs break down in the path of European civilization, leaving the field open for demagogues to exploit both the real and fancied grievances of the native population—which sees such glaring economic inequalities existing for reasons which he cannot comprehend.

While the tone of this despatch is pessimistic, we believe that the political situation here is serious and likely to deteriorate, at least in the near future.

EDMUND J. DORSZ

745R.00/10–2452

The Consul General at Nairobi (Dorsz) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET **PRIORITY** NAIROBI, October 24, 1952.

No. 93

Subject: Preliminary Reaction to Government's Aggressive Campaign Against the Mau Mau

Ref: Consulate General's Despatch No. 81 of October 10, 1952.[1]

The Consulate General's Weekly Review (despatch No. 90 of October 23, 1952),[2] contains a summary of the several aggressive moves taken by the Kenya Government during the last week in dealing with the unrest in Kikuyuland (Central and Rift Valley Provinces). Of the measures taken, that which will doubtless have the most far-reaching effect is the issuance of Emergency Regulations. (See Consulate General's despatch No. 89 of October 22, 1952, for the text of these Regulations.)[3]

Under the Emergency Regulations the Government, through the police and armed forces, has given itself what amounts to a free hand in dealing with the situation. The most important of the powers which it has acquired is that which amounts to arrest and detention without the necessity of preferring charges—merely "for the purpose of maintaining public order".

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not printed; it summarized the events of the week of Oct. 16–22 and indicated how crime in Nairobi had been reduced by the mobilization of government forces. (745R.00/10–2352)

[3] Not printed; it indicated the discretionary powers which had been vested in the Governor and his subordinates by the Emergency Regulations. (745R.34/10–2252)

Within a matter of a few hours after the declaration of the State of Emergency by the Governor, police details picked up over sixty of those who had been designated for arrest under this arbitrary power. Within two days the total reached 104 (90 of whom were Kikuyu), others marked for arrest have gone into hiding. Some of the more important of those arrested were immediately transported to points in the Northern Frontier District, where, for all practical purposes, they are as isolated as they would be on another planet. The Government has indicated that at least a number of those detained will be held for the duration of the emergency.

One of the first persons arrested under the Emergency Regulations was Jomo Kenyatta, President of the Kenya African Union and political leader of the Kikuyu tribe, whom a Government spokesman has described as the person the Mau Mau look to as their leading spirit. It is of interest that the *East African Standard* on October 22 and the *Daily Chronicle* of October 23 carried brief items implying that Kenyatta has Moscow connections. It is to be noted that in each case the connection of Kenyatta with either Mau Mau or Moscow was implied and not directly stated. It is the Consulate General's opinion that the Government has no more tangible evidence of the one than it has of the other. Since it had no basis for a judicial prosecution of Kenyatta, the Emergency Regulations are being used to get him out of circulation without due process of law. Mr. Michael Blundell, Leader of the European Elected Members of Legislative Council, has stated to officers of the Consulate General that the principal reason for setting up the Emergency Regulations was to be able to confine Kenyatta and others considered to be troublemakers.

[Here follows a list of others arrested under the emergency regulations.]

It will be noted that those listed are indicated as having close connections with the Kenya African Union. However, the Colonial Secretary is reported here to have made it clear, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, that the Kenya African Union was not being proscribed, and that Kenyatta was "being arrested as an individual concerned with Mau Mau terrorism". The conclusion which the Consulate General believes must be drawn from the arrest of these K.A.U. leaders under the Emergency Regulations is that the Government is convinced that Mau Mau is directly connected with the K.A.U., but that they lack at the present time the means to prove it in court, or even to the satisfaction of public opinion.

The rapidity with which the Government has acted in the three days since the declaration of the State of Emergency is reported to have bewildered the Kikuyu. However, while there was no immediate reaction, two days after the State of Emergency was declared a Senior Kikuyu Chief was hacked to death near Nyeri while trying to break up a meeting of 500 Mau Mau adherents without sufficient police support. One of his armed askaris suffered a similar fate. The murder of this Senior Kikuyu Chief Nderi, following the murder of Senior Chief Waruhiu, leaves only one Kikuyu Senior Chief living. He is under threat of death by Mau Mau. A further reaction has been a strike of Kikuyu workers on coffee estates in the Kiambu and Ruiru Districts, where a dead cat was found with a message warning of death to any Africans working on European estates.

Meanwhile, additional restrictive measures are being applied to Africans. For instance, on October 22, an order was issued under the Emergency Regulations prohibiting the movement of any vehicles owned or driven by Africans or in which Africans were travelling in three Districts of the Rift Valley Province. Likewise, additional districts were placed under curfew restrictions for Africans. These restrictions, like the cases of police bullying which continue to be reported cannot be expected to make the law-abiding African happy in his present plight.

Official reports have spoken hopefully of satisfaction among law-abiding Africans of the strong Governmental measures, and limited observation by the officers of the Consulate General would confirm that reaction among Africans in Nairobi. However, it is believed that the Government has understimated the terror which the Mau Mau has spread in the Kikuyu Reserves. The murder of Senior Chief Nderi after the declaration of the State of Emergency and the Government's extraordinary "show of force" would seem to indicate that the force of Mau Mau terror continues.

Concurrent with the declaration of the State of Emergency, the Government has undertaken a more intensive effort to inform the African population on the facts and implications of the present situation. Europeans are urged to make available radio listening facilities to their employees and special newspapers in Swahili and Kikuyu are being made available, in order that the "official" news will receive the widest circulation. The reaction of the Kikuyu to this effort may be better assessed within a few days, when it may become apparent whether or not the drastic action of the Government has had the hoped for effect of "breaking the back" of the Mau Mau movement.

These "propaganda" efforts of the Government are, unfortunately, commencing on a high intellectual level, with no emotional appeal. Their effectiveness in "winning friends and influencing Kikuyus" in their present format is considered very doubtful.

If, despite the action of the Government, the Mau Mau continues to be an effective subversive force, the Government will be in a very embarrassing position. Critics in the British Parliament and elsewhere abroad will doubtless accuse the Kenya Government of having bowed to "old settler" pressure and resorted to repressive arbitrary measures to break up the Kenya African Union, the only important African political organization in Kenya—without having shown it to be responsible for the subversive activities of Mau Mau—in an effort to stifle African political development. If it fails to prove a connection between the Kenya African Union, or its leaders, and the Mau Mau movement, the Government will have made martyrs of those arrested under the Emergency Regulations, who will be able to plead that they were moderate, constitutional advocates of their people's cause, before their own people and before world opinion.

On the other hand, a cessation of Mau Mau activities as a result of these arrests or the discovery of a connection between the K.A.U. and Mau Mau will vindicate the Government's action before public opinion, and could be used as justification for the confinement of Kenyatta and his lieutenants beyond the term of the emergency, by means of "quasi legal" detention orders.

This is a calculated risk which the Government took in its "all out" campaign, from which it will find it extremely difficult to retreat without an admission of defeat. It has "declared war" against Mau Mau granting itself extraordinary emergency powers, and at the same time has committed itself before world opinion as requiring those powers to stamp out a retrogressive movement. If the actions taken under the Emergency Powers—which the Government could not otherwise have taken—prove ineffectual, both the Kenya Government and the British Government will be hard put to justify the actions which they have taken.

EDMUND J. DORSZ

745R.00/12–552

The Consul General at Nairobi (Dorsz) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NAIROBI, December 5, 1952.

No. 158

Ref: Consulate General's Despatch No. 93 of October 24, 1952.[2]

Subject: Six weeks of the State of Emergency

After six weeks filled with intensive police activity the Kenya Government finds it necessary to continue piling restrictive measures on restrictive measures in its effort to restore law and order to Kikuyuland. It now admits that this will be a long term and very expensive operation. A running account of the action taken by the Government and accounts of the continued crimes of violence are contained in the Consulate General's Weekly Reviews and Fortnightly Surveys for the period, and will not be recapitulated here.

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[1] This despatch was repeated to London.

[2] *Supra.*

Economic Results

In addition to the financial burden placed on the Kenya Government by the extraordinary police and military activities, which is now estimated to have reached £500,000, an official of the Government has stated that trade is now at about 75% of normal in Kenya as a whole. It is certainly at less than that in the affected area. Collections are slow, 120 days credit being expected; motion picture houses and night clubs are seriously affected, one large restaurant-night club being about to be closed by the creditors; resort hotels in the area report an abrupt drop in tourists, their guests consisting mostly of women and children of the area who are there for reasons of protection. Sales of real estate have dropped, with little interest being shown in farm land in the affected area. Some nine families have made inquiries at the Consulate General concerning the possibilities of migrating to the United States. Their period of residence ranges in Kenya from 8 to 40 years. The Consulate General has been unable to get any estimate of the adverse affect on the inflow of capital arising from the Emergency. Members of the Legislative Council and the press say the loss has been substantial, and we agree.

The forced evacuation of all Kikuyu from certain sections around Thomson's Falls has created a serious labor problem in that rich cattle area. The Labour Office is encountering difficulties in recruiting laborers from other tribes to replace the evacuated Kikuyu. Restrictions on the travel of Kikuyu has [*have*] also created difficulties for the coffee planters in the Kiambu district, a few miles outside of Nairobi. The planters are required to bring their casual labor from some distance each day by trucks which can only travel during the daylight hours.

Trial of Jomo Kenyatta

After being held in a remote part of the Northern Frontier District for a month, Jomo Kenyatta and five other leaders[3] of the Kenya African Union were arraigned and are now being tried. The manner in which he is being tried has resulted in considerable criticism. The trial is taking place at Kapenguria, a remote village some 25 miles over a dirt track from Kitale, the nearest White Highland town. A school room has been converted into a court for this trial. A retired

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[3] Achieng Oneko, Paul Ngei, Fred Kubai, and Bildad Kaggia of the national executive committee of the Kenya African Union (KAU) and Kungu Karumba, the chairman of the Chura Divisional Branch of KAU.

Puisne Judge[4] was appointed "Resident Magistrate" for this district (which had theretofore had no magistrate) a few days before the trial. However, the press is permitted access to the courtroom. From reports of the trial it would appear that the defendants are represented by able counsel.

The special venue of the trial, the specially chosen magistrate, the short time allowed the defense to prepare for the trial and other factors combine to give the impression that the Government is determined to obtain a conviction at any cost, even at the risk of being subject to the accusation of having "railroaded" the defendants. Several responsible persons here, including a top jurist, have confidentially expressed the belief to us that the Government has made a serious error in this regard, stating that it would have been preferable to have held the trial (with adequate security measures) at the "scene of the crime". They feel that the good faith of the Government will be attacked by detractors, both here and abroad. They do not think the Kikuyu would rise in rebellion at the scene of the trial. But if they did, this would be no worse than the hit-and-run type of fighting which Mau Mau is pressing forward. I believe we can expect Kenyatta's conviction at Kapenguria and to see this followed by appeals as far as the Privy Council, accompanied by propaganda attacks on both the Kenya and British Governments, with Kenyatta depicted as a martyr to racial repression.

Solution to the Problem

It would appear that the Kenya Government is now fully aware that there is no pat solution to the Kikuyu problem and is at a loss as to how to deal with it. While the Mau Mau movement may possibly be brought under control within a matter of months, that will be only a palliative unless the causes which made the Mau Mau so attractive to many of the Kikuyu are dealt with imaginatively. These causes, economic, political and social, are many and complex. An attempt to analyze them will be made in a future despatch.

The Consulate General questions whether the Government and the European community is prepared to take measures which are adequate to deal with these causes. As an example of European thinking, the weekly *Comment* of December 4 states that it is a submission to blackmail to even *discuss* at this time the possibility of giving more land to the Kikuyu.

The Government has been either unable or unwilling until last week to permit moderate Africans to go to the Kikuyu and preach against Mau Mau violence. African members of Legislative Council and the present Executive Committee of the Kenya African Union have repeatedly asked to do this, but it was only on December 1 that Mr.

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[4] Ransley Samuel Thacker, Q.C., who had been the Senior Puisne Judge in Kenya and twice had acted as Chief Justice.

Mathu,[8] African Leader of Legislative Council was permitted to address the Kikuyu on a broadcast over the Government radio facilities. Africans would have been very appropriate spokesmen in favor of moderation. Failure to use them earlier is attributed to the belief that these leaders, while attacking the Mau Mau would, if not rigorously controlled, have advocated reforms which the Government is not prepared to make.

The Consulate General believes that, regardless of what degree of success the Government may have in stamping out Mau Mau, there will be continued political unrest in Kikuyuland, with continued pressure being exerted on the Government for greater political and economic freedom. The measure of the British success here may well be their ability to introduce substantive changes designed to eliminate the causes for the political turmoil and economic losses now besetting the Colony.

EDMUND J. DORSZ

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[8] Eliud Mathu had been the first African nominated to the Legislative Council on Oct. 10, 1944.

745R.521/12-1952 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Nairobi

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 19, 1952.

A-23. Information indicates that of the principal persons who are known to have attempted to join the defense of Jomo Kenyatta, Kola Balogun, Nigerian lawyer and secretary of the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons, H. O. Davies, leader of the Nigeria People's Congress, and D. N. Pritt, Q.C.,[1] a member of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, are believed to have Communist contacts and sympathies.

An agency of the Government is interested in receiving on an urgent basis as much information available in reply to the following:

1. What is the opinion of Kenya government and police officials regarding the persons associated in Kenyatta's defense?
2. Are there any indications that Kenyatta's counsel have made contact with local Africans or Indians outside the course of their normal duties?
3. What was the factual basis for a statement of the British Colonial Secretary to the effect that an attempt was being made to convert Kenyatta's trial into a political forum? (Made in House of Commons debate—*London Times*, December 5, 1952)

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[1] Denis Nowell Pritt, Q.C., was a Labour Member of Parliament from 1935 to 1940 and thereafter, a Labour (Independent) Member from 1940 to 1950. He had a long history of representing African nationalists having carried I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson's appeal of his sedition conviction in the Gold Coast to the Privy Council in 1938.

4. Has any Communist propaganda in Kenya or elsewhere yet taken advantage of the possibilities posed by Kenyatta's trial?[2]

BRUCE

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[2] Four days earlier, in telegram 44 to Nairobi, not printed, Bruce asked whether the press epithet "Moscow-trained", as it applied to Kenyatta, was justified and sought information as to the length and date of his stay in Moscow. (745R.521/12–1552) Dorsz replied on Dec. 24 in telegram 72, not printed, that the CID placed Kenyatta in Moscow between 1929 and 1933, but though he registered for some courses at the University, he was not considered "Moscow-trained". (745R.521/12–2452) At his trial, Kenyatta testified that he toured Russia in 1929 and then had spent the years 1932 to 1934 there. Such was reported in despatch 256 from Nairobi, Feb. 4, 1953, not printed. (745R.521/2–453)

511.458/1–853

The Consul General at Nairobi (Dorsz) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL NAIROBI, January 8, 1953.

No. 203

Ref: Consulate General's Restricted Despatch 204[2]

Subject: IIA: Semi-annual evaluation report for period ending December 31.

1A—Factors Affecting the Local Situation:

The socio-political milieu in which IIA operates in British East Africa has altered during the period under review. While the delicate balance between the multi-ethnic components of the society has been chronically beset by underlying tensions, the situation heretofore has been relatively stable. This still applies to Uganda and Tanganyika; in Kenya, however, a serious change for the worse has occurred.

Uganda

Members of the European commercial community in Uganda at times claim that the administration of Sir Andrew Cohen[3] is accelerating the advancement of African interests too rapidly. However, no significant increase in tensions adversely affecting the stability of the Protectorate has occurred.

Major developments in the industrialization foreshadowed by the completion of Owens Falls hydro-electric project, could prove more provocative of social unrest. The integration of African producers in a cash crop economy through the cooperative movement is being accomplished with but few disturbances. However, before this step is fully completed, Uganda will be developing manufacturers and mining. This concurrent introduction of more complex patterns in several phases of the economy may overstrain temporarily mechanisms of adjustment and weaken for a time, socio-political stability. Since skilled Africans are few, the technical and managerial staffs of the mines and factories will be manned largely by Europeans and Asians. African leaders are apprehensive that the economic importance of these communities may be enhanced and the predominance of African interests somewhat eclipsed.

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[1] This despatch, which was repeated to London, was drafted by John A. Noon, the Regional Public Affairs Officer.

[2] Not printed; it detailed the information activities conducted by the Mombasa and Dar es Salaam Consulates in addition to those of the Consulate General. (511.45R/1–853)

[3] Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge of the African Division of the Colonial Office since 1947.

Tanganyika

Beneath the apparent socio-political stability in Tanganyika, there lurks considerable latent tension largely arising from the trust status of the territory. The government is irritated by any action of the Trusteeship Council which it considers intervention in the affairs of the Administration. While the Trusteeship Council is the major target for the hostility, the generally held opinion by the European community that the United States is anti-colonial directs a considerable amount of criticism to the United States.

Tanganyika Europeans consider that the situation is so weighted in a Trust Territory in favor of the indigenous population that only a federation of East African territories can preserve White dominance. Any degree of success in furthering this objective would greatly alarm the African and Asian populations with possible adverse effect on the Territory's stability.

Kenya

In the last half of 1952, Kenya became one of the world's trouble spots. Formerly ignored by the world press and radio news services, the Colony now shares, from time to time, the news spotlight with Malaya and Indo-China. From an area covered by the occasional visiting correspondent, it has become the primary beat of twelve foreign correspondents and one BBC representative. The disturbances in Kenya have not and probably will not attain the magnitude of those in such trouble spots as Malaya and Indo-China because (1) the malcontents are not in as favored a position to receive arms and other forms of assistance from a neighboring or nearby communist state, (2) thus far, the unrest is confined to the Kikuyu who number about a fifth of Kenya's African population, and, (3) latent inter-tribal hostility may serve as a break in its spread throughout the area.

The essential nature of the change in the situation in Kenya is (1) the rejection by the Kikuyu of a multi-racial society as the goal which the Colony seeks to attain, and (2) the resort to subversive tactics, particularly violence, in an effort to create a purely African state in Kenya.

This threat to the existing order is a two-prong challenge. The overt Kenya African Union (KAU) led by English-educated Jomo Kenyatta, is a political organization patterned along non-African lines and operating through such devices foreign to indigenous culture as schools and branch organizations with elected officers, charters and constitutions. From the secret society complex common to most African cultures has arisen the covert Mau Mau, the esoteric and "strong arm" phase of the opposition to duly constituted authority.

The convergence of these two streams of resistance to British rule is responsible for the serious nature of the disturbances in Kenya. Through the trial of Mr. Kenyatta and five other leaders of the KAU, the Colonial Administration seeks to prove that co-operation between Mau Mau and KAU has been deliberate and planned. It is, however, within the realm of possibility that congruent objectives furnished sufficient grounds for joint *ad hoc* action.

In its broadest context, the present disturbances in Kenya can be interpreted as an eruption of Kikuyu frustration produced by their failure to attain satisfaction (rewards) from participation in the complex European-Asian-African society being created in the Colony. The inability of the African to cope with the new situation is evidenced by the fact that he receives a smaller share of goods and services than members of other communities and is unable to command the means for improving his position. He is the most poorly housed, poorly clothed and poorly fed. He receives inferior educational facilities and medical attention. He is found most frequently occupying menial positions, is subject to wage and social discriminations and believes, with some justification, to discrimination in job opportunities. Lastly, he believes that he is herded into overcrowded reserves because European settlers have pre-empted all remaining land suitable for expanding native agriculture while on the other hand, his advancement in the skilled trades and commerce is blocked by superior Asian competition.

The appeal of Mau Mau lies in its simple and direct answer to African frustration. Like its predecessor *Dini ya Jesu Christo*,[4] and its less successful contemporary *Dini ya Massabura*,[5] Mau Mau would solve the problem by eliminating it. The clock would be turned back, Europeans and presumably Asians, would be driven out and pre-European contact conditions would be re-established.

In a more limited context, interest in the Kenya disturbances centers in their relation to world communism. At the outset it is necessary to distinguish between, (1) organized assistance by communist agents and provocateurs within and without the territory furnished on instructions from the Kremlin; (2) the encouragement of and sympathy for movements useful to communist objectives but unaccompanied by assistance in arms, funds or personnel.

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[4] *Dini ya Jesu Kristo* was a violent Kikuyu messianic movement led by Reuben Kihiko, who was executed following a clash with the police in December 1947.

[5] *Dini ya Msambwa* was organized in 1943 by Elijah Masinde who called for a return to Vugusu traditional religion and, subsequently, in July 1947, called for the expulsion of all Europeans. He was arrested and deported and his movement was banned as an unlawful society. A last, bloody clash with his followers took place in April 1950.

The present unrest in Kenya is not receiving type one communist support. Kenya authorities are convinced that the subversive movement is entirely propelled from within.

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In addition to world communism, the other source of outside influence on the subversive nationalist movement in Kenya has been Republic of India sources.[6] The Indian Commissioner in British East Africa has assiduously and openly courted the leadership of KAU. At official Indian functions, the presence of Mr. Kenyatta and his coterie of associates was made more significant by the absence of Africans holding official connections with the Kenya government. Both Commissioner Pant and his wife Dr. Pant were frequent visitors at the Kenya Teachers' College operated by the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association, the educational arm of KAU. Mrs. Pant dedicated the new girls' dormitory at the College in September, 1951. In operating the Republic of India scholarship program, close liaison was maintained with KAU rather than with the education department of the Kenya government. When a successful candidate departed for study in India, KAU staged a send-off demonstration. Since the arrest of Kenyatta, some Indian papers reaching Nairobi have presented the KAU leaders as "martyrs in the war of independence." Mr. Chamanlal, a member of the Indian Parliament is associated with the Kenyatta defense.

Starting from the Indian aversion to colonialism, the Representative of the Republic of India advanced to an active support of African nationalism. It appears that the premise motivating this action is the belief that interests of the Asian community would be best secured by creating an Asian-African front against the European community. The implications of support for KAU appear to have offered no difficulties.

When the nationalist movement entered a violent phase through Mau Mau terrorism and the existence of a connection between Mau Mau and KAU became a decided possibility, it is believed that the close ties between the Indian Commissioner and the KAU became somewhat of an embarrassment. The unreality of an Asian-African front became apparent when considerable terrorist activities were directed against the Asian community. Also, terrorism negates the doctrine of non-violence, and if the connection between Mau Mau and KAU is proven, it will appear that encouragement has been given to a movement which did not subscribe to the policy revered by Indians because of its development as a political weapon by Mahatma Gandhi.[7] Finally, the activities of the Commissioner's office are viewed with suspicion by the Kenya authorities.

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[6] Angus Ward, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan who had previously served as Consul General at Nairobi, reported in telegram 267 from Kabul of Nov. 13, 1952, not printed, that the Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan had indicated to him that "we and possibly Paks have organized and supported movement and are continuing do so". (870.411/11-1352)

The unrest in Kenya which culminated in the proclamation of a State of Emergency on October 21st, has made significant changes in the life of the Colony which in turn affects the IIA program in British East Africa. The judgment as to the overall effect of the State of Emergency is commonly stated in terms of turning back the clocks of progress and development.

The Legislative Council has appropriated £750,000 and was asked for an additional appropriation in like amount to defray expenses of restoring order, funds urgently required for expanding and improving services of all types. Deeply affected has been the confidence of inter-community cooperation in the political developments of the Colony by constitutional means. In the face of what, in European eyes, amounts to a Kikuyu rejection of the goal of a multi-ethnic society, the European non-government community is demanding (1) unqualified European paramcuntcy in the affairs of the Colony, and (2) a greater measure of the self-government. The latter demand is provoked by the feeling that the disturbances in Kenya are (1) made a politicial football in the U.K., and (2) that the Colonial Office inhibits local authorities from taking swift and vigorous action in dealing with terrorists. As the Emergency enters its third month, there is growing apprehension on the part of the Europeans that the government's efforts to deal with the situation will end in a stalemate and that, therefore, terrorism will become chronic rather than epidemic.

Considerable disruption in the normal routine of daily life has occurred for a period, virtually no public gatherings were held in Nairobi after dark. Attendance at the 9:00 p.m. cinema shows was cut by half and people still prefer to patronize matinee performances. European men have been called to serve with the Police Reserve and the Kenya Regiment which has created personnel problems for business firms and reduces audiences at public gatherings. Europeans, Asians and more recently Africans are participating in home guard duties which cover the hours from 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. Travel outside municipal areas is prohibited after 7:00 p.m. except by pass. Even with permission, no one travels outside city limits after dark except in an emergency. In most areas of Kikuyuland, the movement of Africans is forbidden by a 7:00 p.m. curfew. All Kikuyu are required to carry special identification.

The heaviest burden is borne by (*a*) loyal Africans, and (*b*) Europeans residing on isolated upcountry farms. While Mau Mau terrorism is directed against Europeans, it also seeks by terrorism to enforce African solidarity. Therefore, the number of murders and atrocities committed against Africans far exceeds those suffered by all other communities. The police have been signally unsuccessful in protecting headmen, chiefs, informers and government witnesses from Mau Mau vengeance. It is equally true that European farmers are, to a large measure, without police protection. Although the police have been fairly successful in apprehending offenders, it is necessary for Europeans and loyal Kikuyu to take positive measures to defend themselves against the commission of crimes. The possibility exists that the Kenya settler community, under the tension of ever lurking terror, may attempt to take matters into their own hands and defy constituted authority. With one lawless element pitted against another, the situation could rapidly get out of hand. Furthermore, resort to vigilante action holds unequalled possibilities for bringing tribes hitherto unaffected by Kikuyu nationalism into a common front against Europeans.

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[7] Gandhi was assassinated on Jan. 30, 1948.

Under the conditions just described, the difficulties of conducting an effective IIA program have increased many fold:

1. There has been an increased isolation from world events owing to preoccupation with the local situation. Korea, the U.N. and the cold war have almost disappeared beneath a lowered horizon.
2. The outbreak of limited hostilities has sharpened identification of friend and foe. The IIA operation has always involved the danger of falling into Charybdis while avoiding Scylla, now this danger is more acute.

   a. Europeans display less tolerance than formerly. Therefore, IIA must exercise extreme care in tailoring its output. There is also greater reason for observing the mores of the community.
   b. The in-group feeling has been heightened among local Europeans with a corresponding suspicion of outsiders and their activities. This attitude appears to have arisen from the considerable amount of criticism leveled at the European by the U.K. press. Feeling abused and misunderstood, the local community tends to hold an outsider at arms length until his friendly intentions are known beyond question. Thus, the difficulty of establishing rapport with local groups has increased.
   c. African reactions are a blend of confusion and fear for their position in the Colony. Every effort must be put forth either to restore or strengthen Africans' faith in the fair and just nature of democratic principles and procedures.

3. Curtailment of several aspects of the program owing to emergency conditions as detailed under the discussion of various media activities.

The present threat to peace and stability heightens the urgency of IIA's mission in British East Africa. Now that the uneasy equilibrium formerly prevailing in the area has been shattered, it is possible that the basic problems faced and, therefore, the objectives to be achieved by IIA may be undergoing clarification. Until the Emergency is resolved by the establishment of a new working relationship between the various communities, the IIA program must remain extremely flexible and capable of rapid revision to meet contingencies which arise almost daily.

1C—Targets:

Depending upon the outcome of the current Emergency, a reweighing of target priorities may be necessary. We assume that law and order will eventually be restored. In that event, no major revision of priorities will be required. European paramountcy may be temporarily advanced and this group will remain our first priority target. Conversely, the importance of the African community in the affairs of Kenya may temporarily suffer a decline. However, owing to sheer weight of numbers and worldwide nationalist trends, it appears that African interests over the long haul will acquire at least equal importance with those of other communities. While the African community is under a cloud owing to its unfortunate participation in the current disturbances, it would be shortsighted to neglect this group, particularly since the Emergency has revealed that African nationalism in Kenya is powerful and could be captured and used by the Soviets.

In previous reports it has been argued that the growing economic importance of the Asian community and the frequency of indecision regarding alignment with the West or with Communism, should advance the priority rating of this group. In the main these arguments remain valid. Many Europeans feel that Hindu Asians have covertly sympathized with subversive elements in the African community. If as the outcome of the emergency the position of Europeans is strengthened, efforts might be made by the European community to restrict the role of the Asian community in Kenya's affairs.

It is too early and the possibility appears too remote to speculate on alterations in priorities which might follow a failure of the government to establish law and order in the colony.

No change is proposed in target priorities for Tanganyika or Uganda.

III—General Summary:

The summary given in the previous evaluation report (Nairobi's Despatch 310 of June 20, 1952) [8] remains basically valid. The overall picture conveyed is that of an operation which has reached maximum expansion under present personnel and allotment limitations. It is recognized that maximum expansion is not synonymous with maximum effectiveness. Changes in emphasis, methods and approaches offer opportunities for improvement in the achievement of program objectives. Although it is presumed that continual progress will be made in attaining maximum effectiveness, the question of the adequacy of the program in relation to developments in the area affecting U.S. interests remains to be answered.

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[8] Not printed; this despatch prepared by Noon covered developments through June 30, 1952. (511.45P/6-2052)

What new factors point to the need for an expanded IIA program in British East Africa?

1. The current challenge to British rule by a subversive and nationalist movement. This challenge adversely affects the stability of the area which has been assumed to rest upon orderly progress toward self-government under British tutelage.

2. The subversive character of African nationalism is revealed by present disturbances in Kenya. It is disturbing to realize that, despite fifty years of rule by a democratic power with all the supporting influence of democratically patterned institutions, the most effective leaders in the African community are those who subscribe to subversive ideologies. Equally alarming is the success which these leaders have had in winning a following among Africans with a program designed on non-democratic lines. These developments underscore the necessity for intensified activity among both leader groups and the semi-literates who have proven to be strikingly amenable to subversive leadership.

3. The more than negligible volume of anti-West, anti-U.S., opinion which prevails among the Hindu (Republic of India sympathizers) Asians. Such attitudes range from "a soft line on communism" to outright identification by a few with this movement. The danger in this situation lies not only in the defection of a considerable sector of the Asian population in the event of a West-Soviet conflict but also in the encouragement which this group gives to subversive African movements.

4. The presence of an active source of anti-West, anti-U.S. propaganda in the activities of the Indian Information Service. The importance of effectively countering such propaganda reaches beyond East Africa. Asians in the area maintain close ties with India and Pakistan so that the effects of the Information Program in East Africa will be felt in these two strategic countries.

It is recommended that under an enlarged program immediate steps be taken:

1. To open an IIA office in Uganda.
2. To replace the local employee at Dar es Salaam with an American.
3. To augment the Nairobi staff by no less than two European local employees.

Justification of Items 1 and 3 have [*has*] been offered previously. In support of the second recommendation, the following points merit consideration:

1. Dar es Salaam is the seat of a territorial administration and to operate effectively high level contacts must be maintained. There is evidence that the local employee does not have entree to officials or higher echelon. Difficulties frequently arise because the point at issue reaches responsible officials through a subordinate.

2. The present local employee has and any local employee engaged

probably would have difficulty in formulating what are the U.S. interests involved in a given situation. This difficulty is compounded in instances where U.S. and U.K. interests fail to parallel. From the inability to define the issues at stake, arises a failure to comprehend the significance and hence the usefulness of media materials.

The proposal to replace the local employee with an American officer does not imply criticism of the present incumbent. It merely reflects the opinion that the job to be done in Tanganyika is beyond the capacity of a non-American.

For the Consul General:
JOHN A. NOON
Regional Public Affairs Officer

745R.5 MSP/12–1052: Airgram

The Secretary of State Ad Interim[1] *to the Consulate General at Nairobi*

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, January 21, 1953.

A–32. Reference Consul General's Despatches Nos. 165 of December 10, 1952[2] and 184 of December 31, 1952.[3]

With further reference to the forthcoming trip of Bayne, Dechert, and Clemens (Deptel 48, January 9, 1953),[4] the Colonial Office evidently has cleared both the extension of the railroad line to Kilembe and the construction of a power line from Owens Falls to Kilembe as possible projects for MSA financing and the essential details for the necessary project applications will be worked up in Uganda by the MSA team in cooperation with the local authorities.

The assignment of an investment program officer to Nairobi, however, would represent an innovation for MSA in its operations in African DOT's. Although there is no objection in principle to such a proposal, assuming the local representative does not usurp the Colonial Office's prerogative of determining the acceptability and priority of the various projects, the Department feels that the assignment of such an officer at the present time might raise hopes prematurely. Consequently, it would appear preferable to defer action on this proposal until the general pattern and scope of United States economic aid in Africa has been determined.

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[1] Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews acted in this capacity on Jan. 20 and 21, 1953 until John Foster Dulles assumed office.

[2] Not printed; it indicated that Kenya was asking the Colonial Office for the authority to negotiate directly for MSA assistance and expected a favorable response. (745R.5 MSP/12–1052)

[3] Not printed; it reported that the Government of Kenya had been instructed to submit its proposals to the Colonial Office for evaluation and ultimate presentation to MSA, London rather than proceeding through the Nairobi Consulate General. (745R.5 MSP/12–3152)

[4] Not printed; it stated that Edward A. Bayne, Special Assistant for Overseas Territories, MSA, Paris; W. Cornell Dechert, Chief of the Payments Section; and George Clemens, Transport Specialist, were flying to Uganda for 3 weeks to study the Kilembe railroad and Owens Falls power-line projects. (745R.5 MSP/12–2452)

The British have expressed a definite interest in attracting American capital to aid in the development of the African territories. On the other hand, the Department had also heard that prospective investors have been discouraged by the number and variety of obstacles that have been imposed upon them. Consequently, the Department is anxious to appraise the situation, and will appreciate information regarding the conditions imposed on prospective United States investors by the local authorities.

Within the limits of the absorptive capacity of the colonies, the Department favors African development. The Department believes that private capital, both United States and European, will perform the major role in the economic development of Africa. However, the deterrents to increased private financing may lie as much in the lack of basic facilities, such as ports, railroads, water and power facilities as in governmental controls. It is in these areas where private capital may be less likely to respond that United States Government lending could be most appropriately applied. As a practical matter, the Department regards the official development program that has been worked up for each political subdivision as the appropriate starting point for any prospective United States loan projects.

The limits within which the United States aid program to the DOT's must operate for fiscal year 1954 has not been defined as yet, with respect to available finances. The proposed budget allocations may be radically changed before the appropriations are approved, and other sources of financing may have to be explored. Consequently, the Consul General should pursue a policy of "wait and see" during the interim while the quantity and limitations upon United States aid to Africa is being determined.

MATTHEWS

745R.00/7-2053

The Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Tibbetts) to the Department of State

SECRET
No. 375

LONDON, July 20, 1953.

Subject: Recent Developments Affecting Kenya.

There are summarized below the informal comments of an officer of the Colonial Office concerning recent developments affecting Kenya.

1. *Jomo Kenyatta:* This officer had just returned from the House of Commons where there had been a flare-up of some Labor MPs over

the news that Jomo Kenyatta's conviction had been set aside.[1] Wedgwood Benn,[2] Labor, son of Lord Stansgate,[3] had argued that Mr. Lyttelton had prejudiced the chances of a new trial by his earlier statement that some of the evidence associating the Kenya African Union with Mau Mau had come out in Kenyatta's trial. This argument had been set aside by the Speaker on the grounds that the case was *sub judice.*

The Colonial Office expects the Government of Kenya to appeal the decision setting aside Kenyatta's trial and to win it on the grounds that Judge Thacker's commission was good for the colony as a whole. They have also been told by the Attorney General that Mr. Lyttelton's remark did not prejudice Kenyatta's trial, although it would perhaps have been better left unsaid. (The Secretary interpolated it on his own to the dismay of the Colonial Office.) The developments concerning Kenyatta's trial have not therefore worried the Colonial Office unduly.

2. *Nehru and the Africans:* In the course of Nehru's visit to London in June he talked with several of the local African agitators—lobbyists, including Peter Koinange. Koinange does not, however, worry the Colonial Office at the moment. Apart from an occasional letter, they seldom hear from him, and they do not believe that he has much influence either among the Africans in London or in Kenya. What Nehru and the Africans talked about and who the other Africans were is not known.

Mr. Lyttelton himself saw Nehru during June for a long discussion of Kenya and Central Africa. The Secretary told his officials that "Mr. Nehru made exactly as much of an impression on me as I made on him," and it is difficult to imagine two men less suited to each other. The Colonial Office was annoyed but not surprised at Nehru's speech July 6 accusing the British *inter alia* of treating the Africans like wild animals.[4] They have decided not to make representations, however, and to let the matter drop. In the meantime, Patel [5] of the Kenya Asians has written to the Government expressing concern at the effect of Indian statements on Kenya on the position of the local Indians. The British think that local pressure may be the best way of handling this situation.

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[1] He had been sentenced to 7 years at hard labor on Apr. 8, 1953, but on July 15, the Supreme Court of Kenya set aside the conviction on a technicality. However, on Aug. 23, 1953, the East African Court of Appeal reinstated the conviction.

[2] Anthony Neil Wedgwood Benn entered the Commons in 1950 as the representative for Bristol South-East.

[3] William Wedgwood Benn had been raised to the peerage in 1941. He had been a Labour member of Commons.

[4] He made these remarks to the All-India Congress meeting in Agra.

[5] Ambalal Bhailalbhai Patel was a member of the Legislative and the Executive Councils of Kenya.

3. *Murumbi:*[6] Murumbi has left London and returned to India, according to information received at the Colonial Office. He did not call at the Colonial Office and was not active during his stay in London. (During the first two weeks of June there were notices in all of the left-wing periodicals of a public meeting June 20, to be sponsored by the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism, at which Murumbi was to speak; a fairly large hall was hired for the meeting. According to the press, Murumbi did not appear and no adequate explanation for his absence was given. It is possible that Murumbi was worried lest he attract too much attention from the Colonial Office by participating in a meeting of this sort and preferred to run out on the meeting's sponsors.)

4. *The Military Situation in Kenya:* The Colonial Office has been cheered by General Erskine's[7] reports and officials think that, if all goes well, by October or November most of the work can be turned over to the police. The Harvard planes have been particularly effective because they paralyze the Africans with fear. Erskine has asked for more planes, and they are on the way. The Africans who have been in hiding are in a ragged and hungry condition when they appear in the Reserves and this has made easier the problem of identification.

5. *The Kenya Europeans:* The Europeans in effect "served notice" on Mr. Lyttelton during his visit in May that they would allow a period of grace for the new policies to work, and they have therefore been quiet lately. (Mr. Lyttelton is not afraid of the Europeans and will do what he thinks necessary in any case but it does make it easier if the Europeans are behaving themselves.) The new policies—i.e. the sending out of General Erskine and the appointment of a Deputy Governor[8]—have not only made the Government more efficient but have also strengthened it vis-à-vis the Europeans. Sentiment in the Colonial Office is that any Europeans who step out of line should be locked up without delay.

6. *East African Federation:* Speaking at a banquet in London about ten days ago Mr. Lyttelton referred to the prospect of eventual East African Federation. This remark has attracted favorable comment from the Conservative press and somewhat more hesitant notice from non-Conservative journals. The idea has been discussed among officials in the Colonial Office for years and among officials it is believed that eventual Federation is the answer to many of East Africa's problems, particularly that of Kenya. Only by absorbing Kenya into a larger unit can there be progress on the land situation, and "the poison worked out" with respect to race relations.

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[6] Joseph Murumbi, of Masai-Goan stock, had attended school in India. He was the Secretary General of the Kenya African Union.

[7] Gen. Sir George Erskine was the Commander in Chief, East Africa.

[8] Sir Frederick Crawford.

The difficulties are the position of Tanganyika[9] and the attitude of the UN. Even though Federation might be highly advantageous for Tanganyika, the UN would probably be critical. The officials have therefore never gone beyond discussing East African Federation among themselves in terms of "in ten to fifteen years."

The officials were surprised by Mr. Lyttelton's speech. A draft had been written for him which he characterized as "slop" and he then prepared his own. One of his great weaknesses from the point of view of his subordinates is an inability to distinguish between what he has read in public sources and what he has seen in confidential papers. He knew, of course, that the idea of East African Federation was being tossed about and he proceeded to express his own views on the subject publicly. Possibly, said this officer, this indiscretion was calculated. The Secretary has recently been complaining that too much of the public discussion on Africa is along the same old lines; nor is he always impressed by his officials' caution.

In any case, the terms of reference of the East African High Commission come up for review in 1955.[10] It may be profitable to have some new thinking on the situation in East Africa although the officers of the Colonial Office can see no way around the difficulty raised by Tanganyika's status.

MARGARET J. TIBBETTS

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[9] Tanganyika was a trust territory.

[10] The Commission, which had been appointed in November 1952, had been charged with looking into ways of improving the standard of living of the African population particularly as regards land tenure and development. See *East Africa Royal Commission 1953–1955: Report* (Sir Hugh Dow, Chairman) Cmd. 9475, 1955.

745S.00/12–753

The Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Tibbetts) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, December 7, 1953.

No. 2044

Ref: Embtel 2364 Dec. 1[1]

Subject: Deposition of the Kabaka of Buganda.

On November 30th the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lyttelton, announced in the House of Commons that with great regret he had been compelled to withdraw recognition from the Kabaka of the Buganda and that the Kabaka, who was flying to England at the time the announcement was made, was not to be permitted to return to Uganda. A state of emergency had been declared and the Government of Uganda would make arrangements for the selection of a new Kabaka who was prepared to cooperate with the British Government. The reasons for the Kabaka's deposition were given as his announced intention to refuse to cooperate with the British Government despite previous pledges that he would do so, and the fact that his continued presence would be a threat to public order.

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[1] Not printed; it reported that Lyttelton had informed the House of Commons on Nov. 30 that the Kabaka of Buganda, Mutesa (Edward Frederick) II, was no longer recognized by the British Government. (745S.00/12–153) The Kabaka was the traditional ruler of the Ganda.

This statement, which was totally unexpected, immediately precipitated a public uproar and a demand for a debate in Parliament. Mr. Lyttelton made it quite plain that his decision was final although he consented to meet the Kabaka if the latter so wished.

1. *The Government's Position in This Matter.* On December 2nd the debate took place affording the Government an opportunity to state the position. (There are enclosed copies of the House of Commons Journal covering this debate along with copies of a statement by the Governor of Uganda, a memorandum by the Great Lukiko of Buganda, and the Government's reply to the Lukiko memorandum.) [2] The Colonial Secretary outlined the events which had taken place in some detail. He stated that in the middle of August it had become evident that a crisis might develop in Buganda and that the matter had been viewed with great concern. This crisis had arisen over two demands originally made by the Kabaka, (1) that the affairs of Buganda should be transferred from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office and (2) that assurances be given on the question of East African Federation. (It will be recalled that on July 2nd Mr. Lyttelton had made an after dinner speech in London in which he had referred in very general terms to the necessity of considering the evolution as time went on of the still larger measures of Federation of the East African territories.) [3] On this point Mr. Lyttelton said that he had been able to give the Kabaka full satisfaction and he emphasized that the problem of Federation had not entered into the current dispute. The real issue had been the Kabaka's insistence that a schedule must be set for the independence of Buganda within the Commonwealth which would involve the separation of Buganda from the rest of the Protectorate. Even after assurances on Federation had been given, the Kabaka was not prepared to accept the decision of the British Government on the basic issues and had made it clear that he would refuse to cooperate with the British Government and would not appoint Buganda representatives to the legislative council. Under the circumstances, the British Government had no alternative but to take

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[2] None printed. The Lukiko was the traditional Ganda representative body.

[3] The Ganda claimed that jurisdiction over their affairs had been transferred to the Colonial Office without local approval in 1902. As for Lyttelton's speech, which is discussed in despatch 375, *supra*, East Africans feared the implementation of a confederation such as had been established in Central Africa against the will of the majority and thus were very sensitive on this matter.

the steps which it had taken. Mr. Lyttelton emphasized the care which had been taken in making this decision. He dwelt upon the fact that the Kabaka had had six long and serious discussions with the Governor on the subject and that all possible means had been taken to prevent his acting in a precipitate and unwise manner. Since the Labor speakers in the debate had stressed the Colonial Secretary's "high handed" approach to Africans, the Secretary detailed his own attempts to clarify the situation and emphasized the confidence and trust which he reposed in the Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, an appointee of the Labor Government.

The Kabaka arrived in London on December 1st and saw the Secretary on December 2nd. Mr. Lyttelton said that their conversation had been a most painful affair because of the dignity of the Kabaka's manner and his obvious distress at the death of his sister, a distress shared by the Colonial Secretary. (On hearing of her brother's deposition the Kabaka's elder sister had fallen dead from shock.) At this point Mr. Lyttelton, to the surprise of the House and the press, revealed deep emotion and said that he personally had found it most difficult to act as he had done towards the Kabaka who "was a member of my University and of my Regiment, and a friend of my son's at Cambridge." (The significance of these ties to a British audience is virtually immeasurable.) For once the Colonial Secretary was well received by the House and Labor speakers did not dwell in the usual manner upon his alleged brusquerie and insensitiveness. It was a striking personal triumph for the Colonial Secretary although later in the debate he returned to his more usual form in a sharp interchange with Mr. James Griffiths.[4]

2. *The Labor Party Position.* The Opposition's attitude on this question is deeply intermingled with domestic politics. They have never liked Mr. Lyttelton and exploit to the hilt his overbearing and blunt parliamentary manner as well as his reputation as a successful financier which, they say, makes him the personification of those interests against which Labor is dedicated. Very few of them pretend to have much information on Buganda and privately some Labor MPs regretted the haste with which Labor moved on this question because the Party "might well find it has been backing the wrong horse." Nevertheless, they made considerable play on Mr. Lyttelton's remarks on East African Federation, a point on which he is obviously touchy, and queried loudly why such drastic action had been necessary in a Colony where previously all had been tranquil. Mr. James Griffiths eloquently begged the Colonial Secretary to reconsider his position and withdrew a draft motion of censure in the last few seconds of the debate on the grounds that it might yet be possible for the Secretary to come to some

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[4] Former Colonial Secretary in the Labour Government.

compromise solution. Later the Minister of State again stressed that the decision was final.

Although the Kabaka has seen some Labor members, he has made no comments to the press beyond a few words of greeting and has acted in a non-political way since his arrival; he had not been in London five minutes before he borrowed £100 from the Colonial Office and went off shopping in a taxi. It may well be that he is not particularly interested in having Labor play up his case since he is reported to have said that he had always liked London and was looking forward to being here. There is also current in Labor circles a rumor that the Kabaka's private life has very questionable features and a certain amount of caution may develop in the Party's dealing with him. Nevertheless, the sudden nature of the Government's action will probably be played up by Labor for some time, particularly since the Government has made plain that its decision is irrevocable. On December 2 the Opposition misplayed its hand badly by assuming, with considerable justification, that Mr. Lyttelton would present his case badly; they withdrew their motion of censure after his speech but have not abandoned it entirely, to the disgust of the Government which has pointed out sharply that Labor had prepared its motion before bothering to hear the Government's case.

There is strong sentiment in the Labor Party for launching an early debate, probably with a motion of censure against Mr. Lyttelton on the general question of his handling of Colonial problems. As the *Manchester Guardian* pointed out in a not unfriendly editorial, the record of the Colonial Secretary in recent months is not good. He has had his successes in the Nigerian Conference and the West Indies, but Kenya, Nayasaland, Northern Rhodesia, British Guiana and now Nigeria again have all displayed disturbing symptoms. With the Labor Party it has become a tenet of faith to attack Mr. Lyttelton wildly and violently and at the moment the Labor press is trumpetting loudly that "Lyttelton must go," or "This man is dangerous." Right-wing Labor MPs may deplore to a certain extent these assaults, but they say that it is obvious that the Colonial Secretary is seriously miscast in his present role and that the Party is justified in exploiting to the hilt the ineptitude displayed by any Conservative Minister, particularly since there are few Ministers in a vulnerable position. Mr. Lyttelton himself has not helped his cause by his obvious impatience with his critics although on December 2nd he did unquestionably move the House by the sincerity of his manner.

Labor's attitude is further conditioned by the current situation within the Conservative Party, with the Conservatives being off balance as a result of recent Gallup polls and the Holborn–St. Pancras by-election.[5] Those militants among the Labor MPs who believe that attack on every conceivable occasion is demanded are capitalizing on the obvious embarrassment which these Colonial issues have caused the Government in recent months, and unquestionably many back bench Conservatives are unhappy at the fierceness of Mr. Lyttelton's manner when confronting the Opposition. It is very doubtful that Colonial issues will ever become a major factor in British politics, and privately Labor MPs say that no votes ever turn on events in Africa; by keeping before the public the specter of an arrogant Tory Colonial Secretary alienating large sections of the Empire with his every move, however, the Labor Party can lower the Government's general standing in the country and create a widespread uneasiness about the manner in which Colonial affairs are being handled. There are indications that they are having some success in creating an atmosphere of disquiet about colonial problems. It is expected therefore that Buganda will be added to the Labor list and that Mr. Lyttelton will continue to occupy a disproportionate amount of Parliamentary time and energy, unless, of course, he suddenly achieves a successful settlement of some of the Empire's problems. Sections of the press have hinted that the Government would not be displeased to see a major attack on Mr. Lyttelton on the theory (*a*) that such an attack would force the Conservatives who are somewhat unruly at the moment to tighten their ranks behind the Colonial Secretary, particularly since (*b*) when the chips are down Mr. Lyttelton has demonstrated that he can rise to the Parliamentary occasion.

3. *Colonial Office Comment:* The Colonial Office says that there is relatively little of a factual nature to add to the Government's statements on this crisis. The issue was perhaps precipitated by the Colonial Secretary's speech on East African Federation but Buganda nationalism has been simmering for a long time and, if this excuse had not been seized, another would have been found. The issue of Federation was disposed of completely by the Secretary's assurances, but the Kabaka immediately chose another aspect of the future of Buganda to press the issue.

The reasons for the Kabaka's actions are somewhat obscure. He has been losing popularity rapidly because of an unfortunate extramarital liaison and there were indications that he was becoming nervous about his position among his own people. There is some evidence pointing to the fact that he hoped to regain popularity by setting himself up as a champion of Buganda nationalism and to "cash in" on the sympathy he would inevitably receive. On the other hand, "absolutely off the record," it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that he wanted to leave Uganda. (*Embassy Comment:* This interpretation is strongly supported by the Kabaka's behavior since arriving in London. He has refused to comment to the press or to meet representatives of the Uganda student groups, etc.; he is negotiating for a residence in Tangier; he has cabled the Regents in Kampala urging their cooperation with the Governor.)

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[5] Labour retained this seat on Nov. 19, by a greater plurality than in the general election.

Frankly, the Colonial Office expected more trouble in Buganda than has occurred. Every thing has been quiet, and the anticipated disturbances have not taken place. The future of the Buganda remains the most serious problem, for their nationalistic sentiments are increasing. On the issue of the Kabaka himself and his actions, the Colonial Office is confident that its case is strong. The Secretary will receive a delegation from the Lukiko probably before Christmas.

MARGARET J. TIBBETTS

745S.03/11-1854

The Consul General at Nairobi (Dorsz) to the Department of State

OFFICIAL USE ONLY NAIROBI, November 18, 1954.

No. 214

Subject: Buganda Constitutional Reforms

Summary. Amidst nationalist agitation which forced him to discontinue his speech, the Governor of Uganda announced that the Great Lukiko would, after constitutional reforms have been successfully put into practice, be allowed to choose whether to elect a new Kabaka or elect the return of the exiled Kabaka, Mutesa II. Whoever is chosen as Kabaka must accept the constitutional reforms and must abide by the Agreement of 1900 which forms the basis of the relationship between Buganda and the Protectorate Government.

The reforms proposed make the Kabaka a constitutional monarch, vest the conduct of public affairs in an expanded Cabinet, and emphasize the unity of the Uganda Protectorate, including a recommendation that a common Uganda citizenship be created to foster such unity. *End Summary.*

Enclosed herewith in five copies are reports appearing in the *East African Standard* of November 16, 1954 relating to new constitutional changes in Buganda.[1]

It will be recalled that recently a judgment by the Chief Justice of Uganda upheld the United Kingdom's right to withdraw recognition from the Kabaka Mutesa II (despatch 189 November 8).[2] This judgment was issued however in rather obscure legalese and also held that the United Kingdom had made an error in choosing the wrong provision of the 1900 Agreement under which to act. There was almost universal misinterpretation of the judgment by the Buganda which only served to increase the already heavy pressure for return of the Kabaka inspired by nationalist elements. At the time the judgment was announced, the Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, was in London conferring with the Colonial Office. Meanwhile there were widespread rumors (despatch 189) that the United Kingdom had no choice, in view of the heavy popular pressure, but to permit the return of the Kabaka, albeit circumscribing his powers under constitutional reforms drawn up by Sir Keith Hancock [3] and accepted by the Protectorate Government and by a Constitutional Committee of the Great Lukiko. As it turned out, these rumors were almost correct. The Governor of Uganda and the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary [4] announced simultaneously in Kampala and London respectively, that the Great Lukiko will have the choice either to choose a new Kabaka or return Mutesa II after the Hancock Constitutional reforms are in effect for nine months (beginning March 31, 1955) or for such lesser period of time as it appears the recommendations have been successfully put into practice. The then Kabaka, whoever he is, must agree to abide by the new reforms and by the 1900 Agreement which is to be appropriately amended to conform to the new constitutional changes.

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[1] None printed.

[2] Not printed; it reported that Chief Justice J. B. Griffin had ruled that the withdrawal of recognition should have been based on Article 20 and not Article 6 of the 1900 Agreement. (745S.00/11-854)

The Hancock Report is said to contain some fifty articles but the key provisions, which make far-reaching inroads into the Kabaka's powers, are the following:

(1) The first article states that the Kingdom of Buganda shall continue as heretofore to be an integral part of Uganda. (Thus nullifying the October 16 resolution of the Lukiko which endeavored to set a time table for the independence of Buganda and the transfer of its affairs from the United Kingdom Colonial Office to the Foreign Office.)

(2) An expanded (from three to six) Council of Ministers is to have responsibility for the conduct of public affairs in Buganda. It is to consult the Protectorate Government through elaborate machinery to be established (see below) and in event of dispute between the two the Governor-in-Council is empowered to give the Cabinet formal advice. If the advice is not accepted, the Governor-in-Council is empowered to dismiss the Cabinet.

(3) The Kabaka will appoint the Ministers of the Cabinet but only after the Lukiko has elected them and the Governor has approved of them.

(4) The Kabaka will sign all laws but the Governor may act within his discretion in approving any laws passed by the Lukiko except that where questions of principle are involved he must consult the Executive Council of the Protectorate Government.

(5) A Speaker of the Lukiko is to be elected who will have wide powers of legislative management including deciding when motions of "no confidence" in the Cabinet shall be put to debate and vote.

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[3] Director of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies.

[4] Alan Lennox-Boyd had succeeded Lyttelton as Colonial Secretary on July 28, 1954.

(6) Extensive machinery for consultations among the Cabinet, the Lukiko and the Protectorate Government is to be established with respect to education, health, natural resources, local government and community development.

(7) The Resident, who shall be the Governor's representative in dealing with the Buganda Government, shall together with the Katikiro (Prime Minister) of Buganda draw up a program for local government. Certain responsibilities will be transferred to local government bodies as soon as they are firmly established.

(8) The British Government is asked to create a Uganda citizenship "whereby a sense of unity may be fostered".

The Governor was interrupted and forced to discontinue his speech by agitators (not members of the Lukiko) who demanded *inter alia* that the Hancock Report be rejected. I. K. Musazi[5] of the Uganda National Congress has issued a statement that the report should not be considered by the Lukiko until Mutesa is returned. The Lukiko has formally apologized to the Governor for the interruption of his speech but radio reports have been received that a resolution favoring the return of Mutesa has already been adopted by the Lukiko. In any case few observers believe the Lukiko can do other than elect the return of Mutesa. The Lukiko has been adjourned for two weeks to consider the Hancock Report.

In abandoning its previous inflexible position regarding return of Mutesa II, the United Kingdom has made a great concession to the Buganda nationalist movement. In the Consulate General's opinion, however, there is cause for concern in the proposed timetable for decision (presumably nine months after March 31). If reports reaching the Consulate General are correct, a very ugly mood prevails in Buganda which months of continued debate are not likely to alleviate. Since the only possible candidate for Kabaka appears to be Mutesa II, the United Kingdom is in a difficult position to make the concession which Buganda nationalists are demanding, namely, bring Mutesa II back as Kabaka before agreeing to Sir Keith Hancock's proposals for constitutional reform.

EDMUND J. DORSZ

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[5] The Uganda National Congress led by Ignatio Musazi favored the unification of all the peoples of Uganda and the achievement of self-government.

611.45P/12-754

The Consul General at Nairobi (Dorsz) to the Department of State

SECRET
No. 242

NAIROBI, December 7, 1954.

Subject: Five-point Program for a Strong U.S. Policy in East Africa

As the end of the year 1954 approaches, the Consulate General believes it is an appropriate time to take stock of the U.S. position in East Africa, to review our objectives, to define them clearly and to recommend a program for achieving them. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, the Consulate General wishes to restate the situation with which we are faced.

First, it is clear that there is no imminent threat of Soviet invasion or infiltration of East Africa. Perhaps the threat of the local people turning to Communism is not entirely absent, but it is at the moment remote. East Africa is not, in short, a "cold war" operational area in the accepted sense.

Secondly, there is no outstanding problem in our relationships with colonial and protectorate governments of the East African territories. Barring minor points, the understanding and cooperation that exists between the United States and those governments is quite excellent. No delicate diplomacy is necessary in order for us to work here. The limits on the amount we can accomplish are to a large extent defined by what we ourselves *want* to accomplish.

The danger is that, as we are not in the "cold war" area and having a smooth relationship with these governments, we may lose our sense of urgency. We could be content simply to leave the area in the hands of the relatively competent government of the United Kingdom and its local government counterparts and take the plausible line that we have enough to do elsewhere in the world without involving ourselves unduly in this far-off British territory.

There are several long-range considerations, however, why a policy of neglect may eventually prove costly.

If we are to profit by the lessons of China, Southeast Asia and the Middle East, we should not, for example, take lightly the rising nationalist movements in the East African territories. By far the most advanced nationalist movement is among the Buganda of Uganda, who are pressing strongly for political recognition. It is conceivable that the day will soon come when the Protectorate Government in Uganda will be overshadowed by the Kabaka's native Kingdom. Even now the Buganda are tasting a great political victory (see Nairobi despatch No. 214 of November 18, 1954)[1] in forcing the United Kingdom to back down on its previously inflexible position regarding return of the Kabaka. However much the Kabaka's powers may be circumscribed on paper, he is virtually certain to return stronger politically than ever before, and the nationalist groups that supported him will likewise be stronger. Already the Uganda National Congress, headed by I. K. Musazi, flagrantly flouts the authority of the Protectorate Government by burning the Hancock Report before hundreds of supporters and casting the ashes into Lake Victoria. Thus far, the Protectorate Government has refrained from taking him into custody.

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[1] *Supra.*

Governor Cohen moreover laid great stress on the "Moslem influences" creeping into Uganda from the North and the necessity to prevent the rise of extremism. (See despatch No. 232 of December 1, 1954.)[2] Certainly Egyptian interest in the unity of the Nile Valley is not likely to decrease as time goes by.

As matters stand, we have no U.S. representation in Uganda. The Consulate General at Nairobi is too far removed—in distance, personnel and available travel funds—to make the U.S. adequately felt. Hence, the United States is almost an unknown quantity to the native government and population of Uganda. At present the United States has little means of even knowing about, much less moderating, any extremist influences creeping in from the North.

In Kenya, the indigenous—and potentially nationalist—movement took a blind detour through Mau Mau. So long as the prime movers identified themselves with the bestial practices of Mau Mau, the British were at liberty to smash both the political and terrorist movements at one fell swoop by force of arms. Once the military phase in Kenya ends, however, latent nationalist movements are certain to revive and may revive in more intrinsically dangerous forms; i.e., in forms which, as in Uganda, cannot readily be dealt with in military fashion. Nobody can be sure that the British experiment in multi-racial government, though it offers the best hope for stability, can for long succeed. Nor can we be sure the ultimate rise of either Asians or Africans to predominance can be prevented.

In Tanganyika there has been less evidence of ferment, but what happens in Uganda and in Kenya is certain to have repercussions there, particularly among politically-conscious tribes like the Chagga.[3]

In short, no one can say what kind of government we shall be dealing with in East Africa in the next decade. Another and perhaps even more important factor to be considered is that another foreign government is taking a profound interest in what is happening here. It is a government that has an appealing political philosophy of its own. It is tailoring that philosophy to attract nationalist groups. It is a government which can command the cooperation of a sizeable segment of the population of the East African territories, particularly in Kenya, to further its own ends. It is a government which is not necessarily in accord with all the aims and objectives of the United States. We refer to the Government of India.

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[2] Not printed; it summarized an address by Sir Andrew Cohen to the Rotary Club in Nairobi on Nov. 25, 1954. (745S.13/12–154)

[3] The Chagga were major coffee producers along the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro.

The potentialities for Indian penetration here have been thoroughly reviewed in despatches 136, October 12, 1954[4] and 165, October 27, 1954,[5] and it will be noted from the contents thereof that a contest for influence between the U.K. and India is already under way. We can hardly remain disinterested bystanders in such a contest, especially in view of the probable importance of East Africa as a staging area in the event of a major war.

The same reasoning would apply to the spread of Egyptian influence in Uganda.

What then must be the U.S. objective in East Africa? Certainly it is not either to replace or to undermine the British. The former is obviously out of the question. So is the latter. Presently any alternative to British control would be unsatisfactory both from the standpoint of management of local affairs as well as from guaranteeing western interests in the area. On the contrary, the United States in our view should help the British in this area wherever we reasonably can, so long as such help is not given at the expense of our own relationship with the indigenous population. To work in harmony with the British in their efforts to help the native population toward a viable economy and eventual self-government should in our opinion be American policy toward this area. At the same time, it is important that we recognize that British power is definitely on the wane here. We must prepare for the day, which may come sooner than we expect, when *Pax Britannica* alone is not enough to insure local stability and maintenance of western interest. We must therefore begin now to develop stronger relationships with native leaders and with the native population, primitive as they may in some cases be. America must not forever remain an unknown quantity to these people, nor they to us, especially as they begin to acquire political power.

Moreover, we must, in view of the uncertainty of India and Egypt as allies, develop a comparable position to theirs in this area so that we may always lead from strength in our activities here.

To do this it is imperative to get *closer* to the indigenous population—leader-to-leader and people-to-people—than we are at present. To date, America is known to the native peoples primarily through American missionaries. These missionaries have done invaluable work. But in the final analysis, their job has been to interpret religion. It has not been their function, nor should we ask them, to interpret American political policies, American economic philosophy, American business methods, American agriculture, industry, labor, etc. Commensurate with the advance of the local people, there should be a much more fully-rounded activity involving all types of American life, ranging from diplomacy between governments to discussions among farmers. At present, aside from the missionaries, only the Consulate General and USIS at Nairobi, the Consulate at Dar es Salaam and a few scattered American businessmen are here to perform that function.

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[4] Not printed; it detailed the activities of the Government of India in the region. (891.46/10–1254)

[5] Not printed; it dealt with Swahili broadcasts by the All India Radio. (891.46/10–2754)

In light of the foregoing, the Consulate General believes a five-point program along the following lines, modest as it may be, is necessary if we are to develop strength, flexibility and leverage in our future relationships with the people of this area; if we are, in short, to be prepared for the future:

1. *We should augment American consular representation in the territories.* This is important particularly as regards coverage of Uganda where anything can and may happen quickly. A separate consulate in Uganda would be desirable and should remain our goal. Since for budgetary and political reasons it is probably not immediately possible, provision should be made for an increase of Nairobi's staff by one officer and more frequent visits to Uganda by members of the Consulate General's staff.
2. *The USIS program should be strengthened throughout the territories.* (See in this connection USIS despatch No. 135 of October 12, 1954.)[6]
3. *Educational exchange* with Makerere College, with the new Royal Technical College, and with other local educational institutions should be given high priority. As Secretary Dulles said before the Advisory Commission on Education Exchange in August, "One of our troubles is that we like to do things that work quickly. In that respect the Soviet Communists have a great advantage over us because they work for long-range objectives . . .[7] Their work among the intelligentsia and the fact that their propaganda has made such an impact in even the Western World is very largely due to the fact that they are getting the fruits now of work which they started 20 years ago. Another angle that I have been greatly impressed with and one in which we get our greatest help as we deal with the so-called underdeveloped countries—those which until recently were colonial countries—is the fact that in those countries there have emerged and come to the top people who have been educated either in the United States or in American institutions abroad."
4. *FOA* should get into the picture as quickly and as strongly as possible for it has the capacity to reach both leaders and "grass roots" effectively through visible projects (see below).
5. *Constructive contacts with the people of the area by private American organizations of all types should be stimulated.*

The Consulate General has been gratified by the Department's efforts to stimulate private interest in the local "Save the Children" campaign (despatch No. 234).[8] It is furthermore pleased by the visit of Mr. Charles R. Joy of CARE. Mr. Joy has, incidentally, expressed the view that this area has been too long overlooked by private American philanthropic groups. These groups could do much good in cementing people-to-people relationships. No opportunity of this kind should be overlooked.

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[6] Not printed; it outlined a suggested USIS cultural program for East Africa. (511.45R/10-1254)

[7] The ellipsis indicated appears in the source text.

[8] Not printed; it indicated that the diplomatic community had attended a theatrical benefit which raised money for the Save the Children Fund. (845R.57/12-254)

One further word about FOA, in which the Consulate General would like to place special emphasis. The Consulate General is not in a position to speak on the attitude of the Colonial Office, but it is certain that the governments of Kenya and Uganda very much want FOA to come in here to do certain projects (despatches 171, November 2, 1954,[9] and 178, November 4, 1954).[10]

Messrs. Blum and Corfitzen of FOA worked very hard this fall to review and develop these projects with local officials (despatch No. 171, November 2, 1954). Some of these projects we believe, have considerable potentiality for making America present and real, rather than remote and unreal, to the local people. We believe this American presence will be felt whether or not, initially, many American personnel are involved in the projects. We further believe with respect to Kenya that the dimensions of the military campaign against Mau Mau are being rapidly reduced and that the Emergency should not be a deterrent towards FOA undertaking these projects.

The point is that we should make a start. If, for example, there is an American wing to the Royal Technical College, the first important institution in this area to open its doors to all races, it seems to the Consulate General that this will be a "foot in the door", as well as a contribution of lasting benefit to the United States. Whether or not Americans are initially employed at the college, the fact that the wing is there, that it is American, and that the project was conceived in consonance with American principles of racial equality will not be overlooked or suppressed. The Consulate General and USIS will see [to] that. The Indian community, with strong encouragement by the Indian Government, is, incidentally, contributing £100,000 to this project.

Other FOA projects offer similar opportunities to build our prestige here. Building an effective relationship with people with whom we have had so little contact for centuries is obviously not an overnight job. It is a gradual process. Properly handled, however, the results can be cumulative. If in East Africa we are to avoid the catastrophe of China and the rampant extremism of some parts of the Middle East, we should start to develop contacts whenever and wherever we can and we should then build upon the foundations we lay. We believe the cost will be very small indeed in relationship to the benefits derived.

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[9] Not printed; it reported that Robert Blum of USOM, London, and W. E. Corfitzen of USOM, Rome, had arrived in Nairobi to consult with local officials on various FOA assistance applications and to undertake a field investigation of those projects relating to agricultural development. (103.02 FOA/11–254)

[10] Not printed; it summarized the negotiations involving an application for FOA assistance to the Royal Technical College. (745R.5 MSP/11–454)

For this reason the Consulate General hopes that something along the lines of its five-point program above will be carried out to the fullest extent possible in coming months, and that through the combined effects of strengthened diplomacy, public relations, educational exchange, FOA and private American activity, we will be ready for anything that comes in this part of the world.

EDMUND J. DORSZ

ALGERIA

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ALGERIA, IN PARTICULAR THE UPRISING BEGINNING IN NOVEMBER 1954

751S.00/2-2752

The Consul General at Algiers (Lockett) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL ALGIERS, February 27, 1952.

No. 239

Subject: Observations on Stability of French Control in Algeria.

Introduction

Recent events in Tunisia and Morocco raise the question whether similar disturbances cannot be expected to occur in Algeria. That the possibility of outbreaks in this territory exists is certain, since there is no reason to believe that the character of the population has changed radically since 1945, and that circumstances identical to those existing at that time, or other circumstances of equal force, could not lead to the same violent results. This report attempts to examine what circumstances would be conducive to serious disorders in Algeria, and how serious such disorders could become.

It is the habit of French authorities to say, and it is substantially correct, that active nationalists represent a very small proportion of the native population of Algeria. The great mass, in vast majority rural people, are interested primarily in their own tranquility, and are largely indifferent to events which do not directly affect their daily lives. They seem to have little if any patriotic feeling for Algeria as such. If such a feeling existed it would be surprising since (as the prominent nationalist leader Ferhat Abbas pointed out in a famous quotation while he was still pro-French), no such entity as Algeria, by name and dimensions, existed before it was established by the French. They have also little or no patriotic feeling for France and like every mass, they can be whipped into emotion and action by agitators.

Possible outbreak of unrest in Algeria, therefore, can be said to depend on two groups of very unequal size, the Nationalist parties (including the Communist Party) on the one hand and the vast majority of the Moslem population on the other. If the Nationalist leaders deem the occasion propitious; if they believe, for example, that the United Nations would give them favorable consideration, that they could hope for support from the United States, or that world opinion would exercise effective pressure on the French Government, they could at any time promote public manifestations and, if they chose, provoke violence. Any such disorder could probably be brought immediately under control by French authorities. In other words, disorders in Algeria might well be precipitated by developments which do not impinge on the great mass of the population, such as deliberations of the United Nations, but the intensity of such disturbances will be limited unless the population is stirred up by factors to which it is more directly susceptible.

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[1] This despatch was sent also to Paris, Tunis, Rabat, and Casablanca.

Factors which may provoke unrest in Algeria can be divided into those of a political-religious nature and those of an economic nature.

Political-Religious Factors

Recent events in Tunisia have certainly led to a tension in French-Moslem relations in Algeria. On January 31, for example, physical combat between first and second college delegates broke out on the floor of the Algerian Assembly and the tenor of the remarks made became so sharp that the President of the Assembly, a Moslem, refused to preside over the session. The subject under discussion had no remote connection with Tunisia, but concerned a project for eliminating the ban on advertising of alcoholic drinks. It is certain, however, that the incident was caused primarily by the tense atmosphere existing. Parenthetically it may be noted that the episode passed with no more serious consequences than some embarrassment to the Algerian budget, but as long as the Tunisian affair continues, tense situations threaten to recur each time a controversial subject is discussed.

On the other hand, it is clear that the mass of Algerian Moslems has not yet been penetrated with any strong emotion towards events in Tunisia. Communist and Communist-front organizations, as well as the MTLD, made as strong efforts as French surveillance permitted to organize demonstrations on February 1 as a "Day of Solidarity with Tunisia". Police intervention was limited to the seizure of two issues of *Liberté* and one issue of *Algérie Libre*, Communist and MTLD organs respectively, confiscation of some lots of handbills, and the disposition of sufficient security forces to cope with emergencies that might arise. These measures did not prevent the dedication of February 1 as a day of manifestations in sympathy with Tunisia from receiving a great deal of publicity. Nevertheless, the result was approximately nil. No departure from normal activity was visible, and no disorders of any kind occurred. It was obvious that solidarity with Tunisia had little if any mass appeal in Algeria.

In addition I have been assured by the Governor General, and I have no evidence to the contrary, that no acts of disorder connected with Tunisian events have yet taken place in any part of Algerian territory and that such manifestations as have occurred have been confined to a limited number of meetings.

The Governor General also emphasized, however, that the possibility, and even the probability of disturbances in Algeria are not to be discounted depending on the evolution of the Tunisian situation.

If violence flares again in Tunisia and remains uncontrolled for any appreciable length of time, it is almost certain that incidents will occur in Algeria. Some leaders of Nationalist movements here feel that the present opportunity to assert themselves should not be missed. Such a feeling is no doubt reflected in the recent formation of a North African Front comprising representatives of nationalist groups of the three North African territorities.

Algerian Nationalists are also sensitive to events in the Middle East, in particular Egypt, and the development of the situation there influences to some extent attitudes in this territory.

However, regardless of how the situation may develop in Tunisia or elsewhere in the course of the next few months, I see, for the short run, little danger of serious mass disturbances in Algeria. This country covers a large area which cannot be under complete police surveillance continually; hence, individual acts of sabotage or violence may well occur. The Governor General has assured me that he sees little or no danger of any mass disorder; and as far as the near future is concerned, I believe that he is correct.

To all appearances nationalist sentiment is materially weaker here than in Tunisia and Morocco. In addition the higher degree of French penetration and the greater organization of transportation, communications and administrative machinery facilitate the maintenance of good order.

It is pertinent, however, to inquire what may be the more long-term effects in Algeria of the adjustments that will be made in Tunisia following the present situation, and also of similar changes to be expected perhaps in Morocco.

In this connection it is important to bear in mind that the status of Algeria is completely different from that of the two neighboring territories.[3] The former comprises three departments of Metropolitan France and will always remain, according to French plans, an integral part of France. In negotiations between the French Government and local representations of Tunisia and Morocco the former can always point to the goal of eventual independence, or at least internal autonomy. This is not the case with Algeria. Political reforms may be instituted here whereby the native population exercises a greater influence in proportion to its greater number but no steps can be taken in the direction of independence. Thus, while concessions may be made by France to Tunisia, for example, at a more or less rapid rate and a time-table conceivably be established calling for complete internal autonomy at some hypothetical date in the future, no such concessions are possible in the present relations between Metropolitan France and Algeria. At least, the possibility of such change is excluded by France.

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[3] Despatch 69 from Algiers, Sept. 14, 1950, transmitted an analysis of the legal status of the Algerian Departments within the governmental structure of France. Two of the sources used were the Statute of Algeria, Law No. 47-1853, Sept. 20, 1947, Article 50; and the Constitution of the French Republic, Article 60. (751S.01/9-1450)

Therefore the further Tunisia and Morocco advance in the direction of independence, the more difficult will become the French position in Algeria, and the more rapidly progress is made by the two other territories, the sooner will the position here tend to become more acute.

If, for example, the present affair in Tunisia results in a drastic retreat by the French from their previous position, the result can only be to encourage Algerian nationalist leaders to intensify their agitation.

Similarly, if the Tunisian question is placed before the United Nations and receives sympathetic consideration therefrom, and particularly if as a result France is obliged to make substantial concessions, it is almost certain that Algerian nationalists will exert every effort to duplicate the Tunisian performance, including if necessary, the preliminary violence.

Any outbreak of disorder which may occur will be encouraged and exploited by the Communists, who by their high degree of organization can exert a force disproportionate to their numbers.

Up to now the anti-Western spirit which has flared in a number of countries of the Moslem World has not significantly affected the masses of Algeria. There is no reason to believe, however, that in the course of time such an anti-Western wave will not spread here as elsewhere and it is the aim of Nationalist parties, in particular the MTLD and the Communists, to propagate it.

The Economic Factor

The mass of the Moslem population lives close to the minimum level of sufficiency. The vast majority of the rural population are small farmers who have no reserves and depend on each year's crop to carry them through to the next, or in the case of nomads, depend entirely on natural range forage for the sustenance of their flocks. When a drought destroys the crops and reduces range forage, the farmer is left completely without resources. Government-supported credit institutions alleviate distress that occurs normally here and there each year in a climate so erratic as that of Algeria. Occasionally, however, the entire country is afflicted by a severe and protracted drought. At such times vast numbers of farmers are thrown into misery and starvation, far beyond the power of the government to fully alleviate.

Such a situation occurred in 1945, and it is unquestionable that this disaster was an important factor in the insurrection of May 1945.

Should a severe and general drought afflict Algeria for the remainder of the current growing season, destroying the grain crops and drastically reducing pasturage, and assuming that the Tunisian question remains unsettled, one could foresee that disorders would probably occur in Algeria in such a fertile field for Nationalist and Communist agitation.

Fortunately nothing points to such an eventuality at the present time. Rangelands were never in better condition, and prospects for grain crops are as promising as is possible for this time of year.

Extent of Danger

As indicated above, we foresee no likelihood for the near future of any outbreak in Algeria other than isolated incidents that could be rapidly brought under control.

If subsequently, however, some of the eventualities referred to above as favoring the nationalist movement should materialize, how serious could any possible insurrection become?

Assuming that at such time France is not involved in a European war, the Tunisian incident no doubt provides, or will provide, the answer. Military forces already present in Algeria, or quickly brought in, could presumably quell disorders in a relatively brief period. The limiting factor would not be the lack of military force, but the extent to which public opinion, particularly in France but also in the Western World, would tolerate the firm measures which might be necessary to maintain order, measures which would be the more severe, the more the insurrectional movement shared popular support. French opinion would be more disposed to tolerate whatever repressive action might be required in Algeria since France would surely consider any insurrection as an attempt to dismember the French Republic.

It is in the realm of pure conjecture to speculate on possible developments in case France should be involved in a European war with the maximum number of troops committed elsewhere, and a minimum available to maintain order in Algeria. Such circumstances would certainly incite Nationalist leaders to capitalize on the situation and to provoke rebellion if they saw chance of success. It may be suggested, however, that the humanitarian convictions of the public which, to a large extent, exclude in peacetime the possibility of bombing and machine-gunning recalcitrant villages by air, are more quiescent in war time; and that even a large-scale rebellion poorly armed is no match against modern war machines wielded by a very small number of troops.

One factor which tends to restrict the extent of a possible insurrection is the lack of homogeneity of the native population. In particular the Kabyles form a fairly numerous group which has never been fully penetrated by the Arab influence in Algeria, and which remains, in fact, somewhat hostile to the latter. French efforts toward education have met less resistance in Kabylie than elsewhere, and the French believe, rightly or wrongly, that they can count on the loyalty of the Kabyle population, and especially on the loyalty of numerous Kabyle veterans of the French Army who, it is asserted by French officers, have acquired patriotic sentiments toward France.

Conclusions

No one would be so bold as to deny that current events in Tunisia and Morocco, particularly if violence flares out again, are not likely to have repercussions in Algeria. For the next few months at least, however, we see little or no possibility of the occurrence of other than isolated incidents.

For the longer-term future it is by no means certain that the situation will improve. The farther and the faster that Tunisia and Morocco advance towards independence, the more will Nationalist leaders here be tempted to follow their example, and the mass of Algerian Moslems is not immune to being penetrated by the spirit of independence that is strong in the Moslem world at the present time.

The only real solution to the problem thus posed is to Westernize and modernize Algeria and its people, bringing the latter to a standard of living and to a psychology closer to those of the French. Earnest efforts have been exerted and progress has been made in this field. Schools are being built, irrigation works extended, agricultural extension programs carried out and the development of natural resources encouraged. It is true that the rate of progress on such projects is less rapid than the Administration would have desired, since their execution depends to a large extent on aid from the Metropolitan budget which is chronically overstrained.

If a sufficiently impressive rate of progress can be achieved and maintained in the broad program of social and economic investments, the problem of French-Moslem relations in Algeria should be eased, since it would seem that only a relatively small number of fanatics would fail to recognize that the costly investments required are far beyond the means of Algeria alone. On the other hand, if progress falters, discontent can only increase as a result of disappointment in the hopes that have been raised.

In any case, for the foreseeable future it is extremely difficult to conceive of any situation in which French control of Algeria could be seriously threatened by action of the native population regardless of difficulties that may occur.

THOS. H. LOCKETT

751S.32/1–2753

The Consul General at Algiers (Lockett) to the Department of State[1]

ALGIERS, January 27, 1953.

No. 167

Subject: French Action against Algerian Nationalists

A French court of appeals in Algiers heard cases against the following Algerian nationalist leaders on January 22nd:

Ahmed Mezerna, president of the MTLD[2] and director of the MTLD organ *L'Algérie Libre*
Ferhat Abbas, secretary general of the UDMA[3]
Larbi Demaghlatrous, MTLD delegate to the Algerian Assembly.

Charged twice for *propagation de fausses nouvelles* and once for *diffamation*, Mezerna originally received sentences totalling 420,000 francs in fines. The court postponed for one week a decision on the appeal.

Meanwhile, the French authorities brought Mezerna into court on January 26th on new charges. For having failed to deposit copies of *L'Algérie Libre* of November 15, 1952,[4] with the proper governmental offices, Mezerna was fined 10,000 francs in addition to fines he might have to pay on the other charges.

Accused of having committed *violences a magistrat dans l'exercice de ses fonctions*, Abbas originally received a suspended prison sentence of two months. The appellate court changed the sentence to a fine of 10,000 francs.

Similarly in the case of Demaghlatrous, who allegedly elbowed a policeman, the court changed the sentence from three months and one day in prison to a fine of 50,000 francs.

Also on January 22nd another court of appeals in Algiers reviewed the cases of three young MTLD *militants* who were charged with *participation a une manifestation*. The court reduced one sentence from three months to two months in prison and confirmed the other two sentences of two months in prison for each of the other two defendants.

THOS. H. LOCKETT

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[1] This despatch was also sent to Paris.

[2] The *Mouvement du Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* was considered to be the more extreme of the two Algerian nationalist parties. (Despatch 122 from Algiers, Nov. 25, 1952; 751S.00/11–2552)

[3] The *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* was the second major Algerian nationalist party.

[4] The authorities had seized Nos. 56 and 57 of *L'Algérie Libre*, the issues of Nov. 1 and 15, each of which carried an article considering the problems that would be raised by an alliance with the Communists. (Despatch 122)

751S.00/9–1153

The Consul General at Algiers (Lockett) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL ALGIERS, September 11, 1953.

No. 56

Ref: Despatch No. 53, September 1, 1953.[2]

Subject: Algerian Nationalist Comment on French North African Policy.

The lack of resistance to the recent French decisions in Morocco and the negative vote of the United Nations Security Council have apparently induced the Algerian nationalists to take a more sober view of the recent developments in Morocco as indicated by the latest comment in the Algerian nationalist press. Having vented their anger against the French and supported the Moroccan patriots, the Algerian nationalists are now concerned with the conclusions which they believe must be drawn from the Moroccan events for their own guidance.

For UDMA Secretary General Ferhat Abbas, writing in the September 4 issue of *La République Algérienne*, the loss of a man or a throne can be but an episode in the colonial peoples' struggle for self-government. Morocco remains, and with it the Moroccan question. The fiction of El Glaoui and his Berber horsemen, created for the purpose of deluding French and international opinion and providing France's American partner with an alibi, cannot withstand a common sense examination. According to Abbas, responsibility for the events in Morocco lies with the French bourgeoisie which has lost faith in itself and seeks to compensate for its own inferiority complex by a series of criminally brutal acts against the unarmed colonial peoples. This, he believes, is perhaps the last stand of a class which is worn out by power and feels that power is escaping it. "For us", he says, "the way out of this impasse remains the same: we must persuade the French to start their own revolution again and to escape the Fascist forces which threaten them, and then, to build with them a great human community in which the rights of small peoples will not be at the mercy of a handful of plotters and rascals.

"The struggle is the same whether in Paris or in Rabat. M. George Bidault deceives himself and deceives us when he places it on a religious plane. The fact is that this struggle is taking place between the peoples and their exploiters, between those who have everything and those who have nothing."

The editorial in the same issue of *La République Algérienne* also seeks to explain the French actions in Morocco on the basis of an inferiority complex generated by the French defeat of 1940 and mistreatment of France by the three great powers. It then goes on to attack France's "civilizing mission" by asserting that despite the vicissitudes of French politics, the one permanent aim of French colonial policy and the one aim of "real France" (*la France réelle*) has been the erection of colonialist structures postulating the annihilation of the native and of his personality, leaders and institutions; the means for accomplishing this is direct administration. In colonial matters, the editorial observes, the French political pendulum oscillates between Brazzaville and Ajaccio. As for the United States, it has handsomely contributed to the relief of French imperialism and betrayed Roosevelt's promises.

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[1] This despatch was also sent to Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.

[2] Not printed.

[3] For documentation on this topic, see pp. 599 ff.

The September 4 issue of MTLD journal *L'Algérie Libre* drew the following conclusions from the recent events in Morocco. First, that in their dealings with North Africa, the colonialists have no desire for a representative interlocutor and ruthlessly repress any tendency to resist them. Secondly, that French public opinion failed to react during these events and that it would be a dangerous illusion to depend upon French public opinion to exercise pressure upon its Government. This is contrasted with the positive support granted by the Arab-Asian bloc of nations. The latter, frustrated by the colonial states led by the United States, are advocating a large Afro-Asian conference to take the necessary steps in regard to North Africa. The final and most important conclusion (according to the paper) is that the great colonial interests are operating with perfect coordination in North Africa and that since colonialism is united, the North African nationalist movements must unify their efforts against it.

Like its UDMA counterpart, *L'Algérie Libre* rejects the religious aspect allegedly attributed to nationalist agitation by Foreign Minister Georges Bidault. While expressing sympathy for those who in their just anger are inclined to resort to violence, it cautions that base methods can never lead to noble ends.

The MTLD's attitude toward the United States appears to have moderated somewhat. The editorial of this issue of *L'Algérie Libre* takes the position that the fate of the North African questions in the United Nations illustrates the extent to which the predominance given to strategic considerations as a result of the cold war has deflected that organization from its high purposes. Thus, each time opposition to colonialist designs manifests itself, France, fearing universal reproof, appeals to the notion of strategy to win the support or sympathetic neutrality of the leader of the Atlantic nations. "The United States", the editorial says, "are caught in a trap. They must tolerate everything. Their security in the event of the independence of a colonial country would be endangered. The United States, a former colony, thus go in the name of strategy, against their history and the freedom which they pretend to defend throughout the world."

Comment:

It appears from the foregoing that there will be no significant change in the nature or scope of Algerian nationalist activities. Cooperation between nationalists and Communists remains, as in past months, nothing more than a Communist hope.

The apparent discrepancy between Ferhat Abbas' hope for help from the French people and *La République Algérienne*'s distrust of what it calls real France is probably due to a belief (similar to that of many French intellectuals) that the advent of a left of center, and therefore more sympathetic, French Government is inevitable.

THOS. H. LOCKETT

751S.00/5–1954

The Consul General at Algiers (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL ALGIERS, May 19, 1954.

No. 238

Subject: Political Situation in Algeria.

There is quoted below a memorandum of conversation I had with Governor General Leonard on May 18 from which it will be noted that although he believes he has the local nationalistic parties under control there may be trouble stirred up by terrorists from abroad, mentioning in this connection the recent exposure by his police of Spanish Communist activities. Likewise it will be noted the Governor General's belief in the seriousness of the economic situation in Algeria where the increase in population is not offset by the requisite increase in economic wealth, with resulting unemployment and decreased standards of living. His solution, to which he is devoting much time, lies in greater emigration to Metropolitan France under conditions which will make the émigrés friends of France rather than its enemies.

"In answer to my inquiry the Governor General said that the fall of Dien Bien Phu would undoubtedly have repercussions in Morocco and in Tunisia and that it was inevitable that there would be some repercussions in Algeria. The so-called 'anti-Colonialists' would be bound to seize upon the fall of Dien Bien Phu, he said, as an indication of the weakening of French control, with the resulting increased possibility of success for nationalistic activity.

"M. Leonard said that he did not anticipate any difficulty in Algeria of domestic origin. He said that the PPA, as he insists on calling the MTLD, and the Communists were not in a position to do anything. They were, of course, prepared, he said, to seize on any incident which might give them a possibility of causing dissatisfaction with the existing regime or disorders, much as an infectious germ would enter any open wound available.

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[1] This despatch was also sent to Paris, Rome, and Valetta.

"M. Leonard anticipated that if difficulty arose it would come from terrorists sent into Algeria from abroad. He mentioned in this connection increased activity by the Arab League which he felt would step up action in the light of Dien Bien Phu, but then went on to say that his people had unearthed in the last week a very definite resurgence of Spanish Communist activity in Algeria. He said that the movement had been a very closely coordinated one in which each cell contained only about three people. Nevertheless, his police had discovered it and, he believed, had suppressed further activity. He did not agree that the danger from exterior intervention lay necessarily with the Communists, but thought it might easily come through action by the Arab League.

"In this connection the Governor General readily admitted that the economic situation in Algeria was most important. Unemployment had increased of late and he pointed to the fact that every four years there is an increase of a million in the population, with no comparable increase either in agricultural or industrial production. This was a matter, he said, to which he had given much attention. He had had a detailed study made of emigration from Algeria, by a professor whose name I recollect as being Montaigne, and this study, he said, had developed the fact that there was more coordination in emigration from Algeria to France than anyone had previously believed. This coordination, he said, was achieved by the Arabs themselves, principally by people from the villages of the Kabylie. The study had developed the fact that for one reason or another, someone from the Kabylie would achieve success in France and set up a coffee shop, or other enterprise, which would provide a magnet for other people in France from the same village or area. This had developed, he said, to such an extent that people from a particular village in the Kabylie would send their children to a particular region in France where they would immediately find a sympathetic environment. He said he thought this was all to the good as it gave to the Kabyle a good impression of conditions in France and let him return to his native village with a good taste in his mouth. He said also that, given the existing seclusion of the women of the Kabylie, it was a good idea for the women to remain in Algeria. Young men going to France under the conditions he had described should return at least once a year to maintain contact with their families in the Kabylie.

"He said that one of the difficulties with migration from Algeria to France had been that many young men went without contacts in France and after having been knocked about from pillar to post wound up working on some public works project where there was work today and none tomorrow. This bred insecurity and ill will toward France. This was a problem, he said, to which he is now devoting major attention. He said that in the mines in the north and in some of the factories management had of recent years taken greater interest in the welfare of Algerian labor. This was all to the good, he said, and should be continued and expanded. If the Algerian worker in France could find a sympathetic climate and retain a family in the Kabylie to which he could return periodically greater good could be done to the economy of Algeria. He insisted that the large sums donated by the Metropole each year to the well being of Algeria is well expended in the general interest of France, and he went on to say that he hoped to create more interest in the Metropole in the workers from Algeria engaged in public works in France. In the end, he returned to the problem presented by the rapidity of the increase in population in Algeria without the requisite increase in economic wealth, thus resulting in increasing unemployment and decreasing standard of living. He left me with the impression that he feels the answer in the foreseeable future lies in greater emigration to Metropolitan France under conditions which will make the émigrés friends of France and the French Union rather than its enemies.[”]

LEWIS CLARK

751S.00/11-254 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

OFFICIAL USE ONLY ALGIERS, November 2, 1954—11 a. m.
PRIORITY

12. Government radio announced noon November 1 thirty terrorist attacks had taken place during night.[2] Areas affected most are southeastern part Constantine and Aures.

Several persons shot to death: One officer in Khenchela, two soldiers in Batna, a schoolteacher in Arris, Caid in [garble], native policeman in Kabylie and motorist near Mostaganem. Widespread bombing and arson attacks against police stations, guard-houses. Terrorists also attempted radio station and gasoline tanks Algiers. Most arson and bombing attempts ineffective owing obvious lack experience and crudeness means used.

Governor General tells us no incident reported since November 1. Authorities were warned some time ago but terrorist timing surprised them. Governor General is obtaining three additional companies security police and three battalions parachutists to strengthen existing security forces. No question in anyone's mind that terrorists are MTLD–PCA members and attacks made under pressure from Arab League (see Algiers despatch 51 October 7, 1954).[3] Idea of connection between *Fellaghah* and terrorists discounted. Governor General's personal view is that attacks intended to call attention of UNGA to Algeria and help Arab propaganda.

No apparent sign of tension population Algiers and officials state there is no reason for alarm.

CLARK

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris.

[2] Telegram 14 to Algiers, Nov. 1, said United Press had reported a serious terrorist outburst in Algeria and the dispatch of troops there from France. It requested the Consulate General to keep the Department informed. (751S.00/11-154)

[3] Not printed. (751S.00/10-754)

751S.00/11–454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, November 4, 1954—7 p. m.

1912. Reference Department telegram 14 to Algiers,[2] repeated 1602 to Paris.

Surprisingly little specific information other than that appearing in press available Paris regarding disorders Algeria on night of October 31–November 1 and insurrection around Arris.

From discussion, however, with officials in Foreign Office, permanent Secretary of National Defense and Interior, it would appear that disturbances were potentially unexpected except as to timing. Police officials Algeria have been for some time aware of mounting tension and Minister of War Chevallier previously informed us Governor General Leonard was concerned regarding local security measures, lack of troops and his inability to seal off Tunisian-Algerian frontier over which large number of *Fellagah* have been known to be moving due to energetic action being taken Tunisia.

Similar tension known to local police but for psychological and political reasons they were unable to take effective countermeasures such as area-wide roundups of suspects nationalists, etc.

All French officials have been most impressed by obvious organization of outlaws in that within space of few hours some 30 incidents occurred throughout eastern and even western Algeria and timing appears to have been perfect. Fact that Arris area was completely out of French control for some time and situation even now is not fully under control leads all observers to believe that leaders well experienced in military tactics are calling shots. Political acumen also evidenced by murder of Caid Sadok who is described as one of most competent pro-French Algerian Caids.

One encouraging aspect is that contrary to disturbances in 1945 recent events did not touch off spontaneous local disturbances which might be attributed to relative local prosperity of Algerians and fact that relatively well fed populace presently politically apathetic.

Origin of over-all direction and organization is, of course, of primary interest. It has not as yet been specifically ascertained but officials with whom we have discussed matter believe direction stems from Arab League in Cairo. Inflammatory nature of recent Arab League broadcasts from Cairo have led French protest officially and vigourously to Egyptian Ambassador Paris in effort to curtail activities Cairo radio.

Reason for outbreak at this time is obscure although War Minister Chevallier has indicated to press that it might be in effort oblige Algerian units presently engaged in anti-*Fellagah* activities Tunisia return to Algiers. Although Foreign Office minimizes present extent anti-*Fellagah* activities Tunisia, it would appear that they are being considerably stepped up and effectiveness of French countermeasures might have triggered Algerian outbreaks.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Algiers, Tunis, Tangier, Rabat, and Tripoli.

[2] Not printed; but see footnote 2, *supra*.

We have specifically inquired whether *Fellagah* were particularly active in Tunisia at same time as Algerian disturbance and Foreign Office states there is not evidence of concurrent increase *Fellagah* activity.

Although all French officials believe situation can be kept well under control, they are nevertheless concerned over continued extension lawlessness and fact that arms keep coming into area from Libya. Most arms are apparently presently moving westward from Libya in small lots and through desert. There has, however, also been some evidence of light aircraft landing in southern Tunisia and parachuting of either arms or personnel into that area.

For time being, French officials here indicate there does not appear to be close tie-in between Algerian-Tunisian disturbances and those in Morocco. In latter area, they state incidents continue at unabated rate and there is growing evidence of Communist and nationalist cooperation at lower levels.

DILLON

772.00/11–554 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TUNIS, November 5, 1954—5 p. m.

33. Terrorist outbreaks Algeria completely surprised most Tunisians and French. Residency claims attacks not unexpected but this doubted as shock troops arrived after attacks.

Immediate reaction here was of fear that widespread revolt against France might be brewing with result of halting negotiations for internal autonomy, causing military oppression and ruining economy. An informed Tunisian said mere fact of Algeria attacks will encourage hard pressed *Fellagah* to hold out hoping for union with anti-French fighters in Algeria and Morocco. French attitude is that Algeria attacks were well planned but flash in pan could not recur as troops arriving and country too stable.

Seydoux takes more serious view. Replying to my observation that set up and timing of multiple Algeria attacks seemed beyond capacity local extremists he agreed fully and stated flatly he sees for first time the master hand of Moscow directing through agencies like Paris and Cairo. He explained that week before Algerian outbreaks Moscow radio made attack in French against France in Algeria and days later same attack from Cairo voice of Arabs; two days later Budapest radio beamed anti-French tirade direct on Algeria; next day attacks launched. While no accompanying increase in *Fellagah* activity here it not diminished and Moroccan terrorism continued. Pattern too clear to ignore. He added now that other international problems solved Moscow turns to North Africa as the "soft under belly" West Europe alliance and most vulnerable for attack. Not that he expects successful revolt soon or immediate Communist gains but is concerned lest basis be established for future success. Said he hoped US would perceive Communist pattern and help France combat it.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Cairo, Rabat, Casablanca, Tripoli, Tangiers, Algiers, and Rome.

HUGHES

751S.00/11-954 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL ALGIERS, November 9, 1954.

20. Following banning of MTLD by French Government[2] night sixth and subsequent arrest MTLD leaders Algeria and search their premises, planned terrorist activities were prevented and Moslem festival of Mouloud November 8 passed quietly despite cutting Algiers-Moroccan underground telephone cable near border and attack on mine near Tunis border. This time Government [*Governor*] General had been informed and took precautions including seizure two issues Communist organ *Alger Republicain*. Populace calm and stabilization situation continues with reinforcements from France obvious in streets Algiers and elsewhere. MTLD banning resulted arrests 54 activists in Algiers, 111 in Constantine, 31 in Oran. Officials claim terrorist organizations in three departments decapitated. MTLD-controlled property in Algeria sequestered. Government [*Governor*] General tells us confessions and evidence establish extremist wing MTLD committee revolution *Naired Unite et d'Action* (CRUA) as terrorist organization. Party leadership deeply implicated except for Messali who obviously shielded. Police unable to locate Ahmed Mezenna;[3] Hocine LaHouel[4] halted by police has also disappeared.

Countermeasures Aures progressing. Government [*Governor*] General stressing wild character terrain tells me plans are to surround Aures and by use of harassing tactics seek to kill off *Fellagah* leaders and persuade natives of region cease uprising and return to normal activities. He is not sanguine that this can be accomplished with rapidity and recalls simple bandit uprising in Aures two years ago which by use of similar tactics PP required six months to quell. Government [*Governor*] General has no definite evidence supplies being dropped *Fellagah* by plane but reported rumor as rumor. Have impression Government [*Governor*] General is still appalled by suddenness and scope of terrorists' activities and is grasping at any explanation for the failure intelligence services to provide adequate prior knowledge. However, except for the Aures which will require time, believe Government [*Governor*] General now has situation well under control, although as reported mytel 19, November 7 [3] determined militants might still cause isolated incidents.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.

[2] Telegram 1970 from Paris, Nov. 8, reported the Council of Ministers decided on Nov. 5 to dissolve the MTLD and related organizations on French territory. (751S.00/11-854)

[3] Member of the MTLD.

[4] Secretary-General and member of the Central Committee of the MTLD.

CLARK

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[3] Not printed. (751S.00/11-754)

751S.00/11-1254 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET PARIS, November 12, 1954—6 p. m.

2028. During luncheon at Embassy residence today, I had good talk with Chevalier (Secretary d'Etat for Army) regarding situation in Algeria. He said French were moving large forces to Algeria not so much because they would use them in present action, but because their mere presence would inhibit further troubles. He said present plans called for 4 battalions to be moved in addition to the full 25th division which has already arrived. They are also planning to bring back 3 regiments from Indochina for service in Algeria. Chevalier said that he thought there were three or four hundred Tunisian *Fellagahs*, in the Aures region, plus the population of these mountains which was always ready for trouble. He said that the French would make a real effort to clean up this area in the next 30 days prior to the full advent of winter, otherwise they may have to wait until spring to clear the region. Chevalier said that from the NATO and purely military point of view, he felt that something had been gained from this revolt, as now the French were fully cognizant of what would have happened in case of general war. Their plans now were to greatly increase their intelligence service in North Africa and to make certain troop dispositions which would make it easy to handle any future troubles. He said that the major units which had been moved to North Africa could be returned to continental Europe in case of war in time to meet their NATO dates.

Regarding the use of MDAP material,[1] he said that he personally realized that this was a politically important problem in the U.S. and that therefore he was following it carefully. He said that all that was necessary for operations in North Africa were light arms, rifles, machine guns and mortars, practically none of which were MDAP equipment. He said that he could state that MDAP equipment represented less than ten percent of the equipment presently in use in Tunis and Algeria. He said that he would continue to follow this problem personally and that U.S. could be assured that for all practical purposes MDAP equipment was not being used in the present operations in Algeria.

DILLON

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[1] In telegram 1951 from Paris, Nov. 6, the Ambassador reported that he had been unable to see the Premier, who was campaigning in the Lille area. He suggested, however, that any serious representation to the Premier regarding French use of MDAP material in Algeria would be totally ineffective and would create serious risks regarding the French position in NATO. Since Algeria was legally part of Metropolitan France, the Ambassador strongly recommended against making any definite requests which the United States knew in advance would be unacceptable to the French and which would risk public rejection. (711.56371A/11-654)

7518.00/11-3054 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL ALGIERS, November 30, 1954—11 p. m.

34. Mytel 26 of November 15[2] obviously unduly alarming. Have canvassed situation with informed businessmen, French officials and Governor General and can find no expectation major political developments near future. Except in Aures, tension has lessened and situation is calm. Without exception, everyone consulted anticipates continued progress toward stabilization (see General Munson's report mytel 33 November 30).[3] Governor General told me there is some fear that prospective release militant nationalists arrested but not charged may eventually result difficulties but there is every belief they will require time before action. Also in Oran there are known terrorist groups which have not yet acted and which are being watched. As Vaujour, Director Security,[4] said to Assembly, there are dangerous men still

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Rabat, Tunis, Tangier, and Cairo.

[2] Not printed. It reported that the appearance of modern foreign weapons in Kabylie suggested that either arms were still moving into Algeria, or else the Nov. 1 attacks had been launched with the least trained and most expendable elements, saving the better men and weapons for the second round. Either alternative would indicate that the terrorists were better organized than the French would admit. (7518.00/11-1554)

[3] Not printed; it transmitted a summary of the military situation in Algeria. The French Army had 60,000 troops there, with reinforcements expected in the near future. The northwest half of Aures was reportedly cleared, with 10 light battalions converging on the southeast sector. (7518.00/11-3054)

[4] Jean Vaujour, Director General of Security in Algeria from November 1953.

underground who are seeking to regroup and reorganize with increased fanaticism because their orders, arms, money and leadership come from abroad. Governor General mentioned this regard meeting directors terrorist activity North Africa he said took place Tangiers past few days. He remarked upon material improvement situation past two weeks and said that although isolated terroristic activity may be expected to continue on diminishing and unalarming scale his principal worry was of assassinations which, while not as serious as communications stoppages, had greater psychological effect on natives who are by nature a nervous people. Except for assassinations, he expressed confidence order could be maintained.

Government is thoroughly alerted, is taking extraordinary measures to assure public safety and has achieved what amounts to vote of confidence from Algerian Assembly. Similar pattern may be anticipated in National Assembly debate scheduled December 10, particularly as Chevalier, an Algerian and Secretary State War, should be able to control his colonial colleagues from Algeria. Colonials expected blow off steam as they did here but not try unseat Mendes-France. They demand general reprisal and repression while government remains firm that it will maintain order and punish guilty but will not be bludgeoned into inept action. As deterrent further terrorist activity French presence is being made more evident by considerable and widespread reinforcement military and police.

As I see picture therefore, and Governor General agrees with me, we will have comparative calm for immediate future punctured possibl by isolated acts of terrorism and disturbed by continued military action in Aures, but no new coordinated nationalistic uprising. For present Nationalists have failed and the populace is not with them. In the long term much will depend upon the rapidity of the remedial measures, political as well as economic, taken by France. If France moves slowly toward needed reforms further organized Nationalist terrorism will be expedited. If she moves quickly and effectively will be delayed.

Understand Department's hesitation under circumstances authorize my leave US now (Deptel Wirom 24, November 24).[3] Would never consider leaving Algiers if there were likelihood major Nationalist uprisings. Am not of course infallible but am confident that taking leave at this time would not be detrimental US interests. Furthermore would be Washington and could always return Algiers within 24 hours. Accordingly request reconsideration and requisite leave authorization.

Clark

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[3] Not printed.

751S.00/12–154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 1, 1954—8 p. m.

2301. Considerable speculation concerning purpose Juin–Mendes interview yesterday. Interest in call accentuated by fact that it occurred when political pressure on government both by majority and opposition parties on North African crisis is high and by recent reports that Juin advancing candidacy as commander of single military command for all North Africa (a Gaullist-supported proposal).

Interview was at Juin's request and according *l'Aurore* that he pursued line that any clemency to *Fellagahs* should be considered with utmost prudence and must not, in any case, give appearance of weakness.

Reliable source privately circulated newsletter reports this morning that during interview Juin gave Mendes conditions under which he would undertake such command in North Africa. Claimed include complete political and military liberty of action for at least six months with provision that command answer directly to Prime Minister without clearing through interested ministeries.

Reported understandably enough that Mendes found these conditions unacceptable and that Gaullists have taken note of this fact for use in their *démarche* to Mendes today. They are expected press for acceptance of plan for single command for all North Africa but their position on Juin candidacy and conditions not yet clear.

Comment: We find it difficult to believe that Mendes under present circumstances would accept Juin's proposal. These circumstances include reasonably hopeful prospect of settlement of *Fellagah* problem in Tunisia and French Government's disposition to believe that Tunisian Government wants French-Tunisian negotiations brought to successful conclusion. Despite fact that Juin accompanied Mendes to Tunis on July 31 [2] his appointment at this stage would doubtless be interpreted as signal that French believed that negotiations would collapse and that advocates of "hard policy" in North Africa had obtained upper hand. On other hand under Gaullist pressures Mendes may, to survive, ultimately find himself forced to accept some such proposal if *Fellagah* activity is not substantially reduced or if present negotiations end in failure.

DILLON

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Tangier, Rabat, Cairo, Malta, and Rome.

[2] See telegram 44[illegible], July 31, 1954, p. 887.

751S.00/12-654

Memorandum of Conversation, by William Fisher, Office of Western European Affairs

OFFICIAL USE ONLY [WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1954.[1]

Subject: Summary of Conversation Concerning Algeria

Participants: Mr. Abderrahmane Fares
AF—Mr. Utter
WE—Mr. Tyler
WE—Mr. Fisher

The following are the key points of a rather extensive conversation with Mr. Fares, recently President of the Algerian Assembly and perhaps one of the most intelligent of the Algerian Arab leaders.

Federation as the Solution

Mr. Fares said that in the future Algeria must follow one of two courses, either assimilation with France or autonomy. The present unique status of Algeria, set up immediately after the war, straddled the issue. He said that by assimilation he meant Algeria having full representation in Paris in proportion to its population which in effect would give the Algerians the equivalent of about 120 seats in the present National Assembly. If France were to choose the policy of assimilation with all of its overseas territories and follow it through to its logical conclusion the result would be that the overseas territories would govern France. As this was out of the question, he said that he felt the answer lies in autonomy and the development of a Federation very similar to that of the United States of America. Only through a Federation where Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and the other overseas territories as well as France itself would have full autonomy over a large measure of internal affairs but at the same time would look to a revised Assembly of the French Union that had real powers for decisions in those areas which were reserved to the Federal Government, would it be possible to develop real and lasting solutions.

Prospects for Progress

The principal obstacle to the development of a revised French Union along Federal lines was the older conservative elements in France. He said that the older leaders in France simply did not understand the situation but that men like Mendes-France, Mitterand, Roche, Schuman, and the Socialist leaders understood the situation and the requirement for a real evolution in basic relationships between

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on Dec. 9.

France and the overseas territories and dependencies. He mentioned that the old guard radical Socialists, such as Queuille and Martinaud-Deplat were the worst of the lot, particularly because they had no understanding of the situation and were also representatives of the *colons* in North Africa. He mentioned Pelabon as one of his closest friends and as one of those who best understood. He said that the present Governor General of Algeria, Leonard, had learned very much and now seemed to understand the need for evolution. He said that the great majority of Algerians definitely saw evolution and not revolution as the answer and were aware of Algeria's dependence on the metropole and the need for continued close ties with France.

Recent Developments

Fares said that some weeks ago the MTLD split over the question of violent action was timed with UN consideration of the North African questions. The intellectuals in the MTLD refused to go along on the timing and the other elements were responsible for initiating the terroristic activities. Poverty and misery in the Aures region inspired by Arab League elements resulted in a receptivity to action against authority. Ever since the Roman days the inhabitants of this region had revolted about every five or six years. The rest of the population in Algeria is not in sympathy with the revolt and were looking to evolutionary process for the fulfillment of their aspirations.

Radio Broadcasts from Cairo, Tetuan and Budapest

Fares said that these broadcasts make no impression whatsoever on the Algerian population. They are seldom listened to. He said that the Tunisians were probably influenced to a certain extent because they tended to look to the East and to Egypt whereas the Algerians considered themselves superior to the Egyptians and consequently did not look in the same manner to the East. He said that the Moslem religion made it extremely difficult for Communism to make any inroads; and with regard to Algerians in the metropole who had participated in Communist activities, this was due to miserable employment conditions. He said that the government about two years ago had recognized this problem and were [*was*] working to alleviate these conditions.

Visit to the US

He was tremendously enthusiastic about every aspect of his visit to the United States, discussing in particular the striking similarity between parts of California and the area around Phoenix to his native Algeria. He also had been impressed by similarities between the Indians he had seen on certain reservations and certain Algerians. He expressed the hope that many more Algerians could visit the United States.

751S.00/12-3054

The Consul at Algiers (Dorros) to the Department of State [1]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ALGIERS, December 30, 1954.

No. 95

Subject: Current Political Situation.

Police activity inaugurated by the wholesale arrests of MTLD leaders and militants on December 22,[2] continued over the Christmas weekend. Although there seems to have been no clear evidence of a new insurrectionary plot, numerous individuals were formally charged with endangering the security of the State. Meanwhile, the decline in terrorist activity persisted throughout Northern Algeria and the Aurès area. However, outlaw bands in various parts of the country are still stubbornly holding out against French pressure and several large-scale mopping-up operations were conducted by troops and police in Kabylie, in the Department of Oran near Rio Salado, and in the Department of Constantine near Bône with a view to capturing or disorganizing terrorist groups in those areas.

Although official figures are lacking, well over 200 persons are believed to have been taken into custody and questioned by the police in the three departments since December 22. Of those formally charged under Article 80 of the Penal Code, 52 were arrested in the Department of Constantine, 5, including the nephew of Messali Hadj,[3] in the Department of Oran, and 32 in the Department of Algiers. Among those arrested since December 22 were three individuals: Mohamed Abdelaziz, Debouche and Ladjalli, who were allegedly designated to succeed one another, as the need arose at the head of the clandestine MTLD organization. Additional arrests made among the MTLD members of the Algiers municipal council brought the number of councillors arrested to nine; several were, however, subsequently released for lack of sufficient evidence.

Despite much discussion of the abortive "Christmas plot" in the French press and among the European public, there are no serious indications that a plot had in fact been discovered by the police or that its probable existence constituted the basis for the current series of arrests. As far as we can judge the arrests were made solely because the individuals involved were either leading members of the MTLD, or militants known to the police for their activity and therefore presumed by reason of their activity within the party to have known of the MTLD's insurrectionary plans and organization.

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[1] This despatch was also sent to Paris, Tunis, Rabat, Cairo, and Rome.

[2] Despatch 92 from Algiers, Dec. 23, reported on French raids in Algeria, resulting in the arrest of 142 MTLD members. Among those arrested had been three MTLD members of the Algiers municipal council and four former delegates to the Algerian Assembly. (751S.00/12-2354)

[3] Hadj was President of the MTLD.

What makes this last police operation worthy of note, is the fact that it was not aimed at individuals who had participated in terrorist activities but was, rather, designed to disorganize and, if possible, decapitate the clandestine MTLD organization before it could conceive and set into motion a plan of coordinated anti-French activity. Because of its timing and scope, this move against the MTLD appears to have been intended not only as a preventive measure but also as a means of satisfying local French demands for all-out repressive action against "notorious agitators". It remains to be seen whether this gesture of appeasement is merely a tactical move by the Administration, which has repeatedly pledged itself to avoid general repressive measures, or whether it constitutes a new departure in its counter-insurrectionary policy marked by increasing compliance with the demands of the local *colons.*

With few exceptions, local French reaction to this latest development can best be described as one of intense satisfaction and the conservative press has unanimously praised the Administration for its vigorous action to smash the "Christmas plot". The encouragement derived by the *colons* from the Administration's apparent acceptance of their views on internal security measures was demonstrated by the Federation of Mayors of the Department of Constantine which for the first time, on December 28, publicly demanded a severe and rapid repression, a strengthened police, the dissolution of the Algerian Communist Party and the banning of the Communist press. An interesting sidelight on Algerian politics was provided by Senator Borgeaud's[4] *Depêche Quotidienne* which grasped the opportunity to launch an oblique attack against Jacques Chevallier[5] by alleging that the arrested MTLD municipal councillors had planned their anti-French activities in the offices of the Algiers municipality.

According to informed observers, Moslem reaction, aside from the vigorous protests by MTLD public officials still at large and by the UDMA and its leader Ferhat Abbas, is one of increased uneasiness and tension. The number of arrests and the seemingly arbitrary nature of the action taken by the police against former MTLD militants and sympathizers is reported to have discouraged many who trusted the Administration's promises that there would be no general repressive measures. Recent reports in the conservative press mentioning the coolness, or even stiffness, with which French officials touring critical areas are being received by the natives tend to confirm this information.

Although the situation may change if the French make some appropriate gesture to convince the Moslems that they are not to be left to the tender mercies of the *colons*, it is well to recall that the relative speed with which law and order have been restored throughout most of the country is largely attributable to the failure of the Moslem population to turn against the French or even to sympathize actively with the insurrectionaries.

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[4] Henri Borgeaud was a member of the Radical Party and Senator from the Department of Algiers.

[5] Chevallier was a member of the Independent Republican Party, member of the National Assembly from the Department of Algiers, and Mayor of Algiers.

LEON G. DORROS

BELGIAN CONGO

MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE BELGIAN CONGO

755A.5/7-2552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1952.

Subject: Belgian position on military equipment needs for Congo defense, particularly Katanga area.

Participants: Baron Silvercruys, Belgian Ambassador
Mr. Roger Taymans, Counselor, Belgian Embassy
EUR—Mr. Perkins
S/AE—Mr. Arneson [2]
WE—Mr. McClelland

Baron Silvercruys said that the matter he had been requested to bring up was of particular importance in relation to mutual defense under NATO. Describing the origin of the problem, the Ambassador recalled that during the preparatory negotiations in Washington in December 1948 for the North Atlantic Treaty, views had been informally exchanged (largely with Mr. Achilles) [3] concerning the general problem of the defense of the Congo. At that time the Department did not consider the Congo properly within the purview of the NAT. However, the Department did clearly recognize that the defense of the Congo was foremost in the mind of the U.S. military establishment, and that this territory should remain inviolate. It was not thought that further specific assurances were necessary at that juncture.

The question of Congo defense was next raised by Belgium during the latter part of 1949 during the negotiations of the bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Belgium.[4] Belgium then explained that it planned to maintain certain metropolitan forces in the Congo, and was concerned that these forces be insured proper equipment, both for their own use and for the protection of their bases.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted by Roswell D. McClelland of the Office of Western European Affairs.

[2] R. Gordon Arneson was Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs.

[3] Theodore C. Achilles was then the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.

[4] The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed at Washington on Jan. 27, 1950 and entered into force on Mar. 30 of that year. See *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 1, p. 1, or Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2010.

The United States expressed readiness to enter into a gentleman's agreement with Belgium to define the conditions under which such (MDAP) equipment could be used by Belgian metropolitan forces in the Congo without the necessity of additional or separate agreements with the U.S.

In January 1950 the Belgian Government submitted a draft proposal covering the transfer of MDAP material to the Congo to be used for the training of metropolitan units there and for the protection of their installations. It was agreed in a preliminary fashion that this matter would be covered by an exchange of letters or by a memorandum of understanding to be signed either before or simultaneously with the bilateral MDAP agreement.

Somewhat later the Department advised the Belgian Government that the Department of Defense had certain objections, both of form and of substance to the Belgian draft proposal. In essence these objections were that it would be unwise for the United States to enter into such an arrangement prior to the ratification of the MDAP bilaterals lest other NATO countries approach the United States in regard to similar special facilities. It was therefore suggested that an exchange of letters take place after the ratification of the MDAP bilateral.

The Department of State was in general agreement with the Belgian draft regarding the transfer of military equipment for the training use of Belgian metropolitan forces in the Congo. With respect to the defense of bases in the Congo, however, the Department stated that it would be ready to deal with this question, after the completion of the Bilateral and on the basis of a separate and specific request from the Belgian Government. In order to avoid any delay in the signature of the Bilateral the Belgian Government assented to this proposal.

Ambassador Silvercruys went on to observe that although two years had since gone by they had not been empty years since the problem had been further explored by a Belgian-American Military Mission which had gone to the Congo (at the time of Ambassador Murphy's visit)[5] and had addressed itself, in particular to the specific problem of the defense of the Katanga region. The Ambassador said that he had not been informed of the precise results of this mission although he did know that a joint Belgo-American Commission had continued to work on the matter in Brussels. He stated that quite recently a special interdepartmental study group had been set up in Belgium (M. Scheyven represented the Foreign Ministry)[6] with the task of devising proposals for a positive and realistic Congo defense program. This group is expected to file a report about the middle of September; and although their ultimate findings are not yet known, their central conclusions are. These are, that the defense of the Belgian Congo as a whole is one problem, and the defense of the highly strategic Katanga area is another.

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[5] Robert D. Murphy had been appointed Ambassador to Belgium on Sept. 22, 1949.

[6] Louis Scheyven was Directeur Général de la Politique.

The Ambassador explained that a technical military mission had gone out from Belgium to collect information on a realistic defense plan for the Katanga. While this mission had not yet returned to Belgium, it was clear, based on the preliminary results of its investigation, that it would be extremely difficult, indeed well-nigh impossible, for the metropolitan Belgian Government to provide the necessary military equipment. In view of the magnitude of Belgium's total defense commitments it was apparent that the special effort necessary for the defense of the Katanga would be beyond the physical and financial capabilities of Belgium.

Baron Silvercruys underlined Belgium's intention and determination to shoulder the defense of the Congo and of the Katanga to the limit of its ability, but emphasized their doubt that they could do so without our help both from the equipment and from the financial point of view. He expressed the firm opinion that the effective protection of this highly strategic region was in the interest of all the NATO powers, and more especially in that of the United States. The Ambassador asked whether the United States would be prepared to consult with Belgium regarding the provision of the necessary military equipment for transfer to the Congo for the defense of the Katanga.

I told the Ambassador that the answer to the first part of his question was easy, and was yes, we would be delighted to consult with Belgium. It would, however, be more difficult to reply to the second part. As the Ambassador was no doubt aware, we were very badly off from the point of view of available funds as the result of drastic cuts by Congress in appropriations for military assistance. We were going to have a very difficult time, I said, doing the things that had to be done in Europe and elsewhere and we were at present in the process of sorting out our obligations.

Baron Silvercruys remarked that he knew we had our shackles too, adding that when paramount necessities confronted us—all of us—ways were generally found to meet the need. Belgium will do all that it can, he reiterated, but he feared that the Katanga problem would exceed the limit of its capabilities.

Mr. Arneson said that there were certain additional developments in respect to this problem of military equipment for the Congo which had been handled in Brussels and which the Ambassador was perhaps not familiar with. He explained that following the visit of the U.S.-

Belgian Military Mission to the Congo in late 1950 a list of required military equipment was drawn up. This list totalled something like $25 million in value. Subsequently, this list was screened by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and considerably reduced to approximately $7 million. This cut was based on the considered opinion of the J.C.S. that an airborne attack on the Congo was a very remote possibility and that, accordingly, the substantial amount of anti-aircraft warning and defense equipment included in the original list could be eliminated. At the same time, the J.C.S. decided that it would be in our national interest to make the balance of the equipment available to Belgium in the form of reimbursable assistance under Section 408 (*e*) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.[7]

Mr. Arneson went on to say that this revised list was resubmitted to Brussels in March of this year; and it was our understanding that it was to have been considered by the joint Belgo-American Commission for the defense of the Congo. We had not received any specific information to that effect, although we had expected to have the Belgian reaction before this time.[8] We understood, however, that there had been delays due to the unexpected death of the chairman of the Commission, Mr. Leemans.[9] We know, meanwhile, that considerable attention had been given during the last year to building up and strengthening the Force Publique in the Congo. If a newly revised equipment list was to be forthcoming Mr. Arneson said, as a result, for example, of the recent Belgian technical military mission to the Congo, this would have to go back to the J.C.S. for reconsideration in the light of the present priorities situation. This would undoubtedly cause further delay. What we needed as soon as possible, Mr. Arneson concluded, was a barebone, realistic assessment of the equipment needed for effective ground defense of the Katanga.

I said that I hoped the results of the present Belgian military mission's study trip would take into account, and be coordinated with the previous work that had been done on the subject which Mr. Arneson had just described. It would only create confusion if we were to get overlapping or divergent recommendations from more than one source. I therefore urged the Ambassador to recommend to his government the desirability of such coordination. In conclusion, I said that it was our belief that the best purpose would be served by a continuation of the work in this field of the Brussels Joint Commission.

George W. Perkins

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[7] For the text of Section 408 (*e*), see Mutual Defense Act, 1949, amendments as recorded in 64 Stat. 376.

[8] The minutes of the meeting of the Belgian-American Committee for Congo Defense, which took place in Brussels on Mar. 18, 1952, were an enclosure to despatch 1285 from Brussels, Apr. 9, 1952, not printed. (755A.5/4–952)

[9] Franz Leemans.

855A.2547/8–852

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Cowen)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1952.
No. 11

SIR: The National Security Council issued a directive (NSC–29 of August 26, 1948)[1] relating to the security of industrial operations in foreign countries producing materials of strategic importance to the United States and its Allies. It is stated in the directive that (1) the national security of the United States requires that all practicable and appropriate measures be taken for the protection against sabotage of such foreign industrial operations and (2) the Secretary of State coordinate and direct all U.S. Governmental activities to promote achievement of this objective. A special inter-agency committee was established to prepare and keep up to date a list of those foreign industrial operations on which action should be taken under NSC–29.

The inter-agency committee recently added cobalt in the Belgian Congo to the list. For this reason, consideration is now being given to the question of the vulnerability to sabotage of operations involving the production of cobalt in the Belgian Congo, and the need for comprehensive surveys to determine the adequacy of local industrial security procedures with respect to this material of strategic importance to the United States. It is believed that, to be of full value, any surveys already undertaken or to be undertaken in this connection must:

(*a*) Ascertain, if possible, the presence and strength of Soviet agents.

(*b*) Determine whether effective industrial procedures are in force to minimize the vulnerability of the production and shipment of the strategic materials to sabotage or subversive activities.

You are requested to discuss this matter along the lines indicated with the appropriate Belgian authorities, emphasizing that our object in bringing the subject to their attention at this time is prompted by our concern in preventing, in so far as possible, the disruption of supplies of strategic materials to the United States and its Allies in time of war or crisis.

You should then inquire whether:

(*a*) Any security surveys of the Belgian Congo cobalt industry have been made by the Belgian authorities or are known to them to have been made by other government authorities or by private concerns. (If such surveys have been conducted, inquiry should be made as to the availability of reports.)

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[1] "Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries". It was adopted at the 19th meeting of the National Security Council, Sept. 2, 1948 (NSC Action No. 104) and approved by the President on Sept. 4, 1948. It was superseded by NSC 163/1, dated Oct. 24, 1953, which bears the same title. Neither is printed.

(*b*) Industrial security surveys of the industry mentioned in (*a*) above are contemplated in the foreseeable future by the Belgian authorities, or by others known to them.

(*c*) In the event surveys have not been conducted and are not contemplated, the Belgian authorities would be willing to perform such security surveys and thereafter make their findings and recommendations available to the Government of the United States.

(*d*) If surveys have not been conducted, are not contemplated, and the Belgian authorities are not able and/or willing to make such surveys alone, they would have objection to the conduct of such surveys by the Government of the United States or on its behalf, or jointly by the Governments of Belgium and the United States.

(*e*) If no objection is interposed by the Belgian authorities to the conduct of security surveys by the United States of the industry concerned, any outstanding complications or difficulties can be foreseen which would make the conduct of such surveys by the Government of the United States impracticable or impossible.[2]

Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State:

HENRY A. BYROADE

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[2] Such surveys of the cobalt operation at Jadotville and the uranium mine at Shinkolobwe, both operated by the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, were conducted by U.S. representatives on the scene. For further documentation on such matters, see volume I.

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Belgian Congo: Security, 1952–1954"

United States Government Memorandum, January 26, 1953

SECRET

1. Since Bearce's[1] return from his tour of the eastern Congo, he has had several conversations with Congo Sûreté personnel concerning reports he picked up from various reliable sources. These reports are all vague; none put the finger on any incidents of organized native unrest. But the persons Bearce talked with all gave more or less the same opinion concerning the attitude of the natives. All stated that they had sensed a deterioration in rapport between natives and Europeans during the past year, especially during the past two months.

2. According to these reports, the deterioration of relations seems to take the form rather of attitude than of action; surliness, lack of attention to or defiance of orders, complaints of difficulty of work and claims of inability to perform jobs which have been routine, refusal to perform usual job without raise in pay, shorter hours. It is possible that the natives are suddenly developing "iron in the spine", but the pattern which shows up through a study of these reports indicates the possibility of the start of an organized campaign of induced disaffection.

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[1] Roger Mellen Bearce was Vice Consul at Leopoldville.

3. Reports of growing activity of the Mau-Mau[2] in Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika coincide with reports of resurgence of the Kitawala[3] in British East Africa and the Rhodesias, and at Matadi, Belgian Congo, as well as Matchouanism[4] in French Equatorial Africa. Handbills of unknown origin have recently been turning up in Matadi, circulated among natives. These handbills follow the Communist line with a quasi-religious slant. The Congo Sûreté reports that signs of passive resistance are centered upon Leopoldville and Matadi, with the less frequent signs of this attitude in other population centers. Bearce heard of most definite signs of passive resistance at Albertville and Usumbrua.

4. At the suggestion of the Governor General, Humblet left Leopoldville by air for a secret semi-official tour of British East Africa on 3 November, 1952, for a personal study of the native situation in that area, with a view to cooperative planning and action to counteract and if possible, stop the spread of native unrest to the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. Humblet expects to be absent from Leopoldville for about three weeks. Before his departure he told Bearce that he would go into his findings with him upon his return.

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[2] For documentation, see pp. 346 ff.

[3] A syncretistic religious movement which was an offshoot of the Watch Tower movement and which was especially strong in Katanga in the interwar years.

[4] Matsouanism refers to the philosophy of André Matsoua who gained a following among the Lari around Brazzaville in the late 1920's. It was a political movement with religious overtones which advocated passive resistance against Western innovations.

320/8–2853

The Embassy in Belgium to the Belgian Foreign Ministry[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BRUSSELS, August 15, 1953.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to a statement recently made to me by Mr. Ryckmans, Honorary Governor General of the Belgian Congo, that your Government had decided to withdraw from the United Nations Special Committee on Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories and that notification to that effect was being sent to appropriate authorities of the United Nations.

In this regard, my Government has instructed me to bring to the attention of your Government the following views:

My Government intends to continue to participate in the work of the Committee on Information and feels deep concern over possible effects of your Government's decision to withdraw at this time from this Committee. It is our view that the withdrawal from the Committee of a member nation which is responsible for administering a non-self-governing territory will upset the current balanced membership of the Committee and will thereby substantially diminish the possibility of obtaining in the Committee's work during the forthcoming session moderate resolutions for presentation to the United Nations General Assembly. Therefore, my Government urges reconsideration regarding your Government's participation in the Committee at least through the forthcoming session. Postponement of your Government's withdrawal for this period of time would enable the question of the composition of the Committee to be reviewed in the General Assembly with a possibility that even should your Government subsequently withdraw, arrangements may be made so that membership of the Committee would continue to be balanced between nations with and without responsibility for administration of non-self-governing territories.

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[1] This note, which was intended for Paul van Zeeland, was an enclosure to despatch 242 from Brussels of Aug. 28, 1953, not printed. (320/8–2853)

My Government is also presenting the above views to the Committee's other member nations which administer non-self-governing territories.

Please accept [etc.]

033.1100 HI/9-2453

The Consul General at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LEOPOLDVILLE, September 24, 1953.

No. 51

Subject: Alleged Visit of Hickenlooper Delegation to Uranium Mine at Shinkolobwe

There is enclosed a copy and translation of an article that appeared in the *Echo du Katanga*, daily Elisabethville newspaper, of September 18, 1953,[1] regarding the press conference held by Senator Hickenlooper at Elisabethville on September 5, 1953, at which the Senator stated that no member of the delegation visited the uranium mine at Shinkolobwe during the visit to the Jadotville area.

As previously reported, Mr. Pierre Ryckmans, former Governor General of the Belgian Congo and presently Belgian Atomic Energy Commissioner, arrived in Leopoldville on September 1, a few hours before the Hickenlooper party. He sent word that he wanted to see me before he met the Senator, and an appointment was arranged for September 2 at 8:00 a.m.

Mr. Ryckmans asked me whether any member of the party wished to visit the uranium mine at Shinkolobwe. I replied that I knew nothing about their desires in the matter. Mr. Ryckmans then said that some time ago a Belgian parliamentary delegation had visited the Congo and had been refused permission to visit the mine. He went on to say that it might be embarrassing in Brussels if the American delegation were permitted to make the visit,[3] but that the Belgian authorities had invited the Joint Congressional Committee and certain members of the Atomic Energy Commission to visit the Congo, and that if certain of them wished to see Shinkolobwe, he could arrange it with the appropriate authorities on the spot. I said that I would be glad to put the question up to Senator Hickenlooper, who was staying with Congressman Cole in my house, but Mr. Ryckmans said he preferred to speak to the Senator himself.

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[1] Not printed.

The first thing on the official program was a boat trip on the Congo River, and during this trip I saw Mr. Ryckmans talking to Senator Hickenlooper off in a corner where they could not be heard. I heard no more about the matter during their stay in Leopoldville.

The party left Leopoldville for Kamina and Elisabethville on September 3. On September 4 they visited the Union Minière installations at Jadotville, which is about eleven miles from Shinkolobwe. They were in Jadotville from about 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., and it is quite possible that during that time two or three of the party could have been driven over to Shinkolobwe and back. I have, however, no official information on this.

PATRICK MALLON

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[3] The visit of the delegation, which was led by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa and Congressman W. Sterling Cole of New York, had created a certain degree of controversy though it was intended as a good will gesture on the part of the delegates whose primary destination was South Africa. Shinkolobwe was a very sensitive spot and every effort had been made by both the Belgian and the U.S. Governments to downplay the mention of uranium and the arrangements which had been reached pertaining to it. For documentation concerning this trip, see file 855A.2546.

511.55A/2–354

Memorandum by the Consul at Leopoldville (McGregor)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL LEOPOLDVILLE, February 3, 1954.

At a dinner in the home of the Acting Governor General, M. Cornelis, last Monday evening, an opportunity was afforded to exchange views regarding the usefulness of the United States Information Service in the Belgian Congo. After dinner the Principal Officer and Mr. G. Huntington Damon, Area Director for NEA of USIA, on a visit in Leopoldville, were engaged in a conversation which turned quite naturally to a discussion of this general subject matter.

Mr. Cornelis had been referring to the fear prevalent in the Union of South Africa of black domination and remarked that the same fear would become prevalent in the Congo if the white population should exceed a few hundred thousand. As it is, the proportion of white to black in the Congo (70,000 versus 12,000,000) gives no basis for the fear prevalent in the Union where the proportion is 2-½ million to 8 million. I took that opportunity to say that during the past few days Messrs. Damon, Alberts (PAO at this post)[2] and I had discussed quite frankly the usefulness of an information service directed toward the relatively insignificant number of white persons in the Congo. Mr. Cornelis, without any prompting, interjected that the Belgian Congo Government would have no objection to our information activities being directed toward the native population. (*Note:* As the Department and USIA are aware, the major objective of USIS since its inception in the Congo in May 1952 has been to establish among government, business and newspaper leaders a feeling of confidence in USIS operations and, therefore, no effort has been made to direct programs to native audiences.)

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[1] This was an enclosure to despatch 153 of Feb. 3, 1954 from Leopoldville to the Department of State, not printed. (511.55A/2–354)

Mr. Damon asked Mr. Cornelis for an appraisal of existing dangers to stability in the Congo, as viewed by the Belgian authorities. Mr. Cornelis replied that in order of their importance, he would list the following three dangers:

1. Communism
2. Indian penetration
3. The extension of Islamism

With regard to the first, he replied to Mr. Damon's observation that Communism could not be a particular menace at this time, that "there is more Communism activity than you know".

With regard to Indian penetration, Mr. Cornelis referred to the fact that the Indian High Commissioner in Nairobi is also accredited as Indian Consul General in the Belgian Congo. He said that he was delighted to know that this dignitary was being transferred,[3] because he considered him a dangerous man. He said that the danger of Indian penetration is due to the fact that wherever the Indian plants himself in Africa, he breeds amorality. He did not enlarge upon the danger of increased Islamism.

Mr. Damon asked for a definition of the words "immatriculé" and "évolué". Mr. Cornelis said that the first is higher than the second and means "assimilated" in the English language. He did not give numbers in either category. He said, however, that the Belgian Government is so dedicated to the principle of the evolution of the native toward the acceptance of political responsibilities that it would have no objection whatever, if the properly qualified person were available, to having a black Governor General in the Congo. He added that this remark was made in order to emphasize the policy of the Government.

Mr. Damon suggested that insofar as United States Information activities directed toward the natives was [*were*] concerned, it might be better for this to come to the native indirectly and through the Belgian Congo government's information service. Mr. Cornelis agreed. He said that there was an identity of interest between the United States and the Belgians and he described this identity in somewhat the following terms:

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[2] Arthur Stanley Alberts.

[3] India had agreed under British pressure to transfer Appasaheb Balasaheb Pant.

The Belgian Government intends to establish Western civilization in the Congo and to base it squarely upon the principles of the dignity of the individual, equality of opportunity and freedom of expression. He said that these terms are used traditionally to describe the American system or way of life. In fact, he said that it was exactly the American way of life that the Congo Government would like to have described to the native as being a target he could shoot toward and that the Belgian Government had every interest in assisting in carrying this message to the African. He said, however, (and several times he repeated this as a caution) that the merits or demerits of Western civilization as described above should not be questioned or subjected to discussion; that it should be accepted as fact and stated as such.

He went on to say that specifically he felt much could be done with programs centering around the theme of the development of the American Negro and cited the usefulness of stories connected with Negro universities, their inception, their struggles and their realizations. He said this because the Congo Government is about to establish the first native university near Leopoldville.[4] Mr. Alberts joined the discussion at this point. I asked Mr. Cornelis how he would suggest that our Information Service begin a program designed to reach the educated African in the Congo. He replied that the Government intends to create the position of Information Officer in Charge and that the individual selected had been selected after very careful screening and is trilingual, speaking French, Netherlands (Flemish?), and English; that he would be named within a matter of a month or so and that this whole matter could be discussed with him. He agreed with Mr. Damon's observation that it would be best to work closely with the Belgian Information Service not only because it has the means to get any message across, but also because American material would require some adaptation in view of Congo conditions. He added that one of the programs being worked on intensely here is the supplying of electrical power to native communities on a wide scale. This will increase radio reception and give opportunity for more intensive information activity.

In the broader sense of American interest in the Congo, Mr. Cornelis did not dissent from my observation that looking at the Congo from a purely selfish point of view, the United States is vitally interested in the continual flow of mineral products from this area; that any interruption in this flow, whether in consequence of an economic crisis or political factors, was of paramount importance. It was to our interest to have a stable, evolutionary Congo and that insofar as our information activities could implement and support this vital interest, it would be useful and successful in the Congo.

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[4] University of Lovanium.

ROBERT G. MCGREGOR

ETHIOPIA[1]

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE FEDERATION OF ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA; UNITED STATES MILITARY AID FOR ETHIOPIA; THE VISIT OF EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE TO THE UNITED STATES

775.5/1–3052 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Ethiopia (Childs) to the Department of State

SECRET ADDIS ABABA, January 30, 1952—9 a. m.

313. In handing me message (Embtel 312, January 29),[2] FonMin at same time handed me memo today's date reading as follows: "FonMin in recent conversations US Amb reviewed discussion between two governments of proposed arrangements for provision arms and military equipment for Ethio Armed Forces."

Minister stated highest importance attached satisfactory conclusion these discussions and he had to reemphasize in strongest terms effect of lack of any conclusion of their discussion upon public opinion in Ethiopia. People Ethiopia were aware Ethiopia had alone among countries in her geographical and economic position met her obligations under charter UN, and is alone among them in meeting those obligations to full extent military sacrifice and commitment.

"Amb indicated he fully comprehended and sympathetically understood nature and significance Ethios commitment and position in which she had firmly and loyally placed herself. Amb also indicated he was hopeful satisfactory reply would be forthcoming from USG as a consequence of full examination and discussion of common problems during General Bolte's visit to Addis Ababa and in particular proposal formulated for supply arms and military equipment to Ethiopia.[3]

"His Imperial Majesty's wish that Ethiopia should be in military position to continue and if necessary adjust her wholehearted support of implementation UN policy in Korea under leadership USA without risk to Ethios military and political security was brought to Amb attention, and request urgently repeated a reply made now be had to proposed arrangements as prepared pursuant to General Bolte's visit."[4]

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[1] For previous documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1237 ff.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted a message from the Foreign Minister to the Secretary of State. The Ethiopian Government stated that it would agree to accept the "Greater Sanctions" statement regarding a proposed armistice in Korea, in conjunction with the other 15 powers having forces there. (795.00/1–2952) For related documentation, see volume xv.

[3] For documentation on General Bolté's visit to Ethiopia in 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1237 ff.

FonMin said in event world conflict Ethio would be on side US, and it was therefore all important for it to be in a position to assume its external obligations in that respect and it was particularly important for internal security.

CHILDS

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[4] Telegram 336 from Addis Ababa, Feb. 13, reported the Foreign Minister had again asked if the Embassy had any news on military aid for Ethiopia. When told there was none, he said he was being severely pressed by the Emperor and asked the Embassy to make that fact known to the Department. (775.5 MSP/2-1352)

775.5/2-2152 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 20, 1952—5:57 p.m.

282. Recent ltr from SecState to Secy Defense (copy sent you last week by air)[2] recommended that Ethio shld be found eligible for mil aid. This is only first step which must be followed by agreement by Defense[3] and approval by Director Mutual Security before Presidential finding of eligibility can be made. Ltr from SecState included para summarized below:

"Dept believes Ethio shld be found eligible for grant mil assistance, this finding also to allow reimbursable assistance. Dept Defense is asked join in such recommendation, with understanding total arms assistance wld be related to program for strengthening Ethio internal security forces acceptable to Defense and of value not to exceed, say, $5,000,000; with further understanding Ethio wld be required pay such portion of total it can reasonably afford. Determination of Ethio's ability to pay wld first be made by State and Defense on basis data to be supplied by Emb Addis Ababa and wld subsequently have to be agreed to by Ethio Govt".

Urdes 331 Feb 21[4] recognizes cost mil aid to Ethio may be considerably more than they can afford pay. Approximate cost minimum equipment recommended by MA Addis Ababa is US $2,000,000. With addition necessary spare parts, ammunition and transportation we estimate total aid program about US $5,000,000 over two years.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Wellons (AF) and cleared in the offices of Daspit (NEA), Smith (ED), Bryan (S/MSA); and the offices of Lt. Col. Davis (Army) and Lt. Levy-Hawes (OSD) were notified. Bourgerie (AF) signed for the Secretary.

[2] The letter, dated Mar. 6, is not printed. (775.5 MSP/3-652)

[3] The Department of Defense reply, dated Apr. 22, reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and therefore Defense, concluded that Ethiopia should be made eligible for reimbursable military aid. (775.5 MSP/4-2252) For the reply of the Director of Mutual Security, see telegram 377, May 15, p. 423.

[4] Not printed; it reported the Embassy was expecting to receive a cost estimate of $25 million for military items for Ethiopia. The Ambassador said that when he received the estimate he would verbally suggest to the Foreign Office that the expenditure was beyond the financial means of Ethiopia. (775.5/2-2152)

After examination Ethio Govt budget, trade position, loans recd and payments made (e.g. Eximbank loan), and other factors such as Eritrean federation and additional Ethio currency issue required there, we estimate Ethio Govt might be able pay between US $1 and $2 million. But it is extremely difficult set any precise figure because of many uncertain and intangible considerations. Dept requests your best estimate on basis available info maximum amount Ethios cld be expected pay in next two years for reimbursable assistance. Do not discuss this matter with Ethios, although you may obtain relevant info from them or their Amer advisors without disclosing objective, for reason authorization of program depends on agreement Defense and approval Director Mutual Security. Tele summary your estimate soonest. Send details by desp.[5] Instrs re recommendations urdes 331 and related desps will be sent after receipt info from you and Defense has acted on ltr quoted above.

ACHESON

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[5] Addis Ababa telegram 411 and despatch 405, both dated Apr. 4, neither printed, transmitted the information requested. (775.00/4–452)

675.77/4-2952

The Consul at Asmara (Mulcahy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET
No. 162

ASMARA, April 29, 1952.

Subject: Meeting Between Ambassador Childs and Duncan Cumming, Chief Administrator of Eritrea

On April 26, 1952, I accompanied The Honorable J. Rives Childs, American Ambassador at Addis Ababa, to Government House, Asmara, for a forty-five minute talk with His Excellency, Mr. Duncan Cameron Cumming, Chief Administrator of Eritrea.

Summary

The subjects discussed were those of general economic and political import to the establishment of the Federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea this year. The Chief Administrator admitted that he was not wholly optimistic that the transition would take place with perfect harmony although he did seem to think that his task of handing over to the new regime could be completed on schedule as his new "shadow government" had already been fairly well organized. He showed some concern for the necessity of our making arrangements very discreetly with the Ethiopians and with the Eritreans for the permanence of our military forces in Eritrea after September and he admitted his impatience with the failure to arrive as yet at an agreement for the handover of certain federal facilities and properties in Eritrea which were formerly the property of the Italian State. He also expressed his chagrin over the tendency of the Marchese di Campolattaro, Representative of the Italian Government in Eritrea, to exceed his instructions from Rome.

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[1] This despatch was also sent to USUN, London, Rome, and Addis Ababa.

Transition

Mr. Cumming stated that, although there were great grounds for optimism concerning the Administration's ability to accomplish its mission of handing over to the new regime by September 15, he did not think that the need for care and caution had passed. He implied that he foresaw the possibility of the reappearance of civil violence and disorder if the opposing political forces did not reach an agreement on the Constitution and other legal affairs in a short time. He said that, while the new "shadow government" will be permitted increasingly to assume responsibilities for the conduct of Eritrean affairs, he himself will retain a "firm hand at the helm" until the very last moment since the overall responsibility for Eritrea's welfare will continue to be his until September 15, 1952.

Much of the progress yet to be made in arranging Eritrea's future and of defining her part in the Federation remained to be settled. He was obviously nettled at the failure of the Ethiopians to come forward with definite proposals as to what would constitute "Federal" services after September. He also stated that the Foreign Office was at the moment considering the problem of precisely what amount of the ex-Italian State property in this Territory should be turned over to Eritrea and what amount to the new Federal Government.

U.S. Military

The foregoing problems in no small way involve the future of the American Armed Forces stationed in Eritrea since it was obvious that the Department will have to make arrangements with the Ethiopians for use of lands and installations in Eritrea. The Chief Administrator thought it was more than possible that the Eritrean politicians, more probably the Moslems, would sooner or later, whenever it suited their interest of the moment make a political football of the presence of American troops on their soil without their concurrence.

Mr. Childs had told me beforehand that he would prefer to avoid discussion of the position of the American military in Eritrea with the Chief Administrator at this time in view of the delicate nature of the prospective negotiation of the Base Agreement with Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Government's own fears lest knowledge of the Agreement reach the British at too early a date, and the Department's instructions that such matters should not be discussed with the British. Since we anticipated some mention of the question by the Chief Administrator it had been agreed in advance that comments on our part would remain as vague and as general as courtesy would permit. Mr. Childs stated that the formalization of our military position in Eritrea was far from settled and that neither we nor the Ethiopians saw any present need to rush it to a conclusion. We did not, however, anticipate any difficulty in reaching an ultimate agreement with the Government of Ethiopia on this point.

Property Division

Mr. Cumming next said that one of the chief problems with which he is confronted at the present time is the execution of the General Assembly's Resolution of January 29, 1952, which arranges for the disposition of all ex-Italian state property in Eritrea.[2] He is fearful lest the Eritreans later accuse the British of surrendering too much of their patrimony to the Ethiopians; on the other hand he is also worried for fear that an excessive amount of state property owned by the Eritrean state will constitute too much a burden of maintenance upon it when there will be a large enough budget deficit as it is. The Chief Administrator states that his hands are tied until the Foreign Office instructs him more definitely on the disposition of the property. He added that it has not yet been settled as to whether title to property in Eritrea used for the functions of the Federal Government will be transferred to the Eritrean or to the Federal Government.

There were other questions which were equally pressing, one of them being the maintenance of the Eritrean Highway System and the Eritrean Railways. Both would have to be settled together since the highways and the railway are competitors and it would not seem wise for them simply to be divided by giving the Eritrean Government the railway to manage and the Federal Government, the roads. The Ambassador and I thought that something resembling our own system of maintenance of national or interstate highways might provide the answer by making the highways a joint responsibility of both the Federal and the local Governments. Mr. Cumming thought that there was much merit in this plan.

Italian Policy

The Ambassador turned the conversation to a topic which has recently caused the British, the Ethiopians and ourselves some concern in recent weeks: the attitude of Benedetto Capomazza, Marchese di Campolattaro, Italian Government Representative in Eritrea. Mr. Childs stated that even the Italian Ambassador at Addis Ababa felt that the Marchese had been acting in excess of his instructions in his recent dealings with the Ethiopian delegation which visited Asmara and with the United Nations Commissioner. The Chief Administrator replied that this was a matter which the British had also been taking up on a Rome-London level and it was to be hoped that the Marchese would soon be instructed to exhibit greater signs of cooperation and to desist from his minor attempts at obstructionism since the policy of the Italian Government at the present time is to cooperate loyally in bringing about the establishment of the Federation and to preserve the friendly spirit with which the reestablishment of relations with Ethiopia have been accompanied.

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[2] Reference is to UN General Assembly Resolution 530 (VI); the text is in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951*, pp. 282–285.

The Ambassador, several times in the course of the talk, had occasion to compliment Mr. Cumming on the outstanding work he had accomplished since his assuming his present difficult post, especially his success in suppressing the banditry formerly so prevalent in Eritrea. The Chief Administrator expressed his appreciation of the opportunity to speak with the Ambassador on items of mutual interest and regretted that Mr. Childs visit to Asmara had to be so short.

EDWARD W. MULCAHY

775.5 MSP/5-1552 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 15, 1952—5:57 p. m.

377. 1. Director MS found and determined May 12 Ethio eligible receive reimbursable mil assistance under Section 408(*e*) MDAA.[2] You are authorized inform Ethio Govt this fact and state you are prepared enter into exchange of notes as required by Act. Text of suggested note forwarded to Emb by transmittal slip Apr 25.

2. Early conclusion bilateral agreement considered desirable in view decision Dept Defense mentioned Deptel 345 [3] that future contingents Ethio troops returning from Korea must obtain small arms under provision [*Section*] 408 (*e*) MDAA. Since Ethios attach great importance returning troops retaining weapons they may wish submit necessary request soonest after agreement concluded. Army informing MA necessary procedures for Ethios to follow in submitting request. Dept will send similar info to Emb.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Beard (AF) and cleared in the offices of Colonel Coffey (Army), Bryan (S/MSA), Elliott (MD), Daspit (NEA), and Berry (NEA).

[2] The letter from Harriman, dated May 12, is not printed. (775.5 MSP/5-1252) For Section 408(*e*) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as amended, see 64 Stat. 373; 22 U.S.C. 1591.

[3] Apr. 25; not printed. It reported a letter from the Department of Defense stating that Defense would not be able to provide small arms to future contingents of Ethiopian troops returning from Korea unless the two countries first negotiated an agreement for reimbursable aid. It also informed the Embassy that Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had just concurred in a Department of State recommendation that Ethiopia be granted reimbursable aid. (775.56/4-2552)

3. You are requested inform Ethios US wld like publicize agreement after sig and ascertain whether objections perceived. In any event US obliged register agreement with UN SYG in due time, but this can be made matter months. Also mandatory Congressional Comites be notified before any actual trans of material, but publicity can be minimized if Ethios desire.

4. Advise if any delay expected in concluding agreement.[4]

ACHESON

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[4] Despatch 496 from Addis Ababa, June 19, transmitted copies of the note from the Ambassador to the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, setting forth the terms and conditions of payment for reimbursable military aid for Ethiopia. It also transmitted the Foreign Minister's reply, dated June 13, accepting those terms. (775.5 MSP/6–1952) For the text of this agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2751 or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 3, p. 5498.

Despatch 65 from Addis Ababa, Aug. 12, 1952, transmitted a copy of an agreement signed by the Ethiopian Foreign Minister accepting in principle the U.S. proposal for the reorganization of the Ethiopian Armed Forces and requesting specific arms and equipment on a reimbursable basis. (775.5/8–1252)

675.77/7–2252 : Telegram

The Chargé in Ethiopia (Gatewood) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT ADDIS ABABA, July 22, 1952—4 p. m.

41. Ital Amb called to express his private unofficial concern with importance of establishing federal supreme court for which no provision made either in Eritrean constitution or Federal act. He pointed out that, apart from conflicts of jurisdiction foreseen by Article 90 Eritrean constitution, cases involving different interests of parts of federation, must have hearing before strictly impartial tribunal in order minimize possibility Eritrean appeals to UN for protection against Ethio domination. Though confident Ethios do not intend proceed rapidly with measures that wld result virtual annexation Eritrea, Amb believes Ethios strongly impelled, both by their national character and geographic considerations, towards fullest possible control Eritrea and therefore federal supreme court must provide ultimate guarantees (outside UN) of Eritrean autonomy. He does not favor Matienzo's suggestion to GOE that federal court consist of one Ethiopian, one Eritrean and one foreigner as chief justice since foreigner wld be obliged spend most time educating his colleagues as to legal refinements and wld be under very great pressures. He prefers court composed of one Ethio, one Eritrean and three foreigners.

Though without specific instructions from Rome, Amb asked that US Emb lend some support to Matienzo's principle (without commitment as to exact composition of court) by displaying interest in question to Ethios. If this is done, he anticipates ForMin will ask his views also as federal court proposal wld affect many Itals. He hopes US Emb will be willing persuade Brit follow same line during Matienzo's visit here, though he will not speak to Brit directly for fear of compromising good relations with Ethios who might suspect him of organizing pressures against them. He obviously does not wish to be first envoy to discuss federal court either with Matienzo or Ethios.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Asmara.

Before Matienzo returns Asmara July 25 there will be several occasions on which this matter can be tactfully broached. I see no reason why Amb (expected return tomorrow on delayed EAL flight) or I shld not mention US interest in fed court to Fon Min as USG has great interest in maintaining orderly transfer power and future development federation (see Asmara despatch 189 June 13).[2] I already discussed matter with Spencer informally and he personally favors early GOE decision. Believe Ethios wld respond to implication that, when Matienzo renders final report to UN it wld create better impression if GOE had already announced plan establish federal court rather than have UNGA suggest such move. Shld Dept disagree request immediate instructions.[3]

GATEWOOD

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[2] The subject of despatch 189, not printed, was "Views on American Policy With Respect to Eritrea and Ethiopia." It read in part: "To express my thesis in simplest terms I believe that our policy throughout the protracted settlement of the Eritrean problem has been in fact characterized by a desire to obtain through our great influence in international circles the best possible terms for Ethiopia; I believe that the time has now come to readjust the emphasis on our policy to obtaining the best possible terms for ourselves and of gaining the maximum advantage for ourselves—and that on a long range basis. . . . I should like to point out the fact that we have been virtually the prime movers in bringing about the establishment in East Africa of a potentially democratic government, however limited its scope may be and however much of a by-product of an overall settlement it may have been. We have become identified with that phenomenon which, by plan or by coincidence, represents an advance in our policy toward colonial areas. That our policy rightly included action by the rule-of-thumb that the settlement must be to Ethiopia's advantage is not questioned. The thought brought forward, however, for consideration is that by continued application of this rule we may endanger our long range policy and lay ourselves open to charges of duplicity and insincerity. Legalistic considerations to the contrary, we must live with Eritrea." (611.77/6-1352)

[3] A handwritten note in the margin indicated that the Department concurred, so no reply was necessary.

675.77/8-1352: Telegram

The Ambassador in Ethiopia (Childs) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET US EYES ONLY ADDIS ABABA, August 13, 1952—3 p.m.

102. FonMin and Spencer have had several interviews with Brit Amb and Cumming re hand-over. GOE extremely exasperated continued reversals by Cumming and constant raising fresh difficulties transfer power. After several fairly stormy sessions it has been agreed here subject London's approval Federal Act will be ratified Sept 11 on which day Emperor's representative and Ethio federal officials

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Asmara, London, and the Navy.

will enter Asmara.[2] Period from Sept 11 to 15 will be one during which Brit will hand over to federal and Eritrean authorities. Brit will evacuate by Sept 15 except for 50 officers and men of their mil forces who will be left for one month with permission GOE to settle up their accounts.

In view of what GOE interprets as menacing intimation Cumming he wld wash his hands all responsibility for safety Emperor if latter entered Asmara 11, tentative decision reached for Emperor defer his visit Eritrea to Ethio Meskal holiday on Sept 26.

In view foregoing, Embassy recommends visit *Greenwich Bay* and Admiral Hughes be deferred until Emperor's visit. It is strongly recommended visit vessel and Admiral shld not under any circumstances be omitted. Emb has every reason believe GOE wld welcome visit French and Ital vessels at same time while GOE completely indifferent visit British vessel.[3]

CHILDS

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[1] Telegram 118 from Addis Ababa, Aug. 19, reported that the United Nations had accepted Sept. 11 as the date for the entry of Ethiopian officials into Eritrea and Sept. 15 as the date for the completion of the British administration. (675.77/8-1952)

[2] Telegram 89 from Addis Ababa, Aug. 8, had reported the Emperor would enter Asmara on Sept. 11. (675.77/8-852) His visit was later changed to Oct. 4. Despatch 200 from Addis Ababa, Oct. 21, transmitted a brief review of the Emperor's visit to Eritrea. It was considered an unqualified success, and the Emperor expressed appreciation for the visit of the *Greenwich Bay*. (775.11/10-2152)

775.5/9-2952

Memorandum of Conversation, by John K. Beard, Office of African Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1952.

Subject: Training Personnel for Ethiopian Army

Participants: Mr. Utter—AF
Colonel Query—Former Military Attaché, Addis Ababa
Mr. Wellons—AF
Mr. Beard—AF

Colonel Query has just returned from Ethiopia where he served as Military Attaché for more than three years. When the Ethiopian Government was urgently requesting military equipment from the United States last winter and spring it was he who recommended that the Ethiopian Army be reduced in size and organized along modified United States lines.[1] His recommendation was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Colonel's views were requested with respect to the question of whether the United States should furnish personnel to the Ethiopian Government to assist in the reorganization of the Army and in training Ethiopian troops in the proper use and maintenance of the equipment purchased.

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[1] Despatch 317 from Addis Ababa, Feb. 13, reported the Ethiopian Foreign Minister had been impressed with the idea that a smaller army might be more mobile and effective. (775.5/2-1352)

The Colonel stated that the Ethiopians reacted favorably to the United States suggestion that their army be reduced and a reserve organization created, but they have pointed out that a reserve system is completely new to them and, therefore, they will require assistance in setting it up. Embassy officers as well as the Military Attaché's office have made it clear to the Ethiopians that it is impossible for the United States to provide a "Training Mission". The Ethiopians, however, are willing to accept less than a Mission and he feels that if United States equipment is to be made available we should at least follow the recommendation made by Lt. General Bolte last year, i.e., that a small group of officers be attached to Radio Marina or to the Military Attaché's office for this purpose. He felt that such a group should be kept small and assigned for a short, definite period of time only. He thought that about six months should be adequate for the purpose and the Ethiopians should be informed that the assistance of the group would only be available for that period. If the United States does not provide such advisers and technicians it is not likely that the badly needed reorganization of the Army will take place or that the equipment purchased will be put to the best use or be properly maintained.

In response to Mr. Wellons' inquiry as to the number and type of personnel that would be needed for this purpose the Colonel replied that he thought that about twelve or fifteen would be adequate. This group would consist of:

1 officer for organization
1 officer for reserve organization
1 officer and two men for artillery instruction
1 officer and two men for crew served weapons instruction
1 infantry officer and two men
1 logistics officer
A few communications personnel depending upon the amount and type of communications equipment purchased.

Colonel Query requested that he not be quoted on any of the foregoing.

Editorial Note

Addis Ababa despatch 190, October 17, 1952, transmitted to the Department of State the minutes of meetings in Asmara on October 9 and 10, covering the formal negotiations with the Ethiopian Government concerning an Ethiopian Base Agreement for Eritrea. Despatch 193, October 17, commented further on the negotiations. The Ambassador suggested that the approval of a military training mission for Ethiopia would probably result in the speedy signing of the Base Agreement by the Ethiopians. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 711.56375A.

675.77/10-2152

Memorandum of Conversation, by Edwin Plitt, United States Delegation to the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL New York, October 21, 1952.[1]

Subject: Secretary Acheson's Conversations with Foreign Ministers of the NEA Area During the Seventh General Assembly of the United Nations[2]

Participants: Ato Abete-Wold Aklilou, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia
The Secretary
Mr. John Spencer, Minister Aklilou's Principal Adviser
Mr. Edwin Plitt, US Delegation

The Secretary's talk with the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Ato Abete-Wold Aklilou, who was received at the Secretary's office at USUN headquarters this afternoon, lasted nearly an hour. The exchange of views took place in French.

Mr. Aklilou, after the usual exchange of courtesies and references to the President and the Emperor, in response to a question from the Secretary about the situation in Ethiopia, spoke of the recent federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. The Secretary expressed his pleasure at the good relations existing between the United States and Ethiopia and mentioned the strong support the United States gave to the UN resolution providing for the federation.

After some further remarks by the Minister on the subject, he said that he was gratified at the opportunity he was given once again to speak with the Secretary and if the latter permitted and had the time, he would like to discuss a subject which had been giving him a certain measure of concern. The Minister recalled the events leading up to the oral agreement made in regard to the radio Marina installation in Asmara and which, he said, had been scrupulously observed by Ethiopia, including permission for American forces stationed there to wear their military uniforms. Other privileges had since been accorded such as customs courtesies and the question of existing base rights in Eritrea given consideration. He compared the political implications of the granting of base rights in Eritrea with the granting of base rights throughout Ethiopia. If an agreement be confined to Eritrea, so soon after its federation with Ethiopia, it seemed to him quite possible that his government might be adversely criticized for disposing of rights in Eritrea shortly after its coming under the Ethiopian Crown. He added that inclusion of base rights in an over-all agreement with Ethiopia also presents certain difficulties, but might in the end prove an easier solution of the problem.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was typed on Oct. 25.

[2] The Secretary of State was in New York as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly, which opened on Oct. 14, 1952.

He then led up to the signing in 1951 of our Treaty of Amenity [*Amity*] and Economic Relations with Ethiopia.[3] Before this treaty was signed, the Minister said, his government had been urged to enter into the agreement in a rather precipitate manner. In fact, such pressure had been exerted on his office at the time in this respect that he had been obliged to disregard official holidays and even had to convene the Cabinet on Ethiopia's national holiday to meet the American dead-line. The Minister explained that he mentioned this especially because of its bearing on the impending American Bases Agreement with Ethiopia. In speaking of the latter, he said further that he had been faced once more with similar pressure to conclude the agreement and unfortunately at a time when his government was fully concerned and occupied with the preparation for the Emperor's visit to Eritrea for the federation ceremony. He added that whereas there had been upward of a year to undertake negotiations, they were begun only four days before the federation and that he was again obliged, by the tone of urgency contained in the request, to hasten with an exchange of letters on the subject. He expressed himself rather frankly to the Secretary about his unhappiness over this turn of events and the necessity of again having to prevail on the Cabinet to speed up its decision. It is difficult for the Ethiopians to understand the pressure with which he was again importuned. His colleagues reminded him of the fact that the Treaty of Amenity [*Amity*] and Economic Relations signed in 1951—also concluded under pressure as he had previously pointed out—still awaits ratification by the United States Senate! Mr. Aklilou in his further comments on this recounted that he had at one moment met the Ambassador's insistence to hasten the negotiations with the remark that "I am not Mr. Acheson who can do such things in four days." The Secretary expressed surprise at the Minister's criticism and implied that he had been unaware of the circumstances he described.

As to the agreement itself, Mr. Aklilou pointed out that it is customary for a bilateral agreement to be so framed that all of the granting and giving is not reserved to one of the parties. He assured the Secretary that Ethiopia is ready to meet our wishes but that there must of necessity be a suitable *quid pro quo*, otherwise, Ethiopia can foresee trouble with other powers who will insist upon similar one-sided concessions. He emphasized that difficulties will unescapably ensue for Ethiopia if this factor is not taken into careful consideration, "and many European bees will want an equal right to sip the Ethiopian honey." In this connection he mentioned Ethiopia's desire to procure arms and the assignment of a military mission for training purposes from the United States.

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[3] The Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations had been signed on Sept. 7, 1951, but did not enter into force for the United States until Oct. 8, 1953. The text of the treaty is in TIAS No. 2864; 4 UST 2134.

The Secretary, in response to this specific request, explained to Mr. Aklilou that it is under consideration by the Department of Defense whose decision on it is awaited.

In conclusion Mr. Aklilou repeated that he was ready to meet the Secretary's representatives to conclude the Bases Agreement and that when ready, he would be prepared to sign it.

Although the entire conversation was carried on in a spirit of friendliness and understanding, Mr. Aklilou did lead the talk into an unexpected channel of critical comment of US procedure.

775.5 MSP/11–352 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 14, 1952—6:07 p. m.

268. Dept advised informally price list mil equipment (Embtel 353, Nov 3)[2] being actively processed and should be available approx two weeks. Understand certain items required clarification by MA. When completed price list will be presented Ethio Amb here and transmitted simultaneously to MA.

Dept also advised informally JCS comite has recommended JCS approve mil training assistance for Ethio army. Favorable action by JCS and formal notification by Defense to State expected next week.

Utter told Aklilou progress being made on above matters and Aklilou probably informed Emperor. If opportune you may confirm foregoing to Emperor emphasizing final action not yet taken by USG.

Aklilou and Spencer are not yet ready conclude base agreement. We have impression they are stalling until after discussion Eritrea item concluded in UNGA.

BRUCE

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Wellons and Beard (AF).

[2] Not printed; it asked if the Department could tell the Embassy when the list of equipment would be ready. (775.5 MSP/11–352)

775.58/11-2652

The Ambassador in Ethiopia (Childs) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL ADDIS ABABA, November 26, 1952.

No. 251

Ref: Deptel 268 of November 10 [*14*][2]

Subject: Desire of Emperor for American Military Mission to Ethiopia

The Acting Foreign Minister discussed with me at some length today the question of the sending by the United States of a formal military mission to Ethiopia.

The Minister stated that the Emperor had been informed that the United States Government was considering the sending of a military training assistance mission for the Ethiopian Army and the Emperor had stated it was his impression that the military training mission was a formal military mission such as he had desired since the withdrawal of the British military mission.

I informed the Minister by way of background that when Lt. Gen. Bolte visited Ethiopia in May, 1951 the question of a formal American mission to Ethiopia had been raised with him at that time by the Ethiopian Government. Gen. Bolte had informed the Ethiopian Government of the almost insurmountable obstacles to the assignment of such a mission to Ethiopia and had suggested that it might be possible for a few officers and men to be assigned by the Defense Department to Radio Marina at Asmara and detached from there to the Office of the Army Attaché in Addis Ababa for training and instruction in the use of the new weapons which might be furnished the Ethiopian Government under reimbursable military aid. Even this small training mission had not yet been approved by the Defense Department, although I was hopeful that it would be, but the long delay in the approval of even so restricted a mission, I said, illustrated the difficulties in the way of the assignment of a major formal military mission.

The Minister then asked me if I thought it might be in order for the Ethiopian Government to make a formal request of the United States Government for a regular military mission. I replied that I counseled strongly against this and I gave the following reasons therefor:

(1) Congressional approval would have to be obtained and this would be a long and doubtful process. I recalled that the Congress had not yet even ratified the Treaty of Amity signed with Ethiopia more than a year ago because of the pressure of business.

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[1] This despatch was repeated to London.

[2] *Supra.*

(2) The United States had very heavy military commitments abroad already. The allotment of the limited military resources of the United States was based on strictly priority considerations. Our first commitments were naturally earmarked for Korea and for those countries under threat of attack by Soviet Russia. Looking at the matter coolly and calculatingly, I did not think our Defense authorities were likely to consider Ethiopia entitled under these considerations to first priority or that it was in danger of imminent attack or of being required to be immediately bolstered against a possible threat of attack.

(3) The strain on our resources was so great that we could not spare first-class officers for such a mission and neither we, nor, I assumed, the Ethiopian Government would want mediocre officers.

(4) I thought the Ethiopian Government should wait and see the results of the small training mission which we hope to send. After these officers had been here and had given the benefit of their advice to the Ethiopian Army, the Ethiopian Government would be in a much better position to consider its future needs as regards military instruction.[3]

The Minister seemed to consider my arguments sound and he said he would report them to the Emperor.

J. Rives Childs

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[3] Telegram 304 to Addis Ababa, Dec. 3, reported the Department of State had been informally advised that the Secretary of Defense had signed a letter on Dec. 2 authorizing training assistance for the Ethiopian Army. (775.5 MSP/12–352)

Editorial Note

On December 11, 1952, Charles A. Sprague, United States Representative to the General Assembly, introduced a joint resolution on the Federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea, on behalf of his delegation and those of 12 other states. The resolution noted that the conditions laid down by the United Nations for the Federation had been fulfilled, and the Federation had been established on September 11. It congratulated the people and authorities of the Federation for their fulfillment of the original UN Resolution, 390 (V) of the General Assembly of December 2, 1950. The resolution was approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on December 12, and on December 17, it was adopted as UNGA Resolution 617 (VII) by the Seventh Session of the General Assembly.

The text of the resolution is in UN General Assembly, *Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20* (A/2361), page 9. The text of Sprague's speech introducing the resolution is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 22, 1952, pages 999–1000. Additional documentation on this topic is in Department of State files 320, 675.77, 775.00, and 777.00.

711.56375/12–2352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 23, 1952—6 : 36 p.m.

349. Aklilou, accompanied by Spencer, talked with Byroade about base agreement for nearly two hours morning Dec 20[2] and continued discussion in protracted afternoon mtg with other Dept and Defense officials. These talks followed initial mtg with Aklilou and Spencer in Dept on Dec 18 and luncheon given for Aklilou Dec 19 at Blair House by Byroade where among others Aklilou had opportunity talk with Lt. Gen. Lemnitzer whose responsibility while in Korea included supervision Ethio contingent. On Dec 15 and 16 textual changes in agreement had been discussed at length with Spencer in NYC by Dept and Defense officers.[2]

Full report results discussions will be sent you soonest but meanwhile here is summary for your info and guidance if queried officially about progress negots:

Aklilou complained about way he had been "rushed" into negots but burden his grievance was really that US asking for agreement of far wider scope than he had been given to understand in 1948 and that Ethio was now being asked in effect to undertake all risks of mil alliance, without obtaining commensurate benefits. He said Ethio had no intention going back on 1948 assurances to us but that he wld have difficult job selling Ethio Govt on agreement of present scope unless (*a*) agreement was limited to facilities now enjoyed at Asmara or (*b*) he cld provide sufficient indication of US support in defense of area. By latter he meant either written assurances of US collaboration and consultation re defense of area, including reference to mil mission, or promise of mission sufficiently large to do job of training Ethio had in mind for its Army. Therefore he as FonMin cld not in good faith recommend acceptance mission so small as 5 to 10 members, number he thought entirely inadequate to meet needs Ethio Army and various mil training schools. In later conversation Aklilou said mission of 50 member wld be satisfactory.

We in turn argued that agreement was limited to present facilities, and that rights specified therein wld apply to additional facilities only when and if Ethio agreed in negot to grant us those facilities. We emphasized particularly that mil mission wld be large enough to do job we had promised which is to remain in Ethio until it had provided adequate cadre instr in utilization of US equipment and related organizational matters. We said JCS had not specified nr members mission, that figure of five to ten had merely been indication of group that wld proceed to Addis initially, and that Chief of Mil Mission wld in consultation with Ethio mil authorities determine on the ground what additional help might be required. Byroade said he was confident, knowing first-hand US Defense Dept methods (e.g., starting with small mission and expanding as necessary) that mission wld provide assistance necessary. We further explained US training techniques did not require nor wld Ethio want large and unwieldy mission, but that we were committed to insuring that Ethio cadre and instructors were trained to point where they cld carry on by themselves. We said JCS decision came to us as agreeable surprise since it provided for mission rather than mere detachment few officers from Asmara and set no fixed time limit on mission's stay. We said it was really fruitless and irrelevant dicuss nr members mission now and that we were confident Emperor wld see in mission far-reaching decision of principle and adequate evidence US desire and intent help raise Ethio defense capabilities to satisfactory level.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Root (AF) and cleared in the offices of Wellons and Utter (AF).

[2] No records of these conversations have been found in Department of State files.

Aklilou seemed to admit that our explanation during these talks shld relieve Emperor's apprehension that mission might do no more than come to Ethio for brief period to demonstrate use of US arms, as he said "how to insert cartridges in rifles". But he contended a more specific and broader US commitment in writing was necessary to obtain Ethio Govt approval base agreement in present form. The alternative, he said, was to continue on basis existing exchange notes providing *status quo* treatment US facilities Asmara.

On Dec 22 Spencer phoned from NY asking for changes in note on mil mission which Defense cannot accept because they go beyond JCS decision (Deptel 308, Dec 4).[3] We informed Spencer Dec 23 maximum US Govt can agree to contained draft note given him and Aklilou Dec 21 (text being sent you separate tel).[4] Spencer doubted progress cld be made this basis and felt agreement cld not be concluded for several months.

Aklilou due leave for Paris today and says he will return Addis in 15 days—Spencer remaining US 2 months. Our best estimate is that Aklilou will report position along above lines to Emperor. We hope he will indicate foregoing represents maximum to which we can go but have no assurances he will. FYI, Defense Dept appears adamant against any further change. We told Spencer today next move is up to Ethios and that we expect they will in due course inform Emb of their reactions. Meanwhile Dept believes no further initiative shld be taken on our part.

ACHESON

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[3] Not printed. (711.56375A/12-452)

[4] Telegram 356 to Addis Ababa, Dec. 24, not printed. It made a correction in the source text and said the note was given to Spencer and Aklilou on Dec. 20. (775A.58/12-2452)

611.75/3-2453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1953.

Subject: Analysis by John Spencer of Present Ethiopian Attitude Toward the United States.

Participants:
John Spencer, American Adviser to the Ethiopian Government.
John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary.
John E. Utter, AF.

Preliminary to the resumption of discussions between the Ethiopian Foreign Minister and the State Department dealing with U.S. Base Agreement, U.S. Military Mission to Ethiopia, and purchase of arms by Ethiopia, Mr. Spencer called to give us his confidential appraisal of the present state of mind of Ato Aklilou, the Foreign Minister, toward the United States. Mr. Spencer prefaced his remarks by saying that after nine years in Ethiopia during which time he had had an opportunity to understand the workings of the Ethiopian mind, he felt that he was in a position to give us an analysis of the present attitudes of the leading Ethiopian officials toward the United States. He assured us that any seemingly blunt remarks regarding United States policy were given in a spirit of frankness and with the sole object of preparing us for a probably difficult and intransigent attitude of Ato Aklilou during the forthcoming discussions.

He stated that the Foreign Minister had not wanted to come to Washington at this time but had been compelled to do so on the instructions of the Emperor, who had told him that he wanted the three items mentioned above settled before Aklilou's return to Addis Ababa.

Mr. Spencer then went on to relate in great length a series of events directly concerning Ethiopia in which the United States Government was involved which tended to establish in the minds of the Emperor and Aklilou that the United States was not deeply interested in the welfare of Ethiopia. Mr. Spencer reminded us that both the Emperor and Aklilou had long memories and incidents which seemed of relatively minor importance had stuck in their minds and the accumulation of what they considered somewhat lukewarm support by the United States on a series of issues had resulted in a state of mind which might gradually develop into a reticence in dealing with U.S. Government and American private enterprise and a shifting of policy in favor of other nations. Mr. Spencer said that there existed in Addis Ababa a strong group of Ministers among whom were the Ministers of Commerce and Public Health who were critical of Aklilou's partiality for the United States and who seek advantages both to Ethiopia and to themselves in playing off the important European powers against each other. He mentioned the machinations of a Frenchman by the name of Michel Cott who with the aid of considerable funds appeared to be playing an important role behind the scenes in promoting this anti-American policy among Ethiopian officials. Ato Aklilou is, according to Mr. Spencer, still on the spot for having insisted on the resumption of diplomatic relations with Italy and it is obvious that he feels somewhat uncertain of his own position despite the fact that he appears to have had the backing of the Emperor up to this time. Spencer said that the United States brought considerable pressure to bear in connection with the resumption of relations with Italy and we are therefore linked with this unpopular action in the minds of many Ethiopians.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was initialed by Jernegan.

Mr. Spencer gave us to understand that Aklilou's mission was not only to settle the three problems mentioned above but also to be able to return to Ethiopia and assure the Emperor that the United States was really taking more than a casual interest in the development of Ethiopia. Mr. Spencer called our attention to the fact that there was an increasing trend toward Ethiopia's throwing in its lot completely with the Arab States which had already given their support to the Eritrean-Ethiopian Federation and which are now active in courting Ethiopia to join the Arab-Asiatic bloc.

General Mulughetta, Commander of the Imperial Ethiopian Body Guard, who has accompanied Ato Aklilou to Washington, was reported by Spencer to be unconcerned about obtaining a United States Military Mission to Ethiopia and Spencer had gathered the impression that the General would be just as pleased to see a Swedish military mission in its place. Spencer indicated that the Foreign Minister was anxious to settle this issue and that he would probably be satisfied if a fixed number of officers (say 25) for a definite period of time could be assigned. Aklilou would not accept what he considered the vague proposition put forward in December. The question of obtaining arms from the United States on a reimbursable basis was also a ticklish point with the Ethiopians who, probably because of their contribution in Korea, considered that they should have better treatment than such countries as Pakistan and India. The terms for obtaining and purchasing of arms would be discussed and Spencer hoped that the United States could agree to a generous treatment of this question.

With regard to the Base Agreement, Spencer said that Aklilou had withdrawn some of his more extreme objections to the draft in its present form and that the terms of Articles 2 and 3 appeared to be the real stumbling blocks. The Ethiopians were entirely prepared to give complete authority to the Americans within their installations and complete freedom of import and export and to have the necessary cable and wireless communications but were not prepared to give a priority of movement of goods and troops between U.S. military installations.

They would be satisfied, however, by parity between the United States and Ethiopia on this question. Spencer stated that Articles 2 and 3 were too general, vague and comprehensive and gave the impression to the Ethiopians that there was an impingement on their sovereignty. It was suggested to Spencer that he might prepare a rewording of the text which would be acceptable to the Foreign Minister and let us have it before entering negotiations so that we could see just how far we could go along with them.

Mr. Spencer referred to Ato Aklilou's call on the Secretary in the morning and said that the Foreign Minister would not be ready to begin discussions until Mr. Dulles had designated high-ranking and responsible officers to meet with him. We told Mr. Spencer that this was being arranged and Aklilou would be informed shortly. It was understood that discussions would probably not take place until the beginning of next week, although certain preparatory work might be done between Mr. Spencer and members of the African Office.

711.56375A/3-2453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1953.

Subject: Ethiopian Foreign Minister's Call on the Secretary.

Participants: Ato Aklilou Habtewold, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The Secretary.
John E. Utter, AF.

After recalling the pleasant relations he had had with Mr. Dulles during the 1948 United Nations Assembly in Paris, Ato Aklilou referred to the promise he had made to Secretary Marshall at that time that the United States would be allowed to maintain the U.S. Army communications station "Radio Marina" at Asmara in the event Eritrea would be joined with Ethiopia. Ethiopia and Eritrea were federated in September 1952 in accordance with the U.N. resolution.

Aklilou stated that he and General Mulughetta, Commander of the Imperial Ethiopian Body Guard, had come to Washington with instructions from the Emperor to settle three questions—1) an agreement governing the important U.S. Army communications station and other military facilities in Eritrea; 2) details regarding a U.S. military training mission which the U.S. Government is prepared to furnish Ethiopia; and 3) difficulties concerning the reimbursable military aid accorded by the U.S. to Ethiopia. Aklilou described at some length the vicissitudes that had been encountered in previous attempts to settle these questions and specifically referred to the military facilities agreement which had become stalemated during his visit to the Department on December 20–23, 1952. He requested that the Secretary designate suitable high-ranking and responsible officers to discuss the three problems with him and General Mulughetta, in the hope that complete agreement might be reached during his present visit to Washington.

Mr. Dulles replied that proper study would be given to the matter, and assured Ato Aklilou that necessary steps would be taken to facilitate the discussions.

Ato Aklilou said that the Emperor, on being apprised of Mr. Dulles' intended tour of the Middle East and South Asian countries, had indicated that he would very much like to have the Secretary visit Addis Ababa. Aklilou pointed out that such a visit would not cause too great deviation from the Secretary's route, and that omission of Ethiopia, which was so strongly linked to the United States, would be interpreted by the Ethiopians as a slight. The Secretary replied that he appreciated the kind invitation of the Emperor, but doubted whether the limited time at his disposal would permit such a detour. On Aklilou's insistence Mr. Dulles promised to consider the possibility of alterations in his itinerary.

When thanking the Secretary for taking time to receive him, Ato Aklilou mentioned that he had a letter from the Emperor for President Eisenhower which he would like to present while in Washington.[1]

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[1] No copy of this letter has been found in Department of State files.

711.56375/3–3053

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, North African Affairs (Wellons)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1953.

Subject: U.S. Base Rights in Eritrea and Ethiopian Desires for Military Assistance.

Participants: General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Lt. General L. L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Planning and Research, U.S. Army; Lt. Col. Pierce; Mr. H. Byroade, Asst. Secretary of State; Mr. J. Utter, AF; Mr. A. Wellons, AF;
Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs; Gen. Mulughetta Bulli, Commander, Imperial Ethiopian Body Guard; Mr. John Spencer, American Adviser to and Interpreter for Aklilou.

This meeting was held at 3:00 p.m. on March 30, 1953, in the office of General Hull in the Pentagon.

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[1] Beard (AF) helped draft this memorandum of conversation.

After Gen. Hull and Foreign Minister Aklilou had exchanged cordialities, the Foreign Minister stated that he had been instructed by the Emperor to come to the United States to reach a settlement on three matters: (1) the problem of reimbursable military assistance for Ethiopia, (2) the U.S. Military Training Mission for Ethiopia, and (3) the agreement for U.S. military rights in Eritrea (Radio Marina).

Base Agreement

The Foreign Minister expounded at great length on U.S.-Ethiopian relations. He recalled the promise which he had made in Paris in 1948 concerning our continued use of Radio Marina if Eritrea should be placed under the jurisdiction of the Ethiopian Government, and the renewal of this promise to Lt. General Bolte when he visited Ethiopia in 1951. Aklilou mentioned his conversations with Secretary Acheson last fall [2] and Secretary Dulles last week.[3] He pointed out that the facilities which the United States now desired were considerably more than what we had wanted in 1948. Thus when Ambassador Childs proposed the conclusion of a definitive agreement and submitted a draft in August of 1952, he found that it involved all sorts of things and was much broader in scope than the commitment which he had made in Paris. The Foreign Minister stated that when he inquired what was the "*status quo modus vivendi*" the Ambassador was unable to explain just what was involved. In spite of this, however, the Ethiopian Government had exchanged notes with the U.S. on September 11, 1952, granting a continuation of our rights and privileges without knowing fully what was involved.

Aklilou then recalled the discussions of the proposed agreement carried on at Asmara and Massawa in September and October (1952) and said that it was his feeling at that time that the agreement was "unilateral"—that only the United States was benefiting from the agreement. He mentioned specifically that in the case of our Agreement with Saudi Arabia all properties reverted to the Government of that country at the termination of the agreement. He inquired why this could not be so for Ethiopia. In the negotiations which were held in Washington last December he said that the changes were not so much ones of substance but rather of form. The Pentagon's representatives, however, were unable to satisfy him at that time because they were not precise enough. He emphasized that the problem is not that Ethiopia refuses to grant the U.S. request for facilities in Eritrea but that he wants a clarification of our desires in the area.

Arms Assistance

The Foreign Minister recalled that Ethiopia had been endeavoring to obtain military equipment from the United States for more than six years and noted that it was not until one year after General Bolte had visited Ethiopia that a reimbursable arms agreement was signed by the two countries.[4] The Foreign Minister then related a series of misunderstandings or misconceptions concerning Ethiopia's eligibility to purchase military equipment under section 408(*e*) of the MDAA. He said that at the time the agreement was signed it was his understanding that Ethiopia would be considered on the same basis as Greece and Turkey—that it was not until later that he was told that Ethiopia could only "purchase" arms. He said that in Ethiopian eyes the reimbursable aid agreement was regarded as a "Mutual Defense Treaty".

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[2] The memorandum of this conversation, dated Oct. 21, 1952, is on p. 428.

[3] Memorandum of conversation of Mar. 24, *supra*.

With regard to the cost of the equipment Aklilou stated that Mr. Gatewood (Counselor of Embassy and now Chargé d'Affaires a.i. at Addis Ababa) had indicated that the price of equipment would be reduced on a relative scale, for example, from $100 to about $12 or $15. While he was in Paris recently, however, he had received a telegram from the Emperor advising him that the price for 12,000 rifles was four and one half million dollars and that payment therefor had to be made in advance. This was too much and the Emperor instructed him to clear the matter up. He mentioned that the cost of the small arms retained by the Ethiopian troops returning from Korea had been reduced to about 30% of their original cost.

The Foreign Minister then went into a lengthy discourse on Ethiopia's need for arms. He said that about 90% of the old weapons which Ethiopia had been using (mostly captured Italian equipment) were virtually unusable. He referred to Ethiopia's size, its long unprotected borders, the matter of internal security, the problem of communications, floods, etc., etc. In this regard he mentioned that Ethiopia had been given a plan for the reorganization of the Ethiopian Army which had been approved by the United States JCS. He said that this plan did not meet Ethiopia's needs; a plan for using reserves was not applicable to the country under present conditions—what Ethiopia needed was two fully equipped divisions and a brigade to meet its minimum requirements.

Aklilou then proceeded to point out the advantages to the United States for extending military equipment assistance to Ethiopia. He said that arms given to Arab States might not be used as well as arms given to Ethiopia and emphasized that the United States can count on Ethiopia more than it can count on the Arabs. In this connection he mentioned that recently in the United Nations, Ethiopia had voted against the Czechoslovakian resolution concerning Mutual Security whereas the Arab States abstained.[5] He said that Ethiopia wants to collaborate with Americans and mentioned as examples the Sinclair Petroleum Company's concession, T.W.A.'s contract to run the Ethiopian Air Lines, the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, etc. In developing this thesis he pointed out that Ethiopia is independent, is developing economically, and is not a member of a "bloc". She is neither for nor against the Arabs; she is neither for nor against "Colonial Powers". He felt, therefore, that the U.S. would encounter no "bloc" or other repercussions by extending military assistance to Ethiopia.

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[4] See telegram 377 to Ethiopia, May 15, 1952, p. 423.

[5] Reference is to a Czech draft resolution (UN document A/C.1/L.34) which stated that the U.S. Mutual Security Act of 1951 constituted aggression and interference in the affairs of other states. It was overwhelmingly voted down

The Foreign Minister then re-emphasized the close relationship with the United States which he has fostered over the last ten years and pointed out that U.S. influence and prestige in Ethiopia is greater than in any other country of the Near East. However, there has been criticism of his policy within his country and also from the Arabs. It is necessary that he now show results and that the U.S. demonstrate reciprocity of feeling with regard to (1) military assistance, (2) the base agreement, and (3) the training mission.

General Hull then expressed great admiration for Ethiopian accomplishments and for the high caliber of the troops sent to Korea. With regard to Radio Marina, he said that it is very important to us but that we should not ask for extra rights and privileges—that our forces there should not be privileged but should be on equal terms with Ethiopian forces. The General stated that all the U.S. wants is a continuation of what we now have in Eritrea. This should, however, be clearly defined in a formal agreement so there would not be any misunderstanding over the meaning of words. He referred to the proposed changes in the agreement (which Mr. Spencer had given to Mr. Utter on March 27, 1953), said that they were under study, and that he believed an agreement could be worked out on a reasonable basis.

The General felt that the size of the Ethiopian Army, its equipment, the amount of money which could be expended for equipment, etc., were matters which should be decided by the Ethiopian Government. As for the United States, we had declared Ethiopia eligible for reimbursable assistance and we would be glad to supply arms to them on that basis. He expressed his personal opinion that what Ethiopia needed was lightly armed, mobile troops. On the question of the cost of the equipment the General stated that he was not familiar with the details but felt that the Ethiopians had every right to know what is involved and what the requirements are.

General Lemnitzer suggested that the misunderstanding regarding prices may have involved "surplus equipment" which could be sold at considerable price reduction.

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in the First Committee and in the General Assembly in March and April 1953; see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953*, pp. 253–258. For related documentation, see volume VIII.

Mr. Byroade said that the State Department would check on this matter of prices.

At the end of the meeting Aklilou emphasized two problems: they want (1) a reduction in price of the arms they purchase, and (2) to pay for the equipment by installments (presumably over several years) after receiving delivery. Ethiopia, he said, could not pay 4½ million dollars now. Mr. Utter explained that the Ethiopian Government had been told it could buy the equipment they want with a down payment of $850,000 and a letter of credit for the remainder of the 4½ million. Mr. Byroade said that he wanted a settlement of all of these problems and suggested that they be studied by State and Defense and then have a further meeting with the Ethiopians.

Ato Aklilou said that Ethiopia needs equipment now and that the phazing of purchases of equipment would not meet its need. General Mulughetta Bulli added that Ethiopia has trained troops who are ready to use arms. General Hull expressed the opinion that the Ethiopians might purchase the desired 12,000 rifles first and then obtain the other equipment later and thought that the availability of such items should be studied.

The Ethiopian Foreign Minister then inquired what the program was to be and was informed that the problems would be discussed by State and Defense and a further meeting would then be held with him. Mr. Byroade hoped we could have an answer for Aklilou this week.[6]

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[6] A copy of this memorandum of conversation was sent to the Embassy in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa despatch 444, May 1, expressed surprise at some of the statements made by the Foreign Minister. The following points were made in the despatch: 1) The Embassy did not understand how the Foreign Minister could expect Ethiopia to be considered on the same basis as Greece and Turkey, as copies of the Mutual Security legislation had been carefully reviewed with the Foreign Ministry; 2) Since the basic exchange of notes on reimbursable military aid contained clear references to Section 408*e*, the Embassy could not understand how the Ethiopians could consider the reimbursable aid agreement a mutual defense treaty; 3) General Lemnitzer's contention that the misunderstanding regarding prices may have involved surplus equipment was correct. Gatewood said he had told the Foreign Minister that the price of surplus equipment was lower than that for new items, but he never indicated a reduction as great as 85–90 percent even for those items. (775.5 MSP/5–153)

775.5 MSP/4–653

The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1953.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to the letter to the Secretary of Defense dated March 6, 1952, and the reply to the Secretary of State dated April 22, 1952,[2] concerning military assistance for Ethiopia. In the letter of March 6, 1952, the Department of State recommended that Ethiopia be found eligible for grant military assistance under Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The reply of April 22, 1952, reported the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Ethiopia should be made eligible for reimbursable military aid under Section 408(*e*) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, but that Ethiopia did not meet the requirements for eligibility for grant aid.

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[1] This letter was drafted by Wellons and Root (AF) and cleared in the offices of NEA, S/MSA, L, and E.

[2] Neither letter is printed, but see telegram 282 to Ethiopia, Mar. 20, 1952, p. 419. Regarding the Department of Defense reply, see footnote 2, *ibid.* For the determination by the Director of Mutual Security of Ethiopia's eligibility for reimbursable aid, see telegram 377 to Ethiopia, May 15, 1952, p. 423.

During the year which has elapsed there have been several significant developments which I believe justify reconsideration of the recommendation that Ethiopia be found eligible for grant military aid. Under the agreement to provide military equipment on a reimbursable basis signed in June, 1952, the Ethiopians submitted a request for equipment to arm a division equivalent to a United States infantry division, the cost of which is nearly $4,700,000. Our legislation requires that this be paid for in advance—a condition which the Ethiopian Government is not able to meet.

Since last summer the Department of State, in closest collaboration with the Department of Defense, has been negotiating with the Ethiopian Government for a military base rights agreement to cover United States military facilities and requirements in Eritrea. In December these negotiations reached a stalemate.

Last month the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, accompanied by the Commander of the Imperial Ethiopian Body Guard (General Mulughetta Bulli), which provided the Ethiopian troops in Korea, returned to Washington with instructions from the Emperor to settle with the highest United States authorities the three questions of: (1) the United States base agreement, (2) a United States military training mission, and (3) the cost of arms to be purchased from the United States. In conferences which officials of the Department of State and Department of Defense have had with the Ethiopian representatives during the last two weeks it has become evident that the Ethiopians are not prepared to conclude the kind of base agreement we have been seeking without assurances of adequate military assistance from us. Adequate military assistance to them means in reality a grant of essential arms and a military training mission. Decisions which have already been taken by the Defense and State Departments with respect to the mission are, we believe, adequate to satisfy the Ethiopians on this score. Now, however, the Ethiopians have made the furnishing of arms virtually as a gift the essential issue. The Emperor's assignment of General Mulughetta to assist in the negotiations has made this fact clear.

The legislation pertaining to sales of military equipment does not allow this Government to arrange generous long-term installment payments at reduced prices, which is the only basis on which the Ethiopians could pay for the arms they need. If the needs of the Ethiopians are to be met, and their approval obtained for our base agreement, it will be necessary to make them eligible for grant military aid. It is our understanding that the unobligated and uncommitted funds available for military assistance under Section 201 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 now amount to $26,000,000. As you know, ten percent of the total appropriation for Title II military assistance can be transferred to countries in the Near East area, and Ethiopia is in that area. It would appear, therefore, that funds are available from which limited grant aid could be provided to Ethiopia.

A year ago the Department of State believed that the provision of grant aid to Ethiopia was fully justified. The reasons given them have been reinforced by our experience during the last year and can be summarized as follows:

(*a*) Ethiopia has maintained in Korea for nearly two years a contingent of about 1200 troops who have proved in combat that they are very effective soldiers. The third battalion of Ethiopian troops left for Korea in March, 1953. By act as well as by word the Ethiopians have proved that they are on "our side" and are strong supporters of collective security. The presence in Korea of colored troops from an independent African country is of great value to us in the propaganda war as well as in the Korean war. On this basis alone, Ethiopia's request for arms assistance deserves sympathetic consideration.

(*b*) Ethiopia's armed forces seriously need new equipment. In recent conferences the Commander of the Imperial Ethiopian Body Guard has emphasized that nearly 90 per cent of their equipment, most of it captured from the Italians, has become useless. Grant aid from the United States would put weapons in the hands of troops in existing units and thus increase the effectiveness of Ethiopia's internal security forces. This is particularly important since last September when Ethiopia assumed responsibility for the defense and security of Eritrea, where the American military installations are located. Thus adequately armed Ethiopian forces would immediately increase the ability of the country to defend itself and would be an important contribution to the defensive strength of the region and the United States.

(*c*) In the last two weeks the Ethiopian Foreign Minister has repeatedly emphasized that dissatisfaction and criticism of the Emperor's pro-American policy which the Foreign Minister has energetically pursued over the last ten years has increased and that now the policy must show obvious benefits, particularly in the field of military assistance. The alternative is for Ethiopia to turn to other countries, for American influence and prestige to decrease drastically, and we may lose a good opportunity to contribute to the sound military, economic and political development of a key country in that region.

(*d*) Arms assistance to Ethiopia could be cited to the states in the Near East area as evidence that genuine cooperation with the United States and the United Nations, as in Korea, leads to mutual benefits.

(*e*) The Emperor has let it be known several times in recent months that he would gladly join any alliance or grouping of nations opposed to communism, especially any Middle East Defense Organization. The

Department of State believes that Ethiopia could become an effective member of MEDO when, or after, that organization is formed.

In view of all of these considerations, this Department believes that the President should be asked to determine that the strategic location of Ethiopia makes it of direct importance to the defense of the Near East area, that grant military assistance to Ethiopia is of critical importance to the defense of the free nations, and that the immediately increased ability of Ethiopia to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the Near East area and to the security of the United States. The Department of Defense is asked to join in a recommendation to this effect, with the understanding that the total arms assistance to be provided would be related to a program for strengthening the Ethiopian armed forces, thus contributing to the security of American military installations and the ability of the area to defend itself, in an amount not to exceed $5,000,000, and with the understanding that Ethiopia would be required to purchase as much of the equipment needed as it can reasonably afford.

If the Department of Defense concurs, I will transmit this recommendation immediately to the Director for Mutual Security with a request for a Presidential finding that Ethiopia is eligible for grant military aid. For maximum benefit it is important to complete these negotiations while the Ethiopian Foreign Minister is still in Washington; therefore rapid action on our part is essential.

Sincerely yours, **WALTER B. SMITH**

775.5 MSP/4–853

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, North African Affairs (Wellons) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 8, 1953.

Subject: U.S. Military Assistance to Ethiopia.

Participants: Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs; Gen. Mulughetta Bulli, Commander, Imperial Ethiopian Body Guard; John Spencer, American Adviser to and Interpreter for Aklilou.

Lt. Gen. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Planning and Research, U.S. Army; Lt. Col. Davis, U.S. Army; Lt. Col. Kurth, U.S. Army.

Mr. H. Byroade, Asst. Secretary of State; Mr. J. Utter, AF; Mr. A. Wellons, AF.

This meeting was held in Mr. Byroade's office in the Department of State.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on Apr. 14 by Wellons and Beard and initialed by Byroade and Utter.

Mr. Byroade opened the meeting by noting Ethiopia's need for military equipment, and the sympathetic U.S. estimate that it would be desirable for Ethiopia to have such equipment. He mentioned that the cost of Ethiopia's first request for reimbursable arms would be nearly five million dollars and the Foreign Minister's statement in a previous meeting that Ethiopia is unable to meet the payment methods and procedures imposed by our legislation for purchasing all of the equipment which it needs. Mr. Byroade then said, on a direct, frank and personal basis, that he wanted Aklilou to know the situation and what had been undertaken since their meeting in General Hull's office. He said that we (and he included Gen. Lemnitzer) are endeavoring to have Ethiopia declared eligible for grant military assistance. He emphasized that it was not possible to foretell whether our efforts would be successful since the applicable legislation requires that decisions on such matters be approved by other departments and the President, and that Congress should also be consulted. The Assistant Secretary reiterated that even if Ethiopia is declared eligible for grant assistance, this would not fill all of the country's needs for arms and that Ethiopia would be expected to purchase as much as possible of the equipment needed.

General Lemnitzer commented that the Department of Defense was working as rapidly as possible on this matter.

Mr. Byroade explained that he wanted the Foreign Minister to understand that if our efforts to have Ethiopia declared eligible for grant assistance were not successful, it should not be considered as a reflection or indication of the lack of friendship on the part of the United States. On the contrary, he wanted Aklilou to know that we were making every effort to work out mutually beneficial arrangements and therefore he was taking the unusual step of informing Aklilou of our proposal before a final decision had been taken by the U.S. Government.

The Assistant Secretary then stated that while waiting for the decision on grant aid we should take advantage of the time available to draw up a list of priorities for the equipment which Ethiopia wants to procure on a reimbursable basis. It would appear advantageous to utilize General Mulughetta's presence in Washington to determine specifically what Ethiopia wants and what should be sent in the first, second, and third shipments, etc.

General Lemnitzer remarked that the Department of Defense was ready to proceed immediately with staff level talks on the details of reimbursable aid equipment. If grant aid is approved it could be applied to later projects on the basis of whatever plans they might draw up.

With regard to the price of "reimbursable aid" equipment, Mr. Byroade stated that there was no legal way by which the equipment desired by Ethiopia could be sold at a reduced price; that the material must be sold to Ethiopia at the same price that it is sold to everyone else. We can not, therefore, meet the Foreign Minister's request for a reduction in price and the legislation requires payment in advance. Gen. Lemnitzer emphasized that the type of equipment desired by Ethiopia was in short supply since it was wanted in many places.

Ato Aklilou expressed his appreciation for all of the help he had received and for the information about grant aid. He inquired when the decision on grant aid would be made, stating that he is prepared to stay in Washington and work out an agreement, at least in principle. He emphasized that he could not return to the Emperor now and say that the United States is trying to work something out—as that is what has been happening for the past six years. With regard to the misunderstanding on the price of equipment under Section 408(*e*), the Foreign Minister said this was due to information which he had received from our Embassy at Addis Ababa and he also claimed that the Embassy understood that installment payments such as he desired were possible. The Foreign Minister said that since then he has read the provisions of our legislation and that he now understands the requirements. However, in 1948, he gave us his oral assurance regarding Radio Marina, which had been carried out, therefore he was surprised at the terms we now want in our written agreements. On the matter of price, Aklilou said that he was not asking for a gift or a hand-out—all he wants is a political solution to the problem whereby Ethiopia can get assistance under section 202 of our Mutual Security Act.

Mr. Byroade informed the Foreign Minister that we hope to have a decision on grant aid in about two weeks, and emphasized that we are trying to get the *grant aid* which Aklilou desires. The Assistant Secretary expressed regret if anything said by the American Ambassador in Addis Ababa had caused a misunderstanding and wanted to make sure that there was no misunderstanding at this stage.

Foreign Minister Aklilou then cited some of the present difficulties Ethiopia experienced in paying for equipment, due to payments to the British resulting from the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, etc. He repeated his hope of receiving aid under Section 202 and stated he was willing to wait here for a decision in principle.

Mr. Byroade repeated that we must wait for the President's decision on the matter. He again emphasized that Ethiopia must pay something for military equipment received from the U.S.—that this would help to resolve all the matters under negotiation. He requested the Foreign

Minister to think this over and asked if, meanwhile, a priority list for reimbursable equipment could not be worked out between General Mulughetta and the Defense Department. Aklilou and Mulughetta agreed to do this.

611.75/5–153

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON] May 1, 1953.

Subject: Visit of Ethiopian Foreign Minister.

Participants: Ato Aklilou Abte Wolde, Ethiopian Foreign Minister.
Mr. Addimau Tesemma, Chargé d'Affaires, Ethiopian Embassy.
Mr. Byroade—NEA.
Mr. Utter—AF.

At his request, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister called on Mr. Byroade May 1, 1953.

After preliminary pleasantries, Ato Aklilou expressed his concern over the long delay in setting US-Ethiopian questions under discussion. He pointed out that he had been in the United States one month and a half and that his presence was urgently needed in Addis Ababa. However, he would of course not leave until the agreements were concluded, but sincerely hoped that this would be done before May 9th when Mr. Byroade would leave with Mr. Dulles on a trip through the Middle East.[2]

Mr. Byroade was confident everything could be settled within a week, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved military grant aid to Ethiopia, and he would personally expedite the final steps in obtaining the approval of Mr. Stassen and the President. Furthermore, Mr. Byroade understood that practically all of the differences in the Base Agreement had been ironed out and a final text was in preparation. Ato Aklilou expressed appreciation for Mr. Byroade's efforts in bringing these matters to a speedy conclusion.

He then inquired whether the Secretary had been able to revamp the itinerary of his trip to the Middle East and South Asia to include a visit to Ethiopia. Mr. Byroade replied that despite Mr. Dulles' desire to accept the Emperor's kind invitation, he would be unable to adjust his schedule to pass through Addis Ababa. Ato Aklilou said that he would notify the Emperor.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was initialed by Byroade.

[2] For documentation on the trip of Secretary of State Dulles to the Near and Middle East, see volume IX.

Reference was then made to an article appearing in the *New York Times* on April 27 indicating the possible nomination of Reverend Joseph Simonson as Ambassador to Ethiopia.[3] Mr. Byroade informed Ato Aklilou that this announcement was unofficial and premature and the decision in this matter was up to the President. Ato Aklilou expressed concern over the selection of a churchman as Ambassador to his country and anticipated a similar reaction on the part of the Emperor. He suggested that consideration be given to the appointment of a career Minister instead of a churchman. He mentioned possible opposition from the powerful Coptic Church in Ethiopia and his impression that the new Ambassador might act more as a missionary than a statesman. Mr. Byroade reassured him on this score and added that he understood Mr. Simonson was a man of very high calibre with legal training and well considered in political circles in this country.

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[3] Simonson was appointed Ambassador to Ethiopia on July 22, 1953 and presented his credentials on Oct. 6.

Editorial Note

On April 6, the Under Secretary of State requested the Department of Defense to concur in the request for grant military aid for Ethiopia (page 442). In a letter, dated May 8, the Department of Defense agreed. On May 8, the Department of State sent a letter to the Director for Mutual Security, recommending that the President be asked to determine that Ethiopia be made eligible for grant military assistance. The final paragraph of the letter read: "For maximum effect on the negotiation of our base rights agreement with Ethiopia it is important to obtain approval in principle of grant military aid before the Ethiopian Foreign Minister leaves Washington next week; therefore rapid action on our part is essential." A letter by the Acting Director for Mutual Security, dated May 12, transmitted to the Department of State a copy of a determination that Ethiopia was eligible for grant military assistance, which had been signed by the President that morning.

Following the President's finding that Ethiopia was eligible for grant aid, on May 22, the Under Secretary of State signed an agreement for the aid in the presence of the Ethiopian Foreign Minister. On the same day, the Under Secretary of State and the Ethiopian Foreign Minister signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State files 775.5 MSP and 711.56375A. For the text of the aid agreement, see TIAS No. 2787; 4 UST 421.

775.5 MSP/5–2153 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 21, 1953—6:33 p. m.

610. Re immediately preceding tel containing press release on mutual aid agreement.[2]

FYI. In addition above, Acting Secy and Aklilou will at same time on May 22 but in private sign base agreement [3] and exchange following notes: (1) Secret notes specifying installations and facilities granted us now under base agreement and possible US future requirements; (2) Confidential notes confirming that base agreement terminates and supersedes present *modus vivendi* US facilities arranged at time federation; and (3) Confidential note from us informing FonMin of types of equipment we are programming under grant military aid. No announcement of base agreement or notes will be made. This is both by preference Aklilou and because we wish avoid any obvious link between base and aid agreements. Base agreement (but not notes) will eventually be registered with UN,[4] as will mutual aid agreement.

Re third note above, this is maximum commitment on actual aid program we can put in writing. Aklilou aware that agreement in principle has been reached within US Govt on grant aid up to $5,000,000 and note indicates that original arms request (under reimbursable aid) being used as basis for programming grant aid.

Re military training desired by Ethiopians, JCS has decided that, in lieu training mission to which it had agreed before question grant aid arose, US military assistance advisory group to be sent to Ethiopia under grant aid program shld include appropriate number personnel for training function.

Base agreement considerably modified in form from one sent you after negotiations in December but major provisions substantially same. Principal change has been to provide in separate articles for rights and powers within installations, where we have virtually complete authority, and for those outside installations. Latter spelled out in some detail and number are subject to subsequent Ethiopian agreement, but wording is broad enough to permit us do all necessary for operation and control of installations. Provisions on jurisdiction and customs exemption retained intact.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Wellons and Root (AF) and cleared in the office of Cyr (AF).

[2] Telegram 609, May 21, not printed. It transmitted the text of a press release to be issued simultaneously from Washington and Addis Ababa after the signing of the mutual aid agreement on May 22. (775.5 MSP/5–2153) For the text of the press release, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1, 1953, p. 785.

[3] For the text of the base agreement, see TIAS No. 2964; 5 UST 749.

[4] A Department of State press release, dated May 28, 1954, stated that on that date the Secretary of State and Ethiopian Foreign Minister announced the United States was presenting the agreement for formal UN registration (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 7, 1954, p. 871).

Copies all documents being pouched.
Aklilou departing US for Addis (via Europe) May 23.

SMITH

Editorial Note

Telegram 112 to Addis Ababa, October 14, 1953, informed the Embassy that the President had approved a recommendation that Emperor Haile Selassie be invited to visit the United States in 1954 and suggested April or May for the visit. Addis Ababa telegram 148, October 19, reported that the Ambassador had personally extended the President's invitation to the Emperor. Documentation is in Department of State file 775.11.

775.5 MSP/5-454

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1954.

Subject: Military Aid to Ethiopia.

Participants: Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State
Ambassador Yilma Deressa, Ethiopian Embassy
John E. Utter, AF

At his request Ambassador Deressa called on Mr. Byroade for a general discussion regarding U.S. military aid to Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian Ambassador conveyed his Government's concern over the delay in the arrival of military equipment which was accorded to Ethiopia in pursuance of the agreement of May 22, 1953.[2] He expressed the hope that the shipments would be accelerated in order that the re-equipment of the Ethiopian Army might be effected as soon as possible. Mr. Byroade manifested some surprise at this state of affairs inasmuch as we had been given to understand by the Department of Defense that the program was being carried out in a satisfactory manner. Mr. Byroade informed Mr. Deressa that he would request full details from the Department of Defense and would inform him.[3]

Mr. Byroade took this occasion to hand to the Ambassador an *aide-*

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was initialed by Byroade.

[2] Regarding the agreements signed on May 22, 1953, see the editorial note, p. 449.

[3] On May 20, Utter gave Ambassador Deressa an *aide-mémoire* responding to this point. Information from the Department of Defense showed that the only items programmed for Ethiopia that had not been shipped were 12 artillery pieces, which were scheduled for shipment prior to January 1955. (775.5 MSP/5-2054)

mémoire in reply to the request for further assistance by the Ethiopian Government contained in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of January 29, 1954.[4] Mr. Byroade stated that we regretted very much not being able to give satisfaction to the Ethiopians at this time in regard to their request for aid in establishing a merchant marine and naval training school and airplanes with a supply of spare parts. Our *aide-mémoire*, he explained, gave in some detail the recommendations of the Department of Defense for the type of equipment and services which might be obtained on a reimbursable basis. Mr. Byroade said that world-wide demands on the United States made it imperative that we give priority to those countries most vulnerable to communist aggression, and Ethiopia did not fall in this category.

Mr. Deressa inquired whether long-term credit could be allowed on orders of this sort and was informed that immediate payment was usually required. He then wondered whether the military aid agreement signed last year was limited to the first annual amount of 5 million dollars or whether his Government could expect supplementary aid in the fulfillment of Ethiopian military requirements. It was pointed out to him that no amount nor period of time was stipulated in the agreement and the presence of MAAG in Ethiopia was an earnest of the United States continuing interest in the military needs of Ethiopia. It was suggested that the appropriate officials of the Imperial Ethiopian Government bring their views and requests to the Chief of the MAAG in Addis Ababa whose duty and responsibility it was to transmit requests and make recommendations to the Department of Defense.

The Ethiopian Ambassador pressed for our sympathetic consideration of the needs of Ethiopia and was told by Mr. Byroade that His Imperial Majesty could be assured that we always stood ready to study any Ethiopian requests. Mr. Byroade said he wished to emphasize, however, that United States friendship should not be measured by the amount of money we give to any particular country. He added that there were few nations in the world with whom we had such close and friendly ties as with Ethiopia.

Mr. Deressa thanked Mr. Byroade for the interest he had shown in the Ethiopian request and said that he would convey the text of our *aide-mémoire* to his Government. Mr. Deressa said that he wished to take this occasion to express his appreciation for everything the African Office and the Protocol Staff of the Department were doing to prepare for the visit of His Imperial Majesty.

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[4] Neither document is printed. The Ethiopian *aide-mémoire* of Jan. 29 stated that Ethiopia regarded the Red Sea coastline as a natural resource and also a responsibility. It requested help from the U.S. Navy, Merchant Marine, and Coast Guard in establishing a coast guard service and, eventually, a modest fleet of merchant vessels. It also requested help for Ethiopia's military air-training program. (775.5 MSP/4–653)

775.5 MSP/5-2754

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1954.[2]

Subject: Proposed Discussions regarding Ethiopian Problems.

Participants: Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister.
John Spencer, Adviser to the Ethiopian Government.
Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary.
John Utter, AF.

The Ethiopian Foreign Minister requested a short interview with Mr. Byroade to discuss questions of mutual interest to the US and Ethiopia. He informed Mr. Byroade that he would like to come to Washington at the end of the Emperor's trip around this country to discuss the following subjects among others which either we or he might wish to raise:

(1). The continuation of US military aid to Ethiopia through MAAG and pursuant to the Military Aid Agreement signed May 22, 1953.
(2). The promotion of US private investment in the development of Ethiopia.
(3). General problems covering our relations.

Ato Aklilou mentioned that the Emperor would like to have ten or 15 minutes serious conversation with the President after the dinner given at the Ethiopian Embassy in the evening. He also referred to Ethiopia's desire to obtain further loans from the World Bank to develop Ethiopia.

The visit was cut short as the Foreign Minister had to leave to attend a ceremony in honor of the Emperor at Howard University. Before Ato Aklilou left, however, Mr. Byroade assured him that he would be ready and happy to hold conversations at the end of June and beginning of July when the Foreign Minister could be in Washington for about ten days.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was initialed by Byroade.
[2] This conversation took place at 3:45 p.m.

Editorial Note

A May 15 press release by the Department of State announced that arrangements were being completed for the visit to Washington of Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, later that month (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 24, 1954, page 787). A memorandum by the Chief of Protocol to the Secretary of State, dated May 25, gave a detailed program of the Emperor's visit. He was expected to arrive on May 26, and a dinner was to be given by the President at the White House that evening. On May 27, the Secretary of State was giving a dinner in honor of the Emperor. On May 28, the Emperor was giving a dinner in honor of the President at the Ethiopian Embassy; and on May 29, after meeting with the President, the Emperor and his party were to leave for Princeton and New York. The Emperor's official visit was scheduled to end on June 3, when he planned to leave New York for Boston, the first stop on an unofficial tour of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. At the end of June, the Emperor planned to return to New York for a private visit of about 2 weeks, until his departure for Europe on July 14. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 775.11. The texts of statements made by the President and the Emperor at the White House dinner on May 26 and an address by the Emperor before a joint session of Congress on May 28 are printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 7, 1954, pages 867–870.

775.11/5–2954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 29, 1954.

Participants: Emperor Haile Selassie
President Eisenhower

At 10:00 A. M. on May 29, 1954, Emperor Haile Selassie called on President Eisenhower at the White House accompanied by his Foreign Minister and his Secretary Interpreter. Mr. Simmons of the State Department was present and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration joined the conference at the request of the President.

His Majesty, speaking through his interpreter, thanked the President for his reception in the United States, stated that he would have difficulty explaining to his own people the generosity and extended welcome, and then asked if he might mention a few items of official matters.

Upon the President's assent, His Majesty said he wanted to express appreciation of the aid that had been received, of the technical cooperation extended, of the arms that were being provided under the new agreement, and expressed the hope that this assistance would continue.

He expressed a particular interest in the expansion of private investment of American capital in Ethiopia, said that his country would welcome it, and that he wanted it to help in the economic and social development of his people.

He also specifically commented on the new ports which his country had through the Eritrea area, and stated these ports needed development and needed some ships to stand guard for order in that part of his empire.

He cited the Ethiopian airlines as a successful project and expressed the hope that this could be expanded.

He stated he would like to have his Foreign Minister come back to Washington at the close of the current journey to go into these matters with officials designated by the President in greater detail.

In response, the President stated that his officials would be pleased to talk further with the Foreign Minister about these matters at a future date. The President stated that sympathetic consideration would be given on a friendly basis to all these matters, that the President was, of course, making no commitments of a specific nature, but they could be sure of friendly consideration.

The President stated that there was private capital that would be interested in investment if a friendly climate to private investment was maintained. The President mentioned the problem in some parts of the world, of private capital being invested and then being taken away. He said he knew that Ethiopia would not take such steps, but would welcome and safeguard private capital. The President stated that he wanted His Majesty to know that he was complimented by His Majesty's visit to our country, that he looked to a future relationship of friendship; United States did not wish to dominate any country but to work with them as independent sovereign nations on a friendly basis.

His Majesty again thanked the President, stated that his Foreign Minister would return to Washington at a later date, and stated that the agreements between the two countries assured a basis for private capital investment and for friendship. The President stated he was pleased with His Majesty's emphasis upon the social and economic progress of his own people and that the United States was willing to continue to work with them in such a program of social and economic progress.

His Majesty asked if he could leave a memo as an *aide-mémoire* and the President said he would be pleased to accept it.[1]

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[1] A copy of the *aide-mémoire* has not been found in Department of State files. According to a statement by the Foreign Minister when he saw Byroade on June 15 (see footnote 2, *infra*), it asked that a meeting be arranged where various matters of concern to the two governments could be discussed.

611.75/6–2954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, North African Affairs (Wellons)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1954.[1]

Subject: Ethiopian Proposals for Further Discussions with the United States Government

Participants: Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Yilma Deressa, Ethiopian Ambassador
John Spencer, Senior Adviser to Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Ato Menassie Lemma, Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance
NEA—Mr. Byroade
AF—Messrs. Utter, Cyr, Wellons, & Longanecker
S/MSA—Mr. Frechtling
ED—Mr. Ross
FOA—Messrs. N. Paul & W. Moran
Army—Colonel Thomas Hannah

Mr. Byroade opened the meeting by noting that these talks were "discussions" and not "negotiations", and mentioned that this was a rather bad time for us because this was the end of the fiscal year and many officers had to appear before Congressional committees in connection with appropriations, etc., for next year. However, efforts were being made to arrange meetings for the Foreign Minister with Secretary Dulles and with Mr. Stassen.

In response to Mr. Byroade's request to explain the background of these talks for the benefit of all those present, Aklilou repeated, in large measure, the substance of the remarks he made in Mr. Byroade's office on June 15 (Memorandum of Conversation dated June 15).[2] The principal points made by the Foreign Minister were:

1. Ethiopia has for several years pursued a policy of collaboration with the United States, i.e., base rights agreement, export-import trade, etc. He now wants to crown the Emperor's trip to this country with some arrangements of mutual value.
2. If the U.S. wants more military facilities in Ethiopia, including air or naval bases, Ethiopia would be pleased to grant such facilities.
3. Most of the arms supplied to Ethiopia under the MDA Agreement of last year have been received. Ethiopia now needs more military equipment to make Ethiopian troops effective fighting units. In particular, they want to complete the equipment of one division of their Army with American equipment.

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[1] This conversation took place at 11 a.m.

[2] The memorandum of the June 15 conversation is not printed. The Foreign Minister and Byroade, along with members of their staffs, had a general discussion of the questions that were to be brought up in the more detailed discussions scheduled for June 29 and 30. (611.75/6–1554)

4. Ethiopia desires more U.S. investment. To attain this Ethiopia needs public services which are long term projects and which should be started now. Aklilou mentioned that he had seen a U.S. Government pamphlet regarding the type of guarantees American businessmen want in making foreign investments. He said that Ethiopia can meet these requirements, i.e., export of dollars, no danger of expropriation, etc., but desires U.S. advice on the size and length of concessions to be granted.

5. Ethiopia wishes to undertake certain development programs which can not be met by short term loans or private investment such as the development of the ports of Massawa and Assab and the acquisition of coast guard vessels. He remarked that the Ethiopian budget could not support such projects at this time and if they are not undertaken Ethiopia is at the mercy of Djibouti (and by implication—the French).

6. The Ethiopian Airlines is making a profit without Government subsidy. Competing airlines in the area are now introducing four engine turbo-jets. Unless EAL obtains new equipment a U.S. managed enterprise will be in jeopardy.

7. Ethiopia needs secondary roads which are essential to increase their exports, particularly coffee. His Government has been working with the Bureau of Public Roads on a long term program which can be justified on the basis of potential development. The Ethiopian Government wants to continue this relationship with the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads.

Mr. Byroade thanked the Foreign Minister for his expressions of U.S.-Ethiopian friendship and stated that we are always happy to deal with the Ethiopians who seem to come up with ideas similar to our own. He added that the U.S. believes in the future importance of Ethiopia—particularly in Africa—as an area of stability. It is good for Africa to have an example of a progressing, stable country so close at hand.

Mr. Byroade told the Foreign Minister that the answers which we give during these discussions will be cleared at the top-level in the U.S. Government on the basis of the utmost sympathy for Ethiopian desires and objectives. However, he said we may not be able to do all that we would like because what we do has to be considered in terms of our many other global commitments.

In response to a question raised by Mr. Byroade regarding the reason for developing Massawa and Assab, Ambassador Deressa explained that this was to avoid conflict with Aden and Djibouti—a tug of war with other countries—such as Ethiopia had experienced in the past. The Ambassador, in reply to a further question, indicated that Ethiopia feared that a request by them for a loan from the IBRD for the development of these ports would be blocked in the IBRD by the British and French. Mr. Byroade then remarked that this matter should be explored further. Aklilou mentioned also that this was a financing problem—that it would have to be long-term. John Spencer noted that the development needs of the ports would require considerable foreign exchange—about 80% of the total cost.

Mr. Byroade concluded this meeting by saying we would try to complete the discussions and have answers for the Ethiopians by the end of this week.

611.75/6-2954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, North African Affairs (Wellons)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1954.[1]

Subject: Ethiopian Proposals for Further Discussions with the United States Government

Participants: Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Yilma Deressa, Ethiopian Ambassador
John Spencer, Senior Adviser to Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Ato Menassie Lemma, Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance
AF—Messrs. Utter, Cyr, Wellons & Longanecker
ED—Messrs. E. Ross and C. Thompson
FOA—Messrs. N. Paul & W. Moran
Army—Colonel Thomas Hannah

Mr. Paul was Chairman of this meeting.

Mr. Paul opened the discussion with the comment that the FOA appropriations bill was now being considered in Congress and for this reason no definite commitments could be made at this time. He was pleased, however, at having this opportunity of discussing such development plans with the Ethiopians. The discussion followed the order of items in the position papers of the U.S. delegation.

1. *Private Investment.* It was stated that the policy of the United States was to encourage private investment abroad. This was true in the case of Ethiopia and a list of firms which had expressed an interest in that country had been drawn up. A copy of this list was given to the Foreign Minister and to Ambassador Deressa with the suggestion that the various firms be contacted.[2]

The planned Ethiopian exhibit in New York would undoubtedly be of great benefit in interesting American businessmen to undertake various enterprises in Ethiopia. Mr. Moran said that George Andrews (FOA technician advising the Ethiopian Ministry of Commerce and Industry) was ready to proceed with the exhibit and that it should begin next week. Aklilou said that he would try to find out if the Emperor would be able to open the exhibit.

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[1] This conversation took place at 3 p.m.

[2] No copy of this list has been found in Department of State files.

The United States is ready to send a team to Ethiopia to furnish expert advice on investment matters. (This was done in Turkey by Clarence Randall who drafted investment and tax laws to meet Turkish needs.) This matter should be discussed with the FOA Director in Ethiopia, Mr. Gordon, and if the Ethiopian Government should request such assistance FOA would consider it favorably. The Foreign Minister said that Ethiopia was interested in this assistance right now. Mr. Paul then replied that we would tell Mr. Gordon in Ethiopia to work this out as part of the over-all Ethiopian program.

Mr. Paul also stated that if the Ethiopians so desire we are prepared to send a team of management experts to advise on modern methods of production and marketing or a team to assist in the development of administrative skills, both in public and private fields.

With regard to an investment guarantee program, Mr. Paul noted that from experience in other countries the idea of having an intergovernmental guarantee agreement is very useful. American private investors are encouraged if there are such agreements. Mr. Paul urged that some such agreement be considered. This could be in the form of an exchange of notes. He then gave to Ambassador Deressa copies of such agreements between the U.S. and Japan, and the U.S. and Haiti. After these documents are studied Ambassador Deressa will discuss the matter further with FOA.

Mr. Paul mentioned also that a "double taxation" treaty would undoubtedly assist. In response to Deressa's question as to how this would operate, Mr. Thompson explained the details and gave to the Ambassador copies of such treaties which the U.S. has with the Netherlands and with Norway.

Mr. Spencer requested continued assistance in making contacts with U.S. investors and was told by Mr. Moran that this should be done through Mr. George Andrews. Mr. Utter mentioned that a Commercial Attaché at the Ethiopian Embassy here would be extremely useful in this connection.

2. *Coffee Program.* With regard to the coffee development program Mr. Moran said that FY 1955 funds are still being considered in Congress. In any event our aid in this field would be limited to technical assistance, i.e., demonstrating what could be done in special areas, or assistance of the type mentioned previously (production and marketing specialists, etc.).

3. *Fishing Industry.* After remarking that the U.S. recognizes the advantages to be gained by the Eritrean and Ethiopian economies through the development of a fishing industry, Mr. Paul stated that it is premature to discuss a long-term loan of $2,500,000 for its development as we would have to know more about the potential of a fishing industry there. Mr. Lemma stated that at present exports from the fisheries amount to about £900,000 annually and that the

potential is much greater. The FOA and the British Administration in Eritrea (prior to federation) both prepared promising reports on this industry. It was agreed that these reports would be obtained and studied and that FOA would seek to have representatives of U.S. fisheries visit the Ethiopian exhibit in New York.

4. *Expansion of Education.* Mr. Paul stated that the U.S. is interested in assisting Ethiopia expand its educational program through additional technical assistance and that this matter should be pursued through the FOA Director in Ethiopia. Mr. Moran commented that the U.S. desires particularly to help in the development of Ethiopian technical institutions and teacher training colleges and in the training of personnel to staff these institutions. Deressa agreed with this in principle but explained that there was also a great need for on-the-job training in the U.S. for such positions as airplane mechanics, etc., until such time as Ethiopia has facilities for the training of such personnel.

The Foreign Minister then inquired whether it would be possible to train about 100 young people in the United States. He would like to have a summary of just what could be done. This year some 180 Ethiopian students will return with AB degrees—many of whom wish to continue with higher studies. It was agreed that a summary of the possibilities under the Fulbright Program, the exchange of students program and FOA would be prepared. Mr. Lemma said that there remained about $50,000 in the Surplus Property Settlement Account in Ethiopia which could be used for Fulbright scholarships. Mr. Moran mentioned that a check would be made also to ascertain whether scholarships could be obtained through private foundations, such as Ford and Rockefeller.

Mr. Moran noted that the FOA program is made up in Addis and that if the Ethiopian Government wished to put more money into the education program and limit the coffee development program this could be worked out. The Foreign Minister replied that Ethiopia does not wish to change existing programs for coffee or education and inquired whether he could tell His Imperial Majesty whether the U.S. will augment or continue on the same basis. Mr. Paul replied that FOA had requested $2.2 million for use in Ethiopia for FY 1955 but since the matter is still pending in Congress we are unable to say what the final figure will be. In any event this is a planning figure and is not frozen.

5. *Medical Center.* Mr. Paul stated the U.S. was interested in assisting Ethiopia in a health program but does not recommend the establishment of a $10 million medical center at this time. (See U.S. Position Paper on this subject for complete details.)[3] The Foreign Minister said that it was his Government's opinion that a national

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[3] Not printed.

medical center was needed to promote confidence in doctors, etc. The figure of $10 million was not firm—it could be much less in order to get it started. It is possible that $1 million would be sufficient. He likewise noted that they want to increase the number of clinics being established in various parts of the country. Ethiopia needs specialists in all diseases and said that the country could become a center for medical study for East Africa as is done in Beirut for the Near East.

It was recalled that Ambassador Simonson had mentioned the idea of a medical center in Ethiopia to the Rockefeller Foundation which said that it might give the matter some study. Mr. Paul said that we would discuss this matter further but that there were no present prospects of U.S. Government assistance.

Then the meeting was concluded.

611.75/6-3054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, North African Affairs (Wellons)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1954.[1]

Subject: Ethiopian Proposals for Further Discussions with the United States Government

Participants: Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Yilma Deressa, Ethiopian Ambassador
John Spencer, Senior Adviser to Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Ato Menassie Lemma, Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance
AF—Messrs. Utter, Cyr, Wellons and Longanecker
ED—Mr. Ross
S/MSA—Mr. Frechtling
Treasury—Mr. Bean
FOA—Mr. Moran
Army—Colonel Thomas Hannah

Mr. Utter was Chairman of this meeting.

Mr. Utter opened the meeting by expressing the hope that the Foreign Minister understands that if the United States position seems negative that it is not the end of the story; that our Government works slowly and is complicated. He explained that this is not a "brush-off", as we are giving the Ethiopian requests serious consideration.

The Foreign Minister commented that the discussions of yesterday created the impression in his mind that projects, or even further talks, were to be held up pending investigations by Marc Gordon in Addis. His Government had talked with Gordon and knows his position. He had hoped, therefore, to receive an agreement in principle at this time. Mr. Utter pointed out that our understanding of the total problem has been aided by the Ethiopian presentation but that the projects have to be worked out and implemented by Mr. Gordon. Mr. Moran expressed agreement with Mr. Utter's remarks but also stated that we should try to agree in principle now on what could be done.

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[1] This conversation took place at 10 a.m.

1. *Port Development.* With regard to the development of the ports, Mr. Utter inquired why so much emphasis was being placed on Assab, noting that perhaps Massawa might prove better and he also noted the existence of Djibouti as a good, available port. Mr. Utter mentioned that generally port development loans are handled by the IBRD, and inquired why the Ethiopians had not taken this up with the Bank. He also asked for the Foreign Minister's views on getting the French to reduce the rates on the Franco-Ethiopian Railway.

Ato Aklilou replied that Mr. Lemma would discuss the first matter, i.e., Massawa vs. Assab. As to why they did not go to the IBRD, he said that question was answered yesterday—namely, that they feared the British and French would block the loan application. As to why greater reliance was not placed on Djibouti, the Foreign Minister reviewed some 50 years of history and pointed out the fact that Ethiopia had just obtained Eritrea and its ports. He expressed astonishment at the suggestion that Ethiopia rely on Djibouti because Ethiopia had been subjected to French control of its commerce for 50 years. He feared that this suggestion indicates that the Ethiopians expected too much from the Emperor's talks with the President.

In 1945 Ethiopia considered taking over the railroad and operating it with Americans—the J. G. White Company (this idea had been suggested by President Roosevelt). The State Department, however, opposed the idea and said that the United States and the French should not be played off against each other. Aklilou stated that he objected strongly to the Secretary of State on this matter at the time. He felt that Ethiopia was forced to give the Railroad back to the French, but he said they did so on interim conditions only.

The Foreign Minister continued that actually all three ports are needed to serve different areas of Ethiopia and that he could speak for hours on the difficulties that have been experienced with the French. The present use of Assab has been the only factor which has forced the French to reduce the Railroad rates. The Railroad has the highest rates of any in the world. He cited the fact that it cost $35 more to transport an airplane engine from Djibouti to Addis than from San Francisco to Djibouti by sea.

Mr. Utter suggested that perhaps the United States could speak to the French about reducing the rates. Aklilou said that he has discussed this problem with the French at the highest levels but to no avail. He inquired if the French listened to us on other matters. Mr. Utter thanked the Foreign Minister for his explanation.

The matter of developing Assab was then taken up in considerable detail by the Vice Minister of Finance. He cited the fact that the number of ships visiting Assab has increased 30%—tonnage-wise there has been an increase of some 80,000 tons. Ships do not like to visit Massawa for various reasons: (1) because of the difficult channel it takes about one full day to put in at Massawa (dredging the harbor would provide sufficient improvement for the next five years); and (2) it is farther from the regular shipping lanes than Assab or Djibouti necessitating additional time losses. Assab, however, is closer to the shipping lanes. Ships are willing to put in there for cargoes of only £200 whereas they refuse to stop at Massawa for less than £1000 items. Likewise, it is closer to the producing areas of Ethiopia. Since the Federation, traffic at Assab has increased 125%, in spite of the very poor port facilities. By contrast, Lemma said use of Djibouti presents many complications. The port dues are excessive. The service is poor. The currency is based on the United States dollar, perhaps to drain off US dollars earned by the Ethiopians. Mr. Lemma also stated that there are double customs duties (presumably port fees and handling charges) and said that on the last shipment of United States arms the Djibouti authorities asked port dues amounting to 12,000,000 Djibouti francs and it was only after considerable argument on the part of the Ethiopians that this was reduced to 2,000,000 francs. With regard to the railroad serving Addis to the port, the Vice Minister said that although the rates have been reduced it is still much cheaper to ship goods by railway. On the last shipment of 800 tons of United States arms the Railroad offered to transport it at $70 per ton while the trucking establishments offered $45 per ton. In general, the Ethiopian Government has to argue with the French for months in order to obtain special treatment. Small merchants, however, are unable to do this and consequently must pay the exhorbitant charges. In addition, the Railroad is obsolete. For these and other reasons the existence of the Railroad is not a good argument to direct trade through Ethiopia.

Ambassador Deressa injected that the Railroad's charges vary with the value of the goods. Thus if the price of coffee goes up in New York the Railroad's transportation rates likewise increase. Therefore, the profit to Ethiopia is drained away by French taxes. Terming Djibouti a "free port" is mendacious because of the high handling charges.

In response to Mr. Wellons' question regarding the possible extension of the Railroad, Deressa said that if this is done it will be built and owned by the Ethiopian Government and would be primarily to serve agricultural and timber producing regions.

Mr. Lemma added that one pier was wanted for Assab. The Treasury representative then asked if this was all that was included in the $12,000,000 they were asking for. Lemma replied that this amount covered the main pier, an additional pier and a breakwater.

Mr. Ross stated that since the development of Assab by either the United States or the IBRD runs into political difficulties with the French, could the Ethiopians finance its development and find other projects for United States or international financing. Aklilou replied that he did not see how this could cause political embarrassment since the United States had supported the Federation and the return of the ports to Ethiopia. How and why can France oppose another country's developing its ports and resources? He said that on this point he wanted to talk to Byroade or other higher officials.

Mr. Utter stated that this discussion shows the importance and the complications of this subject and the need for additional study before we can give a final answer. Aklilou said that he wants to reach an agreement in principle. The Ethiopians presented their case for their needs in connection with Assab and the approximate cost. The actual cost could be determined later but the Ethiopians need to know now "in principle". He said that there is no need for a "study" which might take years. He added that yesterday he had telephoned him and told him that Byroade had said we would try to get answers "in principle" this week. Now he is concerned by the emphasis on "study".

In reply to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Utter made the point that the matter of principle involves money. The discussions have shown that many new salient factors have to be considered by the United States Government. These discussions have been useful but it takes time to work things out. In our democratic government it takes time; perhaps in other forms of government decisions can be made sooner.

Aklilou repeated that he wanted an answer in principle now. Perhaps he should submit it to higher officers for an answer. He asked, what is the advantage if the United States say go to the French or go to the IBRD.

In response Mr. Utter inquired just what he wanted, a commitment? Does the Foreign Minister want a statement that the United States would loan so much if the requirements of United States enabling legislation were met? This would not mean much until the facts of the case were developed.

Mr. Cyr then summed up the situation: (1) Can the United States give Ethiopia an agreement in principle; (2) The facts supporting the case should be developed including Ethiopia's ability to pay off a loan, etc. over the years. Because of the difficulties involved, further discussion of this item was postponed.

2. *Coast Guard Vessels.* Mr. Utter reported that the United States Navy does not have any coast guard vessels either for grant or for transfer. Certain types of vessels are available for purchase. A list of

these vessels has already been made available to the Ethiopian Government.

In this connection the Foreign Minister mentioned that when the Emperor was in San Francisco he saw anchored in San Francisco Bay a large number of ships which were not being used. Mr. Utter explained that these ships were in the United States "mothball fleet" and that they were largely old World War II ships which are being retained in this status as an emergency measure. They are not available for sale or transfer and even if they were they would require considerable costly rehabilitation. Mr. Utter mentioned that he had discussed this with the Emperor at the time the party visited San Francisco.

3. *Development of Ethiopian Highways.* Mr. Utter pointed out that the present highway program in Ethiopia is based on a loan obtained from the International Bank. Therefore, it was the view of our economic experts that the normal thing for the Ethiopian Government to do would be to approach the International Bank for another loan. Mr. Utter indicated that in recent months and weeks we have been in touch with the International Bank and the Bureau of Public Roads on their program in Ethiopia. From these contacts it seemed to us that the IBRD would consider such a loan application favorably.

Aklilou referred to previous discussions on this matter and explained that a large percentage of the cost of the highway program would be for local currency requirements. In the past the International Bank had not been willing to make loans for their local currency requirements. Since their total development program required such large expenditures Aklilou was hopeful the United States Government could assist on this matter. In reply, Mr. Ross of ED explained after some length that on such matters the International Bank was in a position to be more flexible than the Export-Import Bank. In fact, the Export-Import Bank is prohibited from making loans for local currency purposes. He indicated, however, that under certain circumstances the IBRD might be able to do this. Therefore the entire project should be taken up in further discussions with the IBRD.

Mr. Lemma presented a memorandum giving the Ethiopian answers to questions which had been raised with him in a discussion on June 22.[2] He explained some of these answers and in particular made it clear that the total highway program contemplated by the Ethiopian Government was for much more than the $45 million requested in their memorandum. In response to questions by Mr. Moran and Mr. Wellons, Mr. Lemma said the Ethiopian Government plans to spend at least 8 million Ethiopian dollars a year in addition to the foreign loan they hope to obtain. Mr. Moran pointed out that on this basis over a period of 20 years the Ethiopians would be contributing some 60 million United States dollars which would be significantly more than the amount they are requesting in a foreign loan. On this basis he thought the IBRD might be willing to give their application sympathetic consideration. Although Mr. Lemma and Ambassador Deressa questioned whether the Bank would in fact consider a loan of this magnitude, Mr. Utter reminded them that the United States position is that the Ethiopian Government should approach the IBRD directly.

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[2] Not printed.

In discussing this further it became evident that Aklilou was worried about the conditions which the Bank might impose on such a loan. He went on to emphasize that their desire is to continue the Imperial Highway Authority. In response to questions about the large sums devoted to maintenance, the Ethiopians emphasized the high cost of maintenance in Ethiopia where even the best highways are often washed out during the rainy season.

In further explanation of the United States position, Mr. Moran emphasized that if the Ethiopians think the IBRD terms are onerous then they would find the Export-Import Bank's conditions even more onerous. Furthermore, FOA has no money for such purposes and in any event could not consider giving a loan for a program of such magnitude or duration. He also pointed out as a policy matter that the United States tried to avoid conflict or competition between the IBRD, the Export-Import Bank and agencies of the United States Government. Therefore Mr. Utter concluded the Ethiopian Government should approach the IBRD.

4. *Commercial Aviation Equipment.* Mr. Utter began the discussion by indicating that Ethiopia's desire to have new planes for the Ethiopian Airlines was considered reasonable by our aviation experts. In order to obtain a loan for the purchase of such aircraft the Ethiopian Government should approach the Export-Import Bank. Mr. Utter mentioned that this had been done previously when Convair aircraft had been purchased by the Ethiopian Airlines. Since most of that loan had been paid he thought the chances were very good that the Export-Import Bank would consider a new loan. Mr. Ross explained the procedure further by pointing out that the Export-Import Bank grants a loan of up to 75 or 80 percent of the value of the plane and that the manufacturer usually meets a large part of the remainder of the cost. Ambassador Deressa asked if the Export-Import Bank would grant a large loan for a long period of time. Mr. Ross indicated that the length of the loan usually covered the expected life of the airplane which is about five years.

Aklilou acknowledged that the Ethiopian Government could talk to the Export-Import Bank but he wanted to know whether, in principle, the United States Government is in favor of the project. Mr. Utter replied that the State Department could say yes to this question provided, of course, that the Ethiopian Government would meet the requirements of the Export-Import Bank (Mr. Spencer and the Ethiopians seemed to take this as virtually a commitment on the part of the Department). Mr. Ross said that officials of the Department had discussed the matter with the Export-Import Bank and that it is ready to consider a loan application. However, he emphasized, that it is a separate United States agency which operates as a bank and that its officials think and act like bankers. Therefore the requirements of the Bank would have to be met in order to obtain a loan. Mr. Cyr and Mr. Ross felt it necessary in the light of the discussion to emphasize that the length of such a loan would in no case be longer than the life of the aircraft purchased.

In conclusion Aklilou asked once again if the State Department supported the idea and Mr. Utter replied yes if the conditions demanded by the Bank are met by the Ethiopian Government.

Thereupon the meeting was concluded.

611.75/6-3054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, North African Affairs (Wellons)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1954.[1]

Subject: Ethiopian Proposals for Further Discussions with the United States Government

Participants: Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister
John Spencer, Senior Adviser to Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Ato Menassie Lemma, Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance
AF—Messrs. Utter, Cyr, Wellons & Longanecker
NEA—Mr. Ben Dixon
S/AE—Mr. Bruce Hamilton (left after first item discussed)
ED—Mr. Ross
FOA—Mr. W. Moran
Army—Colonel Thomas Hannah

Mr. Utter was Chairman of this meeting.

In going over the agenda for this afternoon's meeting, Mr. Utter stated that item 3 on arms shipments would have to be postponed. He explained that the Department, and Mr. Byroade in particular, is pursuing this matter with the Department of Defense and therefore the U.S. delegation is not yet in a position to discuss it with the Ethiopian Foreign Minister.

1. *Uranium Prospecting*. Mr. Utter introduced Mr. Bruce Hamilton

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[1] This conversation took place at 3 p.m.

and explained that he had been in contact with the Atomic Energy Commission in regard to the Ethiopian request for uranium prospecting. Mr. Utter said that the Atomic Energy Commission is in a position to assist in this matter and that they can send a uranium geologist to Ethiopia early in the fall, probably by October. Mr. Hamilton explained what we would do at greater length, pointing out that initially one geologist with all the necessary equipment would be sent to Ethiopia. This geologist might need some help locally which it was agreed that U.S. agencies and the Ethiopian Government could provide. This initial reconnaissance by the geologist would take only a few weeks and his report would determine whether further prospecting would be desirable. In response to a question, Mr. Hamilton said that they would appreciate receiving all the information available to the Ethiopian Government on geological formations which might include uranium. Aklilou and Spencer indicated acceptance of the U.S. offer.

2. *U.S. Military Requirements in Ethiopia.* Mr. Utter expressed the views in the position paper:[2] namely, that the U.S. appreciates the Ethiopian offer; that the U.S. military have noted Ethiopia's strategic position, and that after recent study the U.S. military authorities have no immediate military requirements for their facilities in Ethiopia. However, Mr. Utter added the U.S. Government will certainly consider their generous offer if such needs should arise in the future. Mr. Spencer asked if this applied specifically to air and naval bases and Mr. Utter assured him that we have no plans in regard to either. The Foreign Minister noted this exchange of views without comment.

3. *Military Aircraft Training Equipment.* Mr. Utter explained the U.S. position that no MDAP funds are available which could be used to provide training planes or training for Ethiopian pilots in the United States. He did recall, however, that in response to a request from the Ethiopian Ambassador several months ago the Department had provided information in regard to several types of training planes which the Ethiopians could purchase. He recalled that one plane, the Fletcher, seemed particularly desirable and relatively cheap. Furthermore, if purchased in quantities of 10, the Fletcher Company would provide a technician to service the planes and instruct the Ethiopians on its maintenance.

In reply Aklilou made no particular comment on this last point but did reiterate the Ethiopian desire to have their aircraft training continued with the use of American equipment and in the English language.

Mr. Utter reviewed the total situation and pointed out that no future meetings could be held until Friday.[8] In the interval he asked if the Ethiopians would like to arrange to see the Export-Import Bank in regard to a loan for the purchase of aircraft for the Ethiopian Airlines. Aklilou said that the Ethiopian memorandum had been presented to the U.S. Government on instructions of the Emperor. He regarded each of these items as part of a whole program which he would not wish to consider separately until after further discussions with the Emperor. Therefore, he would have to inform the Emperor of the total progress, or lack of progress, being made in the conversations before proceeding on such a matter of detail as having discussions with the Export-Import Bank.

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[2] Not printed.

Thereupon Mr. Utter concluded the meeting.

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[8] July 2.

775.5 MSP/7-254

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1954.

Subject: Ethiopian Requests for Aid.

Participants: Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister
John Spencer, Adviser to the Ethiopian Government
Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary
John E. Utter, AF

After the US-Ethiopian conversations held on June 28–29,[2] Ato Aklilou asked to speak to Mr. Byroade, and this interview was sandwiched in between talks which he had with Mr. Stassen[3] and the Secretary.

Ato Aklilou registered his disappointment at the generally negative answers to the Ethiopian requests for economic, military and technical aid. He singled out particularly his consternation and chagrin at the mere suggestion by the American officials at the meetings that the use of the French port of Djibouti might be more economical for Ethiopia, after obtaining better arrangements from the French, then for the Ethiopian Government to embark on a costly outlay for rehabilitating and expanding the ports of Assab and Massawa. He said that the Emperor, on hearing of our attitude, (which apparently was grossly misrepresented) had been deeply depressed and had been on the point of leaving the country immediately without awaiting the outcome of final talks on July 7th. Ato Aklilou proceeded to reiterate the political and economic reasons which made it impossible for the Ethiopians to entertain any wish or hope of arriving at satisfactory terms with the French either on the Franco-Ethiopian Railway or the Port of Djibouti. Even without American assistance Ethiopia was determined to go forward with the development of the outlets to the sea which had been granted them by the U.N. with the full support of the U.S. and France.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was initialed by Byroade.

[2] Presumably this is a reference to the talks of June 29–30; see the memoranda of conversation, pp. 456–469. No record of conversations on June 28 has been found in Department of State files.

[3] No record of a conversation with Stassen has been found in Department of State files.

Mr. Byroade remarked that on a previous occasion a few weeks ago, he had been under the impression that Ato Aklilou understood that the present talks should be in no way tied to the Emperor's visit to the U.S. The Imperial trip, Mr. Byroade continued, had been an outstanding success and it would be too bad to have the Emperor's evident pleasure at the ovation he received throughout the country marred by disgruntlement at not receiving satisfaction in requests which he put forward to the U.S. Government. Mr. Byroade concluded that he would certainly be inclined to oppose in the future the visit of any chief of state in his area until it was clearly understood that the visit was only for good-will—and entailed no requests for help.

Ato Aklilou said that he understood this principle but that after all the proposals he had set forth were of long standing and he would have taken them up whether or not the Emperor had come. He added that the Emperor would not depart before hearing the outcome of the final discussion on July 7th, which it was agreed would take place in the afternoon.

775.5 MSP/7-254

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1954.

Subject: Ethiopian Requests for Aid.

Participants: The Secretary
Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Yilma Deressa, Ethiopian Ambassador
John E. Utter—AF

Aklilou and the Secretary remarked on the great success of the

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[1] A memorandum by Byroade to the Secretary, dated July 1, listed a number of possible topics for his conversation with the Ethiopian Foreign Minister at the meeting scheduled for 5:30 p. m. on July 2. The memorandum suggested that the Secretary reiterate the President's assurance of May 29 to the Emperor, that sympathetic consideration would be given to proposals made by the Emperor, and that such consideration would not be influenced by pro-colonial considerations. (611.75/7-154)

Emperor's trip to the United States. The Foreign Minister also reported that His Imperial Majesty had just left the Presbyterian Hospital in New York where a check-up revealed him in good health.

Ato Aklilou then made a long exposé of the requests which had been made originally in a memorandum left by His Imperial Majesty with the President. He summarized the different proposals: (1) Loans for improvement of ports, highways and aviation for Ethiopia's expanding economy. (2) Encouragement of American private investment in Ethiopia. (3) Assistance in education and (4) military aid in fulfillment of the U.S.-Ethiopian agreement of May 1953. Ato Aklilou stated that the President had assured the Emperor that the proposals would be given sympathetic consideration. Mr. Byroade had also given him encouragement.

During the last few days, discussions in the Department, with representatives of the FOA and Defense present, had resulted in rather negative answers to all of the requests. In particular Ato Aklilou expressed his chagrin that the French port of Djibouti had been suggested as a possible substitute for the refitting of the ports of Assab and Massawa since there were such obvious political implications involved. The Secretary suggested that perhaps the reason for this was that our economists looked at this without taking into account any political significance.

Ato Aklilou went on to say that His Imperial Majesty had been particularly depressed by this indication of the apparent policy of the U.S. to give support to colonial powers rather than to a friend like Ethiopia. The Secretary made it abundantly clear that the U.S. would not be in any way influenced by any pro-colonial considerations with regard to Ethiopia's intentions to build up its own outlets to the sea. He stated that French policy of colonialism elsewhere, particularly in Indo-China, had been a great disappointment and the Ethiopians should not be under the impression that the U.S. would be swayed by any considerations favorable to building up French colonialism in East Africa.

Aklilou requested the Secretary to give instructions that a decision at least "in principle" be given to the eleven proposals submitted by the Ethiopian Government. The Secretary recalled that at the time of the writing of the Treaty of Versailles the French had agreed to do many things "en principa"—which proved later to be completely disregarded. He therefore preferred to have concrete and definite answers to the Ethiopian requests even if this took a longer time to obtain.

775.5 MSP/7–754

Memorandum of Conversation, by John Root, Office of African Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1954.

Subject: Ethiopian Proposals for Further Discussions with the United States Government

Participants: Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Mr. Byroade, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Yilma Deressa, Ethiopian Ambassador
John Spencer, Senior Adviser to Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Ato Menassie Lemma, Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance
AF—Messrs. Utter, Cyr, Root
ED—Mr. Ross
S/MSA—Mr. Frechtling
Treasury—Mr. Bean
FOA—Messrs. Paul and Moran
Army—Colonel Thomas Hannah

Mr. Byroade expressed his appreciation for the Foreign Minister's change of plans, which had provided a worthwhile additional period to work on the problems with which these conversations were concerned. He hoped the Foreign Minister now understood a little bit better the complicated nature of the US Government. Nothing would have given greater pleasure to Mr. Byroade, to the Secretary of State, to the President himself, to be in a position to satisfy the Ethiopian needs. We had no doubts about the potentialities of a program of aid to the Ethiopian Government. Unfortunately, not even the President himself can act without legislative authority. What we have suggested is in the opinion of all interested American officials the best we can do. The US has many commitments throughout the world and Congress is imposing increasingly stringent conditions and procedures with regard to foreign assistance. When we refer to the possibility of help from lending agencies—governmental, private, international—it is simply because they are the only means for help available. We have given the best response possible and where there is any prospect of help we are continuing to study the case.

Mr. Byroade wished to express the great appreciation of the US Government for the Ethiopian offer of additional military facilities. This offer had been made known at the highest levels and, while at this particular time we had no additional needs, we were certainly gratified to be able to keep such an offer in mind.

With respect to most of the other items under discussion, we had prepared a written memorandum of our replies. Mr. Byroade would touch only lightly on these answers for the details were there for the Foreign Minister to read.

(Mr. Byroade then reviewed the memorandum item by item.[1] Such significant discussion as developed is recorded below.)

Mr. Paul said it would be helpful to know as soon as possible whether the Ethiopian Government wished to adhere to the Investment Guarantee Program. Ato Aklilou said the matter had been considered and he was prepared to reply immediately in the affirmative. The preliminaries of an agreement could be discussed in Washington with the Ethiopian Ambassador and final steps taken by the Foreign Ministry in Addis Ababa.

Mr. Byroade expressed regret for the misunderstanding which had arisen over the question of port development. He hoped that the Foreign Minister's conversation with the Secretary of State had cleared up this misunderstanding. Mr. Byroade wanted to be very certain that the Emperor clearly understood the American position. We very well appreciated Ethiopia's desire to develop its ports. It was a legitimate desire. Ethiopia could put out of its mind any fear that our relations with another country would be a factor preventing the US from being of assistance. Naturally, at this stage in world affairs, we are not looking for any further problems with our allies. But at the same time we are fully aware of the Ethiopian position and will not let the political relations with a third country* interfere with our own decision on the matter. There are no grant funds now available and the only type of assistance we can see would be on a loan basis. However, loans must be justified economically and the economic case for a loan had not yet been made. While the economic potential in port development may not be the primary consideration in Ethiopia's mind, loans are not made on any other basis. It is for this reason that the US has suggested, as a necessary first step, an economic analysis of the port problem. Mr. Stassen has indicated FOA's willingness to help in providing the engineer or experts necessary for this purpose. Once the analysis is made, we are quite willing to support Ethiopia's application for loans on the basis of the analysis. The political problem will not be a factor in our attitude. The Ethiopians can put out of their minds the fear of any political inhibitions on our part. Mr. Byroade wanted to be quite sure the Emperor had no misunderstanding on this score.

In discussing the highway problem, Mr. Byroade said that a long-term loan from the US Government for this purpose was an impossibility. The Export-Import Bank was simply not designed to be of help in this particular respect. He could not speak, of course, for the International Bank but it had indicated its willingness to extend its present program in Ethiopia. It might even be in a position to help with some of the local currency costs. The US of course is willing to help as it can but since the road program has already been started in cooperation with the IBRD it seemed only logical to us that the relationship should continue.

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[1] The memorandum is not printed.

*Mr. Byroade later mentioned France specifically by name. [Footnote in the source text.]

In the field of aviation we understood Ethiopia's desire to remain competitive in its part of the world. The Export-Import Bank was ready in principle to help with further loans and the Ethiopian Government's approach should therefore be to the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. Byroade said that he hoped our offer of assistance in the field of education would be as gratifying to the Foreign Minister as it was to him. Mr. Stassen was impressed, as were we all, by the Emperor's interest in this particular phase and had been able to take unprecedented action in responding to the Ethiopian request. Through the FOA, 50 four-year scholarships for Ethiopian students prepared for college entrance and 100 one-year scholarships for specialized or "on the job" training would be made available to Ethiopian students. In addition, there was a possibility of other assistance as outlined in the memorandum.

Mr. Byroade explained to the Foreign Minister that the question of military assistance—which comprised the matters of matériel for the Ethiopian Army, coast guard patrol facilities and aircraft training—had received exhaustive consideration and Mr. Byroade himself had hoped up to the last minute that the prolonging of the conversations would enable us to give a definitive answer. But Mr. Byroade was now thoroughly convinced that it was truly legally impossible to make a specific commitment. Unspent funds in the fiscal year ending June 30 last had lapsed and would not be available until reappropriated by Congress. Nor would any funds for the new fiscal year be available until Congress had acted on pending legislation. No specific commitments—either to Ethiopia or to any other nation—could be made at this moment.

But it was possible to inform the Foreign Minister that it is our firm intention to provide further military assistance to Ethiopia. This desire and firm intention is subject only to the action of Congress, but that was true for any prospective assistance to anyone at this time. It is certainly likely that we can in fact be of assistance to Ethiopia in the military field. We would like to meet at least part of the requirements Ethiopia has submitted for its Army. We want our Military Assistance Advisory Group to continue to be an effective instrumentality. Our Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement is certainly not for one year only, without any follow-through on the program under way. We cannot say specifically what will follow but we can emphasize our firm intention to follow through.

Mr. Byroade said we were also sympathetic to Ethiopian needs for coast guard patrol facilities. This again depends in the same way as Army matériel on funds yet to be appropriated. We cannot make a specific commitment but both the Army and naval sides of the Ethiopian requirements are under active and sympathetic consideration. We will act as soon as it is legally possible to do so. We cannot tell just when Congress will finish its work. Some further time is then required for administrative adjustments by the Executive Branch of the United States Government. Here the question involved is what other program to reduce, since there is no specific provision in the budget for Ethiopia. But these are technical details and Mr. Byroade felt he could be quite encouraging about the outcome.

With regard to aircraft training, Mr. Byroade stated that he could not be quite so optimistic. Nevertheless, this matter too is under active consideration.

Mr. Byroade concluded by saying that of course it must be understood that all assistance in the future depended on action by Congress. He had mentioned that point specifically in connection with military assistance only because of our desire to give a specific commitment, and our inability to do so because of the legal impediment.

The Ethiopian Foreign Minister then embarked on a long extemporaneous statement in reply to Mr. Byrcade's presentation. He first emphasized his sincere gratitude for the offer in the field of education. This was a matter very close to the Emperor's heart and he knew that His Imperial Majesty would be pleased to learn of the United States offer. The remainder of the US memorandum, said the Foreign Minister, would require detailed study and he would only attempt now to make certain preliminary observations. He could not fail to conceal his disappointment with our reply to all other questions. It would have been better for the US to have said at the outset that it could not help. It would be hard now to explain the US position to the Emperor, who had been led to believe by the President's response and the attention we had given in several meetings to the Ethiopian requests that the US was interested in Ethiopia's economic development. It seemed to the Foreign Minister, however, that our reply was in essence the reply of "fin de non recevoir" (a flat refusal to proceed further with the matter). We had talked about the need for further study. What further study, asked the Foreign Minister? For the ports, military assistance, etc., it seemed to him that ample information was available.

The military question, continued the Foreign Minister, was different from the other questions since the basis for such assistance had already been established. The two agreements, which the US and Ethiopia had signed last year, one on base rights and the other on mutual defense assistance (MSA), were in Ethiopia's mind interdependent. The military agreement provided for a continuing relationship and Ethiopia has assumed the same [to be] true of the Mutual Defense Assistance

Agreement. Was Ethiopia now to find out that the latter agreement was good for only one year? We had said there were no funds but when he looked at the available figures on Congressional appropriations it seemed to him that there were ample sources from which these relatively small sums required for Ethiopia could be drawn. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff now seemed to be deciding, however, that Ethiopia was not in a strategic area and was not important to American security. This seemed contrary to the basis on which the base and aid agreements of last year had been formulated.

With regard to ports our references to Djibouti had caused great consternation on the Ethiopian side. The explanations given by the Secretary and Mr. Byroade would help to alleviate the unfortunate impression which these references had made. Nevertheless, we were still saying that the justification of port development depended upon further study, whereas we had supported the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in the United Nations to a large extent because we recognized Ethiopia's legitimate need for access to the Red Sea.

We had asked the Foreign Minister to try to understand the system of the American Government. He thought he and the Emperor had considerable experience in the way this system worked. For example, the Ethiopian Government had complied quickly on our urging in concluding such matters as the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations and granting us an interim base agreement. In the latter instance Ethiopia had signed even though we had failed to supply important information on details. However, in the present circumstances, where plenty of information was available on matters of detail, we were saying that we could not even reach a decision in principle.

The Foreign Minister concluded his fulminations by opining that the logical consequence of the US failure to respond more positively to the Ethiopian requests could only be that Ethiopia must ask itself again, just what place does Ethiopia actually hold in the eyes of the US? (The implication clearly was that perhaps Ethiopia had attached too much importance to its relations with the US.)

Mr. Byroade said that the Foreign Minister's reaction to the American response could only be due to a failure on the part of the Foreign Minister and Mr. Byroade to understand each other. If after reading the memorandum, the Foreign Minister still felt that our answer was one of "fin de non recevoir", then Mr. Byroade would be extremely disappointed. Mr. Byroade then brought out item by item the positive nature of our replies. He said it was not true that either Ethiopia or the US had all the facts on the port situation. Neither of us knows to what extent port development is possible on a bankable basis. Mr. Byroade said he knew no other way to proceed than to get the answers to the questions that potential lenders would certainly ask. Mr. Byroade emphasized that in no sense did he consider our memorandum a negative response to the Ethiopian approach. Quite the contrary. He hoped the Foreign Minister would agree after reading it.

At this point Mr. Byroade revealed the contents of a note he had just received stating that $500,000 of current military aid funds had been allocated to Ethiopia, although this expenditure had not previously been budgeted for. The decision on this grant, Mr. Byroade took pains to emphasize, had been made before receipt of the Ethiopian memorandum being discussed at these conversations and served as a good illustration of our intention to assist wherever possible.

Mr. Byroade concluded by mentioning his pleasure at having this opportunity for talks with the Foreign Minister. He hoped that some day there would be time to explain at greater length what the United States was trying to do to bolster the security of the general area of the Middle East and the reasons behind our assignment of priorities to our expenditures in this area, particularly along the "northern tier". He felt the Foreign Minister would be reassured by viewing our efforts in the context of the area as a whole, for Ethiopia too benefitted by these efforts.

775.5 MSP/7-854

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1954.

Subject: Ethiopian Requests

Participants: Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary, NEA
John Spencer, Adviser to the Ethiopian Government
John E. Utter, AF

The Ethiopian Foreign Minister signified that he wished to discuss certain points arising out of the conversations which had been held on the previous day before reporting to the Emperor in New York.

Mr. Byroade explained to Ato Aklilou that we had gone as far as we could yesterday with regard to the various types of help which the Ethiopians were seeking. He added that we would like to have a better basis with which to work and mentioned especially the need for a study on the ports of Assab and Massawa. If a sufficiently good financial and economic case could be presented, these port projects could be handled by ordinary loans. Mr. Byroade had hoped that such a good case could be made for a loan. If, however, the ports are based on political and national necessity, some other approach might be necessary.

Ato Aklilou thanked Mr. Byroade for the interest which he had shown and stated that he believed an impartial study would reveal that the port development was a necessity. Aklilou stated that he did not quite understand the paragraph referring to "support" and queried whether public funds meant those emanating from the Government and private funds those from banks. Aklilou said that he understood what Mr. Byroade wished was a study as to whether or not it was necessary to refit the ports for use. Mr. Byroade indicated that any loan with a good sound economic basis could be amortized by revenues. Aklilou remarked that receipts were not the all important thing with regard to these ports and a study should take into consideration the necessity and value to the Ethiopian economy as a whole. Mr. Byroade assured Ato Aklilou that he understood the political reasons for the ports but what we wanted now was to know something about the economic side.

With regard to the financing of the development of the ports, Mr. Byroade again referred to the difference between private loans and public loans through an agency of the United States Government. He pointed out that it was difficult to say exactly how the latter might be accomplished as there seem to be at present great differences between departments of the Government regarding the functions of the Export-Import Bank. At this juncture, Mr. Byroade mentioned parenthetically that he was referring to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and added that, of course, there was always a possibility of submitting such a project to this organization where the United States could support it. There might be, of course, he added, French opposition and naturally we would rather avoid this. Mr. Byroade continued that he could not tell today specifically what agency we might suggest after the survey had been made. The first thing to do was to get the survey done and then we would look into the financing. Aklilou appreciated the explanation of public funds and now said that it was clear to him that this meant American funds as contrasted to IBRD, and the agency referred to might be FOA, Export-Import Bank, etc. Mr. Byroade replied that we would not recommend Ethiopia applying to the IBRD unless we were convinced that this might be a constructive move and that Ethiopia might obtain what she was seeking. Mr. Byroade again mentioned the possibility of Ethiopia seeking loans from the IBRD for other projects which would allow them the possibility of spending their own money for the financing of the port development.

In conclusion, Mr. Byroade stated that he hoped that the Emperor can look upon the present series of conversations as a basis for the future. These talks may not have been satisfactory from the Ethiopian standpoint as they had been in no sense negotiations. Mr. Byroade emphasized, however, that the President, Secretary, and Mr. Stassen, to say nothing of himself, were most anxious to do what they could to help Ethiopia.

Aklilou repeated again how difficult it was for him to explain these questions to the Emperor, but he felt that now he had a good understanding of what our views and present capabilities were and he would try to give a faithful presentation to His Imperial Majesty.

775.5 MSP/7-2854

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1954.

Subject: Follow-up on Ethiopian Requests by Ethiopian Ambassador

Participants: Ambassador Deressa, Ethiopian Embassy
Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary, NEA
John E. Utter, AF

At his request Ambassador Deressa called to review the requests for military and economic aid which had been presented to the State Department by the Ethiopian Foreign Minister during the Emperor's visit to this country.

Mr. Byroade regretted that he was unable to give any different answers with regard to the military assistance since the Congress had not yet completed its consideration of foreign aid. He did assure Mr. Deressa, however, that he would continue to pursue this matter and felt confident that there would be a continuation in the military assistance which had been begun last year.

A short résumé was then given with regard to the economic requests made by the Ethiopian Government:

(1) *Atomic Energy:* A suitable geologist would be sent to Ethiopia in October.
(2) *Private Investment*
Ports and Fishing: We were awaiting the Ethiopian Government's reaction with regard to the proposals already made concerning these items.
(3) *Highways:* We still felt that the Ethiopian Government should approach the IBRD on this subject.
(4) *Aviation:* As recommended an initial approach should be made to the Ex-Im Bank to see whether this agency could give suitable assistance.
(5) *Education:* The FOA was pursuing the question of scholarships and would doubtless be in touch with the Ethiopians on this subject.

The Ethiopian Ambassador stated that he expected to discuss certain of the subjects with Mr. Moran of FOA on the following day. He said that his present call was made as a result of the Emperor's admonitions to him to keep in close contact with the Department of State in order that the Ethiopian requests might be given constant attention by the Department. Mr. Byroade told the Ambassador that he was grateful for his call and hoped that he would continue to prod us on the still outstanding problems.

775.5 MSP/9–254

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, North African Affairs (Wellons)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1954.

Subject: United States Assistance to Ethiopia

Participants: Mr. Deressa, Ethiopian Ambassador
NEA—Mr. Jernegan
AF—Mr. Wellons

Ambassador Deressa called on Mr. Jernegan this afternoon in order to review the status of the subjects discussed with the Department of State by the Ethiopian Foreign Minister in June and July of this year. In response to the Ambassador's question, Mr. Jernegan gave him the original of the attached memorandum [1] which sets forth the Department's understanding of the current status of the subjects discussed with the Foreign Minister. Apparently the Ambassador was satisfied to receive this specific memorandum which he could report to his Government.

Ambassador Deressa then inquired about the prospects for extending military assistance to Ethiopia. He referred to the assurances given by Mr. Byroade in July that we expected to be able to provide some miltary assistance for Ethiopia after Congress acted on pending legislation. Mr. Jernegan remarked that one of the last bills enacted by Congress before it adjourned recently involved foreign aid. Since then, he pointed out, the Department of State, the Defense Department, and the Foreign Operations Administration have been trying to decide how best to allocate the limited funds available for foreign military assistance. For example, he cited the pressures in the NEA area for United States assistance to Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran, as well as Greece and Turkey. Mr. Jernegan also mentioned that the overall situation often changed from area to area and from month to month—thus what happened in Southeast Asia or in Western Europe could materially affect the funds available and the programs planned for the countries in the Near East and Africa.

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[1] Not printed. The final paragraph of the memorandum, dated Sept. 2, stated that Congress had reappropriated funds for the fiscal year 1955, and the Department of State was in the process of determining what action could be taken in favor of Ethiopia under the program.

Ambassador Deressa urged that Ethiopia not be forgotten in the process of allocating funds to such countries. He reiterated Ethiopia's desire to complete the equipping of one division which he said would be available for the "common defense." Mr. Jernegan assured the Ambassador that Ethiopia would not be forgotten and that we would try to meet Ethiopia's request within the framework of our overall requirements. While he was hopeful, Mr. Jernegan made it clear that he was not in a position to say when the decisions in regard to Ethiopia would be made. The Ambassador emphasized the need for obtaining this decision quickly so that his government could make its own military and budgetary plans. Mr. Jernegan assured him of a decision as soon as possible and the Ambassador expressed his appreciation for Mr. Byroade's and Mr. Jernegan's assistance in this matter.

775.5 MSP/10-554 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 27, 1954—1:42 p. m.

98. Joint State–Defense message. Pursuant July talks Ethiopia has now been extended additional grant military assistance not to exceed $5,000,000 under Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed May 22, 1953. Embassy should prepare note advising Foreign Office this development pointing out recommendations regarding types and amounts equipment etc. should be worked out with and submitted through MAAG Chief.

Department believes desirable Deressa be person to apprise Emperor this development. Utter will see Deressa at UN this week so Deressa should be able cable Emperor by weekend. Embassy therefore should withhold submission note or otherwise mentioning matter Foreign Office until next week.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Beard (AF) and cleared in the offices of Colonel Hannah (OSD), Dixon (NEA), and Frechtling and Utter (AF).

LIBERIA

PRINCIPAL POLICIES AND MATTERS OF CONCERN IN RELATIONS WITH LIBERIA[1]

AF files, lot 56 D 418, "Financial Advisor—Bureau of Budget"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Douglas B. Smith of the Investment and Economic Development Staff

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1952.

Subject: Expert to Aid in Drafting Budget Legislation for Liberia

Participants: Mr. More—Bureau of the Budget
AF—Messrs. Meier, Feld, DeGolia, and Farmer
TCA—Messrs. Estabrook and Sherman
ED—Messrs. Gorlitz and Smith

The meeting was called to consider President Tubman's request for a fiscal expert, that the Department had proposed, to study and advise on proposed Liberian fiscal management legislation (Embtel 281 from Monrovia, January 25).[2] For some time the Department has recognized the need for some type of budgetary control mechanism to fill the vacuum created by the elimination of the Financial Advisor's office.[3] That post had existed only because of the Firestone loan agreement, which was recently paid off by the Liberian Government.

An offer was made several months ago to send a fiscal expert under TCA auspices to survey government financial operations in Liberia (see Deptel 109 to Monrovia, October 4).[4] While this offer was not immediately accepted, President Tubman, in his opening message to a joint session of the Liberian legislature on December 14, stated that legislation would be proposed during the session giving the President authority to appoint a financial advisor and a supervisor of revenues who may or may not be Liberians. As a result of this statement Ambassador Dudley was requested to remind Tubman of the offer which had previously been made by the Department (Deptel 203 to Monrovia, January 4).[5] In a discussion with the Ambassador, President Tubman agreed to hold off introducing the legislation until a fiscal expert had completed his study.

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[1] For previous documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1274 ff. For material relating to Roberts Field, see *ibid.*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1706 ff.

[2] Not printed; it indicated that the effort to get Tubman to agree to the appointment of a "Special Assistant" to the President on financial matters would be suspended pending the outcome of the study of the proposed legislation. (876.10/1–2552)

[3] The Firestone Loan Agreement setting up the position of Financial Adviser as a prerequisite for Liberia securing the funds needed in 1926 stipulated that the person holding the title be nominated by the President of the United States and be acceptable both to Firestone and to the Liberian Government. In August 1951, President Tubman of Liberia indicated to Firestone his desire that the position be abolished since the loan was all but paid up and indeed the outstanding indebtedness was settled in December.

[4] Not printed; it suggested that the Embassy gain Tubman's approval of the proposal by offering to persuade Firestone to cancel the clause in the Loan Agreement mandating a Financial Adviser. (876.10/9–2851)

It was the consensus of the group that the reply from Tubman provided an adequate basis for setting up a TCA project and finding a suitable candidate to make the survey. A formal request for the survey could be obtained when the expert was ready to leave for Liberia.

Several candidates for the post were discussed. It was generally recognized that aside from being knowledgeable in fiscal operations, the person would need to convince President Tubman of the necessity for sound budgetary control, which would of necessity restrict the President's own freedom in spending government funds.

[Here follows a discussion of possible candidates for the position of Financial Adviser.]

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[5] Not printed; it stated that if Tubman's proposal for legislation creating a new Financial Adviser post contemplated accepting the Department's offer to provide an expert, then the expert should be permitted to complete his study prior to the drafting of the legislation. (876.10/1–452)

AF files, lot 56 D 412, "Ambassador Dudley—1949–1952"

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld) to Leo G. Cyr of the Office of African Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1952.

[Subject:] Consultation of Ambassador Edward R. Dudley

In connection with the arrival on consultation of Ambassador Dudley, who is expected in Washington about June 11, since he holds reservations for the plane leaving Liberia on June 9, the following are the principal problems AF will want to discuss with the Ambassador:

(1) The renegotiation upward of the royalty rate on Bomi Hills iron ore. On June 2, 1952, representatives of the Liberia Mining Company, including a member of the Board of Directors from Republic Steel, a majority stockholder, left for Liberia to open these negotiations. The Ambassador will be able to bring us up-to-date on developments in this regard and we in turn can then, in consultation with him, formulate the Department's position.

(2) The Ambassador's counsel should be sought on the whole question of relations between the Interdepartmental Port Management Committee and the directors of the Monrovia Port Management Com-

pany,[1] a matter which has caused so much difficulty during the past year or so. The Ambassador has been furnished with a complete file of the Committee's minutes and documents and will, therefore, be in possession of the necessary background. If possible, the next meeting of the Committee should be held while the Ambassador is in Washington on consultation so that he can attend, and address the Committee.

(3) The Ambassador's views should also be sought on the results of the recent negotiations between Larabee [2] and the Liberian Government with respect to the formal demands made on the Firestone Plantations Corporation for payment on income tax on earnings for November and December, 1951.

(4) The whole question of the meteorological services for Roberts Field resulting from the recent refusal of the British at Accra to continue to furnish forecasts for Pan-Am planes should be thoroughly discussed and explored, particularly the proposal that the Air Force be asked to furnish temporary meteorologists, while TCA endeavors to set up a long-term project to train Liberians to take over this function, which is an international obligation of the Republic of Liberia with ICAO.[3]

(5) The Ambassador's views regarding recent Liberian moves in the banking, fiscal and budgetary field should be obtained, and particularly his report on the mission of Mr. Steadman, Controller of the State of Michigan, who arrived in Liberia on May 31, 1952, with Oscar Meier, to do a preliminary survey on Liberia's budgetary and fiscal needs.[4]

(6) Recently the Export-Import Bank has expressed dissatisfaction with the Liberian Government's proposal to alter previous agreements to build about 400 miles of serviceable roads under the $5,000,000 Eximbank loan for public highways and instead to build about 100 miles of "super highways" in the vicinity of Monrovia.[5] The Bank also points out that the Liberians, who apparently feel that the Bank has not kept its agreement because it has declined to allocate funds to certain Liberian requests, have failed to properly certify requests for funds. The Bank is dealing directly with the Liberian Embassy but the Department, before Ambassador Dudley's departure, brought the matter to his attention and requested him to be prepared to discuss it when he arrived in Washington on consultation.

(7) The whole question of TCA activities and problems in Liberia and the working of the Joint Commission should be thoroughly dis-

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[1] Those holding stock in the Port Management Company, Ltd. included: Farrell Lines, the Mississippi Shipping Company, Firestone, Socony Vacuum, the Texas Company, the Liberia Company, the Liberian Mining Company, and the Liberian Government. For more information in regard to the Free Port of Monrovia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1274 ff.

[2] Byron H. Larabee, Vice President of the Firestone Plantations Company.

[3] On approximately Apr. 14, 1952, the British and the French ceased to provide meteorological forecasts to Roberts Field from Accra and Dakar, respectively, thus compelling Pan American World Airways to suspend its northbound flights for a time after May 11.

[4] Robert Steadman was the budget expert who was detailed to deal with the problems discussed in the memorandum of conversation by Douglas B. Smith, *supra*. Oscar Meier was the Director of African Operations for the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA).

[5] For further information concerning this loan, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, p. 1282.

cussed, particularly the appointment of the new TCO, Mr. Davis,[6] who is awaiting clearance. The Ambassador's views on this subject should be obtained.

(8) Finally, the Ambassador has been furnished with a preliminary draft of the proposed new Defense Areas Agreement with Liberia, and his views regarding the probable attitude of the Liberians towards the more controversial articles, such as the articles on claims, jurisdiction, civil aviation, etc. would be very helpful in connection with negotiations with the Air Force and other interested government divisions and agencies, in order to obtain clearance of a final draft which the Ambassador could use in subsequent negotiations with the Liberians for a new agreement. Provided the related meteorological and Air Force-PanAm contractual problems are worked out, there is some urgency in getting a final draft cleared as soon as possible so that negotiations can begin with the Liberians without delay when the Ambassador returns to his post.

(9) Certain other miscellaneous matters, such as the Ambassador's personal plans, staff and administrative problems at the Embassy, etc., will also probably come up for discussion.

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[6] John Warren Davis officially took over as TCA country director in Liberia on Nov. 3, 1952 to supervise Point Four operations.

AF files, lot 56 D 418, "Roberts Field (Weather) 1952–53"

Memorandum by the Ambassador to Liberia (Dudley) to the President[1]

[WASHINGTON,] July 10, 1952.

In 1942 the United States Government entered into an agreement with the Republic of Liberia to build and operate an airfield for the duration of the war and six months thereafter.[2]

Since 1945 and the physical termination of the war, the Air Force through the Military Air Transport Service has operated this field on a contract basis with private American companies. Pan American World Airways is the present operator. However, for budgetary reasons the Air Force is now questioning whether its present MATS requirement at the field is sufficient justification to continue the contract with Pan American now due for renewal. The present contract has, therefore, been extended sixty days from the termination date on June 30, 1952 to permit reexamination of the whole problem.

Apart from any present military significance this field may now hold, we believe it to be a vital tool, together with the free port of

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[1] Dudley had met with President Truman on July 9, and it was at his suggestion that he submitted this memorandum justifying continued operation of Roberts Field by the U.S. Government. Truman thanked the Ambassador on Aug. 9 and referred the memorandum on that same date to Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett with the comment that Dudley's suggestions were "well worth serious consideration." For this latter correspondence, consult the Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF file.

[2] The Defense Area Agreement of Mar. 31, 1942 (Executive Agreement Series 275).

Monrovia, in implementing our present foreign policy towards Liberia, in particular the Mutual Assistance program, which is geared to assist Liberia in raising its economic and political standards. This program is primarily accomplished through the furnishing of technical assistance to match in dollars funds set aside by the Liberian Government for local services, capital investments, maintenance costs, equipment and supplies.

Roberts Field, the only field in Liberia capable of handling international traffic, is now part and parcel of the economic life of the country. Liberia, in my judgment, is incapable of running this operation without more time under our assistance program to so prepare itself. The part played by Roberts Field in permitting easy access to Liberia from overseas is of real importance. Approximately 1,000 Americans are now in Liberia, many of whom depend on air transport. In addition to Pan American World Airways, French and Portuguese commercial aircraft call at the field.

Furthermore, in view of the extensive private American interests in Liberia, including: Firestone, with an 85,000 acre rubber plantation and 300 American personnel; Republic Steel, as majority stockholder in the Liberia Mining Company, exporting 1,000,000 tons of high-grade iron ore annually; the American shipping firms serving West Africa; the Liberia Development Company's cocoa project, etc., it would seem unwise to permit this field to go by default either to an incompetent local operating team or, as may be the case, to French operation, which is a possibility. This eventuality would be particularly unfortunate in view of the fact that the Air Force also now has a highly classified research project at the field whose personnel are engaged in work of vital interest to the security of the United States.[3]

The cost to the United States of operating Roberts Field has been approximately $275,000 per year. Some repairs are now needed on the runways and existing facilities, probably necessitating an additional $200,000 for one year only. Pan American has indicated a willingness to add additional facilities which will probably include a hotel for transients.

In view of the excellent position of American companies operating in Liberia, the favorable balance of trade and our policy objectives towards this country, I strongly recommend the continuation of this operation by the United States Air Force as part of our overall policy for this area of the world.

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[3] In his telegram 332 to Washington of Mar. 27, 1952, Ambassador Dudley referred to a "special project" of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) to which the Liberian Government had given its consent. (711.56376/3-2752) Subsequently in his telegram 514 of June 15, 1953, he referred to project B-145 and the possibility of seeking the permission of the Liberian Government for the persons involved in it to remain if and when the Air Force pulled out. (711.56376/6-1553)

876.331/8–252 : Telegram

The Chargé in Liberia (Litsey) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL MONROVIA, August 2, 1952—6 p. m.

59. Embtel 51, July 29.[1]

Memo of agreement signed last night between Lib Govt and LibMinCo. Salient features are that beginning April 1, 1957 Br at time LibMinCo liquidates outstanding obligations if sooner Lib Govt will participate net profits of company to extent 25 percent for five years, 35 percent next ten years and 50 percent thereafter. In interim and until Lib Govt begins participate profits LibMinCo will pay interim royalty $1.50 ton ore in addition to royalties specified orig concession.

The amount ore optioned at special price to Rep Steel now 66 percent will be ultimately reduced to 45 percent but Rep Steel will have right buy additional 20 percent at price equal to average annual price to other purchasers.

Board of Directors to consist 13 members as fols: Three Lib Govt, three minority shareholders, seven majority shareholders, that is Rep Steel.

Deptel 43, July 30[2] did not arrive in time advise Rep Steel rep US policy re local govt membership board directors Amer companies in Africa.

LITSEY

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[1] Not printed; it noted that representatives of the Liberian Mining Company and Republic Steel had arrived in Liberia to renegotiate the contract and see President Tubman. (876.331/7–2952)

[2] Not printed; it stated that "as matter gen econ policy Dept opposed participation local Govts in directorship governing Boards Amer Corps investing in Af". (876.331/7–3052)

711.56376/9–1152

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert A. Thayer of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1952.

Subject: Continuation of Air Force Support of Roberts Field, Liberia

Participants:
- Mr. Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense
- Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State
- Rear Admiral Page Smith, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Major General Clark L. Ruffner, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Mr. Robert A. Thayer, NEA, Department of State

Problem:

The extent to which the U.S. Government should support the maintenance of Roberts Field, Liberia.

Action Required:

Further consideration of the problem.

Background:

Due to the financial inability of the Liberian Government to maintain Roberts Field, and the absence of other sources of U.S. financing, the U.S. Air Force has been bearing the expense of keeping the field open to civil aviation and in a standby status for possible military use. The current contract between MATS and Pan American Airways expired June 30. During a temporary extension of the terms of the contract the Department of Defense has been reviewing the question of the extent to which military appropriations should continue to be used for the support of Roberts Field. The Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, has estimated that the total cost for the support and maintenance of Roberts Field for fiscal year 1953 would amount to approximately $625,000 which includes, among other expenses, approximately $37,000 to cover additional equipment to be supplied by the Air Force, basic contract costs of $371,000 and an estimated cost of $211,000 for major construction. On August 29, 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that in their view military requirements did not justify an expenditure of this size from military appropriations. The Joint Chiefs recognized, however, that overriding economic and/or political considerations might dictate continuation of the contract with other than military appropriations. During Ambassador Dudley's recent period of consultation in Washington, the President asked the Ambassador to prepare a memorandum with respect to the extent of U.S. Government interest in the continued operation of Roberts Field.[1] This memorandum was referred by the President to the Secretary of Defense for comment, and the Department of Defense is now in the process of studying the matter preparatory to transmitting its views to the President.

Brief of the Conversation:

Mr. Byroade said the Department of State was of the conviction that political considerations require Roberts Field to be maintained under American and Liberian control, and that American flag air carrier services to Liberia be continued. He said he had been led to believe that in the final analysis the Department of Defense would probably arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problem, but he had however recently received the impression the Air Force contract under which the field is kept open might not be renewed. Juan Trippe of

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[1] Dated July 10, p. 485.

Pan American had been in to see him about this situation. Mr. Trippe had given the impression in confidence of a willingness on the part of Pan American to contribute substantially to the cost of certain construction required at the field.[3]

Mr. Nash reviewed the factors which had led to the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the cost of maintaining the field be defrayed from other than military appropriations on the grounds that military requirements for the use of the field are not sufficient to warrant the expenditures contemplated. Mr. Nash, as well as General Ruffner and Admiral Smith, appeared to feel overall U.S. interests indicate the desirability of continuing the contract for at least another year. The question of how this could best be done should, it was agreed, be further explored and it was suggested that Mr. Trippe be consulted at an appropriate time in order to determine to what extent Pan American is actually prepared to contribute.

Note:

In a subsequent telephone conversation between Mr. Thayer and Admiral Smith, it was learned that Mr. Nash's office had gone into this matter in more detail following the meeting with Mr. Byroade. As a result, the Air Staff is being asked for additional comment and information for submission to Mr. Nash. Pending this review of the Air Force position, the Defense Department does not propose to consult with Mr. Trippe. Mr. Thayer informed Admiral Smith the Department would await further word from the Department of Defense on this matter.

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[3] The meeting took place on June 25 and was summarized for Cyr by Byroade. (976.524/6–2552)

876.10/10–1052

Memorandum of Conversation, by Douglas B. Smith of the Investment and Economic Development Staff

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1952.

Subject: Eximbank Activities in Liberia

Participants: Eximbank—Messrs. Dennison and Duvall
TCA—Messrs. Meier and Rives
AF—Messrs. Feld and McBride
DRN—Mr. Disdier
ED—Mr. Smith

Messrs. Dennison and Duvall[1] have just returned from a four weeks survey trip in Liberia. At the suggestion of ED a meeting was arranged to discuss their impressions of Liberia with interested members of the Department.

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[1] Ellery Dennison and John Duvall represented the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. Dennison said that their primary purpose in going was to activate the Eximbank financed road project. In the one and a half years since the credit was granted no funds have yet been disbursed.[2] Soon after their arrival they were able to obtain Bank agreement to approve the first five mile section of the Monrovia–Ganta Highway. They looked into the rest of the program very carefully, rejecting certain parts and adding other elements which were not included in the plans.

Duncan [3] was persuaded to reject the $1½ million equipment repair depot. In its place he agreed to substitute two or three mobile repair shops which could repair equipment at the scene of a breakdown. Mr. Dennison said he and Duvall carefully checked over the $450,000 of equipment purchased for the road program and for which the Liberians are asking Eximbank reimbursement. Most of this equipment has already been heavily used for other operations such as that of the $130,000 Payne Airstrip. (He felt that the Payne airstrip would prove to be of little value.) Considering the expected remaining life of the equipment Dennison and Duvall are ready to recommend that the Bank make only 75 percent reimbursement. And this should be done only if the Liberians set up some reasonable rental system to cover the wear and tear on the equipment when it is being used for public works other than road construction.

Duvall objected rather strongly to the fact that most of this equipment was being used solely by the West African Construction Company. It was parked on the company's lot and put into service for whatever jobs the company was working on with no proper accounting being made to the Bureau of Public Works. Mr. Duvall added that he did not think that the equipment would last long enough to finish the road program. This raises a very serious question as to where money is going to be found to pay for equipment for the final $1 to $2 million of construction work.

Both Dennison and Duvall were rather pleased at the progress which was being made on the water and sewage system.[4] With few exceptions the work is on schedule. Their one concern was that although water would be flowing through the lines early next year no arrangements had been made to tap in the consumers. This lack in planning was pointed out to Duncan who assured them that immediate remedial steps would be taken.

The mining operations in which the Bank has a $4 million loan [5] also was [*were*] inspected. The company became involved in disputes with some of its customers earlier this year as a result of shipping them ore from low grade pockets. As Republic Steel phrased its complaint "it was paying freight on shipping dirt across the Atlantic". Mr. Dennison said that this trouble had been due to a lack of adequate supervision on the job. The company needs another mining engineer to directly supervise the mining operation itself. The manager, a mining engineer, is doing a good job but is saddled with too many other duties.

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[2] The $5,000,000 credit had been authorized on Jan. 11, 1951.

[3] Henry B. Duncan was a Liberian member of the Joint Liberian-United States Commission for Economic Development. As Liberian Secretary of Public Works and Utilities, he had visited Washington between October 1950 and February 1951 to help set up a Point Four Program for Liberia.

[4] The sum of $1,350,000 had been earmarked for this by the Bank on June 14, 1951.

[5] This had been approved by the Bank on Apr. 27, 1949.

Mr. Duvall said that they had been very much impressed by the work of Porcella on the Liberia Company cocoa plantation.[6] The operation was being handled in a very efficient manner. Additional supervisors were being acquired to eliminate the "one man show" aspect of the operation. Dennison and Duvall talked both with Porcella and Frank Pinder[7] and other agricultural technicians of the TCA staff on the question of efficient size of operation. They were convinced that appreciable savings could be obtained in a 10,000 acre plantation. The risk involved did not now seem too great. The hazards of cocoa farming fall mainly in the first two or three years after planting. The Liberia Company has come through these years in very good shape.

Duvall discussed the electric power question. He said that everyone he talked to was very much shocked with the proposed scheme of the Bureau of Reclamation. Duncan and other Liberians readily recognize that a $22 million project was far beyond their means. The Liberians had banked heavily upon a hydroelectric scheme and had assumed that Williams[8] was working on a plan which would supply them with a $4 to $5 million system.

Duvall prefaced his remarks on an inspection trip of the Monrovia power system with the comment that he was not an electrical engineer. He was surprised to find the system in fairly good working order. From the remarks of Williams and others he had previously assumed that it was in the final stages of collapse. According to the English engineer in charge of the power plant the three diesel units which had been turned over to the Liberians by the Navy were good for many more years service. However, in meeting peak loads they had to be operated at full capacity. Fortunately while one unit is being renovated the company is getting power from the Liberian Mining Co. units at dockside. Duvall pointed out that this source could not be depended upon indefinitely as eventually the Liberian Mining Co. would be making full use of its units for its own needs.

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[6] Santiago Porcella III was a forestry graduate of Louisiana State University. He managed the cocoa plantation which was a holding of the Liberian Development Corporation, which had taken over the assets of Stettinius Associates-Liberia, Inc. and the Liberia Company.

[7] Pinder had been assigned as an Agricultural Adviser on May 29, 1952.

[8] Clarke Williams was the District Engineer in Liberia.

Mr. Duvall admitted that in the next two or three years Monrovia probably could use twice the power which can be supplied by the present system. Nevertheless, he did not think that the bank should consider a power loan until the Liberian needs were surveyed by a competent engineering group. He was strongly opposed to the Bureau of Reclamation making this survey. Rather he suggested that the Liberians on their own should hire an approved engineering company. When asked if Westinghouse or General Electric would be suitable candidates he answered in the affirmative.

It is understood that these companies will under certain circumstances perform survey work of this type at no expense to the country or community involved.

AF files, lot 56 D 412, "Ambassador Dudley—1949–1952"

The Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld) to the Ambassador in Liberia (Dudley)

SECRET PERSONAL [WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1952.
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

DEAR ED: As you know, we are desperately trying to keep Roberts Field in operation, but after a number of weeks' consideration of the problem the Air Force told us two days ago that, despite an exhaustive review (as a result of Mr. Byroade's intervention with the highest Pentagon authorities [1] and also no doubt President Truman's interest which you stimulated last July) it could not continue indefinitely to finance the field. I am enclosing copies of self-explanatory memoranda of conversations on this subject.[2] You will gather from reading these memoranda that the Air Force is willing to continue to supply funds until June 30, 1953, if (and it's a very big if) the State Department will give it a firm commitment that it will obtain funds to finance the field from some other source (MSA and TCA have been mentioned as possibilities) from the beginning of FY 1954 onward.[3]

Doug Smith of ED has been exploring various possibilities of financing the field, and has written a memorandum on the subject, a copy of which I am also enclosing for your information and comment.[4] I have also written a brief justification of the field on strategic, political, economic and civil aviation grounds,[5] but I think you should realize that the Air Force's review denied the military justification on the grounds that Roberts does not fit into any of their plans for jet aircraft, etc.

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[1] Byroade had met with Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense, on Sept. 11; see the memorandum of conversation, p. 487.

[2] None printed.

[3] This was revealed to Thayer and Feld at a meeting called by Milton M. Turner, Special Assistant to Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Knight Finletter, on Oct. 16. (AF files, lot 56 D 418, "Transportation & Communication—1952")

[4] Not printed. In submitting his "Justification for Continued Operation of Roberts Field, Liberia" to Feld on Oct. 8. Smith indicated his lack of certainty as to the accuracy of all of his statements. (976.524/10–852)

[5] Not printed.

There are so many differences of opinion regarding the field, the pros and cons of spending more money on Roberts or thinking more in terms of improving Payne air strip up to international standards, that I would like to solicit your views on the entire problem. I talked with Bucky Bryan in MSA/S (Martin's office)[6] yesterday and gathered that there is little if any chance that the project can be financed from MSA funds.* Byroade, in a recent meeting, was very lukewarm about the idea of asking TCA to put in a budget request for the project, but we may wind up with no other alternative. Oscar Meier, who was once not too interested in using TCA funds for the field, now seems much more sympathetic and, as a last resort, we might have to ask Mr. Byroade to agree to TCA financing if the TCA high command is itself agreeable. Heretofore, TCA policy has been *not* to finance airfields in Africa, because TCA has the philosophy that it should interest itself only in essential forms of transportation, such as roads, railways, harbors, etc. In Africa, however, air transport is almost the rule rather than the exception, and is not an additional form of luxury transport where the other more usual forms of surface transport simply do not exist.

Last week I lunched with Ross Wilson and Larabee, and Wilson expressed the view that the MATS engineers have estimated the cost of needed repairs too high. According to Wilson, it would not take anywhere near a million dollars to repair the runway intersection, etc. I am very confused as to who is right, but tend to go along with the larger estimate. I understand that Jim Rives[7] also thinks the MATS estimates are inaccurate. He seems to think that the MATS estimates tend to vary depending on the weather at Roberts. In other words, if they visit the field during the rainy season, the estimate is high, because conditions look so bad, but, if another MATS group sees the field during the period of good weather, they are not so extravagant about the cost of repairs. It's hard to get a completely objective picture out of all this welter of conflicting opinion.

This dithyrambic is merely intended to present to you various facets of the problem as I see it here. It would be very helpful, indeed, if you would let me have your own views as soon as possible. I am particularly anxious to have your answers to the following questions:

(1) Should we try to get TCA to finance Roberts, if all else fail; and, if so, under what terms and conditions?

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[6] Belton O'Neal Bryan was a Special Assistant to the Director, Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs and Edwin M. Martin was the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs.

*Bryan just informed me that Martin will *not* consider our proposal and he also doubts whether TCA can "scare up" any money either. Prospects seem pretty bleak. [Footnote in the source text.]

[7] Public Works Adviser.

(2) What would be the reaction of Firestone and the other American business interests in Liberia if the field were closed down? Also what would they be prepared to do, in your opinion, to prevent this from happening?

(3) What would be the reaction of the Liberians if Roberts were closed down?

(4) Would you consider it wise to let Roberts go and concentrate on building up Payne air strip to international standards; and, if so, on what terms and conditions?

(5) Would the Liberians be interested in obtaining a loan to finance the needed airfield improvements at Payne Field, assuming such a loan could be arranged?

(6) Would it be feasible for Pan-Am to operate an improved Payne Field under an arrangement with the Liberian Government similar to the one under which TWA operates Ethiopian Airlines?

I shall await your reaction to the above with great interest,[8] but in the meantime, I want to assure you that we shall do everything we can to keep Roberts Field in Operation. If you can condense your ideas into a cable, you could save a lot of time by cabling your views.

[Here follows a discussion of personnel matters.]

With very best regards to you and the staff,

Very sincerely,

NICHOLAS FELD

P.S. Leo[9] has read this letter and suggests that I add in this postscript our view that the continuation of Roberts Field would be much more in the U.S. national interest than the building up of Payne air strip as a substitute for Roberts. While I think I understand the Liberians' objections to Roberts, which seems to be historically associated in their minds with the Firestone concession, the U.S. Air Force's exclusive wartime jurisdiction, and U.S. control in general, I feel that it would be more efficient and probably more economical in the long run to improve the present facilities at Roberts than to switch to a field which will have to be built more or less from scratch at a cost of perhaps $900,000, at the very least. Anyway, the Liberians haven't got that kind of money for an airfield project. If they are going to have a field of international standard in their country, it looks as if U.S. funds will have to pay for it, and if this is granted, we ought to have the greater voice in determining where the money should be spent. Incidentally, the figure of $900,000 is one mentioned by Jim Rives. Doug Smith, you will note, speaks of $5,000,000.

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[8] Dudley replied to these questions in a letter of Nov. 7 as follows: He recommended that TCA make an outright grant to repair the runways while Liberia would assume the current operating expenses. He believed that this would require an agreement between Pan American Airways and the Liberian Government. If the field closed, he suspected that American businesses would utilize Air France's DC-3s at Payne Air Field. He thought the Liberians would feel bitter and betrayed should the field close and would seek aid from the French. Dudley opposed building up Payne Field which he considered too costly. But he assumed that the Liberians would welcome a loan to accomplish that end since Roberts Field was too far removed from Monrovia. Though he was unfamiliar with the details of the TWA operation in Ethiopia, he thought it likely that PanAm could manage an improved Payne Field under an arrangement with the Government of Liberia. (AF files, lot 56 D 412, "Ambassador Dudley—1949–1952")

[9] Leo G. Cyr.

976.524/10–2852

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Utter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1952.

Subject: The Problem of Financing Roberts Field

Problem:

To find means by which Roberts Field can be maintained and operated during the remainder of FY 1953 and FY 1954.

Discussion:

1. The Government of Liberia is unable to finance the cost of operating the field.

2. The Air Force does not wish to continue support of Roberts through the MATS contract with PAA for the remainder of FY 1953 unless assurances can be given that sources other than military appropriations will be sought to continue the financial support in FY 1954.

a) There is no military requirement for Roberts which justifies the expenditures necessary, i.e.:

$320,000	operating costs
211,000	runway repair
$531,000	Total

3. The Air Force appreciates the broad considerations involved in the continuance of Roberts Field and is therefore willing to carry the program in FY 1953 including runway repair on the basis of (2) above.

4. The contract between PAA and MATS expires on October 31, and PAA is unwilling to accept a further extension unless assured ways will be found to carry on during FY 1953 and FY 1954.

5. Unless urgent runway repairs are undertaken within the next few weeks, services to Roberts will be terminated.

Justification for Continued US Support of Roberts Field:

Continued US Government support of the field is justified in view of the following:

1) Liberia is the only independent sovereign state in "black" Africa. The circumstances surrounding the founding of Liberia and its eco-

nomic and political development since that date have been characterized by a particularly close relationship with and dependence upon the United States. United States policy toward Africa, as exemplified by the Liberia "experiment" is closely observed by the Colonial Powers. Powerful elements in the western European countries fear the success of the Liberian nation in view of the impact this success might have upon the relationships between the metropolitan governments, private interests and possessions in Africa. Withdrawal of US support of Liberia or the cutting off of direct communications between the United States and Liberia will most certainly be viewed as evidence that Liberia is no longer important to the United States.

2) American business interests in Liberia, primarily rubber and iron ore, are important to us and to Liberia. The success of the development of Liberian resources through private US capital has been outstanding. It offers concrete evidence of the advantages of development with private investment capital as opposed to investment and aid by Government. American business interests in Liberia require reasonably direct air service to the United States and do not wish to be at the mercy of foreign flag air transport under the control of governments who are, to say the least, less than enthusiastic over the economic development of Liberia under American auspices. Firestone supplies the United States with 36,000 tons of natural rubber annually from sources which are secure in comparison with Far East sources. Republic Steel is exploiting the most important single top grade iron ore deposit recently discovered, and is now exporting 1 to 1½ million tons of the highest grade iron ore annually.

3) Liberia, if it is to remain free of direct US Government financial support must continue to depend upon the development of its resources through foreign investment. A relatively small amount of money spent to keep Roberts Field in operation in order to support direct American air services on the route between the United States and South Africa will help serve this purpose of assisting US investment in the country.

4) US air services to South Africa are operated as a national interest route under a certificate approved by the President. The strategic importance of Africa as a source of raw materials needed by the western world makes it essential that at least one US flag air service continue to provide the necessary communications between the west coast of Africa, South Africa and the United States. It would appear reasonable, in the light of the above considerations that this US flag air service should continue to serve Liberia as the point on the route which is characterized by the closest community of interest with the United States. In the event of the loss of Europe to an enemy, Roberts Field would remain as the sole air field in west central Africa under American control.

5) Pan American Airways is feeling keen competition on the New York–Johannesburg route from BOAC's Comet. In order to meet this competition over an already thin national interest route, Pan American has put DC–6 B's into service and is non-stopping points north and south of Roberts. The company prefers for a number of reasons to stop its DC–6 service at Roberts—a field under American control. Unless this field can be kept open, services to South Africa will no longer operate through Liberia.

Conclusion:

Positive action is required by October 31 if Roberts Field is to remain in operation under American control and if direct US flag air services to Liberia are to continue.

Recommendation:

That the President be requested to direct either DMS or the CAB to find means to finance the continued operation of Roberts Field beyond FY 1953 in order that the necessary assurances may be given to the Secretary of Defense re the use of 1953 funds.

976.524/10-2852

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration (Andrews) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1952.

Subject: TCA Financing for Roberts Field, Liberia

For the past several months the problem of financing the continued operation of Roberts Field, Liberia, has been the subject of detailed negotiations between the Departments of State and Defense. Since 1948 the field has been operated with funds made available by the Military Air Transport Service of the Air Force through a contractual arrangement with Pan American World Airlines; but despite the fact that NEA has made every effort to persuade the highest officials of the Defense Department to continue this arrangement, that Department has now determined, after thorough consideration of the problem, that United States military requirements at Roberts Field are not such as to justify the continuation of this expenditure after the present fiscal year ends. As a consequence, it has become necessary, in order to prevent this important civil aviation facility in Liberia from being closed down, with resultant injury to Liberia's economic development, to obtain non-military funds with which to finance the field from the beginning of FY 1954. In view of the very important role already being played by the TCA program in fostering Liberia's economic development, NEA considers that TCA is the most appropriate agency to undertake this project and to provide the necessary financing. Although it has been stated that TCA confines itself in the transport field to basic forms of surface transportation, NEA believes that there are special circumstances in the present instance which fully warrant a departure from this policy. It should be stated, furthermore, that the expense involved is much too great for Liberia to shoulder unaided at the present time, even if the Liberian Government desired to do so. The Liberian Government, insofar as is known, has not contemplated financing and operating the field itself.

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[1] Stanley Andrews had assumed the position of Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration on June 20, 1952.

For purposes of background and in order to provide a basis for further consideration of this project as one of those to be included in TCA's budget for the FY 1954 Liberian program there are attached some explanatory comments and justifications [2] to serve as a basis for a project description. There is also attached a copy of a memorandum and covering letter on the subject of Roberts Field addressed to President Truman in July 1952 by the American Ambassador to Liberia, Edward R. Dudley,[3] together with a brief excerpt from the President's reply to the Ambassador acknowledging the receipt of the letter and memorandum. As may be seen from this exchange of correspondence, the matter has already been discussed at the highest level, but despite this fact, the Air Force has been unable to find military justification for continued financing of the field. It is for this reason that NEA desires to see the field operated as a TCA project and believes that the obvious economic benefits which will accrue to Liberia and the United States from its continued operation are sufficient to justify the use of TCA funds for this purpose. I, therefore, trust that this project will commend itself to you for inclusion in the TCA program for Liberia. In view of the short time remaining in which to make provision for the project in the forthcoming 1954 budget presentations I would also like to request your cooperation in seeing to it that the matter is accorded immediate and urgent attention.

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[2] Not printed; it repeated the arguments of previous documents.

[3] Dated July 10, p. 485.

876.11/11–1152: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 14, 1952—7 p. m.

202. Dept appreciates well balanced comments Embtel 226 [1] re effect proposed change Lib income tax rates on Firestone. But it still seems apparent that in its practical effect change is primarily aimed at Firestone since Firestone is only firm now paying really sizeable corporate income taxes in Liberia, and increase from present 14% to 25% wld

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[1] Not printed; it reported the local feeling that since Firestone had enjoyed the privilege of nominal payments during the time it was seeking to recoup its initial investment, it should no longer cling to this special advantage particularly since the local rate was small in comparison with the tax rates in the United States. (876.11/11–1152)

almost double Firestone tax liability after only little over two years experience under 1950 agreement.[2]

Lib revenue expectations and rate governmental expenditure since 1950 have been based on continued high world prices rubber despite warnings two years ago these prices might decline. Recent drop rubber prices has left LibGovt short funds and impelled it seek additional revenue by various means. Since Firestone and LibMinCo are the only two important sources revenue, conclusion inescapable LibGovt will be continually tempted demand changes in agreements with these two firms whenever short of funds.

This tactic certainly not calculated inspire confidence in other actual and potential fon investors in soundness and impartiality Lib tax and fiscal policies. Question also not one of comparing Lib tax rates to Amer rates nor of emphasizing advantages Firestone enjoys under 1950 agreements but rather of seeming inability Lib Govt to project its revenue and expenditures on anything more than very short term basis subj repeated changes and demands for renegotiation recent agreements. This tactic if continued will have adverse effect on full faith and confidence Lib Govt. Dept feels this consideration outweighs question whether Firestone cld pay higher taxes, and also considers as inadmissible argument that increase in Lib tax will not ultimately cost Firestone anything because parent Firestone Co will pay correspondingly less taxes in US.

Dept understands from Christie[3] that within next two weeks Lib will receive from Mining Co $500,000 from increased royalties.

Dept recognizes deterioration Lib fiscal structure will adversely effect Firestone and others operating in Lib and is very anxious prevent such deterioration. Although raising Firestone tax rate may solve immed crisis cost involved in repudiating present agreement may be too high in terms prestige and confidence. It offers no long run solution recurring financial crises whose prevention lies in placing Lib fiscal policies on soundest basis soonest. Dept believes any reconsideration Firestone tax agreement shld await estab new budget system.

Dept requests Emb views as to steps needed accomplish this, in addition to obvious one of recruiting and sending out an Amer financial expert to advise Pres Tubman which Steadman states Tubman agreed to in talks with him last July.

Bruce

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[2] In April 1950, an agreement had been reached between the Government of Liberia and Firestone whereby the latter would pay an income tax at a starting rate of 12 percent on its corporate earnings. The rate was to go up 2 percent every 2 years.

[3] Landsdell K. Christie was the President of the Liberia Mining Company.

976.524/12-252

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Utter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1952.

Subject: Air Staff Recommendation to Secretary Finletter Against Continued Financing of Roberts Field after FY 1953

Current Situation

AF has received an indication, through Mr. Snowdon of AV,[1] from Colonel Robinson* of the Air Force, that the recently made appraisal of Roberts Field in relation to other airports of marginal military interest has resulted in adherence to the previous decision of the Air Staff advising that maintenance of the field cannot be justified on military grounds beyond FY 1953. A letter to President Truman to this effect is being or has already been prepared for Secretary Finletter's signature.[2] Unless Secretary Finletter, with some urging from you, alters this decision there seems to be no further prospect of obtaining funds from the Air Force after FY 1953.

The Air Force has also taken the position that unless it receives definite assurances from the Department of State that it is actively seeking funds from non-military sources to finance the field after June 30, 1953, the Air Force will not continue to provide funds even for the balance of FY 1953. Pan-American also desires similar assurances that financing during the balance of 1953 and thereafter are really in sight before committing itself to continuing to operate the field under existing arrangements with the Air Force.

Recommendations

1. That you consider making one final effort to influence Mr. Finletter's decision favorably in the direction of continued Air Force financing, thus overruling the Air Staff's recommendation.

2. If you do not wish to make the above approach to Mr. Finletter, serious consideration should be given to the alternatives outlined in the memorandum dated November 17 [7], namely:

(*a*) That you request E/TRC to place the whole problem before the Air Coordinating Committee where a unified government appraisal can be made of the value of the field to the overall national interest. If adequate interest is found to exist, funds could be requested under

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[1] Henry Taft Snowdon was the Assistant Chief of the Air Facilities Branch of the Office of Transportation and Communications Policy.

*Lt. Col. W. B. Robinson, AFOPD (Air Force, Director of Plans). [Footnote in the source text.]

[2] This letter was held up, Lt. Col. Robinson revealed at a meeting at the Department of State the next day, while the Air Force studied the "Bargain Bases" concept which involved operating bases in sub-Saharan Africa at austerity levels. Such bases would be serviceable in the event of an emergency which immobilized bases to the north. (711.56376/12-352)

Public Law 647 which permits the Department of Commerce to operate airports and related facilities considered to be in the national interest. Although we understand this legislative authority has never been used. E/TRC agrees that it may be worth a trial in this case.[3]

(*b*) That you request financing under MSA appropriations, despite previous indications from Mr. Martin that MSA is not able to undertake this project.

(*c*) That you request TCA to finance the project.

If you would indicate to me which of the above courses of action you favor, and at what level the approaches should be made, AF and AV will work together to prepare any necessary papers. In view of the constant pressure we have been under, especially from Pan-Am, to obtain final action on this problem, I hope that the alternatives recommended can be pursued actively to relieve the pressure on the Department.

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[3] This line of action had been recommended by J. Paul Barringer, Director of the Office of Transportation and Communications Policy, in a memorandum dated Nov. 7, which he submitted to Under Secretary of State David Bruce and Willard L. Thorp, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The Air Coordinating Committee was responsible for coordinating federal policy in the field of aviation. (976.524/11-752)

Truman Library, President's Secretary's file

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 30, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I refer to your memorandum dated 9 August 1952 concerning the recommendations made by Edward R. Dudley, U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, with respect to Roberts Field, Liberia.[1]

Roberts Field is presently maintained and operated under a United States Air Force contract with Pan American World Airways. The contract is administered by the Military Air Transport Service. This contract expired on 30 June 1952 but has been extended on a bimonthly basis. The Fiscal Year 1952 contract for Roberts Field involved an expenditure of $280,000, and the Fiscal Year 1953 contract would require $371,000 as a result of additional maintenance costs. Repairs to the runway intersection will require expenditure of an additional $211,000 in Fiscal Year 1953. In addition, the over-all condition of the runways is such that an expenditure in excess of $1,000,000 will have to be made at an early date if the runways are to be kept in safe operating condition.

The Department of Defense presently does not have operational requirements which are of sufficient importance to justify the large expenditures involved in maintaining Roberts Field in operational condition. This Department does recognize, however, that there are large overriding economic considerations which might justify the expenditure of United States Government funds for its maintenance.

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[1] This was a covering note to the Dudley memorandum of July 10, p. 485.

This problem has been discussed with officials of the Department of State who have indicated that political considerations make it highly desirable that Roberts Field continue under United States operation. It is understood that the Department of State, which has the primary interest in the continued operation of this base, is attempting to obtain funds from other than the Department of Defense sources for operation of Roberts Field subsequent to Fiscal Year 1953. The Pan American World Airways has indicated a desire to construct a $350,000 terminal building and hotel at Roberts Field if assured a long-term United States operation of Roberts Field. However, Pan American World Airways is unwilling to share in the cost of the maintenance and operation of Roberts Field.

In view of the overriding national interest in maintaining Roberts Field, the Department of the Air Force will continue to operate this field for the remainder of Fiscal Year 1953 to include the repair of the runway intersection. Although the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff plans for years subsequent to Fiscal Year 1953 do not now indicate military requirements which would justify the maintenance of Roberts Field, studies by the Air Force are now underway which may result in a change in this position. Until these studies have been completed and approved, the Air Force will be unable to justify the expenditure of appropriated military funds on a purely military basis for the maintenance of Roberts Field in Fiscal Year 1954 and subsequent years.

I am informed that the above arrangements are acceptable to representatives of the Department of State.

With great respect [etc.]

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

876.10/1-2353

Memorandum of Conversation, by Alexander J. Davit of the Office of African Affairs

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1953.

Subject: Tax Proposals of the Steadman Report.

Participants: Mr. R. F. Steadman—TCA Consultant
TCA/NEADS—Mr. O. W. Meier
TCA/NEADS—Mr. C. R. Hill
AF—Mr. N. Feld
AF—Mr. A. J. Davit
ED—Mr. D. Smith

A meeting with Mr. Steadman was arranged in order to review his report and discuss its use by President Tubman in the latter's recent speech to the Liberian Legislature.[1] Mr. Feld inquired as to why Mr. Steadman had felt it necessary to couple tax recommendations with the study on fiscal controls.

Mr. Steadman explained that he had felt it necessary to incorporate tax proposals in his report to gain acceptance of his fiscal control recommendations by President Tubman. Mr. Steadman stated that his previous experience has clearly indicated the extreme difficulty of having executive heads of governments even in the United States accept fiscal control recommendations without supplementing those proposals with suggestions for raising revenue. In light of the unsympathetic Liberian view toward the position of Financial Adviser as created by the Firestone Loan Agreement, which advisers exerted restraining pressures on expenditures, he felt it imperative to supplement his views on fiscal operations to gain their acceptance. Steadman stated that the use of this approach to Tubman had apparently been so successful that Tubman had complimented him as being the first American who had worked primarily for the interests of Liberia. Steadman stated that, although he had not recently reviewed his suggestions, he believed them to be fundamentally sound. He stated further that he had attempted in his report to draw President Tubman's attention to the necessity of developing a consistent policy toward investment, one that would apply uniformly and without discrimination to foreign and local investors.

Mr. Feld and Mr. Davit drew Mr. Steadman's attention to the fact that a major objective of Point IV was to develop a favorable climate for investment; unfortunately, the manner in which Tubman publicly announced the tax proposals coupled with recent actions by the Liberians (e.g. newspaper articles, revision of agreements, etc.) had created the danger that Liberia's reputation as a country attractive to foreign investors could suffer in financial circles. Mr. Davit remarked that Steadman's view of developing a consistent policy did not appear to be emphasized sufficiently in the report. Because of increasing pressures for additional revenues there is a possibility that President Tubman may grasp at the tax proposals for short-run gains and forget the broader important concept Steadman had hoped to encourage. Davit expressed the belief that Steadman's view to the effect that the potentialities of Liberia had been clearly demonstrated was probably over optimistic; Steadman conceded that his statement had been "too strong". Davit added that the "reasonable terms" for investing in Liberia to which Steadman referred in his report might have been amplified in light of the view concerning proven profit potentialities and Liberian pressures for greater revenues.

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[1] Steadman's "Report on the Fiscal System of the Republic of Liberia" was dated July 11, 1952. Steadman had been expected to explore the possibility of setting up a mechanism to help Tubman develop a well-conceived budgetary program something on the order of the Bureau of the Budget. Then he was to aid in devising a procedure to review governmental expenditures to assure their efficient application for the proper purposes. This was to be in line with the General Accounting Office. The Department of State was upset that he had submitted his more ambitious recommendations in draft form to President Tubman prior to its having had the opportunity to examine and criticize the proposals. Tubman's speech, incorporating Steadman's suggestions, was made at the opening session of the legislature on Nov. 26, 1952. Aside from the Department, Firestone was also displeased by the thrust of Tubman's address. Larabee indicated this at a meeting designed to ascertain the response of American business interests which was held on Dec. 23. (876.11/12–2352)

In reply to queries on the suggested "excess profits tax" Mr. Steadman indicated that he had offered this proposal merely as a suggestion and believed it fair in light of his recommendation that such a tax not be applied until very high returns had been realized by the investors. He added that various modifications could be made to this proposal and suggested that tax exemption for five years might be considered a reasonable incentive but emphasized the view that 99 year tax free concessions were most certainly out of order. Concerning the protective tariff proposal Mr. Steadman said he had in mind only such simple industries as soap manufacture, furniture manufacture, etc., in total not numbering more than ten or a dozen activities; he concurred he might have been more specific on this item by limiting the proposal to a protective period of five and not more than ten years. Mr. Steadman noted that Tubman's suggestion for increased income tax, 3% emergency tax on imports, and $1 tax on each adult for building schools did not originate with him. He concurred in the view that the $1 tax on each adult was regressive and a type he recommended be minimized. Concerning the 3% emergency tax he noted that this tax did not fit in with his recommendation on simplification of customs duties. Although he was not opposed to increasing duties, he felt a multiplication of special taxes should be avoided.

Steadman felt it pertinent to emphasize that in order for Liberia to develop roads, education, hospitals, etc., revenues were essential, a consideration which he stated, must be remembered when discussing measures necessary for the development of a favorable climate for investment. He expressed the view that the entire area south of the Sahara was "ripe" for development; however, he was unable to name specific areas of activity in Liberia which were so obviously outstanding that investment incentives were not necessary. He concurred that Liberian policy would have to take into consideration policies toward investment in other nearby areas or else Liberia might not be able to compete for risk capital.

Mr. Meier observed, in connection with the development of a favorable climate for investment and the importance of social capital developments, that probably a review of U.S. Government attitudes toward economic development in all of Africa as well as Liberia might be in order, particularly since projects in African areas were to be financed not through grants but loans. He expressed the view that long term loans (50 years or more) were necessary for such developments but were not granted under present lending policies.

Mr. Meier suggested that Mr. Steadman write to President Tubman with a view toward emphasizing the importance of developing a consistent policy toward all investors as well as cautioning him as to the timing and implementation of the various tax proposals. Steadman said he would write Tubman in that vein. Mr. Smith suggested that in addition to the points already discussed Mr. Steadman emphasize the need for honoring existing agreements with investors, and that when modifications were contemplated such changes should be mutually agreeable.[3]

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[3] On Feb. 6, 1953, Steadman wrote President Tubman: "Although present tax rates are by no means onerous, I judge from conversations in Washington following my return from Liberia that there is concern in certain quarters in America that a continued series of tax adjustments and concession re-negotiations might create an atmosphere of mistrust and so discourage that inflow of capital and private enterprise which would be mutually beneficial to the Liberian economy and to investors and entrepreneurs". His letter and his report may be found in AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Steadman Report on Financial Situation in Liberia".

776.11/1–2653 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Liberia (Dudley) to the Department of State

RESTRICTED

MONROVIA, January 26, 1953—4 p. m.

344. Department's instruction No. 18, January 16.[1]

Department's views on Steadman report, tax problems and the possible adverse effect of hasty action on foreign investors agreements discussed today with Tubman in lengthy informal cordial talk. Tubman expressed appreciation for Department's concern and aid in problems his government.

Stated he understands Department's motive is solely to assist Liberians and he will continue to welcome such advice and assistance. His message to Legislature designed as agenda for discussion and not positive recommendation. Following points made by Tubman during discussion:

1. There will be no excess profits tax.
2. No action affecting foreign investors will be taken *ex parte.*
3. There will be no attempts made to influence changes in any present agreements except Firestone's. The wording of this agreement, according to Tubman, is regarded by Liberians as archaic and not in keeping with its sovereignty. He states the 1950 amendment should have been a new agreement thereby changing the onerous phraseology in the old

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[1] Not printed; it instructed the Embassy to review with Tubman the Department's reaction, therein set forth, to Steadman's report and to the Liberian President's annual message, and to attempt to dissuade him from implementing the proposals until they could at least be reviewed by a permanent fiscal expert. (776.11/1–1653)

1935 agreement. This [is] the matter he will discuss with Larabee when he arrives.[2]

4. He believes the income tax is the fairest method of taxation for all future investors and fully recognizes the reasoning of foreign investors in insisting on an agreed upon ceiling beyond which any tax of general application will not apply.

Tubman assures that he has always recognized the sanctity of agreements and has never taken unilateral action. He desires to point out, however, that certain agreements have been made with Liberia where the other side has all the technical information and have been later discovered to be unconscionable. He cited the five cent iron ore agreement.[3] This is entirely satisfactory. The language in the Firestone agreement was forced upon Liberia as he put it while she had her back to the wall. After making these points he dwelt upon the good to the country foreign investors had brought despite certain inequities.

Tubman on the budget has decided not to request a fiscal expert from Washington at this time. In my opinion he will give the job to Margey, former Firestone bank manager now employed with the Treasury Department here.[4]

On the whole I consider Tubman's attitude very good. He appears to be thinking seriously and definitely appreciates Department's continuing advice.

His final statement was to the effect that he knew Steadman had exceeded his terms of reference in his assignment and that he was not accepting all of his tax proposals but was very grateful for the entire job done.

Dudley

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[2] Larabee had been summoned to Liberia by Tubman to discuss the proposed increment in the tax rate Firestone was obliged to pay. However, he indicated that he could not arrive prior to the desired deadline of Nov. 15, 1952 because of health problems. (876.112/12–352)

[3] The Liberia Mining Company had secured an 80-year concession in August 1945 which called for a fixed royalty of 5 cents per ton of ore removed from an area of some 3 million acres, plus a variable sum dependent on the New York price of Bessemer-grade pig iron. See *Liberia: America's African Friend* by R. Earle Anderson (Chapel Hill, 1952), p. 183.

[4] Louis A. Margey was the former Vice President and General Manager of the Firestone-owned Bank of Monrovia between 1943 and 1949.

711.56376/3–253

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

SECRET [Washington,] March 2, 1953.

Dear Mr. Secretary: For nearly a year the Department of State has been exchanging views with the Department of the Air Force concerning the possibility of continuing, after June 30, 1953, the use of Air Force funds for the maintenance and operation of Roberts Field in Liberia. Last July our Ambassador to Liberia, Edward R. Dudley, also discussed the case with President Truman.

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[1] The approach to Wilson was suggested by Byroade on Feb. 18. (711.56376/2–1853)

In a letter of December 30, 1952 [2] to President Truman, Secretary of Defense Lovett stated that although the plans of the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for years subsequent to June 30, 1953 did not then indicate military requirements which would justify continued financing of Roberts Field, studies by the Air Force were under way which might result in a change in this position. The Secretary also indicated that until those studies were completed and approved, the Department of the Air Force would be unable to justify the expenditure of appropriated military funds on a purely military basis for Roberts Field in Fiscal Year 1954 and subsequent years.

Since the action which the Liberian Government may take, in the event the United States Government does not continue to finance the Field, may require that Government to reconsider its budgetary expenditures and may affect Liberia's contribution to the Point IV program as well as its ability to meet payments due next year to the Export-Import Bank, I am particularly anxious that the Liberian Government be notified in sufficient time of the United States Government's intention in this regard. It would be embarrassing to this Government and inopportune for the Liberian Government were the latter not informed until shortly before June 30. In such circumstances the Liberian Government might feel compelled to take hasty action which might not be to the best interests of either Government. In any event the decision of the United States Government will have a direct bearing on the Liberian Government's attitude toward the renegotiation of the Defense Areas Agreement, now lapsed, in which the Department of the Air Force has informally expressed interest.

Your attention is also invited to certain political aspects of this problem which could seriously affect the interests of the United States in West Africa. Roberts Field is a symbol of the close collaboration that has existed for many years between the United States and Liberia. Withdrawal of our financial support for the Field would have a damaging effect upon that collaboration and would play into the hands of the racist and nationalist movements in Liberia which are opposed to the traditional United States leadership which has been dominant in the republic since its founding. Moreover, withdrawal of our support would have unfavorable consequences for Liberia's attitude toward future United States defense requirements in its territory. Accordingly, the Department of State believes the maintenance and support of Roberts Field would be a matter of national interest to the United States, the broader aspects of which, we feel, should be weighed carefully in reaching a decision upon the continuation of financial support after June 30, 1953.

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[2] *Ante*, p. 501.

In view of the foregoing considerations, I should appreciate being advised of your decision in this matter as soon as possible in order that the Liberian Government may be informed at an early date.

Sincerely yours, H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

711.56376/4–1753

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Kyes) to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 17, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I refer to the letter, dated 30 December 1952, from the Secretary of Defense to the President, with respect to the operation and maintenance of Roberts Field, Liberia, by the United States Air Force. This letter stated that while the plans of the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for years subsequent to Fiscal Year 1953 did not indicate military requirements which would justify the maintenance of Roberts Field, studies by the Air Force were then under way which might result in a change in that position.

The studies referred to have now been completed. The Air Force has determined that there are no military requirements for Roberts Field which would justify the expenditure of appropriated military funds subsequent to Fiscal Year 1953 for the maintenance of Roberts Field. Accordingly, the Air Force does not wish to continue its contract with the Pan American World Airways for the maintenance and operation of Roberts Field after 30 June 1953. This question has been considered in my office in the light of a letter from Mr. Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State, dated 2 March 1953,[1] to the Department of Defense, concerning certain political aspects of this problem which could seriously affect the interests of the United States in West Africa. A copy of this letter is inclosed.

As a result of conferences between the State and Defense Departments, my Department does not consider that political considerations are so compelling as to justify the use of military funds for continuing operation of the field when there is no military requirement.

I am informing the Department of State of the position of the Department of Defense on this matter.

With great respect [etc.]

Faithfully yours, ROGER M. KYES

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[1] *Supra.*

711.56376/5–653

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 6, 1953.

Subject: Roberts Field, Liberia

Problem:

To obtain the President's decision concerning the continued maintenance and operation of Roberts Field with Air Force funds after June 30, 1953.

Discussion:

Air Force funds have been used for this purpose since World War II, largely because of the political and commercial interests of the United States Government. The Department of Defense wishes to discontinue its financial support on the grounds that it has no military requirement for Roberts Field. The State Department has explored other methods of financing without success.

In its letter of March 2, 1953 (copy attached),[1] the State Department recapitulated for the Department of Defense the political factors which, taken together with the commercial and military usefulness of the Field, would appear to warrant the continued maintenance and operation of the Field with United States funds. The Department of Defense thereupon orally informed the State Department that *it was referring the question to the President for decision*, in view of the political considerations that the State Department had raised. A copy of its letter of April 17, 1953 to the President is attached.[2]

Colonel Carroll[3] of the White House staff has informed me that the Defense Department's letter has been construed, quite understandably as a result of its text, as requiring no action on the part of the President and that no action will be taken unless the State Department requests it.

We believe this Field should be kept open for the following reasons:

(1) *Political Importance.* It is politically important, at home and in Africa, that the United States show positive interest in Africa. Roberts Field is a symbol of such interest. Withdrawal of our financial support would damage our prestige throughout West Africa, and might be interpreted by important segments of the American public as a decrease of official interest in Africa.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 506.

[2] *Supra*.

[3] Paul Thomas Carroll was the Military Liaison Officer.

(2) *Liberian Trends.* In recent years, Liberian leaders have been exposed to racist and nationalist influences, particularly in the United Nations, with the result that Liberian acceptance of United States leadership has shown a tendency to be less automatic and may no longer be taken for granted. Any sign of lessening United States interest in Liberia would aggravate this tendency at a time when it is generally recognized that the importance of Africa to the free world is increasing.

(3) *French Interest.* Americans doing business in Liberia claim that France is eager to maintain and operate Roberts Field if the United States does not. Air France is a recognized instrument of French foreign policy. The American businessmen fear that French operation of Roberts Field would be only another step in French penetration of Liberia. Firestone and Republic Steel (Liberia Mining Company) would view such a development with concern. French interests are considering the establishment of a bank in Liberia.

(4) *Commercial Significance.* Pan American Airways is feeling keen competition on the New York–Johannesburg route from BOAC's Comet. In order to meet this competition over an already thin national-interest route, Pan American has put DC–6 B's into service and is non-stopping points north and south of Roberts Field. The company prefers for a number of reasons to anchor its DC–6 service at Roberts, a field under American operation. Unless this field can be kept open, services to South Africa will no longer operate through Liberia.

(5) *Future Rubber Supply.* Liberia is the largest natural rubber producer outside Ceylon and the Far East. American control of Roberts Field would be very valuable in the event Liberia became the only secure source of our natural rubber supply.

(6) *Costs.* Operating costs for FY 1954 are estimated at $589,491. In addition to operating costs, however, an estimated $4.5 million would be required to effect necessary runway repairs.

Recommendation:

In view of the fact that a balancing of political and military factors is required, I recommend that you seek a White House decision on this issue for the reasons stated above.

711.56376/5–1253

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1953.

Subject: Roberts Field, Liberia

Last week you indicated to Mr. Byroade that you would consider presenting the case of Roberts Field, Liberia (memorandum attached)[1] to the President for decision, after it had been determined what support you might expect from the Secretary of Commerce.[2]

It is not believed that support would be given by the Secretary of Commerce. Mr. Barringer, TRC, has explored the problem with Mr. Lee, Administrator of Civil Aeronautics (CAA)[3] who would advise the Secretary of Commerce. Mr. Lee feels that Roberts Field fills no real air navigation requirement and that the substantial cost of rehabilitation cannot be justified on the basis of the safety and efficiency of US civil air operations between Dakar and Accra on the US route to South Africa on which Pan Am is certificated. Staff officers of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) informally advise that the revenue potential of Liberian traffic would not support the rehabilitation cost. TRC also believes that international civil aviation policy considerations alone do not warrant the expenditure. It is known, however, that Pan Am is strongly opposed to the withdrawal of US Government financial support.

NEA accepts the views of the Departments of Commerce and Defense on the civil and military aspects of this case, but would still recommend that the President be informed of all aspects, particularly the political, as a withdrawal of United States financial support of the field might be construed, at home and in Africa, as evidence of a negative policy towards Africa on the part of this Administration.

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[1] *Supra.*
[2] Sinclair Weeks.
[3] Frederick Billings Lee.

711.56376/6-2953

The Secretary of the Air Force (Talbott) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 26, 1953.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have reviewed the military and political aspects concerning the operation and maintenance of Roberts Field, Liberia. I believe that they are of such importance that it is in the national interest that Roberts Field continue to be operated and maintained by the United States Government. While the Air Force is unable to justify the current maintenance of this airfield on the basis of military necessity, it does have a possible important strategic value in case of an emergency. Accordingly, I wish to express the willingness of the Department of the Air Force to operate Roberts Field subsequent to June 30, 1953, provided it is determined that such an undertaking is in the national interest.

Sincerely yours,

H. E. TALBOTT

711.56376/6–2953

The Liberian Ambassador (Simpson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 12 June 1953.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Upon instructions of my Government, I have the honor to inform you that on the 19th of May 1953, representation was made by undersigned to the Department of State in Washington concerning reports to the effect that the United States Government was considering the possibility of withdrawing its financial contribution towards the maintenance and operation of Roberts Field, which was constructed by Agreement between the United States and the Liberian Governments and was of strategic value during World War II to the United States and its Allies.

In the course of the conversation I had with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs,[1] he pointed out that although the Department was in sympathy with the position of the Liberian Government, he was afraid that as Roberts Field was not now of strategic importance to the United States Government, in the interest of economy he could not guarantee that his Government would continue its financial contribution.

However, he expressed a desire to be informed of the economic benefit of Roberts Field to Liberia, I assured him that I would represent this phase of the matter to my Government, and would thereafter advise the Department of State.

In a recent telegraphic message which I have received from my Government, I have been instructed to make further representation regarding Roberts Field and to respectfully request that the matter of financial contribution towards its maintenance and operation might be sympathetically reconsidered by your Government.

I am specifically directed to stress the point that the closing down of Roberts Field whose operation was hitherto given support by your Government would have a most disastrous effect on the economic stability of Liberia. It should also be stated that Roberts Field is not merely the only link between the United States and Liberia, but also the inlet and outlet for communication and commerce with Europe and other points in Africa.

The movement of American business men and those of other nationality including Liberians by air must also be emphasized. It is my belief, you will agree, that while Liberia is largely dependent upon America for commerce and other interests, the United States is also in a measure dependent upon Iiberia for important and essential raw materials, and while these materials do not necessarily move by air, it is quite essential that those operating these resources must have quick access to them. It is therefore clear that if Roberts Field is eventually closed it will require about twelve days by surface transportation for American and other business men to get to Liberia.

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[1] A memorandum by Cyr, not printed, summarized the conversation of Ambassador Simpson; Reid Wiles, the Second Secretary at the Liberian Embassy; Jernegan; and Cyr. (711.56376/5–1953)

It would seem from the above statement of facts that the national interests of Liberia and the United States and their historic ties for over a century would require the continued maintenance and operation of Roberts Field which will undoubtedly be assured if the Government of the United States continued its financial contribution towards same.

I should like to be permitted to state that compared with expenditures for national interest in other directions, the amount involved in keeping Roberts Field opened and in condition for Air Communication and Transportation which are so vital to the economy of Liberia would appear to be infinitesimal.

I have every reason to believe you will agree that the history of air communication indicates that once a city or country is served by air, the commerce of that country never stops growing. It is most fortunate that Liberia has developed through its air connections throughout the world and to be now deprived of this facility can only result in a serious diminution of its commerce, which, in turn, will cause obvious destruction to the country's economy.

Lastly, I would like to point out that Roberts Field may now be considered an International Airfield as presently it is being used for Civil Aviation, and in addition to Pan American planes, air traffic is being carried on the said field by Air France, British Overseas Airways Corporation, Liberian International Airways and planes of other nationality.

I avail myself [etc.] C. L. SIMPSON

711.56376/6-2953

Memorandum for the Record by Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 29, 1953.

I discussed with the President the question of keeping Roberts Field in Liberia in operation beyond July 1, 1953 on the basis of the information set forth in the papers furnished by the State Department and the Air Force supplemented by my conversation with Messrs. Smith, Kyes, Talbott and Byroade.

It was the President's view that we should not, under existing circumstances, give up Roberts Field, and that (*a*) Roberts Field should be kept in operation for a further year, (*b*) that the $800,000 estimated in Colonel Hipps' Memorandum of June 26 for major maintenance and operation for Fiscal Year 1954 should be expended,[1] (*c*) that, during the year's interval thus provided, a program should be worked out under which private interests concerned in Liberia would carry forward without cost to the Government the maintenance and operation of Roberts Field at a nominal rent after June 30, 1954.

As we were concluding our conversation, Messrs. Smith and Kyes, came into the room and a further discussion ensued along the above lines in which they participated.

I communicated the foregoing information to Colonel Hipps for Secretary Talbott.

I am forwarding the file of papers furnished to me by Secretary Talbott's office to the Under Secretary of State with the original of this Memorandum. Copies of this Memorandum are being sent to Secretary Talbott and to Deputy Secretary of Defense Kyes.

ROBERT CUTLER

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[1] Not printed; it presented the opinion of Col. William G. Hipps, the Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, that for fiscal year 1955 and thereafter the maintenance cost would be $260,000 a year. (711.56376/6–2953)

711.56376/8–453

The Acting Secretary of State to the Liberian Ambassador (Simpson)

[WASHINGTON,] August 4, 1953.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of June 12, 1953,[1] stating your Government's views concerning Roberts Field and its importance to the economy of Liberia.

I am pleased to inform you that my Government has decided to continue the operation and maintenance of Roberts Field through June 30, 1954, with Pan American Airways acting as contractor for the United States Government. The intent of my Government is to provide a sufficient interval for the Liberian Government and private interests concerned with Liberia to work out a program for operation and maintenance after June 30, 1954, without cost to the United States Government. Although the responsibility for developing, implementing, and financing a program for such operation after June 30, 1954, rests with your Government and private interests, my Government will be pleased to lend its good offices in the establishment of the program. Pan American Airways is being advised of my Government's decision and intention.[2]

You are also informed that, in the interests of safety, my Government considers certain repairs to be necessary at Roberts Field. These repairs would provide Liberia with a serviceable field for a number of years. My Government proposes to make these repairs at its own expense, provided your Government will extend for ten years, from July 1, 1953, the rights granted to the United States in the Defense Areas Agreement signed at Monrovia March 31, 1942. It will be apparent to your Government that such an extension is required as a minimum to justify the expenditures which my Government would incur in making the contemplated repairs. My Government will welcome assurances that this proposal meets with the approval of your Government.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 512.

[2] Smith contacted Samuel F. Pryor, Vice President and Assistant to the President of Pan American World Airways, on Aug. 4, 1953. (711.56376/8–453)

I wish to call your attention to the fact that the foregoing arrangements do not include financing the construction of housing or administration buildings at Roberts Field. In this connection, Pan American Airways has expressed a willingness to share with your Government the costs of constructing the housing facilities which may be essential for continued successful operation of Roberts Field. Representatives of the company will presumably be approaching you regarding arrangements for the construction and operation of such facilities.

Accept [etc.]

WALTER B. SMITH

776.58/9–2853

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Halaby) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 28, 1953.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is in reply to your letter of 17 August 1953[1] regarding the renewal of the agreement between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Liberia providing for the assignment of the United States Army Mission to Liberia.

Liberia is of certain potential military value to the United States because it is a source of natural rubber and high grade iron ore; there is an airfield there, Roberts Field, which may be necessary in case the United States should require a South Atlantic Air Route; Monrovia provides the only port in West Africa not controlled by a European nation. In the event of global war, it would in all probability be necessary for the United States to furnish Army units to protect the supply of strategic materials and bases in Liberia. The strength of such United States Army units could be reduced by the extent Liberia itself is able to contribute to its own security. On this basis and in view of the low costs involved and the good will engendered, it is concluded that continued assistance to Liberia on a very modest scale through the renewal of the agreement is justified.

It is therefore requested that the Department of State initiate the necessary negotiations with the view of renewing the agreement as recommended in your letter. It is further requested that you contact the Department of the Army directly in working out the details.

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[1] Not printed; it solicited the views of the Department of Defense to the overture of the Liberian Government to renew the agreement providing for a U.S. Army Mission in Liberia for an additional 3 years. (776.58/8–753)

Sincerely yours, N. E. HALABY

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "South Atlantic Route Case (Pan-Am)"

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of African Affairs (Cyr) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1953.

[Subject:] Roberts Field: Liberian Government's attitude toward our note of August 4.[1]

The Liberian Ambassador telephoned this morning and read the following message, dated October 16, which he had received from his Government:

"You will inform the U.S. State Department that

"(1) Defense Agreement of March 30, 1942, lapsed and became void six months after World War II;

"(2) (Liberian) Government has on more than one occasion called the United States Government's attention to the fact and suggested a new agreement be made;

"(3) It is not likely that the provisions of the terms and conditions of the Defense Agreement could be made to apply to peacetime even if the Defense Agreement were extant;

"(4) (Liberian) Government would be willing to negotiate an agreement with the United States Government that would extend the privilege of the use of Roberts Field; and,

"(5) (Liberian) Government is presently carrying on negotiations with Pan American for operation Roberts Field after June 30, 1954, as a commercial airfield."[2]

The Liberian Ambassador asked that this message be drawn to the attention of the proper authorities and that he be apprised of the Department's views and reaction to the message.

You will recall that our note of August 4 to the Liberian Ambassador stated that certain repairs were necessary and that "My Government proposes to make these repairs at its own expense, provided your Government will extend for ten years, from July 1, 1953, the rights granted to the United States in the Defense Areas Agreement. . . ."[3] Making the repairs contingent upon an extension of the agreement was at the suggestion of Pan American. The Air Force considered extension to

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[1] *Ante*, p. 514.

[2] Paul M. Strieffler, a special assistant to the Executive Vice President of Pan American World Airways, was in Liberia conducting the negotiations.

[3] The ellipsis occurs in the source text.

June 30, 1954, desirable because funds would be expended on Roberts Field until then.

Since current indications are that the Air Force has no requirement for an agreement, I suggest after clearance with appropriate U.S. Government officials, the Liberian Ambasador be informed that:

(1) the United States Government does not desire to negotiate a new agreement at this time; and,

(2) the Liberian Government's assurance that the field would be available to the United States in the event of a national emergency would be sufficient.

711.56376/3-1654

The Ambassador in Liberia (Locker) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL MONROVIA, March 16, 1954.

No. 148

Ref: A-67, February 12, 1954 [2]

Subject: Roberts Field

On March 11, 1954, Ambassador Locker called on President Tubman by appointment to discuss the Roberts Field situation in compliance with the instruction above cited.

President Tubman informed the Ambassador that his Government had agreed in principle to a division of the costs of operating Roberts Field with Pan American Airways, Inc., and that he had appropriately instructed Ambassador Clarence L. Simpson to take up this subject upon his return to Washington with the Department and the interested American concern on a priority basis. The President expressed his awareness of the importance of finding a mutually satisfactory solution to this problem prior to the termination of the contract between Pan-American and the US Air Force on June 30, 1954.

As the Department may be aware, Pan-American late last year approached the Liberian Government with a tentative scheme for the operation of Roberts Field which included, *inter alia*, a proposal for the construction of a modern hotel in which the Liberian Government's participation was sought. Inasmuch as Monrovia itself lacks a modern hotel, this aspect of the Pan-American proposal met with a brusque rebuff. However, President Tubman is understood to have committed himself in principle to accept an equal share in the cost of "normal" operation of the field, provided Pan-American would present acceptable detailed proposals, exclusive of the hotel feature.

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[1] This despatch was drafted by Frederick H. Hinke, Counselor of the Embassy. Locker had been sworn in as Ambassador succeeding Dudley on Aug. 31, 1953.

[2] Not printed; it instructed Locker to remind Tubman that financial support for Roberts Field would come to an end on June 30, 1954 in the hope that he might thereby be induced to engage in serious negotiations with Pan American World Airways. (711.56376/2-1254)

In a conversation with the Monrovia representative of Pan-American, immediately following the Ambassador's conversation with President Tubman, the former stated that he assumed that Pan-American was working on these proposals in the United States, but thought that the outcome might be related to the larger issue of Pan-American's route certificate which comes up for simultaneous review by the Civil Aeronautics Board in late June or early July.[3] That problem is of course tied in with the anticipated loss of Pan-American terminal rights at Lisbon and a possible rescheduling and rerouting of the West African run.

From the tenor of President Tubman's conversation with the Ambassador, it appears that the locale for the negotiations on the Roberts Field problem is being transferred to Washington and New York with responsibility placed on Ambassador Simpson to deal with the problem on behalf of the Liberian Government.

As a side light on this problem, the Embassy is informed that when President Tubman briefed the Liberian Delegates to the Dakar Defense Conference,[4] he stated that his Government had agreed in principle to carry one-half of the cost of the Roberts Field operations in cooperation with Pan-American Airways.

The Monrovia representative for Pan-American informed the Embassy that it is his understanding that no provision has been made in the Liberian budget for 1954 to cover this charge, which is roughly estimated as $150,000, but that he had been personally given to understand that the necessary funds would be made available, once a mutually satisfactory agreement with Pan-American had been reached.[5]

JESSE D. LOCKER

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[3] This route connected the United States and Johannesburg via the Azores, Lisbon, Dakar, Monrovia, Accra, and Leopoldville.

[4] For information on the conference, see despatch 2138 from Paris, Feb. 18, p. 94.

[5] The draft Liberian-PanAm Agreement, a copy of which was sent to the Department by Locker on May 11, 1954, called for both parties to contribute $150,000 to Roberts Field operations. (976.524/5–1154)

776.58/4–154

The Liberian Ambassador (Simpson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 1 April 1954.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Under instructions received from my Government, I have the honour to advise the Government of the United States of America that because of the universal strengthening of defense for the benefit of national security and with a view to preventing aggression and the ruthless spread of Communism, Liberia recently sent a delegation which participated in discussions at Dakar, Senegal, for the defense of Africa South of the Sahara and West Africa in particular.

With a view to implementing the objective of the discussions mentioned in the preceding paragraph due to the present uncertain posture of the world, and in consideration of the historic friendly relations between the United States of America and Liberia, I am directed to submit for the kind consideration of the Government of the United States the following points of mutual interest:

a) Liberia in virtue of the rôle played by her in World War II by the use of Roberts Field as a military air base from which thousands of United Nations military aircrafts were serviced and took off in the deadly struggle against Nazi aggression which contributed largely to the success of the cause of democracy;

b) The large supply of natural rubber produced in Liberia and which also contributed to the cause of the United Nations fighting against aggression and for the freedom of mankind; and which natural product has increased in volume since the cessation of hostilities of that war and will be made available to the United States in case of another emergency;

c) The construction of the Free Port of Monrovia since World War II that is to be made available to the United States as a military naval base in case of emergency in which the United States may be involved;

d) the iron ore mines at Bomi Hills being operated by the Liberia Mining Company, an American Concessionaire; also the huge concession granted the United African American Development Corporation for the exploitation of iron ore, manganese, corundum, bauxite and other ores and minerals; all of which make the country very vulnerable to attack in case of emergency in which the United States may be involved;

e) The Liberian Government's experience in World Wars I and II when she made declarations of war against the Axis powers and her coast line of more than 350 miles with her cities, towns and villages and the inhabitants thereof lay open to enemy attack and a German submarine bombarded the capital city, Monrovia, and sunk Allied vessels upon the gaze of the population of the country living on the coastal areas;

f) Considering the tremendous advance in modern warfare, the invention of super-dangerous and most destructive implements of war, having almost limitless capacity and ability to strike everywhere and anywhere with the most deadly effectiveness, the Government of Liberia views with serious and grave concern her dangerous and defenseless situation in such uncertain times as these and in a world with such a ruthless and unconscionable enemy as Russian Communism, therefore presents the above and appeals to and requests the Government of the United States of America to:

1. Change the present arrangements of the United States Military Mission to Liberia under the Agreement executed January 11, 1951,[1] to that of a Military Assistance Advisory Group;

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[1] For the text of the agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2171 or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 2, p. 1.

2. That negotiations be undertaken for a total military and naval survey of the Liberian coast and borders with a view of working out a program that will insure better internal security and general defense in case of an emergency in which the United States may be involved, on such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon.

I have the honour to indicate that my Government would be infinitely obliged if the Government of the United States were to find it practicable to consider this matter at its earliest convenience.[2]

I avail myself [etc.] C. L. SIMPSON

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[2] On Apr. 21, Ambassador Simpson was informed that the Liberian proposal was being studied and that a reply would be forthcoming at the earliest possible date. (776.58/4–154)

776.11/4–354

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1954.

Subject: Visit of President Tubman of Liberia to the United States; Other Visits of Foreign Officials in 1954 which have either been Approved by you, or which the Department of State intends to Recommend to you at the Appropriate Time.

Ambassador Simpson of Liberia has informed the Department of State that President Tubman is anxious to visit the United States.

Mr. Harvey Firestone has invited President Tubman to be his guest in Akron. Other American business interests are also prepared to entertain President Tubman.[1] Civic groups and educational institutions have requested him to address them when he visits the United States.

An overt manifestation of friendship between the United States and Liberia would be timely in view of increasing neutralist and racist tendencies in certain African and Asian areas. This African republic has always been of special interest to the American Negro population,[2] as well as to many religious organizations. In addition, numerous individuals have recently been made conscious of Africa's importance through well-known American publications. A visit by Liberia's President would serve to affirm publicly the Administration's interest in Africa and more particularly independent Liberia.

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[1] Firestone had invited Tubman to visit Akron, and other companies including Farrell Lines, Pan American World Airways, and Republic Steel had recommended an invitation to the Liberian President. Initially, because of a crowded schedule of State visitors, the decision was made to delay such a trip until 1955. However, Firestone approached Vice President Nixon, and domestic political pressures increased to the point that a 1954 visit was thought desirable. (776.11/3–2954 and 776.11/3–2354)

[2] Ambassador Locker had written the Secretary on Jan. 6, 1954 that "an invitation of President Eisenhower to President Tubman would no doubt tend to have our people [the blacks] return to the Republican Party, because they could see first hand the representative of the Republic of Liberia". (776.11/1–654)

President Tubman's party would be small. It is planned to restrict Washington ceremonies to a minimum.

I recommend that President Tubman be invited to Washington for three days as an official guest of the United States Government in the course of his visit to various places in this country. I suggest that the visit take place during the first two weeks of October 1954, the details to be worked out by the Department of State with Firestone and the Liberians.

I enclose for your approval a suggested invitation[3] which, if you concur, I shall be glad to deliver on your behalf.

I am also attaching a list of official visits[4] planned for 1954 which have been either approved previously by you, or which we intend to recommend to you at an appropriate time as being politically important enough to justify your attention.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[3] See telegram 85, *infra*.
[4] Not printed.

776.11/4-1054 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia

OFFICIAL USE ONLY WASHINGTON, April 10, 1954—3:39 p. m.

85. You are instructed extend following invitation from President Eisenhower to Tubman:

"I understand that Mr. Harvey Firestone has indicated the hope that you may be able to visit Akron, Ohio, in the near future. Such a visit will, I am sure, be most welcome to the American people as a further indication of the bonds which unite our two countries and of the warm feelings which characterize this relationship.

"It is my sincere hope that you will be able to come to the United States and, during your trip, visit Washington as an official guest of the United States Government. In emphasizing the wish that you will be able to accept this invitation, I know that I am speaking in behalf of all my fellow citizens who recognize the achievements of Liberia and admire the role it plays in Africa."

Inform Tubman you will present written invitation upon its receipt. Precise date Washington visit to be arranged later in consultation with Liberian Embassy Washington. White House indicates last half October probably best time.

You should give no publicity until press release can be properly coordinated Department and Liberian Embassy Washington. Request Liberian Government withhold comment as well in order have coordinated announcement.

DULLES

711.56376/7–1354

The Liberian Chargé (David) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 13 July 1954.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of July 6, 1954 referring to the Embassy's note of June 29, 1954 which was in reply to the United States Department of State note of May 19 [*10*], 1954 regarding the use of Roberts Field, Liberia, by the United States Government during a national emergency.[1]

In reply, I have the honour to advise the acceptance and assent by my Government for the United States Government to use Roberts Field during such national emergency and in accordance with the terms and provision of the 1942 agreement between our two Governments. In accordance with the suggestion contained in your note under reply, the notes exchanged and this reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments in this matter.

Be pleased [etc.] WILMOT A. DAVID

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[1] The notes referred to are not here printed. On Feb. 3, 1954, in response to the Department's note of Aug. 4, 1953, p. 514, the Liberian Government indicated its willingness to consider an exchange of notes incorporating the views of the United States regarding the use of Roberts Field during a national emergency. (711.56376/2–354) The United States suggested on May 10 (711.56376/2–354) that the Liberian Government authorize such use under the provisions of the Defense Areas Agreement of Mar. 31, 1942. Ambassador Simpson indicated the assent of his government to such an arrangement on June 29, 1954. (711.56376/6–2954) Dulles thereupon indicated that his response, dated July 6, 1954, should be understood as formalizing this understanding. (711.56376/6–2954) The source text was then the last step completing the exchange of notes.

776.5 MSP/10–2954

Memorandum of Conversation, by Alexander J. Davit of the Office of African Affairs

OFFICIAL USE ONLY [WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1954.

Subject: Liberian Memorandum on National Security and Defense.

Participants:

Liberian Representatives:
  Mr. William E. Dennis, Secretary of the Treasury
  Mr. C. Abayomi Cassell, Attorney General
  Dr. Joseph N. Togba, Dir. Gen., National Public Health Service
  Mr. Charles Sherman, Economic Adviser
  Mr. Nathaniel V. Massaquoi, Assistant Secretary of Education
  Mr. Rudolph Grimes, Counselor, Liberian Department of State
NEA—Mr. Byroade
  Mr. Dixon
AF —Mr. Utter
  Mr. Davit

Mr. Byroade opened the meeting by indicating that the subject for discussion was the Liberian Government's Memorandum on National Security and Defense.[1]

With reference to the acquisition of military equipment on a deferred payment plan, Mr. Byroade explained that the Executive Order had not yet been signed. In any event, he assured the Liberian representatives that every effort would be made to reach a determination before President Tubman departed.[2]

Concerning the request for a Military Assistance Advisory Group adequately staffed to make a survey of Liberia and the possibility of subsequent grant military aid, Mr. Byroade could not be optimistic. He explained that reduced appropriations had made necessary curtailment of certain plans. In addition, he pointed out that the military build-up in other areas had priority and noted that, in light of the present threat, the United States cannot afford at this time to put military equipment into Liberia. A military build-up could be a drain on the Liberian economy, and Mr. Byroade queried whether in the long run it was to Liberia's advantage to put its resources into military expansion.

With regard to the local threat, Mr. Byroade said that the United States could not expend money at this time because of that probability. He drew attention to Liberia's immediate need for a post-type installation. His remarks were not to be construed as precluding military help in the future, he said.

The United States, he noted, does not intend to stand aside if Liberia is threatened; however, it would be unwise to withdraw now equipment from Europe and the Middle East for Liberia, which is what would have to be done if Liberia were to receive grant aid.

Mr. Cassell inquired whether the United States military training group presently in Liberia were qualified to make surveys and if any had been made, to which Mr. Byroade replied that he understood the training mission was equipped only to handle training and knew of no surveys having been made. Concerning Liberia's internal security problems, Mr. Byroade felt Liberia was the better judge of the possibilities of sabotage and subversion.

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[1] On Apr. 1, 1954 (see p. 518), the Liberian Government had requested that the U.S. Military Mission be converted into a Military Assistance Advisory Group and that a total military and naval survey of the country be undertaken with a view to strengthening its defenses. Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., the Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs, passed this request on to the Department of Defense on June 11. (776.58/4–154) H. Struve Hensel, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, indicated on June 16 that the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been sought. (776.5 MSP/6–1654) Then on Aug. 23, Adm. Arthur C. Davis, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, informed Nolting that the Joint Chiefs had decided that from a military standpoint there were no requirements at that time to justify a military survey or approval of a grant military aid program, to which Admiral Davis added his concurrence. (776.5 MSP/8–2354) It was then on Sept. 13, that Ambassador Simpson handed Byroade his government's Memorandum on National Security and Defense. Eleven days later, Jernegan informed the Ambassador that the United States could not accede to the Liberian request that the existing agreement providing for a military mission be revised to provide for a total military survey of Liberia by a Military Assistance Advisory Group. (776.11/9–2954)

[2] The State portion of President Tubman's visit took place between Oct. 18 and 20. He was greeted at the White House by President Eisenhower on Oct. 18, and a State dinner was given in his honor that evening.

Mr. Cassell referred to the threat of Communism in Europe and indicated that his Government's most immediate concern was the possibility of a collapse in France with possible subsequent developments similar to those which had existed in World War II, in which case territories contiguous to Liberia could fall under Communist domination, following which attacks might be made on Liberia. Mr. Cassell stated that in light of Mr. Byroade's presentation, the Liberian Government would be satisfied with a statement indicating contemplated action by the United States in the event Liberia's security were threatened so that Liberia could know the extent to which she could depend upon the United States. He indicated that a survey would point up to Liberia her defense problem. The Liberian Government considers its present forces inadequate and needs a well-trained token force to be a nucleus in the event of an emergency. Mr. Cassell considered the present United States training team inadequate and asked if it could be enlarged.

Mr. Byroade offered no encouragement for a survey team or grant equipment but said that he considered their request for increasing the present training mission very reasonable. He said that this was a question which the Pentagon would have to decide, but he would be very willing to urge favorable Defense consideration of this question. Similarly, he said he would feel justified in asking that the Pentagon include an officer in the training mission qualified to help the Liberian army conduct defense planning.

Mr. Dennis discussed occurrences which had placed Liberia in jeopardy in past wars. Mr. Massaquoi, emphasizing Communistic opportunism, discussed the problem of our Western Allies and colonialism. Mr. Charles Sherman noted that, if Liberia is to carry the burden of her economic development, it will be very difficult for her to carry the full load of military requirements. He believed the United States might to some extent relieve the Liberian Government of economic development so that Liberia might bear its military burden, a burden which in part grew out of its responsibility to protect American investments in Liberia.

Mr. Byroade, indicating Liberia's fiscal and budgetary position did not appear to be as good as might be desired, expressed concern over Liberia's economic position.

With reference to an Export-Import Bank loan, Mr. Cassell hoped that the bank could indicate the extent to which it could extend credit prior to President Tubman's departure; details could be worked out later. Mr. Byroade reviewed the State Department's relation to the bank and said he had urged the bank to consider as sympathetically and quickly as possible the Liberian request. Mr. Cassell inquired whether it would be possible for Liberian representatives to meet with State Department officials concerned with economic matters so that Liberia's financial position might be reviewed. Mr. Cassell affirmed his desire for a free and frank exchange of remarks. Mr. Byroade set up a meeting with economic officers of the Department for 11:00 a.m., Monday, November 1, 1954.[3]

Mr. Byroade handed Mr. Dennis a draft copy of an *Aide-Mémoire* presenting the United States position on the Liberian proposals concerning technical assistance.[4] It was understood by the Liberian representatives that this was a draft on which their comments were invited.

With regard to the Memorandum on the Free Port of Monrovia,[5] a meeting would be arranged for Tuesday, November 2, 1954.

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[3] Alexander J. Davit prepared a memorandum of conversation summarizing the discussion of Liberia's financial and fiscal problems. (876.10/11-154)

[4] Not printed.

[5] Not printed. The Liberians were anxious that certain maintenance work be completed and hoped for an expansion of the Port Management Company.

776.11/11-854

The President of Liberia (Tubman) to President Eisenhower[1]

[NEW ORLEANS?,] November 8, 1954.

MR. PRESIDENT: I regret exceedingly to have to intrude upon you in these busy moments, as I realize they must be, but please appreciate the fact that I address you because developments in talks going on in Washington by my representatives necessitate my having to do so.

As I had the opportunity of telling you on the morning of the 19th of October, at the stage which development in Liberia has reached it is most urgent, in fact almost inescapable, that long term credit sufficiently large and upon terms of amortization our economy can stand be received, otherwise we would be compelled to cut back to such an extent as would be tragic.

Up to the present we have been unable to obtain an indication of the willingness of the Export Import Bank to extend Liberia a line of credit. Our application indicated the sum of twenty-five million dollars for a term of thirty years at interest rate of 4% for our highway development program.

It is proposed that actual advances would only be made within the limits of this line of credit for specific road projects fully justified by economic and other factors or as may be required and approved by the Bank.

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[1] Tubman arrived in New York on Nov. 9, having cut short his tour of the South. His itinerary had called for him to be in New Orleans on Nov. 6 and 7, and before that in Atlanta.

You will appreciate the position in which I would be were I to return home without any definite indication of the accomplishment of this one of the principal purposes of my mission.

We have not overlooked the possibility of the use of private capital in assisting with the financing of our development program. My desire was accentuated when you mentioned that you thought my request for financing should be based on using both means—a public and a private loan.

I have been exploring that possibility but the proposition which I have received so far proved to be both unreasonable and unsatisfactory. It would paralyze our economy. Ambassador Simpson and Attorney General Cassell will explain the nature of the proposals received from the Boston Corporations.

It is desirable to explore possible sources and accept private capitalization for part of our development program but I do not think it wise, from past experiences, to accept terms which not only pose grave economic problems but also that would be against the country's national solvency and integrity.

We are making every effort and have by adequate legal safeguards endeavored to induce private investment capital to help us exploit our known natural resources. However, the attractiveness and effectiveness of such possibilities depend in a large measure upon the existence of such roads as would m[illegible]ous sections of the country accessible.

May I have the benefit of your kind intervention in the premises before I leave for home on Friday, the 12th instant.

I take this occasion to express my grateful thanks and appreciation to you, Mrs. Eisenhower, the members of your Government and the people of your country for your most kind and gracious reception of me and the members of my party for which we and my fellow countrymen shall ever be grateful.

Sincerely,

WM. V. S. TUBMAN

776.56/11–1054

The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs (Nolting) to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1954.

DEAR MR. STASSEN: In November of 1953 the Government of Liberia requested that it be permitted to purchase from the Government of the United States military equipment consisting principally of rifles, rifle ammunition, rifle range supplies, and several trucks.[1] Subsequently the Government of Liberia requested that it be allowed to make payment for this military equipment by installments over a three year period as provided for in Section 106, Public Law 665, approved August 26, 1954.

The Department of State is of the opinion that the Liberian Government has a satisfactory record of making payments on loans extended by United States Government lending institutions, that it is financially able to assume an obligation of the below amounts, and that it would comply with the terms of agreement providing for payment of this credit in installments over a three year period.

The Department of Defense has costed the equipment requested at $687,132.55. In addition thereto charges amounting to roughly 9 per cent of this amount for inland United States transportation, port handling, and ocean freight would also be charged in order to meet the Liberian request for delivery of this material at Monrovia.

From a political point of view the Department of State considers the sale of this military equipment to the Liberian Government as highly desirable and recommends the sale on credit terms as requested. The Department of Defense has indicated to the Department of State that it favors the sale inasmuch as it will serve to increase internal security within Liberia. It is therefore requested that the Foreign Operations Administration approve the sale of this equipment total costs of which would be paid for by installments over a three year period.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick E. Nolting, Jr.

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[1] Ambassador Simpson submitted this request to the Department on Nov. 3, 1953 (776.5 MSP/11-353), and subsequently on Feb. 9, 1954, Liberia sought permission to procure field and technical manuals. (776.5 MSP/2-954)

776.5 MSP/11-1054

The Department of State to the Liberian Embassy

Aide-Mémoire

In light of conversations with representatives of the Liberian Government on the economic proposals contained in the document prepared by the Liberian Government as a basis for discussion in conjunction with the visit of President Tubman,[1] the United States Government sets forth its position.

Concerning the request that the United States assist the Government of Liberia under the provisions of Title II, Development Assistance, of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 with long-term loans to develop cheap power and to complete the basic all weather arterial road system, Title II funds are not available this fiscal year, such funds having been committed prior to receipt of the Liberian Government's request. However, the financing contemplated appears to be the type for which an approach should be made to the Export-Import Bank.

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[1] The meeting with the Liberian representatives to discuss the economic proposals which they had set forth on Sept. 13 (see footnote 1, p. 523), took place on Oct. 20, 1954. (776.5 MSP/10-2054)

The United States Government is most pleased to concur in an extension of the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation. Experience indicates, however, certain modifications to be desirable in this agreement as well as in the agreement establishing the Joint Commission for Economic Development.[2] Discussion of the changes which might be made in the agreements should take place between representatives of the Liberian Government and the United States in Monrovia.

The United States Government is prepared to increase its expenditures for technical assistance during the fiscal year 1955 by approximately fifty percent of the amount originally projected. The United States prefers not to indicate at this time specific figures of increase in each program but rather prefers to await the conclusions by the Joint Commission of the necessary project agreements.

In connection with the highway development program, the United States Government concurs with the Liberian Government that increased technical assistance in highway maintenance is necessary and is prepared to increase its expenditures in this area of activity.

The proposals for increased expenditures in the health program have been carefully reviewed. Unfortunately, funds of the Foreign Operations Administration cannot be expended at this time for a large-scale trypanosomiasis control program. However, the United States is prepared to establish a training project for the control of sleeping sickness in connection with the rural health development program. In addition, increased expenditures for technical assistance in other fields of rural health development are contemplated.

Concerning education, the United States is prepared to continue the existing facilities for technical assistance and to move forward on the Prairie View University contract.[3] In connection with the latter, expenditures by the United States will most probably be greater than those projected in the Liberian proposal. Further, the Liberian view that greater emphasis be placed on rural elementary education than orginally proposed is accepted.

The proposal on agriculture, forestry, and fisheries indicates that the Liberian Government believes greater emphasis should be placed on marketing and less emphasis than previously on production, a view in which the United States concurs. In the light of this proposed shift in emphasis, increased expenditures do not appear necessary. It is recognized, however, that the Joint Commission may wish to defer the change in emphasis until July 1, 1955.

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[2] For the text of the Memorandum and Agreement, signed at Washington on Dec. 22, 1950, see TIAS No. 2194; 2 UST 476.

[3] Prairie View entered into an agreement whereby vocational staff was to be recruited for the Booker T. Washington Institute.

The United States is prepared to render increased technical assistance in the field of mineral exploration but not exploitation; it is felt keenly that exploitation should be carried on by private investors. The increased technical assistance in mineral exploration would consist of two geologists and their basic equipment for a period not to exceed one year.

The United States shares the desire of the Government of Liberia to make optimum use of all resources available to Liberia for economic development and the strengthening of its economy. In this connection and in accordance with a project previously established in the Joint Commission, the United States remains prepared to render assistance in the field of public administration; an adviser in public administration might render invaluable assistance particularly in the area of fiscal and budgetary management.

In light of the determinations presented above, it is suggested:

(*a*) That representatives of the Liberian Government proceed immediately to explore with the Export-Import Bank the possibility of additional financing of development projects;

(*b*) That discussions commence immediately with United States representatives in Monrovia on the nature and form of the extended General Agreement for Technical Cooperation and modifications to the agreement establishing the Joint Commission for Economic Development; and,

(*c*) That project agreements providing for expanded United States technical assistance be prepared in the Joint Commission for Economic Development.

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1954.

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Locker Correspondence"

The Ambassador in Liberia (Locker) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL MONROVIA, November 17, 1954.

OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just reviewed with senior officers of the Embassy and USOM/L the Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of

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[1] Hinke indicated to Utter in a covering letter that Ambassador Locker's letter to Byroade had been entrusted to Jay V. Hall, Jr., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for hand delivery.

November 10 sent to the Liberian Ambassador in Washington, which sets forth the position of the United States toward the economic proposals of the Liberian Government.[2]

While it is appreciated that the Department's *Aide-Mémoire* probably does not "tell the whole story", our immediate reaction may be described as one of "grave concern" and dismay by its implications, even though the *Aide-Mémoire* itself merely appears to express in a formal manner the oral commitments made by United States representatives in the course of the conversations with the Liberian negotiating team reported in the Department's Memorandum of Conversation of October 20, 1954.[3] It is our considered view that the general tenor of the *Aide-Mémoire*, in itself, will tend to complicate enormously the difficulties of the Embassy and USOM/L in negotiating the "certain modifications" which "experience indicates" are "desirable in extending the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation as well as in the Agreement establishing the Joint Commission for Economic Development".

May I observe that while "the United States Government is most pleased to concur . . . is prepared to increase . . . is prepared to establish . . . is prepared to continue . . . and to move forward" and "shares the desire of the Liberian Government",[4] the *Aide-Mémoire* contains no statement indicating that the Liberian Government has been required to give any firm "*quid pro quo*" or to enter into any firm commitments to improve local standards of public administration, which certainly should be—and should have been made—an essential prerequisite to the extension of increased technical assistance. Without such definite commitments obtained in Washington from the Liberian negotiating team, we must anticipate great difficulties in reaching any meaningful agreements with the Liberian Government when negotiations commence here, whether for the extension of the General Agreement on Technical Assistance, or for modification of the Agreement establishing the Joint Commission, and, still more so, in the negotiations of individual project agreements to spell out in detail the enlarged programs to which the United States has committed itself in principle.

To be specific, even with definite commitments from the Liberian negotiating team as to the "ground rules" under which "an adviser in public administration" might be enabled to "render invaluable assistance, particularly in the area of fiscal and budgetary management", we must anticipate that such "ground rules" as presumably are included in the recommendations of the FOA Evaluation Team will be difficult to implement here.[5]

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[2] *Supra.*

[3] See footnote 1, *supra.*

[4] The ellipses occur in the source text.

While the *Aide-Mémoire* commits the United States to the Liberian Government on a number of substantive questions, it raises or leaves unresolved a host of important policy, procedural, administrative and technical questions, and in such a manner as to suggest that the views of the Embassy, USOM/L and the presumed recommendations of the FOA Evaluation Team have not been taken fully into account.

I recognize that officers in the field are in no position to question substantive Washington policy decisions involving commitments in principle to a friendly government, but my staff and I are gravely concerned by what specific procedures these policy decisions are to be executed; to what extent, if any, policy decisions may be modified or modifiable, taking local situations and conditions into account; the administrative implications of such policy decisions in terms of such problems as housing and transportation (not only in Monrovia but in places such as the sleeping-sickness project proposed for Voinjama, where housing, water, light and transportation are all absent); and how we justify a sleeping-sickness training project before basic research has determined what control programs offer any hope of significant and effective performance.

We are left uninstructed whether the Liberian Government has agreed to expand i's financial contributions to Joint Commission programs, or whether as in the past the interested Departments are to be left in complete control of all activities outside of Joint Commission projects, including contract and concession negotiations, procurement, budget and fiscal planning, which have complicated a variety of joint operations across the board. It is our feeling that, as a tactical matter, the period of direct negotiations with the Liberian team may have been the best time to press for joint funding operations embracing all developmental activities and thereby assuring over-all coordination in programming, execution and evaluation of the total country effort. Would it not still be possible to take this up with the Liberian negotiating team prior to their ultimate departure for Monrovia? Provided the presentation were not "too little and too late", we believe a number of the Liberian cabinet officers might be persuaded of the desirability of agreeing to such arrangements.

My staff and I view with concern the 50% expansion in program funds committed by the *Aide-Mémoire* under discussion, while at the same time FOA/W has taken action to reduce both administrative personnel and funds for the direction of the proposed expanded program, despite the consensus of the Embassy, USOM/L and the FOA Evaluation Team that present administrative resources are inadequate to administer the present program, much less to implement the JAS program which in our view the new commitments will make indispensable.

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[5] The team, which was led by Dr. Robert P. Daniel, President of Virginia State College, Petersburg, and which also included Dr. Vincent J. Browne of Howard University, and Arthur S. King, John W. More, and Albert E. Farwell of FOA, submitted its report to Stassen on Oct. 11, 1954. It spent the period from Sept. 3 to 27 in Liberia. It appraised the FOA operation in terms of U.S. foreign policy objectives. (Monrovia Consulate files, lot 61 F 164)

On the procedural side as a specific instance, the United States is evidently committed to "move forward on the Prairie View University contract". However, I have not had an opportunity to review this question with the Country Director due to his absence in Athens.[6] I deem this essential as there appear to be important reservations evidently held by USOM/L on a number of unresolved issues in the basic contract between FOA/W and that Institution, especially with respect to Article IV. Procedurally, I would consider it undesirable to undertake the negotiation of a *project agreement* in compliance with instructions to USOM/L, Usfoto 163 of November 10,[7] until a meeting of the minds between USOM/L and FOA/W has been reached as to the import of these and other clauses in the basic contract.

While the Department and FOA/W have made it clear that the participation of Embassy and USOM/L representatives, other than the Country Director, were not desired during the discussions with the Liberian negotiating team, I consider that the point has been reached when consultations with the two Washington agencies have become indispensable at the earliest possible date, for the purpose of reviewing the positions taken in their policy, procedural, administrative and technical aspects. I am apprehensive that unless this can be done promptly, the responsible officers of the United States stationed in Liberia may well be placed in untenable positions which might lead to unfortunate consequences, for the program as well as for the officers concerned.

With these considerations in mind, I deem it necessary to request that immediate arrangements be made for the detail to Washington on consultation of certain officers stationed in Liberia. Quite tentatively, I suggest that the "team" be selected from the following officers:

For the Embassy: Ambassador Locker or Counselor of Embassy Hinke.
For USOM/L: Acting Country Director Robert B. Kitchen and Educational Adviser Edward W. Brice.
For JAS talks: Embassy Administrative Officer John T. Sinclair.

Because of the importance which I attach to this request, I suggest that the Country Director be instructed to proceed to Washington direct from Athens for participation in the proposed discussions with the Monrovia Group. I should like to point out that these proposed consultations would make possible a simultaneous comprehensive review of the JAS program, which in my view becomes an urgent necessity because of the expanded technical assistance program being extended to Liberia, together with indispensable parallel fiscal and budgetary planning exercises.

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[6] Brig. Gen. Richard L. Jones was the new Country Director replacing Dr. John W. Davis who gave up his post on Sept. 5, 1954.

[7] Not printed.

Because of the complicated nature of the above discussion, I have deemed it preferable to present my recommendations in the form of a letter rather than by telegram, in the belief that this comunication will provide a sufficiently ample exposition of my views as to presuade you to accord them favorable consideration.

I shall appreciate the earliest possible reply by radio to this communication.

Sincerely yours, JESSE D. LOCKER

103.XMB/11-1954

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Waugh)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY [WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1954.

Subject: Request of Liberian Government for Export-Import Bank Loan

There is attached a copy of President Tubman's letter of November 8 to President Eisenhower on the foregoing subject,[1] and Secretary Dulles' reply of November 11.[2] You will note that the Secretary has promised President Tubman that every effort will be made to advance the matter of a loan to a conclusion before Mr. Tubman arrives in Liberia, which will be about November 30.

To this end members of our respective staffs met yesterday with Export-Import Bank representatives to state why it is politically important that: *a*) a loan be made;[3] and *b*) the Export-Import Bank indicate, before President Tubman reaches Liberia, the extent it is willing to earmark funds for Liberia. The Liberians estimate that $15,000,000 is needed for Priorities 1 and 2 of their road construction program. Our staff members urged the Bank to loan that amount which its engineers consider necessary for Priorities 1 and 2.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 525.

[2] Dulles indicated that the matter would be taken up with President Eisenhower when he returned to Washington. He expressed his regret that a definitive reply would not be possible prior to Tubman's departure, but he hoped to bring the matter to conclusion in advance of Tubman's return to Liberia. (876.10/11-1054)

[3] Operations Coordinator, Walter A. Radius, in the office of Under Secretary Herbert Hoover, Jr., in a memorandum addressed to Walter K. Scott, Director of the Executive Secretariat, indicated his concern "about the practice of having to produce loans, grants, or other agreements for assistance upon official visits to the United States of high ranking foreign dignitaries". (876.10/11-1054)

The representatives of the Export-Import Bank said that the case has been receiving their sympathetic consideration and will be placed before the members of the Bank Board as soon as possible. They also mentioned the necessity of NAC approval and said that while the NAC is supposed to meet on Friday, November 26, there is some question that a quorum will be present on that day.

In yesterday's meeting the representatives of the Export-Import Bank called attention to the fact that, as far as the record is concerned, the Liberians are still attempting to negotiate a loan with the First Boston Corporation and that the Export-Import Bank is enjoined by its legislation from competing with private banks. The Department representatives undertook the task of explaining this problem to the Liberians and to Mr. Larabee of Firestone, who had been instrumental in bringing together the Liberians and the First Boston Corporation.

Representatives of AF explained the problem to Mr. Larabbee yesterday afternoon and he indicated that he would advise the Liberians to make it clear to the Export-Import Bank that the Liberian Government has terminated its negotiations with the First Boston Corporation. This morning, Mr. David of the Liberian Embassy informed AF that the Liberian Government had suspended its negotiations with the First Boston Corporation two weeks ago. Mr. Davis said that Liberian Attorney General Cassell is returning to Washington Monday, November 22, and that a letter will be addressed to the Export-Import Bank setting forth the status of the negotiations with the First Boston Corporation, the proposed terms, and why the Liberian Government considers those terms unreasonable and unsatisfactory.[4]

NEA is prepared to assist in every way to complete action on this loan request and urges that your staff make certain that there will be an opportunity to be heard in the National Advisory Council on or before November 26.

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[4] David met with Cyr and Davis from AF. (876.10/11–1954)

876.10/11–3054 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia

OFFICIAL USE ONLY WASHINGTON, November 30, 1954—6 : 59 p. m.

64. Department's 63.[1] November 29 meeting held Export-Import Bank staff with representative First Boston and Liberian officials.

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[1] Not printed; it indicated that the Export-Import Bank Board had decided on Nov. 26 that it could not act upon the Liberian request for it was precluded by statute from acting in instances such as this when a private source offered reasonable terms. (876.10/11–3054)

Meeting conducted in friendly informal manner. Discussed following Liberian objections negotiate loan First Boston: hypothecation 50% revenues respectively from LibMinCo and Firestone because this would tie up too much revenue and hamper government operations; proposal establish reserve covering one year's debt service as cushion against default; and requirement that Liberians liquidate current short-term debt. Liberians also object because loan on such terms not politically expedient.

Amb. Simpson suggested revenue hypothecation be reduced to 25% respectively from LibMinCo and Firestone.[2] First Boston indicated readiness submit to potential investors any proposals Liberians consider satisfactory but cautioned that loan would be difficult to place if security reduced too much. Simpson also raised question Eximbank participation in loan with First Boston. Eximbank did not commit itself but did not close door such participation.

First Boston prepared work out cash flow schedule enable Liberians meet obligation assign revenues without impairment government operations. Proposed reserve fund be reinvested in US Government bonds to reduce net cost Liberia maintaining reserve. Cited interest insurance company and perhaps other institutional investors making funds available.

Further tripartite meeting to be held New York December 1[3] to determine extent to which Liberian objections may be overcome.

DULLES

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[2] Larabee thereafter advised Ambassador Simpson to abide by Tubman's stated position which was not to pledge any revenues if he hoped to gain a positive result. The Ambassador subsequently informed the Department on Dec. 6 that Liberia had notified the First Boston Corporation of its unwillingness to assign any revenues in order to secure the loan. (876.10/12–754)

[3] A Liberia Mining Company meeting prevented the Liberians from going through with this.

776.5 MSP/10–2954

The Department of State to the Liberian Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The United States Government is pleased to inform the Liberian Government that its request to purchase certain military equipment on credit, payment to be made in three equal annual installments is granted. The designated Liberian representative for purchasing military equipment should approach the Office of the Comptroller of the Foreign Operations Administration in order to complete the necessary arrangements.

Discussions within the United States Government have led to the conclusion that certain steps should be taken by the Liberian Government before the size of the United States Army Mission can usefully be increased. It is understood that some time in the past the United States Army Mission in Liberia suggested to the Liberian Government certain courses of action to improve the Liberian defense structure and to make training more effective.[1] The Mission proposed (1) reorganization of the Liberian War Department and Frontier Force, (2) the provision of adequate indoor training facilities for use during inclement weather and increasing the availability of officers and enlisted men for regular and prescribed training, and (3) improving the serviceability of arms and equipment by providing adequate storage facilities, adequate maintenance facilities, and the accomplishment of proper maintenance operations. Knowledgeable military training experts consider implementation of these recommendations necessary before the United States Army Mission's personnel complement be increased.

The United States Government is also pleased to inform the Liberian Government that the United States Army Mission is prepared to assist it in carrying out these recommendations. Dependent upon the degree of progress which might make desirable increasing the size of the mission, the United States Government will again give careful and sympathetic consideration to such a request.

In connection with the Liberian Government's desire for advice in military planning, the designated chief of the United States Army Mission, Lt. Colonel Hyman Chase, is being authorized to assist the Liberian Government in formulating readiness plans in addition to his regular duties in conjunction with training. Lt. Colonel Chase's experience particularly qualifies him for rendering such assistance.

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1954.

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[1] Col. Oscar Randall, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, had prepared a report for the Liberian War Department on Nov. 11, 1953 entitled "The Program for Armed Forces in Liberia". Ambassador Locker attached it to his letter to Cyr of Sept. 1, 1954, not printed. (776.55/9–154)

AF files, lot 58 D 459, "Locker Correspondence"

The Director of the Office of African Affairs (Utter) to the Ambassador in Liberia (Locker)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 15, 1954.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—INFORMAL

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Mr. Byroade is relinquishing his duties in the Department preparatory to becoming our next Ambassador to Cairo and has referred your letter of November 17 [1] to this Office for necessary action.

Before we began our *conversations* with the Liberians, the Secretary himself made it clear that the Liberians should leave the table happy [2] and that we should make every effort to assure this eventuality. This we undertook to do and the *Aide-Mémoire* [3] correctly reflects the desire of the United States Government to meet the wishes of the Liberians within the bounds of reason.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 529.

Despite our desire to please, we confined ourselves to accepting and initiating courses of action which would ultimately serve the mutual interests of the two countries. Your reports and the findings of the FOA evaluation team had made it clear that many changes are desirable in Liberia.[4] Our job here was to meet the Liberian requests as far as possible while setting up the framework for a local negotiation that would apply the findings of the Evaluation team as well as the knowledge of the Embassy and USOM/L. Our *quid pro quo* lies, we feel, in the fact the Liberians implicitly accepted the idea that changes are necessary. Whether we can cash in on this *quid pro quo* will depend on the success of the local negotiation. We have not ignored your advice but rather have left its application to you in the negotiation. And we in NEA do not consider that anything in the *Aide-Mémoire* will prejudice your chances of success. The Department and FOA/W will prepare more detailed instructions for your guidance in the negotiations and in their preparation will take into consideration the contents of your letter.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN E. UTTER

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[2] The Export-Import Bank authorized a $15,000,000 loan to Liberia on Jan. 20, 1955 for the construction of all-weather roads connecting the provinces and Monrovia. For further information, see *Export-Import Bank of Washington, Twentieth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January-June, 1955* (Washington, 1955), pp. 23-24.

[3] Dated Nov. 10, p. 527.

[4] Jones had provided Locker with a copy of the FOA Evaluation Report on Dec. 7. (Monrovia Consulate files, lot 61 F 169)

LIBYA[1]

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF LIBYA; RENEGOTIATION OF THE BASE RIGHTS AGREEMENT FOR WHEELUS FIELD

Editorial Note

Representatives of the United States and Libya signed a Base Rights Agreement on December 24, 1951. For documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume V, pages 1313 ff. Despatch 103 from Tripoli, January 11, 1952, transmitted the signed original of the English text and a signed duplicate of the Arabic text to the Department of State. (711.56373/1–1152)

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[1] For previous documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1313 ff.

711.56373/1–1652 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 16, 1952—7 : 32 p. m.

3379. During Nov 1951 several tels were exchanged between Dept and Tripoli and Dept and London re deployment 580th ARC Wing to Wheelus Field.[2] That proposed movement was postponed until after independence Libya.[3]

Unit has high priority in US mil plans and its deployment Wheelus required urgently. Present plans provide for movement Wing as fols:

1. No troops wld arrive before Mar 1, which wld be after Libyan elections.
2. Between Mar 1 and Apr 1 fol groups wld be moved in by air:
   - (*a*) Advance Echelon, 80 men.
   - (*b*) Air Echelon of crews, etc., 300 men.
   - (*c*) Ground Echelon, non-fliers, maintenance, etc., 200 men.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Wellons (AF) and cleared in the offices of Bourgerie (AF), Haselton (BNA), Nolting (G), Col. W. W. Dunlop (Air Force), and Berry (NEA). It was repeated to Tripoli.

[2] Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 711.56353.

[3] The independence of Libya was proclaimed on Dec. 24, 1951. For documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1313 ff. At that time, elections were scheduled for February 1952 for representatives and for March 1952 for senators. An account of the establishment of the Libyan parliamentary government is in Majid Khadduri, *Modern Libya* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).

3. As soon after Apr 15 as possible main body of Wing wld arrive by ship. This wld total not more than 1500 and probably only 1300. It wld arrive in two ships at different times. Troops wld debark with minimum personal gear. Maximum nr to be moved through port Tripoli by truck wld probably be only 750 at any one time.

Dept perceives no difficulties in movements of personnel by air. Arrival personnel by ship after Apr 15 is planned to allow time for ratification US–Libya base agreement by Libyan Parliament and King. In order meet above sched planning must be done and orders issued now.

ACHESON

711.56373/1–1652 : Telegram

The Chargé in Libya (Lynch) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TRIPOLI, January 16, 1952—7 p. m.

358. Legation has just seen an unclassified monthly progress report on UN technical assistance to Libya for period Nov 23–Dec 31 from Power, principal secy UN mission in Libya to Trygve Lie in latter's capacity as Chairman, Tech Assistance Board. This report, in outlining the various agreements concluded by Libyans with the UN and foreign powers during the period under survey, states "on Dec 24, there was concluded an agreement between the United States and Libya providing for the continuation of the air base (Wheelus Field) established near Tripoli. It is reported in the world press that the agreement also provides that the United States will make an annual contribution of $1,000,000 to Libya for econ aid and pay rentals for the area occupied by the air base for a period of 20 years. No official confirmation of this arrangement has been released".

So far as I am aware, no such report has ever appeared in world press. If I am right in this, Power must be equally aware of it. Presumably by world press Power refers to AP despatch reported by Deptel Dec 20.[2] The AP despatch, however, merely referred to a cash gift of $1,000,000 on Independence Day. Power as Pelt's deputy fully cognizant of fact that Pelt believes US Libyan agreement shld be made public now and equally aware that Dept desirous maintaining secrecy until presented to Libyan Parliament for ratification. I can imagine no more effective method of forcing our hand in GA than submission this document to Mr. Trygve Lie and God knows who else. It is hardly conceivable that it will go unnoticed by countries whose interests run contrary to ours. . . .

LYNCH

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris and London.
[2] Not printed.

711.56373/1–1752 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 18, 1952—6 : 38 p. m.

Gadel 764. Distribution only to Jessup, Gross, Sandifer. Re Libya; Tripoli's 358 Jan 16 rptd Paris 66 for USGADel; [2] Delga 1086 Jan 17 rptd Tripoli 36.[3]

Dept shares USGADel's hope quoted passage will be generally regarded as routine press roundup, and agrees any effort at this stage have it suppressed or deleted wld only call attn to matter.

Publication this passage in official UN report most indiscreet if not actual breach of confidence even though attributed to press sources and was entirely contrary to wishes and interests of US and Libyan Govts. Power evidently well aware (1) strong interest US Govt in not publicizing this matter in any way, and (2) concurrence Libyan Govt this policy. Even if published sources for quoted passage exist, way this item was presented might well suggest inside knowledge to ordinary reader.

Dept seriously concerned that Power shld have published statement in question, knowing fully as he does strong desire of US Govt avoid public discussion US–Libya agreement until submitted to Libyan Parliament. Dept considers this matter sufficiently important to warrant personal interview between him and Gross or Jessup to obtain his explanation. In addition he shld be asked *inter alia:*

1. Specify published source or sources quoted passage and exhibit clippings;
2. Degree his personal responsibility for quoted passage;
3. Why he caused or allowed to be published any material on this subj, considering his knowledge background of subj and policies US and Libyan Govts on this point.

If Power can not produce published sources this passage, Dept desires his statement re sources he did draw on.

Your report will assist Dept properly assess matter and decide whether further action necessary.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Anderson (UNP) and cleared in the offices of Cyr (AF), Ford (SY), and Popper (UNP). It was repeated to Tripoli.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed. It informed the Department that the report referred to was not normally seen by members of the General Assembly delegations, since it would only be distributed within the special agency secretariats. The delegation feared any effort to have part of the report suppressed would only draw attention to the matter, but suggested that it might take up the question with Power to assure that he would attribute the information to newspaper sources if queried. (711.56373/1–1752)

711.56373/1-2452 : Telegram

The Chargé in Libya (Lynch) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET TRIPOLI, January 24, 1952—4 p. m.

369. Present USAF expansion plans envisage second base in Libya. In this connection King and prominent Cyrenaicans including Ali Jerbi have often stressed desirability of locating an American milit installation near Benghazi, mentioning as possibility Berka II airfield, located about four miles south of Benghazi on the coast. (This was USAF base in World War II.)

Benefits to be derived from locating base in Cyrenaica are:

1. In the event of Libyan unity cracking under still continuing strain of Cyrenaican separatism, we wld not have our strategic facilities in one basket only.
2. US gives Cyrenaicans tangible evidence of econ benefits of US agreement which still must be ratified.

. . . I feel that Benghazi wld be better suited than Tripoli for fol reasons:

1. Benghazi is far less of an internatl community than Tripoli. . . .
2. Geographically its location is more advantageous. . . .
3. Commanding officer Wheelus states his facilities are almost saturated at present.

Therefore, Legation urges that Benghazi be picked as site of second air base rather than constructing another field in Tripolitania at this time.

LYNCH

711.56373/3-1052 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TRIPOLI, March 10, 1952—11 a. m.

453. During my visit to Benghazi it was made unmistakably clear by King Idris as by local officials that US Armed Forces wld be welcome in Cyrenaica. King said he was deeply grateful for American aid and much impressed by what had been done for Tripolitania at Wheelus Field. He told me that Cyrenaican territory was at our disposal and that every assistance and facility wld be offered in event we desired site for milit installations.

Saquizli, Governor of Cyrenaica, was even more outspoken. He expatiated on advantages of Cyrenaica, urged that US establish airbase or bases, and inquired pointedly what had become of Navy communications project at Derna. When I expressed appreciation of this cooperative attitude, Saquizli replied that he must be frank in stating Cyrenaicans were not thinking solely in terms of East-West struggle but also of econ benefits which wld accrue to them from presence of US Forces. It was evident that rivalry between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania strongly colored his viewpoint as well as that of other Cyrenaican auths.

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[1] On Feb. 6, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Henry S. Villard as the first American Minister to the United Kingdom of Libya.

Whatever the motivation we shld realize that Cyrenaica is one of few places of great strategic importance where we are being actively encouraged to establish air or other bases. No comparable situation exists in any part of Middle East; certainly not in any other Arab country. I hope that friendly atmosphere which exists here at present will be fully taken into consideration in over-all milit planning for this area.

VILLARD

711.56373/4–1552: Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State

SECRET TRIPOLI, April 15, 1952—midnight.

560. I took occasion after dinner I gave for Consul General Jernegan April 12 to ask PriMin Muntasser whether he still thought our base agreement wld be ratified during forthcoming session of Parliament in Tripoli (Legtel 503 Mar 29).[1] With Parliament not meeting until April 27 and with numerous laws and various internatl agreements on docket, I wondered whether time margin was sufficient to assure passage in month remaining before Ramadan and probable summer adjournment.

Muntasser replied he anticipated no difficulties and repeated his desire to introduce agreement at most propitious moment, which he believed wld occur well before commencement of Ramadan, May 27.[2]

During call at my office today, however, conversation on this subj developed new angle. Speaking frankly and confidentially, PriMin said there was growing body of opinion that US shld assume primary responsibility for Libyan nation rather than UK or France. Reputation of US among Libyans was higher than that of any other country and its great resources qualified US to underwrite Libya's needs much better than UK. For example, it wld mean little to US to back up Libyan currency and otherwise serve as principal guarantor of Libya's existence as independent nation. In return, Libya had much to offer US owing to its strategic geographic location in Mediterranean.

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[1] Not printed; it reported a conversation the Minister had had with the Prime Minister shortly after the opening of the Parliament in Benghazi on Mar. 25. The Prime Minister said he wanted the ground to be so carefully prepared before he asked the Parliament to consider the U.S. base agreement that nothing could prejudice its successful outcome. He said it would probably be brought up when the Parliament met later in Tripoli. (711.56373/3–2952)

[2] Telegram 637 from Tripoli, May 8, reported the Prime Minister seemed much less sure the agreement would be ratified before Ramadan. The President of the Libyan Senate suggested it might be September before Parliament could resume and consider the agreement. (711.56373/5–852)

While Libyans had nothing against the Brit, it was feared in some quarters that after a few years of primary Brit interest and support, recent events in Cairo wld repeat themselves in Libya. For this reason, progress on negotiating agreements with Brit was very slow, although it was assumed an accord wld eventually be reached. With respect to the French there were real difficulties. Libyans had little confidence in France and any Libyan-French agreement was still some distance off. Relations with the Italians were satis but negot of property agreement was slow and filled with obstacles.

I said US had many other commitments besides Libya, and that owing to its war experience in this area and general position in the Middle East, it was only natural that UK shld have primary responsibility for Libya. I appreciated confidence of Libyans in US polit disinterestedness but I did not see how we cld enter into greater commitments here than we already have. I said I hoped this trend of thought wld not interfere with early consideration of our base agreement as it now stands.

Muntasser replied he was reporting this sentiment to me only because it might be brought out publicly during debate on base agreement. He did not think it wld impede ratification. I asked whether it wld be necessary for Libya to conclude agreements with UK before taking up US agreement, to which he replied in the negative.

VILLARD

711.56373/7-3052 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET TRIPOLI, July 30, 1952—5 p. m.

79. In absence of PriMin I inquired of his Brit adviser, Lord Oxford, whether our base agreement was likely to come up for ratification soon. I was surprised and rather disturbed to find that Oxford was repeating recent Libyan arguments that annual contribution of million dollars was very little indeed for US to pay for vital base rights and that it might be hard to convince Libyan Parliament sum shld not be substantially raised. In customs revenue alone Libya stood to lose much more than million dollars by exemptions under the agreement and it was only natural to expect that some deputies wld regard our proposed payment as out of all proportion to what US was spending for military facilities all over the world.

I pointed out that econ benefits to Libya of Wheelus Field in the form of local employment, rentals, food purchases, construction contracts, etc. ran into several millions yearly and that from what I knew of present mood in Congress it was extremely unlikely our expected contribution of one million dollars in addition to Point IV aid cld be increased at all. Oxford said that first part of my statement was economic argument which might appeal to some people but not to politicians and that second part wld require campaign of education before Libyans were convinced that US was unable to raise the ante.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Benghazi.

If Oxford's remarks are indicative of parliamentary attitude, we may well be confronted with situation bordering on blackmail. There is complete absence of leadership in Parliament and unless PriMin personally makes it his business to push agreement through, it is impossible to predict when ratification may take place. In case my discussion with Muntasser and King seem to be leading nowhere, I shld appreciate Dept informing me how far I may go in confirming or elaborating statement of Asst Secy of Air Huggins to PriMin on July 17 (mytel 50, July 19).[2] Prospect of air base near Benghazi with attendant econ benefits wld have great appeal to Cyrenaicans and might be strong inducement to favorable action in Parliament.[3]

VILLARD

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[2] Not printed; it reported Huggins had told the Prime Minister that the Air Force contemplated the possibility of additional construction in Cyrenaica, but said that further USAF expenditures in Libya depended to some extent on Libyan cooperation in ratifying the base agreement. The telegram ended by informing the Department that the Prime Minister was leaving Tripoli on July 21 to spend the rest of the summer near the King in Jebel. (711.56373/7–1952)

[3] Telegram 10 to Benghazi, Aug. 1, said that USAF requirements in Cyrenaica were under review. The Navy, however, was only waiting for ratification of the base agreement and a reasonable rental arrangement before going ahead with a communication facility at Derna. The telegram concluded by suggesting that if the Minister could not convince the Libyans that $1 million per year for 20 years was fair compensation, he could inform them that their request for greater compensation would compel the U.S. Government to review its military requirements in Cyrenaica. (711.56373/8–152)

711.56373/8–752 : Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (More) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BENGHAZI, August 7, 1952—noon.

12. From Villard at Cyrene August 5. During my first call on PriMin at his summer headquarters Aug 5, I inquired what was status of our base agreement. Muntasser replied that agreement would not be introduced at current session of Parliament. Owing to oppresssive heat in Tripoli and consequent effect on disposition of deputies to consider important matters, decision was taken to adjourn Parliament upon completion of discussion on budget. Probable date for starting next session is October 10 at which time it is hoped King may be persuaded to visit Tripoli and open session in person.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli.

Muntasser continues to maintain that ground must be carefully prepared before debate on agreement begins. He says whole question of foreign agreements is delicate one but that in case of US there is no doubt that agreement will be approved in principle. Sole difficulty is financial. By this I infer he is still thinking of additional payment over and above $1 million per annum in return for what Libya considers its most valuable asset, namely the strategic position of its territory in the Mediterranean.

While I am not attempting to enter into any further arguments on this subj at this particular time, since we are not yet confronted officially with demand for increased compensation, I think we must eventually be prepared to meet Parl opposition on this ground. It wld be helpful if Dept cld inform me specifically whether in last analysis it would be willing to explore possibility of some arrangement yielding Libyan Govt any greater return than that contemplated by exchange of notes of December 24, 1951.[2]

MORE

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[2] Telegram 12 to Benghazi, Aug. 12, informed Villard that any change in the arrangements of Dec. 24, 1951 would probably require informal clearances with appropriate Congressional committee members, and the Department of State did not want to ask Defense to do that on a hypothetical basis. It reminded him that the amount that had been agreed on was reluctantly agreed to by other Departments, as well as the Department of State, as the maximum. (711.56373/8–752)

711.56373/9–252 : Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (More) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BENGHAZI, September 2, 1952—10 p.m.

34. From Villard. September 1. Bearing out my predictions over last several months Libyan Govt has now officially informed us of its dissatisfaction with terms of base rights agreement as concerns (*a*) duration of agreement and (*b*) amount of compensation for economic aid.

Subject was brought to my attention today in form of personal letter signed by PriMin and delivered at my residence in Cyrene by Suleiman Jerbi, Director General of FonOff. Letter was dated August 29 but Suleiman explained there has been slight delay in delivery. Since I have no facilities for Arabic translation in Cyrene, I am summarizing below its contents as described orally by Suleiman. Full text will be transmitted from Benghazi after translation.[2]

1. Opening paras refer to Libya's previous expressions of gratitude for US help and spirit of friendship in which agreement was signed. Request is made in this personal communication for review of terms of agreement.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli and London.

[2] The text was transmitted in telegram 137 from Tripoli, Sept. 3. (711.56373/9–352)

2. It had been intended to submit agreement to last session of Parliament but heat had terminated legislative activities before this could be done. However, members of Parliament had been consulted in advance on terms of agreement and all of them had criticized govt on two points above mentioned. PriMin supported this view and considers the contract poor business for Libya. If regarded with "commercial eye" Libya is giving up approx pounds 700,000 yearly in revenue through immunities enjoyed by US Govt in Tripolitania, as shown by accompanying annexes, while receiving only some pounds 300,000 from US in return.

3. Reference is made to exchange of notes on econ aid for Libyan people, but if it is considered that Libya is giving more than it receives, then there is no real contribution to welfare of Libyan people.

4. Point IV assistance is general in its application and is not limited to countries granting military facilities.

5. Libyan Govt will submit agreement to Parliament opening in November at Tripoli. But before doing so it appeals to spirit of friendship and sympathy displayed by US for Libya and young nations generally, and desires that I take up matter with Washington explain Libyan position in light of above so that amount and duration of agreement may be reviewed.

6. PriMin trusts I will use good offices to support Libyan point of view, that Washington will appreciate Libya is giving twice what it is receiving as well as delicate position in which Libyan Govt finds itself, and that Washington may help overcome these difficulties.

Annexes accompanying letter are in English and give detailed breakdown on estimated revenue lost by Libyan Govt as result of immunities enjoyed by US on basis of "what would have to be paid by a commercial organization of similar magnitude by way of taxes, fees and rentals, etc." This is undoubtedly work of British financial adviser Pitt-Hardacre and his aides. It is too long to be telegraphed and will be airmailed for Dept's info, analysis and comment.[3]

I told Suleiman Jerbi I would comply with PriMin's request and transmit communication to Dept but that I could give him no hope or encouragement that any alteration could be considered in terms of agreement. I said US would never have made such large expenditures as at Wheelus for less than 20 years and that from my personal knowledge of situation $1 million was maximum figure obtainable. I asked hypothetical question if Libya desired both shorter term and more compensation, say 20 years[4] and 2 millions annually, would not result be the same and in this case which did Libya really prefer? Suleiman said he could not answer question. He gave as his personal opinion, however, that additional compensation was more important than duration of agreement. When I asked why Libya needed more money than it was already getting and what it would propose to do with such additional compensation, Suleiman replied that ultimate object was to be freed of dependence on Brit. Meanwhile if funds could not all be spent at once, they could be held and applied in later years when time was ripe. Point IV assistance could not be counted on, as it might end at anytime in future.

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[3] Despatch 38 from Tripoli, Sept. 8. (711.56373/9–852)

[4] Presumably, this figure is a typographical error and should read 10 years.

I propose to answer PriMin's letter using arguments with which Dept has already supplied me,[5] by stating that matter has been referred to Washington and that more formal reply may be expected later on. Also, I am transmitting copy of letter and annexes to C.O. Wheelus Field and Middle East District Engineers, USA, for such comment as they may wish to make.

I have been trying without success for last 10 days to obtain an appointment with the King and am convinced that I have been deliberately put off until PriMin's letter could be delivered. Although my request for interview was made directly to Royal Diwan, I was informed yesterday it was being handled by PriMin. He in turn stated appointment would have to wait until after current feast days were concluded possibly September 4. While my representations to King have thus been in large measure forestalled, I intend nevertheless to discuss subject of base agreement when I see him.

MORE

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[5] According to Benghazi telegram 24, Aug. 22, the Minister had learned the Libyan Government intended shortly to present the United States with a request for $2 million a year as compensation in connection with the base agreement. He believed the request would be due more to British influence than Libyan initiative, but said he would try to see the King and discuss the general question of ratification of the base agreement. Telegram 15 to Benghazi, Aug. 26, directed the Minister to adhere to a firm position on the question of additional compensation for the Libyans and make it clear to them that the U.S. expected ratification on the present basis. It suggested that he might discreetly raise the problem with British advisers to the Libyans and express the hope that they would exercise a restraining influence on Libya. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56373.

711.56373/9-852 : Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (More) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BENGHAZI, September 8, 1952—9 p. m.

38. From Villard.

1. I had hour's interview with King Sept 6 regarding base rights agreement (mytel 34).[2] No one else was present except my interpreter and atmosphere was friendly and informal throughout.

2. After referring to personal ltr which I had recd from PriMin asking for reconsideration of terms of agrmt, I said I had submitted

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli.

[2] *Supra.*

matter to Dept in accordance Muntasser's request and then described contents of reply I had made pending official answer from Washington. I added that in my personal opinion it wld be extremely difficult for my govt to consider request for more than one million dollars econ aid because I had been present when Libya's insistence on that figure had been discussed and I recalled that it had only been agreed upon with difficulty as maximum. Negots had taken many months and I was under impression agrmt had been signed in good faith on both sides.

3. King had evidently been briefed by PriMin and said he knew something about the situation. Muntasser was afraid he wld be accused by members of Parliament of not acting in best interests of the country if he adhered to original sum. Intention had been to present agrmt at last session of Parliament, but after sounding out sentiment it had been decided not to do so because agrmt wld have been rejected. King said that members of Parliament believed what they heard and what they read in the papers and when they saw that US was giving so much more econ assistance to other Middle Eastern countries they felt that Libya was not receiving fair share.

4. I asked whether His Majesty had in mind amount other countries were receiving under Point Four. He said he did not know, only that assistance they were getting from the US was much greater than that given to Libya. He said legislators did not distinguish between different types of aid, but from publicized accounts they knew extent of US econ aid to other countries of Middle East and rest of world. I explained Libya constituted precedent in that it was only country I knew of which wld receive outright cash payment in addition to Point Four program. This apparently made little impression.

5. I said I assumed agrmt wld be presented to Parliament at next session. King replied in affirmative. I then asked what wld situation be if additional compensation were not forthcoming. King answered that position of PriMin wld be very critical and that he and his colleagues wld again be accused of neglecting their duty toward their country.

6. I mentioned that Navy was only awaiting ratification before starting Derna project. King made noncommittal gesture of assent. I pointed out ratification wld speed plans for other USAF projects in Libya, to which he made no comment.

7. I again referred to situation if increased payments were impossible to obtain and asked whether he cld help personally by discussing subj with legislators. King said Parliament was not now in session and before taking any action he wld have to consult PriMin, ascertain who

was principally responsible for objections to agrmt, etc. I suggested that when reply was recd from Washington matter cld be considered further, in which he concurred.

8. When I reminded him that my views were at this stage personal ones and wld doubtless be supplemented later, King said he wished to thank me for clarifying the various points touched upon, some of which he was not aware of and others he did not know enough details.

9. At conclusion of interview I showed King summary of anti-American article in *Al Leebi* of Aug 25 containing such statements as: "The real object of Point Four is to make us indebted to US without our ever receiving loan, to make us prisoners of tyranny masking as charity," "If US wishes treat us thus, then she must remain here only as unwelcome guest;" "We are being militarily exploited;" "There are other hidden political motives;" "They (the Americans) receive everything and give nothing. It is enough for them to drug us with Point Four," etc. I said articles of this kind, which were appearing with greater frequency, cld well be misinterpreted in US when Libya was asking for more money. Just as members Libyan Parliament believe what they hear and read about US, so US Congressmen and taxpayers might form very unfavorable impression of Libyan attitude toward US econ aid, thus doing harm to Libyan cause. I said that I of course did not take these irresponsible attacks seriously, but that I felt constrained to mention *Al Leebi*'s increasingly virulent campaign for this reason.

10. King replied to above stating that Libyan people had only friendliest feelings for US and that he was extremely sorry to see this "imitation of Egyptian newspapers" writing "such poisons," which cld probably be ascribed to extremist patriots trying to show off. He seemed to take matter seriously, however, and repeated his regrets before my departure when he urged me not to believe any statements of this character.

11. I have impression as result of interview that King felt concern at my remarks, that he did not know too much about subj of base agrmt and that he will have to look into it further. At same time he seemed keenly appreciative of difficulties PriMin will face in Parliament when agrmt comes up for ratification, especially as regards attitude supposedly held by members both houses that US is giving large amounts of aid to other countries and that Libya's share is too small. We shall have to take that attitude directly into account if we expect to press for ratification on basis present terms.

More

711.56373/9–1152: Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (More) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BENGHAZI, September 11, 1952—midnight.

41. From Villard. I have discussed with PriMin Muntasser our exchange of correspondence re base agreement.[2] He said he relied on me to persuade US Govt of Libya's need for additional compensation and confidently looked forward to favorable response from Washington. I replied this imputed to me greater powers than I possessed and that I was afraid he might be disappointed.

Muntasser's principal argument, like that of King (mytel 38)[3] was that Parliament had heard of large US expenditures for econ aid in other countries and felt that Libya should receive more generous treatment. This of course is pure hold up, implication being that if US can afford 1 million compensation it can just as well afford 2 million. When I reminded him that he himself had set figure of 1 million, Muntasser said that agreement had been concluded under pressure and that he could not have known how strongly members of Parliament would feel that this sum was inadequate.

For first time question of Israel entered into conversation. PriMin said that when Libyans compared amount of US econ aid to Israel with what they were receiving natural reaction was sense of injustice and discrimination. (While King did not mention Israel in our interview I have feeling he may have had it specifically in mind when speaking of "other countries in Middle East.")

Muntasser's arguments on duration of agreement were self contradictory. He said Libya would like Americans to stay here indefinitely and would be glad of protection of US forces, but that public opinion would not be favorable to more then ten or perferably five year period for agrmt. He suggested that some formula could be worked out providing for renewal of agreement for additional periods considered necessary by US and containing adequate assurance that use of installations would not meanwhile be terminated by Libya. When I said, "suppose we took your word and limited the agreement to ten years?" He protested, "surely you wouldn't want to abandon Libya so soon!"

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli and London.

[2] Tripoli telegram 145, Sept. 6, transmitted the text of the Minister's reply to the Prime Minister's letter of Aug. 29, summarized in Benghazi telegram 34, Sept. 2, p. 545. In the Sept. 6 letter, Villard informed the Prime Minister he could not encourage any hope that the United States would be willing to make any changes in the base agreement. The United States considered $1 million per year during the life of the agreement to be fair compensation; and it could not justify expensive installations at Wheelus Field or any other locality for a period of less than 20 years. (711.56373/9–652)

[3] *Supra.*

After friendly debate on various other aspects of our correspondence, we agreed to defer further discussion until receipt of Dept's reply.[4]

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[4] Regarding the Department of State reply, telegram 166 to Tripoli, Sept. 24, see footnote 2, p. 553.

711.56373/9–1452 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET TRIPOLI, September 14, 1952—3 p. m.

165. At my invitation, Pitt-Hardacre, Brit financial adviser to Libyan Govt, spent evening with me in discussion of Libyan demand for additional compensation under base agreement. He said he had been asked as result of parliamentary attitude to explore basis for collecting revenue estimated lost through exemptions enjoyed by US, and had therefore prepared memorandum accompanying PriMin's letter (Benghazi tel 34, Sept 2).[2] He believed Libyans fully entitled to these revenues. Figures submitted were definitely on conservative side and as commercial proposition should appeal to American business instincts.

During course of our discussion Pitt-Hardacre made fol statements:

1. Origin of demand was extent of US aid to Israel. Parliament felt that Libya deserved more than $1 million in return for base rights, considering that Israel contributed no such facilities for Western defense yet received many times that amount from US for econ assistance.
2. UK contribution to Libya this fiscal year totaled approx pounds 1.5 million for exactly same mil facilities accorded US. Therefore, US should not balk at increasing its contribution.
3. There was no doubt whatever Libya had capacity to absorb more econ aid. All kinds of development projects, among them Karamanli Mole, were crying for money and on urgent basis, regardless of what might have been said during past discussions of Libyan ability to handle foreign assistance for econ development.
4. Agreement would certainly have been rejected if submitted to last session of Parliament and will certainly be rejected next session unless provision for econ aid is increased.
5. Provisional govt which initialed agrmt had no power to commit govt which came into being Christmas Eve 1951.
6. If payment for econ aid should begin only on date of ratification Libyan Govt would make vehement protest. Govt understands contrary to be the case and takes it for granted payment will be retro-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London.

[2] *Ante*, p. 545.

active to Dec 24. Otherwise US would be in position of tenant paying no rent during interval before ratification and Libyans would then have to present bill for occupancy on basis of memorandum transmitted by PriMin. Development agency budget for current fiscal year has already provided for expenditure of million dollars from US.

7. If it were impossible to increase figure $1 million, additional compensation might be achieved by higher rentals for base facilities or some special econ contribution guaranteed over term of years not Point IV, which might terminate any time.

8. Alternative might be US joining development fund, even if special act of US Congress required for this purpose. US would be welcome member and would have vote in proportion to its contribution. It could thus outvote UK if, for example $2 million were granted by US for econ aid.

On strictly confidential basis Pitt-Hardacre disclosed that UK was being asked to subscribe fixed sum annually as grant in aid to Libyan budget rather than indeterminate amount each year to cover expenditures. Cyrenaican budget estimates alone for next fiscal year came to pounds 2 million and expenditures have already created a deficit. With fixed amount known in advance, Federal Govt could say to provinces only so much would be available, thus limiting demands and avoiding uncertainty over sterling requirements. Counselor Brit Legation Pyke (on loan from Treasury), who has worked closely with Pitt-Hardacre, has departed for London in determined attempt negotiate this arrangement. If he fails he intends to resign, as does Pitt-Hardcare.

Both Kirkbride and Pitt-Hardcare ascribe initiative to Libyans in request for additional compensation from US, but thinking such as above may have bearing on matter. Pitt-Hardcare would not specify amount to be suggested as UK fixed contribution, but if limitation is to be placed on UK payments and more funds for econ development are required, US becomes obvious source of contribution to make up difference (London's 14 Sept 4 to Tripoli, rptd Dept 1275).[3] I have feeling as result this conversation that Libyans might be willing drop question of duration of agreement if their request for additional compensation could be met. It is increasingly clear they attach greatest importance to latter.

VILLARD

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[3] Not printed; it reported that the Foreign Office had expressed concern over Lib. an dissatisfaction with the terms of the base agreement. The Embassy commented that, while it was possible that individual British advisers in Libya might not be helpful to the United States, there was no evidence that the British Government was trying to undermine the base agreement or cause it to be altered. It added that, "from standpoint overall Anglo-American relations, Emb dismisses possibility Brit would engage activity this nature as govt policy." (711.56373/9–452)

711.56373/10-952 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TRIPOLI, October 9, 1952—5 p. m.

236. Re Deptel 166, Sept 24.[2] I gave PriMin Dept's reply to his ltr on base agreement yesterday. Muntasser said it wld be considered by Council of Mins which began mtg today, after which he wld discuss subject further with me. In order give him opportunity to disclaim official reps shld he so desire, I have followed his lead in keeping our correspondence on informal personal level.

Without Arabic translation PriMin did not attempt comment on contents reply but immed pointed out that if agrmt were submitted to Parliament without additional compensation it wld incur defeat and he and his Cabinet wld be forced to resign. In that event, policy of govt wld be unpredictable. He repeated previous statements that public sentiment demanded increased payment for econ aid and that members of Parl, who had been carefully canvassed on subj, were united in view that agrmt cld not be ratified otherwise.

While I concur fully with reasoning in Dept's reply, which has stated the case well from our point of view, I think we must now take into consideration possible consequences of our refusal to accede to PriMin's request for additional income. On basis of Muntasser's statements, matter narrows down to question of increased dollar payments over fixed period of years, as I believe that duration of agrmt can be maintained at 20 years without undue difficulty. It shld be borne in mind this connection that indirect aid such as dollar expenditures by Wheelus Field (which Army engineers estimate will last only two or three years at present rate) fails to meet Libyan Govt's desire for free money to be spent on various projects designed to further Libyan economy, or possibly to assist in transferring Libyan currency from sterling to dollar backing and thus reduce Brit controls on Libyan dollar spending. Libyan objective to eliminate financial dependence on Brit was hinted by Suleiman Jerbi when he delivered PriMin's ltr to me in Cyrene (Benghazi tel 34, Sept 2).

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Benghazi.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Minister that the Department of State approved his reply to the Prime Minister's letter of Aug. 29 (see telegram 34 from Benghazi, Sept. 2, p. 545) and instructed him to make a further written reply, enumerating the financial advantages Libya was receiving from the United States. The Department suggested he say in the letter that if all members of the Libyan Parliament were dissatisfied with the grant and with the duration of the military agreement, it indicated a regrettable misunderstanding of the benefits which the Libyan Government itself negotiated and had confidently predicted would be ratified. Since the U.S. facilities in Libya were not a commercial enterprise but rather part of a defense effort benefiting Libya and all nations of the free world as well as the United States, the U.S. Government could not agree to reconsider the agreements. Tripoli despatch 71, Oct. 23, transmitted a copy of the letter mentioned in the source text. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56373.

If PriMin presents agrmt in November and it is rejected, we will be faced with serious problem. If King's remarks to me are to be taken at face value, Muntasser's position wld then be "very critical" and I have little doubt he wld feel impelled to resign if he encountered such a setback.

Rejection of agrmt might also prejudice ratification of UK Treaty of Alliance (mytel 189 Sept 24).[3] End of Muntasser regime and removal of his pro-Western influence wld completely change polit atmosphere in Libya. We wld thus have lost a friendly govt and still have no base agrmt. There is no one in sight to replace Muntasser except volatile, nationalistic and impulsive Fathi Kekhia, whose ambitions for premiership are subj of recurrent rumors.

As Dept rightly observes, govt has not exercised effective leadership in matter of base agrmt. Unfortunate fact is that PriMin never disclosed to us extent of objections to agrmt until after Parl had adjourned, by which time he was captive of opinion which he himself had allowed to develop. Not only has PriMin done nothing to explain benefits of agrmt (its terms are still regarded as top secret by Libyan Govt), but he summarily departed from Tripoli to spend summer in Jebel after Parl was informed July 21 that agrmt wld be submitted for its consideration following week (mytel 63, July 25).[4] PriMin admitted to me that members of Parl had been briefed only on exchange of ltrs regarding economic aid. As mentioned in Benghazi tel 24 Aug 22,[5] govt appears to have deliberately refrained from preparing ground for passage of agrmt and to have permitted hostile press campaign to proceed unchecked. Memo which I submitted to PriMin July 17 for his use in supporting agrmt in Parl seems to have been ignored or suppressed as no reference has ever been made to it by Libyans.[6]

It is questionable whether Muntasser has by nature aptitude or inclination for leadership needed to secure adoption of any controversial govt measure. He personally lacks force in his public attitudes and avoids taking strong position where opposition may be expected, as, for example, in presenting US with Legation property site and then placing on US responsibility for inducing Brit to vacate site. With all Muntasser's weaknesses, however, fact remains he is ablest pro-Western politician on scene. Despite prospect of losing one million dollar econ aid per annum, unless PriMin assumed active leadership of drive to have agrmt accepted, which he obviously does not propose to do under present circumstances, there wld appear little likelihood of obtaining ratification in foreseeable future. At best, agrmt might be shelved indefinitely, with all the attendant uncertainties as to present and future status of USAF activities in Libya.

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[3] Not printed. (873.10/9–2452)

[4] Not printed; it reported questions about Wheelus Field by members of the Chamber of Deputies, who wanted to know why the U.S.–Libyan agreement had not been submitted to the Parliament. The government said it would submit the agreement the following week. (711.56373/7–2552)

[5] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 547.

[6] Tripoli despatch 33, Aug. 29, transmitted a copy of the Minister's letter of July 17. Attached to it was a joint letter from the Commanding Officer of Wheelus Field and the District Engineer of the Middle East District, giving a detailed account of the direct economic benefits which Libya derived from USAF operations. (711.56373/8–2952)

Even if we succeeded in getting agrmt ratified under pressure from King or PriMin, relations between Wheelus Field and Libyan Govt wld probably become strained without additional compensation in some form. Numerous minor annoyances cld assume major proportions, such as question of social insurance for USAF civilian employees and recently expressed Libyan desire that no foreign military shld be permitted in transit at Wheelus. If questions of this kind shld be seriously agitated, it might become necessary to renegotiate entire base agrmt under much more onerous conditions than before. Needless to say, an unfriendly or resentful attitude on part of Libyans wld make it difficult to proceed with plans for new mil installations in other parts of Libya, even though agrmt gave us right to do so.

While I am of course in accord with proposition that US defense effort is not commercial enterprise, I fear that in embroidering its case with US "responsibility for collective defense," Dept has used argument least likely to influence Libyan mind. Defense against potential internatl aggression is almost meaningless to average Libyan, who however, is generally willing to accept US grants and contributions for this purpose if he thinks he can benefit thereby. Attitude of Libyan Govt in this matter was summed up by PriMin when he characterized idea of Libyan contribution to collective defense of free world as "sentimental" (Benghazi tel 47 Sept 19).[7] On various occasions Libyan officials have indicated to me that they regard Libya's sole tangible asset to be its strategic position. They believe they shld capitalize on this principal exportable item to maximum extent, and I have little doubt that in surrendering base rights to US they feel they are selling goods and services. In the interest of Libyan economy, as well as their personal prestige, they wish these goods and services to be paid for at as high a price as possible. While American defense effort at Wheelus Field is certainly not "commercial transaction" from our standpoint, Libyans wld have difficulty in regarding it otherwise. Defense against Soviet imperialism is scarcely understood and seldom mentioned in Libya. Defense against French or Brit "aggression" is much more comprehensible.

I know Dept will regard this situation in light of foregoing and will not expect Libyans to accept high principles of "common defense against the aggressor" as sufficient answer to their arguments. In final analysis it wld seem to be question of strategic value which we place on Wheelus measured in unsentimental terms of cash, which is basis of Libyan position. While it may yet be possible to avoid raising the ante, I trust Dept is exploring all other means of inducing Libyans to ratify agrmt. If an offer were made to meet Libyans at least part way in their request, we might find it to our advantage to propose some "package deal" under which assurances cld be given us regarding interpretation of base agrmt as it applies to current problems at Wheelus or to other base areas in future. In other words, there may well be matters connected with smooth operation of USAF in Libya which cld be included in any proposal for settlement of Libyan desire for increased compensation.

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[7] Not printed; it reported that the Prime Minister said Libya's poverty required the sale of its base rights at a fair price to ensure its national survival. Even though Libya supported the United States, whose lack of colonial aspirations endeared it to Libya, it could not afford to be sentimental and give away its base rights. (711.56373/9-1952)

Legation is sending separate tel on steps which we might take to obtain greater publicity for benefits accruing to Libya through expenditures at Wheelus Field.[8]

VILLARD

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[8] Tripoli telegram 252, Oct. 13, suggested the Department of State might want to consider a one-time lump-sum payment to Libya, or perhaps a part payment in property, such as a coastal patrol boat, an airplane, or some port facilities equipment. (711.56373/10–1352)

711.56373/10–2452 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Libya[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 4, 1952—6:18 p. m.

272. From Villard. Believe there is chance obtain additional aid for Libya in connection with base agreement but difficulty lies in determining amount necessary to satisfy Muntasser he can obtain ratification US base agreement. Another difficulty is form such additional aid, if forthcoming, shld take. One thought is that as mentioned in Legtel 299[2] instead of offering Libyan Govt specific sum we undertake to help finance within limits project such as development bank, agricultural loan agency or "Ente"[3] settlement, details of which wld be worked out with Libyans thru joint consultations.

What I require in my efforts here is best estimate (1) minimum amt additional aid necessary (2) most effective form of aid both to insure ratification and to channel money to useful purposes and (3) whether instead of specifying amt it wld be enough to promise US financial support for some worthy project.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Root (AF) and cleared by Utter (AF).

[2] Not printed; it reported a conversation Villard had with the Prime Minister just before his departure for Washington on consultation. He said that the Prime Minister indicated the position of the Libyan Government remained the same despite U.S. rejection of his request for additional compensation. He added that the Prime Minister had been "shocked, dismayed and deeply discouraged" by the rejection and that if the United States wanted to keep him in power it would have to see if there were any possible way to meet his views and give him the courage to present the agreement to the Parliament. (711.56373/10–2452)

[3] This reference is to a former Italian colonization project, which was to lay the foundation for comprehensive economic development in Cyrenaica.

It occurred to me that Leg might thru indirect channels be able to indicate my problem to Muntasser or Ali Jerbi and pin them down more definitely than heretofore on essential info. This of course wld have to be done with utmost discretion and without raising false hopes for increase.

Altho it wld be better to make no predictions you may, if Muntasser's position or gen polit situation appears to be worsening, let him know thru such indirect or informal way you may choose that I believe hope has been renewed for some increased compensation from US Govt.

In any event I wld appreciate any helpful info on above questions which Leg can provide by Nov 10.[4]

Bruce

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[4] Tripoli telegram 352, Nov. 8, reported the Legation had not yet been able to get any concrete data from the Libyan Government regarding its desire for economic aid. Tripoli telegram 373, Nov. 18, transmitted a note from the Foreign Office calling for renegotiation of the base agreement. The note said the Governments of the United Kingdom and France had each submitted draft agreements to Libya along the same lines as the U.S. agreement, and Libya had decided to revise each of them. The Libyan Government expected to submit its counterproposals in the near future. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56373.

711.56373/11–652 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 6, 1952—4:18 p. m.

3172. Fol consultations here with Min Villard on Libyan request for increased compensation in return for base agreement, Defense now amenable to providing some additional econ aid.[2] Defense obviously wishes obtain ratification for cheapest price possible.

Tripoli has not yet been informed of this Defense attitude and it will not be communicated to Libyan Govt until Min Villard's return later this month. Dept is meanwhile discussing with him in what form and under what conditions offer shld be made.

Important consideration is Brit attitude towards any new arrangement. As reported Tripoli's 299 (30 to London),[3] Libyans now appear interested in using US aid to assist in establishing new econ org, perhaps loan agency for agricultural or gen econ development or perhaps settlement project. Gen opinion here is that we shld attach some conditions to increase to insure that it is well spent. Since Libyans do not want increase to go into Development Agency and appear attach great importance to use of US aid to offset Brit influence, obvious suggestion of assigning aid to Development and Stabilization Agency appears eliminated and we are confronted with delicate problem of how else it can be used.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Root (AF) and cleared by Utter (AF).

[2] On Oct. 31 an Air Force official informed the Department of State that Defense could increase funds to Libya by $1 million, with the maximum to be not more than $2 million per year for 20 years, although they hoped every effort would be made to obtain the agreement for less. (Memorandum of telephone conversation of Oct. 31; 711.56373/10–3152) A letter from the Secretary of Defense, dated Nov. 22, confirmed the agreement in writing, stating that the Department of Defense had discussed the necessity for the additional amount with representatives of the appropriate Congressional committees. Defense hoped, however, that arrangements could be made later to permit the annual payments to be made from a nonmilitary source. Attached to the letter was a copy of a proposed technical schedule which included all of the known U.S. military requirements in Libya. (711.56373/11–2252)

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

Further problem is to insure that this is definitely last round in negotiating compensation for base agreement. In this we wld like to enlist whatever influence UK or Brit advisers can exert on Libyan Govt to secure prompt ratification without further demands for econ assistance.

So that he may discuss these questions with FonOff and obtain Brit views before he approaches Libyan Govt, Min Villard is returning Tripoli via London, sailing Nov. 15 on *United States* which arrives Southampton Nov 20. Suggest Emb meanwhile indicate nature of problem to FonOff so that it will be prepared with opinion upon Min Villard's arrival.

Defense willing further grant be made on understanding that it will insure ratification base agreement earliest possible moment. Consequently Min will have to negot terms any increase immed upon his return to Tripoli.

BRUCE

711.56373/11–2252 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 22, 1952—7 p. m.

2920. From Villard. I had meeting with Allen and Garnett of Foreign Office this morning re Libya. In response their request for my views, I said I felt Libyan note concerning renegotiation entire base agreement probably resulted French [2] concern after studying text British draft agreement that they were getting in too deep. I noted in this connection that UK draft appears go considerably further than US agreement. Allen questioned this. In drafting agreement, Foreign Office had two main considerations in mind:

(1) To meet as many Libyan objections as possible.

(2) To make draft conform as closely as possible to US draft. Foreign Office had thought that it would make matters easier for Libyan

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli.

[2] A handwritten note in the margin indicated that "fresh" was probably the word intended rather than "French", which appears in the source text.

Government to obtain ratification if two agreements were stated in similar terms. There were undoubtedly provisions in UK agreement which were different but he did not think agreement as whole went much further than ours. Allen went on to say Muntasser told Kirkbride it is going to be difficult get British agreement through Parliament because of its similarity US agreement. Muntasser also said in effect that if UK plans get its draft through Parliament, it must help influence US to change its agreement to make it more acceptable.

Re British treaty, Allen said he thought agreement had been reached. Final approval HMG still required but he hoped this could be obtained and treaty initialed before Christmas. Libyans have taken line they cannot sign treaty until military and financial agreements completed. Then presumably whole package would be put before Libyan Parliament.

I said I was greatly surprised and puzzled by latest Libyan move. Except for duration and financial provisions, Libyans had never criticized our agreement. Muntasser told me that with increase of contribution, he thought he could get ratification. It was for that reason I had gone back to Washington to discuss problem. I had now been authorized offer an additional sum. Naturally, I was under instructions obtain agreement as cheaply as possible. My task would, of course, be greatly complicated by latest indications Libyan demands would be more extensive.

Allen said Foreign Office also was greatly perturbed about this development. It has been examining problem posed by Libyan request that UK make fixed contribution rather than subsidize deficit. Kirkbride had expressed opinion it would be best try to yield to Libyans on this point. Otherwise, there would be recurring battle every year when UK reviews budget. Fixed contribution, however, poses following difficulties for British:

(1) It is hard to get Parliament to vote fixed sum over period of 20 years, since usual procedure is to make appropriations annually;
(2) Awkward precedence would be created with respect other countries with which UK has similar agreements;
(3) Whole basic relationship between UK and Libya would be changed. It would be more difficult control Libyan economy and assure that funds are spent in financially sound ways.

In effort solve these difficulties, HMG thinking of agreeing principle of fixed annual contribution for 20 years, but fixing amount of contribution for shorter period, say three or five years, with provision for review at end that time. Re next year's contribution, HMG considering abandoning provision for scrutiny in this year's agreement and simply fixing arbitrary figure. UK would insist good proportion this money pass through development agency, thereby permitting British retain some control. He did not think, however, UK would increase present one-half million pounds ceiling on funds paid to development agency.

I said Libyans and ourselves had agreed tacitly that for first year our contribution would go through development agency. Since then, however, Libyans have made it clear they do not want adopt same procedure in future. They have talked vaguely of setting up agricultural bank for benefit small farmers, but have failed otherwise to be specific in indicating other purposes to which they might put funds. We will certainly stipulate funds must be used for economic development, but have not yet worked out whether we can attach more strings as well. Allen suggested we should consider whether, despite Libyan objections, US should not utilize development agency, which would permit some control on use of funds. I explained that if this were to be case, we would probably want to join agency, but that this presented problems since act of Congress would be required. Nevertheless, we would hope Libyans would listen to our advice re expenditure of funds, relying on either local Point IV experts or possibly somebody sent out from Wash.

Reverting to Libyan desire renegotiate entire agreement, Allen felt it important US, UK, and France endeavor keep in step. We must make every effort dissuade Libya from indulging in blackmail tactics and playing one against others. French were resting uneasy. French Embassy off had suggested to Foreign Office this morning joint UK-French talks on subject, preferably with US participation as well. He presumed French would be making similar demarche to US and suggested it might be good idea hold such conversations while I was still in London. I said I could not, of course, agree such suggestion without clearance from Washington. I thought it would be best if UK went ahead and discussed problem with French. I added that I could not quite understand French eagerness hold such conversations. I had impression from French Legation in Tripoli that French resigned to situation created by Muntasser's comment that nothing could be done about French agreement until US and UK agreements had been disposed of.[3]

Allen felt explanation was simply that French attach importance their agreement as we do. He agreed French unpopular in Libya and that path not smoothed by their participation in this problem. He suggested, however, that French had one trump card which might benefit us all, namely their special position in Fezzan. Libyans under constant apprehension French might split this from rest of Libya and we might reach point where it would be desirable for French do a little blackmailing of their own. He felt UK would, in any event, have to talk to French, since it has not brought them up to date on its thinking re financial contribution. Since French have similar problem, he thought it desirable bilateral discussion take place. If US willing participate, he thought it would be useful.

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[3] On Dec. 24, 1951, the French and Libyans had signed two temporary agreements. A military agreement allowed France to retain French forces in Fazzan for 6 months, pending signing of a permanent treaty, with the option of renewing the temporary agreement for another 6 months if a permanent agreement had not been signed. In a financial agreement, the French agreed to give the Libyans each year a sum equal to the financial deficit in Fazzan. (Khadduri, *Modern Libya*, p. 258)

I again evaded suggestion, saying I thought it perhaps premature hold tripartite discussions until we knew more about background Libyan note to us and perhaps until we had seen Libyan counterproposals. I said moreover I still had some hope I might be able forestall counterproposals on my return Tripoli. I asked whether Kirkbride could not help dissuade Libyans. Allen said he hoped Kirkbride was already making such efforts but if he were not, Foreign Office would suggest that he consider doing so. In that case, Kirkbride would probably have to emphasize UK interests. Allen also suggested we try persuade Pitt-Hardacre explain to Libyans benefits our agreement and dangers inherent in reopening it.

Allen asked if we had given any thought to what we would do if Libyans refused ratify agreement. I said I could conceive of Department instructing me to tell Libyans that we decline renegotiate agreement which we had fairly reached between us and signed. If we chose stand on this line, Libyans could not throw us out. This could pinprick us and make things uncomfortable for us, however, and situation would be unsatisfactory in that it was doubtful we could undertake any expansion of facilities which US Air Force might have in mind.

Allen said situation would also be difficult for British. Interim arrangement which presently covers status British forces in Libya comes to an end December 24 and will have to be renegotiated. Under present arrangement, UK cannot increase its military forces without Libyan agreement nor undertake expansion of facilities necessitated, for example, if decision taken evacuate canal base. Allen went on to note that if we stand firm, Muntasser might well threaten to resign. I said that in past we had thought Muntasser's resignation would be calamity and had gathered British agreed. It might, however, be necessary face that possibility. Great problem was who would succeed him. After examining possibilities, Allen and I agreed there was no promising alternative to Muntasser. There was also danger that any successor might prove even more intransigent, especially if Muntasser resigned on base agreement issue. Allen observed that if suitable successor could not be found, Libya might start down slope which would result in eventual break-up Federal Government into component parts. In such case perhaps base agreements could be negotiated with provincial administrations. He did not regard this as desirable course for events to take, nor was he advocating it. He was merely noting that it might happen. He suggested also that we might try to make King see that if base problem not settled and Muntasser resigned on this issue, there was danger of Libya drifting toward break-up. I said that I thought we should keep possibility of approach to King in mind. I was not however, optimistic it would be productive since my past experience with King indicated that he was purposely evasive on questions of this kind, on which he always expressed desire consult Muntasser. Allen agreed and doubted that we could expect much help from King until we had reached point where we were prepared to stick and refuse Libyan demands for further concessions. Then, however, it might be posssible make King see necessity for intervening. Main danger under such circumstance might be that Libyans would accept agreements which they sincerely did not like. He thought experience in Egypt had shown that it was not good having agreements of this kind which were not in accordance with the wishes of the governments and peoples concerned. I agreed fully.

Comment: I hope Dept will approve my action in evading question of participating in trilateral discussions here. My reasons for doing so are the same as those outlined in Embtel 2909, Nov 21.[4]

GIFFORD

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[4] Not printed; the Minister said he rejected the tripartite approach because it would wipe out the lead the United States already had over the others and bring negotiations down to the lowest common denominator. (711.56373/11–2152)

711.56373/12–152 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State

SECRET TRIPOLI, December 1, 1952—midnight.

406. 1. In absence of PriMin, I have had discussion with Defense Min Jerbi regarding Libyan counterproposals to our base agreement.[1] Jerbi stated that new Libyan approach shld not materially affect contents of agmt as negotiated last year. It did, however, tighten up certain provisions, notably those referring to questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction, and it represented fundamental and basic principles which Libyan Govt is now able to accept.

2. Reason for change in Libyan attitude was realization that UK and France in their draft mil agmts were demanding practically the same terms that Libya had freely and willingly granted to US and this wld never be approved by Libyan people. French, in particular, cld under no circumstances expect to receive the same privileges, exemptions, and general treatment in mil matters accorded to Americans in

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[1] Tripoli telegram 405, Dec. 1, transmitted a preliminary and rough translation of a set of counterproposals to the December 1951 base agreement, received from the Libyan Government on Nov. 27. Despatch 95 from Tripoli, Dec. 8, transmitted a revised translation. The despatch commented that its translation had been compared with the translation of an identical document received by the British and, although the translations differed slightly in some instances, the Arabic text and meaning of the individual paragraphs were the same. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56373.

US base agmt, and there wld likewise be public opposition to granting UK same terms given to US.

3. Counterproposals apply equally to all three foreign orders and assurances cld be given that if accepted by US, the revised agmt wld be approved by Parliament. Of course, in case of US, additional econ aid wld be expected. Jerbi said exact figure in this connection was not his business, but he mentioned sums ranging up to $5,000,000.

4. Jerbi said he hoped he cld be of some use in present situation, but he felt that effort was being made to get him out of the country in near future. I told him of Dept's thinking that Libyan interests might be better served if he did not come immed to US as Minister, since there wld be little for him to do and his experience might be more valuable. Jerbi himself realized there was not much to keep him busy in proposed role as Min to US, or, as recently suggested, Min to Turkey, but he believed forces were actively at work to eliminate him from Libyan scene (I assume because of his well known pro-American feelings). He asked that I speak to the King personally and to no one else about this matter.

5. I have discussed counterproposals briefly with Brit and French Mins and expect to do so at greater length later this week. First reaction of Kirkbride is that new proposals constitute "basis for negots", while Dumarcay thinks they are more or less acceptable as is.

6. French Min told me that document which had been submitted to Libyan Govt last summer was treaty of alliance virtually the same as UK draft and that military annex recently submitted also followed closely UK model. As in case of Brit, it was intention of France to negotiate financial agmt as well. It thus seems clear that UK and France have collaborated in their drafts all along and that submission by French of mil annex with its extensive implications, in face of present bitterly anti-French feeling in this Arab country, probably was immed cause for change in Libyan attitude.

VILLARD

711.56373/12-652 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL TRIPOLI, December 6, 1952—6 p. m.

429. While I realize difficulty in finding Arabic speaking officer to serve at this legation, I wish to point out increasingly serious handicap in our relations with Libyan Govt owing to absence of any Arabic speaking officer on my staff. As Dept knows, it has been necessary to transfer from Benghazi Palestinian Arab to serve as interpreter and translator here. Latter is believed trustworthy and renders commendable service, but I question advisability of employing non-American to

translate such top secret or secret documents as Libyan counter-proposals to our base agreement (Legtel 405 Dec 1).[1]

My situation compares most disadvantageously with that of British and French Ministers, who not only speak and write Arabic fluently but have several officers of their own nationality competent in the Arabic language. This Legation had no such comparable staff member and it required nearly three days to complete translation of recent Libyan counter-proposals. Libyan foreign office has notified foreign legations that commencing next March all correspondence with it must be in Arabic. Communications from foreign office already being received in that language. If it should become necessary to carry on protracted negotiations re base agreement, need for translations will be even more acute.

We are entirely unprepared to cope with this growing problem. I strongly urge that Arabic speaking FSO be assigned Tripoli, possibly instead of Gatch or at least that Arabic specialist reserve officer be sent here on temporary basis soonest.

VILLARD

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra*.

711.56373/12–1752 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Libya[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 17, 1952—12:20 p. m.

357. After lengthy review tels re Libyan counterproposals to US base agreement and Brit and Fr desires for tripartite conversations on our respective requirements in Libya,[2] Dept and Defense approve tactics outlined last two paras Tripoli tel 435 Dec 9.[3] In your first con-

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Wellons (AF) and cleared in the offices of Jernegan (NEA), Admiral Smith (Defense), and Cyr (AF). It was repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Benghazi, and Rome.

[2] Tripoli telegram 424, Dec. 5, informed the Department of State that the Legation felt the Libyan counterproposals constituted a possible basis for negotiations in the event that ratification of the original agreement proved impossible. The Legation considered the present difficulties to stem largely from the fact that the French and British were given copies of the original U.S. draft agreement during the negotiations in 1951. Since the United States had an operative interim agreement of indefinite duration, while the British and French had to conclude agreements or renew their present ones before Dec. 24, the Minister felt the United States would be seriously harmed by tripartite negotiations. (711.56373/12–552) Telegram 340 to Tripoli, Dec. 9, informed the Legation that the Department of Defense strongly opposed renegotiation, since the signed draft was considered completely negotiated and was a signed agreement merely awaiting ratification. (711.56373/12–652)

[3] Not printed; it informed the Department that the Legation considered it impossible to make any decisions about the agreement without first talking to the Prime Minister, who was in Cairo at the time. The last two paragraphs said the Minister felt he should first inform the Prime Minister he had pleaded Libya's case in Washington and had been authorized to discuss the question of additional compensation in relation to the old agreement, but had no authority to renegotiate. Until he had done that, he considered it unwise to engage in tripartite discussions. (711.56373/12–952)

versation with PriMin on his return from Cairo US desire for ratification present agreement shld be reaffirmed as strongly as possible and you shld indicate to PriMin that because of Congressional participation in this matter and urgency mil planning for area US cannot undertake negot of a new agreement. Suggest you approach Muntasser along fol lines:

(1) You cld express our surprise and displeasure at sudden change of attitude on part of Libyan Govt. You shld refrain from saying flatly we cld not in any event consider Libyan counterproposals but you shld make it clear that you have no instructions to proceed on any basis other than the present agreement. Point out that US considers it necessary to proceed with present agreement because of representations already made to Congressional leaders on basis of that agreement.

(2) Important point to emphasize as suggested Tripoli tel 435 is that US Govt has authorized you to discuss question of additional compensation only in relation to present agreement. In mentioning possibility increased compensation you cld tell Muntasser we had counted on early presentation original US agreement to Parliament with assurance PriMin's support for it.

(3) If desirable, you might review history protracted negotiations leading up to signature agreement Dec 24, 1951, and reiterate facts re great amt financial and econ development assistance Libya is already receiving from several US sources.

(4) On negative side you cld point out that failure to ratify negotiated agreement wld force US to reassess both present and proposed commitments re mil facilities and expenditures in Libya which wld result in permanent diversion of funds already earmarked for such places as Cyrenaica. As pointed out Deptel 340 Dec 9 these funds must be committed by Apr 1953. Defense believes time loss involved in consideration of counterproposals wld effectively eliminate Libya as location of additional bases.

In order impress Muntasser with strength and seriousness US position you may elaborate on above points or use additional arguments as you consider necessary.[4]

Bruce

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[4] Tripoli telegram 478, Dec. 23, informed the Department of State that the Minister had had a 2½-hour discussion with the Prime Minister the previous day regarding the base agreement, in which he had closely followed the contents of telegram 357 in explaining the U.S. position. The Prime Minister said that while Villard was in Washington in October, he had realized that Parliament would not ratify the original agreement. At the same time, the United Kingdom and France had submitted agreements similar to that signed with the United States. In addition, the Prime Minister insisted he had been informed when he signed the original agreement that it could later be modified. The Prime Minister said he did not insist on a new agreement, but merely wished to replace parts of the original with sections containing principles safeguarding Libya's freedom and independence. When pressed by the Minister to say whether or not he was prepared to submit the original agreement to Parliament, Muntasser said he could give no assurance on that point. The Minister said his impression of the conversation was that Muntasser was concerned about the situation, and his attitude seemed based largely on fear of British pressure for treatment equal to the United States. He also thought the Prime Minister might be prepared to overcome possible opposition in Parliament if the price were high enough. (711.56373/12-2352)

711.56376/1–553 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Jordan (Green) to the Department of State

SECRET AMMAN, January 5, 1953—noon.

531. ReDeptel 486, December 29.[1] From Lynch.

While in some degree flattering for Muntasser to suggest that I could lead him and his hard-headed advisers up such a diplomatic garden path as indicated in reftel, the story has no basis in fact. I am saddened that Muntasser has felt it necessary to produce such a fiction.

At a reception at 5 p. m. on Independence Day, December 24, 1952 [*1951*] after complete accord on all points in agreement had been reached and after 10 p. m. had been agreed upon as suitable hour for signing all pertinent documents—signing to take place immediately subsequent to my act of recognizing independent Libya on behalf of US Muntasser's private secy told me that Prime Minister would like a few more days to negotiate. My reaction to this eleventh hour suggestion was highly unfavorable and I pointed out the anomalous situation in which Libya would find itself with no agreement to cover presence of our airbase and large number of airforce troops. I made it perfectly clear that I expected Prime Minister to sign at the hour agreed upon, and he did so.

At one time Libyans had expressed desire for assistance of foreign legal adviser to counsel them on certain technical aspects of agreement. We, of course, raised no objection to this but pointed out desirability of having agreement signed on Independence Day. Libyans themselves decided that they would accept advice of their own legal talent when it was ascertained that kind of person they desired for this work was not then available. At no time, however, was it suggested by Libyans or by me that we had labored for more than four months in order to agree upon and sign a document which was provisional or tentative in character.

As for the figure of $1 million per year for 20 years one million was the Libyans own figure not ours. Record will show that I tried hard for weeks to persuade them to accept less. Libyans were delighted with the sum for which they had held out for so long and in such a determined fashion. My chief difficulty was in persuading Dept and Defense that one million per year was a reasonable figure to pay . . . for a 20-year period. It was as Ali Bey Jerbi said (and in circumstances dislike quoting the Libyans) "A good round sum" and one which they could "persuade their parliament to accept" when time came for parliamentary ratification in accordance with Libyan constitution.

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[1] Not printed; it was addressed to Andrew Lynch, Counselor of Embassy in Jordan. He had been First Secretary at the Legation in Libya and, as Chargé d'Affaires, signed the Base Agreement for the United States on Dec. 24, 1951. It reported that Muntasser said he had been informed by Lynch orally that the Dec. 24 agreement was merely temporary and subject to modification after signing. It also said that the Libyan Prime Minister stated he had been forced to accept the amount of $1 million on a take it or leave it basis, but had been given to understand that the amount of economic aid would be raised. (711.56373/12–2952)

GREEN

711.56373/1-653 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET TRIPOLI, January 6, 1953—5 p. m.

509. Re Legtel 508 January 6.[2] It now seems obvious that Prime Minister cannot be induced to submit original agreement to Parliament for ratification, even with additional compensation, because he has committed himself and Council of Ministers to proposition that certain principles safeguarding Libyan sovereignty must be incorporated in our agreement. Question is to what extent it may be necessary go along with these principles in order allow Prime Minister save face and enable him to say he has renegotiated agreement on terms satisfactory to Libya, acceptance of which he can recommend to Parliament. Legation believes that gap between provisions original agreement and counterproposals is not so great as it may appear and that it is worth an immediate and intensive effort on our part to explore possibility of reaching compromise which would preserve essentials of our original agreement and at same time recognize Libyan desire to make provision for cherished principles of sovereignty.

With this end in view, Legation has prepared study of counterproposals in relation to old agreement and believes that it could initiate informal conversations on subject with Libyans without delay. A week at most would show whether possibility existed of coming together. If Department decides attempt should be made, it would be essential start at once, otherwise British negotiations will probably set the pace and blunt Libyan eagerness to do business with United States as preferred party. Naturally, Legation would in no way commit Department in course of such discussions but would simply endeavor arrive at some common ground which could be referred to Department for its consideration. If compromise can be reached without sacrifice our basic needs, perhaps within confines of somewhat shorter document than present agreement, it would be far more satisfactory in long run than to insist on provisions which would rankle in Libyan mind and be source of charge of "imperialism" in years to come.

I believe that ample goodwill exists on Libyan side to insure receptive attitude to approach along above lines. This is advantage which should not be lost sight of, since it is constantly emphasized in our conversations with Libyans. It would doubtless be lost quickly if we formed tripartite front, or permitted British to do negotiating for us. Prime Minister and other members of Cabinet with whom I have conversed on matter insist that it would not be difficult to agree on few principles Libyan Government considers necessary to include in our agreement. My impression in this respect is borne out by after dinner conversation which Counselor Legation had yesterday with Prime Minister. Latter said he foresaw no difficulty in reaching agreement with United States; that Parliament would consider that Libyan sovereignty would be impinged by terms of present agreement, and that he was trying to establish set of principles to safeguard such sovereignty. He mentioned difficulties of granting privileges to other states and indicated, without saying so in so many words, that United States would get far more liberal treatment than other states within the orbit of the general principles he conceives necessary to safeguard Libyan sovereignty. When asked specifically if parliamentary members had actually indicated that present agreement was contrary to Libyan sovereignty, he was most emphatic in stating that such was the case, using the Italian word "certo" to emphasize his point.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, and Benghazi.

[2] Not printed; it reported receipt of a note from the Prime Minister, dated Jan. 3, which the Legation interpreted as a complete rejection of its request that the Dec. 24 agreement be submitted to the Parliament for ratification. (711.56373/1-653)

Prime Minister also indicated to my Counselor that, as validity base agreement provisional upon its ratification and as ratification had proved to be impossible, the re-discussion of its terms would, in such circumstances, fall within the framework of the interim arrangements.

I hope that while moment is ripe Department will authorize Legation to engage in exploratory conversations on informal basis as described above. Colonel Anthis concurs.

VILLARD

711.56373/1–1253 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY TRIPOLI, January 12, 1953—11 p. m.

536. I had one hour conversation regarding base agreement with Prime Minister this noon, which was earliest appointment I could obtain following receipt of Deptel 406 January 9.[2] Muntasser saw Kirkbride earlier morning, when latter made arrangements start immediately discussions of British draft. (Kirkbride had previously notified me London has given him green light commence negotiations without any commitments, and I told him that I was authorized infor-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, and Benghazi.

[2] Not printed; it reported the Departments of State and Defense regretted the apparent impasse in the base negotiations resulting from the Libyan note of Jan. 3 (see footnote 2, *supra*). It authorized the Minister to engage in exploratory conversations with the Libyans on an informal basis as proposed in Tripoli telegram 509, *supra*. (711.56373/1–653)

mally endeavor ascertain just what changes Libyans considered necessary in his original agreement to make it acceptable to Parliament).

I informed Prime Minister, as suggested in Deptel 406, that US Government was surprised and disappointed at his note of January 3, that it was never our intention infringe on Libyan sovereignty, but that we sincerely appreciated spirit of friendship he had displayed in note. While Department still adhered to terms of original agreement I would be glad take advantage of goodwill in our relations and on strictly personal and informal basis examine with Libyan Government precise wording it desired to incorporate in our agreement to safeguard principles of Libyan sovereignty. I would do everything I could assist Libyan Government in this task and if I considered results so warranted I would forward suggested language to Department for its consideration. I stressed that I could make no commitments in advance for my Government, that proposed alterations or amendments should be minimum possible and that we should proceed rapidly in matter owing to necessity for prompt decision in Washington regarding defense plans for Libya.

Prime Minister said he was very gratified with this proposal and that the Department had left negotiations "in good hands". He is certain of my friendship and cooperation and that it would not take long to agree on essential points. Question of sovereignty was of paramount importance. US especially should perceive necessity for safeguarding independence of new country, since US had fought for its own freedom and was champion of smaller nations. Libya trusted US implicitly, but could not be so sure of others. Only weapon Libya possessed to preserve its sovereignty was interest and friendship of US, on which it counted heavily.

Prime Minister introduced new line of thought to explain need for revisions in original agreement. He said Arabic translation prepared by Consulate General, which had been handed him at last minute prior independence, was couched in language which would be "incomprehensible" to laymen and in particular to members of Parliament. Suleiman Jerbi, who was present at our interview today, said he had attempted day or two before independence to prepare agreed Arabic text in consultation with Consulate Generals translator, but that time was inadequate. Muntasser said he had begged Lynch to defer signing for few days in order to give opportunity for study and comparison, but Lynch had insisted agreement must be signed without fail night of December 24. British Administrator Blackley had likewise put pressure to sign exchange of letters with United Kingdom on date set or else "there would be no independence". In signing our agreement under such circumstances, Muntasser said, he had most assuredly understood that he could study Arabic version later and make such modifications or corrections as deemed necessary. Now after reviewing Arabic text at length, he could not assume risk of presenting Parliament with an agreement of highly technical nature, Arabic wording of which Libyan Government itself scarcely understood and was not therefore, in a position to defend intelligently in public. He had thought that with additional compensation he might nevertheless get agreement approved, but his request had been met with flat rejection and meanwhile other elements had entered picture.

When I taxed Prime Minister with fact that he had allowed nearly one year to elapse before calling attention to defects in agreement, he acknowledged that the fault was his, but made excuse that he and other members of Government had been too preoccupied with other matters following independence to get around to serious consideration of US agreement. I said that unfortunately US Government had all this time assumed agreement was complete and merely awaiting Parliamentary action, so that what appeared to be dilatory tactics on part of Libyan Government had made unfortunate impression. However, I would transmit his explanations and hoped that we could remedy situation quickly at this late date. Muntasser agreed, again expressed confidence in US and reiterated his belief that only few changes in agreement would be required, mainly for purposes of clarification and leaving no doubt as to Libyan sovereignty. Subject of counter proposals was not discussed.

Procedure agreed upon is that Prime Minister will submit proposed changes to Council of Ministers. When approval is obtained he will delegate Suleiman Jerbi to discuss wording with Legation representative, after which he and I will go over final draft. As preliminary step, Legation translator Afifi will make study of Arabic text of present agreement in order determine its accuracy and comprehensibility. Department will be kept closely informed of progress.

VILLARD

711.56373/1–2153 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET TRIPOLI, January 21, 1953.

567. Legation received first indication January 19 that Libyan Government has made known contents of United States base agreement to members Parliament. That evening Legation's Arab Secretary was approached by several different groups of Libyan Deputies (all government supporters) who broached subject of agreement, and criticized articles giving United States Forces freedom of movement

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Benghazi.

throughout Libya and freedom from jurisdiction Libyan courts. Deputies argued that former in effect is occupation of Libya by United States and both represent infringement Libyan sovereignty. When given explanation that United States interested only in temporary use of facilities in Libya and has no colonial ambitions, Deputies replied that while this may be true, Libyan sovereignty is nevertheless infringed, and if Libya permits United States to do as it pleases, Britain, who is known to be colonial minded, will certainly expect similar treatment. Deputies added that despite distrust of British, United Kingdom has been Libya's friend longer than United States and has given her more assistance, therefore Libya could hardly grant United Kingdom less favorable consideration than United States.

From Deputies' remarks Legation deduces that government may be attempting justify long delay in submission United States agreement to Parliament and win support for government by pointing out certain articles in agreement to which government objects. It also appears that Muntasser is now creating the opposition to United States agreement which sometime ago he said existed. While this putting ideas into heads of Deputies and taking them into his confidence may possibly strengthen Muntasser's position in Parliament and insure passage of the type agreement he desires, it makes more difficult our task of negotiating agreement suitable to United States. And it may well make it more difficult for us to obtain better terms than those given to British.

VILLARD

711.56373/4–153 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET TRIPOLI, April 1, 1953—midnight.

814. Prime Minister returned yesterday from Cairo and I had hour's conversation with him today regarding Base Agreement.

1. I said first that our Embassy London had discussed UK-Libyan negotiations with Foreign Office and had received impression that speed of Libyan negotiations was affected by progress in solution of Egyptian problem. Muntasser said he understood this and had been under same impression, but that it might take two years to reach agreement between UK and Egypt and Libya could hardly wait that long. He had signed temporary financial agreement with British for four-month period, which was positively last time he could agree

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, and Benghazi.

on such interim measure. Libyan financial situation required prompt settlement with British and it was not fault of Libyan Government that discussions were still pending. Meanwhile, it had been physically impossible for Council of Ministers to devote attention simultaneously to US agreement.

2. I then said I was under instructions to request Libyan Government take up US agreement at earliest possible date. I said we had waited considerable length of time and since UK discussions were not proceeding rapidly we hoped receive Libyan views without further loss of time. Muntasser replied he thought this could be arranged and agreed to take up question at Council of Ministers meeting tomorrow and on April 4. He would request Council prepare draft and open discussions with us next week.

3. Prime Minister said he had another important point to make. US Government had now been tenant at Wheelus Field for 15 months since independence and so far had paid nothing for faciilties accorded by Libyan Government. It was, of course, assured that Libya would in due course ratify Base Agreement and likewise that US would pay at least $1 million annually for economic aid to Libya. It was expected that actual sum would be materially larger but in any case $1 million was due and payable at end of December 1952. He had, therefore, to request that this sum be advanced to Libyan Government against total amount which would eventually be agreed upon in form of annual payments.

4. I said I regretted that I could give him no encouragement on this score. While appreciative of Libya's financial position and entirely sympathetic to need for economic aid, I could not imagine US Congress authorizing such expenditure without agreed and finalized version of our base rights in Libya. Moreover, there still appeared to be some misunderstanding between us, for which I hoped he would not hold me personally responsible and which we should soon endeavor clear up once and for all. It was still my understanding that payments for economic aid would commence only from date of ratification of Base Agreement instead of being retroactive as he implied. Muntasser said we should certainly clear away all misapprehensions and start afresh, but it was inconceivable that US Government would decline to pay for rights and facilities which it had enjoyed without interference over past year. If US refused to pay it would be same as if tenant of house declined to assume responsibility for rent while terms of lease were yet unsigned. Libyan people could never understand such attitude and failure of US to make payment retroactive would jeopardize existence of government.

5. I said I would, of course, transmit his request to Washington, together with an explanation of Libyan Government viewpoint, but that in my personal opinion appeal would have much better chance of receiving consideration if it could be accompanied by agreed-upon version of Base Agreement. Even if it were admitted that some payment were due I was unable see how $1 million could be made available in absence of any definite understanding re base rights between US and Libyan Governments. Muntasser said that financial situation was urgent (he almost said "desperate"), else he would not make this request. He could assure me that Libya would sign new agreement; surely US could not refuse to make "Beau Geste" at this critical juncture in Libyan affairs. He had recently discussed matter of US financial aid with "mutual friends", who had been shocked at smallness of sum provided for Libya and who had offered to "mediate" on subject between us. (I gathered he was referring to members of Arab League at recent meeting in Cairo.)

6. I urged Muntasser proceed quickly with US negotiations if need of funds was so great. I said I hoped that modifications and amendments would be as few and simple as he had given us to understand they would be, and that it would be unnecessary to spend time arguing over words and phrases. Muntasser said it would, of course, be necessary to incorporate in agreement fundamental principles safeguarding Libya's sovereignty and that he could not give us more liberal terms than he could grant to others. I pointed out it would be desirable have something accomplished before Secretary Dulles visit to Tripoli in May. Finally, in order to expedite negotiations, and since decision on modifications would have to be made in Washington in any event, he offered to ask Council of Ministers concentrate on US agreement immediately and present us with full text of all desired changes within one week. I accepted this suggestion and said I would forward proposed revisions to Department as soon as received.

VILLARD

711.56373/6-353

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 3, 1953.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: At the meeting of the National Security Council on June 1 I explained to the President, you will recall, that on my recent trip[2] I had found the Prime Minister of Libya greatly disappointed over the failure of the United States Government to give financial assistance to his Government for our use of Wheelus Air Force Base since December 24, 1951, the date of Libyan independence.

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[1] This letter was drafted by Cyr (AF) and cleared by Jernegan (NEA).

[2] For the minutes of the National Security Council meeting of June 1, 1953, see volume IX. For memorandum of conversation between the Secretary of State and members of the Libyan Government, May 28, 1953, see *ibid.*

The President concurred in my view that prompt action should be taken to remedy this situation. He also desired that we bring to a quick conclusion the negotiations with Libya for long-term use of Wheelus Base.

With these objectives in mind, I urge that Air Force funds be made available in the amount of $500,000 for immediate payment by the American Minister in Tripoli to the Libyan Government, with the understanding that both parties will work for prompt conclusion of the base rights negotiations. The Libyan Government would be informed that this payment would be made as an advance under the provisions of the agreement or agreements which will be reached.

It is my conviction that this action is necessary to break the present stalemate in the negotiations and will help pave the way for obtaining satisfactory provisions on those points of the proposed base rights agreement over which there is presently disagreement.

Sincerely yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

711.56373/6–1753

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to my letter of June 3, 1953,[2] urging that Air Force funds be made available in the amount of $500,000 for immediate payment by the American Minister in Tripoli to the Libyan Government.

The American Minister now reports that the present crisis in Libyan affairs may result in the resignation of the Prime Minister at any moment and that a payment of $1,000,000 may make it possible to forestall this unfortunate development by enabling the Prime Minister to point to a substantial payment from the United States for economic aid as a direct result of his efforts.[3]

I consider it to be in the interest of the United States that Prime Minister Muntasser remain in office and I hereby confirm this Department's oral recommendation of June 18 that the payment mentioned in my letter of June 3 should be increased to $1,000,000.[4]

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[1] This letter was drafted by Cyr (AF) and cleared by Jernegan (NEA).

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Telegram 962 from Tripoli, June 19. (711.56373/6–1953)

Sincerely yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[4] A letter from Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, dated Aug. 19, 1953 confirmed information previously given informally to the Department of State that on June 19 the Secretary of the Air Force directed the Finance Officer at Wheelus Air Force Base to deliver to the Minister in Tripoli a check for $1 million, payable to the United Kingdom of Libya. (711.56373/8-1953)

711.56373/6-3053

The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Secretary of the Air Force (Talbott)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: At the meeting of the National Security Council on June 1[2] the President and the Council members agreed with the Secretary of State that our base negotiations with Libya should be resumed and concluded as soon as possible.

In preparation for the next phase of the negotiations, this Department is formulating views, in collaboration with the military Departments, on the points which the Libyan Government has recently made as necessary to safeguard its sovereignty in the final agreement.

In this connection I have directed the State Department officers to treat liberally with the points raised by the Libyan Government. I have explained that, wherever possible, the Administration wants to eliminate points of difference with the Moslem world, particularly in the case of needy and friendly countries such as Libya; that the continued existence of Libya as a state depends in large measure on the early and successful conclusion of its base negotiations with the Allied powers; that because of Egypt's bid for a dominant role in Libya, the Administration cannot permit our relations with Libya to be taxed by a hard-bargaining attitude on our part in the coming phase of the negotiations; that the degree of our future enjoyment of base rights will be in direct proportion to the degree of satisfaction which the Libyans achieve in the negotiations; and that, with the possible exception of the issue over jurisdiction, the Libyan points can be met in a final agreement which will amply provide for our military requirements at a cost far below that exacted of us in other parts of the world.

I should greatly appreciate your bringing these views to the attention of the military staff members who are preparing for resumption of the Libyan base negotiations.

Sincerely yours, WALTER B. SMITH

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[1] This letter was drafted by Cyr (AF) and cleared by Jernegan (NEA).

[2] For the minutes of the June 1 NSC meeting, see volume IX.

773.13/9–2453 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Libya[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 25, 1953—11: 16 a. m.
PRIORITY

71. Reference your telegram 97.[2] While viewing Muntasser's resignation with concern, Department considers it inadvisable United States representative proceed Rome to urge Muntasser withdraw resignation. Mission would undoubtedly become public knowledge and subject many interpretations. Your suggestion to King through acting Prime Minister that King ask Muntasser form another government provides parties with method healing breach if they so desire and Department would prefer not give Muntasser impression he indispensable from United States viewpoint. While Muntasser obviously best qualified man for position, Department has not been impressed by his performance in respect to base agreement during past year.

Obviously Department deeply concerned over alternatives. Presume King realizes selection of Cyrenaican as Prime Minister would rock federal structure of Kingdom if not destroy it. In view foregoing considerations, believe you should remain Libya, doing there what you can to heal breach between King and Muntasser or giving such advice as you properly can to assure selection of new Prime Minister whose ascendancy would promote continued existence federal Kingdom and successful conclusion our base negotiations.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Rome, London, and Benghazi. It was drafted by Cyr (AF) and cleared by Utter (AF).

[2] Sept. 24; not printed. It reported that the resignation of Prime Minister Muntasser would be a serious setback to the base negotiations. The Minister asked the Department if it would approve his flying to Rome to try to persuade the Prime Minister, on the basis of mutual friendship, to withdraw a resignation he had handed to the King. (773.12/9–2453)

711.56373/11–1853 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TRIPOLI, November 18, 1953—4 p. m.

146. My visit to General Turner (Legtel 139)[2] coincided with presence Prime Minister Muntasser and gave us opportunity discuss base rights negotiations with him. Muntasser undertook send message to acting Prime Minister Kekhia urging prompt consideration United States agreement by Council of Ministers. However he privately expressed doubt to me this would be effective until after government installed in Benghazi. He said also that owing to weakness of cabinet and preoccupation with other matters it was unlikely Kekhia could

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Benghazi, and Frankfort for CINCEUR.

[2] Sept. 24; not printed. Villard reported that he and Colonel Anthis, Commanding Officer of Wheelus Field, were going to USAFE headquarters to discuss the status of the base negotiations. (711.56373/11–1153)

make decisions on draft provisions or accept ultimate responsibility before Parliament of approving present text.

Muntasser assured me that he still believed Libya's future depended on ties with United States, that he regarded our agreement as top priority objective, and that if he continued as Prime Minister he would conclude negotiations in short order. But whether he remained in office depended first on his health and second on his relations with King. He had benefited by treatment in Germany but still far from well. If on return King declined give him authority he required as Prime Minister he would be in impossible situation. His health might be permanently wrecked if he tried carry on as before.

Muntasser appeared well informed re situation in Libya. He deplored move to Benghazi as wasteful and impractical and was bitterly critical of "dictatorship" by Wali of Tripolitania. He thought government at standstill, that with present trend entire federal structure might as well be abolished to save expense, leaving virtually independent provinces loosely held together under nominal leadership of King. Transaction of government business, including United States base agreement, in Cyrenaican capital would be subject to confusion and unpredictable delay. He was deeply pained at these developments, which could lead only to increased Egyptian influence and ultimate rejection of Western alliances. UK treaty might prove worthless in two or three years with repetition of Canal Zone crisis.[3]

I told Muntasser I could not argue against his position that he could serve his country successfully only if he were Prime Minister in fact as well as in name. He made it clear that unless he received firm assurances from King to that effect he would insist his still pending resignation be accepted.

Muntasser plans finish vacation in Spain and offered negotiate with me there on major issues in base negotiations if developments warranted. He expects return Libya about middle December, when show down with King will presumably occur.

On above basis it is my belief (1) that there is less than 50–50 chance of Muntasser remaining in power, and (2) that unless Muntasser preserves continuity of our base negotiations we must resign ourselves to delay of indefinite duration in reaching agreement with Libya.

VILLARD

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[3] For documentation on the Suez Canal crisis, see volume IX.

Editorial Note

Vice President Richard Nixon was in Libya on December 12 and 13, 1953, as part of his goodwill trip to the Near and Far East. While in Libya, he spoke with both King Idris and Prime Minister Muntasser. On his return, he spent the afternoons of December 21–23 at the Department of State, discussing various aspects of his trip with Department officers. On January 8, 1954, he made a lengthy report to officers of the Department. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 033.1100 NI/1–1854.

711.56373/2–1654 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TRIPOLI, February 16, 1954—4 p. m.

270. Deptel 184, February 8.[2] Legation and United States Government officials have repeatedly warned Libyans over past two years of possible waning US strategic interests here because of delay in conclusion negotiations and consequent relocation necessary installations elsewhere. Legation has had impression Libyans consider such warnings merely bargaining tactics on our part. In addition, request US representations as to urgency for expediting negotiations have confirmed to Libyans what they consider strategic indispensibility Libya as far as United States concerned.

Presentation reduced United States requirements as outlined reference telegram should rudely dispel Libyan illusions this latter score and can be expected cause consternation in Libyan Government circles, particularly in view virtual elimination proposed Cyrenaican installations.

Presentation should have salutary effect and demonstrate to Libyans that past statements on part United States were frank and straightforward. It will also put Libyans in psychologically disadvantageous position when negotiations concerning compensation begin.

To achieve maximum effect in terms of:

(*a*) Reducing compensation, and
(*b*) Expediting conclusion negotiations.

Legation suggests following approach:

1. Reduced technical schedule could be handed to Libyans without comment as annex to agreement under provisions Article 11.

2. When Libyans express dismay at modesty United States requirements, as they undoubtedly will, Legation would then point to frequent past advice that requirements in Libya would by necessity have

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[1] This telegram was repeated to CINCUSAFE and CINCEUR, Frankfort; CINCNELM, London; and Benghazi.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Legation that because of delay in securing base rights, the USAF had eliminated a number of requirements in Libya. The Department informed the Legation that "this significant reduction U.S. military requirements Libya puts new complexion on base negotiations, particularly regarding grant aid *quid pro quo*. Two million dollars annually is maximum Defense can provide for reduced requirements." (711.56373/2–854)

to be shifted elsewhere if there was undue delay in concluding agreement.

3. In order to keep Libyans off balance, technical schedules should include two or three minor requirements (but not commitments) which Legation can eliminate in bargaining process as further evidence waning US interest.

4. When actual discussions regarding compensation begin, Legation, pointing to greatly reduced requirements, could start at one million dollars arguing (in this connection) that Libya was at one time prepared give US blanket military access to Libya for this sum and that now, as US requirements are so much lower, this amount would appear generous. If Libyans seem unconvinced, we might find it tactically advantegeous at this point reveal magnitude previous technical schedule. With any further delay Legation could use tactic outlined item 3 above. If, as can be expected, Libyans point to large United Kingdom contributions, Legation would then indicate disparity our requirements as compared those of United Kingdom. In ensuing unhappy atmosphere, Legation could raise ante toward $2 million with *quid pro quo* being promise speedy ratification on part Libyans.

Legation suggests following timing for above approach:

1. If agreement on minor points of difference continues at present relatively rapid pace, Legation would withhold reduced technical schedule until I began negotiations with Libyan Government on question compensation. This tactic would preclude possibility Council of Ministers, angered at prospect of reduced compensation, introducing new objections to articles which might otherwise be readily agreed upon at Council of Ministers level.

2. If Council Ministers insist on technical schedule prior my negotiations, Legation would present slightly expanded list as outlined above, but attempt keep question requirements out of picture as much as possible until maximum area of agreement reached.

3. If unnecessary delay occurs at Council Ministers level, Legation would use reduced technical schedule and possibility further reduction as spur to discussions. Of course, any approach to Libyans must await until permission granted for POL line, [garble] gunnery range unless it appears that delay obtaining such permission will be great.

Legation, on basis original large-scale technical requirements had believed Libyans would consider $2 million out of question. Although shock at reduction their anticipations will be great, they might accept amount as better than nothing. Legation still believes offer should be made palatable with as many "fringe benefits" as possible (Legtel 217 January 9)[3] and recommends Department give urgent consideration Legation suggestions in order we may have some benefits in hand for bargaining purposes.

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[3] Not printed; it repeated the Minister's belief that Libya would not be satisfied with $2 million a year. If he were not authorized to offer any larger payment, Villard suggested a number of "fringe benefits" that might make the agreement more attractive to the Libyans. (711.56373/1-954)

While advent Saqizli as Prime Minister may necessitate modification foregoing approach, particularly in terms of timing, Legation believes on basis present information basic line approach described should be followed.

VILLARD

773.13/2–1654 : Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (Summers) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BENGHAZI, February 16, 1954—2 p. m.

35. At short session Chamber of Deputies last night, attended by only little over 30 Deputies and group of spectators, the Chamber was informed of the acceptance of Muntasser's resignation by King. Muntasser, who was there with his entire Cabinet, made short statement expressing his appreciation of having had opportunity to serve at beginning of Libya's independence and praising King. The President of the Chamber replied in kind and the meeting adjourned. Saqezli was not present possibly because notice of his appointment had not been made public, though it was general knowledge. It has now been published.[2]

Speculation is rife as to composition of new Cabinet. Ben Halim, Nazir Public Works, has stated he would be Minister Communications and there are indications Aneizi will stay as Minister of Finance. Shaaban and Naama may also stay in Cabinet, although not necessarily in post they now occupy because of their tribal connections. There is, however, no definite information as yet.

There is also speculation as to reasons for change. It was known that Cabinet changes were impending and that Muntasser was not happy, but Saqezli had not been mentioned as his sucessor. The change took virtually every one by complete surprise.

Saqezli visited Tripoli over weekend, unverified story being that he went to see Wali who agreed to dissolution Parliament in event of objections to change. Judging, however, from yesterday's session, no real possibility strong objections, although it is understood some Tripolitanian members are not happy.[3]

SUMMERS

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli.

[2] Telegram 36 from Benghazi, Feb. 16, reported the King was making every effort to reduce the position of Tripolitania, and the new Cabinet had four Cyrenaicans to three Tripolitanians. Telegram 37 from Benghazi, Feb. 18, sent a list of the new Cabinet members. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 773.13.

[3] Telegram 275 from Tripoli, Feb. 24, reported that Tripolitanians were dismayed at the replacement of Muntasser by Saqezli, considering it a deliberate plan to concentrate federal power in the hands of Cyrenaicans. (773.00/2–2454)

Editorial Note

Since Benghazi had been designated co-capital of Libya in December 1953, the Consulate in Benghazi was designated a Legation, along with the Legation in Tripoli, in February 1954.

773.13/2-2454 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TRIPOLI, February 24, 1954—noon.

277. In long private conversation at his home yesterday, Muntasser said his resignation was result of mounting Palace interference in governmental affairs and King's unwillingness acquiesce in his suggestions for Cabinet reshuffle. Muntasser had brought matters to a head by asking King whether it would not be in best interests of country to accept his long-standing resignation and try change of government. Palace circles had been quick to exploit Prime Minister's initiative and King's decision had ensued with unexpected suddenness.

Muntasser said affairs of country both large and small were now wholly controlled by Palace. Present Cabinet had no will of its own. Saqizli was honest and sincere individual but did not even have rights and prerogatives of a private secretary in offering advice to King. Personal qualifications counted for nothing among Ministers who would carry out Palace wishes without debate or question. Muntasser believed assumption of supreme powers by Palace dangerous for King who must henceforth accept responsibility for failures as well as success of his policies.

Muntasser foresaw grave threat to unity of country in concentration of power in Cyrenaican hands. He was at total loss to comprehend why British apparently were unconcerned at possible consequences. Even if leadership presently lacking, moment was ripe for secession by Tripolitania, where resentment against King developing rapidly. Future of Fezzan in hands of pro-Egyptian vice Wali. Under circumstances he did not think United Kingdom of Libya could endure another year.

Muntasser expressed deep regret he was unable conclude United States agreement but saw no reason why negotiations should be appreciably delayed. He has no intention visit United States (Benghazi's 39 to Department February 19)[2] but will devote himself to personal affairs next few months. Question of his accepting diplomatic appointment remains undecided but in any case he would not wish serve abroad more than 6 months or 1 year. I have impression he intends biding his time until events again bring him into political picture.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Frankfort for CINCEUR, London, Rome, Paris, Cairo, and Benghazi.

[2] Not printed; it reported a rumor that Muntasser intended to visit the United States for medical treatment. (873.41/2-1954)

Last act of Muntasser as Prime Minister was to submit question of federal powers to Supreme Court. This he did without knowledge or consent of King, whose resultant anger I believe may have been contributory factor in acceptance resignation.

Despatch follows.[3]

VILLARD

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[3] Despatch 381 from Tripoli, Feb. 25, gave a more detailed account of the conversation summarized in telegram 277. (773.13/2–2554)

711.56373/3–854 : Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (Summers) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BENGHAZI, March 8, 1954—1 p. m.

54. From Villard. Since my arrival Benghazi and conversations with members new government, I have impression (*a*) that policy present Council of Ministers is to speed base negotiations, but to drive hardest possible bargain with United States on economic aid, and (*b*) that it regards economic aid as quite unrelated to scope our military requirements. Belief that reduced requirements would prove shock to Libyans (Tripoli's telegram 270 of February 16)[2] seems unfounded, especially as this is Cyrenaica Government and Cyrenaicans are determined obtain maximum amount assistance to rebuild their shattered Province. When they learn that only real benefits accruing to Libya under scaled down requirements will go to Tripolitania, they will undoubtedly be fortified in this attitude.

In view probable indifference of Libyan Government to argument that reduced requirements warrant less economic help, I believe our only hope avoid deadlock over question of compensation lies in King. I hope therefore, that some formula can be devised which would satisfy him as to United States interest in Libyan economic progress, as outlined my immediately preceding telegram. Without any "fringe benefits" or hope of United States aid in future, we might find Libyans prepared reject agreement and place us in embarrassing position of maintaining armed forces in country without legal sanction.

I have feeling that tenacious desire of Libyans to insure United States economic help may be based on (*a*) fear of exploitation by United Kingdom as country with major financial and economic responsibility for Libya, now or in future, and (*b*) anticipation that United Kingdom funds may be drastically curtailed, or ended certain circumstances, eliminated altogether, after five year treaty period. Latter could come about if British decide Libyan economy could do on lower contribution or if Libyans themselves should follow Egyptian lead and abrogate present treaty.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli and Frankfort.

[2] *Ante*, p. 578.

SUMMERS

711.56373/3-2754 : Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (Summers) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BENGHAZI, March 27, 1954—11 a.m.

70. From Villard. Reference: Deptel 51, March 23.[2] Am aware that one million dollars of USAF FY 1952 funds earmarked base rights will lapse if payment not made prior to June 30, 1954. Notwithstanding I believe it neither advantageous nor desirable that payment be made to Libyans prior to completion of base rights agreement. However the fact that the Libyans may lose one million dollars will be used as spur to obtain ratification prior to June 30, 1954. It is my understanding that if base rights agreement were ratified prior June 30, 1954, I am authorized to offer five million dollars as an initial payment (this amount predicated on basis one million dollars for fiscal year 1952, two million dollars for fiscal year 1953, and two million dollars for fiscal year 1954 accrued) and two million dollars annually for 17 years. Request that my understanding as indicated above be confirmed soonest.

Inasmuch as it appears likely that discussion of financial arrangements will begin next week I propose that Department consider and make every effort to provide an arrangement attractive to Libyans along one of the following lines:

1. Initial payment of eleven million dollars and two million dollars for 14 years thereafter.
2. Initial payment of seven million dollars and two million dollars for 16 years thereafter.

Request Department's views soonest.[3]

SUMMERS

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Legation that $1 million of USAF funds for fiscal year 1952, which the Legation was authorized to pay Libya, would lapse if not paid by June 30, 1954. It requested the Legation's views as to how the payment could be made prior to June 30 to obtain the maximum advantage and also prevent lapse. (711.56373/3-2354)

[3] Telegram 54 to Benghazi, Mar. 31, reported the Air Force was authorized to pay up to $40 million for a 20-year base agreement, at a rate of not more than $2 million annually. A formal commitment to the Libyan Government was required to obligate the funds. If negotiations were completed by June 30, Libya could thus receive $4 million for calendar years 1952 and 1953, and on July 1, 1954, could receive another $2 million for calendar year 1954. The Legation was informed that it would not be possible to make the payments suggested in paragraphs numbered 1 and 2 of telegram 70. (711.56373/3-2754)

773.00/4–954 : Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (Summers) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BENGHAZI, April 9, 1954—midnight.

88. From Villard. Re Benghazi telegram 87, April 8.[2]

Yesterday afternoon King ordered Mustafa Ben Halim, Minister of Communications in former Cabinet, to form new government. He began consultations last night assisted by Abdullah Abed.

Exact cause fall of Saqezli Government obscure but presumably connected with developments following Supreme Court order in Ali Deeb's case. Court's decision has still not been published although its terms generally known. Decision has been questioned from local point of view by court judges Ramzi and Dajani and King apparently furious over Sadawi type political comments which decision included in favor of unitary Libyan state, abolition of provincial authority and limited functions of Monarch.

Egyptian Minister told me King's reaction to court's decision was severe blow to Egypt's position in Libya since viewpoint of Egyptian members of court had just been openly flouted. He felt court could have no stand in following this episode and would have to be dissolved.

As Department is aware, Ben Halim is shrewd politician and good friend of Shalhi and the King. He is authoritanian, ruthless, personally ambitious, and when Nazir of works in Cyrenaica was generally considered dishonest. It can be expected that if he forms government it will carry out King's wishes without regard for constitutional niceties. (Ben Halim has often said constitution is much too advanced for Libya.) His relations with Parliament may be difficult, however. He is not personally popular with Cyrenaican deputies and his relations with those of Tripolitania are uncertain. Therefore, high-handed methods he used in dealing with Cryenaica's legislative council may not work with Parliament. Approval of budget, which is opposed by many Tripolitanians, is first item of importance on Parliamentary program and would provide good test Ben Halim's influence.

Legation believes that if Ben Halim can form government,[3] base negotiations should proceed speedily since he has shown himself cooperative and helpful in discussions to date. He has sent me message to effect that interruption in negotiations should not be of long duration.

SUMMERS

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli and Frankfort for CINCEUR.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that the Saqezli government had resigned at noon, Apr. 8. It said the reasons were not yet known, but the base negotiations had been suspended for the time being. (711.56373/4–854)

[3] Despatch 428 from Tripoli, Apr. 16, transmitted the names of the members of Prime Minister Ben Halim's cabinet, which had been announced on Apr. 12. (773.00(W)/4–1654)

711.56373/4-1654 : Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (Summers) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BENGHAZI, April 16, 1954—9 p. m.

92. From Villard. Confirming indications Legation has received from Libyans including King, deputies, and others for a long period of time to effect main issues involved in negotiations were money and jurisdiction, Libyan delegation has been altered to consist of Aneizi, Minister of Finance and Qalhoud, Minister of Justice with Jerbi continuing at least for time being in absence Buseiri, now Foreign Minister.

At meeting April 15, Aneizi, seconded by Qalhoud, immediately opened question of economic aid making following points in justification extensive aid to Libya:

(1) Treaty must be acceptable to Libyan Parliament and people who expect substantial aid from United States in return for making bases available and thus inviting aggression against Libya and possible destruction Libyan cities. Extent of aid which should be provided by United States related in Libyan eyes to that provided other countries which have furnished bases (Spain and Greece) or have not (Israel), to British aid which combines undertaking defend Libya with substantial financial assistance in spite of Britain's financial difficulties, and to known United States position as world's wealthiest power.

(2) Libya which is poor small country has need of additional funds for urgent development projects of which government has details.

(3) As Arab state Libya's political position in signing agreement with west is very difficult especially in view Abd Al-Nasr declaration that Arab states allying themselves with NATO countries are acting against interests of Egypt and Arab League. Therefore it important Libya be able by obtaining sufficient economic aid combat expected attacks from Egypt which might be stronger than those against British-Libyan treaty. Such attacks could be expected to find supporters among Libyan public. In reply I pointed out United States had always been sympathetic to Libya's needs, had sponsored Libyan independence and has worked actively both through United Nations and directly through Point Four and in other ways to demonstrate concretely our interest in Libyan economic development. However, United States Government's program was governed by need for economy including substantial cut in foreign aid. I added that comparisons with British requirements were irrelevant and that I would consider it unfortunate if statements from the Arab League were permitted to block an agreement which appeared clearly to be in our mutual interest. I doubted further United States would be moved by demands for compensation against hypothetical future attacks in view of probability that in such event other parts of free world including US would undoubtedly suffer even more. I doubted there was sufficient time to analyze Libyan projects and stated I would always be prepared to consider fully justified projects over the years taking into account our other commitments.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli and Frankfort for CINCEUR.

I then reviewed past history negotiations re economic aid along lines my telegram 85,[2] and stated we had never received any indication extent Libyan demands. I said I had been authorized in fall of 1952 to discuss additional compensation but Libyans had never been willing undertake such discussions. Now since our requirements had diminished I was not sure whether any increases over original million dollars was possible.

After much discussion Aneizi finally proposed the figure of 7 million pounds annually.[3]

I said that this figure was of course fantastic. I then noted that although we were willing make retroactive payment to December 24, 1951, 1 million dollars obligated for this purpose would lapse on June 30 unless agreement reached before that date. It was in Libya's interest conclude agreement soonest to be assured steady income which would form basis for conclusion FCN and other treaties at later date. Alternative was prolonged negotiation on unsatisfactory present basis.

Aneizi replied that Libyans considered US occupation bases constituted obligation on US Government for payment of compensation and he would consult with Council of Ministers with regard lapse of funds. Libyans were eager to see US status regularized since obviously unsatisfactory continue on basis interim agreement. Therefore they hoped US would make effort come closer their point of view and asked that Libyan demand be transmitted Washington.

Comment: Libyan figure is obviously bargaining ceiling and subject to drastic cut at least to British figure. I foresee prolonged discussions this point and on jurisdiction which of course not yet discussed. Degree Libyan agreement on balance text will probably hinge to large extent on settlement issues compensation and jurisdiction. Meanwhile we will make every attempt secure agreement other articles still at issue during coming sessions. Date next meeting not yet fixed.

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[2] Apr. 6; not printed. It reported on a conversation with Ben Halim, who was Minister of Communications at that time. Villard said that the Libyan Government had never stated what it considered a reasonable amount of compensation for the base agreement. Ben Halim said that U.S. military requirements were entirely unrelated to Libyan economic needs; and the United States, as a rich and powerful nation, had a responsibility to strengthen Libya's economy to assure its survival. (711.56373/4–654)

[3] Tripoli telegram 365, Apr. 21, reported the figure of 7 million pounds was undoubtedly quoted for bargaining purposes. The Minister, his staff, and the FOA country director, however, all felt that the absolute minimum the Libyans would accept was probably about $10 million per year. If that figure were considered, the Legation recommended that it be subject to review at the end of 5 years. Considering the amount of money the United States had already invested in Libya, the fact that the Libyans imposed so few restrictions on USAF operations, and the fact that Libya was the only Arab country to go out of its way to welcome a USAF strategic base, Villard suggested that the United States at least consider that amount. Telegram 366 from Tripoli, Apr. 21, suggested that the United States make at least some payment to Libya, since as yet it had made none since Dec. 24, 1951. Telegram 334 to Tripoli, May 6, authorized the Minister to make an interim payment to Libya. It said he had the authority to make $1 million available without further action from Washington, and the Department preferred to have the payment made before June 30, whether the agreement had been completed by that time or not. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56373.

Summers

711.56373/6-254 : Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (Summers) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BENGHAZI, June 2, 1954—11 p. m.

118. From Villard. Pitt-Hardacre made private call on me yesterday following delegation meeting (my telegram 117 of May 31) [2] to discuss offer of $2 million. He said Libyans were in state of shock over low figure and inclined reject offer outright but he had startled Prime Minister by counseling acceptance. Hardacre had pointed out desirability conclude agreement before US military requirements still further reduced, Wheelus Field perhaps lost to Libyan economy and good relations with US impaired. He had, however, been impressed personally by my proposed statement regarding sympathetic US attitude toward possible further requests for economic aid (Department telegram sent Tripoli 386 of May 29) [3] and by US willingness spend additional $300,000 on Karamanli Mole, which he took as evidence US good intentions.

Hardacre said that for political reasons Benhalim could in effect neither accept nor reject offer. In view exaggerated expectations US aid, it would probably be necessary to outline situation in secret session of Parliament, obtain mandate seek higher figure by visit to Washington and report results in second Parliamentary session.[4] Only if it could be demonstrated that every avenue on compensation had been thoroughly explored was there chance Prime Minister could convince Parliament it should accept US proposal. First step, of course, was to call special meeting Council of Ministers and take matter up with King.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tripoli and Paris for CINCEUR.

[2] Not printed; the Minister said he had offered the Libyans $2 million per year. He informed them that if the agreement was ratified before June 30, 1954, they could receive an initial payment of $6 million almost immediately. (711.56373/6-154)

[3] Not printed; it authorized the Minister to tell the Libyans the United States was making provision, subject to Congressional authorization and appropriations, for further contributions to Libya's economy. (711.56373/5-2954)

[4] Tripoli telegram 441, June 9, informed the Department that Villard would try to persuade the Libyans to postpone their trip to Washington, but he considered the trip inevitable. It seemed doubtful that the Prime Minister would risk his political future by presenting the agreement to Parliament for ratification until every means of getting a higher payment had been explored. (711.56373/6-954)

I said that in my opinion Hardacre had given Libyan Government good advice but that while I could understand political considerations likely to motivate Prime Minister, I felt trip to Washington would be waste of time and money. US position was firm and there was no possibility offer could be increased.

Hardacre replied that even though fruitless he thought such visit would be prerequisite to any action on agreement by Parliament. He, therefore, expected Libyan delegation including Benhalim, Aneizi and himself would try proceed US soonest for discussions with Department.

Hardacre inquired whether fact of his British nationality might be misinterpreted if he went Washington and emphasized he was serving only Libyan interests. I assured him this would be understood. He was exceptionally bitter in his remarks about Aneizi, whom he blamed for "hardening" American attitude by fantastic demand of 7 million pounds, and I did not disabuse him of this impression.

I have feeling that Benhalim will propose Washington trip if it can be fitted in with projected visit to Ankara this month and that he may utilize occasion carry out his original plan to bargain jurisdiction against compensation (my telegram 85 of April 6).[5]

SUMMERS

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[5] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

711.56373/6–1254 : Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY TRIPOLI, June 12, 1954—4 p. m.

448. From Villard. My considered views as to situation which has now developed in base negotiations are as follows:

1. Government of Ben Halim, with support of King, is determined hold out for highest possible price in return for agreement, even though demands may take form of assistance for specific economic projects instead of increase in cash payments over and above $2 million. They will use question of jurisdiction as top bargaining card, which attitude of course tantamount to blackmail and showing little change from barbary pirate tradition.

2. Precedent set in negotiations with UK after we surrendered initiative in December 1952 will be followed to letter, as shown by pattern of discussions on text to date, demands for higher compensation, and removal of negotiations in final stage of opposite capital where chances judged better obtaining more money. Intention of Libyans all along

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London for CINCNELM, Paris for CINCEUR, Wiesbaden for CINCUSAFE, and Benghazi.

has been to conclude negotiations in Washington, only surprise being present timing.[2]

3. French Minister, frustrated and desperate, has apparently recognized the inevitable and invited Libyans enter direct negotiations in Paris before expiration their temporary accord June 30. Libyans are taking full advantage this situation and playing United States and France off against each other.

4. What Libyans consider inadequate *quid pro quo* from "rich and generous United States" will now be advertised to Arab world by inspired "public opinion" and press comment, as occurred in spring of 1952 when million dollars denounced as insufficient (see next following telegram).[3] If understanding not reached on economic aid, campaign may be expected extend to threats terminate interim agreement as illegal document negotiated under duress before independence and carry case to United Nations and forum world public opinion.

5. With exception few outstanding points we have in any case carried negotiations as far as possible here. Since Libyans have consistently remained deaf my pleas not to expect United States underwrite their economy, there may be considerable virtue their proceeding Washington and hearing statement direct from horse's mouth. Essence of problem will be what Wheelus field is worth to USAF, and how our treatment of Libya will react on rest of Arab world.

6. Department will recognize that virtually all of above has been forecast by Legation and that Libyan expectations, probably instigated by Pitt-Hardacre, have steadily risen over last 2 years despite Legation's best efforts forestall such development. Absolute minimum which could be offered Prime Minister during Washington visit would in Legation's opinion be 3 million MSA funds fiscal 55, grant of wheat request and some further guarantee of eonomic aid. It would of course be preferable if such additional assistance could have come through

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[2] An exchange of telegrams took place between Tripoli and Washington during the first 2 weeks of June, regarding the visit of the Libyan Prime Minister to Washington to continue negotiations there. Telegram 409 to Tripoli, June 12, advised the Legation that in view of the King's desire to have his Prime Minister come to Washington, the Department would receive the Libyan Delegation the second week of July. It informed the Minister he would be expected to preside over the meetings and conclude the negotiations in Libya later if necessary. In telegram 438 from Tripoli, June 14, the Minister informed the Department that the Libyans expected to meet high-level officials and that "it would seem futile for me to chair such meetings after two years fruitless negotiations here." He further advised the Department that it was unlikely the Libyans would agree to resume negotiations later in Libya. He said the Department should be prepared for either a successful conclusion, an indefinite suspension, or the termination of the negotiations as a result of the Washington discussions. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 711.56373.

[3] Telegram 449 from Tripoli, June 12, reported on an article from a Benghazi newspaper the previous May. The article said the base negotiations had been suspended because of U.S. obstinacy on financial and judicial issues. (711.56373/6-1254)

Legation channels, otherwise Libyans will undoubtedly attempt bypass any United States Minister in future to seek aid directly from Washington.

VILLARD

711.56373/7–2054 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Libya[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 20, 1954—7:22 p.m.

5. Negotiations with Libyan Prime Minister on base agreement and economic assistance concluded successfully today. Ben Halim has left for New York and will leave by plane Friday for Paris and London before returning Libya about July 27.

Jurisdiction formula accepted by US consists article along lines British Article 32 coupled with secret statement policy in which Libya undertakes waive its jurisdiction save in cases of particular importance. Other remaining details will be ironed out with Suleiman Jerbi tomorrow. Formal agreement will be signed in Libya and submitted special session Parliament convened before end of September.

Economic assistance promised by US consists 1) acceleration of expenditures from USAF $40 million to provide $4 million annually from 1954 thru 1960 with $1 million annually thereafter; 2) $3 million from MSP FY'55 funds; 3) provision up to 24,000 additional tons grain to meet Libyan deficiencies. In addition we have given assurance sympathetic attention to Libya's future economic development needs. US and Libya to study jointly projects to which above money can be applied.

Memorandum handed Prime Minister outlining above position being airpouched.[2] We hope make it possible for Prime Minister announce grain contribution on return Libya. Otherwise foregoing information will remain classified for present.

During visit Prime Minister called on President and Secretary, was given luncheons by President and Byroade and attended large reception given by Kekhia. Appears pleased with hospitality and results his talks.

Conorada flew Prime Minister and party to Texas and Louisiana oil installations over past weekend.

Text joint communiqué for release simultaneously Libya and US Friday morning follows:

"Negotiations between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya have been concluded successfully during talks in Washington between a Libyan delegation headed by the Prime Minister, His Excellency Mustafa ben Halim, and United States officials. A United States-Libyan base rights agreement has been completed in all matters of substance. The formal agreement will be signed in Libya after the return of the Prime Minister and will then be presented to the Libyan Parliament for approval.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Root (AF) and cleared by Utter (AF). It was sent to Benghazi, Tripoli, London, Paris, and Cairo.

[2] Not printed; but see the instruction of July 29, *infra*.

The Prime Minister's visit to Washington was also the occasion for very satisfactory talks on other problems of mutual interest, including Libya's economic development and the means of strengthening the friendship already existing between the two countries."

DULLES

033.7311/7-2954 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Libya[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 29, 1954.

CA-716

Subject: Negotiations in Washington with the Libyan Prime Minister

Negotiations with the Libyan Prime Minister in Washington lasted from July 14 to July 20. Actually, only three meetings involving negotiation were held with the Prime Minister himself. In addition, however, he had an appointment with the President followed by luncheon at the White House (July 15); was received by the Secretary (in spite of the Secretary's busy schedule) before the Libyan departure (July 20); and was the guest of honor at a luncheon given by Mr. Byroade on July 16 and at a reception that evening at the Shoreham Hotel given by the Libyan Minister to Washington. Vice President Nixon attended both the White House luncheon and the reception given by the Libyan Minister. The Secretary of Defense attended the former as did Senators Knowland and Fulbright and Representatives Bolton and Morano. Senator Wiley and Representative Meader attended Mr. Byroade's luncheon. Secretary Dulles was able to attend the Libyan Minister's reception. On one occasion or another the Prime Minister thus met a wide cross-section of the leading civilian and military officialdom of Washington.

Furthermore, he and Dr. Aneizi were official guests at Blair House for the first four nights of their visit and received various attentions from American oil companies interested in Libya, including a weekend trip by chartered plane to the oilfields of Texas and Louisiana. The Prime Minister and his Minister of Finance seemed highly pleased with the hospitality and quite content with the outcome of the negotiations. Perhaps the only factor marring the generally flattering reception given the Libyans was the general lack of interest of the American press in their visit. So far as the Department is aware none of the leading New York or Washington newspapers carried the joint communiqué released at the conclusion of the talks (Department's telegram 5) [2] or referred to it in any way.

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[1] This instruction was drafted by Root (AF) and cleared by Utter (AF). It was sent to Benghazi and repeated to Tripoli.

At the first of the negotiating meetings, on the morning of July 14, the Prime Minister outlined the Libyan position and two sub-groups were appointed, one to discuss remaining problems in the base agreement and the other to discuss economic aid. At the second meeting with the Prime Minister on the morning of July 20, he was given the US reply in the form of a memorandum (enclosure 1).[3] At the final meeting in the afternoon the Prime Minister returned to make certain comments on the US memorandum and to discuss a few final matters.

Mr. Byroade was the principal US representative in the three negotiating meetings with the Prime Minister. Minister Villard, representatives of the Office of African Affairs and representatives of the State Department offices dealing with mutual security aid and economic development also participated. Defense was represented by Major General Harris, Assistant Director of Plans, USAF; Mr. John Johnson, General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force; and others. FOA was represented by Mr. Norman Paul, in charge of operations in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, Mr. William Moran, Director of African Operations, and others.

Libya was represented at the first two meetings by its full delegation. The final meeting with the Prime Minister was a small one in Mr. Byroade's office. The principal personalities present in addition to Mr. Byroade and the Prime Minister were Mr. Paul, Mr. Utter, Dr. Aneizi and Mr. Pitt Hardacre.

The sub-group on economics held two meetings, at which Mr. Pitt Hardacre was the principal spokesman on the Libyan side. At the first Mr. Pitt Hardacre presented a long list of development projects estimated at a cost of £55 million. Mr. Pitt Hardacre subsequently stated privately that what the Libyan side really wished for, aside from a general assurance of US help, was a specific undertaking to assist with the five most urgent projects, which he listed as development of the Benghazi harbor, development of the Tripolitania power system, irrigation in Cyrenaica, irrigation in Tripolitania and federal roads. These he estimated would cost £10 million and take about 5 years to complete. At the second of the two meetings, however, Mr. Pitt Hardacre expanded on a Libyan desire to use initial funds from the US grant for the development of a government banking system particularly in the field of agricultural credits.

Suleiman Bey Jerbi and Dr. Fekini were the principal Libyan spokesmen at a series of technical level meetings on the base agreement. The first several of these were devoted entirely to the question of criminal jurisdiction. Agreement in principle was reached on a Libyan compromise proposal represented by attachments A, B and C to the enclosed memorandum.

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[2] *Supra.*

[3] No enclosures are printed.

At the first meeting with Mr. Byroade, the Prime Minister stated unequivocally that the US could be assured of a base agreement, that he had not come to haggle over a price and that the base agreement should be dealt with as a matter separate from Libya's needs for US economic assistance. He did, however, emphasize the importance of US economic assistance in convincing Parliament and the Libyan people of the desirability of cooperating with the US. He made clear, in fact, that Parliament's reaction to the base agreement would depend largely on the degree to which it was satisfied with the promise of US assistance with Libya's economic needs.

In the final meeting with Mr. Byroade on July 20, the Prime Minister expressed his gratitude for the economic aid which the US had offered in the memorandum handed to him that morning. He asked only whether the assurance with regard to future US economic assistance could be made more specific and proposed that the US Government undertake now in writing to seek future appropriations from Congress. Both Mr. Byroade and Mr. Paul stated categorically that this was a legal and practical impossibility, but they did agree to revise the language in the final paragraph of Section III in the US memorandum to make it more acceptable to the Libyans. The revised language, worked out on the spot with the Prime Minister, is that which now appears in the memorandum enclosed with this despatch.

The Prime Minister also thought that the sort of public statement which Minister Villard was proposing to make in Libya on the wind-up of negotiations would carry somewhat greater impact there if it were issued from the Department of State itself. Mr. Byroade accepted this idea. He also agreed, on the Prime Minister's request, to see to what extent the language of the assurance in the final paragraph of Section III in the memorandum could be incorporated in such a public statement by the Department of State. Finally, Mr. Byroade assured the Prime Minister that the contingency with regard to ratification of the base agreement mentioned in Section V of the memorandum referred specifically to the funds forthcoming from US Air Force appropriations and would not hold up any shipments of grain to meet consumption requirements in Libya in the period prior to ratification.

The Prime Minister in turn assured Mr. Byroade that the base agreement could be signed in Libya as soon as the final drafting details had been worked out and that he proposed to call a special session of Parliament before the end of September at which time the base agreement would be presented for approval.

A number of steps are now required both to complete action on the base agreement and to implement our undertakings with regard to economic assistance. The Legation will receive instructions on these matters as soon as it is humanly possible to forward them.

At the final meeting with Mr. Byroade the Prime Minister submitted a proposal for expansion of the Libyan Army to a strength of 5,000, for which he sought US assistance. Mr. Byroade said merely that we would study the proposal in light of our many commitments elsewhere.

Enclosure 2 of this instruction contains the text of the base agreement revised in the light of the discussions in Washington. Enclosure 3 is a proposed understanding with respect to Article XX. Enclosure 4 is a memorandum of understanding with respect to other articles in the Agreement. These are for your information only pending further instructions from the Department, although you may if you wish review them with Suleiman Jerbi.

DULLES

711.56373/7–2954 : Telegram

The Chargé in Libya (Nes) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TRIPOLI, July 29, 1954—1 p. m.

27. Anthis and I met with Prime Minister prior his flight USAF plane to Cyrene yesterday (Legtel 24).[2] Immediately afterward we proceeded Benghazi separate aircraft to brief Summers results Washington discussions (and Ben Halim's attitude on return) with view utilization this background determine our best tactics and timing proceed with final steps toward signature base agreement. Legation political officer also accompanied Prime Minister to Cyrene as courtesy.

Ben Halim was in most cordial and confident mood and left no doubt he intends press forward with signature. He made following additional comments:

1. Although economic and financial commitments had not been obtained to extent hoped for he had decided rely on future United States friendship as equivalent asset. This might require some selling with Parliament and Cabinet but he was confident no serious difficulty would be met in Tripolitania or Fezzan and he could handle Cyrenaicans and Cabinet.

2. He was certain King whom he would see immediately would give full assent and backing both text agreement and economic arrangements. He intends report to Ministers who are also resident Beida today.

3. Little additional work required here except preparation final

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Benghazi and London.

[2] July 27; not printed. It reported the Prime Minister was returning from London that night and expected to proceed directly to Cyrene to see the King. (711.56373/7[illegible]

Arab translation, drafting supplementary understanding Article XX and notes on economic and financial arrangements. He confident therefore we could plan signature no later last week August with submission Parliament early September. At same time he would have ready and propose National Bank scheme and Libyan-United States economic Planning Commission.

4. He would release immediately announcement US gift additional 24,000 tons wheat. (By thus publicly accepting delivery portion our final economic and financial package, Ben Halim would seem to have committed himself irrevocably to all other agreements reached Washington.)

5. Re Tripoli press editorials mentioned Legtel 12 [3] which cast doubt wisdom acceptance US promises rather than specific commitments future economic aid Prime Minister said he not worried and such "unfortunate" comments would cease now that he was back.

Legation officer who accompanied Prime Minister three-hour Cyrene flight has confirmed above observations.

There is no question but that Ben Halim was immensely impressed warmth reception and VIP treatment he received United States. Appears Turkish representations and oil fields tour also played important part creating atmosphere conducive to Prime Minister's decision make final plunge and settle two outstanding issues jurisdiction and compensation.

Never in history our negotiations has general atmosphere now surrounding Prime Minister's return been so propitious for achieving ratified base agreement. Principle danger lies in any delays which may dampen his present enthusiasm and firm intention push agreement through to September ratification. Trust therefore Department will furnish necessary instructions requested Benghazi telegram 12 [4] expeditiously as possible so that our side will be ready tie up loose ends upon return of Aneizi and Suleiman Jerbi early next week. Hope Department can also provide Benghazi personnel assist requested Wirom 23.[5]

NES

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[3] July 9; not printed. (873.49/7-954) Presumably this is an error, as telegram 12 does not mention press editorials.

[4] July 27; not printed. It requested texts of the agreements signed in Washington, records of discussions, and all other information needed for an evaluation of the situation. (711.56373/7-2754)

[5] Not printed.

711.56373/8-2454 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Libya [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, August 24, 1954—7:45 p. m.

64. Ben Halim from Byroade.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Root (AF) and cleared in the offices of Hancock (USAF) and Jernegan (NEA). It was sent to Benghazi and repeated to Tripoli for information.

"I regret most sincerely any misunderstandings which may have arisen over economic assistance since I am confident that no obstacle presents itself to the execution of the arrangement I proposed to Your Excellency on behalf of the United States Government.[2]

Your Excellency is correct that our discussions revolved around two separate and distinct types of aid, the first being a definite commitment of $40 million, the spacing of which over the future years has already been determined as outlined in my memorandum to you; the second being any additional economic aid which the Congress might in future years authorize. It is with respect to the latter that I could make no specific commitment for the future beyond the $3 million for the current US fiscal year, although promising the continued sympathetic interest of my Government in Libya's economic needs.

The offer of $40 million from the United States Government was made after consultation with Congressional authorities. Under the American constitutional system funds for *all* expenses of the United States Government are voted on by the Congress in annual appropriations bills. This, I believe, is also true in Libya with respect to the Libyan Parliament. The annual appropriation of funds is so fundamental to our system of government that I felt the point was sufficiently reiterated by the language of the final paragraph in the economic section of my memorandum. Since the special funds will come from funds appropriated annually to the Department of the Air Force, the existence of the airbase in Libya in itself constitutes a very practical assurance that the U.S. Government will carry out its obligation in this regard.

What I wish to emphasize is that with respect to the $40 million the United States Government is making a commitment as certain as any it is now possible to make. It is one on which I am confident Libya can plan and rely.

I trust that this letter will serve to dispel any doubts which may have arisen within the Libyan Government, particularly since I am so confident that these doubts are unfounded."

Request Prime Minister in using this letter continue treat fact Air Force source of special funds as classified matter only to be revealed as necessary.

DULLES

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[2] Benghazi telegram 35, Aug. 22, transmitted a message to Byroade from Ben Halim, requesting clarification on the matter of base agreement payments. He had understood in Washington that there were to be two types of aid: the first, a definite commitment of $40 million, and the second, additional aid to be considered and voted each year. Some doubts had been raised about the firmness of the first commitment, and Ben Halim wanted to know if in fact the actual payment would be subject to the specific voting each year of the annual amount by Congress. He wanted to be assured that it was a final commitment, and that only the second type of aid required annual review by Congress. (711.56373/8–2254)

Editorial Note

Telegram 56 from Benghazi, September 9, 1954, informed the Department of State that the Base Agreement had been signed at 11 a. m., local time, on that date. Despatch 38 from Benghazi, September 14, transmitted to the Department the originals or certified copies of all documents concerned in the signing. Among them were a copy of a note, dated September 9, by the Chargé to the Prime Minister with respect to the supersession of the notes of December 24, 1951; together with the original reply by the Prime Minister, in Arabic, also dated September 9, and a translation of the foregoing. Also included were Memoranda of Understanding of ten Articles and two Annexes to the Agreement. Despatch 48 from Benghazi, October 4, contained a detailed account of the final negotiation of the Agreement, covering the period from July 20, the last day of negotiations in Washington, to September 9, the day of the signing. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 711.56373.

Telegram 92 from Benghazi, October 15, 1954, informed the Department of State that the Libyan Chamber of Deputies had approved the Base Agreement by a vote of 39 to 12, with 4 absent. Telegram 96 from Benghazi, October 17, reported that the Libyan Senate had approved the Agreement that morning by a vote of 15 to 4, with 5 absent. Telegram 105 from Benghazi, October 21, reported that the King had ratified the Agreement on October 20, and the last formality was the receipt of a note from the Libyan Government. Benghazi telegram 113, October 30, reported that precisely at noon on that date the Prime Minister had delivered a note informing the Legation that the Base Agreement had been ratified according to Libyan constitutional procedures. The Agreement, therefore, came into force at that time. Despatch 62 from Benghazi, November 5, transmitted a copy of the October 30 note, together with a copy of the Chargé's reply of the same date. Despatch 65 from Benghazi, November 5, contained a detailed account of the events leading to the final ratification of the Agreement. It covered the events that took place from the signing of the Agreement on September 9 to the final ratification on October 30. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56373.

The text of the Agreement is printed in TIAS No. 3107; 5 UST (pt. 3) 2449.

Editorial Note

On September 25, 1954, the United States announced that the Legation in Libya had been elevated to the status of an Embassy. On the same day, John L. Tappin was appointed Ambassador to Libya. He arrived at the post and presented his credentials on November 16, 1954, at which time the post formally became an Embassy. Former Minister Henry S. Villard had left in July for his new post as Principal Political Adviser on Near Eastern and African Affairs to the United States Delegation to the Ninth General Assembly of the United Nations.

711.56373/12–1354

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 13, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am pleased to inform you that negotiations for a military base rights agreement with Libya have been concluded and that such an agreement, together with an agreement on United States economic aid to Libya, was signed at Benghazi on September 9, 1954. Following approval by the Libyan Parliament and ratification by the King, the base rights agreement became effective at 12:00 noon October 30, 1954, which was the time and date when our Embassy received formal notice of ratification from the Libyan Government. I enclose herewith copies of the base rights and economic aid agreements. Signed originals of these agreements will remain on file in the Department of State.

I wish to call your attention to the fact that the base rights agreement proper and a memorandum of understanding regarding certain provisions of the agreement are unclassified and that in due course they will be published in the Treaty and Other International Acts Series of the Department of State and submitted to the United Nations for registration.[2] Other memoranda of understanding, as indicated, and the annexes listing the areas required will for the time being remain Secret.

I should like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the excellent assistance and cooperation that we received at all times from civilian and military officers of the Department of Defense during the difficult and protracted period of negotiation. This assistance was of material help in reaching what I believe to be a highly satisfactory agreement.

Sincerely yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[1] The source text was attached to a memorandum by Jernegan to the Secretary of State, dated Dec. 9. The memorandum stated that the letter was intended to complete the exchange of communications that began with the request of the Department of Defense in 1951 that the Department of State negotiate the Base Agreement with the Libyan Government. (711.56373/12–954) Also attached to the letter were copies of the English and Arabic texts of the Base Agreement and the Economic Aid Agreement of Sept. 9, together with a copy of the Oct. 30 letter of notification of ratification by the Libyan Government, and the United States reply.

[2] See the first editorial note, p. 597.

MOROCCO

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN FRENCH POLICIES IN MOROCCO, AND THE DISCUSSION OF THOSE POLICIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS[1]

771A.00/2-1452

Memorandum of Conversation, by Joseph M. Sweeney, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1952.

Subject: ICJ Case, Economic Issue.

Participants: Meeting at Department of Commerce with Mr. Blackenheimer (Chief of African Division), Mr. Saul (French dependent territories), Mr. Kean and Mr. Sarich (French Division).
Mr. Sweeney

In furtherance of previous phone conversations, Mr. Blackenheimer invited me over to check some material assembled by his office, and to explore more fully for him some of the lines of arguments in which we might be interested. He invited the French division to participate in the meeting.

The meeting revealed the existence in Commerce of a split comparable to that existing in State between the French and the North African divisions. The French desk believes that France is justified, on economic grounds, in enforcing exchange controls in Morocco and that Morocco cannot be separated from France for financial purposes. It is a part of the Franc area and to relax or eliminate exchange control these would simply create a leakage in dollars which would affect the whole financial stability of France.

The North African division questions this on the ground that it is a pure assumption and that no proof has been advanced in support of it:

(*a*) It might not create such a leakage as is feared;
(*b*) free list now in existence proves it can be done; does not endanger economy;
(*c*) other remedies or alternatives have not been examined or applied;
(*d*) French theory that control of import without allocation of currency is necessary is admission that exchange control is not effectively administered; black market;

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[1] For previous documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1368 ff. and *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 135 ff.

(*e*) Actually situation exists only because France [*Morocco?*] has been made part of French financial picture; argument that Morocco has too much of a trade deficit with U.S. to stand on its feet is exaggerated and figures supporting it are inaccurate; figures for export do not include Moroccan products imported to France and then re-exported to U.S.; thus dollar earnings of France [*Morocco?*], actually credited to France should be credited to Morocco;

(*f*) In fact same situation exists in certain African areas controlled by Great Britain; British have also argued the necessity of controlling imports without allocation of exchange when American firms imported material to expand their own operations, and not for sale; British finally fell back on argument that this gave Americans an unjust competive advantage.

I suggested that the main purpose of our argument was to undermine the French position that it can legally disregard previous treaty rights because it is physically, forced, under an absolute necessity, to control exchange and imports (in effect relies *sir standibus* argument). The French should be made to carry the burden of proof of their argument instead of being able to assert it without challenge on our side. While it appears practically impossible at this time to argue that there was no necessity at all for imposing controls, we can question whether they have to carry it so far as to override all their treaty obligations and whether they are not doing in effect more than is reasonably necessary to obtain their legitimate objectives. To this end we could argue:

(*a*) There were alternatives to exchange control.

(*b*) If the French say there were none because this was the most desirable method available, then we question this position by pointing out that it is not shown a leakage in Morocco would weaken the whole French structure, that the controls are badly and inefficiently administered, and that Morocco need not necessarily be included in a franc area.

Mr. Kean stated he did not think his division would object to this line of argument but said that the French would probably come back with arguments along the line he had mentioned i.e., that Morocco could not be separated from the franc area.

353/5–1352

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert McBride, Office of Western European Affairs

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 13, 1952.

Subject: Moroccan ICJ Case, Etc.

Participants: Ambassador Bonnet
Mr. Bruce—U
Mr. van Laethem, French Embassy
Mr. McBride—WE

1. Ambassador Bonnet expressed the regret of the French Government at the publication by *Le Monde* of the famous forged report attributed to Admiral Fechteler. He said this action of *Le Monde* was universally deplored in France and that the reaction of the French press had been strongly unfavorable. He gave as his conclusion that it should not have been published even if it were true.

2. Passing to the Moroccan ICJ case,[1] which was the purpose of his call, Ambassador Bonnet stated that it would avoid an unfortunate misunderstanding between France and the U.S. if certain changes were made in our Rejoinder. He said that in several places political issues had been injected into our legal arguments and that these points would be used by the Nationalists in Morocco. He said that there was some evidence the Nationalists were already stating that our presentation at The Hague proved our basic sympathy with the Moroccan cause.

The Ambassador said that the principal French objections were the three points with which we were already familiar from Paris telegram #6589, April 26.[2] He said that the principal objection with regard to the first point which appears on page 12 of our Rejoinder was that it was a basic attack on the Treaty of Fez. He concluded that to give the Moroccans the impression that we felt the Treaty of Fez was a threat to the public order of Morocco would be most unfortunate and an incitement to disturbances in Morocco. He said this was a basic attack against the French status.

The Under Secretary stated that it was our understanding the case would almost certainly be postponed and accordingly our Legal Adviser, Mr. Fisher, would return to the Department in a few days.

Ambassador Bonnet stated that the point on page 15 of our Rejoinder regarding the Council of Government contained factual errors because this body is not elected and is not on record as objecting to the bond between the French and Moroccan franc. Rather, the statement that is quoted is merely one made by one Nationalist member of the Moroccan Section of the Council of Government. However, our employing this argument will give the Moroccans the impression that we favor the separation of the Moroccan and French currencies.

Finally, Ambassador Bonnet stated the concluding paragraph of the Rejoinder on page 44 was objectionable in that it represented the personal opinion of an official and that it was taken from unapproved minutes since no agreed minutes of the 1939 conversations on Morocco exist. He said that here again this was a purely political problem and that it would be taken by the Moroccans as an indication that we believed the French policy for Morocco is outright annexation rather than association.

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[1] See the editorial note, *infra*, on the ICJ case.

[2] Not printed.

The Under Secretary asked if Mr. Fisher had already been apprised of the French objections. Upon being informed that the Legal Adviser had not yet been officially informed of the French objections, the Under Secretary said that he would take this up with Mr. Fisher upon his return to the Department.

3. Ambassador Bonnet stated that he had received a letter from Foreign Minister Schuman to the effect that he wished to discuss the entire North African situation, including Tunisia, with the Secretary in Europe this month. The Ambassador said he would mention this to the Secretary on May 15 but merely wished us to know in advance that the Foreign Minister wanted to examine this situation. He said that present French thinking was that after the return of the Secretary from Europe, Franco-American North African talks should be started in order to avoid problems particularly with our bases in Morocco and to try to advance our mutual targets.

He said it would be particularly helpful if some public statement could be made by us in a press conference that would help Prime Minister Baccouche get the negotiations under way in Tunisia. He said that harm had already been done by the spread of the idea that we would not again back France in the UN on the Tunisian or similar issues.

The Under Secretary inquired if the Mixed Commission had yet been established. The Ambassador replied in the negative but said that the French still hoped Tunisian delegates would be named soon. However, the situation had not been helped by agitation on the part of the Nationalists. He said that the French Government had taken one step forward in freeing Chenik and his fellow cabinet members but it was very difficult to release Bourghiba after the publication in France of letters indicating that he was definitely committed to the forcible ejection of France from Tunisia.

Editorial Note

On August 27, 1952, the International Court of Justice at The Hague issued a ruling in the case of the *Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco.* The United States claimed that French import regulations of December 30, 1948 in Morocco should not have applied to its nationals. According to the United States argument before the Court, French legislation contravened economic rights of United States nationals based on its treaty of September 16, 1936 and the Act of Algeciras of April 7, 1906. The Court ruled in favor of the United States on that position, although denying the United States claim that its previous consent was required before Moroccan law could be applied to its nationals.

There is a summary of the case and the ruling of the Court in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 20, 1952, pages 620–623, by Joseph M. Sweeney. Sweeney was in the office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs and served as counsel during these proceedings to Adrian Fisher, Legal Adviser of the Department, who argued the United States case before the Court. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State files 353, 771.00, and 771A.00.

Editorial Note

USUN telegram 125, August 8, 1952, reported that Awni Khalidy, the Acting Representative of Iraq, had written to the Secretary-General of the United Nations requesting the inclusion of the question of Morocco on the provisional agenda of the Seventh United Nations General Assembly session. (771.00/8–852)

On September 3, the 13 Asian-African Representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen sent a virtually identical letter to the Secretary-General. Since Iraq subscribed to the collective request, the Representative of Iraq withdrew his individual request in a letter to the Secretary-General, dated September 8. (IO files, lot 71 D 440, Morocco Background Book)

771.00/10–852 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 8, 1952—3:33 p.m.

2017. Dept has decided handle Moroccan item in GA in same manner as Tunisian question. For time being we will follow same line with other UN Dels and press as we are presently following re Tunisia: namely, in reply to inquiries from other dels USUN will inform them in confidence of our position; we will reply to press inquiries that we are consulting with other dels on this and other agenda items.[2]

Pls inform FonOff of foregoing decision which we gather from Hoppenot's statement will not be surprising to Fr. FYI USUN will commence answering inquiries on Oct 10 along above lines.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Elting (UNP) and McBride (WE) and was cleared with AF. It was repeated to USUN, Rabat, and Tangier.

[2] For details, see documentation on Tunisia, pp. 665 ff.

771.00/12–1252 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Rabat [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 12, 1952—4 : 53 p. m.

52. Guillaume's action in outlawing Communist as well as Istiqlal Party,[2] and particularly his firm intention to enforce this decree, wld seem create new situation Morocco and reurtel 63 Dec 10 [3] you shld give serious consideration to wisdom Con Rabat and ConGen Casablanca receiving Istiqlal Reps at all under new situation. Views Leg Tangier and ConGen Casablanca also desired this regard.

If you shld decide receive Bargash,[4] convey in advance to Residency substance proposed remarks, which shld be to effect that Dept cannot advise Istiqlal re future course of action but that you personally, knowing temper of Amer people, feel strongly that further violence no matter what origin will alienate US public opinion and maintenance public order essential best interests all concerned.

Dept interested in any views you may be able obtain from Guillaume or Baudouy re future Fr action in Morocco.

BRUCE

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Cyr and cleared by EUR. Jernegan signed for the Acting Secretary. It was repeated to Casablanca, Tangier, and Paris.

[2] Telegram 64 from Rabat, Dec. 11, reported that widespread arrests of Istiqlal Party and Communist leaders had taken place throughout Morocco the previous afternoon and night, and the Istiqlal Party had been outlawed. (771.00/12–1152)

[3] Not printed; the Consulate reported it had received information that Istiqlal executive committee leaders were to have been arrested the night of Dec. 9–10, but at the last minute the action was not taken. A meeting of the executive committee was to be held on Dec. 10 to select alternates in the event of arrests. In that case, however, the Party said it could not continue to combat Communism as it had been doing, in spite of a press campaign to link it with the Communists. (771.00/12–1052)

[4] Ali Bargash, a member of the Istiqlal Party. According to despatch 220 from Rabat, he had called at the Consulate on Dec. 9 and said that widespread arrests of nationalists would be deliberate provocation by the French, which would lead to worse problems in Morocco. (771A.00/12–1552)

771.00/12–1452 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Vincent) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY TANGIER, December 14, 1952—6 p. m.

240. I flew to Rabat yesterday to call on General Guillaume at his request before his scheduled departure for Paris today. Background and causes his recent action in outlawing Istiqlal and Commie Parties and making arrests was subject of portion conversation.

Guillaume said that French attempt change backward country of Middle Ages into a Twentieth Century nation in matter forty years was responsible for their present difficulties (we have moved too fast).

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Casablanca, and Rabat.

I suggested that developments elsewhere since World War II had accentuated these difficulties by stepping up tempo of Nationalism. He said that when he came here something over a year ago he realized that he was faced with very serious situation that he had feared outbreaks, but that he had hoped patience wld bring about a *détente.* He had attempted improve relations with Sultan, but Sultan was unresponsive, encouraged Nationalists and wld not cooperate in making reforms. (On several occasions in past I have expressed to Guillaume my feeling that closer relations between Sultanate and Residency General might do much offset Nationalist agitation.) He cited fete of Mouloud which I had attended with him Dec 1 as example demagogery incited by Sultan. On that occasion organized groups Moroccans had shouted Istiqlal slogans, as well as the usual praises for Sultan and his son, Moulay Hassan, much to disgust and discomfort of French. He said Moulay Hassan was working with Nationalists. This recalled to my mind conversation I had had with the General when he first arrived in autumn 1951. He had said then that he hoped to work closely with the young Moroccans and with that thought in mind he expected gain confidence of Moulay Hassan. I asked Guillaume whether he felt that Sultan was now completely in camp of Istiqlal. He did not reply directly, but inference I got was that he still hoped Sultan cld be brought to reason. It is interesting note here his expression of hope toward end of conversation with John Gunther, now in Tangier, wld not ask for an interview with Sultan when he visited Rabat.

With regard to recent interdiction of Istiqlal and Commie Parties, Guillaume said that he had absolute proof of connection between the two. They aided and abetted each other. Riots at Casablanca were an example. His patience was exhausted. He had decided that force was weapon to use. He cited cases of Egypt and Syria where he said force had restored order. It is somewhat characteristic of Guillaume, who has spent 25 years in Morocco, that he shld consider action taken here by a Fr ResGen as comparable to that taken in Egypt by Naguib. I feel that he is at times carried away by his emotions and sense of drama which may give idea that he is insincere. He is not. He is mistaken at times, but I do not believe he is insincere. Continuing, he told me that the Pashas and Caids were in full agreement with him and were prepared support and implement his policy. He said as he had said before that mass of Moroccans was not in sympathy with Istiqlal. He seemed to have some doubts as to reactions in Paris, but he had done his duty as he saw it and he wld continue fol a firm and forceful line action. He allowed that other Moroccans might take the place of those arrested and that they might go underground, but that he was determined put end to extremist agitation in Morocco, using whatever means he had at his command.

General Guillaume will be in Paris for several days this week. I suggest that Secy may wish arrange through FonOff have General call on him discuss Moroccan problem.

VINCENT

771.00/12-1452 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 15, 1952—6:01 p. m.

3401. Supplementing Tangier Legtel 240, Dec. 14,[2] 35 to Paris, Balafredj has informed USUN official that he recd msg Sun from Sultan than remaining Istiqlal leaders have been rounded up and he himself is in imminent danger being deposed. Dept queried Con Rabat Sun this matter.[3]

Today USUN reports that Balafredj is broadcasting this news at UN and that Indo Rep mentioned it this morning in UN debate. LaCoste says story is nonsense but that he is not in position make official statement for Fr Govt. USUN also reports Balafredj addressing plea to Secy on this subj.

In light of foregoing, Secy may wish take occasion when mtg with Schuman to express informally opinion that recent Fr public disavowal of intention to depose Bey of Tunis is having quieting effect on North Af situation and that he presumes Fr Govt entertains similar intention toward Sultan of Morocco. Since we understand from USUN that tone Morocco debate more serious in criticism of Fr than Tunisian discussion,[4] presumably Fr public statement denying rumor of plans to depose Sultan wld be even more useful. Since in absence of Fr from North Af debates in UN US has had to accept more active role in debate than we wld have desired, we feel justified approaching Fr this matter.

If Secy approves this suggestion, he may prefer have Emb approach FonOff in this vein.

BRUCE

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Cyr (AF) and cleared in EUR and NEA. Matthews (G) signed for the Acting Secretary. It was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, and Casablanca.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Telegram 53 to Rabat, Dec. 14, not printed. (771.00/12-1452)

[4] For the documentation on Tunisia, see pp. 665 ff.

Editorial Note

USUN telegram Delga 372, December 15, transmitted the text of a draft resolution on Morocco submitted in Committee I by the 13 members of the Asian-African group. It requested the Government of France and the Sultan of Morocco to enter into negotiations to reach an early peaceful settlement in accord with the sovereignty of Morocco. (320/12–1552) A memorandum by McBride (WE) to Knight (WE) and Bonbright (EUR), dated December 16, said the Asian-African resolution on Morocco was much more moderate than the resolution on Tunisia. It did not suggest a Good Offices Commission and did not ask to have the item automatically placed on the agenda of the next General Assembly session. McBride considered it undesirable, nevertheless, for a number of reasons. For one thing, it said nothing about safeguarding the legitimate interests of France in Morocco. Since the Latin Americans had introduced a resolution that day on Morocco, a copy of which had not yet reached the Department of State, he suggested that the Latin American resolution be considered before a decision was reached to amend or reject the Asian-African one. (771.00/12–1652)

USUN telegram Delga 376, December 16, transmitted the text of a resolution on Morocco sponsored by the same 11 Latin American countries that had sponsored the resolution on Tunisia: Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. It expressed hope that France and Morocco would continue negotiations working toward the development of the free political institutions of Morocco, "with due regard to legitimate rights and interests under the established norms and practices of the law of nations." USUN telegram Delga 377, December 17, transmitted the text of an amendment to the Latin American resolution introduced by the Representative of Pakistan. It revised the wording of one paragraph of the Latin American resolution to hope that negotiations would bring "self-government for Moroccans in the light of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." USUN telegram Delga 378, December 17, said the Pakistani amendment was unsatisfactory for several reasons, the most important one being the fact that Morocco was much farther from self-government than Tunisia. Unless the Department objected, he planned to vote against the Pakistani amendment and, if the amendment passed in the committee, he planned to vote against the amended resolution. These telegrams are in Department of State file 320.

The Committee I debate on the Moroccan question began on December 13. Ambassador Jessup spoke on December 15, saying that while there were similarities between the Tunisian and Moroccan questions, the nature of the differences led to the conclusion that the Moroccan problem was more complex. The Committee voted on December 17. It first rejected the Asian-African resolution. It then approved the Latin American resolution, with the addition of the Pakistani amendment, by a vote of 40 to 5, with 11 abstentions. The United States voted against the Pakistani amendment and against the amended Latin American resolution.

In the plenary session, on December 19, the Pakistani amendment was deleted from the Latin American resolution by a vote of 29 to 8, with 22 abstentions. The United States voted in favor of deleting the Pakistani amendment, and then voted for the resolution as a whole. It was approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 45 to 3, with 11 abstentions.

Ambassador Jessup's speech is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1953, pages 33–34. Additional documentation on this topic is in Jessup files, lot 53 D 65.

771.00/2–1053

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1953.

Subject: French Reforms in Morocco.

Participants: Gabriel van Laethem, First Secretary, French Embassy
John E. Utter, AF

On his return from a holiday in Europe which included a fortnight's visit to Morocco, Mr. van Laethem called to give me his views on the present political situation in Morocco.

Mr. van Laethem said that since the "defeat of the Moroccans' attempt to arouse the United Nations on their behalf" calm had returned to the Protectorate. He said that he had discussed the present situation with most of the top officials in the Residency at Rabat, although he was unable to see General Guillaume who was absent in Paris. The general impression which he gathered was that steps toward the instituting of reforms must be taken at once and without further delay. Therefore, if the Sultan himself did not wish to cooperate by signing the necessary dahirs, the French would move forward by Residential decree. The program which he outlined to me was an acceleration of the establishment of local assemblies and preparation for the setting up of regional assemblies as rapidly as possible. This was considered the best way to form Moroccans in democratic processes and in developing a body of men who would eventually be in a position to take over affairs in the central government.

A plan is evidently under consideration in Rabat to start djemaa-like organizations in the various industries and mines in Morocco which would be the equivalent of trades unions. This, Mr. van Laethem said, was to insure that such organizations would not be politically inspired and dominated by the Istiqlal, but would be truly representative and devoted to the betterment of the living standards of the workmen.

The third reform, which was long overdue, was the modernization of the judiciary. Mr. van Laethem said that provision must be made for appeal against the arbitrary decisions of the Caids and the Pashas.

Mr. van Laethem said that he found a full realization among the French officials of the necessity for housing the many Moroccans who had swarmed to such centers as Casablanca and Port Lyautey. Already, he said, projects are underway for constructing simple dwellings for workmen in the Casablanca region and the Government is urging private industries to play their part as far as possible in this undertaking.

Relations between the Resident General and the Sultan, according to Mr. van Laethem, had been better since the Moroccan ruler realized that appeals to the United Nations were of no avail.

320/3-1053 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 10, 1953.

Gadel A-1. Re possible Arab-Asian attempt raise problems Morocco-Tunisia (re Delga 437[2]) following are Department's preliminary views and suggestions:

1. Reported Arab-Asian intention send letter to GA President appears diminish possibility they might seek revive formal consideration these problems as agenda items. We would of course oppose renewed formal consideration on grounds that far too little time has elapsed since adoption of GA resolutions to expect conclusive results in negotiations. Renewed GA consideration these items at same session in absence unmistakable worsening of situation in area not only contrary sound GA practice but would represent unwarranted interference in negotiations and could prejudice their chances success. US would support invoking Rule 82 GA Rules Procedure preventing reconsideration at same session unless ⅔ majority vote in favor.

2. As pointed out in Delga 425[3] Arab-Asians probably intend use letter to Pearson as point of departure for attack on French North African policy in Committee statements under other GA items. Polish omnibus item appears most susceptible to exploitation for such purpose. Under this item they might for example argue situation in

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[1] This airgram was drafted by Mangano (UNP) and cleared in the offices of Utter (AF), McBride (WE), Howard (NEA), Monsma (ARA), and Popper (UNP). It was signed by Assistant Secretary Hickerson and was repeated to Paris, London, Cairo, Tangier, Tunis, Casablanca, and Rabat.

[2] Not printed; it reported the Arab-Asian group had appointed a subcommittee to draft a letter on Tunisia and Morocco to the President of the General Assembly. (320/3-653)

[3] Not printed.

Tunisia and Morocco is adding to "international tension" or that welfare these countries being unduly subordinated to interests NATO powers in East–West cold war. Alternatively they might renew charges French violation human rights vis-à-vis Moroccans and Tunisians. Latter course appears especially likely as offset probable US tactics re Soviet persecutions.

3. Department apprehensive such Arab-Asian tactics might provide Soviets opportunity accentuate divisions between Arab-Asians and West. We do not exclude possibility that Arab-Asians, Soviet Union or both might submit proposals under Polish item (either as separate resolution or amendments to tabled resolutions) describing situation French North Africa as a source international tension and calling for GA action beyond existing resolutions.

4. With foregoing in mind Department believes: (*a*) matter should be discussed privately with UK and French delegations and particularly with Committee chairman Muniz to concert tactics designed keep situation under control; (*b*) should Arab-Asians go no farther than random critical comment re French North Africa in their Committee statements under other items we should not react; (*c*) if they show concerted and persistent effort to make major issue French North Africa in such statements, or submit proposals under Polish item bearing on substance Moroccan and Tunisian problems, such moves should be ruled out of order by Chairman relying on Rule 82 which bars "reconsideration" unless ⅔ majority approve. Point of order to accomplish above result should be made by delegation other than US, preferably LA; (*d*) this whole matter should be fully considered by USDel in connection with intended counter attack and possible resolution re Soviet persecutions under Polish item.

SMITH

Editorial Note

Despatch 333 from Rabat, April 7, 1953, transmitted to the Department of State copies of two notes signed by Abdelkadar Banjelloun, interim Secretary-General of the Moroccan Democratic Independence Party, to the French Government. The first, dated March 24, forwarded a copy of a note to the French President from the Moroccan National Front in Cairo. That 15-page note accused the French Government of denying to the Moroccans the ideals for which they had fought in the last war. The second, written by Banjelloun himself on behalf of the Democratic Independence Party, was addressed to the French Resident General in Morocco. It made five demands: 1) lifting of the state of siege; 2) liberty and amnesty for political prisoners; 3) an end to press censorship; 4) freedom of assembly, association, and movement; and 5) formation of a government of negotiation to enter into discussions with the French Government to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance based on the principles of the United Nations, which would safeguard the legitimate rights of French citizens living in Morocco. The Consulate believed that, although both notes were extremely partisan, they presented the Moroccan nationalist argument in a forceful manner. (771.00/4–353)

Editorial Note

Telegram 96 to Rabat, May 30, 1953, requested verification of a rumor that relations between the Residency and the Sultan had been broken off. Rabat telegram 136, June 2, reported that this had not happened, but the situation appeared serious. At a meeting on May 30 between the Sultan and the Resident General, the Sultan reportedly accused the French of having virtually torn up the Protectorate Treaty of 1912. He also refused to sign the French reform plan in its present form.

The Consulate considered the current French tactics a move to force the Sultan to sign a municipal reform program calling for elected assemblies with 50 percent French participation. Since the Sultan could probably not sign without compromising his position as sovereign, the French move was expected to have the opposite effect from that desired. It seemed to the Consulate that the Sultan had refused to be intimidated and had stiffened his opposition. (771.00/6–253)

771.00/6–1553

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge, Pakistan–Afghanistan Affairs (Metcalf)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1953.

Subject: Security Council Resolutions on Tunisia and Morocco Proposed by the Asian-African Group

Participants: Mr. M. Shafqat, Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Pakistan Embassy
SOA—Mr. Smith
Mr. Metcalf
UNP—Mr. Mangano

Mr. Shafqat called yesterday evening at the Department's request to be given the US attitude toward proposed Security Council resolutions on Tunisia and Morocco which representatives of the Asian-African group are reportedly planning to introduce in the near future.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on June 17.

Mr. Shafqat had earlier requested the Department's opinion on the advisability of introducing such resolutions as well as an idea of the US position on the matter (memorandum of conversation, May 28, 1953).[2]

I began by referring to the traditional sympathy of the American people toward the aspirations of dependent peoples for self-government, and alluded to the Secretary's June 1 report to the American people following his trip,[3] particularly the passage in which the Secretary said that the leaders of the countries which he had visited recognized the disastrous implications of a break between the United States, Great Britain and France. The Secretary had declared that without breaking from the framework of Western unity the United States could pursue its traditional dedication to political liberty. The Western powers were certain to gain rather than to lose from the orderly development of self-government. I pointed to the Secretary's accent on the word "orderly." Continuing, I pointed out to the Chargé that US support for General Assembly consideration of the Tunisian and Moroccan questions last fall did not imply US acceptance of the idea that these questions constituted threats to international peace and security. Rather, the problem was one of aspirations of dependent peoples for self-government and of the assurance of orderly progress in that direction.

I told the Chargé that the Department had studied the proposed resolutions carefully and that in its opinion insufficient time has elapsed since the General Assembly Resolution of December 19, 1952 for concrete developments to take shape. Mr. Mangano noted at this point that it is not realistic in a complicated process of working out further steps toward self-government to adopt an arbitrary cut-off day and say that no progress has been made thus far toward self-government, and that therefore one of the parties should be taken to task publicly. I concluded that the Department does not consider it advisable for the proposed resolutions to be introduced into the Security Council and that the US would not wish to see them introduced.

Mr. Shafqat indicated understanding of this position and asked if the Department had any alternative ideas in mind in behalf of advancing the cause of self-government in Tunisia and Morocco. He remarked that the Asian-African group was quite annoyed over the absence of French response to the group's communications to the French Government on Tunisia and Morocco which were transmitted in mid-March through the President of the General Assembly. French inaction was interpreted by the group as an unwillingness to move ahead on the issues. Mr. Mangano said that the matter of alternatives is a different question involving various considerations. The Department hoped and expected that progress toward solutions of Tunisia and Morocco would be achieved along the lines advocated by the General Assembly last winter.

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[2] Not printed.

[3] For documentation on the visit of the Secretary of State to the Middle East, including his June 1 report, see volume IX.

Mr. Shafqat said that he would report the Department's position to his Government and indicated that his Government might instruct him to approach the Department again as to other ideas which the US might have in mind with respect to these issues.

Editorial Note

Despatch 6 from Rabat, July 8, 1953, reported on a letter written by the Sultan to the French Prime Minister. The letter reportedly stated that reforms could not be discussed in the troubled Moroccan atmosphere of the time. The Caids had been signing a petition demanding the Sultan's abdication, supposedly at the instigation of Si Thami El-Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakech. French officials at Rabat thought the French Government would not send a reply to the Sultan in the near future, but would eventually reaffirm its confidence in the Resident General and insist that the Sultan deal directly with him. (771.00/7–853)

771.00/8–1053 : Telegram

The Chargé at Rabat (Stokes) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT RABAT, August 10, 1953—7 p. m.

6. Sultan's confidential emissary Sbihi called Consulate today stating he charged by Sultan inform US Government Morocco situation "extremely grave," with *coup d'état* planned occur between fifteenth and twenty-fifth August. Sultan expects his deposition and replacement by Hassan El Hafedi (son Moulay Hafid), with some form division Morocco into north and south. Sultan believes coup, planned by Bidault and Glaoui, to be executed by De Blesson in Resident General's absence. Sultan, despite repeated appeals to his supporters for calm, certain "blood will flow" if coup attempted: Morocco "on brink of abyss" and civil war declared imminent if present French policy continued.

Sbihi also stated Sultan, prior formal appeal France, United Nations, and world, desires know urgently US Government attitude.

Sbihi stated Sultan's information reliably based on intelligence reports from entire Morocco, including Glaoui entourage.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris and Tangier.

Color lent these palace apprehensions by sudden early return Glaoui, his whirlwind "triumphant" tours southern cities, daily public denunciations Sultan, heavy publicity given "movement opposition and reform," capped Friday by Glaoui dinner at residency with De Blesson.

Consulate local employee informed (by Caid's son) Caid Amor of Boulhaut compelled, under physical threats by Controleur Civil, receive Glaoui during current tour. Other informant, Moroccan landowner Ben Ahcine, separately told us today Glaoui tour supported by French use force.

We feel Glaoui machinations leading up to some imminent climax, but independently had not deemed situation so critical as viewed by Palace. However, lack opposition press and isolation Consulate from nationalist (and all but few other) sources limit our vision. Sultan undoubtedly well and widely informed, and aware unfounded appeal would weaken his status future emergencies.

If *coup d'état* takes place, believe Sultan's warning bloodshed will materialize. We are receiving petitions endorsing Sultan, signed by long lists Moroccans, despite reports force used suppress them. Glaoui strength, on other hand, of doubtful dimensions (see Bordeaux despatch 10 of July 22 [2] for disagreement within Glaoui household).

Sultan awaiting reply, though we promised only to transmit message. Sbihi to see Sultan twelfth and will call Consulate later same day. Request instructions.

STOKES

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[2] Not printed.

771.00/8–1253: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, August 12, 1953—1 p. m.

541. Embtel 535 to Department, August 11 [2] repeated Rabat 9, Casablanca 3 and Tangier 6.

Marchal gave us at noon today following account of most recent developments in Moroccan situation:

1. Following meeting Council of Minister's "strong instructions" have gone to De Blesson to endeavor to prevent Glaoui action to proclaim new Sultan. Unfortunately, Guillaume, whose influence on situation would be much greater, left Vichy a day or so ago enroute to his homeplace in the Hautes-Alpes and government does not yet know, due PTT strike, whether Guillaume has yet received its telegraphic

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Rabat, Casablanca, and Tangier.

[2] Not printed; it reported rumors that Glaoui was planning a *coup d'état* against the Sultan. The Embassy suggested the U.S. military commanders in Morocco should be informed, as the Sultan's followers were certain to riot if he were deposed. (771.00/8–1153)

instruction to him to proceed immediately to nearest military airfield and return Paris by plane. Decisive moment should be reached tomorrow night when, it is understood, Glaoui plans issue proclamation naming new Sultan. If he does so, despite Fr Govt. pressure, civil strife certain to follow. Glaoui being supported by certain French circles who believe misguidedly they are acting in best interests France and Morocco.

2. In reply to query what action French Government would take in event Glaoui does issue proclamation, Marchal said somewhat dispiritedly that he did not yet know. He added that French Government would, of course, have to use force to put down any disorder.

Throughout conversation Marchal gave appearance being deeply concerned over situation which today is being reported in press including text Sultan's appeal to French Government. Latter being made subject of separate message.[3]

DILLON

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[3] Rabat despatch 50, Aug. 18, transmitted the text of the Sultan's communiqué of Aug. 11 to the French Government. The Sultan said that French authorities were encouraging opposition to him, and he appealed to the French President to stop the campaign to overthrow legitimate authority. (771.00/8–1853)

771.00/8–1253 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, August 12, 1953—5:55 p. m.

471. Department seriously concerned over reports indicating rapidly deteriorating situation Morocco, particularly plans of Glaoui to proclaim new sultan tomorrow. You should see Bidault personally soon as possible and express views along following lines:

United States Government gratified learn from previous conversation with Marchal (your telegram 541)[2] that French Government views Moroccan situation as extremely serious and has sent "strong instructions" to De Blesson to prevent Glaoui from taking action proclaim new sultan. United States Government shares French concern over grave repercussions which would result in Morocco, Arab-Asian World and United Nations if Glaoui permitted take such action. You should express our confidence French will prevent Glaoui from taking action which would result in disorders that French would have to put down by force.

Rabat should convey substance foregoing to De Blesson immediately. Under circumstances Department believes probably desirable, subject views Legation Tangier, Dorman accept social invitation which would be attended also by Prince Moulay Hassan (Rabat telegram 7).[3] If desirable in order allay fears of Moulay Hassan Dorman might mention our information (Paris telegram 541) indicates French Government is taking necessary steps prevent any untoward developments.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Wellons (AF) and cleared in the offices of Bonbright (EUR), Jernegan (NEA), and Knight (WE). It was repeated to Rabat, Tangier, and Casablanca.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed.

Dulles

771.00/8–1553 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, August 15, 1953—2 p. m.

594. Embtel 593.[2] Substance of agreement signed yesterday by Sultan and Guillaume as follows:

(1) General expression of Franco-Moroccan friendship.

(2) Responsibility of Sherifian Government for maintaining order.

(3) Relations between two governments to be on strictly bilateral basis; any external interference would handicap development of mutually friendly relations.

(4) Provision by Dahir for municipal elections.

(5) Provision by Dahir for (*a*) Criminal code, organization of judiciary and status of magistrates, and (*b*) Regional assemblies.

(6) Establishment of Restricted Council through which Grand Vizier empowered to issue any administrative regulations.

(7) Power of Council of Viziers modified with respect to composition and procedure for passing of legislation.

(8) Agreement that further reforms would be accomplished to give the Moroccan state modern structure, permitting greater participation by peoples in the management of public affairs, with guarantees for protection of French interests, such reforms to be developed by Franco-Moroccan Commission.

(9) Establishment of Commission mentioned in (8) above of which Moroccan members would be members of Makhxen appointed by Sultan with approval of Resident General.

Guillaume also telegraphed text of Dahir's instituting regional assemblies and Restricted Council.

Dillon

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Rabat, Tangier, and Casablanca.

[2] Not printed.

771.00/8–1753 : Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Dorman) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY RABAT, August 17, 1953—7 p. m.

32. We believe important this time recapitulate urgently our concern immediate and far-reaching consequences present coup. Sultan's withdrawal today previous approval dahirs ceding power [2] and expected French reaction raise immediate and pressing question US Govern-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Tangier, and Casablanca.

[2] See Paris telegram 594, August 15, *supra*.

ment position re forced abdication. Resident General just informed Deane situation now fluid and test of strength expected immediate future.

For Department's urgent consideration following is summary Rabat's views:

A. *Present Crisis*

1. Coup has full support residency which attempted strip Sultan of temporal powers on August 13 and religious on August 15 leaving him powerless prisoner French.
2. French will probably attempt force Sultan abdicate near future.
3. "Popular support" for Glaoui-led pasha's caids grossly exaggerated.
4. Separation Sultan's temporal spiritual powers believed unacceptable orthodox Moroccans.
5. Fez treaty flagrantly violated.

B. *Immediate Considerations*

1. Virtual removal Sultan means loss young intelligent unifying force whose leadership vitiated Communist attempts penetrate Nationalist movement and whose consistent pleas calm usually been effective restraining Nationalists.
2. Although French repeatedly charge Sultan employing obstructionist tactics they have offered him almost no substantive reforms leading toward increased Moroccan participation real government powers.
3. Replacement of Sultan by Glaoui adherent may win for French support some political feudal Berber tribes at expense support more educated politically-conscious Arabs thereby delaying long overdue political development Morocco.
4. Coup will doubtless swell number embittered Nationalists already deprived civil liberties who may well resort underground program sabotage terrorism, easy prey Communists eager exploit anti-American feeling.
5. Repressive measures needed maintain order presumably will be intensified, thereby increasing rather than diminishing year-old tension.
6. Basis for genuine Franco-Moroccan mutual confidence being sacrificed for Franco-Berber master-servant relationship.
7. French losing sight own (and our) long-range interest for shortsighted expediency.
8. Department can better judge reactions Moslem countries to current situation here.

C. *US Interests*

1. In event underground terrorism US Air Force, Navy bases Morocco will become logical target sabotage by Moroccans irate US passive acceptance French coup. This also independent conviction of US Air Force office special investigation Rabat.
2. In long-range interest our military installations US cannot afford arouse hostility local population.
3. Although Moroccan people cognizant US concern crisis January 1951, no such cognizance exists now although US military stakes today Morocco inestimably higher than two and half years ago.

4. Potential installation puppet Sultan would offer French opportunity abrogate US-Morocco treaty 1836.

D. *US Responsibility*

1. As long as US is only country maintaining special treaty rights Morocco we are expected by educated Moroccans concern ourselves plight their country, privilege implying responsibility. We cannot accept usual French charge US interest orderly political development Morocco based solely unrealistic emotional sympathy for dependent peoples. If our special treaty rights are outdated they should nevertheless not be surrendered by default.

2. Confidential advice French now may avoid risk publicly aired Franco-US differences over Morocco at UN.

In view French apparent refusal take US attitude into consideration and Residency's deliberate deception while engineering coup which threatens legitimate US interests Morocco, we feel that before deposition Sultan becomes accomplished fact French should be made to realize, at highest level, degree of seriousness with which US Government is concerned over consequences "ill-advised and ill-timed action".

DORMAN

771.00/8–1753: Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Satterthwaite) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORTY TANGIER, August 17, 1953—10 p. m.

72. Reference telegrams Rabat, Paris and Tangier on Moroccan crisis.

Following are Legation's comments on latest developments:

1. It appears French are now too deeply committed in Glaoui's maneuvers either to withhold support from new "imam" or to fail take drastic action if Sultan should maintain his present refusal Sbaldahirs. Latter's abdication now seems probable if he is not deposed first.

2. French in name modernizing feudal country have instigated tribal chieftains stir up discord on regional racial and religious grounds. Reputable sources consider Sultan proud intelligent individual enjoying widespread popularity. He has shown considerable personal courage in face French pressure and seems actually have acted as stabilizing factor in present conflict. Sultan had apparently not refused approve legislation granting increased Moroccan participation in local self-government, as alleged by French, but only delayed so-called reforms which gave French residents equal status and disproportionate participation.

3. We therefore now appear be witnessing practical extinction last vestiges sovereignty ancient nation whose monarch and people never

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris and Rabat.

fail recall historic ties with United States. Fact we did not respond by any gesture to repeated enquiries from palace has enabled French convey wholly false impression United States position.

As seen here we have been placed in position of supporting practical annexation nation whose sovereignty we no less than French are bound by valid international instruments respect. United States was also symbol that some hope lay in eventual recognition of legitimate aspirations thru cooperation with anti-Commie West. There is reason fear now that nationalists may be finally driven into arms of Commies.

4. Repercussions on Arab-Asian bloc and their effect on forthcoming General Assembly session are obvious.

SATTERTHWAITE

771.00/8-1853 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, August 18, 1953—8 p. m.

624. Guillaume and Vimont arrived Paris last night and conferred with Bidault and Laniel today. Council of Ministers meeting tomorrow will face major decisions on Morocco. Following picture given us by Margerie, Marchal and Baeyens.

Situation both "uncertain and confused" and "out of hand". Seriousness indicated by Guillaume's return to Paris at own request at time when his presence in Morocco almost indispensable. Principal impression he and Vimont brought back was that strength of movement represented by Glaoui and Caids considerably greater than anticipated.

Moroccan religious festival this coming Friday in effect represents deadline before which some action as yet undetermined must be taken to restore stability. Essential immediate problem, as Foreign Office sees it, is to maintain order and prevent situation arising which could lead to massacre of French and other foreigners. In addition to dangers of bloodshed in Morocco, Foreign Office recognizes probable repercussions in other countries, particularly in Arab world, although in view recent events in Egypt, Iran and elsewhere they are not too concerned over this aspect. Possibility also foreseen of government crisis if Assembly meets next week and situation has not been restored.

Recognizing that French Government will be strongly attacked both in Morocco and abroad for any course of action leading to removal of Sultan, our informants expressed view that belligerent attitude of Pashas and Caids led by Glaoui make Sultan's removal seem lesser evil and course likely to cause least violence. Additional factor is that most French Union forces Morocco are recruited from Berbers and French fear possibility they might revolt.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, and Casablanca.

Request all recipients treat foregoing with greatest discretion since decision not yet taken.

Re Rabat's telegrams 32[2] and 33[3] August 17 and 18 (repeated Paris 25 and 26) and Tangier's telegram 72,[4] August 17 (repeated Paris 13). While French authorities Morocco made grave mistake in permitting situation to develop to present stage, French Government is now faced with very grave and difficult decisions to make and must make them in light of what it considers its own national interest. French Government cannot be unaware of attitude of United States Government with respect to question of removal of Sultan, which has been conveyed to French authorities in past, nor of our concern in present situation which we have constantly reiterated. French must accept responsibility for whatever flows from their acts or past omissions. Any intervention on our part at this point would probably have little or no influence on their decision and would afford them opportunity lay partial blame on us for results.

DILLON

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[2] Dated Aug. 17, p. 616.

[3] Not printed; it reported the situation was entering the critical stage, and the French were faced with the alternative of deposing the Sultan or withdrawing support from Glaoui. (771.00/8–1853)

[4] *Supra.*

771.00/8–1953: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, August 19, 1953—8 p. m.

649. Embassy telegram 624, August 18.[2] Marchal tells us Council Ministers meeting today reached no final decision regarding Morocco, that Guillaume returning alone to Rabat this evening and that final decision will be made by Council Ministers meeting late tomorrow afternoon or night following receipt report from Guillaume tomorrow. Guillaume has been instructed to endeavor arrange some compromise settlement, which Marchal did not reveal to us.

Marchal personally does not believe that any compromise settlement is now possible as in his view events have gone too far. He believes that French Government must decide for Sultan or for Glaoui and group and points out that trouble with Glaoui would necessitate use of French Union troops throughout Morocco while trouble with Sultan will bring difficulties in urban centers. He expresses belief that whatever decision is reached, French Government keep situation under control, but believes that recent developments and present situation in Morocco have made problem Franco-Moroccan relations extremely difficult for some time to come.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Rabat, Tangier, and Casablanca.

[2] *Supra.*

AFP and AP today report according authoritative circles Paris, French Government denies United Nations competence intervene in Moroccan affairs and that "diplomatic circles" say that if France called to account regarding Morocco it would "go very far". AP quotes Foreign Office spokesman as interpreting this as position on part of France similar to that recently expressed by Senator Knowland regarding admission Communist China to United Nations when he said he would seek Senate resolution in such case for United States withdrawal from United Nations. Marchal said foregoing statement made by Baeyens as Foreign Office spokesman. He did not elaborate further.

DILLON

771.00/8-2053 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, August 20, 1953—6 p. m.

672. Embtel 649, August 19.[2] Marchal informed us this afternoon of action just taken by Guillaume to depose Sultan,[3] as Agence France Press and AP ticker reports came out announcing this move. Marchal gives us following account of latest developments:

1. Guillaume saw Glaoui six o'clock this morning in effort effect compromise. He asked Glaoui withdraw his opposition provided Sultan renounced Istiqlal. (Marchal stressed this for confidential information United States Government only.) This Glaoui refused to accept and Guillaume so informed Paris. Glaoui's forces reported moving toward Rabat. Council Ministers thereupon reached decision France could not meet forces backing Glaoui with French troops and only course open was to obtain Sultans abdication or to depose him. Sultan refused to abdicate and Guillaume therefore had Sultan with two sons removed by plane to Corsica. Sultan did not offer resistance.
2. Next problem is that of Sultan's successor and he is likely to be "a third Sultan", i.e., neither the present one nor Glaoui's choice. Choice expected to be named by Grand Vizir, who is for time being ranking Moroccan official. Foreign Office position is this matter for Moroccan decision and French Government has no intention intervening.
3. It is feared that constant acts terrorism similar to Tunisian situation may now result.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, Casablanca, and Frankfort.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Rabat telegram 94, Feb. 3, 1954, informed the Department of State that the official information bulletin for January 1954, No. 38, p. 31, contained a statement that on Aug. 20, 1953, the Resident General had requested the "ex-Sultan" to abdicate in favor of his younger son, Moulay Abdullah. When the Consul asked a member of the Residency about the statement, he was told that it was true. The Resident General had felt that the nationalist connections of Moulay Hassan, the Sultan's older son, made him unsuitable for the position. (771.00/2-354)

Separate telegram being sent re question security United States citizens.[4]

DILLON

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[4] Telegram 658 from Paris, Aug. 20, reported the Embassy was keeping military officials informed of developments in Morocco. The two groups had discussed the possibility of sending additional security personnel and, if necessary, evacuating civilians to Algiers. The Embassy stressed, however, that the United States should avoid creating any impression of needless alarm, or of a feeling that the United States considered the situation had deteriorated to the point where evacuation was being considered. (771A.00/8–2053)

771.00/8–2053 : Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Dorman) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT RABAT, August 20, 1953—9 p. m.

43. Saw Baudouy who related following:

Decision to depose Sultan taken yesterday Council Ministers Paris. Sultan submitted early this p. m. without difficulty and flown with two sons to near Ajaccio, Corsica. No decision Sultan's replacement although Imam remains. Official communiqué planned 8 p. m. tonight and Mindel may convene Consular Corps before then.

Baudouy said Berber tribes "marching on Rabat" were friendly with vague instructions celebrate aid El Kebir Rabat and desire to be first to greet new Sultan.

Re signing of dahirs, Baudouy said "makes no difference. We will be able do what we like—for first three months".

Baudouy said French against wishes forced depose Sultan by pressure Glaoui. Said ResGen recalled Morocco August 13 with instructions Paris settle situation and maintain Sultan. Having sized up determination Glaoui and tribes Marrakech ResGen returned Paris with Vimont to present Council Ministers with situation. After long debate Ministers decided Sultan must be deposed and ResGen returned Rabat this a. m. with appropriate orders.

Re "relinquishment powers" Baudouy said Sultan was "forced" to abdicate.

DORMAN

771.00/8–2153 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, August 21, 1953—7 p. m.

695. Embassy telegram 672, August 20.[2] Embassy believes that suddenness and pace of recent Moroccan developments ending in deposal (or as French describe it publicly "eloignement") of Sultan actually did take French Government somewhat by surprise and that

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, Frankfort, and Casablanca.

[2] *Ante*, p. 621.

situation brings to fore problem French have faced for some time of implementing French policy in North Africa in face of opposition thereto by French *colons* and certain protectorate officials. Schuman, after his resignation as Foreign Minister, pointed up this problem by stating publicly that important reforms effecting French relations with Morocco or Tunisia impossible without a return to sense of responsibility and obedience on part of subordinate officials in protectorates. Pro-government *Figaro* on August 18 was even more specific in front-page article re Moroccan problems. This article charged government policies decided upon in Paris were ignored and not carried out by French officials in Morrocco and that maneuvers by French officials in Morocco confronting government with fait accompli were serious threat to Franco-Moroccan amity.

Responsible Foreign Office officials confidentially expressed to Embassy their concurrence with this description of situation. They also pointed out that Glaoui's campaign to unseat Sultan had been going on for some time, that it was supported by both *colons* and by certain Residency General officials, who were actually named in the abovementioned *Figaro* article, and that latter apparently expected to present government with what in effect would have been fait accompli. These Foreign Office officials said that government was not kept fully informed by Residency General officials and that in absence of General Guillaume, Glaoui's movement made such headway that at time of crisis it was practically "too late" for government to take necessary action. Thus situation developed to point where French Government could not follow compromise policy nor could it mediate successfully between Sultan and Glaoui. In the end decision had to be taken to adopt course representing lesser of two evils, course which French Government considered would be best designed to prevent outbreak civil strife and to maintain order. French have made point that immense majority of Moroccan people favored Glaoui movement and government decisions at critical moment had to be made in light of Guillaume recommendations and estimate of situation, which must have included appraisal of opposing forces.

We do not believe that French Government itself was guilty of any duplicity in this matter although its officials in Morocco and influential non-official elements both there and in Paris must have been involved. Both *France-Soir* and *Le Monde* have spoken of part that Juin may have played in these developments and *Le Monde* states that in Cabinet meeting certain Ministers have raised Juin's name in this connection. Except for *Aurore*, non-Communist press had generally been critical and both *Figaro* and *Le Monde* call for accounting and appropriate penalties against officials found responsible for Moroccan developments. There are also unconfirmed reports that several Ministers, notably Faure and Mitterand, were strongly opposed to taking action depose Sultan but that in final analysis all were unwilling to take decision use force to impose solution which was considered to be necessary if Glaoui movement stopped.

There have already been indications that government will undoubtedly face questions on its Moroccan policy at National Assembly if it reconvenes next week. Socialist Party has issued statement denouncing "insolvency" of government policy in Morocco and *Le Monde* has commented that Moroccan problem really more serious than strikes situation in France due to its effect on French position throughout North Africa. Foreign Office at least is aware of international repercussions in Arab-Asian world, although it, as well as French Government will not take such attitudes as matter of grave concern. While there will be questioning of government policy, it must not be forgotten that in eyes most French Sultan has been obstructive force in Morocco for several years and strength of attack on government for recent developments should not seriously threaten it unless, of course, situation in Morocco got completely out of hand by time National Assembly reconvened.

Dillon

771.00/8–2153 : Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Dorman) to the Department of State [1]

RESTRICTED PRIORITY RABAT, August 21, 1953—4 p. m.

45. Mindel convoked Consular corps noon today and gave following summary his version events:

1. Council Ministers Paris, faced with deteriorated situation in which only choice lay between deposition Sultan by French or civil war resulting in expulsion Sultan by force native dissidents, gave Resident General broad authority but preferred compromise solution. Resident General returned, met Glaoui Casablanca 6 a.m. August 19, offered unrevealed compromise but Glaoui refused. Although Glaoui gave word prevent disorder, similar restraint by other caids could not be relied upon, especially as several thousand Berbers converging Rabat.

2. Resident General called palace and told Sultan situation so far deteriorated that Resident General obliged remove sovereign to prevent disorder. Tanks accompanied Resident General in case several thousand Moroccans living inside Mechouar caused trouble but none ensued.

3. Grand Vizir accepted abdication and sent due notice all pashas, caids, in traditional letter leaving much space for signatures acknowledgment. Fez notice signed by all Ulemas, Chorfas, Alouite relatives, other notables. Maghzen members, dominated by authoritarian ex-Sultan, relieved at abdication. Majority Istiqlal supporters mere opportunists who will cooperate with government now Sultan gone.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Tangier, and Casablanca.

Moroccan leaders "unanimous in approving deposition, with no word regret Sultan's departure".

4. Moulay Ben Arafa chosen Sultan because he "was already half way (Iman)", close relative former ruler, "most worthy candidate, and had support Moroccan chiefs". Ben Arafa will make triumphal entry Rabat late morning tomorrow (August 22), which equivalent ceremony enthronement. No time to arrange Hedya. Reign new Sultan will begin era wide new reforms and development toward democracy.

Dorman

771.00/8–2153 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL Washington, August 21, 1953—7:05 p. m.
PRIORITY

609. Department feels any statement regarding Moroccan situation which would not offend French would be too weak to accomplish useful purpose with Arabs. Consequently intends make no public formal statement.[2] When asked for comment by press reply being made orally somewhat along following lines attributable to Department "officials":

> The United States Government views with deep concern developments in Morocco including the violence which culminated in the removal of the Sultan. The US regrets any action from any source which disrupts peace in the area.
>
> It will also be emphasized to the press that a basic tenet of this Government's foreign policy is support for the orderly development of dependent areas towards self-government, and the US will continue to support this policy in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Further, the press will be told that the US earnestly hopes that there will be an early end to violence in Morocco and the restoration of an atmosphere of calm which would be conducive to orderly progress.

Smith

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Cootes (WE/P) and cleared in the offices of Acker (NEA/P) and Wellons (AF). It was repeated to Rabat, Tangier, Casablanca, Cairo, Madrid, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, Tripoli, and Tunis.

[2] A memorandum for the record by Knight, dated Aug. 22, summarized a series of telephone conversations he had had with officials of the French Embassy that afternoon. The French called to express indignation over a UP story concerning a Department of State spokesman's remarks to the press regarding Morocco, and to criticize the idea of making any statement at all, which could only be interpreted as U.S. support for the nationalists and supporters of the previous Sultan. The Department's spokesman assured Knight he had adhered to the language contained in telegram 609. Later conversations with representatives of the news media disclosed editorial additions on the part of UP. Since the original remarks to the press did not constitute an official government statement, the Acting Secretary said the Department had no obligation to make any further public statement on the matter. (771.00/8–2253)

771.00/8–2453 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, August 24, 1953—1 p. m.

715. In view press reports Arab-Asian bloc request to UNSC for investigation French action Morocco [2] and posssible developments flowing therefrom, Embassy recommends that US Government either vote against such request or abstain for following reasons:

Regardless of French actions or failure to act prior to recent developments in Morocco, we are now faced with *fait accompli* which French Government justifies on grounds any other course would have led to very threat to peace of which Arab-Asian bloc now complains. French Government maintains that action to remove former Sultan and seating of new Sultan have approval of large majority of Moroccans. General Guillaume in press conference at Rabat on August 20 spoke of "democratizing Morocco gradually at all levels" and of bringing Moroccans into administration of country. Present situation cannot be reversed and French will obviously use force to put down any attempt to do so. French would not permit UN investigation and UN attempt to send any commission to Morocco for this purpose would lead to French refusal permission entry and to worse strained relations between France and UN than was case when Moroccan-Tunisian problem last brought before UN. For US Government now to question French actions in recent developments would in sense be equivalent to denying accuracy of French official statements. To do so publicly would seem to require presentation of some evidence to back up such charges. That would appear difficult, if not impossible, to do. Whatever we do will be closely observed by Moroccans as well as Tunisians. Action to censure France would probably give encouragement to Istiqlal and other opponents of French and might play part in setting off campaign of terrorist activities designed to prove to UN that danger to peace did exist. Effect of such developments on French public opinion and French attitudes toward US are easy to imagine, to say nothing of possibilities of increased inflamed opinion throughout North Africa against French, and eventually USA.

We suggest, therefore, that while being careful not to endorse recent French actions, we both privately to French and publicly in UN make clear our expectation that, as stated by Resident General, France will go forward with genuine reform program designed to bring about development of Morocco toward self-government and increased Moroccan participation in administration. Only thus will there be hope for peace and order and UN interjection into question would tend prevent very aim it endeavors to bring about.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Rabat and Tangier.

[2] USUN telegram 123, Aug. 21, transmitted the text of a letter from the Asian-African bloc to the Secretary-General, concerning the deposition of the Sultan. The letter requested him to call a meeting of the Security Council to investigate the danger to international peace caused by French actions in Morocco. The final paragraph of the telegram informed the Department of State that Security Council members generally agreed to a meeting on Aug. 26. Dr. Charles Malik, the Ambassador of Lebanon, called the Department on Aug. 21 to request U.S. support for inscription of the item on the Security Council agenda. Documentation is in Department of State file 330.

If from strictly legal standpoint we should make any reservations re recent Moroccan changes, these could be made subject direct discussions with French Government.

In this connection, today's *Nyht* carries front page story by Homer Bigart under Washington dateline headed "US objects to action of France in Morocco", in which he quotes French Embassy spokesman as saying "we know of no expression of dissatisfaction" by State Department or its representatives re recent French actions Morocco. This story has not yet been picked up by French press. While most non-Communist French press has been critical of recent French policy in Morocco, there seems to be belief that France should now formulate policy to be faithfully implemented by French representatives Morocco. There are reports that Blesson, Boniface and Vallat may all be removed and Guillaume seems to be slated for a NATO position, once latter entirely unconnected with recent Moroccan developments. If French are endeavoring to start with clean slate, it would be more constructive for us to assist them than to take action which would make their task more difficult.

It is difficult to see how we can really please Arab-Asian bloc without voting for UN investigation. Therefore, we believe that US should take action which would to extent possible avoid placing us in position which would give us worst of both worlds, i.e., not pleasing Arab-Asian group and arousing strong French resentment.

DILLON

771A.00/8-2453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, August 24, 1953—5:12 p. m.

627. For Ambassador and Achilles. Inform Laniel and Bidault personally soonest that I have decided to vote against inscription of Moroccan case on Security Council agenda.[2] While we have been moti-

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Knight and cleared in draft in the offices of MacArthur (C), Merchant (EUR), and Byroade (NEA). It was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, and Casablanca.

[2] Telegram 74 to USUN, Aug. 24, instructed the Mission to vote against the inscription of Morocco on the Security Council agenda on the grounds that the situation in Morocco was not one that would endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. (320/8-2153)

vated by desire to assist our French friends and allies, especially at present when France has such grave and difficult problems at home, in Indochina as well as in North Africa, you should make very clear to Laniel that this decision will be most unpopular with certain important elements of US opinion in addition to causing us further and serious difficulties in our relations with Arab-Asian States. These repercussions at home and abroad will be even more pronounced as it is highly likely, in view composition of Security Council, that our vote will determine the action taken.

You should take this occasion to impress upon Laniel our gravest concern that time is running out and that if France does not institute quickly a reform program with real substance with view to granting internal autonomy not only to the Moroccans but to the Tunisians and show real determination to move along this path notwithstanding the obstruction of local French officials and colons alike, we do not see how we can long pursue our present course. You should remind Laniel that US has long been told by French Government that ex-Sultan was main stumbling block to reform program because of his "all or nothing" attitude and his constant tactical refusal to approve any reform measures. With this obstacle removed, we are now confident that France will make good the opportunity to take rapid strides forward. It is because of this full confidence in intentions of Laniel and French Government that we have taken decision to vote with France in Security Council.

I trust that this proof of further support of our French allies (on April 14, 1952 we only abstained re inscription of Tunisian case in SC) coming as it does after a period of over a year during which implementation of reform programs in both Tunisia and Morocco has been virtually nil, should convince Laniel of sincerity of our desire to be helpful to France and North Africa. At same time I believe that this full support justifies our making US views known to French Government frankly and fully.

I will talk to Ambassador Bonnet 5 o'clock today along above lines, but consider essential that you impress upon Laniel and Bidault personally gravity with which we view North African situation and motives which lead us to support France.

Strictly for your information US Government decision has not been taken concerning inscription Moroccan and/or Tunisian item on Agenda 8th UNGA.

Dulles

771.00/8–2553 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 25, 1953—7:40 p. m.
PRIORITY

80. For Lodge.[2] Following draft statement has been personally approved by Secretary. The use of the phrase in parentheses is left to your discretion:

"In passing on the question of inscription of this item we must decide whether the developments in Morocco constitute a situation the continuance of which endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. We are not asked to express our position on colonialism, or on other similar questions, important and appealing though they may be. The US is certainly one of the greatest examples in the world today of a country which has successfully freed itself and helped to free others from a colonial status. We applaud the fact that in the brief time since the UN came into existence —— million people in the non-Soviet world have won their independence (just as we deplore the fact that in the Soviet-dominated world a comparable number of people have lost the reality of independence). We have recently publicly applauded the July 3 announcement of the French policy of complete independence for the Associated States of Indochina. We look for increasing self-government in Morocco and elsewhere. Such are our sentiments. But it must be obvious to anybody who looks at the facts candidly that the situation in Morocco does not endanger international peace and security, just as it must be clear to anyone who surveys the UN candidly that the surest way to undermine the position of the SC is to depart from its primary mission to maintain the peace of the world and instead to deal with all sorts of other questions under the guise of international peace and security.

I realize that the argument is made that the fact that 16 nations object to recent events in Morocco in and of itself constitutes 'international friction' and therefore empowers the SC to investigate to see whether continuance of the situation is likely to endanger international peace. This line of reasoning would make it possible always to break down the distinction between matters of domestic and international concern.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Mangano.

[2] A memorandum by Kitchen to Smith, dated Aug. 25, transmitted several statements on Morocco for use in the Security Council debate on Aug. 26. One was a text submitted by Ambassador Lodge in USUN telegram 134, Aug. 24. Attached to it were a memorandum by Sandifer suggesting some minor revisions and a final revision of Lodge's text by UNA. Also attached was a memorandum by Merchant to the Secretary indicating that EUR could not concur in the UNA–NEA draft and transmitting a suggested statement by EUR. (771.00/8–2553) Another copy of the Merchant memorandum had a handwritten note by O'Connor, noting that the Secretary had seen it and had sent his own version by cable on Aug. 25. (330/8–2553)

It is our conviction that the situation in Morocco does not endanger international peace and security and we therefore shall vote against placing this question on the agenda." [8]

DULLES

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[8] On Aug. 27, Lodge advised the Security Council of the U.S. position along the above lines. On Sept. 3, the Security Council voted not to include the item on its agenda by a vote of 5 to 5, with 1 abstention.

771A.00/8–2853 : Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Dorman) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET RABAT, August 28, 1953—3 p. m.

52. In view ultimate paragraph Deptel 19 Rabat quoting Deptel 627 Paris,[2] we feel we should highlight certain points possibly not sufficiently clarified by us in past:

(1) Issue between French Residency and former Sultan was not principle of implementing reforms per se but of legalizing extensive participation by Frenchmen in Moroccan Governmental institutions.

(2) Although time element is now important in implementing reform program before UNGA discussion Moroccan problem, careful examination should be given to substance reforms.

(3) Proposed "reforms" as outlined briefly Paris 594 to Department [3] and expanded today's press apparently aimed less at "democratization" or "internal autonomy" than at strengthening French grip on Moroccan Government by "decentralization" powers from Sultan to bodies controlled not merely by French appointees but by French members.

(4) French intend institute elected municipal assemblies but presumably will continue insist on 50 percent French participation even in centers which are overwhelmingly Moroccan. Similarly (top secret) extension of procedure for electing all members Moroccan section council government, though good on paper, offset by fact council is consultative only and elections are indirect. French-controlled pressure groups (i.e. Chambers Agriculture, Commerce) will continue dominate two of three colleges.

(5) Local French officials and colons, far from obstructing envisaged "reform program," have unanimously supported it as means ensuring absolute French control.

(6) Perhaps more convincing (to Moroccans) evidence genuine French desire democratize country would be, concurrent to any reform program, lifting 40 year-old state siege, gradual easing strict measures against freedom speech, press, movement, assembly and prompt adju-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Tangier, and Casablanca.
[2] Dated Aug. 24, p. 627.
[3] Dated Aug. 15, p. 616.

dication of Nationalists held long periods without charges, trial or sentence.

(7) Although question violation treaty rights by French in arbitrary removal Sultan and our legitimate interest therein have not been raised with French, presumably Department will have to establish position in replying questions at UNGA. Acceptance by Department of recent coup may be interpreted as US recognition unconditional French power over person of Sultan.

DORMAN

771A.00/9-553 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 5, 1953—3: 26 p. m.

826. For Ambassador. You should at moment most advantageous in your judgment, but as soon as possible, discuss following as well as Deptel 627 [2] with Laniel and Bidault with view obtaining full understanding our problems forthcoming UNGA and most constructive French attitude there. Strictly FYI Department has decided vote for inscription Moroccan-Tunisian items. Department concerned re possible effect this decision on conclusion US-French Indochina understanding. We hope NSC decision Indochina can be made Sept. 9 [3] and French advised confidentially soon thereafter. Public announcement could not be made until after Congressional consultation, i.e. perhaps by Sept. 20. We hope be able avoid divulging US position on inscription until after we have informed French our decision Indochina confidentially. If queried now by French re inscription issue, suggest you simply state position not firm.

As set forth Deptel 627 we hope be able assist our French friends and allies in UN—even though we hardly consider Franco-Moroccan relations satisfactory. Our ability to do so in forthcoming UNGA depends not only upon French reform programs of real substance (reftel) but also upon French approach to UNGA consideration.

US position is that GA has competence. Recent events in Morocco make it unreasonable for US oppose inscription on ground there have not been significant developments or sufficient lapse of time since 7th GA resolutions adopted. Obviously these events increase pressure for discussion. Arab-Asian pressure further increased by rejection inscription Security Council. Item almost certain to be placed on agenda even if US were to oppose and our ability moderate subsequent action would be greatly reduced. Difficulties would be compounded if in addition

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Fisher (WE) and cleared in NEA, UNA, and C.
[2] Dated Aug. 24, p. 627.
[3] For documentation on Indochina, see volume XIII.

French delegation were again to walk out in expectation US would carry burden.

Last fall we attempted persuade French it was in their own best interests not to oppose inscription but to emphasize their positive contributions welfare Morocco and Tunisia. French decision to take negative attitude then made by Pinay in midst severe parliamentary difficulties particularly concerning Schuman. French position regarding UN legal competence coupled with probable domestic political reaction to any UN "interference" appear limit possibilities new French attitude. However, present internal political situation in France appears somewhat different from that which confronted Pinay. We believe French must realize US bound to have different point of view concerning competence. We therefore hope they might pursue course which will help moderate discussion and action as well as temper reactions in France, Morocco and US. For example, if UNGA decides to discuss question in spite of French views on inscription, as seems inevitable, we would hope that French would not belabor issue of "competence", walk out, threaten withdraw from UN, etc. but would help facilitate acceptable treatment in UNGA in which case US efforts exercise restraining influence in debates would be much more effective.

We realize that course of action advocated this message goes directly counter current French mood of increasing intransigence re North Africa and have taken this into account in drafting this instruction. However, Department fears that US Government's sincere desire to help France will come to naught unless she compromises somewhat with her absolute position and thus makes it possible for us to help her.

DULLES

771.00/9–1653 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, September 16, 1953—4 p. m.

1088. Following is brief summary of provisions of particular interest to US of proposed dahirs approved September 15 by French Cabinet (Embtel 1077 September 15): [2]

1. Municipal Organization.

(*a*) Title I defines powers of Pasha.

(*b*) Title II re chief of municipal services provides *inter alia* that latter, named by Residency *arrete*, assist Pasha in administration of municipality and countersign latter's *arretes*.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, and Casablanca.

[2] Not printed; it reported the French Cabinet had approved the Moroccan dahirs that day. The Cabinet also had dahirs regarding labor unions and a bill of rights that had been prepared by the Residency. (771.00/9–1553)

(*c*) Title III—municipal commission.

(1) Commissioners elected for 6 years. Commission in chief city each region comprises equal number French Moroccan members. In other cities vizirial *arretes* will establish division of seats.

(2) Commission under Presidency Pasha, or his delegate. Commission yearly elects Vice-President alternatively from French and Moroccan membership. Between commission sessions Vice-President watches over the execution by chief of municipal services of municipal decisions and use of budgetary credits.

(3) Commission meets four times yearly and in addition on request chief of municipal services or ⅔ its membership.

(4) Commission's decisions require absolute majority of votes. President votes only if majority not obtained after 2 ballots and then has casting vote.

(5) Through its decisions commission regulates affairs of municipality. Certain decisions (re budget, taxes, construction, loans, etc.) enforceable only after approval by higher authority to be given within 2 months. Other decisions enforceable if one week after notification chief of region has not opposed. In event opposition decision referred to higher authority mentioned above.

(6) Commission can pass resolutions but not those having political character or relating to non-local matters.

(7) Commission can be dissolved or suspended by vizirial *arrete*. Special delegation then assumes certain of its functions provisionally.

(*d*) Title IV enumerates categories of obligatory expenditures.

(*e*) Title V relates to judicial action by or against municipality.

(*f*) Title VI—miscellaneous provisions.

(1) Vizirial *arrete* can specify that powers vested in municipal commission by this dahir can be exercised provisionally by Pasha with advice of municipal commission, but his actions are subject to control of superior authority. Pasha also obliged to refer to Grand Vizir disagreements arising between him and municipal commission.

(2) Vizirial *arrete* re election municipal commissioners.

(*a*) French commissioners elected by list on single ballot (*scrutin de liste a un tour*) by French electors. No splitting of ballots (*panachage*). If list receives absolute majority of votes all candidates thereon elected. In contrary case, system of proportional representation applies. Candidature must be announced on week before election.

(*b*) Moroccan commissioners elected in 2 stage voting. Eligible Moroccan voters in each electoral district elect delegates who in turn elect commissioners, on vote for individuals not lists. Modalities of election of delegates will be established by *arrete* of Pasha.

(*c*) Conditions governing candidacy and eligibility to vote of French and Moroccans appear quite similar.

2. Council of Government.

(*a*) Council comprises French and Moroccan sections meeting together and having same number of members. Each section comprises 3 colleges as heretofore. Members third college to be elected by direct or indirect votes under conditions to be established by Residency and vizirial *arretes* for French and Moroccan sections respectively.

(*b*) Council meets twice yearly, but extraordinary sessions can be held.

(*c*) Permanent commissions formed—budget, economic affairs and social affairs.

(*d*) Draft budgets drawn up by Finance Directorate submitted to council. On this occasion council gives its advice on all financial, economic and social questions.

(*e*) Vizirial *arrete* will establish modalitiese of constitution and functioning of council and will fix number its members.

3. Regional Assemblies.

(*a*) Assembly instituted in chief city of each region and will comprise equal number French and Moroccan members elected by direct or indirect vote by population of region. Residency and vizirial *arretes* will establish modalities of election for French and Moroccan members, respectively.

(*b*) Assembly meets twice yearly, but can be convoked for extraordinary sessions. Presided over by chief of region who establishes agenda. French and Moroccan members sit together, but if President believes advisable they can meet separately.

(*c*) Assembly exercises functions in social and economic matters and in particular is consulted on preparation of regional budget and equipment proposals of interest to region.

(*d*) Vizirial *arrete* will establish modalities of functioning of assemblies.

4. As 3 dahirs re judicial reform highly technical and very detailed (code of penal procedure alone comprises 195 articles) and as they appear fairly non-controversial, Embassy will not summarize.

5. Texts mentioned Embtel 1077 forwarded today by airpouch to Utter.

DILLON

Editorial Note

USUN telegram Delga 78, October 7, transmitted a draft resolution on Morocco given to the United States Delegation by the chairman of the Egyptian Delegation. The text noted that France had not implemented the December 19, 1952 resolution of the General Assembly on Morocco. It requested the French Government to terminate martial law in Morocco, release all political prisoners, establish democratic institutions through free elections, and ended with a paragraph requesting the President of the General Assembly to confer with the French Government on implementing the resolution and to report to the General Assembly as appropriate.

USUN telegram Delga 75, October 7, reported that a member of the French Delegation at the United Nations told the United States Delegation he was sure the Arab-Asian resolution could not get enough votes to pass. The French hoped no alternative resolution would be introduced, and requested the United States Delegation to actively discourage any Latin American move to introduce one. Telegram Gadel 19 to USUN, October 8, informed the delegation that the French Ambassador had approached the Department of State, expressing hope that the delegation would oppose the introduction of any resolution by friendly supporters. The Department's position was that, while the United States would vote against the Arab-Asian resolution, it had to maintain freedom of maneuver. If the Latin Americans introduced a mild and reasonable resolution on their own it would probably be adopted, and it was hard to see how the United States could oppose it.

USUN telegram Delga 97, October 9, transmitted the text of the resolution introduced on that day by the Delegations of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. It was basically the same as that transmitted in Delga 78. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 320.

771.00/10-1553 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

CONFIDENTIAL　　WASHINGTON, October 15, 1953—5:06 p. m.
PRIORITY

Tosec 3. For the Secretary from Murphy.[2] We think you should be informed of recent developments on Moroccan case in UN General Assembly in event Bidault raises matter with you.

As you know, French have hoped debate now going on in GA Political Committee could be concluded without passage of any resolution. Discussion will probably end today. Last night Brazil, Bolivia, Haiti and Uruguay gave us draft recalling last year's General Assembly resolution, stating that sufficient time has not elapsed to appraise its results, and renewing Assembly's appeal to parties to pursue the easing of the present tension and to develop the free political institutions of Moroccan people in accordance with spirit of Charter.[3]

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Popper and cleared in the offices of McBride (WE), Bonbright (EUR), and Cyr (AF). It was signed by Murphy and was repeated to USUN and Paris.

[2] The Secretary of State was in London for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers; see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1709. The text of a statement made by the Secretary at National Airport on Oct. 14, on his departure, is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 26, 1953, pp. 546–547. On Oct. 20, after his return, he made a speech in New York about the meeting. The text is *ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1953, pp. 587–589.

US Delegation feels strongly that it is in our interest to support such a resolution.[4] Tactical situation is such that opposition to above text would have damaging effects on our relations with Arab-Asian states. It would force Arab-Asians to press their own extreme resolution and would force us into a position of categoric opposition to that resolution and any amendments to it. We would also disappoint Latin-Americans, many of whom feel GA should not fail pass some type of resolution in order continue modicum of gentle pressure on French.

We agree with Delegation that if resolution required, Latin American draft text acceptable, although we continue believe no resolution preferable. We have informed Delegation that if this resolution introduced we should vote in favor, but in meantime should avoid any encouragement to Latin Americans.[5]

We have informed French Embassy here, and Lodge is informing Hoppenot in New York. He will try to persuade Hoppenot that action we are taking is in over-all interest of French.[6]

SMITH

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[3] The text of the resolution was transmitted to the Department of State in USUN telegram Delga 117, Oct. 13. The Mission at the United Nations reported that the countries who introduced the resolution, and some other Latin Americans, did not favor the Arab-Asian resolution, but believed strongly that France "should not get off scot free." The Mission requested guidance from the Department about its position on the resolution. (320/10–1353)

Telegram 1490 from Paris, Oct. 15, informed the Department the French had just been informed of the Bolivian resolution and considered it unsatisfactory. They hoped the United States would be able to keep the Bolivians from introducing it. The Embassy assumed Bidault would probably bring up the topic with the Secretary in London. (320/10–1553)

[4] A member of the UN Mission telephoned the Department on Oct. 15 suggesting that it was clearly in the interest of the United States to support the Bolivian resolution. Members of the Mission did not see how the Bolivian resolution could injure the French and felt that refusal to support it would stimulate the Arab-Asians to press their own resolution. (320/10–1553)

[5] Telegram Gadel 30 to USUN, Oct. 15, informed the Mission that the Department appreciated the tactical situation. While the Mission was not to encourage the Latin Americans, it was authorized to tell them that it would support the resolution if they introduced it. (320/10–1553)

[6] Ultimately, the UN General Assembly failed to adopt any resolution on Morocco. The Arab-Asian draft resolution, opposed by the United States, was voted down in the Political Committee on Oct. 19; the Latin American resolution, also opposed by the United States because of objectionable amendments added by India, Indonesia, and Burma, failed adoption in the General Assembly on Nov. 3.

771.00/2–854 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, February 8, 1954—7 p. m.

2893. General Guillaume told me today that he had expressed some concern at current Franco-Spanish relations over Morocco but hoped that improvement could be brought about. He said that in simplest terms North African question could be described as being whether North Africa should form part of Europe or Near East. Spanish interest like that of France, was in having it part of Europe but when Spain had no friends in Europe she had sought them in Moslem world and now, heartened by new respectability from agreements with US was trying to play both games. He said that during recent developments he had made considerable effort to insure that Spanish provocations were met calmly both in Paris and in Morocco and to avoid any retaliatory action which would make situation more difficult. He said the two countries which were fundamentally Christian and anti-Communist had much to gain from more cooperation and nothing to gain from discord. He very much hoped US could help promote such cooperation. I assured him that our policy was to endeavor to do exactly that.[2]

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Madrid, Tangier, and Rabat.

ACHILLES

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[2] Tangier telegram 211, Feb. 10, reported that the Spanish had been telling the Legation they thought the French intended to incorporate Morocco into Metropolitan France, as they had Algeria. The Legation suggested that if Guillaume's ideas became known in the Moslem world, it would probably harden anti-Western sentiment throughout the Arab-Asian bloc. (771.00/2–1054)

771.00/2–1754 : Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 17, 1954.

Subject: Paris Telegram 2893[2] and Tangier Telegram 211.[3]

CA–4408. The Department has read with interest Paris telegram 2893 of February 8 reporting the views of Resident General Guillaume regarding the desirability of the general political orientation of North Africa toward Europe rather than toward the Near East. This is another expression of the long-standing French concept of maintaining North Africa, as the southern fringe of the Mediterranean Basin, as an integral part of the western system. While the United States has obviously never been called upon to take any position on this geopolitical concept, nevertheless our recognition of this situation might be considered to lie in our having made Morocco a part of our western defense system through the establishment of air bases in that country.

In this connection, the Department would answer in the negative the question raised in Tangier's telegram 211 of February 10 regarding Spanish fears on this score. While the policy objectives of France and Spain in Morocco are obviously at variance in the present situation we believe firmly that the ultimate viewpoint of Spain on this problem also envisages the western and European orientation of North Africa, with especial reference of course to Morocco. Therefore, what the Spanish fear with regard to French North African policy is not, in the Department's view, the integration of the area more closely with Europe as the French are trying to do. Indeed, any contrary tendency would deal Spain out as effectively as France.

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[1] This instruction was drafted by McBride (WE) and cleared by Utter (AF) and John Wesley Jones (WE). It was sent to Madrid, Paris, Rabat, and Tangier.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra.*

Rather it is the Department's opinion that Spain's desire with regard to North Africa is to improve her own position in Morocco at the expense of France, within the framework of having the entire area facing northward rather than eastward. The recent caid's demonstrations in Tetuan, organized by the Spanish, and Spanish demands regarding Tangier fit into this pattern. Furthermore Spanish territorial aspirations to extend her zone as far south as the Sebou would not seem consonant with a wish to have Morocco become a part of the Near East.

The basic Spanish policy in Morocco would seem to be one of self-interest, like that of the French. The policy of *rapprochement* followed by Spain with regard to the Arab world would seem to be entirely consistent with the retention of her present position in Morocco and even its expansion, in Spanish eyes. We have repeated indications that, in the last analysis, the Spanish realize French loss of control over North Africa would inevitably be followed by the expulsion of the Spaniards. While this might be somewhat more gentle in view of the more conciliatory line taken with the nationalists by Spain, there is no doubt that the former Sultan, who was the most influential Moroccan leader of the postwar period, felt the Sherifian Empire should be reunited under his effective rule, and had no feeling that Spain should have any different position from France in Morocco. There was some question at one time he might consider a different status for the International Zone, at least temporarily, but even this was open to question.

Furthermore, the pro-Arab policy of General Franco had other bases than the Moroccan situation alone, and was involved with the isolated position of Spain from 1946 to 1953. While the Spanish Government doubtless hoped to preserve a favored position in Morocco should anything happen to the French, this was at best a forlorn hope they generally realized.

Therefore, while the Spanish, for a variety of reasons, may desire to annoy the French to the utmost over the Moroccan question, it is hardly conceivable that Spain seriously believes it could form part of an eastern-oriented Arab bloc. Morocco of course occupies an important role in Spanish eyes, both from strategic and for prestige and patriotic reasons, and Spain would doubtless sacrifice her pro-Arab policy to the necessity of remaining in Morocco by force should the situation develop to a point where that choice were necessary. While under present conditions cooperation with the French in such an endeavor would be distasteful, and the Spanish seem to be enjoying present French discomfiture as a result of the terrorist campaign in the French Zone, we are inclined to believe that any general anti-European outbreaks throughout the Sherifian Empire would find Spanish and French military authorities working together to put them down.

Thus, while the views of General Guillaume in Paris telegram 2893 may be oversimplified, and are unpleasant to the Arab world, they are hardly news to the Spaniards or to the Arabs, North African and otherwise. Incidentally, it is believed that Guillaume and the many other French who hold the thesis that North Africa should look to Europe rather than eastward, are talking in political-economic-strategic terms, and certainly not in terms of religion, culture, etc. In this connection, while Spain undoubtedly has a strong cultural and historical tie with Morocco, which France does not, it also might be pointed out that present French religious policies toward Moslems are just as liberal as those of Spain. Neither France nor Spain has made any effort to subvert the Mohammedan religion in Morocco, since both realize that this would be a disastrously unsuccessful venture.

It is concluded that while France and Spain are unquestionably having serious squabbles over the Moroccan question at this time, the Spanish recognize a fundamental community of European interest and would agree with the conclusion of General Guillaume that North Africa should be tied to Europe—otherwise Spain would lose her hold in the Moslem part of the African continent entirely.

Smith

771.00/4-2654 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Satterthwaite) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

Tangier, April 26, 1954—6 p. m.

262. After private luncheon party he gave Saturday for Ford and Cyr of NEA with only Americans present, Mendoub appealed to me in great confidence to have my government persuade French change their policy in Morocco before it is too late. Situation is growing worse and French cannot hope cope with present terrorist movement unless policy is changed. He realizes pressures *Colons* put on French Government but says even *Colons* will be unable work their lands shortly if situation worsens. Practically all Moroccans are disgusted with French policy and are turning against French. They have only scorn for present Sultan. Therefore, future looks hopeless indeed unless French Government faces situation and takes drastic steps remedy it.

Ex-Sultan still greatly loved by most Moroccans, Mendoub continued. Letter he wrote to French Envoy published in local French paper Saturday morning is most interesting in that while promising refrain from political activities (whatever that means) he did not abdicate. Only possible solution which Mendoub can see is that ex-Sultan's second son should be placed on throne. This solution would be received with rejoicing by all Moroccans including terrorists who claim they are opposed to it. At same time it is essential in Mendoub's opinion that not only Guillaume but also his entire team be changed with possible exception General Olie of whom he spoke highly.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris and Rabat.

Mendoub praised local French Minister Panafieu who has good understanding situation in Morocco. He would make excellent delegate at Rabat. Mendoub would not, however, dare tell even Panafieu what he had just told me as all French officers are so sensitive they consider any one criticizing their Moroccan policy as anti-French. He trusted Americans, however, and hoped we could bring French to their senses. He urged me, however, not to mention his name in any way.

Foregoing estimate of situation coming from Mendoub, whose fate is completely tied up with French and who is considered French stooge, is remarkable indeed and is further indication that situation in Morocco is much more serious than French are willing admit or is generally [recognized?]. Mendoub's natural fear for his own position if his views as expressed above should become known, contents this telegram should not be made known to any Foreign Office.

SATTERTHWAITE

771A.00/5-2054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS, May 20, 1954—8 p. m.

4470. Cabinet this afternoon named Francis Lacoste as new Resident General in Morocco. At same time, it confirmed General Guillaume in his functions as Inspector General of French Forces in North Africa.

According press, Naegelen today informed Laniel that he could not accept post of Resident General offered him on Tuesday, justifying his refusal on uncertainty of being supported in his mission by the majority and even by Ministers in Government.

Although General Koenig had been seriously considered for post, desire to name civilian rather than military figure, combined with Laniel displeasure over DeGaullist support in vote of confidence test last week, believed to have given Naegelen the edge. With either of two as Resident General, designation of Lacoste as Minister Delegate had been considered virtually foregone conclusion. Their elimination as candidates pushed Lacoste to fore.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, Geneva, and Casablanca.

Basdevant, Foreign Office, tells us that present plan is for General Guillaume to return to Morocco early next week and to remain there for about two weeks making his farewells, etc. Lacoste would arrive shortly after his departure, armed with new instructions which would have been approved by government. Basdevant stated it was premature to comment on probable nature of instructions but emphasized that appointment of Lacoste reflected French Government's desire pursue liberal policy in Morocco.

DILLON

771A.00/6–954 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Joyce) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, June 9, 1954—8 p. m.

4779. The following are highlights of conversation today with Basdevant Foreign Office regarding Moroccan developments:

1. Lacoste departs for Morocco June 12 on board *Lyautey* by which time it is expected that Government will have approved instructions that Foreign Office has been preparing. Hence comments below must be treated with reserve pending final Government action.

2. Announcement will be made in near future of general lines of long-term program of Morocco indicating various stages of anticipated evolution without, however, specifying time factor or final Moroccan-French relationship.

3. Emphasis will be placed on fact that reforms announced following deposition of ex-Sultan represent only one step towards final goal. Lacoste will give attention to adaptations which may be desirable in announced reforms and to additional reforms that may be feasible at this time.

4. Emphasis will be placed on Moroccan sovereignty, stressing that French participation on parity or near-parity basis in institutions provided for in reform program will decrease as Moroccans show capacity for assuming greater responsibilities.

5. Re dynastic problem no spectacular development to be anticipated in near future. Lacoste will neither urge present Sultan to abdicate nor will he press him to try to build himself up. Replacement of Arafa by second son of Ben Youssef would perhaps satisfy some elements but create new problems. (Impression drawn from Basdevant's statement was that a change in Sultan by no means precluded but that it will not take place until after Lacoste has had ample opportunity thoroughly to examine all aspects of problems.)

6. Important changes in residency team can be expected within month or so. Foreign Office view this measure may have greatest impact on Moroccans from psychological standpoint as indication of

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tangier and Rabat.

changed spirit in residency. Basdevant admitted that Jean Daridan (present Minister Washington) most likely choice post of Minister-Delegate but stated final decision not made. (Newspaper correspondent, friend of Daridan, told us Daridan now in Paris and would depart June 12 with Lacoste for Morocco returning Washington several weeks later to spend month of July cleaning up his affairs at Embassy.)

7. Lacoste has been receiving great variety of delegations from Morocco and other groups interested in Moroccan problems but has made no commitments to any and will wish to spend some time after arrival making contacts and reaching his own conclusions.

JOYCE

771.00/6–1654

Memorandum of Conversation, by John Bovey, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1954.

Subject: Moroccan and Tunisian Problem in the United Nations

Participants: NEA/P—John A. Bovey, Jr. and
Mr. Keshishian, New York correspondent of "Al Ahram" and other Arab papers in Cairo, and ex-correspondent of "El Alaam" and "Istiqlal" in Morocco

Mr. Keshishian inquired as to the Department's position in any forthcoming discussion of the Moroccan and Tunisian problem in the United Nations. I stated that I was unable to answer this and did not believe that any decision had been taken on this matter since the occurrence or circumstances of any such debate were unknown at present. I asked Mr. Keshishian whether he thought that the matter would come up, and if so, who among the Arab states would carry the ball. He replied that it would most certainly come up and that it would probably be by a joint effort of the Arab states. He said his information was that the campaign would be set up at the forthcoming conference in Djakarta. I gathered that this and other statements were based on corridor talk at the UN in New York. Mr. Keshishian appears to be in frequent contact with members of the Near Eastern delegations as well as with Moroccans and Tunisians, though he has never been in North Africa. His principal beat is the U.N.

Mr. Keshishian said that his Moroccan and Tunisian friends were greatly disappointed that Mr. Dulles made no allusion to North Africa in his recent address on colonialism to the Rotarians. I tried to explain that he was speaking specifically of Indo-China and could hardly be expected to enumerate all the areas in the world where this problem existed, not to mention the number of our allies to whom such a catalogue would be offensive.

Mr. Keshishian replied that Moroccans and Tunisians were increasingly restive and disappointed with the United States since the Acheson and Jessup declarations before the United Nations, which had aroused high hopes, had not been followed by any concrete assistance or betterment.

Mr. Keshishian felt that nationalists such as Balafrej and El Fassi were extremely skeptical as to the outcome of the Lacoste mission and were of the opinion that with the best will in the world the new Resident would not be able to survive the onslaught of the colons and the conservative bureaucracy. A change of tack in the metropole was necessary, Mr. Keshishian said, and he agreed that the solution to the problem really lay there. The only ultimate solution, he said, was the independence of the two countries.

He asked whether there was any talk of the return of Moulay Abdullah, the Sultan's second son, to succeed ben Arafa. I said that there had been some discussion of it as a possibility and asked whether his friends thought this would really do any good. He stated that the Moroccan masses—he included the rural as well as the urban populations, though at present to a lesser degree—were extremely attached to the ex-Sultan and his family, but said his friends were skeptical that Abdullah would do the trick. The Istiqlal favored a plebiscite, he said, and short of the return of Sidi Mohammed V, he thought the people's choice would be with Moulay Hassan and that any other change would not materially alter the situation. What the Istiqlal really wanted, he said, was a constitutional monarch along the lines of Feisal in Iraq or Hussein but with a revered figure such as Sidi Mohammed V as the symbol of Moroccan aspirations. I said that I thought that this idea was associated rather with Benjelloun's Parti Democrate d'Independence and that the Istiqlal had tended to put its eggs in the basket of an absolute theocratic Sultanate. He said he did not think this was the real Istiqlal aim, but admitted that Moroccans as a whole were probably at present more interested in the symbols of sovereignty than in any program of reforms or their direct participation in government.

Mr. Keshishian said that in Tunis where the Bey was less closely associated with the movement and where the degree of evolution was greater, leaders such as Bourguiba could be brought back without the loss of face for the French which could result in Morocco from changing the head of the state. He maintained that El Fassi had a considerable popular following in Morocco.

I asked him whether he thought that El Fassi or Balafrej and other veterans of Moroccan nationalism were sufficiently in control of the movement to be able to influence more extreme elements and halt the present wave of terrorism even if French policy should take a favorable turn for the nationalists. He said he thought they could halt it, but he did not know how long this would be the case. I suggested that in that event they might well have done so in order to give Mr. Lacoste an even break during the exploratory phases of his mission; this would certainly constitute a far more interesting demonstration of power and responsibility for foreign consumption than the stepped-up terrorism which had followed the news of Lacoste's appointment. He dodged this one by reiterating his own skepticism as a Syrian concerning France's ability to change course in colonial matters, and spoke rather emphatically of what he considered the scant attention given in the United States and in the Department to Arab opinion, especially that in the dependent areas. He contrasted Arab public relations with those of Israel in this respect.

Mr. Keshishian said finally that while he understood the United States' embarrassment because of our commitments to our NATO allies, he really didn't see how we could justify much longer a so completely pro-French stand (particularly in the U.N.) regarding an area which was not threatened directly by Soviet aggression. I tried to explain that Soviet imperialism was an urgent problem which certainly had a bearing on North Africa because of the vital interrelation between Africa and Europe. He said he didn't see how this interrelationship could be useful to us in the long run except on the basis of independent North African allies, friendly to France and to us.

711.56371A/7–2254 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, July 22, 1954—4 p. m.

297. Deptel 4540, June 11.[1] Yesterday afternoon I called on Koenig and left with him *aide-mémoire*, copy of which being forwarded airmail,[2] setting forth U.S. military requirements French North Africa. Attached to *aide-mémoire* was chart prepared US EUCOM indicating peace and war-time breakdown as set forth JCS paper.

Although Koenig's staff had been previously advised purpose my visit, he was not familiar with details of matter and merely skimmed documents I gave him. I limited my comments to noting that Navy requirements were in implementation NATO infrastructure program and Air Force requirements were for air defense North Africa and

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[1] Not printed; it stated that U.S. military requirements for French North Africa had been approved by the JCS and were being transmitted to the Embassy. The Embassy was requested to seek French agreement in principle to negotiate. (711.56371A/6–1154)

[2] A copy was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 270 from Paris.

Western Mediterranean area. Koenig stated problem North African military facilities must be settled soon and he was presenting to High Council National Defense at its next meeting which will be before end of month the "package" of North African military requirements which has been prepared in ministry defense.

Today Embassy officer left with Boegner, Chief FonOff Service Des Pactes, copy *aide-mémoire* and attachment. Boegner noted that U.S. now officially requesting at highest level French Govt's agreement in principle to U.S. facilities North Africa. Stated heretofore that discussions at service-to-service level had been exploratory only and admitted that French military had been under formal instructions to make no comment on requests presented by their American counterparts. Boegner stated matter would be given urgent consideration and noted that decision would be important and perhaps difficult to arrive at due to what he termed large number personnel we desire stationed at these facilities.

While *aide-mémoire* mentions U.S. desires re site surveys I did not stress this point with Koenig. Embassy officer Drew Boegner's attention to this request and expressed hope that early agreement in principle might be obtained so that joint surveys may begin soonest. Boegner merely indicated that agreement in principle would of course have to precede such surveys.[3]

Copies being sent Satterthwaite and Reinhardt.

DILLON

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[3] Paris telegram 427 from Paris, July 30, said the Embassy had been notified by the Foreign Ministry that the *aide-mémoire* on military requirements was being considered, and the Embassy should not expect a decision for 3 or 4 weeks. (711.56371A/7-3054)

771.00/8-1054 : Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Porter) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL RABAT, August 1, 1954—1 p. m.[2]

10. Lacoste returned Rabat yesterday, stated he did not see Mendes-France, but discussed Moroccan problems with Fouchet. He added he obliged to return "without instructions," but would proceed to France again in near future.

Heavy rioting broke out in Fez yesterday on circulation of rumor that former Sultan had returned and was in his Palace there. Crowds carrying his picture jammed narrow streets and were forced back by police amid "indescribable uproar." Four persons trampled to death and several wounded. Smaller demonstrations also reported in Casablanca and Rabat. Gates to Palace enclosure Rabat locked yesterday to prevent repetition of scenes at Fez.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Tangier, Casablanca, and Tunis.

[2] The file copy is incorrectly dated Aug. 10. It was received in the Department on Aug. 2.

It is unfortunate in present atmosphere that Lacoste returned empty-handed though there is still time for him to make pacifying gesture prior to Moslem feast August 10 and anniversary of dethronement of Ben Youssef August 20.

Former chief of security in French zone has just called at Consulate to comment on Residency "passivity" in face of situation which he believes will almost certainly deteriorate during coming month. When I asked whether steam might be taken from nationalist drive by release of some political prisoners he declared emphatically that would be wrong course to take.

PORTER

771A.00/8–1654 : Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Porter) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL RABAT, August 16, 1954—noon.

28. Early yesterday morning the French entered Fez with four battalions of the Legion, a half company of Republican Guards and an unknown number of Moroccan police. These forces amounted to 3500 men. Purpose was to "reestablish normal life in dissident city". Occupation carried out without incident, 145 arrested of a total list of 180 with remainder taking refuge in sanctuary of Moulay Idriss.

Lacoste yesterday spoke at Mazagan saying that it was known when arrived that August would be a difficult month; that no government could avoid trials that have occurred without inconceivable capitulations nor was it possible to "elude problems arising from a past toward which there cannot be nor is there any question of returning". He praised police successes at Marrakech (where terrorist cell recently apprehended) adding similar successes expected elsewhere. He said police sweeps at Petitjean, Port Lyautey and Fez without precedent for magnitude and their results highly satisfactory. Resident General then condemned (in obvious reference to French elements similar to that mentioned Contel 26 to Department August 12)[2] "lies and unconscionable and deliberate calumnies" which sometimes appear in publications of greatest circulation.

Relative calm prevails in major cities at this moment, this being direct result of generous use of French military strength. Restriction on American movements reported in Contel 16 to Department August 7[3] were substantially continued over past weekend by agreement between consulate, Air Force and Navy. It is generally assumed here that there is one more critical date to be passed—August 20, first anniversary of deposition of Ben Youssef. Also, there is possibility of more nationalist moves at or about time of convening of General Assembly. If French maintain their present military posture here, however, such moves may take form of individual attacks rather than mass demonstrations.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Tangier, Casablanca, and Tunis.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed; it reported that the Consulate, Air Force, and Navy were maintaining close liaison to ensure the safety of Americans in the area. (771.00/8–754)

PORTER

771A.00/9–154: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, September 1, 1954—8 p. m.

930. Basdevant of Protectorates Ministry elaborated to us today on statement on Morocco which Mendes made to National Assembly August 27.

1. Reference to measures to improve personal situation of ex-Sultan and family meant to imply their transfer to France. Although Mendes specifically ruled out ex-Sultan's return to throne, fact that he was silent about throne possibilities for latter's sons not significant. Present thinking does not envisage such a solution.

2. Most immediate step to be taken, as foreshadowed in speech, is creation of Council he presenting most qualified representatives of different tendencies of Moroccan opinion which will be called upon to comment on reforms which French Government now has under preparation. Resident General Lacoste has been instructed to move ahead with this step as rapidly as possible but many delicate problems remain to be solved. For example, if Council is created by Sultan's Dahir, Istiqlal may refuse to participate. Lacoste's views awaited on how to deal with this problem and on probable composition of Council. Presumably Council would also include representatives of Pashas and Caids and other elements both opposing and favoring ex-Sultan.

3. French do not plan to submit dynastic problem to Council for study. On other hand, will not preclude Council comment on this problem. French hope that one of great purposes which Council will serve will be to lead to a rapprochement between Moroccans if different tendencies who will be meeting together.

Embassy comment: Judging from Basdevant's remarks, French expect dynastic problem to be raised by Council and probably hope that some reasonable compromise solution will emerge that will be acceptable to the majority of groups represented. Ruling out return of ex-Sultan does not mean that replacement of Arafa would not be acceptable to French. Most important consideration would be that such a move be widely accepted in Morocco which may explain French desire to create a widely representative Council. *End comment.*

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, Rome, Malta, Casablanca, Tunis, Algiers, and Baghdad.

4. Government plans to move ahead vigorously with institutional reforms, one of most important of which expected to relate to central administration. Council of Viziers and directors has become too powerful and should have counter-balance in form of representative assembly which would replace council of government.

5. One explanation of calmer atmosphere prevailing past several weeks in Morocco which Ministry believes has some substance is that Istiqlal leaders abroad gave orders to this end in realization that Mendes government seriously prepared to seek solution of Moroccan problem as soon as other more immediate problems such as Indochina, Tunisia and EDC disposed of.

Basdevant also confirmed that Ludovic Chancel, French Ambassador in Iraq, would be named Minister-delegate within several days. He spoke highly of him adding that he had had previous experience in Morocco as counsellor of Sherifian government for several years after end of World War II.

DILLON

771.00/8–2654

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1954.

SD/A/C.1/444

THE MOROCCAN PROBLEM

THE PROBLEM

The Arab-Asian States have submitted the question of Morocco for inclusion in the agenda of the Ninth General Assembly. In their explanatory memorandum they charge that France has not taken effective steps to develop "free political institutions" for the people of Morocco, that tension and repression have increased in that country since deposition of the former Sultan a year ago, and that this situation, involving contradiction of human rights, represents a "constant threat to peace". The French Government, having worked out since July 31, 1954, a constructive plan of reform in Tunisia, is expected to work out and announce proposals for reforms in Morocco which can be made the subject of negotiations between the parties concerned

UNITED STATES POSITION

1. Assuming that this problem will be actively pressed before the Assembly, the United States should support, and if necessary vote in favor of, inclusion of the Moroccan problem in the agenda.

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[1] This paper was prepared for the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly.

2. The United States should not play a prominent part in the debate. It should maintain that although the problem of developing self-government is considerably more complex in Morocco than in Tunisia, the method of direct negotiations between the parties which was recommended by the General Assembly in 1952, and now being applied in Tunisia, is the best available method of insuring preparation of the Moroccan people for greater self-government.

3. The United States should oppose any proposal inconsistent with the above view (e.g., proposal for direct United Nations intervention in Morocco through a United Nations Commission) or expressing undue criticism of France, but may encourage development of a resolution expressing the hope that progress will be made toward increased Moroccan self-government.

4. The Delegation should consult the Department with respect to specific texts under consideration.

COMMENT

The problem of Morocco has previously been considered by the General Assembly at its Seventh and Eighth Sessions. The problem was brought there by the Arab-Asian Governments which, at various times, also attempted unsuccessfully to raise these problems in the Security Council. In December, 1952, the General Assembly adopted a moderate resolution recommending that France and Morocco continue to negotiate on an urgent basis "towards developing the free institutions of the people of Morocco . . .".[2] The Assembly resolution also stressed the importance of avoiding acts which might aggravate the situation. At the Eighth Assembly in 1953, the matter was again fully discussed only a few weeks after the political crisis in Morocco during which the former Sultan was replaced. However, no resolution was adopted by the Assembly last year. Both in 1952 and 1953 the United States Delegation actively used its influence to moderate debate and to avoid Assembly action which might be harmful.

On August 24, 1953, in the midst of the crisis connected with the deposition of the former Sultan by France, the Secretary informed the French Ambassador that "it was essential that the French Government proceed rapidly with the institution of far-reaching reforms" in Morocco and Tunisia. In an instruction at that time to our Paris Embassy, the Secretary's idea on reforms was further described as being of "real substance with a view to granting internal autonomy". The situation in Morocco has, if anything, deteriorated during the past year. Wtihin the past few months a new Resident General, M. Lacoste, has entered upon his duties, displaying a conciliatory but firm approach to the problem. It is his hope that representative Moroccan opinion can be fully consulted on appropriate reforms through a council in which

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[2] Ellipsis in the source text.

Moroccans of different political views may be able to reconcile their respective positions and thus assist the French in moving ahead with the program.

At the extremes of Moroccan opinion the advanced nationalists on the one hand, and elements of the Berber population under the influence of the pro-French Pasha of Marrakech, El Glaoui, on the other hand, have pursued sharply different aims as to the political status of Morocco. It is these extreme elements which have been most critical of Lacoste's moderating efforts. Our representatives in Morocco believe that, in the long run, the forces of nationalism will prove to be the most important factor in the situation.

During the past year France worked out and sought to apply limited reforms in Morocco with approval of the new Sultan whom they placed in authority a year ago. However, these reforms were resented rather than welcomed by Moroccan nationalists because (1) they could be applied only after the former Sultan had been deposed; (2) their overall effect was to strengthen French control of major policy agencies and to limit the influence of the Moroccans on future political development; and (3) they included provision for the participation of French nationals in the elective, municipal and regional councils on an equal numerical basis with Moroccan representation in such bodies. The Moroccan nationalists have long bitterly opposed the idea of such representation on the ground that a sort of "co-sovereignty" would thereby be exercised. These elective councils are mainly advisory in nature, although they would presumably be the forerunners of future organs with policy-making powers. Reforms of the judiciary, while more substantial and promising than in the political field to date, have nonetheless provided for the retention of extensive French control over the native courts.

Admittedly, the Moroccan situation is considerably more complex and difficult to contend with than that of Tunisia. There has been less opportunity to develop experience in the art of self-government. A small part of Morocco is under the administration of Spain which has been following a line of cultivating closer relations with, and support from, the Arab-Moslem world. The local Spanish authorities in the Spanish zone of Morocco have refused to accept the authority of the new Sultan placed in power by the French a year ago. The international city of Tangier is technically an integral part of the Sherifian Empire. The native population of Morocco far more heavily outweighs the European population than is the case in Tunisia.

We continue to believe, and recent developments in the Tunisian picture tend to support the conviction, that the best hope of speeding self-government for Morocco lies in direct negotiations between France and Morocco in an atmosphere free from extremist agitation or irresponsible outside pressure. We can therefore accept (assuming that tension in Morocco continues and that there is no satisfactory progress) a moderate resolution which, free from undue criticism of France, reiterates the interest of world opinion in a better rate of progress toward the desired goal. However, in view of the recent statement of Mendes-France that the time has arrived to adopt a reform program for Morocco, it is in our interest to avoid adoption of any resolution on Morocco which might endanger the prospect of mutual agreement between the parties, encourage excessive and unreasonable demands by the Moroccan nationalists, or drive the French Government into more severe, repressive policies.

771.00/9-1054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter) [1]

SECRET

TANGIER, September 10, 1954.

Participants: Resident General Francis Lacoste
Director of African Affairs John E. Utter

During a tête-à-tête luncheon at the Residency in Rabat on September 7, 1954, Francis Lacoste, the Resident General, an old and close friend of mine, opened his heart regarding the present situation in Morocco. He told me that he had not been to bed the previous night and had resumed his work this morning after a bath and breakfast at 7:30. Such was his preoccupation over state of affairs that he felt not a minute should be lost. This was due firstly to his realization that some constructive action must be taken before the opening of the next U.N. General Assembly and secondly to the goading which he had received from M. Mendes-France on a recent visit to Paris. The French Prime Minister, according to Lacoste, was somewhat heady over the rapid solutions he had achieved in the Indo-Chinese and Tunisian crises and was anxious to bring about a similarly quick cure for Moroccan ills. Lacoste bemoaned the fact that the Moroccan problem was not as simple as all that.

In the first place the question of the Sultan complicated the undertaking of reforms. However, Lacoste stated that after seeking every possible device and after much mature consideration he had abandoned for the time being hope of finding a compromise formula as a necessary first step to Franco-Moroccan negotiations. . . .

As a gesture of good will towards the Moroccans and a first step towards restoring confidence in France, Lacoste told me that he would announce on the radio, probably on September 9 or 10, the reform program to which Mendes-France had given his approval. Over the past week long discussions and heated debates over the reforms had been held, according to my informant, with the Chief of Regions, Sherifian Government directors, Syndicalists, Maghzen officials, Kittani and the Glaoui. Heavy criticism had been forthcoming, particularly from certain Chiefs of Region and directors, but the Resident General assured me that his arguments had prevailed and he hoped for loyal support from his subordinates.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 123 from Tangier, Sept. 10, 1954. (771.00/9-1054)

The general tenor of Lacoste's recital was one more of desperation than of optimism. He clearly expected a continuation of troublous times and recognized the difficulties in finding representative Moroccans ready and willing to negotiate their differences with the French. He saw little chance of such conversations in the immediate future as the Nationalists would unquestionably refuse invitations to participate in talks if issued by the present Sultan. Time, Lacoste thought, might mend this.

Lacoste questioned me at length on the Tunisian situation and expressed the opinion that an early and satisfactory solution would present many difficulties. As far as Morocco goes, the Resident General assured me that he would pursue a liberal policy energetically even at the risk of being removed.

I took the opportunity of raising with Lacoste three items which, if not properly dealt with, might contribute to the worsening of Franco-American relations.

1) The case regarding the right of Americans to use U.S. automobile licenses in Morocco in the same way that the French use licenses issued in France. I explained to Lacoste that we wished to avoid having Mr. Humphreys, an American ressortissant in Casablanca, be subjected to the court expenses incurred if this case were brought before the Court of Cassation in Paris. We had on several occasions informally brought to the attention of the Residency in Rabat the U.S. Government's views regarding our right of most favored nations in such matters, and had been assured that steps would be taken to settle the question out of court. Lacoste said that he would give the matter his attention.

2) I told Lacoste that our Consulate General in Casablanca had requested me to bring to the Resident General's attention a trend regarding exchange controls which was causing concern to the American community. Recently several charges of alleged exchange control violations going back as far as 1950–51 had been leveled against American businessmen. Settlements out of court, it was reported, had been requested by local officials. I pointed out that we hoped that rather than a stiffening of exchange regulations the French would move forward toward a more liberal system culminating eventually in free convertibility. The Resident General said he would investigate this question.

3) The raising of the ceiling on our troops in Morocco which had been the subject of great concern to General Glantzberg during my con-

versation with him was the third item which I discussed at length with Lacoste. The Resident General was fully aware of this problem which had already been brought to his attention on several previous occasions by American civilian and military officials. He said that he personally had no objection to the increase in the number of operational trainees provided they were quartered on the already established bases. He would not approve of having small groups of American military personnel spread around the country for obvious political reasons. Lacoste made it clear, however, that this was a matter for decision by the French Government in Paris and ventured to say that no satisfaction would be given the American Air Force until the Status of Forces Agreement had been signed. He further remarked that he could not take the initiative in pressing our wishes, for he would be told by Paris in no uncertain terms that this subject was not his responsibility. He did promise to support our point of view, however, if consulted, provided of course his above-mentioned caveat was respected.

771.00/9–2154 : Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Porter) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL RABAT, September 21, 1954—11 a. m.

43. Resident General broadcast speech yesterday evening which made following point: immediate improvement of agricultural salaries; granting of syndical rights; economic recovery; opening of public functions to young Moroccans; apprenticeship in democracy for Moroccans in local and regional assemblies; study of reorganization of central power in free Franco-Moroccan consultations; creation of council of diverse political opinion to study reforms. Translation by pouch.

Resident General handed me text just prior to recording. He said it contained "nothing essentially or substantially new" but he hoped we would find in it enough to enable us to help the French in UNGA. His chief of cabinet stated speech "aimed at Americans".

Examination of text indicates Lacoste correct when he said contains nothing new. Morcccans may derive some encouragement from statement that Resident General "in order calm sentiment of population and permit certain persons to express their sentiments freely, proposes to end certain measures of internment". The speech disappointing not only because it for most part merely reiterates what has often been said or promised by French, but also because it fails to indicate that Resident General has had any success in his intense effort to induce cooperation of important Moroccan elements.

PORTER

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Tangier, Casablanca, and Tunis.

USUN files

Memorandum of Conversations, by Henry Villard of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] October 7, 1954.

Subject: North African Items (Separate Conversations)

Participants: Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Jabbar, Saudi Arabian Delegation
Dr. Mohamed Fadil Al Jamali, Iraq Delegation
Henry S. Villard, U.S. Delegation

Sheikh Jabbar approached me at the opening of the afternoon session of the GA on October 6th and stated that the Arab delegations were meeting immediately after the session to decide, among other matters, what priority they would urge for consideration of the Tunisian and Moroccan items in Committee I. He referred to our luncheon conversation of October 5th with Dr. Hassouna, Secretary General of the Arab League, when the latter had suggested that these questions might be deferred if there was any hope that the US through Secretary Dulles would urge Mendes-France to expedite the negotiations with the Tunisians and Moroccans in order to reach some acceptable solution before it became necessary to debate the subjects in the GA. Specifically, Sheikh Jabbar asked that some indication of the US attitude be conveyed to him before the Arab delegations' meeting so that it might be taken into account in the formulation of Arab policy.

After talking with Ambassador Lodge, and with Mr. Jernegan (NEA) on the phone, I informed Sheikh Jabbar (1) that Ambassador Lodge was taking the matter up personally with Secretary Dulles (2) that the US government was keenly interested in the progress of the negotiations and was confident that the French were devoting as much attention to North Africa as other important problems permitted, and (3) that if we felt progress in the talks was not being made we would take the first opportunity to let the French know our views. I added that I would be glad to keep in touch with Sheikh Jabbar over the next few weeks on the progress of negotiations so that further consideration could be given to the matter if necessary.

Sheikh Jabbar expressed himself as satisfied with my remarks and said that the Arabs would, in the light thereof, be inclined to put Tunisia and Morocco toward the end of the agenda in order to allow the maximum amount of time for the negotiators to reach agreement without public controversy in the UN. He said that in taking this position, the Arabs would expect US support for deferment of the items until later. I said the US delegation also favored putting the North African items toward the end of the agenda.

Later, Dr. Jamali of Iraq asked to see me and expressed a somewhat dissenting opinion. He said he went along on the suggestion to defer Tunisia but that he was pessimistic about any constructive steps being taken in the case of Morocco. Jamali felt therefore that Morocco should come up early, so that no time would be lost in compelling the French to seek a solution. Morocco and Tunisia were the only subjects in the GA which really interested the Arabs, and they were prepared to make a particularly strong case on Morocco. I replied that according to my information the French authorities were working hard on the subject of Morocco, which was much more complicated than Tunisia, and that deferment of this item was equally desirable to give the negotiations a chance. Jamali finally said he would consent to putting Morocco, as well as Tunisia, in the latter part of the agenda.

When I spoke to Mr. Jernegan on the phone, I reported to him the view of Ambassador Lodge that it would be very helpful here in the UN if Secretary Dulles could, when he next met Mendes-France, and subject to any other considerations which the Secretary might have in mind at the time, inquire about the progress in the North African discussions in the hope that this subject would not have to be too much publicized here.

USUN files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Henry Villard of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

[New York,] October 14, 1954.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Arab League Views on Morocco

Participants: Dr. Hassouna, Secretary General of the Arab League
Ambassador Lodge, U.S. Delegation
Henry S. Villard, U.S. Delegation

After commenting favorably on the attitude of the present US administration toward the Arabs, Dr. Hassouna observed that another favorable factor in the relations of the Arab countries with the West was the conclusion of the Suez Canal agreement.[1] He thought that once this was out of the way, it would be the starting point for a new chapter in Arab history. He intimated that it might also then be possible for the Arabs to do something about improving their relations with Israel. Ambassador Lodge said that from what he knew of the Arabs, they could be counted upon as opposed to Communism and as basically friendly to the West.

Dr. Hassouna was particularly interested in the question of Morocco. He said that while progress had been made in the negotiations between the Mendes-France Government and Tunisia, nothing definite had yet taken place in regard to Morocco. He called attention to an article by Associate Justice William Douglas in the current issue of *Look* and said that he could not add one word to that account as an accurate portrayal of the Arab point of view. During the course of a visit to both French and Spanish Morocco, he had observed the depth of the feeling for self-government. In conversation with General Franco and Spanish authorities he had received assurances that progress toward self-government would be strongly encouraged in the Spanish Zone of Morocco. However, this seemed to be dependent on a settlement of the problem in French Morocco, which thus took on added importance.

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[1] For documentation on the Suez Canal Agreement, see volume IX.

Dr. Hassouna requested that Ambassador Lodge take a direct interest in the Moroccan question with a view to persuading the French to reach a solution as soon as possible. In order to give every opportunity for a settlement, the Arab delegations at the GA were disposed to do nothing to disturb the situation for the moment and to keep the Moroccan item for the latter part of the agenda. He hoped that the United States could take a hand in persuading Mendes-France to act promptly in the case of Morocco, just as in the case of Tunisia.

Ambassador Lodge said that he agreed with the need for impressing on the French the desirability of expediting a Moroccan solution and he would recommend to Secretary Dulles that steps be taken toward that end. The more immediate problems of the Mendes-France government, such as Indo-China had been taken care of, and it might be possible for us to bring this subject to the attention of the French in a friendly manner, in the hope of influencing them to take appropriate action. Dr. Hassouna said he would like to leave the entire responsibility for this matter in the hands of Ambassador Lodge, which however Ambassador Lodge said he could scarcely undertake to accept.

Dr. Hassouna explained that the Arab League lacked adequate representation in the United States and that he had been fortunate in obtaining the services of former Ambassador Rahim to establish an Arab League office either in Washington or New York. Various technical questions remained to be settled in regard to the status of such an office vis-à-vis the United Nations and the United States Government, which he had discussed with the Secretary General and with officials of the State Department respectively. He asked that Ambassador Lodge endeavor to obtain a favorable reaction in regard to this matter. Ambassador Lodge said he would see what he could do.

Mr. Villard inquired why in the opinion of Dr. Hassouna, Dr. Jamali of Iraq had been so anxious to place the Moroccan item high on the agenda of Committee One. Dr. Hassouna replied that this was due to the fact that the Moroccan nationalist Balafrej had come to New York with news that the French attitude was most discouraging and that no negotiations were in prospect. It was in an attempt to call attention to the urgency of the matter in the face of this situation that Dr. Jamali had tried to gain immediate notice for Morocco.

Dr. Hassouna concluded by again referring to the change in United States policy toward the Arabs shown by the present administration. He expressed gratification at this development and said that it would contribute materially to an improvement in relations with the Arab world. Ambassador Lodge said he felt we were on the right track and that as time went on he hoped the results would be even more fruitful.

651.71/10–1554

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 15, 1954.

Subject: Progress of French Reform in Morocco.

Discussion:

Following a dramatic initiative of Mendes-France in July, the French and Tunisians have been negotiating, with prospects of success, agreements giving the Tunisians a large measure of control over their internal affairs. Although Mendes-France is believed to be equally desirous of developing for Morocco a reform program comparable to that in progress in Tunisia, no solution has been developed for the dynastic problem, which problem has so far prevented bilateral negotiation and real progress. On September 20, Lacoste, the Resident General, admittedly with the UNGA in mind and specifically the US position there on the Moroccan issue, announced an outline of a reform program which, also admittedly, contained nothing new.

The Arab States are currently satisfied about developments in Tunisia but they may nevertheless press for a full scale debate due to the French failure to activate similar developments in Morocco. Delegates inquiring as to the US position have been informed that we are awaiting developments. Ambassador Lodge believes it would be helpful if you would urge Mendes-France to take more effective action in Morocco.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Thomas Simons (NEA) and William Fisher (EUR). A handwritten note on the memorandum stated that the Secretary had seen it.

Attached to the source text was a memorandum by Merchant to Byroade, dated Oct. 26. It stated that in spite of the recommendations in the source text, as well as four separate reminders to the Secretary while he was in Paris, the question of Morocco was not raised with Mendès-France. (651.71/10–2654) (The Secretary had been in Paris for Nine-Power, Four-Power, and North Atlantic Council meetings Oct. 20–23. For documentation on those meetings, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1404 ff.)

We have no "answers" to the Moroccan problems and are unable to give more than restrained acknowledgment of the complexity of the situation. Although it is our position that the UNGA can discuss the Moroccan issue, we believe that such a debate would be counter-productive and should be avoided. However, it appears that it can be avoided only if France makes urgent progress in Morocco.

Recommendation:

That you utilize an appropriate occasion for discussing the North African situation with Mendes-France along the following lines:

1. We commend efforts in Tunisia and hope for their success.
2. We recognize the difficulties in Morocco but have confidence that French can devise means to make real progress.
3. We hope some further and perhaps dramatic steps can be taken in Morocco urgently, otherwise the US, because of its relations with the Middle East, could not work to avoid debate in the 9th General Assembly nor a resolution again urging progress through bilateral negotiations.
4. We reaffirm our support of the French presence in North Africa but again caution that further dissension there will seriously jeopardize the basic interests of the free world community.

771.00/10–2554: Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Porter) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET RABAT, October 25, 1954—3 p. m.

57. It seems clear from Embassy telegrams 1707 October 22 [2] and 1714 October 23 [3] to Department that French officials in Paris, though aware of seriousness, are less impressed with urgency of Moroccan situation than their counterparts here. Even allowing for detachment which comes with distance, however, it is difficult discern basis for belief that Lacoste has made encouraging progress and has calmed "enflamed emotions". It was not very long ago that same officials were equally reassuring about fact that terrorism was confined to Casablanca and that countryside remained calm. Today terrorism continues in major cities and we are witnessing widespread series of attacks

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Tangier, Casablanca, and Tunis.

[2] Not printed; it reported on conversations between the Embassy in Paris and members of the Protectorates Ministry concerning a visit to Morocco by Lacoste. (771.00/10–2254)

[3] Not printed; it stated the conclusions of the Embassy in Paris, that the French Government was probably prepared to replace Moulay Arafa, but would not do so until it found a successor who would be acceptable to both the present Sultan and the ex-Sultan. The Embassy informed the Department of State that it did not favor an approach to the French at that time to urge further action on Morocco, as it considered the French to be seriously working on the problem. (771.00/10–2354)

throughout Central Morocco, significance of which lies in fact they are occurring in Berber territory.

French statistics also indicate attacks increased 25 percent during first three months of Lacoste tenure as compared with similar period prior his arrival. At this time, French Zone is enduring average of twenty armed attacks (bombings and shootings) per week and this average is increasing. Figure does not include other incidents such as train derailments and arson.

Embassy conclusion that French intend wait until Ben Youssef and Arafa agree on latter's successor is new and depressing note. It is probably true, as Ministry believes, that French can in meantime maintain present degree of order but cost of doing so should not be overlooked: 300 people are estimated to have died during August, mostly as result French anti-riot action at Port Lyautey.

Lacoste has prolonged his stay in Paris and we sincerely hope he will return this time with something more substantial than instructions to cope with secondary issues. To break present impasse, French must begin with dynastic question and approach general problem along lines mentioned Department telegrams 1449 to Paris October 19[4] and 74 to Tangier October 22 (repeated information Paris 1487).[5] Speed is important as in my view population of this country is slowly but surely being infected and controlled by extremist elements which owe much of their success to French failure to come to grips with and rectify past errors. Resulting dissension here, as Department pointed out, will jeopardize not only French interests but ours and those of free world generally.

PORTER

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[4] Not printed.

[5] Not printed; it stated that the Department of State recognized some inadequacies in the French program for Morocco and favored a high level approach to the French. If practicable, the Secretary planned to tell Mendès-France the United States hoped some further steps could be taken in Morocco soon, or the United States could not work to avoid a debate in the Ninth General Assembly. (771.00/10-2154)

771.00/10-3054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 30, 1954—5 p. m.

1838. Reference: Deptel 1567.[2] During interview with Mendes this morning, I told him that the Secretary had wanted to speak with him concerning Morocco as US was concerned regarding course of events there and was most interested in hearing his views and program.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, and Casablanca.

[2] Not printed.

Mendes said that he had not had adequate time personally to study Morocco problem but as he saw it there were two separate problems in Morocco at present. First, the need for dramatic and fundamental reforms in the economic and social fields primarily, but also in political field to somewhat lesser extent, and secondly, dynastic problem. He said that present situation would be helped if dramatic reforms of social and economic nature could take minds of population temporarily off dynastic problem. However, he felt population was still in state of such nervous crisis that this could not be hoped for and that economic and social reforms which French intended to carry out would not be adequate to restore situation.

As to dynastic problem, Mendes said that he felt time was not yet ripe for solution and that solution would only come after some time had elapsed and people had tired of state of crisis and become more compromise-minded. He said that various solutions had been proposed. The first of these involved resignation of present Sultan and creation of regency to rule for interim period. Mendes said that he personally was opposed to this solution as he felt that while it might calm things down for few weeks it would solve nothing and fight would continue between opponents and adherents of former Sultan now in exile. Second suggested solution had been creation of Khalif or religious leader to separate religious from temporal authorities. Mendes did not believe that this would be useful as struggle would continue as to who should exercise temporal political authority. Third solution, and to Mendes' mind best, would be resignation of present Sultan and election of new Sultan who would be acceptable to all factions including former Sultan who is now in exile. Difficulty in this solution according to Mendes was that latest information indicated that exiled Sultan was not as yet prepared to agree to appointment of any new Sultan whom he would freely and fully recognize.

Mendes said he recognized that situation was at an impasse but he felt that there was nothing that could be done about it for moment except to institute economic and social reforms which he did not expect to be enough to calm down feelings which have been stirred up over dynastic issue.

DILLON

771.00/12–1054 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, December 10, 1954—9 p. m.

Delga 371. Verbatim text. Re Morocco.

1. Arab Dels have informed USDel staff member that Arab-Asian

resolution (Delga 365)[1] might be modified along more moderate and conciliatory lines.

2. French have urged Latin Americans not to engage any effort bring about more moderate resolution since they believe present text will not carry. Reps of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Honduras have informed USDel that Latin Dels have not yet concerted views on this matter, but they believe most Latin Dels would not be able oppose moderate resolution. Mexico, for example, though anxious stay in background, will vote for present Arab-Asian text.

3. French have urged USDel use its influence with Latins to prevent any attempts to draft a more moderate text.

4. We believe resolution if modified along lines of text quoted below would gain substantial support since it would amount to restatement of principles of 1952 resolution. Such a text would be difficult for US to oppose especially in view generally more moderate attitude Arabs at this session and friendly support we have received from several of them (notably Iraq) on key issues. USDel would not in any event engage in campaign to obtain passage of any resolution.

5. Ambassador Lodge plans call Secretary tomorrow morning to discuss following text and Gadel 151 [2] just received.

6. "*The General Assembly*

Having considered the question of Morocco,

Reaffirming its resolution 612 (VII) of 19 December 1952,

Believing that the settlement of this question in a tranquil atmosphere would promote friendly relations which should exist between nations,[3]

Recommends negotiations between representatives of the Moroccan people[4] and the Government of France for the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people in conformity with the purposes and principles of the charter."

LODGE

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[1] Not printed; it transmitted a copy of the draft resolution introduced in the committee on Dec. 9 by the Syrian Delegate on behalf of Afghanistan, Burma, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Pakistan, and Yemen. Differences between the Arab-Asian draft and the one proposed by USUN are noted in footnotes 3 and 4 below. (771.00/12-954)

[2] Not printed; it said the Department of State was impressed with the relatively moderate tone of the Arab-Asian resolution, especially in comparison with the previous year's resolution. In its present form, however, the resolution was unacceptable to the United States, and it suggested discreet negotiations with the Arabs to try to get them to change parts of it. The delegation was told to keep the French fully informed and to make clear to the Arabs U.S. opposition to an international conference on Morocco. (771.00/12-954)

[3] The corresponding paragraphs in the Arab-Asian resolution read as follows:

"*Believing* that further delay in the settlement of this question may impair the friendly relations which should exist between nations,

"*Recommends* that an atmosphere conducive to peaceful settlement of the question be created in Morocco,".

[4] The Arab-Asian resolution used the phrase "the true representatives of the Moroccan people."

771.00/12–1054 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 11, 1954—2:12 p.m.

316. For Lodge from Secretary. Reference Delga 371[1] and your telephone conversation.[2] Situation in Paris so delicate and balance in favor of sustaining Mendes-France on London–Paris accords so precarious that we feel we must avoid any action which could be misinterpreted in France as desertion of France and support of Arabs. Have just received appeal from Mendes in this sense. Therefore believe we must avoid any activity which would make us appear to be co-sponsors of a moderate resolution which the Arabs would introduce. Even if the Arabs introduce a resolution as moderate as suggested in reference telegram, we should still vote against with a statement that while we do not dissent from any of the sentiments expressed in the resolution, we do feel that a UN resolution at this time is inadvisable, given the fact that we believe that present Government of France is sincerely striving to settle this problem in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and that as a practical matter present efforts are more apt to succeed without UN interposition than if there is such interposition.[3]

DULLES

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] No memorandum of this telephone conversation has been found in the Department of State files. Presumably, this reference is to the call mentioned in paragraph 5 of telegram Delga 371, *supra.*

[3] Ambassador Lodge set forth the U.S. position along the above lines before the Political Committee on Dec. 13. Ultimately, the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 55 (United States) to 0, with 4 abstentions, on Dec. 17, a compromise resolution providing for postponement of the Moroccan question until the next session, while expressing confidence in France's intention to provide full internal autonomy in Morocco.

771.00/12–3054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 30, 1954—6 p. m.

2756. We discussed Moroccan situation with Protectorates Ministry (Basdevant) yesterday. Commenting on newspaper reports from Morocco that certain reforms would be undertaken in very near future, such as abolition of Council of Vizirs and Directors, Basdevant stated that no measures likely until Government is able to consider Moroccan problem as a whole and to reach decision on program to be carried out. Thereafter, measures may be taken piecemeal (such as abolition above Council) but only as part of agreed over-all program. Unlikely that decision will be reached on program until Tunisian agreement concluded at which time Mendes expects give more attention to Moroccan problem.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, Casablanca, Algiers, Tunis, Cairo, Malta, and Rome.

Basdevant commented that Lacoste still carrying on consultations with Moroccans of various shifts [*shades?*] of opinion and that further group of seven nationalists released few days ago. He mentioned that Lacoste recently gathered together number of nationalists and "traditionalists" (Caids and Pashas), many of whom previously known to each other by name only. We gather principal and not unexpected conclusion drawn from meeting was that gap between views these opposing groups very considerable. We further gather that while in principle French are still working for creation of Moroccan study group to consider reform program other formulas are being developed. Upon dynastic problem, there is little indication here that any progress being made toward solution.

We continue to feel that Mendes does not underestimate seriousness of Moroccan problem and that it will soon be next item on his priority list. From North African viewpoint, however, we believe that his most important immediate task, after Paris Accords, is to guide French-Tunisian negotiations to early and successful conclusion. It may even be necessary for him to await ratification Tunisian agreements before taking conspicuous action on Moroccan problem in order to avoid adding to already large body of parliamentarians who can be expected vote against these agreements. However, we believe that once agreements are concluded, he will press for their early ratification.[3]

DILLON

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[3] Tangier's telegram 184, Dec. 31, said it was evident from the information given in telegram 2753 that the Mendès-France government would not undertake a major Moroccan operation in the near future, but stated that the passage of time would allow the problem to become worse and correspondingly more difficult to solve. (771.00/12-3154)

771.00/12-3154 : Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Porter) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL RABAT, December 31, 1954—4 p. m.

82. Lacoste will proceed Paris early in January though prospect does not arouse much local interest or excitement in view his empty-handed return from previous visits there. He is in position, however, to report sharp increase of terrorism hereafter UN session, with last week of 1954 witnessing approximately 50 armed attacks (bombings and shootings) identified by French sources as politically motivated.

Our records indicate steady progression in number armed assaults during 1954 commencing with 82 in first quarter, 195 in second quarter, 249 in third, and approximately 300 in final quarter of year. These accompanied by unprecedented arsonist attacks against farms in dry season. Figures conservative and have been checked from time to time with French agencies. They do not include incidents occurring during major rioting at Fez, Port Lyautey and elsewhere during year. Casablanca has been main trouble spot, but fact that serious French difficulty not confined to that city evident in curfew imposed in Tiflet farming area since August as well as indications that incidents at police manned road blocks on rural highways now more numerous and widespread than ever.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tangier, Paris, Casablanca, Algiers, and Tunis.

Lacoste recently confronted nationalist leaders with certain Caids at residency. (See Paris 2756 to Department)[2] Caids stated they and countryside would never accept some nationalist ideas particularly demand for return of former sultan. These declarations, according official informants, did not evoke Nationalist reaction or marked interest.

PORTER

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[2] *Supra.*

TUNISIA

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FRANCE AND TUNISIA OVER THE POLITICAL STATUS OF TUNISIA; UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS DEBATES AND ACTIONS REGARDING TUNISIA[1]

330/1–852 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State[2]

CONFIDENTIAL — TUNIS, January 8, 1952—3 p. m.

57. Farhat Hached, SYG UGTT told me today mass of people (meaning Neo-Destour and UGTT) is determined Tunisian case must be brought before UN. Wants Tunisian Govt make official direct presentation to Security Council on grounds French repressive policy Tunisia is creating threat to peace.

Hached said PriMin Chenik still undecided but popular pressure building up and likely result in mass demonstrations if he refuses act.

Re general situation in regard future Franco-Tunisian relations Hached took dim view possibility *entente* in light of French note Dec 15.[3] Says Tunisians will not accept mixed Commission study form of new representative Assembly nor prolongation Grand Council. If new Resident General attempts carry out policy French Govt he will meet passive and even an active resistance. If he does not follow that policy he will be removed under pressure French colony.

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[1] For previous documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1396 ff.

[2] This telegram was repeated to Paris.

[3] On Oct. 31, 1951, Tunisian Prime Minister Chenik presented a note to the French Government in Paris. The note included three requests: 1) creation of an elected, representative Tunisian legislative assembly; 2) formation of an all-Tunisian cabinet; and 3) gradual replacement of all French civil servants in Tunisia with Tunisians. Paris telegram 3584, Dec. 15, 1951, reported the French Council of Ministers had approved a French Government note to be presented to Chenik that evening and gave a short summary of the points the Foreign Ministry said were in the note. (396.1/12–1551) Paris telegram 3618, Dec. 17 (*Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, p. 1424), transmitted a summary of the French note of Dec. 15. (651.72/12–1751) Paris despatch 1711, Dec. 29, transmitted a translation of the text of the Dec. 15 note. (751.13/12–2951) The French note said, among other things, that France was proud of the progress attained in Tunisia during the past 70 years and did not intend to depart in the future from a course which benefited the whole population of Tunisia. It informed Chenik that in January the French Government planned to constitute a mixed Franco-Tunisian commission to study plans for a representative system and expected the evolution toward representative government to continue under peaceful conditions.

The text of the Chenik note of Oct. 31 is in *L'Année politique, 1951*, pp. 587–589; the French note of Dec. 15 is *ibid.*, pp. 591–592.

According Hached, unless UN or other agency brings about change French policy serious incidents to be anticipated, including eventual guerrilla warfare.

JERNEGAN

651.72/1-1452

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, January 14, 1952.

No. 240

Ref: Tunis Confidential Telegram No. 60, January 11, 1952.[1]

Subject: Expression of Views on French Policy Toward Tunisia.

During the course of a conversation on January 11 (partially reported in my telegram under reference), Acting Resident General Robert de Boisseson asked for my personal views on the Tunisian political situation. Emphasizing that I was speaking personally, I stated them as follows:

1. I was convinced that the only American interest in the premises lay in having Tunisia remain in friendly hands and, since no other power could be thought of to assume that responsibility, it was in our interest that France should continue its protectorate.

2. Assuming this, it seemed to me that the next question was how best this continued French control could be assured, what were the best tactics to be employed. One had to take into serious consideration the nationalist movement. Since my arrival in Tunisia I had done my best to determine how strong that movement was, and I had concluded that it really represented popular sentiment. It could not be ignored. Neither could it be put down by force; forceful control of dependent territories was too repugnant to world opinion, especially to the states of the Near East and South Asia. The alternative was the one which had been chosen by the French Government itself: amicable negotiation and concessions to nationalist aspirations.

3. I thought the basic elements necessary for an understanding between the French and the Tunisians were present. In contrast to other nationalist movements, the Tunisians (that is, the dominant Neo-Destour party) did not demand complete independence. They had expressly said that French control of foreign affairs and national defense was not in question. Both publicly and in private conversations they had repeatedly stated that they did not want France or the French residents of Tunisia to pull out of the country completely. In talking with me, nationalist representatives had recognized that they needed French help and that it would be a disaster for them to be left entirely to their own devices.

Furthermore, I had noticed again and again that whenever the Neo-Destour had hopes of gaining some concession from France, even a relatively minor item, its press and leaders adopted a mild and conciliatory tone. From this, among other things, I deduced that they would accept considerably less than they had asked in the way of political reforms.

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[1] Not printed; it transmitted a summary of the conversation under reference in the source text. (330/1-1152)

4. However, I felt that France had been too hesitant in granting concessions. It was moving too slowly and might let the opportunity for an amicable settlement slip by. I had been disappointed in the French note of December 15. No answer at all would have been better than this reply to the Tunisian proposals of October 31.[3]

5. It seemed to me that it should be possible to find a formula which would give the Tunisians much of what they asked, even including an all-Tunisian cabinet and an all-Tunisian legislature, while at the same time safeguarding essential French controls and French interests. As a beginning, perhaps Tunisian under-secretaries could be appointed as deputies to the French directors of departments (Public Works, Education, etc.), with the understanding that in ten or fifteen years' time the positions would be reversed. In the crucial Direction [*Department*] of Finance it might be necessary to make an exception and retain a Frenchman indefinitely at the head, explaining to the Tunisians that so long as France was responsible for economic stability and for making up the deficit of the Tunisian budget and balance of payments it must retain control of that department. Similarly, a compromise might be reached on the legislature. I had seen the suggestion made in a newspaper that a bi-cameral assembly be established, one house to be exclusively Tunisian and the other, which would consider matters affecting French interests, to have both French and Tunisian representatives.

Reforms of this kind would not fully meet the demands of the Neo-Destour, but they might well go far enough to produce a lasting *détente*.

6. Undoubtedly an administration run by Tunisians would be less efficient than the present regime, but it might be the lesser evil to accept a certain amount of inefficiency in order to protect more important interests.

Mr. De Boisseson did not seem shocked by my remarks. On the contrary, he said that his thinking was along much the same lines, although he would probably not go so far as some of my suggestions. He agreed that the note of December 15 had been unfortunate. He also agreed that it was necessary to reckon with the nationalist movement. One great difficulty, however, was the attitude of the French colony in Tunisia. The "colons" had become accustomed to thinking of the present regime as unchangeable and they were greatly upset at the mere idea of change. Perhaps after they had had two or three months to get accustomed to the thought they would become easier to handle. As for turning over the French-headed departments to Tunisian ministers, that involved a very major change and would take much courage. At present those departments were run, by technicians, as technical administrations. If Tunisian ministers were in charge, they would fall under a political regime, like cabinet ministries in other countries.

In reply to my inquiry regarding the possibility of a Tunisian appeal to the United Nations, Mr. De Boisseson said he was not clear how such an appeal could be made, since France is charged by treaty with the conduct of Tunisian foreign relations. If the Tunisian cabinet asked the French Government to present the case. France would of course refuse. What then? A simple petition to the Secretary General of the U.N. would get nowhere; such petitions were received by the thousand. With regard to the suggestion that the Security Council could take cognizance of the dispute, Mr. De Boisseson could see no threat to the peace. There was no fighting in Tunisia. He was emphatic in saying that France would resent and vigorously oppose any Tunisian attempt to go before a United Nations forum.

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[3] See footnote 3, *supra*.

I said I too was doubtful of the validity of an appeal to the Security Council and also doubtful that the Tunisian cabinet could act directly vis-à-vis the United Nations. I suggested, nevertheless, that the case might be raised in the General Assembly in the same fashion as the Moroccan question. Some friendly U.N. member could act on behalf of the Tunisians. I would regret any such development, because it seemed to me that the western powers had enough problems already on their hands, especially in their relations with the Near East and South Asia, without having to cope with a debate on Tunisia. At the same time, looking at the picture objectively, it appeared quite logical to me that the Neo-Destour should want to go to the United Nations. It would be a positive action which the leaders could point out to their followers to show that they were pursuing the struggle, and they might also hope that it would result in pressure on France which would bring about a softening of French policy.

I believe this conversation is noteworthy because it is the first time a French official of any importance has seriously asked for my views on the local situation. It is even more noteworthy because Mr. De Boisseson received so calmly my frank expression of rather revolutionary thoughts. I should add that it is the first time I have expressed my ideas so specifically to any Frenchman or Arab.

Our whole talk, which lasted an hour, was most friendly and was on a strictly personal basis on both sides. I request that the Department take care that Mr. De Boisseson's expressed views do not leak back to any French officials as coming from him or through me.

JOHN D. JERNEGAN

820/1-1652 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, January 16, 1952—1 a. m.

66. If Dept thinks necessary I shall be glad inform Residency US Govt would much prefer avoid UN debate on Tunisia (Paris tel Delga

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris.

1012, January 14).[2] I have already expressed personal opinion that effect to Min De Boisseson.

I should be reluctant, however, approach Tunisian natlists this regard. For reasons stated my tel 45, December 3,[3] I think it preferable we avoid direct official *démarches* with Tunisians. In present case, too, I would find it difficult present plausible reasons why Tunisians should refrain from appeal to UN through whatever channels they can find or why US should oppose such appeal. Fact we do not wish alienate Fr or add to number controversies before UN would not interest Tunisians. Technical objections re legal standing Tunisian mins in relation UN, Fr control of Tunisian fon affairs, lack of threat to peace, etc. had better be raised by others if we want avoid antagonizing Tunisians.

Furthermore, I am not entirely sure we should oppose consideration of case if presented to proper forum and through proper channels. Fr Govt policy re Tunisia as stated note of December 15 [4] is so maladroit and threatens cause so much trouble here and in our relations with Near East that it is possible a public debate creating pressure on France to change policy would be lesser of two evils.[5]

I am also doubtful that we should support France in any debate on substance of question. Present Fr policy is, to my mind, virtually indefensible. Only a promise by new Fr cabinet and new res gen Tunisia to institute more progressive policy would give US grounds to argue on Fr side.

Time may well have come when we should play a little ball with

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[2] Not printed; it reported information from a French Delegate that, despite opposition by the Bey to presentation of the Tunisian case to the United Nations, Bourguiba was pressing presentation and allegedly stating that the principal members of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly favored such action. (320/1-1452)

[3] Tunis telegram 45 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, p. 1423. It recommended the United States not give direct official advice to the Tunisian Ministers, as that would put it squarely in the middle of the dispute. The Tunisians would then consider the United States an interested party and would expect it to intervene in the debate on every future occasion. (772.00/12-351)

[4] For information on the French note of Dec. 15, see footnote 3, p. 665. Paris telegram 4132, Jan. 11, informed the Department of State of the main points of a Tunisian Government note delivered to the French Foreign Minister on Jan. 9, which constituted Prime Minister Chenik's reply to the French note of Dec. 15. Paris despatch 1821, Jan. 11, transmitted a copy of the French text and an informal English translation of the Tunisian note. The Tunisian note claimed that the participation of the French of Tunisia in Tunisian political institutions could only appear to sanction the idea of co-sovereignty and would signify that the assistance of one State to another conferred the right to participate in the recipient country's government. It stated also that the Dec. 15 note posed principles which invoked explicit reservations on the part of the Tunisian Government and caused consternation and doubt among Tunisians. Documentation is in Department of State file 651.72.

[5] Telegram 37 to Tunis, Jan. 21, advised the Consul General that recent events in Tunisia would probably stiffen the Arab-Asian wish to have the Tunisian question aired in some forum of the United Nations. The Department believed the U.S. Delegation should be cautious about taking any action in those circumstances. It also agreed that technical arguments against Tunisia's right to raise the question in the Security Council should be raised by others, not by the United States. (320/1-1652)

Moslem world rather than share resentment and difficulties created by Fr stubbornness and incapacity.[6]

JERNEGAN

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[6] Paris telegram Delga 994, Jan. 12, reported a conversation with a Neo-Destour representative in Paris, who had just returned from a short visit to Tunisia. He informed a member of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly that the Tunisian Nationalists had concluded the position of the French Government stated in the French note of Dec. 15 would mean a backward step in the progress of Tunisian development toward self-government. The Tunisian Ministers had decided unanimously to submit their case to the Security Council, but had not decided when they would take that action. In addition, the Tunisians interpreted the arrival of the new Resident General on a French cruiser as a provocative gesture. (320/1-1252)

320/1-1652 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Roosevelt) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, January 16, 1952—9 p. m.

Delga 1059. G: Tunisia—possible SC item. Gadel 708,[1] further Delga 1033,[2] initial examination Tunisian complaint and covering statement of PriMin purporting qualify Youssef and Badra be heard, these documents suggest Tunisians playing this either for hearing in SC "or any other body", presumably GA. We understand Tunisians put first emphasis on SC consideration of case because they feel GA presentation Moroccan item[3] did not lead to satisfactory results and they have not been advised on or thought through implications request to SC.

Zafrullah stated they had approached him re supporting SC consideration. He determinedly noncommittal. He must ask his govt for instrs, and added he thought it unwise put before SC during French presidency. FYI Greece president in Feb.

1. Staff sees clear inter-relationship between this move and Moroccan case which can again be brought up in GA at any time. If Tunisian

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[1] Jan. 15; not printed. It reported the Department of State had concluded the Tunisians' chances of obtaining any resolution were dimmer in the Security Council than in the General Assembly, and as a propaganda forum, the Security Council was not much superior to the larger body. (320/1-1552)

[2] Jan. 15; not printed. It transmitted the text of two documents, signed by Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Chenik and dated Jan. 12, left by the Tunisians with Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General. The first document was a letter to the President of the Security Council, asking him to put before the Security Council the request of the Tunisian Government concerning its dispute with the French Government. The second document was a letter of authorization for Salah Ben Youssef, the Tunisian Minister of Justice, and Mohammed Badra, the Tunisian Minister of Social Affairs, to present the letter in the name of the Tunisian Government, and to speak for it if the case came before the Security Council or any other body of the United Nations. (320/1-1552)

[3] For documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. II, p. 135 ff.

complaint were to be put before GA, which we believe unlikely, it wld be most difficult for US, even if supporting French view it shld not be heard, keep it off agenda. Consistently with considerations recited Gadel 596,[4] we feel it wld be wise to urge French not to oppose in head-on way any hearing in UN organs.

2. Basic complaint seems to us very weak, particularly from SC point of view, in that it recites that a dispute exists resulting from treaty of 1881.[5] This 70 year old dispute is brought to [surface?] because of French action as indicated by note of 15 Dec. Thus there is no allegation of immediate danger to peace and security. Case cld be more effectively controlled in SC than GA which undoubtedly is reason for Zafrullah's comment and French wld feel more secure, because of existence their veto. Also, so long as case is before SC, there is question whether GA can go beyond discussion in light art 12, and it can receive more leisurely treatment and all preliminary issues can be carefully examined. US can remain passive in public position until complaint is circulated formally as SC document or informally as of interest to SC members. We see advantages in French pres calling mtg on it rather than have Tunisians shopping with Pak and USSR.

3. (*a*) Re adoption agenda, there are many precedents for preliminary examination of complaint without any finding on issue of SC competence. Most recently issue arose in Anglo-Iranian oil case, where Lacoste (France) stated 1 Oct 1951 in voting for placing item on agenda that where views differ on competence there is need for debate that subject. Parodi (France) in Hyderabad case 16 Sept 1948 stated it was preferable place item on agenda, it being understood all subsequent decisions, including competence, were reserved. He took same position Indonesian case 22 Aug 1947 and Berlin case 5 Oct 1 and Berlin case 5 Oct 1948.

(*b*) Question of right of PriMin or other Cab member to act on behalf Tunisia in absence authorization by Bey can be handled as credentials question under SC rule 14 and Min heard under SC rule 39 simply as person with info on complaint without proceeding under arts 31 and 32.

(*c*) Question of whether Tunisia is state within meaning art 35 wld probably arise at this stage but from political point of view we would question desirability SC determination based on finding on that fact.

(*d*) Original complaint suggests either this might be treated as juridical dispute involving interpretation of a treaty or it is clearly in negotiating state and shld be kept so by parties with at most item remaining on list items of which SC seized. Some such formula as this arrived at in unhurried way might avoid case being inflamed as Arab-French critical issue.

4. Above preliminary analysis suggests desirability our urging Fr

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[4] Jan. 4; not printed. It reported hope that the French might be persuaded to stop campaigning against consideration of the Moroccan question if it should be reintroduced into the General Assembly. Since the Department of State considered it probable that the item would receive the necessary votes to place it on the agenda, it saw little to be gained by the United States trying to exert influence on other delegates to try to keep it off, especially since there was strong Arab-Asian feeling on the matter. (320/1-452)

[5] This reference is to the Treaty of Bardo, signed in 1881 by the French and the Bey of Tunis, which had governed relations between France and Tunisia since that date.

not let their position crystallize by strong statements on merits but that SC consideration along above lines wld be effective way keep case under control and not present Arab Nationalists with second rebuff. This wld also have advantage to us of keeping on our traditional line of hearing complaints with open mind as in initial phases Indonesian and Hyderabad cases.

ROOSEVELT

772.00/1–2152 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, January 21, 1952—5 p. m.

83. Min Public Health Mohamed Ben Salem, son-in-law of Bey, told me today that Bey and entire Cabinet united in determination resist French pressure. Says French have even threatened depose Bey but he and other leaders undismayed. May be forced out by Bey [garble] not otherwise. Insists Cab and sovereign all of one mind in present sit and have people behind them. Says Bey has definitely refused request recall Mins from Paris and dismiss Cab.

I attach special significance to these statements because Ben Salem generally regarded as moderate, is not member Neo-Destour, and is undoubtedly closer to Bey than other Mins.

Ben Salem stressed moderate nature Tunisian requests for greater autonomy, saying they wld accept very gradual transfer of auth even in internal field. Wld not demand, for example, immed replacement of all French Dept directors by Tunisians Mins. However, French note of Dec 15 had slammed door in their faces and friendly negots cld only be resumed if French wld make equally formal statement affirming indivisibility Tunisian sovereignty and willingness discuss problems on reasonable basis.[2]

Likewise stressed Tunisian appeal to UN was in mildest possible form. If Tunisians were wrong in their arguments, let UN say so since Tunisians had accepted full obligations of UN member for peaceful settlement of dispute. If necessary, Bey will affix seal to complaint.

Complained bitterly against French police brutality in handling demonstrators (of which we have seen something ourselves in past few days), asserting it deliberate and designed produce bloodshed so as to intimidate people. Claimed reports from Public Health doctors showed 90 percent of casualties in recent clashes were hit in back, proving they were fleeing and not resisting. Said that in place such as Kairouan where Controleur Civil is reasonable and understanding, demonstrations have passed off without trouble, while most serious affairs have all taken place within jurisdiction of tough Bizerte controleur, Rene Stablo, who he claims is known for his harshness (it is true that in center and south, there have so far been no violent incidents).

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris.

[2] Telegram 91 from Tunis, Jan. 24, reported the Resident General had seen the Bey that morning for the first time since Jan. 15, perhaps signifying the resumption of negotiations. The final paragraph of telegram 91 informed the Department of State that, since both the *New York Times* and Associated Press had American correspondents on the spot, the Consul General would no longer report public developments unless Americans were involved. (772.00/1–2452)

Min terminated conversation by saying friendly intervention of reasonable third party wld be most helpful. Failing this or UN action, he saw no possibility of lasting solution. Settlement imposed by French force wld solve nothing. I, of course, noncommittal.

JERNEGAN

772.00/1–2552 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, January 25, 1952—5 p. m.

4449. Embtel 4388, Jan 23, rptd Tunis 83, London unn.[2] FonOff official in charge Tunisian affairs gave us today fol appraisal Tunisian sitn:

1. Fr Res Gen Hauteclocque had "exhausting" two-hour talk with Bey yesterday, which from Fr viewpoint was made difficult by presence throughout conversation Tun PriMin Chenik, four other Tun mins and Bey's son. At outset conversation Bey, "like boy repeating lesson from memory," asked for release of Bourgiba [*Bourguiba*].[3] Res Gen's impression was that this request made in manner of Arab bargaining in market place. After brief inconclusive discussion this point, Res Gen asked that Bey make public appeal for restoration peace and order. Bey declined to do so, but authorized Res Gen to issue such appeal in name of Bey. Res Gen broadcast appeal, indicating he was doing so in agreement with Bey, but unlikely that Tunisians wld believe that Bey had concurred. Res Gen again asked two Tun mins Paris be recalled and appeal to UN be withdrawn. Long and

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, London, Tangier, and Rabat.

[2] Not printed; it reported on a statement by the new French Prime Minister, Edgar Faure, to the National Assembly on Jan. 22 regarding French policy on Tunisia. (651.72/1–2352)

[3] Paris telegram 4268, Jan. 18, reported the Foreign Ministry had instructed the Resident General to expel Bourguiba and a dozen other Neo-Destour leaders from Tunis to provincial villages because Bourguiba had appealed to Tunisians to revolt. Paris telegram 4297, Jan. 19, reported the French Government said it had received generally favorable reports from Tunis in reaction to measures taken by the Resident General, especially the arrest of Nationalist leaders. Documentation is in Department of State file 651.72.

exhausting discussion followed without results, but Res Gen had impression that, due Fr firmness and efforts restore order and lack of success to date by Tunisians in effort obtain UN action, Bey and mins wld study question further. Res Gen pointed out further discussions cld not take place until order restored and Tun mins here recalled.

2. As reported in press, Fr Govt is sending reinforcements to maintain order and stability. Tun sitn which originally one of demonstration and disorder is moving toward character insurrection though not of mass proportions which apparently not desired by Tunisians.[4] While FonOff of opinion that to negot with Chenik and present mins wld be taken as sign of weakness, this is polit decision which must be taken by Council Mins. Council mtg today and, although it not expected take such decision today, sooner or later it may be forced to do so. Inconceivable that Bourgiba [*Bourguiba*] cld be released under present circumstances although he probably wld be released if order restored and conversations resumed. There wld, however, be no question of making release prior condition to such action. Hauteclocque endeavoring obtain "green light" on his actions and result is Council Mins making most of important decisions.

BRUCE

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[4] Telegram 94 from Tunis, Jan. 25, reported that French officials tended to dismiss the current unrest as mere local disorders caused by nonpolitical groups, rather than an insurrection. But the Consul General suggested such an interpretation did not coincide with accumulating evidence of French concern at the serious nature of the local situation. He also reported that French officials with whom he had talked were either unable or unwilling to give any information on the meeting the previous day between the Resident General and the Bey. (772.00/1–2552)

Editorial Note

Paris telegram 4338, January 21, reported the French Government was preparing to send the Tunisian Government a message clarifying the French note of December 15, especially on the issue of cosovereignty between French residents and Tunisians. (651.72/1–2152) Paris despatch 2010, January 31, transmitted a translation of a note from the French Government to the Bey of Tunis, delivered by the Resident General on January 30. The French note, among other points, requested the Tunisians to abandon the idea of bringing a complaint against France in the United Nations so that conversations between the two governments could resume. Tunis telegram 104, February 4, suggested the Department of State urge the French to stop insisting on withdrawal of the United Nations complaint as a prerequisite to the resumption of negotiations.

Tunis telegram 105, February 6, transmitted a summary, furnished the Consul General by a Neo-Destour source, of a Tunisian reply of February 5 to the French note of January 30. The Tunisian reply reportedly made the following points: that French antiterrorist measures were stronger than necessary to maintain public order; the French note of January 30 was too vague on the issue of the participation of French nationals in public institutions; the French state of siege was contrary to the principle of Tunisian sovereignty; and, for negotiations to be resumed, the French would have to terminate the state of siege and recognize the fundamental indivisibility of Tunisian sovereignty.

Paris despatch 2093, February 8, transmitted a copy and translation of the Tunisian note of February 5. Tunis despatch 270, February 6, commented further on the Tunisian note of February 5. According to the Consulate General, the French note of January 30 had failed to allay Tunisian suspicions on two important points, the nonpermanent character of the present regime and the idea of co-sovereignty, and the Tunisians did not consider it a satisfactory basis for negotiation. The Tunisian note of February 5, on the other hand, was not really a reply to the points made in the French note. It made no mention of a reestablishment of order and ignored the United Nations aspects of the case. Apparently there was no clear agreement at that time on what terms the Tunisians would be willing to accept as a basis for resumption of negotiations. Neo-Destour was apparently committed to a policy of passive resistance plus occasional sabotage. Given that fact, the Consulate General considered it fairly certain France would have to change to a more liberal policy than the one presented in its notes of December 15 and January 30, and in the meantime could maintain order only with a regime openly based on force. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 772.00.

772.00/2–852 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, February 8, 1952—4 p. m.

107. In conversation with me today Boisseson was pessimistic about prospects early solution Tunisian impasse. Said recent acts and statements Tunisian leaders have brought him to conclusion they do not want resume negots on reasonable basis. Thinks they may have decided to go for all or nothing, on theory that if they get nothing now their position as patriots and possibly martyrs will be so strong that

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris.

in year or two internatl pressures will force France concede what they ask.

Boisseson analyzed sitn as fols:

(1) Since arrival Hauteclocque Tunisians have done nothing facilitate resumption conversations. On contrary, they sent appeal to UN on very day of his arrival and have stiffened rather than softened their demands. It has been difficult for Res Gen even to see Bey.

(2) They have failed acknowledge softening of Fr position since Dec 15 note, in such things as disavowal cosovereignty, dropping of insistence to prolongation Grand Council, agrmt to discuss legislative, exec and admin reforms at same time.[3]

(3) By insisting on prior assurances re nonparticipation of Fr in Tunisian exec and legislature they are, in effect, demanding satisfaction on substance of negots before negots even begin.

(4) Bourguiba continues to call for violence and in face of this, French cannot reduce security forces or release nationalist leaders, yet Tunisians demand just such action as prerequisite to negots.

(5) Recent violence and continuing Tunisian intransigence have made Fr *colons* and many Fr politicians still less disposed grant concessions, yet some concessions must eventually be made to Tunisians. Fr Govt and Res Gen are placed between devil and deep sea.

In absence change of Tunisian attitude, Boisseson suggested best hope of breaking impasse lies in change of TUCA, replacing present Mins with men not personally responsible for UN appeal and other acts objectionable to Fr. New men might represent same polit viewpoints and groups as the old; for example, Hedi Nouira might replace Ben Youssef as Neo-Destour rep, but it would be easier for Fr auths to deal with them. Concessions made to them would be less objectionable to Fr colony and people than if made to Chenik Cabinet. He admitted, however, such change would be difficult to effect. Also admitted that Fr would not insist on change if way could be found resume discussions without it.

Said Fr still want Tunisian Cabinet withdraw its UN appeal, but do not consider that so important now that complaint being taken up by other state.

JERNEGAN

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[3] See the editorial note, *supra*.

772.00/2–1452: Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TUNIS, February 14, 1952—11 a. m.

111. We think FonOff is indulging in wishful thinking if it believes forced removal present Tunisian Cabinet will make resumption

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris.

negotiations easier (Paris tel 4950, Feb 12)[2] If Chenik is afraid of Bourguiba, his successor likely to be equally afraid. Do not believe any reputable Tunisian natlist wld accept office in opposition to will and policy of Neo-Destour. In any case, negotiations with unreputable Cabinet cld be meaningless so far as ultimate settlement is concerned, and I think anyone who is not acceptable to Neo-Destour must be considered unreputable. We see no signs of split in natlist opinion. On contrary, recent events seem to have increased solidarity of Tunisians. Even moderates like Tahar Benammaf[3] (who has ostentatiously visited Bourguiba at Tabask) are lining up with Neo-Destour.

It is possible that change of personalities in Cabinet wld make things easier, from prestige and tactical point of view, but only if change were made by agreement rather than by force, and we feel sure agreement cld be obtained (if at all) only if new members represented substantially same groups and ideas as present ministers.

I devoutly hope French are not thinking of handing Bey an ultimatum on dismissal of Cabinet. If he gave in to overwhelming pressure it wld weaken his own power as moderating influence in Tunisia and wld undoubtedly further exasperate all Arabs against French. If he rejected ultimatum, French wld be forced either to back down or depose him, and I do not think either French or we can afford repercussions of another deposition in Tunisia.

I believe solution present impasse lies along fol lines:

1. French shld stop fretting about prestige and personalities and recognize that Neo-Destour with Bourguiba at its head is dominant fact of life in Tunisia. Any discussion which attempts eliminate party is eventually going prove futile.
2. French shld likewise stop being indignant because Tunisian leader "condoned" or even inspired violence. Violence is inherent in situation this kind. Charles de Gaulle, Edgar Faure, Jean de Hauteclocque, not to mention George Washington and Joan of Arc, all advocated and practiced violence in support political aspirations their people.
3. French shld recognize Tunisian appeal to UN is equally natural and logical reaction of dissatisfied natlists and shld stop insisting on withdrawal of appeal. If *de facto* negotiations resumed in Tunis, UN

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[2] Not printed. Telegram 4621 to Paris, Feb. 6, expressed concern over the Tunisian situation and asked for information on French plans for handling the question in the Security Council. In reply, Paris telegram 4950 reported the Embassy's impression that the French policy regarding Tunisia was still undecided. One Foreign Ministry official informed the Embassy that there appeared to be only two courses open. One was firmness and force, including removal of the Tunisians in government who wanted such complete concessions that negotiations would no longer be necessary; the other was capitulation to the Nationalist demands, a policy bound to culminate in the eventual loss of all North Africa to France. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.

[3] Presumably this reference is to Tahar Ben Amar, President of the Tunisian Chamber of Agriculture and former President of the Tunisian Section of the Grand Council. Paris telegram 5337, Mar. 5, reported that Maurice Schumann had had a series of discussions with Tahar Ben Amar, and that he was presumably the same man referred to in Tunis telegram 111. Despatch 306 from Tunis, Mar. 11, reported that Ben Amar had been to Paris, and while there had been widely received by French Government officials. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.

case will almost surely collapse. If talks unresumed, other Moslem states will push complaint on Tunisian behalf whether or not Tunisian leaders openly active in matter.

4. Instead of haggling about conditions under which negotiations case resumed, French shld come forward with concrete proposals. In reality talks have never been suspended; what has happened is that instead of talking about substance they have been talking about procedures and making broad statements of principle. This plays into Tunisian hands, since efforts to change procedure through establishment of mixed command they like give impression of subterfuge, while juridically and propagandawise Tunisians are on their strongest ground when discussion is reduced to questions of principle. On basis of treaties principles of UN Charter and previous French declarations it is almost impossible argue have been offered.

5. If French wld offer definite concessions not tied to any conditions I think they wld have good chance of breaking the log jam. Without destroying essential elements of French control, these might include fol:

(*a*) Legalization of natlist parties and release of leaders. (Order has been substantially restored, so this need not involve serious loss of face.)

(*b*) Through public inquiry into asserted excesses in Cap/Bon and Sahel regions.

(*c*) Statement that Tunisian natl sovereignty (not merely Bey's personal sovereignty) is one and indivisible.

(*d*) Statement that eventual relationship between France and Tunisia shld be worked out over period of years by mutual accord (thus jettisoning idea that protectorate must inevitably be permanent) and that in meantime concrete steps toward internal autonomy wld be promptly resumed.

(*e*) Tunisians to be appointed in place of present French directors of Reconstruction and Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones. A Tunisian to be appointed as asst SYG. (This wld give Tunisians majority of Cabinet, but that need not be disastrous as long as Resident General retains veto power. French FonOff considered giving Tunisians majority as long ago as summer of 1950.)

(*f*) Except for certain highly technical posts reserved to French, Tunisians to have preference for all civil service jobs.

(*g*) Discussions to be opened immediately for creation of natl and local rep assemblies, which wld have only limited powers initially, on basis of participation French reps only in economic matters directly affecting their interests, French political interests to be looked after by Resident General as rep French nation.

(*h*) Without any statements being made, demands for dismissal of Cabinet, withdrawal UN complaint, prolongation grand council, and establishment mixed commission wld be abandonded.

Foregoing suggestions wld be revolutionary from current French viewpoint, but I do not believe this situation can really be settled for less.

Jernegan

772.00/2-1552 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, February 15, 1952—9 p.m.

5031. Tunis tel 111 to Dept Feb 14, rptd Paris 90[2] Have read reftel with great interest and, while agreeing that certain of suggestions therein may appear revolutionary from current French viewpoint, believe that French must move generally along certain of these lines if they intend move from present precarious impasse involving control by large display of force and work out permanent and friendly relationship with Tunisians.

Present preoccupation of French Govt with many pressing problems appears to have prevented top members from giving fullest study to resolving Tunisian crisis on other than provisional basis. Realization that whatever policy they take in Tunisia is bound to have repercussions in Morocco and Algeria probably plays large part in French decisions and apparent slowness in resolving crisis may be due to weighing thoroughly all sides of problem before taking steps affecting conditions of their control of all North Africa.

We believe that any formal offer of assistance by US at this time wld be unwelcome. French are aware of our sympathetic interest in their dilemma and grateful for our support in having kept Morocco and Tunisia off agenda Sixth GA[3] They know US favors accelerated development of self-govt in both Tunisia and Morocco and has welcomed French statements looking to that end. French are also aware general trend of public opinion in US critical of French policy in North Africa. They are also cognizant of their role in maintaining security northern shores of Mediterranean within framework of Western defense, and our interests in their continuing that area.

We believe that best approach wld be to discuss with FonOff informally on working level certain of Jernegan's suggestions as factors in situation, making clear this being done in spirit of friendship and concern for problem which is now of international interest.

Our comments on Jernegan's suggestions will follow.[4]

BONSAL

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] For documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. II, pp. 135 ff.

[4] Telegram 5070 from Paris, Feb. 18, was a more detailed evaluation of the Embassy's response to the proposals in Tunis telegram 111. It commented that the Embassy believed the French Government was beginning to realize the majority of Tunisians supported Neo-Destour's nationalist aspirations, but the habit of trying to divide and rule would die slowly. It also reported the Embassy had informally let the French know it was convinced resumption of negotiations would result in an end to the Tunisian case in the United Nations. (772.00/2-1852)

772.00/2-2252 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 22, 1952—12:19 p. m.

4982. Ref Tunis 111 Feb 14,[2] Paris tels 5031 Feb 15[3] and 5070 Feb 18,[4] GADel tel 544 Feb 19.[5]

Dept has studied above series messages and commends offices concerned for helpful and thoughtful analysis Tunisian problem and agrees final para Tunis 111 and para 1 Paris 5031 that some substantive progress in near future Tunisian question essential in view situation existing there. Dept agrees with approach recommended by Emb Paris in last para Embtel 5031 and accordingly instructs Emb proceed along these lines taking into consideration following comments by Dept on specific sections Tunis tel 111.

Re numbered para 3:

We agree likely best hope keeping Tunisian case out of SC is by resumption *de facto* negots between Fr and Tunisians. If issue is posed in SC US Del wld be obliged follow traditional policy of not opposing discussion there as outlined Deptel Gadel 906 Feb 5 rpt Tunis 44.[6]

Re lettered paras under numbered para 5 Dept has following comments:

a. Dept agrees legalization Nationalist parties desirable and release leaders prerequisite resumption negots.

b. We agree with Emb suggestion re scope inquiry.

c. Dept view is sovereignty remains with Tunisia and did not pass to Fr with Bardo Treaty.

d. We think some statement along line set forth last sentence Emb comment this para provides logical solution. Very fact Bardo Treaty provides no means for adjustments nor any termination date appears further reason for Tunisians taking case UN. It is noted Tunisian Mins state all they wish is full observance treaties by Fr.

e. We agree that having Tunisian majority in Cabinet is desirable principle.

f. We agree with Tunis recommendation and hope Fr Govt will overcome Socialist objection on grounds natl interest.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by McBride (WE), Richey (AF), and Elting (UNP). It was cleared with the offices of Bonbright (EUR), Byington (WE), Elting (UNP), Jones (UND), Hewitt (L/UNA), Allen (EUR/UN), and Bourgerie (AF). Bourgerie signed for Webb. The telegram was repeated to Tunis and USUN.

[2] *Ante*, p. 676.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 4, *supra.*

[5] The editors have been unable to identify this reference.

[6] Not printed; it instructed the delegation to indicate, if the matter came up in discussions with other delegates, that the United States stood by its traditional position of not opposing discussions of any consequential matter in the United Nations. It also instructed the delegation to indicate informally to the Tunisians that the United States did not contemplate any unilateral action since the matter was being put into UN channels. (320/2-152)

g. We agree with Emb that local assemblies presumably wld not satisfy Tunisians and therefore effort shld be made by Fr open discussions for creation both local and natl assemblies.

h. We agree silence these matters advisable.

For Gross: Pending further discussions in Paris and consideration in Dept, we feel it inadvisable matter be discussed substantively in NY.[7]

WEBB

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[7] The following sentence in the original was deleted before transmission: "If you are approached by Fr or other dels, you shld in informal comment be guided by above."

772.00/2-2652 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, February 26, 1952—6:12 p. m.

549. Re Tunisia. Protitch (Secretariat) advised by Bokhari that Pak del plans within next few days to request SYG to circulate as SC document communications from Tunisian ministers whose passports have been invalidated by French Govt. Asian-Arab subcomite comprising Pak, India, Indonesia and Yemen delegates now preparing report for submission to full group. Bokhari told Protitch that Pak will undoubtedly request SC Pres to place Tunisian item on agenda and to call meeting in March. Date not yet agreed upon by Asian-Arab group. According to Bokhari all members of group will request right to sit at SC table. Such request would obviously raise embarrassing if not important policy question which Dept will wish to consider and concerning which we shall shortly make recommendations to Dept.

Confirming Hyde–Popper telecon, Von Balluseck who will be SC Pres in March has requested opportunity to discuss with us problems involved in connection with anticipated request for SC meeting on Tunisia.

In light of last para Deptel 4982 to Paris, Feb 22,[1] we shall refrain from discussing question substantively here but assume we are expected and authorized to notify Von Balluseck of policy outlined Gadel 906, Feb 5.[2]

For our info only is there any prospect of resumption *de facto* negotiations between French and Tunisians? Has French Govt already been approached in accordance Deptel 4982 and in particular have French been advised that if issue is posed in SC US will follow traditional policy of not opposing discussion there?[3] We are concerned lest first indication US policy in this regard might reach French indirectly through Dutch in light of anticipated discussion with Von Balluseck here.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not printed; but see footnote 6, *supra.*

AUSTIN

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[3] Telegram 317 to USUN, New York, Feb. 28, authorized Austin to notify Von Balluseck of the U.S. position outlined in Gadel 906 and instructed him to make it clear the United States still hoped there would be a way to avoid the SC issue through the resumption of direct negotiations between the French and Tunisians. It informed him that no report had yet been received concerning the substance of the latest talks between the French and Tunisians or the approach to the French in accordance with the instructions in telegram 4982. (772.00/2–2652)

772.00/2–2852 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NEW YORK, February 28, 1952—6 : 36 p. m.

554. Re: Tunisia. Bokhari (Pak) called on Gross and Hyde. He had come to put before us frankly the plans of the Asian-Arab group to bring Tunisian situation before SC in March. A majority of the group has already received its instrs to do so and Bokhari regards it as definitely decided that he will request SC meeting, probably next week.

In general, feeling of Paks and group is that Tunisian situation is likely to endanger international peace and it should be ventilated in SC without delay. The firmness or conciliatory character of presentation by Paks and others will depend on attitude of France in SC. Bokhari emphasized important political fact of 15, or perhaps 16, UN members sponsoring a simple request that SC consider Tunisian situation.

He reported that this group had considered meeting with US rep and requesting that we take lead in presenting this case. Bokhari feels it is in character with US role of favoring the development of self-government for colonial peoples to do so. He hopes we will not adopt the alternative of support for what he considers a series of French colonial blunders. He invited our leadership in presenting Tunisian situation and if not our leadership at least our cooperation. However, he pointed out that if we cannot cooperate with Asian-Arab group they will still proceed and present their case to SC.

Gross commented that he would report fully this conversation and that we had not instrs on general question and that on the substance the Dept must necessarily study all the facts. Gross promised to confer further with Bokhari as soon as we have further info from the Dept. Bokhari felt it premature until the general reaction of US to this proposed agenda item is known to commit himself on tactical and procedural matters. He felt these questions would in many instances be decided by the US attitude toward case as a whole.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Karachi, and Tunis.

His general theory of case is for 15 states jointly to request SC meeting characterizing subject as Tunisian situation involving a threat to the peace. Sponsors see in this case pattern of infringement of Bey's sovereignty over a period of 70 years with resulting regime governing against will of people. It follows that any former colonial people, such as Paks, react against this. Also, situation is deteriorating with numbers of Tunisians being killed and vicious circle results with French refusing to negotiate until atmosphere is calm and their refusal results in disorders. With leaders in prison or refugees, case need general debate in SC.

Very bad impression is created by refusal of passports to Tunisian Ministers [2] who possess first-hand info of use of Paks in preparing and presenting SC case. Bokhari felt SC is "police station" which, if UN has meaning, should be open day or night to receive complaints from all. He intends to seek a SC res requesting presence of these Ministers.

Bokhari will urge that all co-sponsors of complaint to SC who are not members be invited to sit at table on theory that this privilege has always been granted and number involved should not affect the privilege. In answer to question by Gross, he added that if US is favorably disposed to case in general, an accommodation could be reached on whether it is desirable to have fewer than 15 come to table.

Bokhari felt it would be great political mistake for France, and particularly for US to attempt in any way to hinder placing of case on agenda. He added complaint was so drafted in describing case as a situation to make it simple for all SC members to favor a general discussion. This general SC discussion is first primary objective of presenting case to SC. Bokhari understood that final relief to be attained from SC would have to be worked out in the light of the discussion. Once case is on agenda, however, he argued that all loyal SC members, and particularly US should come forward with suggestions on what a proper solution should be, and he again invited our collaboration.

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[2] On Feb. 12, an officer of the French Embassy called at the Department of State and asked the United States to refuse visas to two Tunisian Ministers visiting Paris who wanted to go to New York in connection with possible Security Council action on Tunisia. The Department replied that it would be impossible to refuse to issue the visas because the Tunisians had valid diplomatic passports. (Memorandum of conversation of Feb. 12; 772.13/2–1252) Telegram 4968 from Paris, Feb. 13, sent the translation of a note received from the Foreign Ministry that day. The note informed the Ambassador that the French Government had terminated the diplomatic passports of the Tunisians. The French intended to exchange the diplomatic passports for ordinary ones, valid for travel only in France and return to Tunisia. (872.181/2–1352) Paris telegram 4995, Feb. 14, reported the Embassy had informed the Tunisians that it could not issue U.S. visas since their diplomatic passports had been invalidated by the French Government. (872.181/2–1452)

We left it that Bokhari would make no formal move to call SC meeting until after reasonable time has elapsed to get Dept's reaction and Gross agreed to be in touch with Bokhari early next week.

AUSTIN

772.00/3–152 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, March 1, 1952—5 p. m.

5288. Deptel 4982, Feb 22 (rptd Tunis 50).[2] In series informal conversations with Puaux, director Protectorate Division FonOff, we have submitted suggestions Tunis tel 111, as modified by Dept's comments in reftel, as possible line of action French might take in solving Tunisian problem. Puaux appreciated spirit in which our views presented, and understanding US interest in finding solution satisfactory to both French and Tunisians. General impression gained is that French while conceding that certain reforms are necessary are still clinging to idea that forceful approach only one suited to Arab mentality and yielding too much to Tunisians this juncture wld be fatal not only in Tunisia but in rest North Africa.

Puaux said that FonOff recognized need for prompt resumption negotiations in order to stave off discussion Tunisian question in SC but rather despairingly admitted that instability of govt which has since fallen wld inevitably delay obligatory Cabinet decision.[3]

Fol are briefly summarized Puaux's reactions, to lettered paras under para 5 Tunis tel 111.

a. French cld not legalize nationalist parties at time when latter are directly responsible for stirring up trouble, nor cld they release nationalist leaders until law and order completely restored. Puaux felt that both might be accomplished once negotiations undertaken and *modus vivendi* established.

b. Puaux stated that inquiries already conducted or being conducted by military and other regarding alleged atrocities Cap Bon and Sahel all that cld be done now. He said it wld be better to keep Parliament's nose out of this.

c. Puaux gave long discourse on how necessary it was to maintain sovereignty of ruler in Arab countries, where scanty notions of democracy and general illiteracy of people made it advisable to maintain existing auth of throne and protect inhabitants from unbridled, unethical and corrupt demagoguery of nationalist leaders. He pointed to Farouk as saving grace in Egyptian politics and considers that Tunisia wld best be served by maintenance of sovereignty in person of Bey.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis.

[2] *Ante*, p. 680.

[3] This reference is to the government of Prime Minister Edgar Faure. Antoine Pinay became the new French Prime Minister on Mar. 6. For additional documentation on this topic, see volume VI.

d. Puaux confirmed most French Govt has never declared permanency of protectorate and referred to public statements of Foreign Minister promising self govt. No denial was made that internal autonomy was feasible under terms of Bardo treaty.

e. Puaux seemed lukewarm to replacement of French directors public service by Tunisians without preliminary consideration by mixed commission and appeared opposed to suggestion of appointment Tunisian as asst SYG without offering any reasons.

f. This was only item to which Puaux agreed remarking, however, that replacement of French by Tunisians must necessarily be gradual process to allow for retirement of French civil servants who cld not be peremptorily dismissed after serving years in administration.

g. Puaux was noncommittal on subject creation national assembly and considered this a question to be worked out by mixed commission. He said formula for replacing General Council was under study.

h. Puaux readily perceived advantage of no statement being made but let it be understood that apart from prolongation Grand Council three other points formed part of French conditions at moment. He insisted that there are elements in Tunisia quite ready to negotiate moderate evolutionary program which wld be difficult if not impossible of achievement with extreme nationalists who he still tries to convince himself do not represent thinking of majority of people.

Bruce

772.00/3-652 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 6, 1952—8:18 p. m.

5246. Paris for Bruce from Secy. Pls see Schuman earliest opportunity and inform him Tunisian situation continues give us serious concern; that we are particularly disturbed lest reference of question to SC (which will come to a head next week) further exacerbate situation and increase tension to great detriment current efforts resume Franco-Tunisian negots and achieve satisfactory settlement. You may assure Schuman of our desire be helpful but point out difficulties our position in absence any public assurances re French willingness meet minimum and reasonable demands Tunisian Govt re resumption negots. In order to do so we must be able take position that (1) direct French-Tunisian negots offer best possibility satisfactory resolution problem and (2) that such negots will be resumed shortly and do in fact promise eventual satisfaction legitimate Tunisian aspirations. In present circumstances we do not have necessary assurances to support this position. In short, we convinced that any possibility of avoiding formal proposal for admission of item to agenda or if that fails of avoiding extensive consideration in SC depends on Fr assurance that some measures will be taken soonest to help satisfy more urgent demands of Tunisians.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by McBride (WE) and cleared in substance with the Secretary of State, NEA, and the offices of Matthews (G), Hickerson (UNA), Ferguson (S/P), and Tate (L). Bonbright (EUR) signed for the Secretary. The telegram was repeated to Tunis.

Therefore, though we obviously aware Schuman now acting in caretaker capacity only,[2] we believe some immed action by him essential. We wld strongly urge statement by him in next two or three days to effect Fr are determined renew bilateral talks on basis specific proposals for reforms and intend press forward with negots with firm resolve make every effort conclude with Bey's Govt arrangements for orderly progress toward development autonomy in accord existing treaties and sincere desire both Govts.

We do not concur with Fr view as reported in para 1 Embtel 5288 [3] that force is any but short-term solution to problem and cannot be satisfactory policy so far as we can see. It has not proved notably successful in past.

Naturally we agree that Fr themselves are most intimately acquainted with details of problem and in best position to say what can be done re urgent Tunisian demands, and we hope they have come forth with something viable in program which Hauteclocque recently presented to Quai d'Orsay.

In this connection you shld tell Schuman we feel we shld be informed now re details of this program. If it envisages substantive improvements and if the parties involved are about to resume negots, the Fr position vis-à-vis the SC wld be greatly strengthened. If on the other hand, newest project is basically window dressing Fr shld be told this simply is not good enough and will in no way solve problem. Fr must realize necessity for acting now in imaginative way in Tunisia.

We continue to feel such measures as legalization nationalist parties, replacement of Fr functionaries regardless their retirement problem, appt Tunisian Asst Sec Gen as highly desirable now. Study of longer term questions such as creation of purely Tunisian legislative body perhaps with Fr participation on some council dealing with economic questions only and ultimate form of Protectorate itself shld also not be further neglected. Finally we concur Emb's view that it is delusion on part Quai d'Orsay if they still believe nationalists represent only insignificant minority of Tunisians.

With foregoing in mind explain frankly difficulty we are now facing in UN on this question. Reiterate we desire assist Fr in this field but are hindered from so doing by Fr refusal face facts. State we expect something concrete emerge from present Hauteclocque plan that will permit resumption bilateral talks and that we regard this approach as by far most satisfactory. However, stress again that time has arrived when vague promises will not be sufficient solve either immed UN or basic Tunisian problem.

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[2] Paris telegram 5426, Mar. 8, reported that Robert Schuman, who had been the Foreign Minister in the Faure Cabinet, would hold the same position in the new Pinay Cabinet. (751.13/3–852)

[3] Mar. 1; not printed. The first paragraph reported the Embassy had informally given the Foreign Office the suggestions made in Tunis telegram 111, Feb. 14, p. 676, as modified by Department of State comments in telegram 4982 to Paris, Feb. 22, p. 680. The Embassy had the impression the French, while conceding certain reforms were necessary, still clung to the idea that a "forceful approach" was the only one suitable to the Tunisian situation and felt that for France to yield too much would be fatal to them elsewhere in North Africa. (772.00/3–152)

Finally you may inform Schuman that our position is as follows: (1) Our primary interest is settlement of Tunisian problem with minimum disturbing of stability of area. (2) We will seek postponement of consideration of Tunisian item in SC at least until Fr governmental situation is cleared up.

Acheson

772.00/3–752 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bishop) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 7, 1952—6 p. m.

5399. For Secretary from Bruce. Deptel 5246, March 6,[1] rptd Tunis 56. I assume reftel crossed Embtel 5280, March 4[2] re conversation between Maurice Schumann and Bonsal on Tunisian situation, or at least that our message was not fully considered prior to dispatch reftel.

I would like to point out there is now new Prime Minister who will present his cabinet to Parliament for approval on Tues. Robert Schuman should not be approached at this point and would have no authority to handle this situation. In my opinion, we should continue our expressions of interest to FonOff officials and also continue our working level discussions of various possibilities.

Tahar Ben Amar has now returned to Tunisia following his five conversations with Maurice Schumann. He is reported to have seen Bourguiba and we assume he has also seen other leaders, including Bey's Ministers. Contact between parties therefore exists.

We cannot anticipate immediate French decision on program for resumption negotiations since timetable will depend largely on political developments here.

I would like to stress my conviction that French will react most unfavorably to attempt to use probable SC consideration of Tunisian matter as either club or lever to move French Govt. As we have frequently indicated, this problem is intimately related to whole French position in North Africa. French will not be moved by what they consider irresponsible demagogic activities of Arab-Asian bloc, nor do they consider developments over past few months in Iran and Egypt furnish any basis for condemnation of French approach to North African problems.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not printed; it reported that the French Foreign Ministry considered the Tunisian problem one of great complexity, which had not been simplified by recent government crises and other major preoccupations. The Embassy was informed that the French realized it had been a mistake to raise the issue of the dismissal of Chenik and had abandoned that condition. (772.00/3–152)

We believe that at present best we can do is to urge French to convey soonest appropriate instructions to French reps on SC re nature of statement which can be made when matter comes up and we can express hope such statement may be as "progressive" as possible. We will convey to FonOff two numbered points in concluding para reftel.

Bishop

772.00/3–752 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 7, 1952—7 : 36 p. m.

329. In your conversations other dels on Tunisian case you shld take fol line:

1. US is sure dels agree that what we all desire is fair settlement Tunisian problem.

2. US convinced best way reach such settlement is get Fr-Tunisian negots going in good faith with object their achieving mutually satis settlement. Accordingly, all our common efforts shld now be directed that end.

3. View present governmental situation we strongly urge others support our view that decision whether to bring up question in SC shld be held off until new Fr Govt is formed and has had reasonable brief time to orient itself.

4. Dept believes above is a reasonable position which shld commend itself to other dels and that it will be unnecessary to go further at this time. However, shld Arab-Asians indicate that they will insist on SC mtg immed, you may inform them they will not get our support and we will abstain shld they seek to get Tunisian item placed on agenda now. You shld also make clear however this position is entirely without prejudice to what our position will be after there is a Fr Govt.

5. If at time your conversations a Fr Govt has already been formed and is functioning, in your discretion you may add that we have been using our good offices with the Fr with a view to persuading them to make new concrete proposals.

Acheson

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Elting (UNP) and cleared in draft by the offices of Bonbright (EUR) and Bourgerie (NEA). Wainhouse (UNP) signed for the Secretary. It was repeated to Paris, Tunis, and Karachi.

772.00/3-1852 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 18, 1952—6:51 p. m.

621. From Gross. Palar (Indonesia) coming in at his request this afternoon had frank talk with me re Tunisia. He said he thought he wld help Tunisian cause, on behalf of which Indonesia and 14 other Arab-Asian States are working, by making clear to us issue as these States see it.

Palar assured me that despite govt crisis in Indonesia,[1] his role is perfectly clear since all parties at home in agreement Tunisians shld have what they are pressing for i.e., "home rule." He referred to heavy pressure this unanimity of view is placing on his del to champion Tunisian cause. He took occasion to declare that as an anti-Communist he fully appreciates need for strong US and anti-Communist Europe. He said he felt that granting Tunisian desire for home rule will add to European strength while French obstruction will weaken it and cannot be "permitted" by his govt.

He went on to say that there is division of opinion within Arab-Asian group, some desiring immediate SC action, others, including Indonesia and Pakistan, counseling patience. He considers new French Govt must have time to make clear whether it intends negotiate with view to granting Tunisians home rule. This to him is a matter of weeks, perhaps 2, certainly not months. He prefers solution through bilateral negotiations, but will move for SC action the moment he becomes convinced French do not intend bona fide negotiations. If there are negotiations and French satisfy Tunisians on some basis short of home rule, of course Arab-Asians must be satisfied too.

In this connection Palar said group here is awaiting arrival of several Tunisians, by what method he is not at liberty to say. Group's decision on SC action will depend on their information and cables from Tunisians if there are negotiations with French.

I said we think as Palar does that best solution is through bilateral private negotiation and new govt should have time to orient itself and decide Tunisian policy. I mentioned that we have been using our good offices with French with view to their initiating negotiations on specific constructive basis. I thought it premature to discuss questions of competence, merits, etc. I asked Palar to specify what he thinks Tunisians want. He seemed somewhat troubled and answered that in Paris he knew they wanted home rule but subsequently there are indications they may be going beyond that to full independence. He repeated that Indonesia would have to support even this extreme position if French were not reasonable.

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[1] For documentation, see volume XII.

In answer to my question on what basis he thought SC action would be called for by group, Palar quoted articles 34 and 35 of charter, saying there was no condemnation in mind but merely desire to get French and Tunisians negotiating. Perhaps good offices comite might be used.

Palar terminated statement his views saying he thought when and if Indonesia came to conclusion French do not intend bona fide negotiations, there wld be no difficulty in getting Asian-Arab group unanimously to move for immediate SC action.

In commenting on Yemeni role in Arab-Asian sub-comite (India, Pakistan, Yemen, Indonesia) Palar said Yemen politically inexperienced and its rep even more so. Recent statement Yemeni rep was deplorable and product this inexperience and Yemeni had "bad time" when Palar next saw him.

AUSTIN

772.00/3–1952

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1952.

Subject: Tunisia

Participants: The Secretary
H. E. Henri Bonnet—French Ambassador
Mr. Jacques Schricke, 2nd Secretary, French Embassy
Mr. Bonbright—EUR
Mr. Wainhouse—UNP

The French Ambassador accompanied by Mr. Schricke came in at the Secretary's request to discuss the question of Tunisia. The Secretary began the conversation by stating that there are two aspects to the problem—the substantive aspect which relates to a program for direct French-Tunisian negotiations, and the Security Council aspect. The Secretary stated that we are aware of the French desire to avoid the appearance of a cause and effect relationship between their actions and events in the United Nations. He stated further that he was pleased that the matter is now before the French Cabinet, and hoped that rapid progress would be made in resuming negotiations. The Secretary stated that anything that the French can tell us about the program will help us in acting with a sense of conviction. The Ambassador commented that he did not know much about the program which the Cabinet has today approved and which is going forward to the French representative in Tunisia.[2]

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[1] In the week preceding the meeting between the Secretary of State and Ambassador Bonnet, Bonbright transmitted two memoranda on Tunisia, dated Mar. 12 and 19, to the Secretary. The Mar. 12 memorandum referred to Paris telegram 5399, Mar. 7, p. 687, and suggested the Secretary call in Ambassador Bonnet and discuss the matter with him along the lines suggested in the reference telegram. The Mar 19 memorandum mentioned some additional information the Secretary should consider when talking to the Ambassador that afternoon. A memorandum [illegible] to Gross, dated Mar. 19, informed him the Secretary had called in the Ambassador and made the U.S. position clear along the lines indicated in both memoranda by Bonbright. Documentation is in the UNP files, lot 59 D 237, "Tunisian General Correspondence, 1952–54".

With respect to the Security Council aspect, the Secretary stated that we are doing our best to hold off the Asian-Arab agitation in New York for Security Council consideration. He said that our efforts will work for a time but not for very long. If the matter is brought to the Security Council two problems arise:

(1) the question of inscribing the item on the agenda; and
(2) if the matter is inscribed, the question of competence.

With respect to (1) the Secretary stated that it would be unwise for the French to oppose and that we ourselves will not vote against inscribing it. On what we do, whether we abstain or vote to put it on the agenda we have, he said, not yet made up our minds. At this point, the Secretary referred to our position on the Moroccan case in the General Assembly and characterized our voting position there as geared to the General Assembly procedures which are different from those of the Security Council. (2) On the question of competence, the Secretary stated that while he has not carefully studied the opinion of the Legal Adviser dated March 10,[3] the view held in the Department is that the Security Council is competent to deal with the problem. The Secretary mentioned particularly the opinion of the Permanent Court on the Nationality Decrees Case as a precedent which might control the question of the application of Article 2(7) of the Charter to the present Tunisian-French dispute. The Ambassador intervened to say that he was vaguely familiar with the case, but thought it was an old case and did not have any application to the Tunisian question. The Ambassador stated that the Tunisian question was a purely domestic one.

The Secretary went on to say that if this matter is debated in the Security Council, discussion of the substance would take place in any case whether the French object to the Security Council's competence or not. The best thing to do would be to have the Security Council adopt a resolution which would reserve the issue of competence, note that both parties are willing to negotiate and express the confidence that negotiations will be resumed; or in the alternative the President of the Council could express "the sense of the Council" that the parties will resume negotiations and the proceedings would be adjourned.

At the request of the Secretary whether Mr. Bonbright or Mr. Wainhouse had any comment, Mr. Bonbright stated that if the negotiations with the Tunisians do not start at once a declaration by the French at this time of their intention to negotiate would be helpful in connection with the situation which we face in New York. Mr. Wainhouse, in order to clarify the difference between an abstention in the General Assembly and in the Security Council which the Secretary alluded to, stated that in view of the peculiar voting procedures in the Security Council where seven votes are required to inscribe an item on the agenda, an abstention is tantamount to a negative vote, and in that respect an abstention in the Security Council is different from an abstention in the General Assembly. The Ambassador agreed that an abstention in the Security Council would perhaps have the same result as a negative vote, but the implications of an abstention are different from those of a negative vote.

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[2] For a summary of the program, see Paris telegram 5797, Mar. 22, *infra.*
[3] A copy of this opinion has not been found in Department of State files.

Ambassador Bonnet stated that the Cabinet program approved today will be sent to Hauteclocque this weekend. He would put up to his Government the suggestion about a declaration, although he understood that a government spokesman had already today told the press that the Cabinet had considered a new Tunisian program. He stated that this item should not be placed on the agenda of the Security Council and that the French will vote against inscribing it on the agenda. On the question of competence, he expressed the view that this is an internal question with which the United Nations has nothing to do. He agreed with the Secretary that it would be better not to have the matter come up and that he would inform his Government of this conversation. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador again that whatever view is taken—that is whether there is competence or not, the discussion on the substance would still be had and the harm would be done. With this the Ambassador agreed.[4]

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[4] Telegram 5591 to Paris, Mar. 21, transmitted a summary of the source text to the Embassy, and instructed the Embassy to follow up with further working level discussions on Tunisia. (772.00/3-1452)

772.00/3-2252 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 22, 1952—6 p. m.

5797. Ref Embtel 5796.[2] Fol is résumé of Tunisian reform program as given us by Puaux of FonOff:

1. *Legislative.*

Formation of two councils or chambers.

A. Legislative and consultative entirely Tunisian, partly appointed by Bey and partly elected.

B. Financial—exclusively for budget. Mixed Franco-Tunisian with equal representation. Bey would keep his legislative power by issuing decrees which would be approved by resident general.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Tangier, and Rabat.

[2] Not printed.

2. *Executive.*

A. Free area, i.e. discontinuance of all French control over following Tunisian ministries: Justice, Public Health, Social Affairs and Commerce.

A technical convention would be signed reserving rights and interests of French in purely French institutions (Fr law courts, hospitals, etc.).

B. Area controlled by French. Public instruction and public works would remain under French directors for period not less than five years. Tunisian deputy directors would take over thereafter.

Finance considered special case, therefore no time limit specified. This believed justified because of French contributions amounting to 40 percent of ordinary budget and Fr financing of investment budget.

C. Reserved area.

National defense (including security forces) fon affairs. These will remain under Fr control.

3. *Civil service.*

Access to admin posts will be reserved entirely for Tunisians. If, however, there are vacancies which cannot be filled by qualified Tunisians, Tunisian Govt may employ foreigners provided they are French nationality. Civil servants holding posts at present will not be removed.

4. *Compposition of council of ministers.*

While this is still under study, it is proposed that it be reduced to four Tunisians (Prime Min, Mins of Justice, Pub Health and Commerce of Soc Affairs) and four Fr (Sec Gen, Dir of Fin, Pub Instruction and Pub Works).

Prime Min will preside. Sec Gen would become deputy of Prime Min without having separate powers.[3]

Bonsal

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[3] A memorandum, dated Mar. 25, by Elting to Hickerson and Wainhouse, presented an analysis of the French reform proposals summarized in telegram 5957. It commented that the program marked a great advance in French thinking, principally because the French had accepted the "timetable" principle. The speed with which the new cabinet had agreed to the program was also seen as a good sign. On the other hand, the fact that the Resident General seemed determined not to negotiate with Prime Minister Chenik, despite the fact that the French Government alleged it was willing to yield on that point, was a disturbing factor. (UNP files, lot 59 D 237, "Tunisian General Correspondence, 1952–54")

772.00/3–2552 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY Tunis, March 25, 1952—4 p. m.

124. Min Public Health Ben Salem called unannounced at my house today at 2 p. m. saying he had just come from Bey's palace and wanted tell me privately of serious polit development which had just occurred.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris and Naples for Unger.

Substance his statements was: 1. Res Gen had attempted arrange private interview with Bey to present reform program. Through his son Chedly, Bey had refused. Hauteclocque, therefore saw Bey this morning at 11:30 in presence of full Cabinet except for two Mins still in Paris.

2. Res Gen told Bey he had with him full reform program but wld not present it for discussion unless present Cabinet dismissed from office because it was responsible for recent violence Tunisia. Bey said this impossible. Hauteclocque thereupon said that as representative Fr Govt he "demanded" dismissal of Cabinet by three o'clock this afternoon. Failing such action he wld be forced take "strong measures" and responsibility wld fall on Bey.

3. Bey and Cabinet determined stand fast. Tels have been prepared and will be delivered to Residency today rejecting demand and protesting to Fr Govt against tone and language used by Res Gen.

4. Cabinet Mins prepared for worst. Consider it likely they will be arrested and even possibly executed. (Ben Salem left me hurriedly in order, he said, to arrange his personal affairs before three o'clock.)

5. Pri Min whom Fr want substitute for Chenik is Gen Hayder, Mayor of Tunis, generally considered Fr stooge. Other members cabinet wld be in same category. According Ben Salem, such group wld not last 24 hours in office unless its members were constantly escorted by tanks.

6. If Fr wld agree to gen principles of Tun requests and present proposals along that line to present Cabinet, Chenik and other Mins wld be prepared resign immed and let negots be conducted by different leaders (presumably not Hayder, however).

Ben Salem seemed highly indignant, especially at delivery of threatening ultimatum to Sovereign and at charge that Cabinet responsible for Tun troubles. Insisted Fr have been pursuing inhuman policy of violence including murder, rape, robbery, destruction and unjustified arrest and imprisonment of Tuns. Spoke bitterly against Res Gen. Asserted, in strictest confidence, that latter yesterday sent personal note to Pri Min Chenik warning him that if he did not resign developments wld occur which wld endanger health of his son (who is seriously ill). This interpreted by Chenik to mean he himself and other members his family might be arrested or otherwise molested. Ben Salem expressed view US shld intervene to moderate Fr attitude. Said it seemed inconceivable we cld permit naked [force?] to rule in world in 1952. I replied my function was that of observer, I was always glad obtain info re current events but I cld not speak for my govt or forecast its attitude toward any given question.

I have appointment see Hauteclocque tomorrow and hope get Fr version then.

JERNEGAN

772.00/3-2852 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

PARIS, March 25, 1952—8 p. m.

5851. Comparison of French reform program for Tunisia outlined Embtel 5797, Mar 22 [2] with recommendations made by Dept (Deptel 4982, Feb 22 to Paris,[3] 50 Tunis) based on Tunis 111, Feb 14 [4] to Dept and Embtel 5070 Feb 18 [5] to Dept, 118 to Tunis reveals well meaning if somewhat timid, adoption by French of certain concessions to Tunisian aspirations means breaking present impasse between French Tunisian Govts.

1. Legislative. All Tunisian chamber although still subject to beylical decree and veto of Residential Gen cld be beginning of truly representative national assembly. Financial and economic affairs handled by mixed Franco-Tunisian chamber provides for French participation in affairs directly affecting their interest. Local WEP assemblies already under consideration since 1950. This proposal corresponds generally to lettered para (*g*) Tunis 111, Feb 14.
2. Executive. Complete Tunisian authority over five ministries, gradual takeover of two within five years, and close collaboration in finance demonstrate French intention of relinquishing direct control. (They meet certain aspects of para *e*.)
3. Civil service. French proposal seems most liberal and going practically whole way to meet Tunisian demands (para *f*).
4. Composition of Council of Ministers. While parity is still maintained between Tunisians and French it wld appear that Tunisian majority wld be attained automatically within five years when public instruction and public works turned over to Tunisian directors. Secretary general being shorn, as we understand, of any separate powers will lose former importance and be subordinate to Prime Minister (para *e*).

It is true that paras *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* and *h* of Tunis tel. 111, Feb 14 are not mentioned by FonOff, but they do not rightfully belong in a detailed program of governmental reform. These are matters more appropriately handled separately by action or statements of Resident General and/or French Govt.

Reports of Hauteclocque's futile attempt to approach Bey through latter's son Chadli confirms tactic mentioned penultimate para Embtel 5606, Mar 14[6] as device to by-pass Chenik. If direct contact with Bey can be established and French program can be accepted by him in principle, way may be opened for French Govt to make statement regarding resumption of negotiations.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Rabat, and Tangier.
[2] *Ante*, p. 692.
[3] *Ante*, p. 680.
[4] *Ante*, p. 676.
[5] Not printed; but see footnote 4, p. 679.

Proposals of French will undoubtedly not meet full demands of Neo-Destour but shld it is to be hoped provide basis for negotiations.[7]

BONSAL

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[6] Not printed. In the paragraph under reference here the Embassy reported the French were seeking some way to bypass Chenik and negotiate with Tunisians other than Neo-Destourians. (772.00/3–1452)

[7] Despatch 2634 from Paris, Apr. 4, transmitted a copy and translation of the French Government's instructions to the Resident General at Tunis on Mar. 22. (772.00/4–452)

772.00/3–2652 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY TUNIS, March 26, 1952—2 p. m.

127. Min deleg de Boisseson gave Consular Corps fol info this morning:

1. ResGen ordered as of midnight last night temporary exile from Tunis to Kebili (in southern Tunisia) of all Tun Mins presently Tunisia. Transfer of all but Min of Agri has already been accomplished without incident and they are resident in small hotel. Agri Min took advantage of permission (which was also offered to others) remain his home for brief period arrange his affairs but will presumably soon join others. Period of exile of Mins will probably be short.

2. This measure taken, on basis powers conferred by state of siege, in view Cabinet's refusal resign at request ResGen and because it had completely lost confidence of Fr Govt. Reasons for loss of confidence were:

A. Appeal to UN at moment of arrival of new ResGen indicated that Cabinet did not desire negotiate with France.

B. Departure of two leading natlist Mins (Ben Youssef and Badra) and their prolonged stay in Paris left Cabinet unrep for negotiating purposes.

C. Cabinet had failed take advantage of various opportunities offered by France to withdraw without loss of face from its negative position.

D. Since last October Cabinet had virtually ceased to administer country, refused submit decrees for Bey's signature and had not even prepared budget for fiscal year beginning April 1.

E. Cabinet had not lifted finger to check wave of violence that has swept country in past two months. Since it claimed to be sole rep of Tun people, this constituted tacit approval of violence.

3. No legal proceedings instituted as yet against Mins but such action might later be taken against certain ones.

4. All police and security personnel have been delegated temporarily

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris and Naples for Unger.

by ResGen to Gen Garbay, Comdr of troops in Tunisia. (Garbay, however, is subject to ResGen's orders.) Curfew has been imposed effective tonight in all large towns from 9 to 5 a. m. Certain categories persons, including non-local members Consular Corps, are exempt. Control over telegraphic communications has been imposed but will be exercised in liberal spirit and will not apply official consular msgs. Tele and curfew restrictions will probably be lifted in few days. Telephone service Tunis was cut this morning but will be restored this afternoon. No restrictions envisaged on land, air or sea travel or on mail.

5. ResGen expects that new Cabinet will be appointed shortly in normal fashion and will be composed of men who have confidence of both Bey and Fr Govt and who will devote themselves to their duties.

In subsequent private conversation with me, ResGen Hauteclocque confirmed that he has considered it impossible to deal with Chenik Cabinet, repeating previous statements that Chenik was merely stooge for Bourguiba who was irresponsible and wld never be satisfied. Said if he had not taken action remove Mins Fr colony wld have itself resorted to violence in self protection. Claimed natlists working with Commies and using Hitler tactics. Read me portion his instrs from Paris which declared Fr Govt cld not treat with Cabinet and left to ResGen full liberty of action to obtain Ministry composed persons having confidence both of Fr and Bey. He said he wld [*had?*] read these same passages to Bey yesterday.[2]

Said what he wanted was strictly admin Cabinet to run current affairs while reforms were discussed in mixed Franco-Tun Comm. Members of mixed comm cld be as natlist as they pleased and cld include present Mins.

Confirmed that he had refused communicate any portion of proposed reform program so long as Chenik in office. (He gave me oral outline of program, which will be reported separately.) Declared he does not expect serious outbreaks of violence although Tun attitude will undoubtedly "stiffen" for a few days.

I commented, speaking personally, that I liked his reform program but did not agree with procedures he had adopted. I feared result wld be to make Tuns more resistant than ever. I thought any new PriMin wld prove to be as much of a "tool" of Bourguiba as was Chenik. He replied I was entitled my opinion but he had the responsibility and believed he had taken only possible course. Thought he cld find reasonable man not under Bourguiba's thumb.

JERNEGAN

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[2] Tunis telegram 133, Mar. 28, informed the Department of State an official from the Resident General's office confirmed press reports that the French Government had given unqualified support to the Resident General. (772.00/3-2852)

772.00/3-2652

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert McBride, Office of Western European Affairs

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 26, 1952.

Subject: Tunisian Situation

Participants: Mr. van Laetham, French Embassy
Mr. McBride, WE

Mr. van Laetham called at his request this morning to bring us up to date on today's events in Tunisia. He said that the French Government had decided to carry out measures against Prime Minister Chenik and his Cabinet because of the impossibility of getting the reform program under way by any other means.[1] He added that the goal of the French was to put in the reform program and that they did not propose to be stopped by the difficulties of negotiating with Chenik. He stressed that there was no intention of removing the Bey. He said that the Bey was a weak character who was terrorized by the Neo-Destour and was under the influence of his Cabinet which was in turn dominated by the Neo-Destour Party. Since the Tunisian Prime Minister was a prisoner and could not make any move, the French believed the measures which they have taken represented the only solution.

Mr. van Laetham said that there were plenty of ministerial candidates who would be acceptable to both sides and that it was very much hoped the operation would be a success. He said that the French Government had considered very seriously before it took these measures and that there was no thought of going back on them. He said that all parties in France except the Communists supported the arrests, the de Gaullists because it showed that France retained firm control of the situation and the more liberal parties because the obstacle to the reform program had been removed. In conclusion he said that the Resident General has asked the Bey for another interview and that it was conceivable that in fact the recent French action was not unpalatable to the Tunisian ruler.

He said that the French Embassy very much hoped that the Department would understand the reasons which had impelled the French Government to make these moves. He added that he hoped public statements which might be made on the problem would take all sides into account. I told him that the Department had as yet received no official reports and until his call had only the news agency reports to go on. I said that any views we might have could not be formulated until we had received some additional word on the situation.[2]

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[1] See Tunis telegram 127, Mar. 26, *supra*, for an account of the measures taken by the French.

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[2] In a memorandum dated Mar. 26, McBride presented a summary of French actions and an analysis of their effect on the U.S. position to Perkins and Byington. The memorandum suggested that negotiations would now be out of the question because of bitterness toward the French on the part of the Tunisians and other Moslems. The final paragraph of the memorandum read, in part: "In view of the latest developments in Tunisia it is no longer seen what we can do to hold off the Arab-Asian bloc." (722.00/3-2652)

772.00/3-2752 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, March 27, 1952—6 p. m.

5910. At presentation of my credentials this morning Min Fon Aff stated Fr Govt most anxious to keep us fully informed re Tunisia developments. Later Maurice Schumann gave Bonsal fol info.

Schumann confirmed reports already received from Tunis, especially Tunis tel 106 Mar 26 rptd Dept 127.[2] He said that, while Hauteclocque had not been specifically authorized to arrest mins and move them south, govt wld in Assembly and publicly back him up. He added reply to Bey's message to Auriol was being flown to Tunis this afternoon. He expressed strong hope Bey freed from extremist pressures, wld be able to find suitable mins. He reiterated he wld keep Emb fully informed of all developments.

Schumann again insisted on "bold" nature of proposed reform program (Embtel 5851 Mar 25,[3] rptd Tunis 143 Rabat and Tangier by pouch). Bonsal remarked that, without passing upon Hauteclocque's actions vis-à-vis Chenik and Co, it was certainly regrettable these actions had coincided with presentation of reform program and had, in fact, completely drawn public and press attn away from reform program. To this Schumann rejoined, that he assumed Hauteclocque had felt he cld not hold his hand. Schumann added Fr SC reps will be fully informed.

Schumann confirmed that two Tunisian mins who had been in Paris since UNGA have proceeded to Switz whence Schumann believes they will go to Cairo. He was concerned at action of Fr auths in permitting their departure. Schumann stated he was preparing statement to be made by Pinay in Assembly if necessary on this subj.

As is shown by special press round-up sent today, there is considerable uneasiness in Socialist circles and perhaps also in MRP, the party of both Robert Schuman and Maurice Schumann, at Hauteclocque's actions. However, Maurice Schumann made it clear that in spite of fact that Hauteclocque's action took govt by surprise, govt expected to back him and he stressed highly confidential nature of his statement to Bonsal on this subj.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, London, and Rabat.
[2] *Ante*, p. 696.
[3] *Ante*, p. 695.

Schumann also expressed familiar sentiments re importance of Fr position in North Africa and Fr Govt's confidence that France's allies will support her. Bonsal replied that arrests of Mins wld undoubtedly encourage and stimulate abroad criticism of Fr actions and reiterated hope for prompt favorable developments.

DUNN

772.00/3-2752 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, March 27, 1952—7 : 11 p. m.

5753. For Amb from Perkins. Re Tunis tel 131 to Dept [2] rptd Paris 112, pls approach Schuman soonest and express gravest US concern over report which we have recd and hope is inaccurate. Point out that such an act on the part of the French would in our opinion embitter situation both in North Africa and in relation to Arab world for years to come and make it quite impossible for indefinite future to arrive at sound evolutionary solution of Tunisian situation along lines Fr reform program.

Referring to existing situation you should then say that as Secy made clear to Fr Amb last week voluntary negotiations between France and Tunisia only sound and constructive approach to solution current difficulties. Above was reason for US representations to Amb.

New situation created by arbitrary Fr actions in detaining Chenik and other Tunisian leaders has inflamed situation to such extent that only most prompt Fr action to begin negotiations would warrant US in attempting forestall immediate inscription of Tunisian matter on S.C. agenda as currently proposed by Pakistan.

Only situation in which US could oppose SC consideration of Tunisian case would be if, by time it comes in SC, negotiations would have started or be convincingly imminent.

For this reason US Govt hopes that Fr Govt, in addition to refraining from taking any action against Bey, will be liberal in their attitude as to composition of Tunisian Govt with which they would be willing to negotiate reform program. You should make clear that we are not urging reinstatement of Chenik but merely that they avoid pitfall of appearing to insist, which is certainly not Fr intent, on dealing with a puppet Govt having no ties with Tunisian people and which therefore could be accused of being at beck and call of Fr.[3]

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Knight and cleared, presumably by telephone, by Knight, with the offices of Acheson, Perkins (EUR), and Sandifer (UNA). Berry cleared for NEA. It was repeated to Tunis.

[2] Mar. 27; not printed. It informed the Department that a Residency press officer told an American correspondent the Resident General had been trying to see the Bey for 2 days, and if he did not succeed he planned to send a member of the Bey's family to ask him to abdicate. If the Bey refused, the next logical step seemed to be forced deposition by the French, and the Consul General recommended the United States warn the French not to take that action. (772.00/3-2752)

You should suggest Fr might further help break impasse in Tunisia and get Tunisian cooperation by appointing some Cabinet Minister or high level officer to proceed Tunis to conduct talks.

ACHESON

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[3] Telegram 5937 from Paris, Mar. 28, reported the Ambassador had just seen Schuman in response to telegram 5753 and conveyed the Department's concern over events in Tunisia. Schuman told him the Resident General was meeting with the Bey that morning, and the French had indications they would arrange to set up a new cabinet of responsible persons who would begin conversations regarding the reform program. He promised to keep the Ambassador informed about developments in Tunisia. (772.00/3-2852)

772.00/3-2852 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, March 28, 1952—8 p. m.

5969. In accordance with Schuman's promise this morn[2] to keep us fully informed re Tunisian developments, Latournelle this afternoon confirmed to Bonsal content of joint communiqué covering interview between Bey and Hauteclocque as carried on AFP ticker and drew Emb's attn to Hauteclocque's press conf describing successful outcome of interview.

In reply to question Latournelle stated there had been no discussions between Bey and Hauteclocque of possible withdrawal of SC submittal as had been reported by one press agency. French view on this is that submittal was made without proper Beylical auth and therefore has no legal standing from strictly Tunisian point of view.

Latournelle expressed hope Bey wld now proceed together with his new PriMin to appoint Tun members of mixed commission which will draw up reform program beginning April 24. Latournelle also stated copy of reform proposals had been sent to Bonnet for distribution to Amer newspaperman but such distribution must be held up because Bey has some question re proposal for popularly elected Tunisian assembly. Bey apparently leans toward appointive assembly. French Govt is therefore holding up fully publication of reform proposals pending agreement with Bey. These proposals will apparently be put in form of draft legis and decrees and submitted to mixed commission for discussion and agreement.

Latournelle expressed satis at outcome today's conversation and optimism for future. He stressed point made by Hauteclocque in press conf to effect former Mins might shortly be released from present place of confinement and added in his opinion it was to be hoped confinement of Bourguiba and others cld also be terminated fairly soon and state of siege lifted.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Tangier, and Rabat.
[2] See footnote 3, *supra*.

DUNN

772.00/3-2852 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 28, 1952—4: 30 p. m.

652. Re Tunisia—from Gross. On Balluseck's initiative as President SC, Ross and I met with him, Jebb and Hoppenot this morning as follows:

Balluseck reported Bokhari promise to inform him immediately any decision this morning. Bokhari's attitude reported as not wanting any more than necessary to agitate matter but rather to bring parties together. There were indications from Dutch Embassy, Paris that Tunisian Ministers recently there were afraid Arab-Asian group might go too far in presenting case.

In light of this morning's report that new Prime Minister had been named Hoppenot and Lacoste appeared to be greatly relieved and banking heavily on "new situation". They estimated situation next two or three days will be better than it has been or may be thereafter; therefore, they are inclined not to resist calling of SC meeting on Monday [1] if requested by Arab-Asians. They reserved judgment, however, as to whether they would wish council, if meeting called on Monday, to deal immediately with question of inclusion on agenda and "get it over with". Alternatively, motion for simple adjournment of meeting, which is not debatable (rule 33), might be made immediately following presentation of Arab-Asian request, presumably by Bokhari. I indicated we would probably be inclined to follow French tactical lead on this point. It was agreed that consideration should be given to interpretation Art. 35 in event non-member of SC, e.g. Indonesia, or entire Arab-Asian group, should request inclusion of item and opportunity to be heard on inclusion question.

If and when question of inclusion arises Hoppenot indicated he would hope to speak first and briefly, indicating Bey responsible authority had appointed new Prime Minister, negotiations in process of resumption, and therefore no question for Council to consider. Although he thought there might have been possibility his abstaining on question of inclusion, Hoppenot now felt in light new development he would almost certainly be instructed vote against.

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[1] Mar. 31.

Jebb indicated that under his present instructions if four other members were against inclusion UK would abstain or vote against. If there were not four others against, Jebb said he might have to vote for inclusion; he thought probably, however, he would be instructed to abstain.

Balluseck indicated that under no circumstances would he vote for inclusion. He was not clear whether he would be instructed to abstain or vote against.

There was agreement that indications definitely are that Brazil, Chile, China, Pakistan, Turkey and USSR would vote for inclusion, with UK, France and Netherlands against or abstaining, and Greece and US uncertain. I indicated we had not yet received instructions as to whether we would vote for or abstain. On assumption item included on agenda, Jebb indicated very strong opposition to seating all members if Arab-Asian group at table and equally strong opposition to inviting Tunisian reps. Balluseck, and of course Fr, seemed to share Jebb's views. Lacoste indicated, perhaps half facetiously, that reps of new Tunisian Govt might be invited to come. Jebb, and somewhat less wholeheartedly Balluseck, seemed to share Fr view on issue of competence. I indicated that I was without instructions on these points, pointing out, however, that precedents as in Iranian case indicated that inclusion on agenda did not prejudice issue of competence.

If question arises under Pak SC presidency, should Pak rep disqualify himself under rule 20 of SC rules of procedure?

Jebb inclined to view if Pak lodged complaint, he should step down.

AUSTIN

772.00/3-2852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 28, 1952—8:11 p. m.

362. Re Tunisian case. Now appears Fr-Tunisian negots based on Fr reform program will soon be underway. Since we believe Fr-Tunisian negots are best means toward solution problem, we consider SC consideration at this time undesirable.

You shld convey above soonest to Bokhari pointing out that overriding consideration is peaceful orderly advancement toward home rule in Tunisia. This advancement can best be achieved by direct negots between Fr and Tunisians on basis current Fr offer. In our estimation this offer constitutes an important step towards mtg what appear to be principal Tunisian demands. Without questioning jurisdiction of SC we believe SC consideration at this time wld complicate negots on basis of this offer which presents opportunity of progress. We can not see how any SC action at this time wld facilitate agreement.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Stein and Elting (UNP) and cleared with the offices of Sale (EUR), Bourgerie, Plitt and Cyr (NEA), McBride (WE), and Hickerson (UNA). Hickerson signed for the Secretary. It was repeated to Paris, Tunis, Karachi, Ankara, Athens, The Hague, London, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Taipei, Baghdad, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Tripoli, Amman, Jidda, and Beirut.

Recourse to SC remains open if present prospects prove illusory and if SC assistance shld later appear helpful in bringing parties together.

Under present circumstances US can not support SC consideration.

If Bokhari raises recent Fr actions in Tunis you shld say that while we do not condone Fr resort to forcible methods, important matter is get along with negots toward Tunisian home rule. You are authorized communicate above views to such other dels as you deem advisable.

ACHESON

772.00/3–2952 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 29, 1952—1:58 p. m.

656. Re Tunisian case. USUN this morning conferred about Tunisian case with Bokhari (Pak) who called at his request. After substance of Deptel 362, Mar 28,[2] was outlined to him, Bokhari made following comments:

Arab-Asian group is "emotionally and politically committed" to raise item in SC. Following meeting on Monday, it probably will do so through note to SC President on Wednesday requesting that SC meeting be called on Thursday or Friday, probably latter. He added that delay stems in part from fact that some dels require clearance from their govts regarding language to be used in note to SC Pres.

Bokhari said he agrees completely with US objectives re French-Tunisian negotiations, believes Fr reform program has much to commend it, and that as situation stood a week ago res to be tabled by Arab-Asian group would have concentrated on value negotiations, with only one or two other minor thoughts being added. But, he continued, recent French arrests in Tunisia now raise question as to whom Fr will negotiate with and that it appears to him that "French will be sitting on both sides of table." He observed that "British, who are a tough people" and French have resorted to such measures before and recalled how in India, Gandhi and Nehru were arrested under rather similar circumstances, but how, in final analysis, negotiations necessarily were conducted precisely with Gandhi and Nehru. He said he cannot believe newly appointed Tunisian leaders have any significant support from Tunisian people. He added that Arab-Asians are angered by belief that France has misused period of delay which was made possible by US recommendations, to which Arab-Asian group attaches heavy weight, in order to achieve a transient, political and tactical victory.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Karachi, and Tunis. The following sentence was added to the telegram sent to Tunis: "View imminence SC consideration you shld submit on priority basis all indications Tunisian reactions recent events with evaluation reliability and follow up with any details, confirmatory or otherwise."

[2] *Supra.*

Bokhari also referred to French use of force and believed Bey, who is old man, had succumbed to it. He pointed out that Arab-Asian countries are highly incensed about this and that he cannot urge too strongly, as one has a deep emotional attachment to US principles and traditions, that US rep in SC state clearly that US does not condone Fr use of force. When informed that "under present circumstances US cannot support SC consideration", he said he assumes this to mean that US will abstain on inclusion of item on SC agenda, in which case Arab-Asian move to place Tunisian case on SC agenda will be defeated. Upon being told that US will probably wish to be as quiet as possible during SC airing of Tunisian case, Bokhari hoped US will at least explain its vote and express itself on Fr resort to forcible methods, not only because of helpful effect this would have on Arab-Asian Govts and press, but also so as not entirely "to leave him all alone in SC with Jacob Malik", whose assistance he said we would not relish.

AUSTIN

772.00/4-152

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul at Tunis (LeBreton)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, March 31, 1952.

Participants: Comte de Choiseul-Praslin, Chief of the Diplomatic Cabinet of the Resident General
Mr. LeBreton, American Consul

This afternoon, after he had explained the reasons why it was impossible to obtain an exemption for the Consulate General's chauffeur, who has been called up for three weeks' special military service, M. de Choiseul turned to the current political situation. The immediate crisis, he said, might be over but the situation was far from being settled. The Resident General wants to end the state of siege and restore normal administrative processes as soon as possible, and had even considered the possibility of terminating the curfew and censorship as of this morning. After consultation with his staff, he reluctantly concluded that the former must remain for awhile yet. As for the latter, internal censorship will be continued for awhile, but there is in practice no censorship of outgoing letters, telegrams, or, as of today, telephone calls. The principle remains on the books, of course, and can be invoked if necessary. (M. de Choiseul professes small respect for the Tunisians, and said somewhat deprecatingly that "these people" need to feel a hand on the bridle.)

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 331 from Tunis, Apr. 1. (772.00/4-152)

The new Prime Minister, my informant continued, has been advised by the Resident General to go slowly in forming a ministry. The French want to give the Neo Destour and nationalists in general a chance to cool off. I mentioned the various motions and petitions that have come to our attention in which Tunisian groups say they will not recognize the legality of a non-Chenik government, and asked him if he thought the nationalists would accept the new setup. He dodged that one, but gave me the impression that the Residency is none too sure that things will work out as they hope. He said that there were lots of candidates but that it was important to staff the new cabinet with men of character and stature with whom they can work seriously on getting the reforms under way. The French have no desire to have to do this thing all over again. Baccouche he characterized as an "old fox."

At this point, he reverted to the question of internal security and the importance of maintaining it. He said that it was necessary to act promptly and drastically last week, for if the situation had been allowed to get out of hand, all of French North Africa would soon have followed and that would have spelled the end of the whole European defense concept.

I asked him about the "éloignés" and what plans the Resident General had for the release of Chenik and his group. He said it was hoped that this could be done as soon as possible. However, it is a decision to be taken when the new government is established. Apropos of their complaints about their quarters, he said that the other day the ex-ministers had tried to beat up some *Paris-Match* photographers who had refused to take phony pictures making it look as if they were in prison cells. Bourguiba ("c'est un fou") and the other exiles at Remada are a security problem; their release is not contemplated at present. I then jocosely mentioned the two rumors (1) that the Chenik cabinet had been rescued and spirited away to Libya, and (2) that Bourguiba had escaped, and he assured me both were false.

As for the rumored bomb explosion in Tunis last Saturday night, Choiseul at first professed not to be informed. He said, of course there had been a few explosions of "engines of local fabrication", i.e., sardine cans, which did little damage. In fact, the Residency officials are very surprised and grateful that there was so little of that sort of thing during the disorders. In his opinion, the Tunisians are people of no character. In Morocco the indigenous population would have put up much more of a show. In fact, yesterday's riots in Tangier were far worse than anything that happened here. I pressed my earlier question about the Saturday night explosion, and said that according to rumors it was more serious than the others and some one had been shot. He then admitted this was true, but said that the victim was trying to escape from the scene of the crime after curfew hours.

Choiseul wound up with a little encomium of his chief, Ambassador de Hauteclocque. To understand him (the Resident General), one must realize that the fundamental attributes of his character are those of the *bon père de famille*. This has colored all his actions in Tunisia. He is a good disciplinarian and expects his children to be well brought up, but he would never resort to unnecessary violence. He has insisted that General Garbay instruct the troops, police and gendarmerie not to shoot except on extreme provocation. The point that impressed him most and was in fact the turning point in his second conversation with the Bey was the latter's concern for the welfare of the Tunisian families who had already suffered and might suffer more unless the disorders of the last few months were promptly brought to an end. M. de Hauteclocque felt that he had indeed touched a responsive chord.

David LeBreton, Jr.

772.00/4-152 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

Tunis, April 1, 1952—8 a. m.

137. Current security measures including state of siege and press censorship driven nationalist agitation underground for time being, atmosphere here is outwardly calm and harmonious as between Fr and Tunis. However, we have had evidence during past few days in form of res, motions etc. delivered at Consulate that various nationalist groups are far from happy about development leading to Baccouche appointment and are by no means remaining politically inactive.

Group ostensibly representing "all shades Tunisian opinion" addressed motion to ResGen March 26 protesting arrest and exile of cab, coercion of Bey, martial law and disorders allegedly stemming therefrom and demanded immed change Fr policy in order normalize Franco-Tunisian relations. Document which was also communicated to Bey for his info, signed by 19 orgs including Neo-Destour, Old Destour, UGTT, UGAT, UCAT, professors of Grand Mosque, Young Moslems Assn, Tunisian Chambers of Commerce and Agri, lawyers etc.

Similar doc signed by Tahar Benamar on behalf same groups March 29 also declared present situation cld not be considered solution to Tunisian problem, that Tunisian people cannot be bound by UN rep cab and that they will continue struggle for their just claims.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Rabat, and Algiers.

Neo-Destour has likewise protested Fr policy and intimidation, characterized arrest Chenik Min as flagrant breach Tunisian sovereignty and disavowed legality of any new cab created under these circumstances. Copy this document signed and sealed by Hedi Nouira, Neo-Destour Asst SecGen, delivered to ConGen.

UGTT also chimed in as above and ordered gen protest strike April 1 motion, signed and sealed by Asst SecGen Boudali also delivered to ComGen.

While ResGen apparently intends lift state of siege soon as possible, nationalist activities as reflected by foregoing may be deemed sufficiently threatening to warrant postponement restoration normal admin of country.

JERNEGAN

772.00/4-252

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Pakistan–Afghanistan Affairs (Metcalf)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 2, 1952.

Subject: Pakistan Sponsorship of the Tunisian Case in the Security Council

Participants: H. E. Mohammed Ali, Ambassador of Pakistan
SOA—Mr. D. D. Kennedy
—Mr. Lee E. Metcalf

Mr. Mohammed Ali called this morning on instructions from his government officially to inform the Department of State that the Pakistan Government is taking steps to place the Tunisian case on the agenda of the Security Council at an early date.[1] After delivering his message the Ambassador read the text of a telegram from the Foreign Office to the effect that the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Zafrulla Khan, had very recently told the French Ambassador in Karachi that, in the absence of a reply from the French Government to certain questions put to it by the Pakistan Government, the latter had no other alternative but to proceed according to plan.

Before taking his departure, Mohammed Ali asked what he could report to his government to be the reaction of the State Department to Pakistan's decision. Mr. Kennedy countered by asking what Pakistan thought might be gained by presenting the case at this time. The Ambassador replied that any sign of advance in the progressive realization of Tunisia's national aspirations is the desired objective, adding that it is his personal opinion that if the Security Council became seized of the issue the Tunisian people would be less likely to take direct action in the matter. The discussion was concluded with a comment by Mr. Kennedy to the effect that while there was a time for everything, in his opinion the timing of the Tunisian item on the Security Council agenda was unfortunate.

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[1] A memorandum of a telephone conversation by Elting reported Cory had called from New York at 11:15 a. m. on Apr. 2 to report that Pakistan had requested that the Tunisian case be brought to the Security Council. The Secretariat had received communications from a number of the Arab-Asian countries requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council. (651.72/4-252)

772.00/4-252 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 2, 1952—11:11 a. m.

663. Re Tunisia. In considering procedure to be followed Tunisian case we are impressed by fact Asian-African group was not persuaded by Dept views (Deptel 362, March 28)[1] made clear to Bokhari as reported USUN's 656, March 29.[2] In view this fact, specific problem is what position USUN should take on question of inscribing item on agenda.

USUN believes we should vote for inscription. Problem as we see it is one of fundamental policy re use of UN forum. US traditional and consistent view has been that inscription of item on agenda does not prejudge question of competence nor does it imply decision that question is ripe for consideration. As example, Formosan question is on UN agenda but we have been able consistently to postpone consideration of question.

It seems to us dangerous from point of view effective future conduct proceedings in UN to reverse our past policy and practice, since thereby issue would arise in every future case whether putting item on agenda prejudges or prejudices either competence or merits. Disadvantages obvious re cases such as Iranian oil or complaints we may in future wish to bring against Communists. Moreover, see no useful purpose served re Tunisia by reversal of consistent past practice, since we can as we have done successfully so often, argue for postponement consideration of question once it is on agenda. In our view orderly and logical course toward which Deptel 362, March 28 points would be for us to vote for inscription on agenda but move or support, as we feel majority of Council would do, postponement of consideration.

We are concerned by politically damaging aspects of reversing in Tunisian case our traditional principle of voting for inscription, however such a case may lack merit. Attitude of Asian-African group, as reported ourtel 656, March 29, is that France is sitting on both sides of conference table and therefore medium for good faith negotiations is absent. Future course of negotiations will reveal truth or falsity of Asian-African concern. Hence postponement of issue is supportable and we do not undermine our moral position if we explain reasons why we favor postponement.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 703.
[2] *Ante*, p. 704.

AUSTIN

772.00/4–252 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 2, 1952—5:10 p. m.

665. Re Tunisian case. Kyrou (Gr) called today at his request on Gross, Ross and Cory to report his conversation this morning with Azad (Pak) re Tunisian case and to seek latest US views on subject.

1. Kyrou learned that Pak del wishes to call SC meeting this week, preferably Friday, possibly Saturday morning, and that Bokhari does not intend to step down from presidency.

2. According to Kyrou Azad intimated that Asian-African group consists basically of only 12 members, for Ethiopia, Syria and Lebanon participate very slightly in group discussions, advancing as reasons their lack of instructions.

3. Kyrou said his instructions (which he requested us to hold as strictly confidential) are to vote as US. He therefore has an exceptional interest in US policy on Tunisian case and is prepared to work closely with us. He sees US and Gr votes as critical, for he still adheres to his estimated line-up of US, UK and Neth abstaining on inscription and Pak, USSR, Chile and China voting for, with Brazil and Turkey also voting for, although positions of last two dels are still not quite firm. He is much concerned about adverse effect Greek abstention would have on Greek-Arab relations.

4. Kyrou said that in his talk with Azad this morning, Kyrou pointed to 3 elements in Tunisian case: Inscription, competence of SC, and substance. He said he suggested to Azad that he thought a happy solution might be for SC to inscribe item but then immediately to postpone discussions on competence and substance, thus giving time for French-Tunisian negotiations and general development of Tunisian situation to proceed. Kyrou said that after Azad reacted negatively to this suggestion, he then suggested to Azad that such postponement of Tunisian qustion might be beneficial to Pak, if based on logic that Kashmir question is about to come again before SC and that SC should handle Kashmir before entering into full-fledged discussion of competence and substance in Tunisian case. According to

Kyrou, Azad reacted "very favorably" to this suggestion and agreed to discuss it with Bokhari.

5. Kyrou said he also this morning discussed with Lacoste (Fr) possibility of postponement after inscription, that Lacoste also reacted "very favorably" and agreed to discuss suggestion with Hoppenot. Kyrou offered to inform USUN of further reactions of Bokhari and Hoppenot which he expects to receive this afternoon.

6. Kyrou then suggested to USUN that if, despite his hope, US does abstain on inscription perhaps an arrangement might be worked out under which he would still vote for inscription and immediately thereafter explain his vote in which, after referring to precedents in Iranian and other cases, he would move for immediate postponement of SC discussions re competence and substance. He felt reasonably certain that such postponement would be supported by Greece, US, France, UK, Neth, Brazil, Turkey and quite possibly China, provided, of course, that appropriate arrangements are made before-hand with these dels. He also pointed out that such a move would have additional advantage of postponing SC decision whether to invite members of Asian-African group to table.

7. We agreed to report conversation to Dept.

Austin

772.00/4-252 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY New York, April 2, 1952—7:56 p. m.

668. Re Tunisian case. Following conversations were held by Cory this afternoon during disarm com mtg:

1. Kyrou (Greece) said that he has had further discussions separately with Lacoste (Fr) and Azad (Pak) re his suggestion of postponement SC mtg following adoption of Tunisian item on agenda (see USUN 665, Apr 2).[1] According to Kyrou, Azad said that Bokhari reacted negatively to idea but wished to think about it further and Azad will speak to Kyrou again on subject. Kyrou said that Lacoste, however, found Hoppenot favorably inclined to idea.

2. Cory later asked Lacoste directly what latter thought of Kyrou suggestion. Lacoste replied that he still hopes US and Gr (which he firmly believes will follow US lead) will abstain on inscription and thus avoid all discussion. If however, Lacoste continued, US decides to vote for inscription then he personally believes Kyrou's suggestion would be very desirable provided always that appropriate arrangements are made with other dels for them immediately to support proposal for postponement which Kyrou would make, and that timing of

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[1] *Supra.*

Kyrou proposal be such as to forestall Bokhari inviting members of Asian-African group to sit at table. When Lacoste expressed some concern lest Cory's inquiry may foreshadow Dept's decision to vote for inscription, Cory explained that USUN has received no further instructions since Saturday, that USUN has no foreknowledge of future instructions, that inquiry was motivated only by desire of USUN to examine possible alternative programs of action, and that it was solely in this connection that confirmation of Lacoste's statements to Kyrou were desired. Lacoste said he is seeking instructions from Paris re Kyrou suggestion.

3. Azad expressed doubt that seven members of SC will vote for inscription but said his govt feels so strongly about matter that it would call SC meeting on Tunisian case even if it stood alone. He expressed himself feelingly on importance of SC giving full hearing to item, pointing out that UN is designed precisely for that purpose and adding that he thinks negotiations between Fr and present Tunisian leaders would serve true interests of Tunisia no more than negotiations between USSR and Marshal Rokossovsky would serve interests of Poland. Azad said Pak del has instructions to call meeting this week, that Saturday would be unsatisfactory to certain members and that Monday would be unsuitable for Neth del which is expecting arrival of Queen Julianna. Therefore Friday afternoon was chosen. Kyrou suggestion was not discussed with Azad.

4. Dayal (India) expressed hope that US will act in accordance with its traditions and support SC airing of Tunisian case. He pointed out that issues are now being heatedly debated in India press and elsewhere in Asian-African countries. He inferred that within Asian-African group some Arab dels are extremely emotional about matter, but said that he himself looks at the subject more cooly realizing that SC itself is not an emotional organ, and that he believes SC could usefully contribute to lessening of tensions in Tunisia and speeding up of genuine negotiations there. He added that within Asian-African group his del, for instance, was taking strong position against any radical or emotional program such as condemnation of Fr which, he implied, is favored by some of more hot-headed Arabs.

AUSTIN

772.00/4–252 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TUNIS, April 2, 1952—3 p. m.

140. Tunisians currently have virtually no opportunity demon-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Algiers, Rabat, and Naples.

strate their reaction to recent polit events (re Deptel 70, March 31,[2] recd here April 1, 3 p. m.). All newspapers are under Fr censorship. Radio is French operated. Public mtgs are forbidden. Virtually all nationalist leaders are either in prison, in forced residence in southern desert (where they seem no longer to have privilege of communicating with outsiders), or outside Tunisia. Consequently, our estimate of situation must necessarily be based on deduction, local rumor and minimum of hard info. These bases may be summarized as fol:

1. All major nationalist orgs have protested against French actions and refused to recognize legality of any new cabinet. Groups signing these statements have included conservative Tunisian Chambers Commerce and Agriculture led by moderate Tahar Ben Ammar. (mytel 137, March 31 [*April 1*])[3] Under present conditions, however, it is impossible be sure leaders these orgs accurately reflect attitude majority their members.

2. Chenik and other exiled Mins insist they are still legal cabinet and represent will of Tunisian people. Reject appt of Baccouche and Bey's capitulation to French demands as brought about by coercion. (See Homer Bigart story *NY Herald Tribune* March 31) claim new French reform program is merely another French stall and means no more than previous French reform promises.

3. Baccouche was most reluctant accept appt as PriMin and has obviously had great difficulty persuading reputable individuals join cabinet. This may be partly due to fear of physical violence by natlists and partly to patriotic feeling. Some people speculate Baccouche and Bey are playing stalling game in hopes of internatl action.

4. On other hand, predictions that natlists wld react violently to French arrest of Mins (mytel 125, Mar 26)[4] have not been fulfilled. Past week has seen no mass demonstrations and fewer attacks and sabotages than previously. Gen strike called April 1 by UGTT, with USTT support, seems to have been substantial failure although as usual Arab portions of towns closed up shop.

My best guess is that majority of people wld probably vote reinstate Chenik if they had opportunity and that natlist leaders will continue reject negots or acts of Baccouche govt as illegal and unrepresentative. Whether Bey secretly shares this attitude is great unknown. He may as French suggest, be happy to be relieved of Neo-Destour pressure but he probably resents French procedures and may fear eventual reaction his own people against him. He clearly is not free agent at present.

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[2] This was USUN telegram 656, Mar. 29, p. 704, as sent to Tunis with the addition of the material in footnote 1 thereto.

[3] *Ante*, p. 707.

[4] Not printed; it reported the Tunisians were greatly excited by news of the dismissal of the Cabinet. The Consulate General had received information that if the Resident General resorted to force against the Cabinet the situation would develop into a state of guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, if he backed down the French would suffer further loss of prestige in Tunisia. (772.00/3-2652)

Regardless of subjective feelings of majority Tunisians, it is perfectly possible that they will tacitly accept new cabinet and new reform proposals, for time being, as best they can get in face French power and as point of departure for future polit struggle when conditions more favorable.

[JERNEGAN]

772.00/4-352 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET TUNIS, April 3, 1952—noon.

142. Very reliable Tun source today assured me Bey was deeply distressed at having to dismiss Chenik Cabinet and did so only under direct threat of deposition. Source, who has strong Nationalist sentiments but is friendly to French and has never been politically active, has talked with Bey since dismissal and claims latter had tears in his eyes when he spoke of recent events and said appt Baccouche as PriMin was forced upon him by Pres Auriol's msg which proposed Baccouche by name and said "this is your last chance". Bey ceded because his own deposition wld merely have brought complete French puppet to throne and have gained nothing for Tunisia.

Bey is moving to summer palace Carthage today, one month ahead of usual time, and my informant says this is because he is deeply unhappy and will feel more at home at Carthage palace which belongs to him personally.

Source has been mentioned as possible member new cabinet but states he has not been approached and wld in any case refuse. Says no reputable Tunisian wld willingly accept office in cabinet which will obviously be rubber stamp for French. If cabinet is eventually formed under Baccouche, informant believes it will be composed of career civil servants who dare not refuse.

States in his opinion Tun people deeply shocked by Fr actions and will never accept new cabinet or reforms so long as policy of force maintained. Adds that Tunisians consider reform program announced by Baccouche April 1 (mytel April 2)[2] as inadequate and full of loopholes.

JERNEGAN

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris.

[2] Presumably this reference is to Tunis telegram 140, *supra*.

772.00/4-352

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert McBride, Office of Western European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1952.

Subject: The Tunisian Question

Participants: Ambassador Bonnet
Mr. Van Laetham
Mr. Perkins
Mr. McBride

Ambassador Bonnet called at his request to discuss the Tunisian case and said that it was his impression from what we had told him that the US would not support inscription of the case on the SC agenda. Mr. Perkins stated that this question was being discussed this afternoon. Mr. Perkins said that we had received some information from New York indicating France might abstain from voting. The Ambassador said that France would vote against inscription and had asked if the UK could do likewise. He said he would be grateful if the US might also take a firm line and vote against inscription.

In continuing he said that the news from Tunisia was good and that it was hoped a cabinet would be formed tomorrow. He said that relations with the Bey were entirely satisfactory and that the slight delay in announcing the cabinet was due to personality problems among the Tunisians and not to any political difficulties.

Returning to the SC case he said it would appear unfortunate for France to vote alone against inscription, and he believed that the more resolute action of voting against the inscription by the US and the UK would have a better effect for the future and would also demonstrate a desirable western solidarity.

In so far as the reform program in Tunisia is concerned he said he believed we considered this program a satisfactory one, and that it had been taken following two years of requests by the US that some progressive action be taken in North Africa. He said it would help immeasurably in getting the program under way if we could make some statement showing we approved the program.

Mr. Perkins inquired as to what, in the Ambassador's view, were the hazards of putting the case on the agenda. The Ambassador said that discussion in the UN could not possibly lead to a solution of the Tunisian problem. He said France would claim the SC had no competence if the question were inscribed on the agenda and would oppose any substantial discussions if it were undertaken. He said inscription was the best means of causing disturbances in Tunisia and would encourage extremist elements who are already receiving support from the Soviet Union, the Arab-Asian bloc, and some encouragement from US press articles. With all this support, he added, the extremist elements expect to win, and such action by the SC would encourage them further toward their aim of taking over the North African protectorates and establishing their own dictatorships there. He thought a crisis in the UN itself might be created, while discussion of the question, by its disruptive effect in North Africa, would only assist the Soviet cause.

The Ambassador stressed that the majority of the Tunisian people are calm and that an understanding is possible. He said that the French policy in North Africa is the same as in Europe and that North Africa should be integrated into Europe as much as possible and, because of its strategic importance to all of the Atlantic powers, not cut off from it.

Mr. Perkins asked what would be the effect if the French in the SC would say that they have nothing whatever to be ashamed of in North Africa and accordingly would welcome an investigation. The Ambassador replied this would be a great success for the Arab-Asian block and would cause North African people to support this block even more against the west. In reply to a comment of Mr. Perkins the Ambassador said unfortunately only a firm policy could be successful. He stressed that world peace was not threatened by events in Tunisia and that French acceptance of an investigation would cause a clamor throughout the area. He remarked that the Secretary had told him that he believed a bilateral solution to this problem was the best one, and that the French are now undertaking this.

Mr. Perkins reiterated that this matter was being discussed this afternoon and that we would be in touch with the French here or in New York later in the day. The Ambassador said that inscription of this question on the UN agenda would endanger the future of the UN and that French democracy should be permitted an opportunity to function in North Africa. He said that this case in New York was a vitally important one which was being agitated by many irresponsible elements. He regretted that we had been unsuccessful in preventing its being brought to the UN, and said that, however, the US must continue to take the lead in this question.

Prior to departing Mr. Van Laetham stated that the French believed they would obtain our support by proposing this far-reaching program since it appeared to meet the conditions which we had always made for giving them our blessing in North Africa. The Ambassador closed by stating that the Embassy was already in some difficulty with the French Government because it had pushed what it thought was the Department's views on this question. If we would not now support France, he said, it would seem that nothing short of French withdrawal in North Africa would satisfy us.

772.00/4-352

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Barbara Evans, Office of the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1952.

Participants: Mrs. Roosevelt
Mr. Acheson

Mrs. Roosevelt telephoned the Secretary about 11:30 this morning and said that she had not intended to bring the Tunisian matter up before she saw him next week (when she has an appointment at 11 a. m. on April 10),[1] but in view of the recent development she felt she had to call the Secretary. She urged very strongly that, if it was at all possible, we should not vote against the question going on the Security Council agenda, whatever we do afterwards. She said that if we have to vote to keep it off the agenda she has a very strong feeling that it will do us great harm with the entire Arab group. She said anything we could do now toward helping to settle the Moroccan situation and towards creating a little better feeling toward us among the Arabs is desperately important. She said she realized fully what a dreadfully difficult question it was to decide. She said the feeling that she had found throughout the Arab countries, including Pakistan, on this question was extremely high and she thought that we must try to settle the refugee question and handle the Moroccan one in such a way that more stability in that vital area would be created. She said she understood why we had had to handle the Moroccan question as we did in the General Assembly and she had explained the situation over and over again.

The Secretary said that he appreciated very much indeed her calling him; that the question was a most difficult one; that he had just come from a meeting at which it was discussed in the Department with great divergence of opinion and that he was going to meet on the matter again this afternoon.[2] He said he would like to ask her whether she

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[1] Regarding Roosevelt's meeting with the Secretary on Apr. 10, see footnote 2, p. 725.

[2] No memoranda of these conversations have been found in Department of State files. The files do, however, contain memoranda documenting the differing positions of the various bureaus in the Department. A memorandum by Knight (WE) to Perkins (EUR), dated Mar. 27, recommended that the United States vote against inscription of the Tunisian question on the Security Council agenda or, if that position were deemed impossible, abstain. While stating that nothing in the memorandum was intended to condone recent French actions in Tunisia, it urged that the U.S. purpose was to bring about a dialogue between the French and Tunisians rather than to assess rights and wrongs and pass judgment. The memorandum claimed that a vote placing the United States overtly on the side of dependent peoples would stiffen French intransigence and possibly cause serious trouble within NATO. (WE files, lot 54 D 467, "Tunisia")

A memorandum by Hickerson (UNA) to the Secretary, dated Apr. 3, recommended that the United States vote to place the Tunisian item on the Security Council agenda. The memorandum, drafted by Elting (UNP) and concurred in by

Footnote continued on following page.

thought it would be helpful if we voted to put it on the agenda and then took a vigorous position against having it discussed in the Security Council until the parties concerned had an opportunity to try to solve the question themselves. She replied that she thought that would help us a great deal. She would not like to see us take a position which which would bar the question coming up eventually for discussion.

She closed by saying that our action in the General Assembly [on Morocco] had done us a great deal of harm; if we repeated that position we would create feeling against us which would take a very long time to overcome, if it could be done at all.

The Secretary thanked Mrs. Roosevelt again for her views.

B[ARBARA] E[VANS]

Footnote continued from preceding page.

NEA, reported that USUN in New York had also strongly recommended that position. The United States had told the French that it could oppose Security Council consideration only if negotiations had started or were imminent, and those conditions did not exist. (772.00/4–352)

772.00/4–452: Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TUNIS, April 4, 1952—6 p. m.

145. Res Gen sent for me this afternoon, apparently to tell me that he considered everything was going very well. He said:

1. Baccouche will probably announce formation of Cab tomorrow. (Hauteclocque) has deliberately avoided intervention in discussions on formation of Cab, being confident that Baccouche wld choose only "friends of France," and does not know who will be members.

2. Mixed common reforms, which will meet April 24 will probably be composed of seven French and seven Tunisians. Hauteclocque intends ask Baccouche appoint Tunisian representing all viewpoints. Character of French representation still undecided but impossible eliminate French colony of Tunisia. He is thinking of recommending three French from Tunisia and four from France. It will probably meet neither at Paris nor Tunis, possibly at some spot near Marseille, to avoid outside pressure.

3. Once new Cab formed he plans remove special security measures such as curfew and release exiled mins. He is much pleased that events of past ten days have passed off without bloodshed and asked that I point this out to Wash. (This is true if one overlooks few isolated incidents which may have no direct relations to strong measures taken against Tunisian leaders.)

4. One Tunis informant (son of Bey Ducamp, heir apparent) overheard Bey tell his wife that Res Gen had been harsh in dealing with

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Algiers, and Rabat.

him (the Bey) "but at least had delivered him from clutches of Neo-Destour."

5. It has been proposed that new legis advisory assembly shld be appointed rather than elected. This was only comment Bey made on reform program when Res Gen presented it to him.

6. Baccouche will probably issue statement tomorrow disavowing Tunisian complaint to UN.

7. Protests circulated in name of Natlist or US (mytel 140 April 2)[2] have been in reality drawn up and signed by small group of leaders, one for each org, who have not consulted their members in advance.

JERNEGAN

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[2] *Ante*, p. 712.

772.00/4-252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 4, 1952—12:31 p.m.

370. Re: Tunisia.

1. Dept has weighed carefully alternative courses of action open to you on question of how US shld vote on inscription of Tunisian item on SC agenda, urtel 663, Apr 2,[2] and Secy concluded that you shld abstain on question of placing Tunisian item an agenda. This decision you shld communicate to all friendly SC Dels. Statement to be made by you before voting contained in next fol tel.[3]

2. If item is placed on agenda we feel you shld take fol position:

a) Oppose seating of entire Arab-Asian group of complainants at SC table on ground that their interests cannot be considered as "specially affected" as required by Art 31 of Charter. Rule 37 gives discretion to SC whether to invite members bringing matter before SC. SC must apply rule of reason in exercising this discretion and shld not allow elected SC membership of 11 to be submerged by equal or even larger number of nonmembers. We feel that compromise arrangement seating one member as spokesman of Arab co-sponsors and perhaps another as spokesman of Asian co-sponsors a reasonable one. We suggest you take same position if this issue is raised prior to vote on insertion of item on agenda.

b) If proposal is made to hear former ministers of Tunisian Bey presently in Cairo or any spokesman of Neo-Destour party, you shld support and if necessary propose postponement on ground that you will require further info concerning these individuals and generally obtain instructions on this impt decision. We assume that Fr will not propose in today's mtg that reps of Bey shld be heard. If proposal to invite any Tunisian is made prior to inclusion of this item in agenda, we suggest you take position that in accordance with established practice such proposal shld be voted upon only if and after matter is included in agenda. If, nevertheless, the vote is taken on this issue prior to insertion you shld abstain.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Stein and Wainhouse (UNP) and cleared with the offices of Allen (EUR), Runyon (L/UNA) by phone, Hickerson (UNA), and NEA. It was repeated to Paris and Tunis.

[2] *Ante*, p. 709.

[3] Telegram 371, *infra*.

3. If question is raised in private conversations or in Council re propriety of Pak Rep presiding over mtgs dealing with Tunisian matter, you can point out that US wld not desire express any view on this issue in this case, and under Rule 20 wld leave decision to Pres of Council himself.

4. We feel that US shld not play a leading role in the consideration of this case.[4]

Acheson

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[4] Barbara Salt of the British Embassy came to the Department of State on the morning of Apr. 4 to advise the Department the United Kingdom had instructed Sir Gladwyn Jebb to vote against inscription of the Tunisian item rather than abstain. She urged strongly that the United States instruct its representative to vote the same way, suggesting the negative vote could be justified on grounds that inscription would prejudice the real objective of a solution through negotiations. An officer of the Department informed her that it was unlikely that the U.S. decision to abstain would be changed at such a late date and gave her the substance of telegram 370 and the message in telegram 371, *infra.* (Memorandum of conversation of Apr. 4; 651.72/4–452)

772.00/4–452 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 4, 1952—6:25 p. m.

371. Fol is SC statement on Tunisian case based on your suggested revision:

"I shld like to express fol views of my govt on this subject.

"It is only natural that the states which have proposed inclusion of this item on agenda, drawing heavily upon their own past experience, shld do everything they consider helpful in encouraging the progress of other areas towards self-govt.

"My govt has always considered that UN organs shld be available for examination of any problem which causes serious friction in internatl relations. For this reason we have supported inscription of charges, however groundless or malicious, when made against US.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Stein and Wainhouse (UNP) and cleared with the offices of Allen (EUR), Bourgerie (NEA), and Sandifer (UNA). Hickerson signed for the Secretary. Circular telegram 837, Apr. 4, to 19 posts in North Africa, the Middle East, Far East, Europe, and Latin America informed them the Department of State had decided the U.S. Representative in the Security Council should abstain on the question of placing the Tunisian item on the agenda. Circular telegram 843, Apr. 7, read: "Fol is text of statement US Rep expects make in S.C. before vote on admission Tunisian item. You shld fol this gen line if matter raised by FonOff or local authorities." It then repeated telegram 371 to 30 posts in Africa, the Middle East, Far East, South Asia, Latin America, and Europe.

Telegram 377 to USUN, Apr. 9, read as follows: "Re: Tunis. Dept believes in order clarify publicly reasons for known US position you shld seek make statement (Deptel 371) at SC mtg tomorrow. If you see serious tactical disadvantage pls advise." Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.

At same time, it is clear that under the Charter the parties to a controversy are obliged to seek a solution by negot. As SC consideration shld be designed to help the parties reach agreement, each member of SC, which acts on behalf of all members of UN, has a responsibility to ask himself whether consideration of a problem in the Council at a given moment will really help to bring the parties closer to the desired agreement.

"From the info available to my govt, it wld appear that the essential facts may be summed up as fols. There is a genuine and broadly-shared desire on the part of the inhabitants of Tunisia for a greater voice in the govt of that area. On the other hand, Fr authorities have recognized the validity of Tunisian demand for internal autonomy. They have proposed a plan for the people of Tunisia to progress toward that goal and it is hoped that negot between the Fr authorities and the Tunisians will soon begin.

"We do not wish to pass judgment upon the most recent developments in Tunisia. The US, however, cannot condone the use of forceful methods by either party. Force cannot possibly be an end in itself. Force and violence only serve to embitter the atmosphere and thus impair the chances of peaceful progress toward the common objective.

"It is the belief of my govt that at this moment it is more useful to concentrate on the problem of facilitating negots between the Fr and the Tunisians than to engage in debate at this table. The overriding objective of the SC must be to foster agreement through negot between the parties themselves. The Fr program of reforms, in our view, appear to constitute a basis for the resumption of negots looking toward the estab of home rule in Tunisia. We fervently hope that France faithful to its tradition, will bring about far-sighted and genuine reforms in Tunisia; history has taught us that in the long run the voices of those who really represent a people will be heard and will assert themselves.

"The Council will note that in stressing the desirability of negotiation, I am not dealing with the question of the Council's competence to consider this matter. If this item is not included on our agenda at this time, the Council will, nevertheless, remain open to any member of the UN to bring the question to the Council's attention again. My govt wld naturally reassess the situation if that is done.

"For these reasons, Mr. President, I have been instructed to abstain on the question of including this item on our agenda at this time."

ACHESON

772.00/4-552 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 5, 1952—1:01 p. m.

5923. Under Secy called in Amb Bonnet today and informed him as fols re Tunisian case:

"After most careful and exhaustive consideration the Secy of State decided, as you are aware, to abstain on question inscription Tunisian case in SC. He took this decision, rather than one to vote for inscription, only because we believe this course of action shld be conducive to creating more auspicious climate than otherwise for talks between Fr Govt and Tunisian auths looking towards Protectorate's internal autonomy. Fr Govt must realize that our decision not to vote for inscription will have unfavorable repercussions not only in various other parts of world, but also in our own press and among Congressional circles.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by McBride and Knight (WE) and cleared with the offices of Hickerson (UNA), Berry (NEA), Perkins (EUR), Byington (WE), and Bruce (U) in draft. It was repeated to London, Jidda, Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Tangier, Tripoli, Addis Ababa, Monrovia, and Rabat.

Other nations may likewise abstain on issue but it is clear to us as it must be to you that number other govts may look to us on quest. Without our action Tunisian case wld have been inscribed SC agenda so onus falls on us. Accordingly we feel we have right talk frankly with you this subj.

You will therefore see from our willingness to face the attacks which will be leveled against us, great importance which we attach to this quest. We have been willing fol this course only because we have full confidence France will make good opportunity thus created to take rapid strides towards Tunisian settlement which will be satisfactory to two parties concerned. If progress is not soon evident, we do not see how we can pursue our present course.

Specifically, it is of course apparent that creation representative Tunisian cabinet is prerequisite any effective negots. Therefore, we trust that there will be developments in this field in next day or two. Estab of Tunisian Govt that wld justify charge which has been made in some quarters to effect France 'wld be sitting on both sides of Conference table' wld obviously not permit real solution problem. In this connection US Govt ventures to hope that Fr Govt will give due weight to importance of representative Tunisian Govt and therefore will facilitate formation such cabinet.

Furthermore, we earnestly hope provisions an acceptable Fr reform program, will be put into effect just as rapidly as possible.

Finally, we believe tension wld be relieved and negots facilitated if extraordinary measures which were taken on occasion arrest former PriMin and his associates were lifted promptly, and that former mins and others detained purely for polit reasons were released. Our Emb Paris has informed us Fr Govt has already recommended ResGen Tunis liberalization these extraordinary measures. We consider this wise move and hope it will be carried out. We desire help Fr on this problem but must state frankly measures taken by Fr such as arrests PriMin and others have made it most difficult be of assistance. In this connection we also note suspension Apr 3 of Moroccan nationalist daily newspaper in Rabat, and fear measures this sort are conducive creating atmosphere which we are sure both France and ourselves wish avoid.

In conclusion we must stress that while we believe decision which we reached abstain Tunisian quest SC is correct one in immediate present, it is necessarily of temporary nature and can be confirmed only when Franco-Tunisian talks will have succeeded putting into effect an acceptable reform program. Shld developments Protectorate progress unsatisfactorily we wld very likely be forced to vote to inscribe item shld it be raised again. Finally, we believe that time is running short and we note initial mtg Tunis scheduled for Apr 24.

We wld wish see mtg even before Apr 24 if possible in light SC situation. We express fervent hope that substantive discussions will be scheduled leading to implementation reform program Tunisia earliest possible date."

ACHESON

772.00/4-752: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 7, 1952—7 p. m.

6159. Deptels 5923[2] and 5924,[3] April 5, rptd Tunis 74 and 75. We have this morning shown text re Bruce–Bonnet talk contained reftel to Maurice Schumann and to La Tournelle. Bonnet's report coincided with that in ref tel concerning major elements US position and particularly re our attitude toward inscribing Tunisian item on SC agenda in event unsatis developments in Tunisia.

Maurice Schumann said he hoped for favorable developments today, including announcement Baccouche's cabinet and also of Tunisian members of mixed commission to negotiate on reform program. He said new cabinet should be considered as temporary admin group and that it wld consist of reliable "neutral" persons, including some officials. Tunisian element of mixed commission will be most representative; it will consist of seven members, including one from Neo-Destour, one from old Destour, one independent nationalist, a rep of Tunisian land owners, a Jew representing business activities, an important trade union official and one man of independent prestige.

Maurice Schumann stressed need for an understanding of France's position and problem and for solidarity between Allies. He spoke emotionally of Korea and Indochina. He referred to recently published Bourguiba letters as proving Bourguiba's deliberate plans for bloodshed and chaos.[4] We replied by urging that French create conditions to facilitate our support and we referred again, as we have frequently done, to bad effect produced by forcible removal and confinement of former ministers. Schumann reiterated latter will be released as soon as new cabinet is formed.

DUNN

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed. It instructed the Embassy to show telegram 5923 to the Foreign Ministry at various levels, so that the French would be under no illusions regarding the U.S. view of the gravity of the situation, and there would be no opportunity for a misunderstanding of the question between the French Embassy in Washington and the French Foreign Ministry. (772.00/4-552)

[4] Despatch 2711 from Paris, Apr. 11, transmitted a translation of two letters which the Embassy reported were allegedly written by Bourguiba in 1950. The letters had been printed in the French newspaper *Le Figaro* on Apr. 5 and 6. (772.00/4-1152)

772.00/4–952 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 9, 1952—9 a. m.

6189. La Tournelle this afternoon informed us that FonOff had been much disappointed at failure Baccouche yesterday to constitute Cabinet and to announce Tunisian membership of mixed commission to discuss reforms. He reported that Baccouche called together designated Tunisian members of mixed commission for preparation reforms and was told by them yesterday evening they considered terms of reference insufficiently broad to enable them to take affirmative decision at once; in other words, they would have to give further consideration to question of their participation and they implied they hoped for further unspecified concessions from French side.

In view this development Baccouche informed Hauteclocque constitution Cabinet wld be delayed. When Hauteclocque remonstrated and urged importance of having functioning Tunisian Govt Baccouche promised to see if he cld make an announcement tomorrow. It has come to light in this connection, according to La Tournelle, that Bey generally only places his seal on official documents on Thursday of each week.

La Tournelle concludes from all this that "Baccouche is taking us for a ride." La Tournelle feels Baccouche wld like to wait for SC disposition of Tunisian item before finalizing constitution Cabinet. In event SC decides to take up Tunisian item there wld presumably be no Baccouche Cabinet. Assuming, however, that SC will probably fail to act on Tunisian item, Baccouche is coming to feel, according to La Tournelle, that from point view his own position constitution Cabinet after rather than before such failure wld be preferable. Hence his delaying tactics.

DUNN

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Tangier, Rome for Unger, and Rabat.

Truman Library, PSF Subject file, "Tunisia"

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 9, 1952.

Subject: Your Conversation with Mrs. Roosevelt on Tunisia

Mrs. Roosevelt may raise the subject of Tunisia with you when she sees you at noon, April 10.[2] Should she do so, she will very probably argue that our decision to abstain in the impending Security Council vote on the question of inscribing the Tunisian item on the Council's agenda is a grave mistake. She may refer to the strong position which you took in the speech I read for you on April 8 in favor of political freedom for the peoples of Asia and Africa.[3]

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[1] A copy of the source text in Department of State files was attached to a memorandum by Hickerson to the Secretary of State, dated Apr. 9, stating that the Secretary might want to send it to the President for his use when he spoke with Roosevelt on Tunisia the following day. (330/4–952)

The source text was drafted by Popper and Wainhouse (UNP) on Apr. 9.

If this subject is raised, it would be most helpful if you could explain to Mrs. Roosevelt the objective we have in mind in our Security Council tactics on Tunisia. Our purpose is to foster agreement through negotiations between the French and Tunisians, leading to the attainment of Tunisian self-government. This is what the Tunisians say they desire, and it is an objective fully in keeping with the philosophy underlying your speech of April 8.

To facilitate negotiations it has seemed best to us to avoid Security Council consideration while the parties are seeking to start discussions. Security Council consideration at this stage would inflame emotions on both sides and harden their extreme positions. The United Nations Charter (Article 33) recognizes that the parties to a dispute should seek a settlement by direct negotiations before they bring the matter to the Security Council.

In abstaining on the motion to put the Tunisian matter on the Security Council agenda, we shall make it clear that we are not departing from our general willingness to consider in the United Nations problems which cause serious international friction. We shall simply state that we think that this is not the proper time to raise the matter in the Council and we will reassess the situation if at any time the subject should again be presented for Security Council consideration. We do not condone acts of violence by either side.

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[2] A memorandum drafted by Elting, dated Apr. 11, read as follows: "It appears Mrs. Roosevelt spoke to the Secretary about Tunisia but not to the President.

"She was quite upset over the case but after the Secretary had informed her of the statement we intended to make and indicated his intention to take a new look at the matter if the French do not get negotiations started and if the case is brought to the UN again, she went away quite happy. It appears that she commented on the fact that our position is sometimes better than we can make known publicly." (330/4–1152)

No memorandum of the conversation between Roosevelt and the Secretary of State has been found in Department of State files.

[3] A memorandum by Wainhouse to Hickerson, dated Apr. 9, noted that the *New York Times* of that date carried the text of the President's address of Apr. 8 on the Point Four Program. In the absence of the President, it had been delivered by the Secretary of State to the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development. For text of the address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 21, 1952, p. 607.

Some excerpts from the address were quoted in the memorandum, which noted that they expressed the traditional policy of the United States toward colonial peoples. It went on to say, however, that while technically the U.S. position in the United Nations with regard to Tunisia was not in contradiction with that policy, it might be so regarded. It was feared that the quoted excerpts might be used to embarrass the United States in the Security Council.

The final paragraph of the memorandum read: "I don't know who wrote this speech and whether it had been cleared with others in the Department. I do know that UNP was not consulted." (330/4–952)

Meanwhile, although for obvious reasons we would not wish for this to be known, we are applying great pressure in Paris, to induce the French to carry through a serious program of reform looking towards Tunisian self-government. Tunisia is of vital importance to the French because the loss of any part of North Africa would shake France's position as a Great Power. It might also endanger our strategic position in the North African area. Our own national security demands that we do everything humanly possible to avoid exacerbating our relations with the French, while at the same time seeking to persuade them that in their long-run interest they must satisfy legitimate claims made by the Tunisians.

Our position in the Security Council is based on considerations of timing and is not a compromise of principle. We think that Security Council consideration now might hinder negotiations, and would make it more difficult for both sides to take a moderate position. We have made it clear to the French that, should the prospect of negotiations on their reform program prove illusory, we will very likely revise our position in the Security Council.

I may say that this is one of the most difficult decisions I have had to make in the Department of State. I made it only after the most exhaustive consideration of all the factors involved.

DEAN ACHESON

772.00/4–1052 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT NEW YORK, April 10, 1952—12:11 p. m.

691. Re Tunisia—confirming USUN telecon with Wainhouse (UNP).[1]

1. Bokhari (Pak), SC Pres for Apr, has raised with USUN question concerning our attitude in event some or all Arab-African group request to be heard by SC for purpose responding to statements made by Fr rep at SC mtg Apr 4. Latter, according to sponsoring dels, charged them with giving currency to "inexact and tendentious" statements and to "disseminating propaganda and historical untruths." Sponsoring dels in identical letters to Pres of SC have recorded "emphatic rejection of all these charges and imputations."

Deptel 370, Apr 4,[2] instructs USUN to "oppose seating" of entire Arab-African group of complainants at SC table on grounds that their interests cannot be considered as specially affected as required by Art 31 of charter.

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[1] Department of State files contain a memorandum for the files by Wainhouse, dated Apr. 10, regarding a telephone conversation that morning with Ambassador Gross. It is not clear, however, whether it concerns the conversation under reference here. (772.00/4–1052)

[2] *Ante*, p. 719.

Two questions arise as to which USUN requires specific instructions:

a. Does "oppose" in Deptel 370 mean vote against or abstain? If former, does "oppose" mean speak against as well as vote against? Moreover, does "oppose" mean that in informal discussions initiated by other SC dels prior to SC mtg, is USUN instructed to inform other dels that we oppose seating?

b. Is USUN instructed to vote against seating reps if basis their request is to answer "charges and imputations" made by Fr rep at SC mtg Apr 4?

2. Bokhari, as well as Santa Cruz (Chile), Tsiang (China) and Sarper (Turk) have expressed hope that in view US decision to abstain, question of inscription will not come to vote at SC mtg today, Apr 10. USUN requires instructions concerning following questions:

a. In informal discussions with other dels who raise this question on their own initiative, is USUN instructed to take "neutral attitude" and to advise such dels that we will "let nature take its course"?

b. In probable event Fr, possibly supported by UK, should press for vote at SC mtg, is USUN instructed to support France? Question is likely to arise by SC Pres asking for sense of Council rather than by preliminary vote. In such event is USUN instructed to keep silent and if not, what position should USUN take? If Fr rep formally moves that SC vote on question today, how is USUN to vote on such a motion? In the event that a motion for adjournment is made prior to vote, how should we vote on adjournment?

AUSTIN

772.00/4–1052 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 10, 1952—6:43 p. m.

379. Re: Tunisia—urtel 691 Apr 10.[2] Re para 1 (*a*) and in confirmation Ross–Wainhouse telecon Apr 4,[3] word "oppose" means abstain. If question raised in informal discussions you shld inform other dels our position with reasons as indicated in Deptel 370.[4]

Re para 1(*b*), Dept feels that desires of Asian–Arab group in this connection wld be met if they submitted written statements to be circulated to SC members. Dept recognizes personal nature of desire to reply Fr charges, and hopes that this can be accomplished through individual letters and that it will not be necessary to resort to indiv replies from countries in SC. If, however, this suggestion does not find favor you might further suggest that one or two be selected from group to make answers for all in SC.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Stein and Wainhouse (UNP) and cleared with the offices of EUR, Cyr (NEA), and Hickerson (UNA). Signed by Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] No memorandum of the telephone conversation of Apr. 4 has been found in Department of State files.

[4] Dated Apr. 4, p. 719.

If proposal is made to seat more than one or two reps to answer the charges, you shld abstain.

Re para 2(*a*)—if queried in informal discussions by other dels as to our position on question of immed vote on agenda issue, Dept believes you shld state that while we are prepared to vote on this question any time we have no strong views on timing and will go along with consensus of SC.

Re para 2(*b*)—in event Fr make statement urging vote in SC mtg suggest you not speak but if you consider it desirable you may make statement expressing views set forth in preceding para. If Pres asks for sense of Council position in preceding sentence also applies. If Fr rep formally moves that SC vote on agenda question today, you shld abstain explaining reason for abstention as above. In event that motion for adjournment is made, you shld also abstain and give reasons as above.

ACHESON

772.00/4–1152 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 11, 1952—7 : 05 p. m.

859. Tunisia: Use in full Gross' statement in SC Apr 10[2] which defines US position on Tunis question. For present do not take initiative in linking Gross' statement with Pt Four speeches of Pres and Acheson Apr 8–9.[3] If explanation of relationship required, emphasize (*a*) Pres speech expresses traditional US sympathy for aspirations all people for econ advancement and polit freedom, (*b*) Secy analyzed problems

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Robinson and Hendershot (IPO/L) and cleared with the offices of Jones (NEA/P), Kirkpatrick (EUR/P), Kroll (FE/P), Allen (UNA), and Block (IPO/L). Block (IPO/L) signed for the Secretary. The telegram was sent to 57 posts in Europe, the Middle East, Far East, and Africa.

[2] See telegram 371, Apr. 4, p. 720.

[3] Regarding the President's speech of Apr. 8, see footnote 3, p. 725. Regarding the Secretary of State's speech of Apr. 9, a memorandum by Sanger to S. Shepard Jones, dated Apr. 10, noted that Secretary Acheson spoke to the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development on Apr. 9. The Secretary remarked, among other things, that the purpose of the Point Four Program was to direct ferment in underdeveloped countries to peaceful channels of development rather than chaos. For text of the address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 21, 1952, p. 609.

Sanger's memorandum stated that there was some confusion about the U.S. stand on Tunisia. But, taken against the background of Gross' statement to be delivered later that day and Under Secretary Bruce's position in his conversation with Ambassador Bonnet on Apr. 5 (telegram 5923 to Paris, Apr. 5, p. 721), the remarks by the President and Secretary of State appeared to fit into the overall U.S. pattern. (772.00/4–1052) which must be overcome by peoples of areas concerned to achieve these long-range econ and polit goals, and (*c*) Gross expressed US view, within context of broad policies outlined by Pres and SecState, that at present Tunis question best resolved through negot between parties directly concerned. SC remains open to any member of UN to bring question to Council's attn again, in which case US Govt wld reassess situation.[4]

ACHESON

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[4] At its meeting on Apr. 14, the U.N. Security Council voted on the Tunisian question. The proposal that the Council take up the question failed adoption for lack of seven affirmative votes. The vote was five in favor to two opposed, with four (U.S.) abstentions. (UN document S/PV. 576)

UNP files, lot 59 D 237, "Tunisia"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 18, 1952.

Subject: Tunisian Question, Etc.

Participants: M. de Boisanger, Director, American Section, French Foreign Office
EUR—Mr. Perkins
WE—Mr. McBride

M. de Boisanger called on me today at his request explaining that while he had come to the United States primarily on business in connection with the Palestine Conciliation Commission, he informally wished to call on principal officers handling European Affairs in view of his present position in the French Foreign Office.

M. de Boisanger asked if there were any specific thoughts I wished him to take back with him to Paris. He said that he had become even more aware since his arrival in the U.S. of the importance which the Tunisian case had played in our recent relations with France. I agreed that this indeed had been one of the most vexing problems we had faced recently. I reiterated to him that the Secretary's decision had been reached with considerable difficulty and with the expectation that the French would now move ahead with their program for Tunisia. I inquired as to the prospect for the Mixed Commission which is due to meet on April 24 and was informed that neither the French nor the Tunisian Section had yet been selected and that there appeared to be some difficulty as to the composition of the French Section. M. de Boisanger added that for our confidential information M. Faure had been suggested as the head of the French Section but had declined the position. I inquired as to whether there might exist any outside possibility that the French could show their goodwill in this connection by appointing some of the Moslem-Algerian Parliamentarians to the French side of the Commission. M. de Boisanger replied that this might be difficult because such persons might be driven to take a nationalistic stand even though they did not agree with it.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted by McBride. Boisanger also met with Bonbright on Apr. 18, and a memorandum of that conversation is in the UNP files, lot 59 D 237, "Tunisia".

In conclusion we agreed that this problem was of tremendous importance and would remain so in the immediate future. We likewise agreed that it was primarily political rather than an economic problem and that merely showing that the standard of living in Morocco was higher than in the independent Arab countries, for example, would not help the French position.

We also touched briefly on the EDC where M. de Boisanger believed satisfactory progress was being made.

772.00/4–2252 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) to the Department of State

SECRET ANKARA, April 22, 1952—7 p. m.

1100. Following is résumé Turk position vis-à-vis Tunisian case posed for consideration SC: Turk FonOff has during period development Turk policy toward Tunisian question in SC, consulted fully this Emb. We have consistently presented and rationalized to FonOff US policy on this question. Turks have without any pressure on our part, followed the policy.

Turk abstention in SC has evoked some direct criticism and no direct support in Turk. *Yeni Sabah* (Istanbul) Apr 14, regrets Turk delegates adopted neutral stand in Tunisian affair and asks what *quid pro quo* Turk Govt obtained from France. *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul) Apr 16, commenting that discontinuation by US of policy bringing issues such as Tunisian case before SC would only help anti-western campaign sponsored by extremist elements in Medit area. It adds that Franco attempting take advantage this situation to pose as guardian Arab world but Spain can hardly assume leadership role in ME or Medit. *Hurses* (Ankara, RPP) in edit April 12 asks "How can we remain an abstainer?" Edit notes French using force in Tunis and asks how Turk delegate can believe Franco-Tunisian negots can bring favorable results under such circumstances. Edit asserts: "Colonial mentality is now thing of past . . .[1] we sympathize with every movement for independence." In long edit *Kudret* (Ankara, NP) Apr 20, Hikmet Bayur observes that Bey of Tunis has been center polit maneuvers and in order keep throne appointed pro-Fr Govt. Thus no complaint against Fr before SC from Bey or Govt Tunis. If Bey had not yielded to Fr pressure situation cld have been very definite in SC and very difficult for US and Turkey abstain in vote for consideration case. Writer considers reforms now proposed entirely inadequate, ignoring such basic problems as redistribution land now held in large estate by Fr owners. Concludes Tunisian question cannot be easily settled and stresses danger to all western nations of growing collaboration between Nationalist and Communists in North Africa.

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[1] Ellipsis in the source text.

Turk abstention has naturally caused adverse reaction on part Arab states, who point to Turk action as additional evidence lack of sympathy with problems and national aspirations their fellow Moslems, as previously indicated by Turk position on Suez and other questions. Iraqi Chargé and Syrian Min have both called on me to express this feeling. At least three Arab reps, including Egyptian and Lebanese, have called on FonOff to make similar representations. This is, of course, to be regretted since it defeats objective of fostering better relations between Turk and other Moslem and ME states and increasing confidence these states in Turks.

It is assumed Dept decision to abstain in SC vote was difficult one and taken after most careful consideration all factors, including of course, our relations with [garble]. Turk position, according to FonMin, was based principally on desire to maintain solidarity with western powers, particularly US. As Birgi of FonOff put it "we looked to you. We wld have voted for consideration if you had".[2] Birgi says Turk decision not popular in Turk; that govt will escape criticism if Fr and Tunisians reach agreement but will be criticized if no agreement reached.

Question I wish to raise with Dept is whether we may not in our relations with Turks and perhaps with other friendly nations put too much stress in solidarity in issues not of vital importance. Is it absolutely imperative Turks vote with us in all such issues or shld Turks not in particular cases follow their own best judgment as affected by their own relationship to problem?[3] Perhaps Turks shld in such cases weigh more carefully impact their decisions on their relations with Moslem and other ME states, as well as with western powers? FonMin has frequently complained to me that Turks made error in following western lead in vote on Suez issue,[4] which lost much Arab good will for Turks. If Tunisian case reconsidered by SC, perhaps we shld discuss question with Turks along foregoing lines regardless of US position.

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[2] USUN telegram 786, May 6, reported the Turkish Delegate to the United Nations informed members of the Mission he felt strongly that Turkey should have voted for inclusion of the Tunisian item on the agenda of the Security Council. He thought he had almost convinced his government he should be permitted to vote that way, but was instructed to abstain after the American Ambassador in Ankara indicated to the Foreign Office that the United States would abstain. According to the U.S. Mission in New York, an additional, and perhaps deciding, factor in Turkey's decision was reluctance to seem to be turning against France so soon after Turkey's admission to NATO. (772.00/5–652)

[3] Telegram 1010 to Ankara, May 8, informed the Ambassador that in the particular case of Tunisia the United States did not exert pressure on Turkey to follow the U.S. lead in abstaining, and the Turks had been "entirely free if they had wished to vote for inscription." The last paragraph of the telegram noted that there might be instances where the United States would feel compelled to urge its friends to support positions on important issues, but, in general, its attitude was simply to let the Turkish Delegation know the U.S. decision and let it make whatever decision it thought wise. (720.00/4–2252)

In discussions with FonMin on Tunisian case, he stressed necessity for big powers not to abandon their principles in their dealings with smaller nations, otherwise they will lose confidence of small nations. I assured FonMin US dedicated to adherence principles in its dealings with all nations, large or small.

McGhee

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[4] For documentation on Suez, see volume IX.

772.00/4–2552 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, April 25, 1952—2 p. m.

3928. Bajpai presented me following *aide-mémoire* on subject Tunisia:

"Recently Security Council decided against placing Tunisian dispute even on its agenda. Purpose of nations which sought that Council take cognisance of dispute was not to condemn France, but to urge that dispute be settled by friendly negotiation between France and Tunisia in calm friendly atmosphere. UN is only forum where, if disputes are not to be settled by violence, they can be freely discussed and way prepared for friendly solution of problems which, if unresolved must lead to conflict. When opportunity for discussion of dispute, even though earnestly sought by large group member nations as in the case of Tunisian issue, is denied on technical or procedural grounds because feelings or interests of one particular country are, in its view, likely be hurt or adversely affected, solidarity of UN as an organization is imperiled by effect of such denial on those nations whose sense justice and fair play is offended by denial.

"Tunisia is latest example of tendency that threatens become habit. Issues tend be discussed or dropped according to convenience or interest of one or more of major powers. This reminiscent of history of League of Nations and pointer to rock on which UN may founder if that history is allowed repeat itself.

"If UN is to survive and achieve its aims, not only must fear and mistrust that divide major powers be allayed and ultimately eliminated, but sense of confidence must be created among all member nations, irrespective of measure of their military and economic powers, that their voice or voices raised individually or collectively, in cause of progress, justice and peace, will be heard and heeded. World passing through period transition in which new and unprecedented forces astir. Subject peoples are awakening to new sense life and destiny; their aspirations cannot long be held in check or denied by procedural manipulations or devices designed serve some narrow or shortsighted interest. Every member of UN has duty not only to itself, but an even higher duty to corporate well-being and strength of UN. That duty calls for sacrifices from all and for greater sacrifices from great powers because they have more to give. In no spirit of hostility to them, but from sense loyalty to UN, it is duty of one and all of us do whatever we can ensure UN, through all its organs, discharges its high duty to mankind with vision understanding and even-handed justice. My government desires me make this appeal to representatives of all like-minded nations and to offer their unstinted cooperation in any measure or measures that can be devised to achieve this vital purpose."

Having read above to me Bajpai spoke with emotion on subject: colonialism Asia and Africa. Stated he felt US grossly underestimated depth feeling on subject and that to some extent this explained by fact that nations such as India, although resenting compromises which they believe we have made, are hesitant embarrass US in view world situation.

Bajpai said GOI did not expect colonial countries act in enlightened way on this subject and when they did GOI is amazed and pleased. He stated, however, that educated people in Asia and Africa had been brought up look on US as courageous exponent of minorities and right of any people decide its own destiny. Quoted both Lincoln, Jefferson.

Bajpai, however, abruptly brushed my explanation aside saying we more and more obsessed with need for short-range compromise and more and more oblivious to long-range forces which in end would determine course of world.

Bajpai closed subject by saying with considerable feeling that we took for granted Asian leadership such as his, Nehru's and others educated in West, that probably we were right in counting on them because whether or not they liked it, these individuals emotionally tied to West and too late in life to change; but that if we continued undermine ability their leaders work with West by actions such as Tunisia result would ultimately be disaster for everyone concerned.

Bajpai was intensely emotional and closest I have seen him to being bitter. It my guess based on inferences that several in Cabinet wanted India take much tougher public stand; that he had recommended relatively sober non-public *aide-mémoire* to avoid increasing world bitterness, that he had been criticized by some of his colleagues and that he had been finally backed up by Nehru.

I believe Department should not underestimate bitter feeling this whole subject here in India. Every question touching on racial or colonial minorities in Africa or elsewhere is given dominant newspaper emphasis. Mrs. Roosevelt's comments that she was in disagreement personally over Tunisian decision given major headlines.

Extremely important for us capture moral leadership which we formerly held and which we are now in danger of losing.

In my opinion we must not delay much longer in working out some kind long-range proposal to UN calling for liquidation colonial possessions as such over period years on orderly basis with due respect to rights of all concerned. I discussed this in Washington in January and am keenly aware of intense practical problems involved. But am even more aware of extreme danger we face in letting events which are beyond our control in Africa and elsewhere shape our policies on a question which is of first importance to two-third's of the people in the world.[1]

BOWLES

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[1] Telegram 2448 to New Delhi, May 6, informed the Embassy that a member of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations had circulated a letter identical to the *aide-mémoire* quoted in telegram 3928 to members of the Asian-Arab group and some Latin American delegates.

The telegram then instructed the Embassy to reply to the *aide-mémoire*. The reply was the same as numbered paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of telegram 411 to USUN, Apr. 30, p. 738. The final paragraph suggested the Embassy orally add the following: "Decision to abstain April 14 shld not be interpreted as evidence that US any less dedicated to principle dependent peoples entitled decide own destiny. Decision was most difficult one and no doubt similar to problems Bajpai has faced in deciding questions in face of conflicting Indian interests. This was issue which necessitated balancing of principles and policies which together with practical realities of situation were not all compatible one with the other." (772.00/4–2552)

Telegram 2448 was repeated to Karachi, and the Mission at the United Nations was instructed to give the substance to Bokhari. Telegram 423 to USUN, May 7, stated it would be undesirable for the United States to convey its thinking to the Government of India and not to the Pakistanis, in view of the competition between the two for the leadership of the Asian-African group. (772.00/5–752)

For documentation on the U.S. attitude regarding dependent areas question at the United Nations, see vol. III, pp. 1427 ff.

Editorial Note

On April 24, Bonbright (EUR) sent a memorandum to Under Secretary of State Bruce, to which he attached an early EUR draft of telegram 6353 to Paris, April 29, *infra*. The memorandum suggested Bruce speak to Bonnet the next day, provided he agreed with the approach indicated in the telegram. The memorandum also suggested that showing a draft of the telegram to Ambassador Gross "might help to make Gross more cooperative in trying to keep the lid on the Tunisian problem in New York if he were to know personally how strong a line we are taking with the French."

Attached to the Bonbright memorandum in Department of State files were two other memoranda. One, by Ambassador Jessup (S/A) to McBride (WE), dated April 24, pointed out that both Gross and the Secretary had given the impression the United States was familiar with the French plan for reform in Tunisia and thought it promising. Jessup suggested the United States would be in an even more difficult position if it should become known that we did not really know what the program was. He said we could not continue to support the French position unless we were fully informed.

The other memorandum, by Wainhouse (UNP) to McBride, dated

April 25, stated that the United States should avoid assuming any commitment that we would be able to maintain our present position of abstention on a Tunisian vote in the Security Council. While believing the draft telegram was useful and necessary, he proposed strengthening it so that the French would be in no doubt that the United States would reconsider its position if the Tunisian problem was brought to the United Nations again. The draft telegram and memoranda are in the WE files, lot 54 D 467, "Tunisia".

A memorandum by Hickerson (UNA) to Bruce, dated Apr. 25, listed some background considerations UNA hoped the Under Secretary would keep in mind if he met with Ambassador Bonnet before the draft telegram was sent to Paris. The memorandum stated that the United States could prevent Tunisia from being included on the Security Council agenda a second time; but the consequences would be extremely serious, especially since the French had failed to move toward negotiations for Tunisian autonomy. If the Arab-Asian states requested a special session of the General Assembly to deal solely with Tunisia, the United States might not be able to prevent that. An unsuccessful attempt on the part of the United States to prevent a special session "would constitute the greatest defeat we have ever suffered in the United Nations and could not fail to jeopardize most seriously our future leadership in the Organization."

UNA suggested that a continuation of the present course on Tunisia would strengthen the belief the United States was only interested in the United Nations as a tool to serve its own narrow interests and contribute to a suspicion of NATO on the part of non-European nations. In addition, a frustration of United Nations efforts to deal with the Tunisian problem would stimulate a recourse to violence by nationalist groups in French and other colonial territories. The memorandum concluded that further United States efforts to prevent United Nations consideration of Tunisia would harm rather than help its national interests, and any commitment to abstain if the question came up in the Security Council again should be avoided. (772.02/4-2552)

330/4-2952 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 29, 1952—1:37 p.m.

6353. (Verbatim text message) Dept increasingly concerned failure Fr move ahead Tunisian program during breathing spell resulting largely from our abstention SC vote. UnderSecy's Apr 5 talk with Fr Amb [2] made abundantly clear our position and our problem. Since then kind and rate of progress we expected have not developed.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by McBride (WE) and cleared in draft with the offices of the Secretary, Bruce (U), Matthews (G), Bohlen (C), Perkins (EUR), Byroade (NEA), Hickerson (UNA), Jessup (S/A), Nitze (S/S), and Byington (WE). It was signed by the Secretary and was repeated to Tunis, Cairo, and London.

US recognizes difficulties Fr internal polit situation in connection with this issue. We wish stress our realization US and Fr both desire Tunisian issue resolved promptly and with minimum further complications.

Fr have not named their reps to Mixed Comm and we wld not normally expect Tunisians name theirs until Fr had done so. In this connection de Boisanger informed Perkins Apr 18 [3] difficulties had arisen naming Fr delegs and that Faure had refused chairmanship Fr group. Furthermore Fr Emb informs us preliminary mtg Mixed Comm scheduled Apr 24 postponed "until early May" because inability either side name its reps. Dept has recd Paris desp transmitting FonOff instrs to de Hauteclocque [4] from which it appears reform program exists only in outline form with detailed plan not yet worked out and apparently to be evolved in Tunisia. In this connection Amb Gross has stated in SC Fr program appeared constitute basis resumption negots. Accordingly, we hope Emb or ConGen Tunis will get copy finished work when available since we cannot help explain Fr position unless we are fully informed. We trust provisions this program will not give with one hand and take away with other.

In light continued overwhelmingly unfavorable public opinion on US abstention inscription Tunisian item SC agenda coupled with disappointing results to date Dept feels renewed approach to Fr this quest requires explaining once more basis our position. It is feared some feeling exists on Fr part immediate danger avoided and burden now rests US undertake program educate public opinion necessity full support Fr North African policy. US is convinced this shows misconception depth public feeling No African quest US press and congressional circles as well as in Arab-Asian countries. Accordingly far from being able undertake further measures assist Fr, Dept has done its utmost this matter, and Fr must perform substantially to justify position we have taken SC.

What disturbs us most is widespread feeling here and elsewhere that Fr Govt under-estimates urgency Tunisian situation in UN, and in Nor Afr as well as in US, and only gives it substantial attn when crises are red hot relegating it conveniently into background between times.

While negots in abeyance pressure in NY continues mount and there seems considerable likelihood special session GA discuss Tunisian quest. Our info is to effect Arab-Asian bloc can obtain 31 votes required call session with only minimum lobbying necessary.

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[2] See telegram 5923 to Paris, Apr. 5, p. 721.

[3] See the memorandum of conversation by Perkins, Apr. 18, p. 729.

[4] Paris despatch 2634, Apr. 4, not printed. (772.00/4–452) See Paris telegram 5851, Mar. 25, p. 695.

If special session GA called consider Tunisian problem, so-called colonial powers wld be pitted against Afr-Asian group, Sov bloc and others, with impossibility avoiding adoption resolutions in comite perhaps condemning France and proposing UN investigation Tunisia. Action this type wld strengthen trend toward radical measures Assembly behalf dependent areas and give further impetus Arab-Asian leadership GA.

We still believe Fr committed grave error, though we aware they disagree, in arresting cabinet containing prominent nationalists. Presumably had negots been completed with Chenik, nationalists wld have accepted them since they participated his govt. Nevertheless we think Fr must continue try obtain nationalist representation at least on Mixed Comm possibly by means freeing Chenik and other Tunisian leaders at once as evidence good faith.

In this connection our impression was special precautionary measures adopted last month wld be removed and Chenik cabinet wld be released upon installation Baccouche cabinet. We now see this is not case. We regard this as bad judgment and as rendering creation comm obviously more difficult and virtually precluding meaningful nationalist participation therein. We cannot believe any body without some genuine nationalist reps cld have any effective support from Tunisians generally, or be convincingly represented before world opinion as adequate.

In conclusion fol summary our position shld be conveyed to FonOff at highest levels:

(1) Our position in SC was predicated circumstances prevailing at time Tunisian quest came up. Our decision to abstain taken at highest level only to give Fr time to move ahead. They must move very rapidly. Statements by Secy and Amb Gross have already made it clear our position re advisability UN discussions applied Tunisian problem as we then saw it.

(2) We felt Fr shld have opportunity negot long-term Tunisian settlement on basis program with substantive content for bringing Tunisia along road to internal autonomy. We explained our position in SC on grounds SC consideration at that time might hamper Fr and Tunisians this respect.

(3) If no immediate progress made on program with substantive content in negots with reps of Tunisian groups our decision to abstain which is so contrary to public opinion here and has been so strongly criticized throughout many areas of the world will appear not to have been justified. We wld accordingly be obliged to reconsider our position. Fr shld further realize this whole problem is not merely one of mtg public opinion but involves larger common interest which we share with Fr in terms gen relations with Arab-Asian world.

ACHESON

772.00/4–3052 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 30, 1952—7 : 34 p. m.

411. Re Tunisia. (Para 4 urtel 752 Apr 28)[2] Inform Gonzalez as fol:

(1) We greatly appreciate his telling us in confidence of approach made him by Bokhari and his seeking our views on substance Tunisian case as well as more specific question special session. In return we are happy inform him basis our thinking.

(2) Our position on this difficult and important matter has been motivated entirely by a desire fol whatever course holds most promise successful results. We are sure all concerned wld agree that most desirable end is Tunisians shld obtain satis their legitimate aspirations through orderly negots with Fr without outside pressures. Our decision abstain in SC resulted from our sincere conviction a debate at this time far from assisting interested parties reach agreement wld serve to drive them further apart. This being so, we felt the question of timing was important and so indicated in our statement in SC on Apr 10. At that time we also pointed out that it remains open any member bring question to Council's attention again and if that were done US wld reassess situation. On other hand, we believe, and Charter so provides, that parties must be given adequate opportunity negotiate.

(3) Negots in Franco-Tunisian Mixed Comm were scheduled commence Apr 24. We regret that for various reasons this sched was not met and Mixed Comm has not yet been appointed. We understand new Fr target date is mid-May and we are urging Fr strongly no further delay be allowed intervene. In this connection it is of course equally necessary Tunisian Govt act with despatch in appointing their members of comm. In our view situation in Tunisia justifies allowing parties concerned at least another few weeks get comm established and to negot. If negots are not started or prove unproductive it is obvious that all of us wld wish reexamine question in light new situation. It is equally obvious that any effort impose specific time limit on negots wld merely play into hands of those who do not desire negots succeed.

(4) For reasons indicated above, we are convinced discussion now

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright (EUR), Hickerson (UNA), Wainhouse (UNP), and Stein (UNP). It was cleared by S/A and the office of Bourgerie (NEA) and repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Not printed. It reported Gonzalez had informed the U.S. Delegation the Pakistani Delegate wanted him to circulate an unidentified document to the Latin American delegates and call them to a meeting to hear Bokhari discuss it. He assumed the unidentified document was the Indian *aide-mémoire* (see telegram 3928, p. 732). Gonzalez felt the Latin American delegates should hear Bokhari, but should not take any action as a unit. Paragraph 4 of the reference telegram transmitted Gonzalez' request for U.S. views on the substance of the Tunisian case and the U.S. position on a special session on the matter. It was not certain whether Venezuela would support a special session, but there was much strong anticolonial sentiment in Latin America which would support it. (772.00/4–2852)

Tunisian question in any UN forum wld be harmful. If negots have not been resumed after reasonable period (say four or five weeks) and if Arab-Asian group shld then feel they must present question in UN, it seems to us that more logical way wld be to request new mtg SC and ask members review decision Apr 14. In our view such procedure wld be preferable to any move for consideration Tunisian question in special session GA. At such time we wld be prepared to reassess situation. We cannot of course now know what our decision wld be after such reassessment.

You shld inform Fr and UK dels that you have been confidentially approached by Gonzalez and that you have replied to him along foregoing lines. You shld further inform Fr and UK dels that we view with concern idea of special session on Tunisian question. In such special session so-called "colonial powers" wld be pitted against African-Asian group of 15, Sov bloc of 5, Yugo, certain number of Latin Americans, and perhaps Scandinavians. It is unlikely "colonial powers" wld be able obtain majority support for their positions. While they cld probably muster enough votes prevent adversaries from obtaining necessary two-thirds majority, it may be impossible avoid bitter debate of and adoption in comite of one or more drastic res which might condemn Fr and propose UN Comm be sent to Tunisia. Loss of leadership on Tunisia question wld drain away future Assembly support from Western Powers on East-West issues and greatly strengthen trend toward radical measures in Assembly on behalf of under-developed and dependent areas. For this reason, if we are ultimately faced with choice between prospect of special session and SC consideration, we wld prefer latter.

Acheson

772.00/5-152 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, May 1, 1952—7:22 p. m.

769. Re Tunisia. Gonzalez (Venezuela) came to USUN at 3 o'clock this afternoon bearing copious notes from morning mtg with Asian-African group.[1] He reported that there had been present reps of Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Yemen for ASAF (Asian-African)

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[1] USUN telegram 767, Apr. 30, reported the Latin American delegates would meet with the Asian-African delegates the following day. The Asian-African group had circulated a Spanish translation of a memorandum entitled "The Problem of Tunis and the UN." One section of the memorandum dealt with the unsuccessful attempt to have the Tunisian case placed on the Security Council agenda. It concluded that it was therefore necessary to consider a special meeting of the General Assembly to publicly discuss Tunisia. (772.00/4-3052)

group and all LA reps except Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua. He saw no significance to absences.

Gonzalez appears to have had unfavorable reaction ASAF's. Among contributing reasons for his discontent are unsuccessful attempt by Bokhari to make him preside mtg, which he interpreted as effort to create impression ASAF's meeting with caucus, despite clear understanding attendance was on individual basis; contradictions between statements of individual ASAF's and between attitude of Bokhari and Tunisian rep, presumably Ladgham (former cabinet minister escaped from Tunisia) toward primary objective of group in desiring special session and objective as announced in Indian *aide-mémoire* and other ASAF statements; and suspicion that ASAF's have not thought this matter through and are not united in their thinking.

Gonzalez's account of mtg is as follows: Bokhari, explaining group preferred this informal "affectionate" way of appealing to their dear LA friends, feeling that this was better than formal, more impersonal diplomatic approach on govt level, stated Tunisian case has become matter of honor for ASAF's; colonial question has become serious problem and becomes more serious with delay; Tunisian case is not domestic matter; case must be settled because it is dividing world, setting Europeans against non-Europeans and developed countries against undeveloped countries; and two actions now possible; in SC or in special session. Bokhari did not know whether the group would be successful in attempting to obtain session, but would make good try.

Khalidy (Iraq) declared SC useless and special session necessary. Dayal (India) stressed necessity of UN discussing every question, such as present one, which transcends domestic character.

There then followed long exposition by Tunisian rep of French oppression, ending with plea for LA support for special session. When Uruguay inquired date for such session Bokhari replied nothing set, but ASAF's impatient. Bokhari emphasized that ASAF's want is only to get French and Tunisians negotiating around table.

Santa Cruz (Chile) after affirming Chile's unwavering support for free UN discussion and its disapproval of blocs in UN, asked (1) what measures of French would satisfy ASAF's and lead them to withdraw complaint? (2) has such information been communicated to French Govt? (3) what does Tunisia want, complete independence or autonomy within French Union? Bokhari replies only to third question, indirectly saying that primary objective of ASAF's is to reduce tension, that freeing political prisoners would enable Tunisians to talk with French and thus would threat to peace disappear. If negotiations then failed, UN could send rep as mediator to offer his good offices, etc.

Tunisian rep, replying contradictorily to third question, said Tunisia aspires to recover absolute independence but does not want in so doing to break with France. Therefore, Tunisia wants negotiated ("agreed") independence, safeguarding French culture and economic interests as well as France's strategic interests on regional and world scale. Re French Union, he was bearish, saying experience with operation of union has not been good and religious consideration i.e. Moslem-Christian was obstacle. Furthermore, he said, French system is cut out for republics, not for monarchies. And finally he said colonials are opposed to even Tunisian autonomy within union.

Colombian rep asked whether special session is urgent and whether purpose thereof is to be understood as to find peaceful way to arrange Tunisian independence. (In conversation after mtg Colombian told Gonzalez he wished to inform his govt clearly whether purpose of ASAF's is independence or merely to find ways to get negotiations started since if former is case it is obvious LA support of special session will, to a degree, commit LA's to support Tunisian independence.) Bokhari replied in affirmative to both questions.

Indonesian spoke up to say that most important thing is to obtain good offices. He thought good offices might come from SC action (Gonzalez interpreted this as attempt to play down independence talk and showed Tunisian disagreement therewith).

Finally, Bokhari said ASAF's will invite LA's to second mtg after they have received govt's reactions from reports of this one. He said also ASAF's intend approach other UN members.

Commenting on mtg, Gonzalez said all LA's were reserved and weighed words carefully. He personally did not know whether second mtg would materialize since questions were individual and not for caucus and LA's would be called on to take positions.

When I inquired Gonzalez's opinion whether LA's would favor special session, Gonzalez found uncertainty but said he rather felt that many LA's will have to support calling of session if it is for independence of Tunisia.[2] He thought Bokhari was clever in putting up independence idea since it will appeal to LA govts. An appeal on basis of human rights would meet poor response.

I then inquired whether, if France sought similar mtg, LA's would attend. I stressed I had no idea that French had any such intention, but was interested in LA attitude. Gonzalez replied all LA's would go and French ought to seek such mtg. I then expressed our gratitude to Gonzalez for his cooperation and made comments based on Deptel 411, April 30.[3] Gonzalez thanked me for this expression of views and said he would be talking with LA colleagues since his govt would wish him to. Reverting to contradictions, he pointed out Bokhari had said primary objective is to reduce tension, but then had spoken of urgency of special session which Gonzalez thought would only raise tension; Bokhari had said purpose was to find peaceful means of getting negotiations started, but later had said objective was independence and had been confirmed by Tunisian rep; Indonesian had contradicted Bokhari and Tunisian rep by saying most important thing was to obtain good offices.

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[2] Telegram 803 from New York, May 12, informed the Department of State Gonzalez told the U.S. Delegation he had received instructions to oppose calling a special session and understood similar instructions had been sent to a number of other Latin American representatives. (772.00/5–1252)

[3] *Supra.*

GROSS

330/5–252: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, May 2, 1952—7 p.m.

6739. Deptels 6352,[1] and 6353, April 29.[2] In accordance with instructions reftels I called on Maurice Schumann and, after outlining Dept's views, left with him memo containing US position on Tunisian issue contained in three numbered paras 6353.

Schumann expressed surprise that US Govt showed lack of understanding of French position and difficulties they are having. Also that we should become party to Asiatic-Arab drive which was purely propaganda, results of which could only benefit Stalin. In this connection he stated that French have reliable info that Kremlin has given orders to agents everywhere that demonstrations against France should continue.

US position of non-abstaining, if known, would cause dangerous reaction, according to Schumann, on French public opinion and more particularly on reps in Parliament. It would raise question in latter's minds how far solidarity of Atlantic nations could be maintained in solving particular problems. He foresaw serious effect on NATO and possibility even of defeat of EDC, if US broke solidarity over Tunisia, an issue where France considered it right to expect solidarity. He digressed here on French accomplishments in North Africa and importance of French control over Morocco to NATO.

I told Schumann that our feeling re NAT meant solidarity in fact in all its deepest meaning, including defense, security against aggression and in political matters, and increasing our mutual strength through improving econ and social conditions. My understanding of this solidarity was that it did not mean blind acceptance by one govt of actions taken by another without consultation. It could only be reached if we were all frank with our friends and explained to them positions we intended to take. In this case, US Govt had real problem of public opinion to deal with and solidarity could be achieved only by policy which took it adequately into account.

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[1] Not printed. It instructed the Ambassador to show telegram 6353 to the highest levels of the Foreign Ministry and leave there a copy of the last three numbered paragraphs. It suggested that, at the initiative of the Embassy, it might be advisable to leave a copy of the whole message. It also informed the Ambassador the Under Secretary of State had discussed Tunisia with Jean Monnet along the lines of telegram 6353. (330/4–2952)

[2] *Ante*, p. 735.

I made point of stressing how difficult it was for our people to understand internment of Chenik and his ministers. He made no comment regarding promised liberation these Tunisians. Re Bourguiba, Schumann remarked that Tunisian leader could have been shot as traitor at end of war, in view his connivance with Axis. This was not done and Schumann stated that French now wish only to work with him.

After being resistant to my representations, Schumann cooled down and wound up by assuring me that French Govt just as anxious as US to speed up solution to Tunisian crisis. He made no promises but said he hoped to be able to discuss matter with me in few days.

Schumann then described difficulties French were having in Tunisia, and stated that Bey and Baccouche really didn't want reforms at all. French, he maintained, were in position of "imposing" reforms, and were determined to go forward along lines of published program. He told me that he would give me complete text of this program.

Schumann's temperamental reaction is typical of the man, and we are following up closely on the working level, where we shall show copy of reftel and where effect of our position will receive more measured consideration.

Dunn

330/5–552 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

Paris, May 5, 1952—6 p. m.

6798. Embtel 6739, May 2.[2] Subsequent to Amb's conversation with Maurice Schumann re Tunisian issue as reported in ref tel, we conveyed our summary whole contents Deptel 6353[3] to Puaux of FonOff, who was already in possession memo left by Amb. Fol are Puaux' comments.

Firstly, he stated that Dept appears to be laboring under misconception that every effort had not been exhausted to undertake negots with Chenik. Latter turned down offer made in Fr note Dec 15 and stubbornly refused any subsequent overtures. Min's release wld not mean their cooperation. FonOff realizes value natl participation in comm, but latter's adamant stand to boycott such body admittedly diminishes rep value of comm. Puaux feels that speedy action can only be obtained by Fr instituting reforms directly with Bey and Baccouche, abandoning, at least for time being, any idea of mixed comm.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Cairo, London, and Rome.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] Dated Apr. 29, p. 735.

When Puaux described tone of our memo as stern, we took occasion to reiterate pressure which was being brought to bear on Dept by Amer public opinion, Cong, and outside sources. He recognized this, but countered with argument that FonOff was also faced with public and parl opinion which made their handling of case most difficult. Robert Schuman's liberal attitude, he stated, was not shared by members present govt who in last analysis decided policy towards Tunisia. Pinay and members of his Cabinet, reflecting rightist tendencies, had stiffened against too conciliatory stand of FonMin, and were not in any mood to accept dictates of UN led by such feudal and backward countries as Yemen, where conditions cld hardly stand comparison with those in Fr No Africa.

Puaux informed us that Fr reply to Amb's *démarche* (which was drafted in FonOff for Bonnet to present to Sec State) had been cleared by Parodi, but still awaiting Schuman's approval. Puaux said that FonMin might possibly decide to await Byroade's arrival Paris beginning June to discuss matter with him, but he wld let us know.

Main theme of FonOff views to be given Sec State, according to Puaux, was that France wld not tolerate UN domination in such vital matters as Tunisia. If France were to accept emotional, irresponsible, propaganda-seeking UN decision pushed thru by group of backward Arab-Asiatic states regarding Tunisia, she wld be faced by succession of attacks aimed at complete destruction of Fr Union. Preservation of this Union was far more important to France than her membership in UN and if obliged to choose, she cld not hesitate. If carried to extremes, he commented half-jokingly, UN concern for nationalist movements might even lead them one day to support independence movement of Brittany.

Puaux added that present trend in UN was fitting nicely into Sov pattern of weakening big powers by using nationalist groups to cause disintegration of their empires. Fr, he stated, were well aware of need for econ, social and pol development in their dependent areas, had renounced old colonial practices, and were prepared to go forward with principles enunciated in UN charter and Fr constitution. They were not prepared, however, to allow unrealistic UN decisions to bring chaos in any part of Fr Union, thereby weakening family of free nations and playing into hands of Sovs.

We expressed our sympathy for difficulties France is facing but urged FonOff to take rapid and magnanimous steps re Tunisia and Morocco to forestall further criticism and UN action. Such action on part of France wld make it easier for her friends and allies to rally to her support.

Incidentally, Puaux stated that contrary to Maurice Schumann's statement to Amb, there exists no text of reforms for Tunisia other than those contained in instructions to Hauteclocque and statement by Baccouche. Mixed comm, he explained, was supposed to work out details based on gen lines enunciated.

DUNN

772.00/5-552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs (Kirkpatrick)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 5, 1952.

Subject: Tunisia

Participants: Monsieur Daridan, Minister Counselor, French Embassy
Helen P. Kirkpatrick, EUR/P

At luncheon May 4, Monsieur Daridan raised the subject of Tunisia. While indicating that he personally is very critical of the French handling the question, he was nevertheless equally critical of the American position. He agreed that the pressure of public opinion here is such that the United States cannot indefinitely maintain its stand in the United Nations, but he felt that no real effort was being made to educate American opinion. He stated that rightly or wrongly French opinion would resist any attempts by the US or the UN to interfere in French North African affairs and that a worsening of the situation in Tunisia could easily lead to French withdrawal from Indochina and the use of force to suppress nationalist demonstrations anywhere in North Africa; that France would undoubtedly withdraw from the UN and from NATO rather than give up the North African territory. He expressed appreciation of the State Department's understanding of the problem but spoke very bitterly against "other interests" who are encouraging the nationalists. I asked what he meant by "other interests" and what form the encouragement is taking. He mentioned the number of Tunisian nationalists coming to this country—El Fassi in particular—and said that obviously they are being subsidized. Pressed for the identity of those who are supposedly subsidizing these people, Daridan mentioned the Trade Unions. I said that undoubtedly the Trade Unions were showing an interest in North Africa Trade Unions, but felt that this would not justify his accusation. He then asked why I thought Carmel Offie was working for the A.F. of L. and insisted that "other interests" are using the trade unions to encourage Tunisian nationalists to bring them to this country. I assured him that the only interests behind the trade unions are the trade unions themselves and that Mr. Offie was no longer connected with the US government in any way.

330/5-552

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert McBride, Office of Western European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 5, 1952.

Subject: Tunisia

Participants: Mr. Daridan, Minister Counselor, French Embassy
Mr. van Laethem, French Embassy
Mr. R. B. Knight—WE
Mr. Robert McBride—WE

Mr. Daridan and Mr. van Laethem called at our request and read the conclusions of Deptel 6353, April 29,[1] to Paris regarding the outstanding points in our Tunisian policy. They were also given a summary of the rest of the message with the indication that this matter had already been taken up by the Embassy in Paris.

Commenting on our policy Mr. Knight stated that our objective was, of course, the maintenance of the French presence in North Africa for, he added, this appeared to be the only intelligent solution to the question, and the problem of French relations with the Moslem peoples of the area must be solved. He added that we were in favor of evolutionary progress in North Africa, while fully recognizing the French public opinion and other problems.

Mr. Knight added that we fear the French lack the sense of urgency on this problem and they must convince us that they are determined to move ahead.

Mr. Daridan stated French public opinion would, under no conditions, accept UN action in this case and that France would leave the UN rather than permit such measures.

Mr. Knight stated that we, of course, wish to be helpful to France in this problem but stressed that before we could undertake any public opinion campaign we must know that we will not be placed in an impossible position by French inactivity.

Mr. Daridan reiterated the French point of view on some of the North African problems, particularly the fact that the reigning dynasties in Morocco and Tunisia could never be used as Bao Dai had been used in Indochina. He concluded that the problem was particularly difficult because France would never go as far in Tunisia, for example, as she had in Indochina, while it was perfectly clear that the Tunisian leaders, such as Bourghiba, wanted full independence for their country with no French presence whatever. He cited the Bourghiba letters recently published in *Figaro* in this connection.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 735.

Mr. van Laethem complained that we had repeatedly asked for a full text of the French reform program for Tunisia and pointed out that such a document could only exist after negotiations had taken place. He said that to publish such a paper would destroy the French negotiating position. He stressed that the Bey of Tunis was opposed to an elected legislature and cited again the fact that the North African rulers were extremely backward and did not wish the democratic reforms which we were urging the French to institute. He said that if the French insisted on an elected assembly, for example, her relations with the Bey would be poisoned forever. He said the basic French view was that political reforms were essential and that they must start at the bottom on the communal level but added that the Bey was even opposed to measures of this kind. In response to a question he said that the idea of an administrative tribunal in the new French reform program did not mean a retrogression from the 1950 program but was merely designed to place a check on the corruption of Tunisian officials in office which had already become apparent during the relatively short period of the Chenik Government. He stressed that merely for the sake of political reform France would not undermine her entire North African position, and that we must give some evidence of trust in the French judgment on this point.

Mr. Knight mentioned that we hoped the French reform program would not give with one hand and take away with the other, and that such a measure as the administrative tribunal might undermine all the good which could be done.

Mr. van Laethem returned to his favorite argument that the United States problem in Tunisia was basically one of educating our public opinion on the entire colonial problem. He said that had this been done there would not have been the adverse reaction to our Security Council vote which had made our present position so difficult. He said if we continue along the present lines France will, within five years, begin to have the same difficulties in West and Equatorial Africa as she now has in North Africa. He stressed that at the present time the situation in black Africa was generally satisfactory from a political viewpoint, but that it would not remain so if the climate continued favorable for extremism in North Africa. Insofar as North Africa was concerned he concluded again that the greatest obstacles to progress were the Bey of Tunis and the Sultan of Morocco.

Finally, Mr. Daridan stated that he hoped the United States would undertake to examine the entire French colonial problem and not just Tunisia. Mr. Knight said that we had tried to do this as early as 1947 but that the French had indicated little interest in having our views at that time, and that unfortunately what would have been satisfactory to the North Africans five years ago would no longer be enough.

772.00/5–552 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, May 5, 1952—11 : 17 a. m.

780. From Gross. Tunisia. May 2 spent eve in NY with Romulo [1] who talked at length on Tunisian issue. Is convinced of great difficulty ahead unless French reach satisfactory agreement with Tunisian nationalist reps. As he has informed Dept, Indian Govt now making informal approaches certain capitals, including Manila, to sound out sentiment for Asian mtg New Delhi to concert policy re Tunisian issue. Romulo believes GOI sat back until after "failure" of Pak rep to win SC hearing and is now taking up cudgels to show Asia that India can provide only real leadership. Romulo thus explains recent GOI initiatives, such as circularizing other UN dels. He sees danger to US in this Pak-Indian competition on Tunisian case, which must lead to constantly more extensive demands.

Romulo agreed that only real hope was agreement between French and Tunisians and that special session of GA should be avoided at all costs. He not only fears consequences outlined last para Deptel No. 411, April 30,[2] but is terrified of situation which would confront him personally since he feels he might have to attack US attitude. I gather his present position is awkward enough. Several Asian-African dels, including Pak, had urged him to come to NY personally to lead the fight for SC consideration. He put them off, expressing confidence that US would certainly vote to put question on SC agenda with indefinite postponement of discussion of case. Santa Cruz talked with Romulo before tabling Chilean proposal having this objective.

More in sadness than in anger he asked explanation of our failure to support Chilean res.[3] He fears we may underestimate the impact of our abstention upon FE public confidence in our motives, particularly because of the "insidious" fact that this is regarded as a NATO action and as "proof" that in addition to being a defensive alliance against Russia it is also an alliance of colonial powers to maintain *status quo.*

I outlined our position to him, telling him of my conversation with Gonzalez (mytel No. 769, May 1) [4] and informed him in confidence of the general nature of our approaches to the French. He was gratified to hear of latter, repeating his agreement that the only road to lasting solution was agreement between the parties.

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[1] Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, the Ambassador from the Philippines to the United States and Representative of the Philippines at the United Nations.

[2] *Ante*, p. 738.

[3] The Chilean resolution stated that it favored Security Council inclusion in its agenda of consideration of the communication by 11 Arab and South Asian nations regarding Tunisia, with the understanding that action would not imply the competence of the Security Council to consider the substance of the question. It also called for postponement of consideration of the question for the time being. (UN document S/2600)

[4] *Ante*, p. 739.

He warned against re-enacting what he called the "tragedy of Indonesia", where he feels that although the US was in fact the instrument by which Indo achieved independence, nevertheless our "wobbly and weak attitude" at the beginning of the Indo dispute created a public opinion in Asia which has remained suspicious ever since. Romulo attributes our present difficulties with Indo govt largely to this fact, arguing that Indo people do not really know what role we played after initial widespread bitterness at our support of Dutch.

Austin

772.00/5–1352 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY New York, May 13, 1952—1 p. m.

808. Re Tunisia. Pursuant to Deptel 423, May 7,[1] Gross and Ross met with Bokhari and Asad at lunch yesterday and communicated our views as set forth in Deptel 2448, May 6,[2] to New Delhi. Bokhari indicated he was very glad to get our views before rather than after Asian-African (ASAF) mtg scheduled for May 13.[3] He requested that memo setting forth our views be presented to Zafrullah in Karachi.

Bokhari referred to number of signs which he said indicated situation in Tunisia was not at all "healthy"; for example, the "conditional" release of Chenik and other Ministers. (We said we thus far had no confirmation that release was "conditional".) Bokhari referred also to info indicating Chenik was refused permission go to Paris and to "character assassination" of Bourguiba as Nazi collaborator. (Asad reported indirect info indicating Jules Moch had know Bourguiba very well and had said he was not a collaborator.) Bokhari said also that Tunisians unwilling serve on Negotiating Commission were being arrested.

Bokhari then questioned what would constitute "negotiations." He said basis for "negotiations" would be formula which no self-respecting nationalist could accept as basis. He had no doubt, however, that French would be able find some group with which they could "negotiate". These "negotiations" would go on for six months, year or two years. Meanwhile, French would be protected in their position on theory they were "negotiating".

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 734.

[2] *Ibid.* The substance of telegram 2448 is in numbered paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of telegram 411 to USUN, Apr. 30, p. 738.

[3] USUN telegram 811, May 13, reported on a meeting of the Asian-African group that morning. The group decided efforts should be made to obtain a special session of the General Assembly, rather than again trying to bring the matter to the Security Council. It decided to hold a meeting with other delegations the following week. (772.00/5–1352)

All of foregoing Bokhari said was "old familiar pattern" in colonial countries.

Recognizing disadvantages of special session from our viewpoint, Bokhari indicated that advantage of GA was broader forum for expression ASAF viewpoint. In considering whether to use SC rather than GA, Bokhari said it would make difference to group if it were known in advance US would not be against competence of SC, this assuming there would be necessary votes to put item on agenda.

Gross made clear that both on question of voting on agenda and question of competence we were not in position undertake any commitment at this time beyond commitment to reappraise situation if after reasonable period, say four to five weeks, negotiations had not started. He expressed view that if after reappraisal US should vote for inclusion on agenda, it would not be logical to argue immediately against competence. He reminded Bokhari of SC practice and US previous positions that question of competence was not prejudiced by inclusion of item on agenda, and that question of competence if raised did not need to be decided until question of action on a res arose.

In course conversation Gross made clear, in response to comment by Bokhari, that we were no less sympathetic to Tunisians and their aspirations than others; that our decision, which was most difficult one to make, involved a conflict between our sympathy and the practical and effective means of achieving a desirable end.

AUSTIN

772.00/5-1352 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, May 13, 1952—6:28 p. m.

810. Re Tunisia: Ladgham (rep "Tunisian del") came at his request yesterday afternoon to discuss Tunisia. Main points he made are:

1) Tunisians aspire to eventual full independence, reached through agreement with French, but for present will be satisfied with internal autonomy, on condition Tunisia not be part of French Union. Tunisia can never be member French Union. This he had attempted to make clear to LA's on May 1st.

Comment: Ladgham's explanation to LA's as he repeated it yesterday closely follows account we had received from Gonzalez (ourtel 769, May 1)[1] so far as Tunisian aversion to French Union is concerned, but is at variance with respect to matter of independence.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 739.

2) French proposed reforms are entirely unacceptable to Tunisians as basis for negotiations since, in envisaging French participation in and control over executive and legislative branches of Tunisian Govt, they violate French promise of last year to grant internal autonomy. In this connection Tunisians' situation is worse than it was last January:

a) At that time when state of siege was not being enforced there were newspapers, freedom of speech and communication and representative Tunisians were talking with French Govt. Today situation is completely changed in all these respects;

b) From point of view of Tunisian statute, Tunisians would be worse off under French proposals than formerly since proposals sanction participation French nationals in govt, give administrative tribunal veto power, make resident general foreign minister, etc. Therefore, mention in Gross' statement in SC indicating we consider French proposals suitable basis for negotiations has met strong objection among Tunisians.

3) Ladgham is confronted with delicate situation through activities of El Abed Bouhafa, Arab UN press correspondent who, he says, is assuming *de facto* leadership of Tunisians here. Ladgham hopes we will understand he, Ladgham, is only authorized rep here at present.

AUSTIN

USUN files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs (Knight)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1952.

Subject: Forthcoming talk with M. Schuman about North Africa.

Participants: The Secretary
Ambassador Bonnet, French Embassy.
Mr. Van Laetham, French Embassy.
Mr. Wainhouse, UNP
Mr. Knight, WE

Ambassador Bonnet called under instructions to prepare the way for a discussion on the subject of North Africa which Mr. Robert

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[1] A memorandum by Hickerson to the Secretary of State regarding his meeting with Ambassador Bonnet, dated May 15, contained a list of recommended points for the Secretary to mention. According to the memorandum, the U.S. abstention in the Security Council on Apr. 14 was predicated on rapid French progress in negotiating reforms leading to Tunisian autonomy. When the Apr. 24 target date for a mixed commission was not met, the United States was assured that negotiations would be started by May 15. Prospects for the resumption of genuine negotiations on that date appeared even less hopeful than they had previously. The memorandum suggested the Secretary inform Bonnet the United States felt compelled to inform appropriate delegations in New York that, because the threat of a special General Assembly session was real, if the United States had

Footnote continued on following page.

Schuman wishes to have with the Secretary later this month in Paris.[3]

Ambassador Bonnet started the conversation by saying that he had heard that Mr. Schuman was somewhat encouraged about the prospects of having the Contractual Relationships Agreement and the EDC Treaty signed in accordance with the current schedule calling for the "24th and 25th" of May. The Secretary agreed that these prospects had improved and mentioned the dates of the 24th and 26th.

The French Ambassador then referred to Mr. Schuman's desire to talk with the Secretary in Paris not only about Tunisia but also about North Africa as a whole and said that he had been instructed to cover the subject in a preliminary fashion in order to facilitate the subsequent talks between the Ministers.

Mr. Schuman believes that it is urgent to avoid misunderstandings between the U.S. and France as those are exploited by a minority of extremists in North Africa where they are doing their best to prevent the establishment of reform programs mutually agreed between the French and local population. These misunderstandings also play into the hands of those extremists who are seeking to reopen consideration of the Tunisian question in the UN in the expectation that the U.S. will find itself in a more difficult position to frustrate their maneuvers.

According to Ambassador Bonnet, the French Government is of the opinion that local Communists in Europe and North Africa, backed by the U.S.S.R., are orchestrating a campaign to foment distrust between the free countries of the West and particularly between the U.S. and France as part of their strategy to block conclusion of the Contractuals and of the EDC. He referred to the recent forged documents published in *Le Monde* purporting to be a report from Admiral Fechteler to the NSC. Other such documents have been recently prepared between Communists in France and elsewhere such as the "Jessup Report". False news concerning the U.S.S.R. is disseminated so that it can be brilliantly denied by the Kremlin. He also mentioned

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

to choose it would prefer another Security Council hearing to a special session. The last paragraph of the memorandum read: "Developments in the last few weeks seem to justify the concern we have expressed repeatedly to the French. We sincerely hope the French appreciate the dangers which lie ahead if there is not an immediate change of course on their part."

A memorandum on the same date, by G. Lewis Jones to McBride and Knight, stated that it was in the U.S. interest to pursue a policy of urging the French to accelerate their program for internal autonomy in Tunisia. It added, however, that it was not in the U.S. interest to encourage the Tunisians in an irresponsible position. It suggested the United States take a firm line publicly and privately against the Nationalist boycott of French reforms. The memorandum ended with the suggestion that the United States and other interested powers might make a statement calling on all concerned parties to refrain from agitating the Tunisian question and give the French time to achieve the results they planned. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.

[3] The Secretary went to Paris later that month for the signing of the European Defense Community Treaty on May 27; for documentation, see volume v, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.

the French plane and other recent Berlin incidents. In French eyes all these developments point to a concerted effort to divide the West at this crucial time.

The French Ambassador stressed the French Government's will to carry through reform programs "in Tunis, Morocco, and in North Africa generally". It is difficult, however, to do so now because of the agitation in the UN which has acted as a deterrent to the North Africas' willingness to negotiate. However, it would seem that the extremists in the UN may have over-played their hand and that many Latin American countries, for example, are now less ready to go along with the Arab-Asiatic bloc as their real purpose of full independence for Tunisia is gradually coming to light. The French Government hopes that the U.S. and France can agree on sensible reform programs for North Africa which would be supported by a majority of "responsible governments" which would consider these programs in a different spirit then the one now prevailing in the UN.

Referring more precisely to the forthcoming talks between the Secretary and Mr. Schuman, Ambassador Bonnet stressed the extreme complex character of the problem. He mentioned the two million Frenchmen in North Africa who "must be protected". As to the Jewish minority in Tunis and Morocco, these are already showing signs of fear and some Tunisians are trying to emigrate. According to Ambassador Bonnet it might be somewhat strange for the U.S. to find itself in the position of supporting nationalist governments of such an intolerant nature that important elements of the native population preferred to leave the country. The French policy is one of "association" in Africa, both white and black. It is not a colonial policy nor a policy of oppression or suppression. The French do not wish to see develop a mosaic of small units which, today, would constitute an anachronism. Much time, of course, would be needed for the implementation of France's policy, but "U.S. understanding" would certainly be of considerable help. The French Ambassador then made a brief reference to the common strategic interest of both the U.S. and France in North Africa. After the Secretary's return from Europe, it should be possible to decide on the nature and scope of the talks, the purpose of which should be the establishment of a common policy not only for North Africa and in the UN but also for presentation to the U.S. public. An agenda for these conversations would be desirable. Furthermore, there was no reason why it would not be possible to start talks in Paris concerning an increase in the number of U.S. troops to be stationed in Morocco in accordance with current U.S. desires.

The Secretary expressed his great interest in the subject and the hope that Mr. Schuman would be more specific when they met in Paris. We are anxious to arrive at a common policy with France in relation to North Africa but so far French suggestions have been too vague. Before we could decide to support a common policy we would have to have details as to the French programs and the opportunity to study them with care. What, for example, were the specific reforms which the French have in mind in Tunis? Some French officials say that there exists a detailed program, while others say "no", that the only document in existence is the one with the general terms of reference given to Mr. de Hauteclocque concerning the initiation of conversations with the Tunisians. Before the Secretary could talk usefully with Mr. Robert Schuman, we should receive a paper setting forth the French reform programs for Tunisia and North Africa with both details and reasons. The present situation is worse than a vicious circle as we are making no movement at all. The Secretary referred to the meeting in New York two days ago (Arab-Asian bloc) and pointed out that a special session of the General Assembly would be definitely worse than Security Council consideration and that it was urgent that we move off dead center very soon since time was running out. The Secretary emphasized that he did not need to be convinced as to the undesirability of UN action in the Tunisian case as hampering rather than aiding agreement between the French and the Tunisians and of the dangerous and destructive character of extreme Arab nationalism. Instead, the problem is the drafting of a precise and constructive program of reform which we could all support. The Secretary expressed sympathy with the French position but insisted that the French must provide something acceptable with which we could go to the American people and which the U.S. can support. Time is of the essence.

The French Ambassador concluded by saying that Mr. Schuman believed that a special session of the General Assembly "could lead to a very severe crisis". One of the troubles seemed to be that both the UN and the Arabs representatives therein do not have much to do. In any event, according to Mr. Schuman, no French Government would be willing to permit the UN becoming primarily a mechanism ("machinery") for getting the French out of North Africa.

772.00/5–1852

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan)

SECRET CARTHAGE, May 18, 1952.

Subject: Tunisian Political Situation

Participants: Prince Chadly Bey (eldest son of the Bey of Tunis)
Prince M'Hamed Bey (second son of the Bey of Tunis)
Consul General John D. Jernegan

At the request of M'Hamed Bey, who we had previously known, my wife and I called on him and his wife at the Bey's summer palace in Carthage. On arrival, we found Chadly Bey was present. The ostensible purpose of the visit was to say goodbye prior to our departure the next morning, but it became obvious that the two Princes wanted to have a last opportunity to solicit American support for Tunisian Nationalist aspirations. The gist of their remarks was as follows:

1. The Tunisian people were thoroughly dissatisfied with the current political state of affairs. The French were acting in a most arbitrary manner, making no real concessions to the legitimate demands of the Tunisians. The reforms proposed by the French Government amounted to nothing.
2. The French were not acting in good faith and the Tunisians had been so often disillusioned that they could no longer believe any promises made them. As an example of French trickery, Chadly Bey stated that his Father had wished to issue a communiqué on the anniversary of his accession to the Throne, May 15, in which allusion was made to the desires of the Tunisian people. Instead of publishing this document as it was written, the Residency General had substituted a brief paragraph merely saying that the Bey did not wish to have any ceremonies or festivities on this anniversary. (I had previously mentioned that I had asked for a farewell audience with His Highness, the Bey, but had been told that he did not have time to see me before my departure. M'Hamed Bey said that the Palace had never been informed of my request and that His Highness would have been very glad to receive me at any time. He cited this as another incident of French deceit.)
3. As evidence of French repressive tactics, the two Princes informed me that they were forbidden to leave the Palace grounds and their sister, Princess Zakia, wife of Dr. Ben Salen, was forbidden to come to the Palace from her home in Le Bardo. Similarly, they said the former Cabinet Ministers, who had recently been allowed to return to their homes in the vicinity of Tunis, were not allowed to circulate freely or to receive visitors. All of this, they said, was true despite the fact that the Residency General had formally denied that these restraints had been imposed. (The assertion that Princess Zakia was not permitted to come to the Palace was also made to my wife by the Beya, Mother of the Princess, whom my wife saw during the course of our visit.)
4. In view of the existing impasse, the only solution would be the intervention of a third party, such as the United Nations, to impose measures on both parties. Direct negotiations would get no where.

Both Princes spoke very bitterly against Resident General de Hauteclocque, saying that he had treated their Father, the Bey, very roughly and had used tanks and jet fighters to intimidate him.

As I was leaving, M'Hamed Bey handed me a copy of a statement which he said he had himself prepared outlining the events which brought about the removal of the Chenik Cabinet and the subsequent developments involving the Bey and his family.

The Princes flatly denied that they or their sister, Zakia, were involved in any terrorist activities.

772.00/5–1852

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul General at Tunis (*Jernegan*)

SECRET CARTHAGE, May 18, 1952.

Subject: French Thinking Regarding Reforms in Tunisia.

Participants: Mr. Jean Binoche, Head of the Africa–Middle East Section of the French Foreign Office
Consul General John D. Jernegan

Mr. Binoche, who was making a short visit to Tunis in company with the French Minister of Veteran's Affairs, called at my house to discuss briefly the current status of affairs in Tunis. He told me in strict confidence that there were two schools of thought in the French Government regarding the next step to be taken in an effort to break the existing deadlock. One school held that the Government should adhere to its previously announced intention of creating a Mixed Commission to elaborate political reforms on the basis of the instructions sent to Resident General in March. The other school held that such a Commission could not possibly arrive at any positive result and that the best plan would be for the French Government itself to draw up the reform program and simply impose it on Tunisia at the earliest possible moment. In view of this second school, the technical details of the reforms (such as the exact manner in which the elections might be held) could be worked out by a Mixed Technical Commission, but this would be quite a different thing from the originally proposed Mixed Commission.

Mr. Binoche said that the main purpose of his visit to Tunis was to help his Government arrive at a decision between these two points of view. He had not yet completed his investigations but his present thinking was that a compromise might be desirable. Reforms giving the Tunisian Ministers greater administrative authority and the Tunisians greater access to Government jobs might be drawn up and imposed by the French Government, whereas the creation of a National Assembly could be left to some sort of Commission inasmuch as elections to such an Assembly could not be organized quickly in any case.

In connection with the question of a National Assembly, Mr. Binoche remarked that there was a difference of opinion between the Bey and the French Government as the former wanted to appoint all members, whereas the latter proposed an elective body. I remarked that I did not see how the Bey could maintain his position inasmuch as the Tunisian nationalists themselves were insisting upon an elected Assembly. It occurred to me, however, that one might start by having the Bey appoint an interim Assembly which could then itself prepare plans for a representative elective body.

I emphasized that I thought speed was essential and said I was inclined to agree with the thesis that in the present circumstances the only way to arrive at reforms was for the French Government to present them as *fait accompli.* I did not think it would be possible for a representative Mixed Commission to agree on anything.

As usual, Mr. Binoche spoke of the great difficulty of dealing with the North African problem because of the presence of such large numbers of French settlers in the area. They could not be abandoned to their fate and it was therefore not possible to treat North Africa as Syria, Lebanon and Indo China had been treated.

772.00/5–2052 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET

New York, May 20, 1952—4 : 51 p. m.

835. Re Tunisia. Hoppenot at his request called yesterday for general review of variety of current matters. Following comments re Tunisia may be of some interest to Dept.

Hoppenot seemed generally discouraged. He referred to two extreme attitudes which we gathered exist in France:

(*a*) Bourguiba and other nationalist leaders might be released and negots undertaken with them; this would be "yielding to blackmail", however, and would be most strongly resisted by colonials to maintain considerable political power in France and whose legitimate interests in any event must be protected.

(*b*) At other extreme, a policy of very great firmness might be continued. In this connection Hoppenot referred to feeling that if US had from beginning taken firm stand that question, exclusively one of internal jurisdiction, nationalists would not have been encouraged to maintain intransigent position. He referred to Secy's letter to Javits[1] which he said had been interpreted in Fr as assurance to Javits that if question raised again US would approve UN consideration. He also referred to last Saturday's *NY Times* story from Paris which he seemed to assume was an American leak.

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[1] Representative Jacob K. Javits wrote to the Secretary on Apr. 18 expressing concern over U.S. action in abstaining from voting on the Tunisian issue in the Security Council and requesting the reasons for that action. In a letter dated Apr. 30, the Secretary answered that the U.S. decision was made only after the most painstaking assessment of all factors involved. The United States had not intended the statement in the Security Council, or abstention, to be permanent barriers to a UN hearing on Tunisia, but merely meant to provide some time for the French and Tunisians to begin direct negotiations. The letter ended by informing Javits that if U.S. hopes concerning negotiations proved illusory, any UN member was free to bring the case up again. Under those circumstances the United States would reexamine its position in the light of the situation at the time. No copy of Javits' letter has been found in Department of State files, but a copy of the Secretary's answer is in the UNP files, lot 59 D 237, "Tunisia—General Correspondence, 1952–54."

Hoppenot thought that establishment of negotiating commission and solution by this method was out of question. He thought French govt would have to "give" ("promulgate") reforms. He did not use term "impose".

Hoppenot anticipated that in French Assembly today Pinay or Schuman would make brief report on Tunisian situation, debate thereupon being postponed. Hoppenot saw no direct or indirect relationship in French situation between Tunisia and EDC treaty or contractual arrangements. Only relationship he saw with other questions was with Indochina where he described situation "like an abcess".

Hoppenot reaffirmed that if choice of evils must be made SC would be preferable to GA. He had little doubt that in any event question would arise in 7th GA. He did not feel, however, that Moroccan question would necessarily have to come up. He said that Marchal, Director General of North African Affairs in FonOff, believed in making "substantial concessions" to Sultan. He felt such concessions might do trick in Morocco.

AUSTIN

772.00/5-2252

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Northern Africa Affairs (Cyr)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1952.

Subject: Tunisia

Participants:

The Under Secretary	G	—Mr. Matthews
NEA—Mr. Berry	UNA	—Mr. Hickerson
EUR—Mr. Bonbright	S/P	—Mr. Ferguson
NE —Mr. G. L. Jones	S/S	—Mr. McWilliams
UNP—Mr. Wainhouse	USUN	—Mr. Maffitt
WE —Mr. McBride	AF	—Mr. Cyr

Mr. Jernegan—ConGen Tunis

Mr. Bruce welcomed Mr. Jernegan to Washington and asked him to state his views on Tunisia, with particular reference to action that the French should take and any recommendation he might wish to make as to what the United States position should be.

Mr. Jernegan stated that the Nationalist movement in Tunisia started in the early 1920's—a fact which is too often overlooked by the French. The Neo-Destour Party's alleged membership of 300,000 may be exaggerated, but recent events have certainly swelled the ranks of sympathizers to much more than that. Current events have brought about a solidarity among the Tunisian people, including even the moderates. This solidarity now reflects a body of opinion which cannot be eradicated by force—it can only be channeled. From this viewpoint, Mr. Jernegan said, he believes the French have made many mistakes in the last few months. They have offered too little too late. The French December 15 note, for example, was very badly framed and offended the Tunisians very deeply.

In answer to Mr. Matthews' question as to the background of this note, Mr. Jernegan explained that upon becoming disillusioned with the manner in which the February 8, 1951 reforms were being implemented, Prime Minister Chenik went to Paris in October 1951 with three demands: an all-Tunisian Assembly, an all-Tunisian Cabinet, and an all-Tunisian civil service. He remained there until December 15 when the French reply was delivered to him.

In reply to Mr. Bruce's question, Mr. Jernegan stated that the Tunisian demands did not except financial matters, but he expressed the opinion that the Tunisians undoubtedly would compromise on this point and be willing to leave financial matters in French hands, at least for a time. Mr. Jernegan stated that Resident General Perillier did not like the French note of December 15. He himself, however, was fired for being too lenient.

After receiving the December 15 note, Mr. Jernegan stated, the Tunisians despaired of reaching any sort of agreement with the French and proceeded to appeal to the Security Council. At that point the New Resident General, M. de Hauteclocque, arrived in Tunis and was highly insulted by the failure of the Tunisians to await his arrival before resorting to the Security Council. Mr. Jernegan stated that this point seems to have become an obsession with Hauteclocque, who has therefore been more rigid in his policy than might otherwise have been the case. Hauteclocque came to the conclusion in March that he could make no progress with the Chenik cabinet and it is quite apparent that he intimidated the Bey, by deposition threats, to dismiss the cabinet. His plan was then to submit a rather liberal program to the new cabinet for study and review by a mixed Franco-Tunisian commission. It developed, however, that the Neo-Destour Party did not consider his outline as meeting even their minimum demands and they resolved not to participate in any discussions based on it. They also took the position that no self-respecting Neo-Destour would accept appointment on the mixed commission. There has also been difficulty in finding French members for that commission. In no event would the Neo-Destourians sit on the commission with a French "colon", and the French have differed among themselves regarding the character of their representation.

Mr. Jernegan indicated that this is where the situation now stands in Tunisia: there is no mixed commission; there has been no elaboration of the outline of reforms; the cabinet is composed of powerless and uninfluential civil servants; it is doubtful whether the cabinet has the confidence of the Bey; Resident General de Hauteclocque has recommended that the French Government abandon the idea of a mixed commission and put into effect immediately, with the Bey's seal, a more liberal reform program which might appease the Tunisians and cut the ground from under the Arab-Asian group in the United Nations. Mr. Jernegan talked to Mr. Binoche before his departure from Tunis and was told that the French Foreign Office has this recommendation under consideration and had sent him (Binoche) to Tunis to help it arrive at a decision. Binoche tentatively thought that it might be desirable to impose reforms in the executive and civil service fields but to reserve the creation of a national assembly for study by a commission.

Mr. Jernegan expressed the opinion that the Nationalists would not be satisfied by such a step but that it would nevertheless have the effect of lessening tension in Tunisia. He stated that the basic trouble in Tunisia at the present time is that the Tunisians have completely lost faith in anything the French tell them. Whether the Bey would seal such a plan, Mr. Jernegan said, would depend on what it actually contained in the final analysis, but he pointed out that it has been possible in the past to press the Bey.

In answer to Mr. Matthews' question as to the Bey's outlook, Mr. Jernegan expressed the belief that if left to his own devices, the Bey would just sit and enjoy life and the fruits of his office.

In response to Mr. Bruce's question as to the course the French should follow, Mr. Jernegan stated that for the short term he would recommend the course of action proposed by the Resident General, i.e., submission of a liberal reform program to Prime Minister Baccouche without reference to a Mixed Commission. This reform program should go beyond the concessions contained in the March 22 outline of Foreign Office instructions to de Hauteclocque by adding another Tunisian minister or two to the cabinet immediately. That is, it should reflect a definite gain immediately. Mr. Bruce reminded Mr. Jernegan that he had previously indicated that the Neo-Destourians didn't like this approach. Mr. Jernegan agreed that this was true but that in his opinion the Neo-Destourians would be less militant in the fact of such a proposal.

In reply to Mr. Matthews' question, Mr. Jernegan indicated that Prime Minister Baccouche has little or no political standing in the community. He does have money, comes from a prominent family, and is close to the Bey.

Mr. Bruce asked what the United States position should be in respect to the Tunisian problem. Mr. Jernegan replied that he had discussed the matter with Messrs. Wallner and Utter in Paris and that he was inclined to agree with the proposal Embassy Paris had put forward in its telegram No. 7195 of May 21.[1] In short, the proposal indicates that we want concessions from the French and they want concessions from us—we cannot support the French unless they make concessions to us. Mr. Bruce indicated that he did not like this proposal very much.

Mr. Bruce asked how explosive the situation in Tunisia would be if the French did nothing. Are the "colons" jittery about their own personal security? Mr. Jernegan responded that the "colons" are in a nervous state but that there have been remarkably few incidents involving their personal security. How long this situation would persist he did not know. As a result of the situation, some of the "colons" are more amenable but others have become even less so. Mr. Jernegan observed that the type of minor terrorism now going on in Tunisia could go on indefinitely.

Mr. Ferguson observed that he understands the wisdom of sometimes taking unilateral action but he wonders whether the French are deriving maximum benefit by their practice of yielding grudgingly to Nationalist demands. He wondered if they were not by this method merely dissipating their bargaining position. Mr. Jernegan agreed with this general observation, indicating that the French must go faster with more definite and concrete plans in Tunisia, although they need not go as fast as the British had in India. Mr. Jernegan observed that if the French had gone as far last year as they are willing to go now, there would have been no trouble in Tunisia this year. The Tunisians are not a ferocious people and are reluctant to resort to drastic action. It is necessary for the French, he said, to envisage internal autonomy for Tunisia within a few years, but there is no reason why they cannot continue to handle foreign affairs and defense matters indefinitely, provided they act quickly enough in other fields.

Mr. Bruce asked how useful UN action could be in this case. Mr. Jernegan replied that he had had difficulty in seeing what contribution the UN could make. Possibly, it could spur the French to action. From the beginning the French have clearly indicated that they resent pressure from any source in this connection since they consider it an internal problem. The Tunisians, Mr. Jernegan said, have a childlike faith in the United Nations. They seem to think UN action is such a formidable thing that the French would have to fold in the fact of it. Mr. Hickerson observed that in this they are expecting the impossible of the United Nations.

Mr. Bruce asked Mr. Jernegan what the French could do to "appease" Bourguiba. Mr. Jernegan stated that since December 15 Bourguiba has been more adamant. His feeling now seems to be that he cannot trust the French and that the Franco-Tunisian connection must be severed. Despite this, Mr. Jernegan expressed the view that it would be possible to bring Bourguiba around again.

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[1] Not printed.

Mr. Bruce asked whether minority interests in Tunisia could be protected if the three Tunisian demands of October 1951 were met (which he doubts will happen). Mr. Jernegan expressed the belief that this would be entirely possible. Various suggestions had been made, including the conclusion of special Franco-Tunisian treaties and the creation of a dual legislative body, one of the chambers of which would include French representatives. Mr. Bruce said he understood that the Tunisians had rejected the idea of the French having the rights of Tunisian citizens. Mr. Jernegan replied that the Tunisians were perfectly willing to have the French residents become Tunisian citizens even while retaining French citizenship but that they objected to their enjoying privileges and protection in Tunisia over and above those granted the Tunisians themselves. In reply to a question, Mr. Jernegan indicated that the tax rates for French residents in Tunisia are the same as those for Tunisians, but, of course, the French pay more taxes because they have more property. Mr. Bruce asked whether it would be impracticable to develop a formula providing for gradual reforms in Tunisia while at the same time protecting minority rights. Mr. Jernegan replied that he thought it would not be impracticable to do this. In answer to Mr. Bruce's question, Mr. Jernegan stated that the teaching of French is an issue in Tunisia. At the present time, French is the dominant language in Tunisian schools, but Mr. Jernegan did not think a continuation of this system is essential to French interests.

Mr. Bruce expressed the opinion that the two-assembly idea is not a sensible one for Tunisia. Mr. Jernegan agreed and indicated that the old Grand Council had not been liked by the Tunisians.

In answer to Mr. Bruce's question, Mr. Jernegan replied that the French seem to think that the Bey is opposed to the popular election of officials in Tunisia but that he himself doubts that this is the Bey's view. In any case, the Bey could not really oppose elections when both the French and his own people call for them.

Mr. Bruce asked Mr. Bonbright for his reaction to the preceding statements. Mr. Bonbright indicated that he still could not see where we are going. He expressed doubt that the French would adopt the three point program mentioned above, and indicated that the recent telegram from Ambassador Dunn sums up the difficulties which face us in Paris.

In answer to Mr. Bruce's question, Mr. Jernegan indicated that he liked Hauteclocque personally. He considered him a tough-minded man of action. He stated that Hauteclocque likes to beat the opposition into submission and then "offer them a carrot". Hauteclocque has had no previous North African experience, although he had had similar experience in Damascus. Hauteclocque's philosophy apparently calls for brutality for Arabs with an admixture of rigid fairness and justice. Mr. Jernegan expressed the view that Hauteclocque really means to put a reform program into effect but the question seems to be whether the French Government will let him and whether the progress made will be adequate.

Mr. Bruce asked Mr. Hickerson how many votes the Arab-Asian bloc would be able to muster in the United Nations. Mr. Hickerson replied that he did not know the actual count at the present time but that the bloc does not seem to be having much luck with the Latin Americans at this time. He said that Security Council action is not being considered by the Arab-Asian bloc, which is pressing for a special session of the General Assembly. He observed that every day the regular General Assembly gets closer and therefore makes a special session that much less practical. In the regular General Assembly a majority would be required for inscription of the item on the agenda and ⅔ would be needed to pass a resolution. His impression is that the Arab-Asian bloc could get the majority but that the French would be able to muster the ⅓ needed to prevent passage of a resolution. He agreed with the idea that they should not fritter away their position but should take definite concrete action in the form of a statement in the United Nations defining clearly their position and future plans. This, he felt, was the best way to make the Arab-Asians discontinue their agitation. Mr. Bonbright wondered if in fact such a course of action would have that effect on the Arab-Asians. Mr. Hickerson discussed the adverse effect that the existence of independent Libya and prospective independent ex-Italian Somaliland have on the feelings of Tunisans and their friends. It is obvious that the Tunisians are more advanced than either the Libyans or the Somalis. A question was raised as to whether the Arab-Asians might not be glad of an opportunity to forget the Tunisian issue and there was some indication that the Asian nations would be more persistent than the Arabs in this connection.

772.00/5-2552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of the Embassy in France (Utter) [1]

SECRET PARIS, [May 26, 1952.]

Participants: François Puaux, Director of Protectorate Division,
Africa-Levant, Foreign Office.
John E. Utter, Embassy, Paris.

Present thinking of the Foreign Office regarding Tunisia and more generally North Africa was brought out during a long conversation I had with François Puaux, Director of the Protectorate Division in the Foreign Office. Following are the highlights:

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[1] The memorandum of conversation was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 3106 from Paris, May 26. The despatch informed the Department of State that the interview had been held to elicit the general line Schuman might take on North Africa in his forthcoming conversations with the Secretary of State. (772.00/5-2552)

The conclusions of Emmanuel Temple, Minister of Veterans, and Jean Binoche, Director of the Africa-Levant Section of the Foreign Office, during their recent trip to Tunis confirmed, according to Puaux, the growing conviction in the Foreign Office that the proposed Franco-Tunisian Commission for negotiating reforms was a dead issue and the French must go ahead with their own program immediately. Puaux referred to a telegram just received from Hauteclocque which stated that the Bey had suggested that the matter be dealt with directly between the Resident General and himself. Temple, who held many conversations in Tunis with a wide variety of Tunisians, including former Prime Minister Chenik and Destourians, was referred to by Puaux as well-intentioned but not very shrewd ("malin"). Temple had returned from his exploratory mission, which had been sanctioned by Schuman despite the misgivings of Pinay, completely disillusioned. He had found that Tunisian demands for the recall of Hauteclocque, the re-installation of Chenik, the liberation of Bourghiba, etc. as preliminaries to negotiation so extreme as to rule out the establishment of a Mixed Commission. Puaux remarked that much valuable time had been wasted by the thoroughly unrealistic concept of this Commission.

When I pointedly repeated the necessity of urgent and magnanimous action on the part of the French and the hope that some satisfactory progress would be made in view of the impending conversations between Schuman and the Secretary, Puaux assured me that urgent consideration was being given to the problem, but that the United States could be helpful in affirming its support of its NATO ally. He stated that if the United States Government would unequivocally come out in support of France, the Tunisians would at once cease their clamorings and become reasonable. I again pointed out the virulent attacks to which our Government had been subjected following its action in the last United Nations General Assembly regarding Morocco and more recently in the Security Council over Tunisia, and that we must expect from the French Government an earnest of its good intentions if we were to champion it against domestic public opinion and Asiatic-Arab attacks. I insisted that nothing short of a sincere and definite program which could be implemented without delay would quiet the critics of France.

I then asked Puaux what long term objectives, if any, the French had in mind in respect of all North Africa, quite apart from the more pressing immediate measures which they presumably were prepared to undertake. He replied that in view of the large European population there, the close geographic relation to Europe, the strategic and economic importance of the area, France would never relinquish entirely its control. Referring to the possible dispositions under the French Union, I asked whether they envisaged Tunisia and Morocco eventually as Associated States, and was given a firm No. Puaux said that once French troops left Indochina the three Associated States there would be virtually independent, with only monetary and economic ties to France. This, he emphasized, could not be possible for North Africa. What then would be the future status of Tunisia and Morocco, I asked? Some form of Protectorate status, Puaux replied, must be projected indefinitely. This, of course, bears out the oft-repeated conviction of our Foreign Service officers in North Africa that France has no intention of ever leaving those shores, unless forcibly removed.

In view of this conversation, I venture to surmise that the paper which Puaux has prepared for Schuman for use in his conversations with the Secretary will include the following points:

1) France is ready to institute reforms in Tunisia and Morocco, providing for wider participation of the native populations in the administration of their affairs and leading to virtual internal autonomy over a period of years, the time depending on the speed with which Tunisians and Moroccans demonstrate their capacities for assuming the tasks of self-government. France will, however, continue to maintain control over foreign affairs and the defense of the countries and will assure the rights of French nationals there.

2) France expects from the United States full support for its policy in North Africa. In the French view this will deflate the comparatively small group of unrealistic extremists, allow for the development of friendly relationships between France and the moderate elements, and help to preserve law and order to necessary to the security of these highly strategic territories.

3) France will not be in a position to envisage extension of bases to the United States in Algeria and Tunisia without assurances that the United States shows full confidence in the French handling of the North African situation, and plays an active rôle in defending France's policy against critics in the United States and abroad. To this end, the Department of State can use its influence on the American press, which has so unquestioningly accepted the nationalist point of view widely ballyhooed by the irresponsible Asiatic-Arab bloc in the United Nations.

John E. Utter

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108

United States Delegation Minutes of a Meeting at the Quai d'Orsay, May 28, 1952, 4 p. m.[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, ?] June 3, 1952.

SCEM Min 3

Participants: *France*
- Mr. Pinay
- Mr. Pleven
- Mr. Robert Schuman
- Mr. Queuille
- Mr. Brune
- Mr. Maurice Schumann
- Mr. Parodi
- Mr. LaTournelle
- Mr. de Margerie
- Mr. Bourbon-Busset
- Mr. Binoche
- Mr. Laley

U.S.
- The Secretary
- Mr. Jessup
- Mr. Dunn
- Mr. Perkins
- Mr. Wallner
- Mr. Knight
- Mr. Utter

Subject: North Africa

Mr. Schuman, as the responsible minister, opened the meeting with an exposé of the North African problem, pointing out difficulties and possible joint action. He stressed the importance which France attaches to North Africa, where a special situation exists because of the long occupation by the French and the presence of two million Europeans in the territory. In mentioning the concern of the French not only for the French in North Africa but also for the natives, he pointed out how French attitude had changed after two world wars from the previous 19th Century colonial concept. A résumé of French policy, he declared, was contained in the following sentence of the 1946 constitution: "France intends to lead peoples for whom she has assumed responsibility toward freedom to administer themselves and to conduct their own affairs on a democratic basis."

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[1] A negotiating paper, entitled "The Franco-Tunisian Problem", was prepared for the Secretary to use in his talk with Schuman. Attached to the paper was a memorandum, dated May 12, stating that the paper had been approved at the working level. The negotiating paper stated that every device should be used to highlight the importance the United States attached to the Tunisian question. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 110) The Secretary sent a report of the conversation back to the Department in telegram 7425 from Paris, May 29, not printed. (772.00/5–2952)

The difference between French and nationalist policy was that the latter wished to move on to independence without reforms which they considered secondary, while the French held reforms of primary importance in moving gradually toward the establishment of self government. If necessary stages were not respected there would be anarchy. In maintaining law and order in North Africa the French are convinced they are defending the interest of the Allies as well as their own. Otherwise, there is a risk of communist action behind the nationalist cloak, indications of which have been evident in recent events in Tunisia.

Mr. Schuman defined French policy as one envisaging agreement with two partners, namely the Bey and the Sultan, with whom protectorate treaties were signed. He described the difficulties in convincing leaders who were attached to feudal principles to move toward democratic institutions and the difficulties French were having to find the right men to accomplish democratic development. Mr. Schuman stressed that France is not against nationalism and understands the Tunisian and Moroccan desire and perfect right to obtain internal autonomy. France cannot, however, accept terrorism or systematic agitation for the political role. He referred to the role of the Arab League in promoting agitation and attempts by the League in its almost official status in the UN to obtain intervention in affairs which are the sole concern of France and Tunisia. The Arab League, Destour, and Istiqlal, are all trying to prevent agreement in order to put these questions on an international basis in the UN.

Mr. Schuman thanked the Secretary for having supported the French stand regarding Morocco in the Sixth General Assembly in Paris. He stated that there was at present no tension in Morocco and the Sultan had asked the French to delay their reply to him until the Resident General returned. Mr. Schuman admitted that this did not mean there were no problems and that there would be no difficulties in Morocco. There were indications that negotiations would be opened soon as the result of the memorandum received from the Sultan. The latter had expressed the desire to deal directly with the French Government.

While there is no Moroccan crisis the situation is very difficult in Tunisia. On April 14 France had the support of the United States in the Security Council but subsequently the situation had changed. Through indiscretion extremists had learned that the attitude taken by the U.S. Government had been discussed and that it might change. Henceforth it was believed the U.S. Government would vote for the inscription of the Tunisian question in the UN. Mr. Schuman felt that there would be no special session of the UN for this item but he hoped some agreement might be found so that the extremists would not exploit the U.S. position in the Seventh General Assembly. The Tunisians have systematically avoided commencing negotiations solely because they were speculating on UN intervention.

Mr. Schuman expressed understanding of the difficulties the U.S. Government had to face in connection with U.S. public opinion and the courage required by the Secretary's decision in the Security Council on April 14. He then referred to the U.S. rejoinder of April 30 and the Moroccan case for the International Court of Justice which he contended questioned the protectorate status in Morocco.[2] He remarked that repercussions from such errors could be graver than the error itself.

Referring to reforms in Tunisia, Mr. Schuman said that details of these had been conveyed to the U.S. Government and France would institute reforms when the Bey indicates his readiness. He then talked of our common tasks in North Africa. France, in defending its own interests, was defending those of the Allied community. In December of 1950 France had given facilities for American air bases in Morocco and had not asked for any counterpart, feeling that it was the duty of France to give such facilities. However, when further bases were contemplated for Algeria and Tunisia the French had sought to find a mutually satisfactory formula to establish the principle of non-interference in North African political affairs. There must also be agreement on status for U.S. forces in North Africa before consideration is given to a possible increase of U.S. forces in Morocco. The principle of rights and duties on both sides must be clearly defined. The purpose of the exchange of views between the U.S. and French was to determine on what points the French could count on the U.S.

If in the UN a situation developed which the French considered unjust, Schuman declared that France would have to choose between the UN and the interests of France. He sincerely hoped that the French interests will not run counter to UN interests, but he pointed out that in the troubled state of the world France had the duty of defending the interests of France which were those of Western civilization.

Mr. Pleven remarked that nothing can trouble Franco-Moroccan relations more than misunderstanding of North Africa and he felt that some misunderstanding existed at the present time. He referred to a complex of problems existing in North Africa due in large measure to the large French population and the necessity for the U.S. to understand the situation.

Mr. Pinay then requested the Secretary to comment on the problems raised by Mr. Schuman and Mr. Pleven.

Expressing gratification at the frankness of the exchanges, the Secretary stated there was no misunderstanding by the U.S. Government but difficulties lay in the force of public opinion in the U.S. and France. The U.S. Government, he said, believes that continuation and strengthening of the French position in North Africa is basic and essential. Without France in North Africa that territory would disintegrate into quarreling small, weak states, affording ideal terrain for communism and extreme nationalism. It was the U.S. desire to act in every way possible to strengthen the position of France in North Africa and that is unequivocally the policy of the American Government. After removing this illusory difficulty the Secretary wished to come to the real difficulty, which was unrest and agitation in Tunisia and Morocco. While the U.S. Government was not directly concerned with the substance of the unrest and had no mission or desire to bring about other systems in North Africa, it was interested in seeking a way to lessen that agitation. This unrest was related to similar unrest throughout the world since the war and ranked with a spirit of nationalism in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran, and the Arab world. The agitation in North Africa found echoes in the rest of the world.

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[2] See pp. 189 ff.

In considering the most effective method to settle the agitation and to bring about order and stability, one must choose between negative and positive attitudes and in doing so it is necessary to examine our public opinion and the democratic setup, together with the nature of the North African problem and similar problems throughout the world. The heart of any solution lies in the French working with authorities in the area. This cannot be brought about by France's friends, enemies, or an association of both, such as the UN. The problem is to find the best way to create an environment whereby France can work out a solution in Tunisia and Morocco. The negative approach would be to suppress criticism and discussion and work the problem out in an atmosphere of silence. The positive approach would be to take an offensive in which the French Government would declare that it had a solution which was progressive and good and of which it was proud and wanted everyone to know about. France should get her friends to support her program and rally the European and Latin American states to her policy. It is not for France's friends to suggest what these reforms should be. The U.S. is in no position to know; however, it might be wise for the French to consult with their friends to find out what reception would be given to these reforms by public opinion in other parts of the world. Certain modifications might then be made. The Secretary urged that reforms be put forward at once in order to put an end to the present state of non-activity.

Turning to the public opinion problem in the U.S., the Secretary said he doubted whether the French really understood it. The Government did not fear going against public opinion, but in the North African case its position was drowned out by contrary voices of press, radio, and influential public figures. This attitude sprang from ignorance of the situation in North Africa and certain American habits of thinking. Among these American habits of thinking were:

(1) Traditional sympathy for people who say they are oppressed, which strikes a responsive chord among Americans who liberated themselves from a former oppressed state, thanks to French help;

(2) Deep-rooted belief that anyone has a right to be heard publicly, whether his case is good or bad. The U.S. Government position seems to deny public forum for North Africans, whether in the General Assembly, the Security Council, or in the U.S. Consulates in North Africa, and this bewilders Americans.

The U.S. Government can oppose these habits of thought but cannot change them. It could, however, canalize them satisfactorily if it could point to a substantive French program and say it is a good and fair program, and that the sensible thing to do is to get behind this program and stop sympathizing with the agitators. Absence of such a program is the root of our trouble. This absence rather than any official indiscretion gave rise to the wide belief echoed in the world press, to which Mr. Schuman had referred, that the U.S. Government was about to change its position in the Tunisian case in the Security Council.

Referring specifically to the UN problem, the Secretary said he was hopeful of avoiding a special General Assembly session, but that unless there was some change, inscription of the Tunisian item at the GA next October seemed to be inevitable. On the other hand, if the French had announced their program it might be possible to turn a liability into an asset, to get the UK and other friendly nations especially the Latin American countries behind it, and then to take the offensive in the GA and win.

Mr. Schuman expressed warm thanks for the Secretary's words. As far as Tunisia is concerned, he said, "We have a program; we have given it to the Bey and to the U.S. Embassy in Paris." As to substance, the French are not at fault, but they have not published the program because of difficulties of oriental habits of negotiation, which were intensified by the nationalist clamor involving the raising of the ante at every turn. Perhaps, however, the time had come to change tactics and to publish the program. This was a matter which would receive Cabinet consideration within the next few days. Seconded by Mr. Pleven, Mr. Schuman again asked whether misinterpretations of U.S. motives could not be definitely removed from North African minds and he referred to the report of the Veterans Affairs Minister Temple, who has just returned after talking to all shades of Tunisian opinion and which was unanimous in stating the Tunisians would block any French reform program as long as the possibility existed that the U.S. would agree to UN discussion of the case.

The Secretary again analyzed the U.S. public opinion problem and said that while he could again restate the U.S. position to the press this would be of doubtful value unless coupled with the publication of the French program. He asked whether the program we had received was complete and urged the U.S. be shown a program for publication in order to offer drafting suggestions to make it palatable to public opinion in various parts of the world.

Mr. Schuman said the Tunisian program is not complete but was to be completed by a mixed commission. The commission, however, never met, and French plans now call for putting the program into effect without going through the commission. If the French published the plan would the Secretary make a public statement along the lines he had stated at the table today regarding the necessity of French presence in North Africa.

The Secretary replied that this was not impossible. It would be good if the U.S. and the UK could publicly and vigorously support a sound French program, but the U.S. would wish to see it in advance and be able to offer suggestions. He recapitulated: our objectives are identical; there is no misunderstanding between our governments; irritation between French and U.S. public opinion will continue unless we can do something constructive, and the sooner the better.

The conversation then turned to what could be said to the press. Mr. Pinay naively suggested that the Secretary make the statement of support for the French position at once. The Secretary declined this gambit, pointing to the necessity to see the French program and discuss it with the President and the Cabinet. The Ministers agreed that whatever was said to the press should be agreed upon by both sides. They accepted Mr. Schuman's suggestion that nothing be said to the press Wednesday, but that a communiqué carrying all three meetings should be published at the conclusion of the discussions Thursday afternoon. Such a communiqué should be general in nature.

772.00/6–1052 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, June 10, 1952—7:06 p. m.

915. Re Tunisia. As reported ourtel 910, June 10,[1] Asian/African group plans meet June 12 or 13 with intention to reach decision to request SYG circulate membership on special session call. This info, if correct, raises urgent important problems.

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[1] Not printed; it reported that at a June 6 meeting of the Asian-Arab group, it was decided that the group would review the prospect of obtaining a special session of the General Assembly. After a count of possible supporters, the group felt it was close to having the 31 votes necessary to call a special session. (772.00/6–1052)

1. Should US Govt attempt dissuade ASAF group from taking this action?

Dept will be aware rule 9 of GA rules of procedure provides for 30-day period from date of SYG communication during which members may concur in request. If request should be circulated, we might face full month of confusion doubt and agitation with possibly serious impact on Tunisian situation itself.

2. If we do not seek to influence ASAF group from proceeding with request for special session, we would be confronted at once following issuance SYG communication with inquiries from many dels concerning our attitude. Our assumption here is that we would have no choice but to respond frankly that we oppose a special session. There is of course no room for "abstention", the issue being whether or not we concur in the request.

3. Our position may influence attitude of some members, possibly enough to prevent majority concurrence. It is difficult to see how we can avoid incurring displeasure of ASAFs in any case. However, we may be in better position if we make a successful effort to disuade them from proceeding. If on the other hand we "let nature take its course" and say 25 or more UN members express their concurrence, we would then be in the position of opposing a much larger sector of UN opinion than merely the ASAFs.

4. If it is decided to attempt to dissuade ASAFs from proceeding, we could advise group that we continue to oppose UN debate for reasons set forth in SC in April. We should avoid promises or predictions of any nature. Our approach to them might of course be unavailing but at least we would have told them frankly and in advance what our position would be if they nevertheless insisted upon proceeding.[2]

Gross

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[2] Telegram 479 to USUN, June 11, instructed the Mission at the United Nations to inform the Tunisians that the U.S. position was predicated on the hope that the Tunisian problem would be solved by the French reform proposals. Since the French proposals were still unknown, the United States would be obliged to withhold support for a special session. (772.00/6–1052)

772.00/6–752 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 10, 1952—7 : 16 p. m.

7283. We do not feel Fr plan as outlined Paris tel 7651, June 7 (rptd London 2117)[2] fulfills understanding between Secy and Schuman at Paris for prior consultation by Fr with us before putting Tunisian reform program into final form. We feel that if Fr present plan to Bey before discussions with us they will then be unable make changes which we might suggest and wld use pretext Bey had approved plan as excuse alleged inability fulfill conditions we might feel absolutely essential success of plan.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by McBride (WE) and cleared in the offices of Cyr (AF) and Perkins (EUR) and was repeated to London for Byroade.

[2] Not printed. It reported Schuman had told the Ambassador the Tunisian program might not be in its final form until the conclusion of a parliamentary debate, which might go on until June 17. When the program was finished, it would be presented to the Bey, and after he approved it, the French would show it to the United States before making it public. (772.00/6–752)

Inform FonOff that our understanding is that Fr will go over plan with us while it is still sufficiently flexible permit alterations and before it is submitted to Tunisians. Furthermore we expect no premature publicity will be given Fr program. At proper time of course reform shld be given widest possible coverage in France, US and elsewhere but revelation details prior to discussions with us wld once again limit flexibility later modifications.

As Secy explained to Schuman, our interest in seeing proposals before they are frozen arises primarily because of our belief that we might make useful comments in connection with public opinion reaction here.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

Telegram 7748 from Paris, June 12, reported the Ambassador had asked that the United States be shown the program for Tunisian reform before it was discussed with the Bey. Schuman readily agreed and said that the United States would be able to see the program as soon as it was finalized, which should be after the completion of the Assembly debate on Tunisia, expected to end in the next week. Telegram 7354 to Paris, June 13, informed the Embassy the Department of State wanted an opportunity to make suggestions on the reform program before it was put into its final form. If Schuman planned merely to show the United States the text in *pro forma* fashion before submitting it to the Bey, the Department did not believe the question raised in telegram 7283 to Paris, *supra*, would be answered.

Telegram 7946 from Paris, June 19, reported the Embassy had received a copy of a statement Schuman planned to make on Tunisia that day. The statement included a general outline of the reforms planned for Tunisia, and Schuman stated in conclusion that those reforms constituted the first phase of the contemplated program. The Embassy commented that the reform program, transmitted in telegram 7968, *infra*, did not seem very different from the instructions sent to Hauteclocque on March 22. (For the March 22 reform program, see Paris telegram 5797, March 22, page 692.) Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 772.00.

772.00/6–1952: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, June 19, 1952—8 p. m.

7968. Fol is free translation of Tunisian reform program referred to in Embtel 7946, June 19.[1]

I. *Reform of Executive.*

1. Govt.

Homogeneity of govt cannot be envisaged by one first step. It wld constitute at present an inappropriate solution and necessary reservations wld make measure fail in its purpose. Very rapid evolution already accomplished in composition of Tun Govt in course of last several years shld be recognized. It is not without value to state again that parity between Fr and Tun members of council of mins has been accomplished within last two years.

However, it shld be pointed out that in second phase composition of council of mins will be modified in such a way as to increase further the min depts assigned to Tun. At present: The fol shall be under direction of Tun Mins:

PriMin, who is henceforth chief of govt.

Min of State, responsible for supervision of local admins.

Justice, Public Health, Agric, Commerce, Labor Mins. Fol min depts remain temporarily under Fr direction:

Fin, public works, public instruction, as well as Tunisian office of post, telegraphs and telephones and commissioners office of reconstruction and housing.

However, in mins depts which will remain under authority of Fr directors, Tun asst directors shall be appointed and shall be assigned duties involving real responsibilities.

In order to prove that homogeneity of Tun Govt is objective of evolution now in progress, Tun mins are going to assume greater responsibilities than in past. To this end, a draft decree "relating to general admin of Tun" grants Tun chiefs of admin complete autonomy in management of their depts:

(*a*) "Assent" by res gen to min orders (*arretes*) is abolished: Consequently the orders are made public and are enforceable without any previous control by Fr authorities;

(*b*) Supervision of personnel, which until now has been one of functions of SecGen, has been withdrawn from this high official of Fr nationality, and personnel management is in complete charge of each admin chief.

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[1] Not printed, but see the editorial note, *supra*. Despatch 3378 from Paris, June 27, transmitted a complete text of the program and a translation prepared in the Embassy. (772.00/6–2752)

At same time duties of office of SecGen are reduced by assignment to PriMin of presidency of interministerial commissions and by transfer to director of fin of supervision of expense commitments. Thus new step has been taken in direction which has been followed for last few years, designed to make SecGen "chief collaborator of PriMin". As admin chief, he now has only fol services directly under his control: Civil service admin, and formulation and supervision of the econ plan, a task for which he has statistical service at his disposal.

Finally, in sectors which are to remain under authority of Fr directors, Tun asst directors with duties involving real responsibilities, are to be appointed. Thus these officials will obtain experience necess before assuming highest responsibilities.

2. Creation of an Administrative Tribunal.

Creation of this tribunal constitutes an essential reform: Creation of a tribunal qualified to judge all cases against state and to decide on legality of admin decisions is one of first guarantees to be accorded to private individuals in any modern country.

Jurisdiction of tribunal extends to all acts of admin authorities of regency, and, in particular, police authorities.

On other hand, jurisdiction of this tribunal does not extend to Beylical decrees of a judicial or religious nature or which have force of law. Insofar as other decrees are concerned, it is understood, in order to reserve the sovereigns powers, that this trib will merely express its opinions. On contrary, min and directors orders may be annulled by this trib.

Within scope of his supervisory powers, ResGen has right to inform admin trib of all orders (*arretes*) which he considers illegal. Such action, which must be taken within period of one month, is suspensive.

Pres of admin trib is a Fr chosen from among members of Council of State "*Conseil d'Etat*"; trib includes eight judges, four of whom are of Fr nationality and four of Tun nationality.

Decisions of Tun admin trib may be appealed to an appeal commission which is Tun jurisdiction. Pres of this appeal comm is pres of legal section of Council of State; appeal comm includes Fr members chosen from among Councillors of State and three Tun members appointed by Beylical decree. Its sessions are held in Paris.

This composition of admin trib and of appeal comm has been imposed on US on internatl level by Fr commitments to countries which have renounced regime of capitulations.

3. Civil Service Reform.

In this field, and beginning from present time, contemplated text satisfies Tun claims to greatest extent possible.

"Percentages" established by decrees of Feb 1951 have been abandoned for a formula more favorable to Tun: Appointment to civil service is henceforth open, in principle, to Tunisians only, with reservation that Fr officials shall continue to retain positions they now hold and that Beylical decrees shall continue to determine conditions for certain number of positions to which officials of Fr nationality must be assigned, especially in consideration of commitments made by Fr on finan plane and in connection with natl def. With view to guaranteeing qualifications of appointees, provisions have been adopted designed to maintain standard of competitive exams, on one hand, by prescribing programs of study similar to those preparatory to corresponding competitive exams in Fr, on other hand, by maintaining requirement of juries including both Fr and Tun members, to examine candidates. These exams are in Fr for principal responsible positions and at option of candidates in Fr or Arabic for other positions. Arabic shall continue to be used exclusively in competitive examination for appointment to positions which have long existed.

Finally, text provides for transitional measures in favor of persons under contract and for temporary appointees whose service dates back a certain length of time in Tunisian admin.

During entire period when Tun might not be in a position to provide officials to fill all vacant positions, Fr officials may be assigned to these positions temporarily and placed at disposition of Tun Govt in accordance with conditions to be determined by Fr authorities.

II. *Legis Power.*

At present legis power belongs to Bey. In present stage, and in present state of Tun institutions, it is not contemplated proposing to him that he shld give up this power.

In fact, experience makes it possible to state that it is dangerous to give a legis assem power to decide questions, and to set up a sort of parliamentary regime before local elected assemblies have been constituted; such local assemblies are necessary foundation for legis assem, and moreover, creation of such local assemblies is contemplated in present reform program.

For time being therefore, it is not permitted to be more than a consultative assem. In order to take into consideration at same time certain Tun aspirations and necessary protection of interests of Fr population in regency, we contemplate two assemblies having distinctly different powers and scope.

1. Legis Council.

This council, composed exclusively of Tunisians, has general legis powers, with exception of finan and budgetary decrees. Bey alone may present decrees to this council which must give its opinion on texts which are submitted to it. Council proposes amendments which it considers desirable.

Members, 30 in number, in theory, shall originally be appointed by Beylical decree. After caidat councils and municipal councils have been established, members elected to legis council by these local orgs may gradually replace members appointed, in beginning, by Beylical decree.

2. Finan Council.

Finan council is made up of both Fr and Tun members, mtg together. Council has equal number of both Fr and Tun members. This numerical equality is justified by large contrib made by Fr to expenditures included in budget and by finan participation of metropolitan Fr in local expenditures, in form of local or subsidies.

Council has entire charge of budget and of all matters of finan or budgetary nature, but it is not qualified to deal with any other legis matter.

Some of its members are appointed from among persons representing econ interests.

Fin council has right to make amendments, but govt may request second reading if it disagrees with proposed amendments.

Finally, let us make clear that no provision of text brings in idea of two colleges or of two sections in required majorities.

III. *Local Govt Organizations.*

Reform contemplated in this connection is of real importance for it substitutes election procedure for procedure of appointment by decree, for members of municipal councils, and it establishes a deliberative assembly in each caidat.

Today Tunisia is an extremely centralized state.

Apart from municipal councils which function in 70 local cities there is no govt organization in regency responsible for taking care of local interests as a whole, and consequently state budget is burdened with matters which shld much more logically be dealt with locally.

Through municipal reform and through creation, within framework of caidat, of assemblies responsible for drawing up a budget, for administering public property and for establishing certain local public services, it is a question at same time of familiarizing Tunisians with exercise of right to vote and of initiating Tunisians thus elected in responsibilities resulting from mandate conferred on them by their electors whom they represent.

This experience will be gained in large cities in collabortion between French and Tunisians elected by two distinct electoral colleges; in towns and localities where Eur population is numerically small, as in majority of caidat councils, officials elected will be all or nearly all Tunisians. From results of these various experiences, it will be possible to draw particularly valuable conclusions as to possibilities for hastening country's advance toward internal autonomy.

Beyond all possible doubt, this reform plan falls within framework of policy which France has adopted in Tunisia. It constitutes, beginning now, a real regime of internal autonomy not only within local govt organizations, but also in important sectors of Tunisian central admin. On basis of reforms thus achieved, and taking into account experience acquired, it will be possible to extend this regime, by successive stages, to Tunisian institutions as a whole, and gradually to make internal autonomy a living reality.

It is not impossible that these plans, which certain people will object to because they go too far, and which others will object to because they do not go far enough, may arouse reservations and opposition. However, govt will do everything within its power, within limits and within periods of time which it has prescribed for itself, to end that these reforms and principles which they represent, be incorporated in institutions of regent.

Dunn

UNP files, lot 59 D 237, "Tunisia, General 1952–54"

Memorandum by the Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) [1]

SECRET [Washington,] June 20, 1952.

Subject: Tunisia

Background:

The French have made public their reform program for Tunisia without giving us the promised opportunity to see it in advance in order to make comments intended to make it acceptable to US and world opinion.

The text as transmitted in Paris telegram 7968 [2] reveals that it is the same in substance as the one outlined in the instructions to the Resident General on March 22 and as made public by Prime Minister Baccouche on April 1. The Department did not consider that program satisfactory and continued to urge the formulation of a better one.

Since originally the French were unable to constitute a mixed commission to discuss the program because of broad Tunisian opposition to its terms, there is no reason to suppose that the same program would be any more acceptable to the Tunisians now. Thus, continued Tunisian opposition accompanied by more disturbances can be expected.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Popper, Stein, and Elting of UNP.

[2] *Supra.*

The French announcement comes too late to affect the request of the Arab-Asian group for a special session. It is too early to say whether or not the announcement will increase or decrease the chances that a special session will be held. On the one hand those who are inclined to oppose such a session will argue that the program at least be tried out before discussion takes place; on the other hand, those who are critical of the French will say the program's inadequacy makes a special session more important than ever.

Without a radical change in the French position, the Tunisian item is certain to come up at the 7th General Assembly. If the US should indicate now that the French program should be tried out, the French would claim we had betrayed them if subsequent events confirm our impression that the program is inadequate and if we are forced therefore to assent to some UN action. Moreover, as soon as we publicly support the program, we will have lost a large part of our leverage with the French.

Recommendations:

1. That the Secretary refrain from any public declaration of support for the program since we think it is inadequate and since the French did not consult with us in advance as they had promised to do.
2. That, if politically advisable, we tell the French in what respects the program would have to be altered to obtain our support.

(We wish to stress that in our view the first recommendation should stand even if the Department should feel that the program represents a step in the right direction and that we should encourage its implementation.)[3]

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[3] A memorandum, also dated June 20, by Perkins (EUR) to Bruce (U), summarized the French reform program and stated it was not believed the Tunisian Nationalists would be satisfied with it. Their principal objection was expected to be to the creation of an administrative tribunal, to which they had already objected, and participation of French citizens in the Municipal Councils and one of the Consultative Assemblies. The memorandum concluded, however, that the beginning of elected Municipal Councils and increased participation by Tunisians in the civil service could be important in developing an electorate and administrative cadre, that could lead to further democratic measures in the future. (772.00/6-2052)

772.00/6-2152: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, June 21, 1952—2 p. m.

8009. Although govt finds itself in unpleasant position as result of Assembly's failure to endorse its Tunisian program, and although narrow margin by which censure of Schuman was avoided has weakened his position, we believe yesterday's debate was not as disastrous for govt and for its Tunisian policies as some press comment here wld have it.[2]

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Tunis.

1. Since prog has not been disapproved, govt will definitely proceed with its submission to Bey. We are informed to this effect by Binoche, Dir FonOff African and Levant Affairs. Date tentatively envisaged is June 30, in view holidays fol Ramadan.
2. Debate and the votes fol it also indicated in our view that more liberal program cld not have got past the Assembly under present conditions. Leftist support for more liberal prog wld not have made up for losses on the right.
3. This consideration cld be talking-point for Hauteclocque in his dealings with Tunisians. It is true that he has no clear mandate from Assembly to proceed, but he can point to govt's and Schuman's difficulties as evidence govt has gone as far as it can.
4. Schuman's position has been impaired, not only due to his Tunisian policy but due to accumulation of opposition on other issues as well. Pinay has publicly defended him, however, and said it wld be "cowardice" to jettison him; and therefore we feel Schuman's position in Cabinet, while weakened, has not become untenable.
5. It is significant govt did not in fact, seek clear endorsement of its Tunisian policy from Assembly. Pinay considered for a while putting confidence question on affirmative motion but decided against it. That decision meant govt wld content itself with rejection of opposition motions. That is what has taken place.

Fact nevertheless remains that Pinay has somewhat lost stature in Assembly. Assembly itself, however, by demonstrating its inability to obtain majority for any alternative to govt's Tunisian policy. Has not acquitted itself brilliantly in the debate either. What has damaged Schuman's position most was not the total of 227 votes against his person (largely accounted for by Gaullists and Commies) but large number of abstentions. Breakdown of vote not yet available.

DUNN

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[2] Telegram 8020 from Paris, June 22, gave a breakdown of the June 20 vote on the Tunisian question in the French Assembly. By a vote of 328 to 258 the Assembly had rejected a motion to endorse the government program for Tunisia. It also rejected, by a vote of 276 to 224, a motion to censure Schuman for his part in bringing about a Tunisian settlement. (772.00/6–2252)

A memorandum by McBride (WE) to Byington and Knight (WE) and Bonbright (EUR), dated June 22, had an interpretation of the French vote. While the government program was not approved, it was not disapproved either. Since the government had disposed of all opposition motions, Prime Minister Pinay was expected to impose the reform program. But, according to the memorandum, any effort by Pinay to promulgate a more liberal program would probably lead to his downfall. The suggestion was made that the United States refrain from pressuring the French on the North African problem in the near future. (772.00/6–2252)

772.00/6-2452

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert McBride, Office of Western European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1952.

Subject: UNGA Special Session on Tunisia.

Participants: M. Daridan, Chargé d'Affaires, French Embassy
M. van Laethem, French Embassy
Mr. Bonbright—EUR
Mr. McBride—WE

M. Daridan called at his request to discuss the action of the Arab-Asian bloc in asking for a special UN General Assembly session on the Tunisian problem.[1] He said that many states were delaying their replies to the Secretary General's letter pending the US reply. He added this was especially true of the Latin American nations. He said that France had presented a good program and deserved assistance in the Tunisian question. He noted that the Tunisian nationalists had denounced the program even though they had not yet seen the text. He felt that UN action at this time was particularly inappropriate since the French had just presented a program.

M. Daridan stated that his Government wished to ask our assistance in forestalling this special session by letting the other governments know our attitude promptly. Mr. Bonbright stated that we had already gone part way in this connection by sending out a circular to our Embassies informing them that we were opposed to a special session and that they might so state if queried.[2] M. Daridan expressed the hope that we would be able to publicize this position in order to achieve the maximum utility therefrom. Mr. Bonbright indicated that he felt our position would probably become known anyway but that he would look into the question to see if anything could be done.

M. Daridan stated that what we had done thus far only went part way and that Paris appeared to take great stock by this point of our advertising our position. M. van Laethem added that it seemed particularly important for us to make our position known unequivocally in the immediate future in order that our press and public opinion might not once again conclude that the Department's position was vacillating. Mr. Bonbright promised once again to look into the matter on an urgent basis.

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[1] USUN telegram 962, June 20, informed the Department of State that the Secretary-General had received a request for a special session of the General Assembly on Tunisia, signed by 13 Arab-Asian countries. A UN cable was to be dispatched that night to the rest of the UN membership, asking if they supported that request. (772.00/6-2052) Copies of the Arab-Asian letters requesting the special session are in the background book on Tunisia, IO files, lot 71 D 440, "7th GA, Tunisia."

[2] Circular telegram 1052, June 23, informed the Embassies that the United States did not intend to concur in the request for a special session. If questioned, Embassy personnel were instructed to inform the Foreign Office that the U.S. position on Tunisia continued to be based on the hope that the problem would be solved in the near future by a reform program mutually satisfactory to both French and Tunisians. (772.00/6-2352)

772.00/6–3052 : Telegram

The Acting Consul at Tunis (LeBreton) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, June 30, 1952—5 p. m.

207. Neo-Destour has circulated memo expressing Tunisian people's alleged dismay at US position on special UNGA session Tunisian case.[2] Characterizing Schuman reform program as illusory, memo recalls that it has been subject to searching analysis by reps all shades Tunisian opinion and found wanting (Tunis desp 396, June 24).[3] Deplores fact that State Dept apparently determined to propound error of its position last month re SC.

Memo denies that Neo-Destour policy based on obstructionism, contending that refusal consider Fr program justified by fact that proposed reforms are inadequate and even retrograde in substance, while procedurally they are not to be negotiated but unilaterally imposed without opportunity being given Tunisians to express their opinion. Denies also that present abnormal situation based on state of siege, censorship, concentration camps, stifling of free expression of opinion. Constitutes "favorable psychological climate" for a detente as Mr. Acheson appears to think.

Copy of memo has been sent ICFTU Brussels with added comment that program will never obtain Bey's approval.

Boudali called this morning to communicate emphatically and lengthily Tunisian disappointment at latest US stand. According him, our abstention in May given benefit of doubt as possible case of bowing to necessity; latest Gross statement, however, can only be interpreted as betrayal. Memo of conversation and comments follow by despatch.[4]

LEBRETON

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris.

[2] In reply to the Secretary-General's communication regarding a special session, transmitted to USUN in telegram 517, June 26, the Department of State informed him it did not believe the special session was warranted so soon after the recent French reform proposals for Tunisia. A copy of the message was sent to U.S. missions abroad as circular telegram 1068, June 27. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.

[3] Not printed; it reported a group of prominent Tunisian leaders had given the Consul a paper summarizing Tunisian criticisms of the French reform program of June 19. The gist of their criticism was that the program was illusory and constituted no reform at all. The Consul commented that the Bey's attitude was unknown, and Tunisian public opinion was not necessarily as opposed to the French program as Tunisian leaders seemed to think. (772.00/6–2452)

[4] Despatch 1, from Tunis, July 2, 1952, not printed. (772.00/7–252)

772.00/7-852: Telegram

The Acting Consul at Tunis (LeBreton) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, July 8, 1952—midnight.

5. ResGen presenting reform program to Bey this morning.

On instructions from this chief, Choiseul summoned me and said:

(1) Assembly debate may have been indecisive, but Hauteclocque's policy has full unqualified support of Pinay, Schuman and Schumann.

(2) No action expected for several days, but Fr think Bey will accept. Present atmosphere in Palace favorable to detente. Bey's poor health a factor.

(3) Baccouche Mins who have been informally shown Fr proposals pleasantly surprised at liberality which exceeded the expectations. Consider program real step toward internal autonomy.

(4) Considerable disquietude in Fr circles, however, because of (*a*) consultative council on which they not represented and (*b*) preponderance of Tunisians in civil service appointments. Fr colons particularly incensed at former functionnaires at latter. Although both groups wield political influence in Paris, Hauteclocque does not intend let them stand in his way.

(5) Neo-Destour's intransigence based partly on incomplete knowledge but mainly on awareness that program cuts ground from under them. In order counteract favorable impression reforms sure to make, Neo-Destour has been circulating first rumors such as one now current that Fr will surround Palace with troops and tanks in order force Bey to sign.

(6) Acceptance of reforms by Tunisian public opinion will mark sharp decline in Neo-Destour's influence. Public will appreciate speciousness of UN plea. Hauteclocque believes party can play useful role as natl political party but cannot be countenanced as refuge for revolutionaries and agitators.

(7) Liberal terms of reform program (abandonment of Fr parity with Tunisians in Cabinet for instance) were not made public earlier out of courtesy to Bey, but principally because Neo-Destour a dangerous enemy and important take them by surprise.

(8) In utmost confidence he said all 893 remaining political detainees will be released either Bastille Day or Aidelkebir. Only those charged with crimes with then remain in custody. Bourguiba considered as special case. He cld be indicted for incitation to revolt and causing bloodshed, but present Fr policy is to leave his *status quo*.

(9) ResGen seeks complete *détente* and believes similar desire exists in Palace. Harvest excellent and there is widespread desire resume normal commercial activity that has been so badly disrupted since Jan.

Comment: Choiseul obviously instructed bear down heavily on optimistic aspects of program and softpedal unfavorable features. Nevertheless, ResGen with whom I talked briefly last night gives impression of going at this with goodwill, confidence and reasonably good chances of success.

LEBRETON

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Rabat, Algiers, Tangier, and Naples.

772.00/7-1052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Tunis [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 10, 1952—4:56 p. m.

4. Ladgham visited Dept Tues express disappointment 1) US had not at least abstained re special session, and particularly 2) had explained its negative vote by reference to Fr program, implying it formed proper basis for discussion with Tunisian auths. He particularly disliked this indication US considers Baccouche Cabinet as duly constituted Tunisian auths. He referred to Chenik as PriMin and to fact that even Hauteclocque is not duly accredited, not having recd necessary documentation from Bey this regard. Stated if special session occurs, he might be in position to formulate res to resolve differences, but that as matter of principle no such conciliatory attitude cld prevail at 7th UNGA.

Ladgham reiterated his understanding US position in light of world problems but protested above mentioned negative vote and implication as gratuitous US blows to nationalist cause, and stated US vote on special session less sympathetically understood in Tunisia than SC abstention vote.

Ladgham was urged not to foreclose discussion of Fr plan, as real hope for Tunisians lies in constructive suggestions re program.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Cyr and cleared by NEA, WE, and UNP. It was repeated to Paris.

Editorial Note

Despatch 50 from USUN, July 23, transmitted a note from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, informing the Department of State that he would not call a special session of the General Assembly to consider the situation in Tunisia. The Secretary-General's note, dated July 21, stated that since the requisite majority of members had not concurred in the request for the special session, the Secretary-General would take no further action on that request. Also transmitted was a note by the Secretary-General listing the replies on the special session, the date on which each was received, and the position taken by each country. Ten members, besides the original 13 making the request, concurred; the 29 other countries who replied did not concur. (772.00/7-2352)

A memorandum by Byington (WE) to Perkins and Bonbright (EUR), dated July 22, stated it seemed obvious that the question of Tunisia would almost certainly be raised at the Seventh Regular Session of the General Assembly in October. The memorandum suggested it would be desirable to have the French agree to put Tunisia on the agenda at that time, and the United States should make every effort possible to overcome French reluctance. Attached to the memorandum was a suggested draft statement to be used for that purpose. A memorandum by Perkins to Byington, dated July 25, agreed that the United States should try to persuade the French to agree to including Tunisia on the agenda. It concluded, however, by disagreeing with the idea of the draft statement. (UNP files, lot 59 D 237, "Tunisia: Memoranda of Conversation, 1952–54") Telegram 80 from USUN, July 24, reported it was likely that enough support would be forthcoming to put the Tunisian case on the agenda in October. (772.00/7–2452)

On July 20, the 13 countries that had requested the special session on Tunisia wrote to the Secretary-General and proposed that the Tunisian question be included in the agenda of the next regular session. A copy of the letter is in the background book on Tunisia in the IO files, lot 71 D 440, "7th GA, Tunisia." The concluding paragraph of the letter stated that the question was being referred to the General Assembly so that a just and peaceful settlement might be achieved. The letter was transmitted as an enclosure to USUN despatch 100, August 5. (772.00/8–552)

772.00/7–2552 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, July 25, 1952—7 p. m.

580. Binoche, FonOff, today commented as follows to Emb officer:

A. *Re Tunisia.*

(1) Bey sent message several days ago to Pres Auriol,[2] indicating he had expected Baccouche would return reform program to him for consideration rather than return it to ResGen for Fr approval of proposed modifications, and requesting that program now be given to him for study.

(2) Fr Cabinet has approved virtually in entirety modifications to program as proposed by Baccouche Cabinet (Embtel 465, July 21

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Rabat, Tangier, and London.

[2] Despatch 14 from Tunis, July 28, transmitted a copy of the Bey's message, dated July 22. The letter informed President Auriol that on July 4 the Bey had been informed that drafts of the decrees instituting the French reforms would be submitted to him without delay. Since that date, press despatches had alluded to the Bey's "alleged implied approval," and to meetings of the Tunisian Cabinet. Finally, the Secretary General of the Tunisian Government had gone to Paris to submit amendments to the reforms to the French Government. The Bey said he was astonished at such behavior toward him since the reforms had never been submitted to him, and no authority had been delegated to the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. The Bey closed by saying he had not even been informed of the departure of the Tunisian Secretary General for Paris. (772.00/7–2852)

rptd Tunis 3, Rabat 10, Tangier 2).[3] Fr plan make no announcement at present re acceptance of proposed Baccouche modifications.

(3) ResGen will probably not be in position to submit program to Bey before Monday or Tuesday as final drafting, translation into Arabic not yet completed. Concessions granted through approval modifications proposed by Baccouche Cabinet have created new point of departure for demands by Bey for further concessions. FonOff does not know procedure Bey plans follow in studying program or whether he will give approval. It is not contemplating any forms pressure to expedite approval or assure it as it believes this would exaggerate situation.

(4) Bey reported as unusually cordial to Baccouche at Thursday morning seal ceremony, perhaps to compensate for shabby treatment re message to Pres. (See para one above.) Unconfirmed reports indicate considerable division within Bey's family with third son, who apparently favors program, coming to blows with second son.

(5) Fr attitude toward consideration Tunisian problem by gen assembly in fall session not, of course, yet established. Decision will be difficult one for govt as Binoche believes there is considerable support in country for position reportedly advocated by Marshal Juin—Fr withdrawal from UN if North African issue forced. Binoche indicated he believed there were at least five ministers in present cabinet who would support such a position.

B. *Re Morocco.*

Fr Cabinet has given final approval to proposed reply to Sultan's note which will be transmitted to Sultan in early August. Emb will be given text when final drafting has been completed.

DUNN

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[3] Not printed; it reported the Tunisian Secretary General had returned to Paris with a set of proposed modifications to the reform program. They had been drafted during discussions between the Resident General and the Baccouche Cabinet. A member of the French Foreign Ministry commented to an Embassy officer that, while general popular Tunisian reaction had been favorable to the reform program, Neo-Destour opposition had been so vigorous that it was possible the Bey might not approve the program. (772.00/7–2152)

772.00/7–1852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 30, 1952—12:25 p. m.

548. With expiration deadline for calling special session UNGA on Tunisian case, Arab-Asian bloc having failed obtain necessary votes,

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright (EUR) and Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson and cleared by Jernegan (NEA). Bonbright signed for the Secretary. It was repeated to Tunis, Tangier, and Rabat.

Dept believes we shld at once begin efforts avoid difficulties on both Tunisian and Moroccan cases at 7th GA.

While fully recognizing depth Fr feeling and their domestic polit difficulties, we are convinced most important aim to be sought at this time is gain Fr agreement not to oppose inscription Tunisian and Moroccan cases on the agenda.

At least Tunisian item seems certain to be inscribed regardless Fr position even if backed by US and UK and even if implementation reform program has made some progress (see USUN 60).[2] It is likewise clear Moroccan item will most probably be raised and some sentiment exists that this question already on provisional agenda as holdover from 6th GA.

As indicated by Muniz of Brazil in USUN 60 Fr efforts again to block UN discussions on Morocco and Tunisia may lead to most serious situation whereas their willingness have items inscribed wld probably result in only mild debate and innocuous res and forestall anything worse such as condemnatory resolutions or efforts send UN good offices comm to North Africa.

We have believed in the past and believe even more strongly today that only wise and realistic course for Fr to take is acquiesce in discussion and take offensive by describing in detail what they have done and intend to do in North Africa. Fr cld do this while reserving position on question of competence, if they think it necessary. We hope that by autumn Bey will have accepted Tunisian reform program[3] (and its implementation shld be under way) and Franco-Moroccan discussions on reforms will be in progress. If these hopes are realized we see little danger for Fr in such a course.

While our own position not yet formulated it is clear it will be even more difficult for us this autumn than it was before to oppose inscription. You will bear in mind that this issue will have to be faced immed on opening GA Oct 14. Fr undoubtedly aware practically unanimous public and press criticism in this country which followed our abstention last spring.

While we appreciate risks it seems to us Fr shld also be thinking about advantages which might be derived from inclusion of one or more Tunisian Ministers on Fr UN delegation, assuming of course that Tunisian reform program in operation by time GA convenes. However this is point on which Fr will be best judges and we wld not wish press it.

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[2] July 18; not printed. It informed the Department of State that the Asian-African group was likely to put Tunisia on the Seventh General Assembly agenda and that the entire Latin American group would support the action. (772.00/7-1852)

[3] Tunis telegram 28, July 28, reported the Tunisian Prime Minister had issued a statement stating that the Bey alone had the right to make the final decision on the French reform program. (772.00/7-2852) Tunis telegram 31, July 29, reported on a meeting held the previous day by the Resident General and the Tunisian Prime Minister with the Bey. The Bey's position was reported as ambiguous; he said he could not seal the decrees in final form for 6 weeks or 2 months, as his advisers had to study them. (772.00/7-2952)

We recognize that it is by no means merely a question of persuading Schuman and FonOff of wisdom of proposed course of action. We leave entirely your discretion nature and level of your approaches to Fr Govt but we feel you shld raise this at once and keep it constantly before the Fr Govt. UKUN is recommending Brit Govt make similar representations to Fr Govt.

ACHESON

772.00/8–452 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jones) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, August 4, 1952—5 p. m.

40. 1. ResGen invited us to call today and reviewed developments past few days, since he "wished Mr. Byroade and Dept to have full picture situation." He confirmed generally Grellet's account (Tun 38 and 39, Aug 2)[2] and stressed fol points:

A. Baccouche and Mins constitute legal advisory group of Bey: Baccouche and his Mins Bey's choice made without ResGen pressure.

B. Bey's new advisory group "abnormal and illegal" in that Tun Govt excluded. Thus "rules of game have been violated".

C. Group not representative either politically or geographically, and "wld be hard to find two reasonable men among them". Under stronger majority rejection reforms foregone conclusion.

D. Binoche, FonOff, arrives Tunis tonight for brief on-spot study.

E. Referred again importance sealing budget Oct 1 (Tun 36, Aug 1).[3]

2. ResGen said he had been busy calming Fr opinion both here and Paris. He had advised Paris that even though "rules had been broken and advisory group not representative", France must stick to original plan because (*a*) world public opinion (including some opinion in

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, London, Algiers, Naples, Rabat, and Tangier.

[2] Telegram 38 reported the Bey had summoned approximately 36 leaders of Tunisian public opinion to the Palace the previous day. He asked them to study the reform decrees, consult the people they represented, and report to him in 15 days. Telegram 39 reported the Bey's action caught the French Residency by surprise, and they considered many of the members of the group anti-French. An informal check by the Consulate General regarding the depth of Nationalist feeling in the group confirmed the Residency's belief that the group would probably not approve the French program. The Consul General suggested the Department of State display extreme reserve on the matter, since the French had been put on the defensive and had little room to maneuver. (772.00/8–252) Despatch 32 from Tunis, Aug. 6, transmitted the available biographic information on the members of the Bey's group. (772.00/8–652)

[3] Not printed [illegible] reported extreme concern on the part of the Residency at the Bey's refusal [illegible] routine administrative decrees, which had led to a virtual standstill of the government. The temporary device under which the budget had been operating would expire on Oct. 1, and the French felt that something would have to be done before that date. (772.00/8–152)

France) wld tend sympathize with new procedure introduced by Bey and (*b*) delay by Bey inevitable anyway. He said France's position unchanged insofar as Bey and reform program concerned. No drastic action contemplated against Bey because changing Beys would not change situation. ResGen will not hesitate take necessary steps to check any increase terrorists activity.

3. Speaking confidentially ResGen said Palace clique banks heavily on (*a*) recall Hauteclocque and (*b*) full US support nationalist position. Re (*a*) he stated categorically rumors without foundation. Re (*b*) he again mentioned letter which Hached allegedly received from US labor union (Tun 33 July 30)[4] and likelihood US will find Bey's advisory group reasonable and liberal step.

4. ResGen, making clear he was speaking without specific instrs Fr govt, asked us to let Dept know that he regards next two weeks as crucial in Tun situation. During this period Bey's advisory group will be deliberating and he considers that favorable comment by US re substance of reforms offered by Fr might carry great weight with them. Reminding us that NATO grand strategy requires stable North Africa and that proof reform program liberality is bitter opposition local Fr, ResGen hoped very much Dept through any means at its disposal wld find it possible present current program to US public as "genuine, liberal and fair". He is convinced these adjectives apply and that program goes as far as is now possible without risking internal disorder in Tunisia.

5. ResGen handed us on restricted basis Fr text preambles seven reform decrees and said these give clear picture substance reforms. Decrees themselves constitute files several inches thick but he wld give us these as well. Unless Dept instructs otherwise translations preambles will be pouched Aug 7. Decrees deal with (1) general admin of Tunisia, (2) civil service, (3) municipal reform, (4) caidal councils, (5) legislative council, (6) administrative tribunal and (7) financial council. Together they total approx 1,000 words.

6. *Comment:* ResGen's "business as usual" attitude did not hide deep concern over latest developments particularly its impact on public opinion abroad. Decree preambles are in accord with earlier Fr ex position reforms contemplated but they are of necessity dry and unnewsworthy and some of their most liberal aspects are likely to be missed outside Tunisia. We doubt therefore that Dept will wish go much beyond Secy's still valid June statement though France will hope

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[4] Not printed; it reported the Consulate General had heard from two sources that the Bey's resistance to the French reforms had been greatly stiffened by Farat Hached. Hached had read the Bey a letter from an American labor leader stating American labor was firmly in back of the UGTT leader and would pressure the U.S. Government to support him in the United Nations. In the final paragraph, the Consul General suggested that if American labor leaders wrote or phoned Hached counseling restraint, that action would have a great impact on Tunisian policy. (772.00/7-3052)

for at least reiteration substance of this. In candor we think ResGen may overestimate effect on advisory group of official US statement. Attitude US labor leaders, without "official" stigma, more likely have some effect. (Tun 33, para 4.)

JONES

772.00/7-3052

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1952.

Subject: Relations between the AFofL and the Tunisian UGTT

Participants: Mr. Samuel Berger, Special Assistant to the Director, MSA.
NEA: Mr. Jernegan

Following the receipt of Tunis telegram No. 33 of July 30,[1] reporting that Farhat Hached had received a letter from an American labor organization urging him to stand firm because American labor would put pressure on the American Government in favor of Tunisian aspirations, the Under Secretary asked Mr. Berger to talk informally with an appropriate AFofL representative. Mr. Berger informed me that he had done so yesterday, August 4, in the course of a conversation with Mr. Jay Lovestone.

Mr. Lovestone admitted that the AFofL was in correspondence with Farhat Hached and was also in contact with Mr. Ladgham, Tunisian Nationalist representative in New York. He did not know, however, the contents of each and every letter which might have been sent to Hached. (He remarked that some of their letters seemingly failed to arrive at destination.)

Mr. Lovestone said that the general line the AFofL was taking with the UGTT was that the Tunisians should work for internal autonomy, leaving control of foreign affairs and defense in French hands. The AFofL intended to continue its support for the Tunisians in working toward this objective and, specifically, would exert its influence to get them a hearing at the next UN General Assembly.

Mr. Berger had explained that the situation was very delicate and expressed the hope that the AFofL would not do anything to make things more difficult for us. He especially urged that they not mislead the Tunisians regarding the extent of the support they might expect to receive in the US. Mr. Lovestone assured Mr. Berger that they were not misleading the Tunisians.

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[1] Not printed; but see footnote 4, *supra*.

Mr. Berger told me that he was sure Mr. Lovestone understood our concern and that he, Mr. Berger, was not merely speaking personally. Nevertheless, he was not inclined to think that the conversation had had any affect in changing the views or activities of the AFofL. At the same time, he did not think any harm had been done.

I thanked Mr. Berger for his efforts on our behalf.

772.00/7-2952 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 5, 1952—3:59 p. m.
PRIORITY

669. Verbatim text. As Emb has seen from USUN 89 July 29[2] (rptd Paris 670 and Tunis 14) Dept has received communication from Ladgham Neo-Destour rep in NY re Tunisian sitn. We assume Ladgham has given this to other dels NY and may of course release it to press.

Dept will not reply directly to Ladgham since this wld appear inappropriate and give too much weight to his ltr. Nevertheless because of various misstatements fact in document Dept feels it shld be countered and allegations contained therein not allowed to pass. Accordingly we believe USUN shld convey Ladgham our comments as given below. We further believe ConGen Tunis probably shld make our views known in Tunisia and that Chedly Bey might be best point of contact but we invite Jones comment on this suggestion. Before proceeding either in NY or Tunis however Emb Paris shld show Ladgham memo and our comments to FonOff and outline our plan of action and reasons therefor as given above. However, USUN has appointment with Ladgham noon Aug 6 and unless Fr raise objection by then USUN shld proceed. Tunis shld await further instrs.

Fol are Dept's comments:

Dept wld like comment certain statements re Tunisian question which have appeared press and have been conveyed to members our UN Delegation NY.

Neo-Destour Party seems to feel that, if implementation of reform program can be delayed until convening regular session UN, it will be easier then have Tunisian item placed on Agenda. It shld be noted

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Cyr (AF) and McBride (WE) on Aug. 1. It was cleared in the offices of Hickerson (UNA), Bonbright (EUR), and Jernegan (NEA) and signed by Bonbright. It was repeated to Tunis and USUN.

[2] Not printed; it reported a communication received from Ladgham, a representative of the Tunisians in New York. Ladgham claimed U.S. and U.K. support enabled France to keep the Tunisian question from the Security Council agenda, and Tunisians considered that action a tacit encouragement of French policy. He wanted to inform the Department of State of the recent upsetting turn taken in Franco-Tunisian relations and emphasize the dangerous repercussions if the situation continued. (772.00/7-2952)

UN Charter itself requires parties to dispute shall first of all seek solution by negot. All parties in Tunisia wld seem obliged exhaust every effort reach agreement with Fr auths before attempting refer their problem to UN for consideration. We remain convinced that effective reform program is way in which Tunisian aim internal autonomy will be reached. We do not believe obstructive attitude or refusal negot will in any sense assist Tunisian cause.

It is important that Tunisians recognize cold facts re limitations on ability of UN to help them realize their aspirations. GA debate and even res, if one is accepted, will not in themselves improve situation in Tunisia and may indeed set back possibility of achieving desirable reforms. If Tunisians are really sincere in their hope for progress toward autonomy, they will weigh carefully results of a demagogic, emotional campaign in the GA.

We have heard charge to effect Tunisian cabinet hastily adopted Fr reform program under pressure, making only a few purely formal changes. Our understanding is that Tunisian cabinet recommended at least one substantive change and Tunisian suggestions were referred back to Fr Govt for consideration. Therefore, we are unable understand references which have been made to this "hasty method" of putting reform program into effect.

We have also heard charges of continuation "armed repression" in Tunisia. In this connection Dept of State has noted recent release by appropriate auths in Tunisia of large nr of persons who were arrested some months ago.[3] We hope others still under arrest may be released shortly.

There is no info available to this govt indicating that, as been alleged in some quarters, attitude Resident Gen has stiffened since failure attempt call Spec Sess GA. It is noted furthermore that some feeling exists US policy encouraging agreemt between Fr and Tunisians is in error. We regret this feeling for we had hoped and continue hope two parties in this case can reach amicable agreemt between themselves.

Finally, it has been charged that Resident Gen is considering deposition of Bey of Tunis. Answer to charge this nature, which alludes to intentions Fr Govt, is obviously matter for latter to consider. US Govt has noted, however, that Resident Gen and other Fr auths have publicly stated there is no intention proceeding agnst person of Bey.

In closing it can only be rptd that this govt still believes an arrangement between Fr and Tunisians is most direct route to goal Tunisian people wish to reach—management of their internal affairs.

Bruce

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[3] Telegram 739 from Paris, Aug. 2, informed the Department of State the decision to release Tunisian political prisoners rested with the Resident General. It confirmed that approximately 200 detainees had been released on July 14 and 100 more on July 24, with about 600 still detained. (772.00/8–252)

772.00/8–652 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

LONDON, August 6, 1952—4 p. m.

668. Re Deptel 831 on Tunisia.[2] Official Brit position will be discussed at mtg August 6 but fol is present FonOff thinking:

1. If only question were that of UN tactics, FonOff agrees that probably Fr shld not object to inscription of item on agenda and shld be forthcoming in debate.
2. On principle, however, UK believes issue raised is one of deepest concern both to Fr and to UK because of UK's own colonial interests. UK cannot admit competence UN in non self governing territory field and believes that if exception made for Tunisia Brit's own colonial position may be weakened vis-à-vis nationalist agitators; one of UK's main concerns in this respect is Cyprus particularly since Grks "may not exercise restraint" and Cyprus question may be on agenda.[3] Importance of this question of principle has been agreed by Eden and Secty State for Colonies.
3. Brit will back up Fr on issue altho their support does not rule out attempting to influence Fr posit. FonOff did not completely rule out possibility some formula cld be found to permit discussion Tunisia without raising issue of principle and undesirable precedents.
4. Brit Emb Paris does not believe there is danger hasty Fr action freezing Fr posit since mins are on vacation, officials cannot make decision, and Fr attitude will depend somewhat on circumstances in Tunisia at time of discussion etc. Therefore, UK wonders if this is appropriate time to raise question with Fr since Fr posit will probably be formulated in Sept. FonOff thinks it wld be unfortunate if US and UK shld appear to be putting pressure on Fr.

Emb is pessimistic about UK going along with US on this in view evident conviction FonOff that Brit's own colonial posit is inextricably involved, particularly since Eden shares this view. Unless legal advisors can demonstrate conclusively that Tunisia discussions wld not create precedents etc, UK will probably remain firm on issue of principle. Even if satisfaction cld be give on legal issues, sentiment at working level appears to be that from psychological standpoint of Brit colonies themselves dangers of permitting UN discussion outweight recognized tactical advantages.

Since foregoing written I have had personal discussion with Eden. He believes raising Tunisian matter in GA violation of UN charter which expressly excludes intervening in internal affairs of member states. He thinks Fr should be urged to show progress with Tunisian reforms in order counteract criticism in GA. Eden also took same posit outlined above about fear of precedent dangerous to UK.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris and USUN.

[2] Aug. 5; not printed. It reported the Arab-Asian group had requested the Secretary-General to place the Tunisian question on the provisional agenda of the Seventh General Assembly. It requested the Embassy in Paris to make every effort to persuade the French to agree to the debate. It requested the Embassy in London to inform the Department of State as soon as it could find out the British Government's position on the issue. (722.00/8–652)

[3] For documentation on this topic, see volume VIII.

HOLMES

320/8–1152

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Popper) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1952.

Subject: Tunisian Question in the United Nations.

Participants: Mr. van Laethem, First Secretary of the French Embassy
Mr. Popper, UNP
Mr. Stein, UNP

Mr. van Laethem called at his request to discuss the United Nations aspects of the Tunisian problem.

In a general discussion of the problems arising out of the inclusion of the Tunisian question on the provisional agenda of the Seventh Assembly Mr. van Laethem made the following principal points:

1. The French Government is distressed by the prospect that the Tunisians will not take any positive steps on the reform program within the next three months, in the expectation that General Assembly debate will be helpful to their cause. This unfortunate prospect can be avoided only by a strong French statement that France will pay no attention to whatever comes out of the Assembly debate; such a statement would be effective only if it received immediate and strong international support. Such support, however, is obviously not forthcoming, and thus there is little anybody can do to stimulate a more cooperative Tunisian attitude in the next three months.

2. The principal French objection to United Nations discussion of the Tunisian question is the conviction of the French Government that the consideration of this case will open the door to "20 other cases" involving in the end all of French Africa, Cyprus, etc.

3. There are two possible positions the French could take: (*a*) vigorously oppose the inclusion of the Tunisian matter on the agenda and refuse to participate in the debate, making it clear that they will have nothing to do with any resolution adopted by the Assembly; and (*b*) acquiesce in the inclusion of the matter on the agenda with an express reservation on the jurisdictional angle, and state virgorously the French case on Tunisia. Mr. van Laethem intimated that he would personally support the latter course.

I told Mr. van Laethem that as his Foreign Office is aware we would be much happier if the French would accept the inclusion of the matter on the agenda, which in our view is unavoidable regardless of the position France or the United States may take. In the subsequent debate, we will of course do our best to exert moderating influence on the extremist delegations and we will oppose action in the General Assembly hostile to France. I said that we fully appreciated France's concern as to the precedent which might be established in the United Nations by a discussion of the case, but we could see no alternative since the inclusion of the question in the agenda appears unavoidable.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted by Stein (UNP) on Aug. 13.

In response to a question, Mr. van Laethem said that the French would very definitely not favor a proposal that the General Assembly should ask the International Court of Justice whether the Assembly has the right to consider the Tunisian problem. We pointed out that if the French stress the jurisdictional issue and argue predominately on a legal basis, such a proposal will probably be made in the Assembly.

DAVID H. POPPER

772.00/8–1352 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Tunis [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 13, 1952—6:28 p. m.
PRIORITY

28. Daridan Fr Chargé called on me Aug 12 re Tunisia.[2] First he expressed FonOff appreciation for "excellent" reply US made in New York to Ladgham communication.[3] He stated FonOff agrees no publicity shld be given US–Ladgham exchange because of exaggerated importance it wld give Ladgham. FonOff wld be very pleased he said if ConGen Tunis cld be instructed express same views in mtg with Baccouche in Hauteclocque's office with idea that views wld reach Bey and other Tunisian leaders. I stated Dept wld let Daridan know its decision soon.

ConGen will recognize above course of action as that authorized by Deptels 18 [4] and 26 [5] with important variation that US reply to Ladgham communication wld be made known under Fr auspices. Since Bruce-Daridan mtg Dept has reviewed matter and come to conclusion that having sought Fr opinion we shld follow procedure suggested by Fr. Daridan has therefore been informed that you will follow Fr procedure. In addition Dept likes your suggestion of talk with Boudali or Hached (urtel 46)[6] and leaves such additional approach in your discretion (Deptel 26). To avoid exaggerated importance Ladgham you need not mention his ltr in your talks unless you wish.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Cyr (AF) and cleared by the offices of Jernegan (NEA), Hadsel (S/S), Hickerson and Popper (UNA), Allen (EUR), and Bruce (U). It was repeated to Paris and London.

[2] No memorandum of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Not printed, but see the summary of USUN telegram 89, July 29, in footnote 2, p. 791.

[4] Same as telegram 609 to Paris, *ibid.*

[5] Aug. 9; not printed. It authorized the Consul General to communicate the substance of telegram 18 to the Tunisians, after such consultation with the Residency as he deemed appropriate. (772.00/8–952)

After discussing need for close coop between free states to prevent balkanization Africa Daridan raised question of US public statement re Tunisia, referring in passing to Secy's unpublished statement to Schuman May 28 (Paris tel 7425 May 29).[7] He suggested that Fr on verge of important decision re inscription Tunisia UNGA agenda and reluctant favor inscription without some such support as US public statement wld give.

I replied no question re need for mutual coop prevent balkanization Africa but questioned desirability US public statement at this time such statement now wld run risk making Tunisia a campaign issue and revive press controversy on subj. I pointed out such statement, made before conclusion bilateral discussion between Fr and Tunisians, wld be looked upon as US interference in internal affairs of others. I mentioned Fr program still subj to modifications. I said Secy leaving for two weeks and no decision re making public statement can be made during his absence. I said indications are UNGA inscription practically inevitable and it wld seem behoove Fr favor inscription and send her best orator make vigorous presentation Fr case in UN. I expressed view that US public statement wld be wasted before bilateral discussions end and that it wld seem wise save ammunition for UNGA. I stated nationalists have developed exaggerated expectations from UN review, after which disillusionment may well set in. At some such point US public statement re Fr program as reasonable basis for resuming negots might serve useful purpose. I informed Daridan Dept already doing what it can to present current Fr position of seeking to institute reforms to US press as favorably as possible.

Paris Embtel 928 Aug 12[8] noted. Dept believes reasons given above against public statement outweigh reasons in favor of statement. ConGen Tunis may wish to comment.

BRUCE

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[6] Aug. 11; not printed. This telegram contained the Consul General's comments on telegram 18. He suggested the Tunisian Nationalists thought of the United Nations as a stage to parade French shortcomings rather than as a place that could produce a solution. He agreed the Department of State should not publish its views on Ladgham's communication and hoped he would be given discretion in using the comments transmitted in telegram 18, perhaps discussing it with Boudali and Hached. (772.00/8–1152)

[7] Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 766.

[8] Not printed; it listed reasons the Embassy believed a statement publicly supporting the French would be desirable. It would be considered a helpful gesture by the French Government and might help moderate the tone of the French press, which had become increasingly critical of the United States. Taken in conjunction with USUN's comment to Ladgham, an indication of U.S. confidence in the French Government's intention to work with the Tunisians might help to moderate Tunisian counterproposals to the French. (772.00/8–1252)

772.00/8-1852 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, August 18, 1952—7 p. m.

693. I am keenly aware of complexity Tunisian question and other issues likely to be raised at UNGA Assembly by African-Asian group, and I certainly do not underestimate difficulties faced by Dept. However, direction we take at this session so crucial in our relations here that I feel I have clear responsibility outline problem as I see it.

In April and May when I discussed Tunisia with Bajpai (circ 843 April 7 and Deptel 2448 May 6) [1] their deep disappointment at US abstention on question SC consideration.

In many high quarters our action reinforced growing conviction we departing more and more from our traditional strong position in support legitimate nationalist groups in colonial areas. It used with great skill by Commie propagandists to illustrate our "indifference to problems Asian and African peoples" and our "obsession with cold war diplomacy".

Ind leaders encouraged, however, by Gross statement SC that "if (Tunisia) is not included on our agenda at this time, Council will nevertheless remain open to any member of UN to bring question to Council's attn again. My govt wld naturally reassess situation if that is done".

This statement gen interpreted Ind as meaning if no results achieved in discussions between Fr and Tunisians, US wld look with favor on UN consideration problems. It underscored by *aide-mémoire* presented Bajpai on Dept request last May.[2]

I later wrote Secretary Acheson underscoring extreme danger to our position this part of world that results from any substantial and continuing departure from our historic position. I offered specific suggestions which were discussed in gen terms during my visit Wash in June.

At this time problems surrounding Bonn treaty were acute and I clearly understood grave difficulties faced by Dept. Dept moreover hoped that despite delays progress wld soon be made between Fr and Tunisians truly representative of their people's aspiration to find solution. Since then I understand no progress reported and assume Tunisian question will come up for consideration at seventh session GA Oct 1952.

It is a hard fact that Ind officials and public leaders look on Tunisian and similar questions not only as test of US belief and support principle of self-determination but also as measure effectiveness UN itself. PriMin Nehru during press conf in June warned "If whole of Africa and Asia combined cannot even get a subject discussed in SC because two or three great powers object to it, then a time may well come when these countries of Asia and Africa will feel happy in their own countries and not in the UN.

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[1] Regarding circular telegram 843, see footnote 1, p. 720. Telegram 2448 is not printed.

[2] Neither Gross' statement nor the U.S. *aide-mémoire* is printed.

South African racial persecution also causing deep resentment here, and in all likelihood some move will be made for UN investigation and action at GA session.

Shiva Rao, member Parl, informed me this morning he is going to US early Sept at Nehru's urgent request to propose to UN that special committee on info on non self-governing territories shld be made permanent, and not simply continued for another three years. GOI proposal will be that committee continue operate under 73–E as regular organ of UN and to continue function precisely as in past three years.

I am not overstating case in saying attitude which US shows toward Arab-Asian-African questions such as Tunisia, South Africa and colonies during forthcoming GA session may prove be determining factor in polit orientation Arab-Asian countries for years to come.

I need hardly add we deeply appreciate importance Eur defense and key role which France plays present plans. However, it seems hard believe recent Brit history in Ind, Burma and Ceylon would not convince Fr honest colonial reform only possible way keep Tunisia and other colonies as part Fr union.

Only alternative seems be bloody riots and wrangling ending eventually in Fr defeat and profitable only to Soviet Union. Of course good relations with Fr are vital to US. But bitter resentment of Asian-African nations containing hundreds of millions people and conviction we have ceased to represent cause of nationalism and independence seems dangerously exhorbitant price for US to pay.

Because of crucial importance we attach to retaining and strengthening ties with Arab-Asian countries I earnestly recommend US take clear affirmative early stand on UN consideration Tunisian question and also respond not only favorably but with conviction to other reasonable proposals which Arab-Asian countries may raise on South Africa, colonial info and related subjects.

BOWLES

772.00/8–2252: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 22, 1952—5:56 p. m.

1041. At his request and on instrs from FonOff Daridan Fr Chargé called on me again Aug 20 a. m.[2] to urge Dept to reconsider its position and agree to public statement on Tunisia now. (Deptel 839 to Paris, 28 to Tunis Aug 13.)[3]

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Utter (AF) and cleared in the offices of Knight (WE), Elting (UNP), Bruce (U), and in NEA. It was repeated to Tunis and London.

On being informed that ConGen Tunis had under instr conveyed same US views, as already expressed to Ladgham, to Baccouche or any other Tunisian notables under Fr auspices, Daridan expressed anxiety that these views might be deformed when rptd by Tunisian agents. FonOff he added felt that this local treatment wld not suffice and wld lack force of statement by Dept.

I rptd arguments already given Daridan Aug 12 which seem to me to militate against public statement this time, unless Fr can furnish us convincing reasons how such declaration wld effectively contribute to solution of problem. I particularly requested clear indication as to who Fr believed wld be affected thereby: Tunisians, Amer public opinion or UN members. Daridan replied that motive behind Fr request, and he subsequently revealed that suggestion came from Hauteclocque, was to influence Bey and his advisers before reply made to ResGen on reforms.

I pointed out that according to our info Bey was expected to give ans Aug 21 or soon thereafter and that in this event, Bey's decision wld already have been made, thus rendering futile US declaration. Daridan was unaware supposed imminence Bey's reply and stated he wld query FonOff and also obtain, at my request, more complete and convincing arguments for our issuing statement which I cld present to Secy for consideration on his return next week. I told him that we shld have to be sure that we were not uselessly squandering ammunition which might be more appropriately used at later date. Possible boomerang effect in US of further statement at this particular time was also discussed. I advised him we would consider matter further but could give him now no indication of what our decision might be.

I took this opportunity to reiterate to Daridan Dept's belief that early decision and announcement by Fr Govt accepting inscription Tunisian item UNGA agenda wld help take wind out of sails of France's opponents. (Deptel 948 to Paris, 30 to Tunis Aug 19.)[4] Despite every effort of Fr and her friends to oppose inclusion UN discussion Tunisia appeared to us to be inevitable; therefore Fr wld be in better position if she faced issue squarely and took offensive. Daridan expressed hope that in event GA raises question US wld support Fr contention that UN not competent to interfere in Franco-Tunisian affairs. If present negotiations in Tunis fail Daridan stated that there wld be stiffening of Fr Govt towards problem though he did not imply that Fr wld withdraw program.

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[2] No memorandum of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[3] *Ante*, p. 795.

[4] Not printed; it instructed the Embassy in France to convey to the Foreign Ministry the Department of State's reasons for wanting the French to announce they would agree to the inclusion of the Tunisian question on the Seventh General Assembly agenda. (772.00/8–1352)

BRUCE

772.00/8–2852

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs (Knight)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1952.

Subject: Further US statement regarding Tunisia

Participants: The Acting Secretary
Mr. Jean Daridan, Acting French Chargé d'Affaires
Mr. Ridgway Knight

Mr. Daridan availed himself of an appointment with Mr. Bruce in connection with another matter to raise briefly the question of a further official US statement in connection with the Tunisian reform program proposed by the French, etc. He explained that according to information which the Embassy had received, the Bey and Prime Minister Baccouche are apparently falling increasingly under the influence of the more extreme Nationalists. In particular Ferhat Hached and other Tunisian labor leaders felt that their hand was being considerably strengthened by the strong sympathy and support which they were receiving from American labor. According to Mr. Daridan the French Government believes that a US statement urging moderation, bilateral negotiations, etc., would serve to deprive the Nationalists of their current best argument derived from this alleged American labor support.

Mr. Bruce briefly pointed out that the US Government did not and could not have any control over the actions and statements of American labor unions, and referred Mr. Daridan to their past conversations on the subject. Without any commitment, he said that the French request would be presented to the Secretary for his consideration upon his return next week.[1]

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[1] A memorandum by Bruce to the Secretary, dated Aug. 28, informed him that Daridan had been in three times that month with instructions to ask if the Secretary would be willing to make a statement in support of the French reform program. After summarizing his three meetings with Daridan, the Under Secretary reported he believed Daridan seemed to feel lukewarm about the idea. But the Ambassador was coming to see the Secretary on Sept. 5, and the Under Secretary suggested the Secretary discuss the matter with various members of EUR before that date. (772.00/8–2852)

772.00/9–552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1952.

Subject: Tunisia.

Participants: The Secretary
Ambassador Bonnet, French Embassy
Mr. van Laethem, First Secretary, French Embassy
Mr. Knight—WE
Mr. Utter—AF

Mr. Bonnet referred to recent events in Tunisia and pointed out that the Bey and his Nationalist advisers remain faithful to the delaying tactics which they already adopted sometime ago. He remarked that the Tunisians still have illusions regarding the results which might be expected from a United Nations intervention and they therefore are decided to avoid any agreement and to maintain a state of agitation in order to create a favorable climate to the Nationalists' abusive tirades in New York.

He noted that these illusions with regard to the UN unfortunately stem from, among other things, the attitude of the United States in this matter:

The remarks made by Mr. Gross in New York have in fact been interpreted as a change in the Department's position on two principal points.[2]

On the one hand, in speaking of "real representatives" of the people the Deputy Delegate of the United States gave the impression that he disapproved of the Baccouche experiment, despite the fact that it was undertaken with the formal and repeated assent of the Bey, and that he considered moreover Messrs. Chenik and Bourghiba as the real spokesmen of the Tunisian people. On the other hand, in expressing the hope that a "constructive solution" might result from the debates in New York, Mr. Gross appeared to recognize the right of the UN General Assembly not only to discuss the question substantively but also to recommend to the parties the course to follow.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted by Utter. A summary of the conversation was sent as telegram 1350 to Paris and 40 to Tunis, Sept. 9. (772.00/9–952)

A memorandum by Bonbright (EUR) and Jernegan (NEA) to the Secretary regarding this meeting, dated Sept. 5, summarized the conversations between Bruce and Daridan during the previous month. The memorandum recommended that the Secretary respond to Ambassador Bonnet's request for a statement of support by repeating Bruce's reasoning, unless Bonnet presented new arguments and a more convincing statement of position. If he presented something new, the memorandum recommended telling him the Department of State would consider the matter further. According to the memorandum, there were further considerations which might make it advisable for the United States to keep the door open regarding the possibility of a broader statement of support for the French. In Paris, the French had raised the matter of a statement in connection with French agreement to raise the number of U.S. military personnel in Morocco, and as an influential, although not directly related, factor in French ratification of the EDC treaty. (772.00/9–552)

[2] This reference is to a radio interview given by Ambassador Gross on Sept. 1. Telegram 76 from Tunis, Sept. 4, reported the Acting Resident General expressed concern over the impact on the Nationalists of a statement Gross supposedly made during the interview. Gross was reported to have said " 'we hope that consultations between Fr and the true reps of Tun people will result in an agreement prior UNGA.' " The French in Tunisia said the word "true" would be interpreted by the Nationalists as U.S. backing for their thesis that Prime Minister Baccouche, who supported the French reform plan, was not a true Tunisian representative. (772.00/9–452)

He pointed out to me that, while giving the Nationalists a weighty argument for their propaganda, which they had not hesitated to exploit immediately, these unfortunate declarations also aroused grave concern in French opinion which had been echoed by the press. He referred to Mr. Colonna's indignant declaration and declared that reactions of this kind would not be lacking from other quarters if the State Department did not correct the disastrous impression created by the words of its representative in New York.

I admitted that the statement of Mr. Gross had been unfortunate and stated that the conclusions which the French press had drawn from them were without foundation. The United States Government, I added, is aware of the necessity of supporting France in the coming debate. As soon as the French Government has decided on its position we should study together the questions of procedure and tactics so that a fruitful collaboration might be established between our delegations. An attempt should be made to discourage any unjustified hopes of Tunisian and Moroccan Nationalists and to make possible bilateral negotiations.

Mr. Bonnet reverting to the statements made in New York, underlined the fact that if one considered the "real representatives" of the people to be those who make the most noise and resort to the use of dynamite, one would be building up "Mossadeghs", who would become prisoners of ignorant people from whom they could not escape. He pointed out that if France had followed this course in Indo-China the latter would undoubtedly be Communist at the present time.

He expressed the opinion that in the Middle East and Africa the Communist tactic seems more and more to be aiming at, in its first phase, the elimination of European and American influence; in the second, the progressive weakening of young nations by playing up extreme nationalism which leads to economic retrogression and to the flight of capital and; finally, in the third phase to the seizing of power, thanks to the poverty-stricken state of the people.

I admitted that this tactic, covert though it be, was undeniable and that this was a problem which we should study together one day.

In referring to discussions which took place in Paris on the 28th of May regarding the United States policy with regard to North Africa, Mr. Bonnet reminded me of my promise to consider making a statement and underlined the importance which such a statement by me would have at this time.[3]

I queried whether this statement would be able to have a real influence on the Bey. I was not certain, furthermore, that it would be opportune to disclose arguments which we might have to present in November. I considered that it might not be judicious to give ammunition to adversaries of the Administration and run the risk of introducing polemics which might be prejudicial to France. I recognized, however, that it was important for France that the impression created by the statements made in New York be corrected and I asked Mr. Bonnet to give me a few days to consider the matter before letting him know what I might be able to do in this connection. I remarked, however, that for the moment I could see no opportunity for making a statement.

It was suggested that the opportunity might be given if France made known that it would not oppose the question of inscription on the UN agenda. Mr. Bonnet emphasized that this would be entering a vicious circle for the French Government could not think of deciding its position before having obtained a formal promise of support from the United States.

Mr. Bonnet insisted that if the present misunderstandings were not removed the French Government might be forced by its public opinion to assume a stiffer attitude which might be extremely embarrassing not only with respect to the questions which will be raised in the United Nations but also for the settlement of numerous problems which are pending between France and the United States in North Africa. It was necessary in his opinion to establish an atmosphere of confidence in Franco-American relations on the subject.

I promised to give serious thought to this problem and would try to find a formula which might satisfy the French request.

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[3] The U.S. Delegation Minutes of the May 28 meeting are on p. 766.

Editorial Note

Telegram 90 from Tunis, September 10, reported that on September 9 the Bey had handed the Acting Prime Minister two documents: a letter by him addressed to French President Vincent Auriol and a copy of his Advisory Group's statement rejecting the French reform proposals, both dated September 9. The Acting Prime Minister then gave the documents to the Acting Resident General. According to the Consulate General, the delivery of the documents on the eve of the Resident General's return was a strategem designed to lower Hauteclocque's prestige.

Despatch 77 from Tunis, September 10, transmitted a copy of the Bey's Advisory Group's report, which recommended a "pure and simple rejection" of the proposed French proposals. An evaluation of the report by the Consulate General commented that it was likely to become a basic document on the Tunisian problem. According to the despatch, it would be difficult even for a Francophile to refute the general substance of the report, which was that the French reform program was only thin camouflage for legally implanting France and French nationals in Tunisian affairs. The final paragraph of the despatch recommended that the United States remain as aloof as possible from the Franco-Tunisian quarrel. Calling the Tunisian report the obituary of the French reform proposals, the despatch stated it would be doubtful wisdom for the United States to comment favorably on the substance of the French program.

Despatch 78 from Tunis, September 15, transmitted a translation of the Bey's letter to the French President. In his letter, the Bey told Auriol that he had consulted qualified representatives of the principal Tunisian social groups, in order to associate his subjects in the responsibility for a decision which would bind the future of Tunisia. Those representatives' investigation disclosed that the proposed reforms constituted a threat to Tunisian sovereignty, perpetuated the principle of direct administration, aggravated the confusion and irresponsibility of powers, and made no progress toward democratizing Tunisian institutions. Since the French program did not constitute progress on the path of internal autonomy, as solemnly promised by the French Government, it did not seem possible for the Bey to put his seal to them.

Telegram 1537 from Paris, September 11, informed the Department of State that members of the French Foreign Ministry had told Embassy officials the Bey's reply to the French program, while theoretically leaving the door open, was for all practical purposes a rejection of the program. The French considered it clearly designed to serve the Tunisian nationalist cause in the United Nations, and the Foreign Ministry did not intend to reply or reopen negotiations until after the General Assembly session. Now that the Bey's answer had been received, the French officials personally felt it would be wiser not to press the United States for a statement of support for the French policy in Tunisia until the matter came up in the General Assembly. When an Embassy official commented that the effectiveness of United States support would be determined by French tactics in New York, the French commented that instructions to the French Delegates would be determined by the Cabinet just prior to the Delegation's departure for New York. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 772.00.

320/9–1052 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 10, 1952—5:06 p. m.

729. Greatly appreciate ur analysis GOI attitude on Tunisian question and other problems of special interest to Asian-African Govts to be raised in 7th GA (urtel 693, Aug 18).[2] This analysis most helpful in current planning US program for Assembly in which we expect one of our major problems to be to avoid split ASAF Dels from West on so-called colonial issues;[3] USSR will undoubtedly make strong effort foster this split. Hope fol views will be useful in ur discussions with GOI.

During past months we have urged Fr in Wash and Paris promptly decide on and make known position agreeing inclusion Tunisian question in Assembly agenda. Such announcement wld clear way for gen agreement to discussion in GA thus removing collateral issue unrelated to substance Tunisian problem involving principles free access to UN and equal standing small states. This wld, we hope, improve atmosphere at opening GA and wld improve possibility calm and sympathetic debate with chance of advancing settlement by negot of parties. FYI. It is our estimate that Tunisian question will probably be placed on GA agenda regardless of what position Fr or for that matter US take on agenda issue. End FYI.

On substance of Tunisian question we have been consistently urging Fr offer meaningful reform program acceptable to Tunisians which wld ensure internal autonomy within relatively brief period. We believe offer by Fr of reforms is helpful step in that direction. We have also advised Tunisians negotiate with Fr since difficulty in end can be resolved only by mutual agreement. Problem is to restore atmosphere confidence and persuade both parties negot in good faith. We are now developing US position for GA and will advise you as soon as necessary decisions made.

Our views re Tunisia reflect basic US policy to support progressive development towards self-government of dependent people as envisaged UN Charter. This policy envisages maximum progress "as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each terr" (Art 73). In Tunisia, present circumstances appropriate for maximum progress on internal autonomy. US has welcomed and in nr cases actively furthered emergence of new states in Asia and Africa, e.g., Philippines, Indonesia. Some 10 former colonies have emerged in free world as independent states since end World War II and great strides have been made in other areas toward improving status of still dependent people. (At same time, unfortunately, new colonialism has engulfed millions of people behind iron curtain who for centuries enjoyed independence.)

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Stein (UNP) and cleared in UNE, L/UNA, UNA, UND, NEA, SOA, WE, AF, and EUR. Popper (UNP) signed for the Secretary. It was repeated to USUN.

[2] *Ante*, p. 797.

[3] For documentation on U.S. planning to meet the Arab-Asian problem in the Seventh General Assembly, see vol. III, pp. 32 ff.

On question South African racial persecution this govt has supported GA jurisdiction to consider item on treatment of Indians and voted for GA res implying disapproval Union policies and offering UN machinery for negots designed settle problem. New item which GOI reported planning to submit appears not limited to problem of population of Indian extraction (which has long history of intl negots between India and Union) but involves South African policies toward its entire non-white population. We do not yet have enough info re Indian plans on this item to offer our views. It is, however, our feeling that in delicate field of human rights, we must weigh every intl action most carefully in order not to exacerbate conflict but seek practical means which wld help and not harm those for whom we are concerned.

Re Indian proposal to make Special Comite on info from non-self-governing terrs permanent we believe extension of comite for another 3 years with present terms ref wld be most practical way to proceed and wld be most likely to assure continued cooperation of both colonial and non-colonial powers. Under present circumstances we are opposed to permanent continuation. Here again we must keep in mind that Charter provisions concerning dependent peoples, particularly provision for public debate in TC on stewardship of administering authorities, constitutes important advance in intl community. San Francisco conf rejected proposal for estab of comite along above lines. For this reason, US Govt originally opposed estab as unnecessary and extra-constitutional. On basis further experience however we have come to recognize its utility. Administering powers in UN went along with this development although it clearly increased difficulty of mtg their responsibilities. We believe this was another important step ahead which cld be taken only when broad majority including most directly interested parties were willing to agree. We believe all important constitutional steps such as that proposed by GOI require broad gen support which we doubt is presently forthcoming. There is some opinion that Comite 4 of Assembly tends to disregard detailed work of Special Comite and thresh same material over again, and that some membs of Special Comite encourage this in order secure passage of proposals which failed in Special Comite. If there is to be such duplication in 4th Comite, utility of Special Comite tends to diminish. We believe, for these reasons, that further experimentation is desirable in order to enable membs to judge its advantages, and since review conf on Charter is projected for 1955 it seems to US Govt that experience then acquired wld give better basis for action than exists in 1952. US Govt has great admiration for constructive and painstaking service in Special Comite rendered by Dr. Shiva Rao and other Indian reps who have helped put Comite on rational instead of propaganda basis. We hope, therefore, that GOI and US Govt will be able cooperate further to demonstrate practical worth of this Comite.

ACHESON

320/9–1152

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1952.

Subject: Inclusion of the Tunisian Item on the General Assembly Agenda

As the General Assembly approaches, it becomes increasingly difficult to carry forward our preparations in the absence of a decision on the question whether we shall vote to include the Tunisian question in the General Assembly agenda.

From the UNA point of view, it is extremely important that a decision be taken now that the United States will vote in the Seventh General Assembly to place the Tunisian question on the Assembly's agenda, regardless of the French position. I propose that we inform the French of our decision at once and encourage them to make and announce a similar decision before we communicate our own position to other delegations. A draft telegram for this purpose is attached.[2]

I make these recommendations for the following reasons:

1. Resistance by the United States, France, and other so-called "colonial" states to *discussion* of North African questions in the United Nations has magnified what should be a simple matter of procedure to the status of a major issue of crucial importance (*a*) to United States relations in the non-European world and (*b*) to the future of the United Nations. On three prior occasions, the United States has taken a stand which was tantamount to a refusal to discuss such questions: in keeping the Moroccan case off the Assembly's agenda in 1951; in keeping the Tunisian case off the Security Council agenda in the spring of 1952; and in opposing a special session of the General Assembly on Tunisia in the summer of 1952. Now thirteen Arab-Asian states have placed the Tunisian question on the agenda

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Popper, Stein, Henkin, and Elting (UNP), and transmitted to the Under Secretary through Matthews (G).

[2] Not printed; the telegram under reference here was an early version of telegram 1780 to Paris, Sept. 26, p. 813.

of the forthcoming General Assembly, and Iraq has reintroduced the Moroccan question. If on this fourth occasion to take a stand on the issue of discussion we do not unequivocally support discussion, we will be bitterly denounced for seeking to prevent the United Nations from serving its intended purpose as a sounding-board for discussion of issues of concern to the Members. We shall be accused of seeking to prevent small states from exercising their right to be heard in the United Nations. When the issue is presented in this form, we are in no position to win majority support for our views. In fact, it is generally conceded that we will not be able to prevent the inscription of the Tunisian case on the General Assembly agenda this fall.

2. With the approach of the General Assembly the attention of the American public will again be focused on the Tunisian problem. Unless we announce our support for inscription now, we run the very real risk of reviving the press controversy in the United States and having this question injected into the presidential election campaign between now and October 14. If we do not support inscription when the item comes up in the General Committee at the start of the session, the Tunisian problem will be certain to become an issue in the closing phases of the campaign.

3. I am fully aware of the extremely important strategic and political implications of any development concerning North African questions which would impair the basic stability of the area. We should try to assist the French on North African problems so far as we can without compromising basic principles in our foreign policy. At the present juncture we can be of the greatest assistance to the French by taking a forthright stand on the question of the inscription of the Tunisian item on the Assembly's agenda. By doing so, we will not only clear away the extraneous issue of "free discussion" and help General Assembly debate to focus on the substance of the problem; we will also avoid the loss of prestige which would result from either a fruitless course of opposition to inscription or a grudging, last-minute assent. With our credit unimpaired, we could then exert our full influence to moderate the debate and to prevent the passage of condemnatory resolutions. With the Latin American countries in particular the influence we will be able to exert in behalf of moderation will depend to an important degree on the position we take on the admissibility of the question for discussion. Generally speaking, the Latins espouse broad discussion but are extremely reluctant to take any action which can be construed as intervention in local affairs. Since the Latin American states comprise one-third of the membership of the General Assembly, their support is virtually essential to block action we oppose or to carry through action we desire.

4. It may be argued that we should wait for the French to make up their minds before we ourselves decide on our position on this question. Our experience in this matter suggests that the French, torn by internal differences, may not be able to firm up their position until shortly before a vote is taken in the General Assembly. Our own silence in the interim would serve to encourage the more intransigent French element. If the French should finally decide to oppose inscription of the item on the agenda, they will exert great pressure on us to abstain. An abstention would be regarded by the Arab-Asians, United States

public opinion, and world opinion as equivalent to a negative vote. If we later decide to vote in favor of inscription in the face of announced French opposition, the reaction in France would be particularly bitter.

5. Our basic problem has been to balance our desire to support the French against the consequences of that support upon our relations with the "anti-colonial" countries of the world. Through three separate attempts to secure discussion of North African questions in the United Nations, we have given consistent support to the French. There is no denying that in the non-European world we are considered to have abandoned our traditional support for the concept of self-determination as well as free access to the United Nations. As a result, our credit has not only been impaired in the non-European world, but the credit of the United Nations, which is vital to us, has also suffered. As an illustration, Prime Minister Nehru has said that "If the whole of Africa and Asia combined cannot even get a subject discussed in the Security Council because two or three great powers object to it, than a time may well come when these countries of Asia and Africa will feel happy in their own countries and not in the United Nations."

6. To the Arab-Asian states, no issue in the United Nations is today as important as their right to obtain a hearing of the Tunisian case. When the Austrians asked the Indian envoy in Vienna if India would sponsor the Austrian item, they were rebuffed with the remark that India considers Tunisian independence at least as important as Austrian independence. India is not alone in this atttude. If, therefore, we should oppose inscription, we would tend to force the Arab-Asian bloc into opposition to us on other issues. The possibility of obtaining support from them for any resolution we might present on the Korean problem would be prejudiced. The support we could obtain from them on other "cold-war" issues would decrease markedly. The difficulties we have been experiencing in connection with non-political issues, such as the character of economic development activities and the role of the United Nations in dependent area affairs would be notably increased. And the Arab-Asian bloc would undoubtedly seek—and obtain—considerable support for its views among other groups including the Scandinavians, Latin Americans, and of course the Soviets.

7. I am proposing immediate action on the question of inscription because we shall have to initiate within ten days or two weeks the usual intensive consultations with other Member Governments and delegations which must precede every Assembly, if we are adequately to exercise our leadership and control. We can not achieve a meeting of minds with other governments until we are ready to announce our position on this key issue. An early announcement will be favorably received by a large majority of the delegations. It will rob the Soviets of an issue they will otherwise exploit to the full.

We have been careful from the outset to base our procedural position against consideration of the Tunisian problem in United Nations organs on the question of timing. We can no longer effectively postpone discussion on that ground. We can, without embarrasment, announce our decision to support discussion of the Tunisian item in the General Assembly. I hope you will agree that we should do so at once.

772.00/9–1652

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 16, 1952.

Subject: Inclusion of Tunisian Item on 7th UNGA Agenda

With reference to the memorandum of September 11 from UNA [2] regarding the position which the United States should adopt on inscription of the Tunisian Item on the Agenda of the 7th United Nations General Assembly, we feel that the adoption of a position supporting inscription should be accompanied by a public declaration along the lines of the attached draft.[3] It will be noted that this statement contains the following points:

1. The United States will vote for inscription.
2. We remain convinced that this is essentially a bilateral problem between France and Tunisia capable only of a bilateral solution.
3. We will do everything possible to help such a bilateral solution and we think the General Assembly should also have the resumption of direct negotiations between France and Tunisia as its goal.
4. We sympathize basically with the desire of the Tunisians for a greater measure of self-government, and accordingly have followed with interest the development by France of a reform program for Tunisia.
5. Our attitude on inscription is not a vote of censure of French policy in Tunisia.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Utter (AF) and McBride (WE) and was transmitted to the Under Secretary through Matthews (G).

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed. A memorandum by Assistant Secretary Hickerson to Bruce, dated Sept. 17, informed the Under Secretary that UNA considered the EUR–NEA draft statement undesirable. The French were not pressing for such a statement, and to issue EUR–NEA's statement would be repeating the past error of tying procedural and substantive issues together. If the Department of State considered it necessary to issue a statement, UNA attached a draft to be considered. UNA's draft merely stated that the United States Delegation would vote in favor of placing the Tunisian question on the agenda. Since the Bey had rejected the French proposals, discussion in the General Assembly seemed appropriate, and the United States hoped it would contribute to a constructive solution of the problem by agreement between the French and the Tunisians. The final paragraph of the UNA draft stated that the action was a reaffirmation of traditional U.S. policy that all members were entitled to a hearing in the United Nations. (772.00/9–1752)

A memorandum for the files by Hickerson, dated Sept. 29, stated that he had not signed the memorandum of Sept. 17, but had authorized UNP to send a copy of it to Ambassador Jessup. He concluded: "I did not sign this memorandum for the reason that I felt we had passed the time for writing such papers and faced the urgent necessity of reconciling top views in the Department by getting together in a meeting. At my request Ambassador Jessup arranged such a meeting, which led to the decision regarding Tunisia set forth in the Department's telegram No. 1780 of September 26, 1952 to Paris." (772.00/9–1752) No memorandum of conversation of the meeting arranged by Ambassador Jessup has been found in Department of State files.

We believe that a statement along the above lines should supplement our decision to vote for inscription because we will thus reiterate our basic policy regarding the bilateral nature of this question and, at the same time, give a measure of satisfaction to the French by explaining our reasons for deciding to vote for inscription. There is some indication that the French are not pressing as hard for a statement following the Bey's rejection of the French program as they were before, but we believe they would certainly greatly prefer such a declaration to be issued in conjunction with the announcement of our decision to the simple statement we were voting for inscription, on which question the French position is still undetermined.

Therefore we recommend that the United States vote to inscribe the Tunisian Item on the General Assembly Agenda, after first informing the French Government, and that this decision subsequently be announced by a declaration along the lines of the attached draft.

772.00/9-1852 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 18, 1952—6 p. m.

1711. When I raised Tunis question with Robert Schuman last night he said that yesterday's Cabinet meeting had not discussed the matter so that the views he was expressing were purely his own personal opinions and might not be shared by all of his colleagues in the govt. Now that the Bey has rejected the Fr reform program Schuman believes that France must go ahead and implement as much of the program as can be done without Tunisian approval particularly by bringing young Tunisians into govt services. Fr will also continue show conciliatory attitude as exemplified by their releasing all those imprisoned except persons whose action bordered on the criminal.

Regarding the attitude of the Fr delegation to the UNGA he said he did not think the Cabinet would take a position until shortly before the delegation leaves Paris. He made a particular point of asking that his views on the possible Fr position be brought to the Secy's personal attention. Schuman intends to avoid actively opposing inscription of the Tunisian item on the agenda in the belief that such action would charge the atmosphere in NY at an early moment and would establish target for the Arab-Asian bloc. Assuming that the item is placed on the agenda there would be at least a month before it comes up for debate. During this interval he plans to be in NY and hopes to discuss with the Secy his plans for handling the debate. His personal thinking in this connection is that the Fr delegation should present a complete and detailed statement regarding the action Fr has taken in Tunisia and present to the Assembly all the facts in the case. This would be presented to the Assembly not as a basis for passing judgement on France's position but rather to show the Assembly France's good faith and liberal intentions. Thus he hopes this presentation would enable the Secy to support him which wld he believes preclude any UN action condemning France or establishing an investigatory body. He emphasized that these were his personal views and that he would, of course, have to challenge the UN's competence to act in this matter but that he hopes the govt would permit him to take the broader line rather than to narrow his presentation to one of UN competence alone.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Tunis.

DUNN

772.00/9–2352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 23, 1952—6 : 44 p.m.

2102. London from Secy for Bruce, Perkins, and Dunn.[2] I feel it is now necessary to decide how we will handle problem of making known our decision to vote to inscribe Tunisian question on GA agenda. Bruce and Perkins saw before their departure statement prepared by NEA and EUR[3] which it was proposed to issue now after informing Fr (text being telegraphed). Fol procedure is now proposed as alternative to issuance of a statement (question is on alternative procedure and not on text of statement).

"1. We have decided vote to inscribe Tunisian item UNGA agenda and wish so inform Fr before communicating US position to anyone else.

2. Our reasons for decision to vote for inscription are:

a) Present situation unlike that in spring when we abstained on SC consideration Tunisian item because Fr were in process preparation reform program. Bey has now rejected Fr proposals and negots appear at standstill despite Fr efforts. Accordingly there no longer exist same objections to inscription this item on agenda.

b) We feel that item will be inscribed regardless Fr attitude or US stand for that matter, and if we vote for inscription we will then be in best position assist Fr thereafter.

3. Our decision to vote for inscription relates only to procedural aspects Tunisian case and represents no comment on substance thereof. As Fr are aware, we consider GA has competence to consider this question. We gather Schuman's personal idea (Paris tel 1711)[4] is to reserve Fr position on competence and make strong affirmative speech

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[1] This telegram was drafted and signed by Jessup (S/A). It was cleared by Sandifer (UNA), Bonbright (EUR), and, in substance, with Byroade (NEA) and the Secretary. It was repeated to Paris and Tunis.

[2] Bruce, Perkins, and Dunn were in London for the London Chiefs of Mission Conference. For documentation, see volume VI.

[3] See the memorandum, dated Sept. 16, p. 810.

[4] *Supra*.

outlining Fr program for Tunisia. We think this an excellent idea and if Fr follow this procedure, it wld enable us to support them more fully and to oppose condemnatory or other harmful resolutions.

4. We are not planning any official public declaration of our decision.

5. We will inform interested dels who my inquire along lines of points 2*a* and sentence 1 part 3 above and will plan similarly answer press inquiries which may be anticipated when our decision communicated UN Dels NY. It shld be stressed Dept will take no initiative in presenting its views but will give them only in response to queries."

I would much appreciate your views soonest on foregoing so that suitable instr can be sent Dunn for discussion with Schuman. If you recommend that some explanatory statement should be issued now I would welcome your views as to what it should contain.

ACHESON

772.00/9-2652 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 26, 1952—7:14 p. m.

1780. For Amb Dunn. Pls inform Schuman as follows:

1. After most careful consideration we have decided to vote to inscribe Tunisian item on agenda of 7th GA and are informing Fr before making known our views to anyone else.

2. Our reasons for this decision are:

(*a*) Situation in Tunisia is unlike that which existed last spring when we abstained on consideration of same item. At that time Fr Govt was about to present a reform program to Tunisians. Now, however, Bey has rejected Fr project and negots appear to be at standstill despite Fr efforts. Accordingly we no longer feel same objection to inscription of this item exists.

(*b*) We think Tunisian item will be inscribed on General Assembly agenda no matter what position either Fr or US takes. We feel that we can be more influential in actual consideration of problem in GA if item has not been inscribed over our opposition or abstention.

3. As Fr Govt is aware, we consider GA has competence to discuss this question. We have been informed that FonMin Schuman's personal view is that Fr shld reserve her position on competence, and make a strong affirmative speech outlining Fr program in Tunisia. We think this is an excellent idea and that if Fr follow this procedure it will enable us to support them more fully and to oppose more effectively harmful or condemnatory resolutions. Frankly, the degree of our support will depend almost entirely on strength of their case.

4. On substance of question we will reiterate as appropriate in GA

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright (EUR) and Hickerson (UNA) and cleared by Acheson and Jernegan (NEA). It was repeated to USUN, London, and Tunis.

that this remains in our view essentially a bilateral problem, as was stated by us last spring. We will add that we continue to hold view that only direct negots between Fr and Tunisia can lead to settlement. GA discussion will contribute to a solution between the parties only if debate is temperate and uninflammatory and that for our part we will do everything we can to bring about that kind of discussion.

5. In discussing substance of question in GA we will also state that we continue to support aspirations of Tunisian people towards greater measure of self-govt. We considered reform program recently presented by Fr govt to Bey of Tunis as reasonable basis for commencement of negots.

6. Sole interest of US in this question is a solution that is satisfactory to Fr and to Tunisians. Accordingly we feel that all friends of two countries shld do everything within their power to facilitate resumption of talks between two parties. We believe that Tunisian development can only be facilitated by continuing cooperation between France and Tunisia.

7. US is planning no public statement of its position, but will respond to press inquiries and to inquiries from interested delegations in New York along general lines of foregoing (omitting paras 2*b* and 3).

8. Pls inform Dept as soon as you have acted. USUN shld take no action until informed that Paris has acted.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

Telegram 1729 from London, September 25, suggested it would be preferable if the French could be induced to state their position publicly before the United States acted on the Tunisian question. Since the Embassy understood there was practically no chance the French would do so, it believed the United States should advise France of its position and then answer questions from UN delegates, rather than issue a statement. Telegram 122 from Tunis, September 27, informed the Department of State the Consulate General in Tunis favored the procedure outlined in telegram 2102 to London (page 812), which did not involve a published statement.

Paris telegram 1935, September 29, reported the Embassy in Paris had previously prepared a draft position on Tunisia for Department consideration. In addition to the position transmitted in telegram 2102, the Embassy's draft position emphasized that, while the United States would vote for discussion of the Tunisian question at the United Nations, at the same time the United States believed the French position in North Africa should be not only maintained but strengthened. It wanted the United States to state that the continuation of the French position in North Africa was basic to United States policy.

Telegram 1823 to Paris, September 29, instructed the Embassy to present the position outlined in telegram 1780 to Paris, September 26, *supra.* It informed the Embassy the Department would keep in mind the Embassy comments in telegram 1935, but lack of time precluded a change in the position given in telegram 1780. Paris telegram 1955, September 30, informed the Department that Schuman had been informed of the United States position on Tunisia transmitted in telegram 1780. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.

772.00/10–252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 2, 1952—12:42 p. m.

1891. Fr Emb yesterday afternoon urgently requested we not make known to other dels or press our proposed position on Tunisian item until after Fr Cabinet has reached decision on question Oct 7.

Emb was informed last evening this wld be extremely difficult since USUN had already informed Pakistan Del.[2] It was pointed out further that Amb Dunn had informed Schuman more than 24 hrs before of how we intended to proceed with press and other dels and Schuman had raised no objection at that time.

In view USUN's conversation with Bokhari USUN obviously cld not deny it if queried by other dels. However, in desire to be as helpful as possible to Fr, Secy decided this morning on fol line.

(1) You shld not take intiative in raising question with other dels but in response to direct questions you may give other dels in confidence position as stated Deptel 1780 to Paris.[3] In carrying out this tatic it is important that info be given only in response to direct questions from other dels.

(2) Info concerning our Tunisian position shld not be given to Press. In response to Press inquiries you shld say we have matter under consideration and are conferring with other dels concerning it as we are on other important items on Agenda.

In advising Fr Emb of foregoing this morning we are stressing unlikelihood that secrecy can be maintained and pointing out immediate decision by Fr Cabinet, instead of waiting until Oct 7, wld appear to be only sure way of avoiding situation which they fear.[4]

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright and cleared with the offices of Sandifer (UNA), Utter (NEA), and McBride (WE). McBride signed for the Secretary, and it was repeated to Tunis and USUN.

[2] USUN telegram 306, Oct. 2, transmitted an account of a conversation the previous day with the Pakistani Delegate in which a member of the Mission "in response his direct and iaescapable question informed him our decision support inscription of item on agenda." (772.00/10–252)

[3] Dated Sept. 26, p. 813.

ACHESON

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[4] Circular telegram 369, Oct. 2, summarized the instructions in telegram 1891 and transmitted them to most U.S. posts for background information and for use in case the Tunisian question was raised by the Foreign Ministry. (772.00/10–252)

772.00/10–452

Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK, ?] [1] October 4, 1952.

SD/A/C.1/394

THE TUNISIAN QUESTION

THE PROBLEM

To determine the United States position in the General Assembly on the Tunisian question.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should support inclusion of "The Tunisian Question" submitted by the Arab-Asian States on the agenda of the Seventh Session. In the General Committee, the United States Delegation should speak on the question after the French have spoken, and should refrain from taking a prominent part in the discussion.

2. The United States should oppose having the General Assembly vote specifically on the issue of its competence and should discourage any efforts to have this issue pressed to a vote. However, if the question of competence becomes an issue, the United States while supporting the view that the Assembly is clearly competent to inscribe the question on its agenda, discuss it and make recommendations with regard thereto, should attempt to minimize the importance of the issue of competence and avoid exaggerating our differences with the French and British.

3. If there is a general desire to hear Tunisian representation, the United States should favor a hearing for a representative of the Bey of Tunis rather than of unofficial Tunisian groups.

4. The United States should take the position that the purpose of discussion in the General Assembly should be a calm and sympathetic consideration of the basic issues so as to encourage progress in direct negotiations between the parties.

5. The United States should take the position that while General

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[1] There is no indication on the paper, prepared for the Seventh Regular Session of the General Assembly, whether it was prepared in Washington or New York. Officers of the Department in Washington, as well as members of the Delegation in New York, worked on position papers; but presumably this final copy was typed in New York.

Assembly discussion can be helpful in encouraging an agreed bilateral solution, there may be no need to have any resolution adopted by the Assembly. If, however, a resolution is desired by other members, we should use our influence to ensure that it not seek to prescribe a solution nor to interject UN machinery into the negotiations but be directed to encouraging the parties themselves to reach a negotiated solution. Accordingly, the United States should support a resolution which would express the hope that the parties will continue negotiations on an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government for Tunisia in accordance with the relevant treaties and provision of the Charter of the United Nations.

6. The Delegation should seek to discourage any proposal which would have the effect of automatically retaining the issue on the agenda beyond the Seventh Session. If such a proposal is pressed to a vote, the Delegation should oppose it. If it appears possible to head off such a proposal by substituting a provision inviting the parties to advise the Secretary General of the results of the negotiations, the Delegation should support such a provision.

7. The Delegation should make every effort to impress on the French delegation privately the desirability of presenting the French case most effectively by:

a. explaining fully what the French have done, both since the inception of the Protectorate and recently, to develop Tunisia economically, socially and politically;

b. explaining what the proposed reforms consist of and emphasizing that they are only a first step in a plan of political development toward self-government;

c. outlining what future steps they plan to take in this direction and stating at least a provisional timetable leading to self-government.

8. The Delegation should be prepared, depending on developments and the course of the debate, to make a statement which would contain the following ideas:

a. France has contributed greatly to the development of Tunisia;

b. As a result of this development, it is generally recognized that Tunisia has advanced to the point where the Tunisians can assume a greater degree of responsibility for the management of their own internal affairs.

c. Tunisians have declared their desire to respect French economic rights as well as French treaty rights in matters of foreign affairs, defense and security.

d. Consequently the United States has every confidence that the parties can reach an agreement which will satisfy legitimate Tunisian aspirations for self-government and safeguard legitimate French interests.

[Here follows a 15-page background section, giving a history of Franco-Tunisian relations to 1952.]

320/10-752 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, October 7, 1952—8 p. m.

2130. Binoche gave us following résumé and elaboration of cabinet decision on handling Tunisian and Moroccan items UNGA:

France will not accept UN competence on Tunisian and Moroccan problems. As corollary France will oppose inscription, and, assuming items are inscribed, will not participate in GA debates. It will not, for example, agree to commission of investigation coming to Tunis or Morocco in event assembly should vote to establish such commission. However, present thinking is that Robert Schuman will make statement of France's past accomplishments and future intentions in Tunisia and Morocco, probably at time these issues are taken up by first committee, but Cabinet is leaving to discretion UN delegation specific action it should take and timing thereof within above limitations.

Binoche said that although initial reaction to US position as outlined in Deptel 1780[2] was favorable, subsequent reports from Bonnet and Hoppenot made clear that US not openly and actively supporting France on competence question but that support was of more indefinite nature which could not be guaranteed to assure favorable outcome these issues before UN. Further factor entering into considerations was clear indication from British that they would strongly support France on competence issue. Binoche said that most important factor, however, was situation of government before parliament at this time.

DUNN

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Tunis, Rabat, and Tangier.

[2] Dated Sept. 26, p. 813.

772.00/10-852 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 8, 1952—8 p. m.

2156. Embtel 2135.[2] Press and Parliamentary reaction to govt decision on Tunisia and consequent Assembly rejection yesterday of proposal for foreign policy debate has been virtually unanimous in favor of Pinay. Even Socialists who normally criticize govt for too reactionary an approach in negots with Tunisians have shown certain sympathy for position that govt shld take firm attitude re UN interference in this question.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London.

[2] Oct. 8; not printed. According to the Embassy, it seemed clear that the Cabinet decision to take a strong line on North Africa in the United Nations had helped Pinay to avoid a dangerous foreign policy debate in the opening days of the National Assembly. (320/10-852)

Pinay gets full credit for great skill in handling Assembly as well as (1) pleasing MRP by maintaining solidarity with Schuman (2) pleasing dissident Gaullists whose reason-for-being is belief they can influence foreign policy by cooperation in domestic issues as opposed to De Gaulle's lack of influence through complete opposition (3) speaking in advance De Gaulle's chances of rallying opinion on Tunisian issue in foreign policy statement expected today and (4) not only pleasing right-wing parties by firm Tunisian stand, but increasing own stature before all parties by appearance of having acted as real head of govt and having taken situation in hand.

Pinay is being credited with having killed "l'affaire Schuman" by fact that he appeared to have moved in and taken over direction of foreign policy from Schuman, who reportedly favored "weaker" approach of agreeing to inscription and then arguing noncompetence or French case.

Result of this vis-à-vis Parliament is that Pinay, who had succeeded in capturing "confidence" of country in his handling of domestic affairs, has now succeeded at least temporarily in creating large measure of confidence in his ability to safeguard Fr interests in foreign policy matters, a field in which he was previously considered uninterested if not unqualified. If this new feeling persists, it may greatly assist govt in obtaining acceptance of policies which previously have been considered, at least by many Parliamentarians, as strictly "Schuman" policies.

Dunn

772.00/10-1052 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 10, 1952—6:13 p. m.

165. Re talk with Bokhari on Tunisia, urtel 342.[2] We desire be certain there is no misunderstanding re US position on question GA jurisdiction to deal with Tunisian problem. As set forth in Dept position paper,[3] Tunisian question is not matter essentially within domestic jurisdiction of France. Accordingly, question of what, if any, types of GA action might constitute "intervention" within meaning of Art 2(7) of Charter does not arise. Position paper makes clear US view that Assembly is competent to discuss and make recommendations concern-

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Meeker (L/UNA) and cleared with EUR and Popper (UNP) by phone. Signed by Meeker.

[2] Presumably, this reference is to USUN telegram 343, Oct. 9, which reported Bokhari had asked for the U.S. view on the question of competence, particularly as it related to the nature of a General Assembly resolution. (772.00/10-952)

[3] Dated Oct. 4, p. 816.

ing subject matter of Tunisian item. This competence is not limited to actions which fall short of "intervention" as that term is used in Art 2(7).[4]

Accordingly, suggest you take early opportunity in discussion with Bokhari to make clear above US view concerning GA competence re Tunisian item. This point, of course, is separate from question of type of resolution which US, from political point of view, wld believe appropriate or acceptable.

ACHESON

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[4] A section on p. 14 of the Oct. 4 position paper, under the heading "Competence of the General Assembly," read as follows: "In our view, Tunisia is a sovereign state, and the current Tunisian situation arises out of the basic treaty relationship between the two States. Under the protectorate treaty, France was granted the right to exercise certain aspects of Tunisian sovereignty, especially those concerning the conduct of foreign affairs and national defense, but Tunisia remains sovereign and a state in international law. Accordingly, in our view the Tunisian situation is not a matter 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' of France within the meaning of Article 2 (7) of the Charter, and the Assembly's authority to discuss and recommend is clear."

320/10–1052 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 10, 1952—7 : 37 p. m.

2082. Re Tunisia and Morocco. Dept has urgent need for specific info on tactics Fr and UK propose fol re these items in Gen Comite which now sched meet Oct 14 or 15 and subsequently in Polit Comite. We are frankly confused about Fr handling Tunisian item and ignorant their plans for handling Moroccan item. If we are to be able to help Fr we must know line they propose to take soonest. Specifically we must know nature of substantive arguments Fr expected make and whether UK will support also nature and timing of Fr and/or UK arguments on inscription and competence. Re competence do Fr and/or UK wish invite what wld probable by adverse GA vote on issue? Do they want ref to ICJ? Or do they merely plan state their view on competence and reserve position thereon?

Dept notes that if Fr raise competence issue in Gen Comite in more than perfunctory fashion, this wld not contribute to fulfillment Fr hope that ques of inscription "be dealt with as quietly as possible" (Embtel 2133).[2]

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Elting (UNP) and cleared in the offices of Hickerson (UNA), McBride (WE), Utter (AF), and, in draft, Pollak (S/A). It was repeated to London and USUN.

[2] Oct. 8; not printed. A Foreign Ministry official informed the Embassy Schuman still intended to make a vigorous defense of French conduct in North Africa in the First Committee, and now had the authority to do so under the Cabinet decision. (320/10–852)

You shld make continuing efforts obtain details from FonOffs and Fr-UK Dels.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] Telegram 2156 from London, Oct. 13, reported the Foreign Office said the British inclination was to avoid debate in the General Committee, but it considered the question of competence so important that it would have to be debated sometime. The United Kingdom believed it was the French intent to debate competence on the Tunisian question and had decided to support the French all along the line. (320/10-1352) Information on the French position was transmitted in telegram 2267 from Paris, Oct. 13, *infra.*

320/10-1352 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 13, 1952—7 p. m.

2267. Binoche FonOff tells us (re Deptel 2082 Oct 10[2] rptd London 2569 USUN 167):

1. Fr hope inscription Tunisian and Moroccan agenda items (which they consider inevitable) can be accomplished without vote, after which Fr delegation wld make statement that Fr silence on inscription does not imply Fr recognition UN competence. If some other country requests vote on inscription Fr will be obliged vote against inscription. Fr believe British would prefer to have inscription issue put to vote but will follow Fr lead on this point.

2. Fr believe real discussion will come when items considered in political committee, probably sometime in Dec. Fr will categorically oppose UN competence and will vote against, if issue put to vote. Principal argument will be based on Art 2 para 7 UN charter and nature of treaties concluded between France and Tunisia and Morocco. Fr would oppose referring competence issue to ICJ.

3. FonOff appreciates Dept's handling of press inquiries re US position these issues. Believes that less public attention given inscription issue prior to Assembly consideration more likely inscription phase will pass off in relatively quiet manner.

4. Composition French UN delegation not yet finally determined but no special delegates are being sent, or are considered necessary, to handle inscription issue. In coming weeks, as political committee discussion Tunisian and Moroccan items approaches, argumentation and tactics on competence issue will undergo further development.

DUNN

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[1] This telegram was repeated to USUN, London, Tunis, Rabat, and Tangier.
[2] *Supra.*

Editorial Note

Secretary of State Acheson was Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Seventh Session of the United Nations General

Assembly, which opened in New York on October 14, 1952. On October 16, he spoke to the General Assembly in an address entitled "Achieving the Goals of the Charter." His speech is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 27, 1952, pages 639–645.

Editorial Note

A memorandum on the North African question by Knight (WE) to Perkins (EUR), dated October 20, stated that the question of North Africa was the most important one in French public opinion at the time, and any concessions by the French Government would be greeted by a great outcry. The Department of State had been informed by Ambassador Bonnet on October 15 that the policy was being considered at the Cabinet level, where the decision had been made that France would remain in control in North Africa regardless of United Nations action. The Cabinet felt that the Ambassador and, to a lesser extent, the Foreign Minister, had made a basic miscalculation of United States policy. The basic French position of nonparticipation in any debate on the subject was so firm that any United States attempt to influence attitudes in the United Nations would have to be directed against the Arab-Asian bloc.

According to the memorandum, French public opinion had moved away from a moderate policy in North Africa partly because of inscription of the Moroccan and Tunisian cases on the United Nations agenda and United States support for that position. It emphasized the belief that the uncompromising French attitude should be thoroughly understood and taken into account in everyday decisions. If not, the possibility existed that the United States might be led to a position of stronger support for the French than would otherwise be necessary. The memorandum concluded by stating that: "Indeed should we be faced in a few weeks with a French position requiring a 'yes' or 'no' answer, it is probable that under the pressure of strategic considerations as well as of major European policies which require French support and participation, we would come out on the French side. Instead it would seem preferable to take a more sympathetic position in our day-to-day attitudes which should obviate a showdown and permit us to exercise greater moderating influence on the French both in the UN and in North Africa itself."

UNP disagreed with EUR's conclusions. A memorandum by Elting (UNP) to Wainhouse (UNP), dated October 24, suggested that the French were following a policy of bluff, "since overriding French interests require them to go along with us on the basic issues whether or not they like our position on North Africa." In particular Elting disputed the final paragraph of the Knight memorandum and suggested that the Pinay government's policy was not as unyielding as

Knight claimed. These memoranda are in the S/S–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, "Tunisia."

320/10–2352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, October 23, 1952—11:55 p. m.

Delga 45. From the Secretary. Re US vote in Comite 1 yesterday to place Tunisian question second on agenda,[2] I have explained matter to Hoppenot along following lines:

1. US vote was not result of any prior decision of US del or govt to favor discussion Tunisian question second and does not represent any abandonment of US intention support France on substance this issue so far as possible. We would have preferred, and were prepared to support, order worked out by SYG and proposed by Colombia, which would have placed Tunisia in fifth place, following CMC, disarmament, Korea and Austria.

2. Indeed, although US had strong preference not to have Korea discussed prior to US election, when it became clear in course debate that choice lay between Korea or Tunisia as first item US rep, following my instructions, supported prior discussion Korean problem despite possible domestic complications.

3. Thereafter US decision to vote for Egyptian motion to put Tunisia in second place was made by US re Gross in comite just before vote on basis his best judgment of temper of comite and limited alternative courses then open. It seemed clear to him that even if US should vote against or abstain, it would have been impossible defeat motion and, that being so, it seemed desirable go along with majority and thus hope place us in better position both to obtain *de facto* postponement of item through various indirect procedures until Schuman can be present and to influence temper of debate and any resolution on substance. Although I was not present and situation did not offer opportunity consult with me, I am prepared accept judgment US rep in light difficult tactical situation.

4. We are fully aware possible additional difficulties of French Govt in France and Tunisia arising from misinterpretation likely to be placed on US vote, but if in retrospect, it should seem to have been tactically unwise, mistake was an honest one and represents no change in US attitude or position.

5. In our view, decision place Tunisia second on agenda does not in fact create serious danger that it will be reached prior US election

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris.

[2] Telegram Delga 37, Oct. 22, reported that the First Committee had voted on the order of consideration of items. Of nine items on the agenda, Korea was to be discussed first, followed by Tunisia, and then Morocco. (320/10–2252)

or Schuman's arrival. I assured Hoppenot that we would do our best to see question would not be taken up until that time. I mentioned US intention prolong debate on Korean question (citing this as one reason for my having moved adjournment debate this afternoon) and stated that if comite should finish Korean item prematurely, US would seek have comite adjourned and question rediscussed at length in plenary before comite proceeds consider Tunisia. I stated we intend explore other procedures open to us, including possibility lengthy discussion provoked by Soviets, of charges of US use of BW in Korea.

Hoppenot pointed out unfortunate implications in France and North Africa of fact that US vote would appear implicitly to endorse Arab argument that priority for Tunisian question essential because situation, like that in Korea, presents threat to international peace and security, but expressed appreciation for foregoing explanation.

Suggest you take same line with French Govt, adding other arguments set forth Delga 39[3] as appropriate.

ACHESON

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[3] Oct. 23; not printed. In addition to reasons for the vote given in Delga 45, it stated that the delegation did not want to begin the debate on Korea under a cloud of Arab-Asian hostility. The delegation also considered it essential to retain the maximum possible influence with the Arab-Asian group in order to moderate their attitude on the Tunisian and Moroccan cases. (320/10–2352)

320/10–2352

Memorandum by the Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs (Knight) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1952.

Subject: North African Crisis

The action of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly in voting for the Arab-Asian resolution to put the Tunisian and Moroccan items on the GA agenda in second and third position, immediately after the Korean question, has brought to a head with unexpected rapidity the crisis forecast in WE's memorandum of October 20 on French public opinion on the North African problem.[2] As outlined in detail in our memorandum, a whole series of recent events have made us "Public Enemy No. 1" on the North African affair, which is, in turn, the most sensitive problem in the entire French gamut. Our vote against France on the agenda issue added to the already overcharged atmosphere regrettably appears to have led to a real explosion in France.

Last night's debate finished too late for the French correspondents to file their stories for this morning's Paris press. Therefore, *Le Monde* this afternoon will be the first to carry a full report. Maurice Ferro has read to Mr. McBride the text of his article. He apologized in advance for its tone but said neither his readers nor his bosses would permit anything else. We were lucky, he added, that this report would appear before that of *Aurore*, which will not come out until tomorrow morning. This, he described, as a piece written by a newly-arrived correspondent who had been horrified by the United States North African policy and called virtually for a reorientation of French pro-Western attitudes, and a retreat to neutralism. Ferro's own article is logical and well-written as always; it contains a strong denunciation of the United States position in general on the North African question.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by McBride.

[2] Not printed; but see the editorial note, p. 822.

Ferro does not, however, go into details of what allegedly happened during the vote yesterday in New York. This is left for other correspondents. George-Henri Martin of *France-Soir* has informed Miss Kirkpatrick that it was his understanding that the United States Delegation had violated its commitment made only a few minutes before to the French Delegation not to vote with the Arab-Asian bloc on this question of promoting the North African items on the agenda, but to abstain. He felt our vote was a direct about-face. The French position on this question, incidentally, was to leave the Tunisian and Moroccan items in fourth and fifth place where they had previously been placed, and where the Secretary-General had recommended they be left. The French reasoning was that they did not wish to have the North African questions come up until Foreign Minister Schuman arrived. He is not coming, to avoid possible embarrassment to us, until after the United States elections. Finally, in the press field, the AFP has a lengthy piece without much comment but also stressing the breaking by the United States of its commitment on this procedural question immediately after we had dragooned the reluctant British and French to vote for an immediate Korean debate which they opposed. The French Embassy has taken the line it prefers not to discuss this unfortunate episode with the Department or anyone else at this time.

From the foregoing it is quite obvious that we will have a major crisis on our hands tomorrow morning in Paris. Unfortunately WE simply cannot guarantee at what point resentment against the United States on this issue may stop, even though the cause of the blow-up was not one of substance (but rather, in the French view, one of good faith). The general atmosphere it is believed was fully outlined in the October 20 memorandum. However, that document did not foresee any such unforeseen event as yesterday's vote, and it is difficult to see, in the present circumstances, how the forces of moderation can maintain control of French governmental and public opinion on United States policy in North Africa. Furthermore, and what may be more serious, a definite damper has been placed on their willingness to lead France in other policies which they have undertaken in the common interest, such as the EDC. An immediate outcry for withdrawal from Indochina can also be anticipated, and indeed has already been foreshadowed in certain remarks in the Assembly during the past two or three days.

Given this most regrettable set of circumstances, we have been giving urgent consideration to what if anything can be done to redress the French situation. It is apparent that this is no time for half-way measures. It would seem that any "assurances" which we might now give the French on our attitude in the forthcoming UN debate would be useless, because we have already told them that we will, under no conditions, approve anything more than a resolution enjoining the French on the one hand and the Tunisians and the Moroccans on the other to negotiate bilaterally on the problem, and this position has already been deemed insufficient by the Arabs. Furthermore, the damage in the UN insofar as France is concerned has already been done.

Therefore, it would seem that we have now reached the point where, in the overriding interest of our basic policies, such as the EDC and NATO, we are now obliged to issue a statement endorsing the French "presence" and French policy generally in the Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia. We would have preferred to issue this statement some months ago when Franco-American relations were less exacerbated than now. However, it was not issued. The present crisis can hardly be rectified by anything else. We have been unable to think of any alternative that would unequivocally prove that United States motives in North Africa did not involve the weakening or even disappearance of French control. As has been repeatedly stated, our policy in North Africa, which is governed basically by vital strategic concepts, decidedly does not aim at the French departure from the area. Therefore, I strongly recommend that the Department now issue immediately a clear statement of our policy vis-à-vis France in North Africa. Without such a statement it is difficult to forecast to what point and how rapidly our relations with France may deteriorate.

There is attached for your consideration a possible draft for such a statement.[3]

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[3] Not printed.

320/10–2352 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

NIACT PARIS, October 23, 1952.

2503. News that US had voted with USSR and Arab States to consider Tunisian and Moroccan questions in political committee immediately after Korean question reached Paris too late to hit all of morning papers. Some however carried factual AFP account with little or no comment with *Aurore* headlining "US Against France In UN Political Committee". Afternoon papers carry heavy front page heads over New York dispatches which express surprise, bewilderment and indignation.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to USUN, Tunis, Rabat, Tangier, and London.

France Soir headlines "Surprise Vote At UNO" with subheadline "This Decision Reached With US Approval Has Placed French Delegation In Difficult Position". Paper's special correspondent, G. H. Martin, states decision unexpected, particularly since Amb Gross personally had assured only several days ago that US would oppose Arab attempts to place North African issues ahead other agenda items, assurance which French delegation indicated had been officially repeated by Amb Gross within last few days. Thus, Martin continues, "We discount US support in warding off risk of seeing North Africa become great star of Assembly, adding to an already difficult situation an insult to our diplomatic prestige." French career diplomats well known for moderation their views declare openly that Amb Gross "has played us a dirty trick" and emphasize that US could have at least abstained. Martin then refers to explanations given by Amer diplomatic circles, that when Amb Gross saw that no other delegation raised its voice to ask that France not be offended by particularly unfriendly procedure, he let himself be carried away by the current. Pessimistic observers, concludes Martin, suggest that Gross has decided to abandon France after bargaining with Arab-Asian delegations on Korea, observers believing that US seeks at any price to prevent UN from withdrawing from Amer military the right to negotiate exclusively with the Chinese and that it has bought support of Arabs for Korean affair.

Le Monde's Maurice Ferro refers to vote as complete success for Arab-Asian bloc and considers it as setting in motion a tendency that does not augur well for future. Comments with some bitterness on the concern of Orientals such as Indonesians, who are being protected from Communist designs by American forces in Korea and French forces in Indo-China, to demand that complaints against France in Tunisia and Morocco be first to be examined by committee. US delegation, he states, followed same line as Moscow representatives and US position undoubtedly exercised a determining influence on outcome of vote. Refers to Mr. Gross explanations that he waited in vain for French to express opinion and having received instructions to abstain or vote along with the strong majority he voted for text submitted by Egyptian delegation. Ferro observes that while State Dept experts in Washington seek ways to influence France to show more understanding European integration, Amer diplomacy in New York seems to overlook completely the currents of opinion which now in motion in France. He adds America seems more anxious to assure itself of sympathy of Near and Middle Eastern countries and to enroll them under banner of West to obtain a comfortable majority in the Korean affair than to make a common front with a France which is an eternal friend and continental bastion of Atlantic community. He concludes: "It is doubtful that after having indicated by this vote that NA affairs are more urgent than measures of collective security and disarmament, US will now show solidarity with French on competence question".

Paris-Presse carries AFP dispatch emphasizing the great surprise of this decision which will force FonMin Schuman to hasten his departure for US to head UN French delegation when North African affairs are discussed in ten days. Noting that US has voted with USSR and Arabs against France, dispatch concludes that USDel has "jumped off the French boat" as a result of subtle negotiations with Arabs delegation question of Korea because US wants to avoid by every means UN taking over armistice discussions with Sino-Koreans which are at present within exclusive province of Amer military. This dispatch will be carried in provincial papers all over France.

DUNN

S/S–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, "Tunisia"

Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly at New York, October 23, 1952[1]

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/244

Present:

Secretary Acheson
Ambassador Austin
Mrs. Roosevelt
Senator Green
Senator Wiley
Ambassador Gross

Ambassador Jessup
Ambassador Cohen
Mr. Sprague
Mrs. Sampson
Mr. Lubin
Mr. Charles Allen
Mr. Ward Allen
Colonel Babcock
Mr. Bancroft
Mr. Barrett
Mr. Bechhoefer

Mr. Kitchen
Mr. Meeker
Mr. Mills
Ambassador Muccio
Mr. Plitt
Mr. Pollak
Mr. Popper
Mr. Richey
Mr. Roberts
Colonel Rodieck
Mr. Ross

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[1] These minutes, dated Oct. 27, were prepared by Charles D. Cook, Assistant to the Executive Officer, U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Mr. Brown
Mr. Byington
Mr. Cook
Mr. Dreier
Mr. Gerig
Miss Gough
Mr. Hall
Mr. Hickerson
Mr. Hyde
Ambassador Key
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Sherer
Mr. Shulman
Mr. Stein
Admiral Struble
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Winslow
Mr. Witman

AGENDA

1. The Tunisian Question. (Document SD/A/C.1/394)[2]

After Ambassador Austin opened the meeting, Mr. Taylor commented on the Plenary agenda for the following day. He said that there were three subjects. The first would be the Secretary General's report on ways for shortening Assembly Sessions. This item was non-controversial and should present no difficulties.

The second item was the Council elections. For the three seats on the Security Council, the United States had moved early in order to clarify the matter. Our position had already been given to the candidates we would support for these seats: Denmark, Lebanon and Columbia, which was now the definite choice of the Latin-American caucus. For ECOSOC, we would, of course, support our own re-election and also the candidacies of Turkey, Australia, Yugoslavia, Venezuela and India. For the Trusteeship Council, the United States would vote for El Salvador to succeed itself and for Syria to replace Iraq.

The third item in the Plenary would deal with the report of the Negotiating Committee for extra budgetary matters. This too, it was expected, would be non-controversial.

I. THE TUNISIAN QUESTION

Ambassador Austin welcomed Mr. Richey, from the Bureau of African Affairs, to make a statement on the background facts. Mr. Richey began by recalling that Tunisia was a sovereign State under the protection of the French. He described the geography of Tunisia and listed its economic aspects. In describing the political history of Tunisia, he noted that the rights of the French and of the Bey were regulated by the protectorate treaty. French authority was exerted through a Resident-General, while the Bey was represented by the Prime Minister. In effect France was in control of both the internal and external affairs of Tunisia.

He described the Nationalist Movement, noting that it was non-Communistic, although for a short period of time it had collaborated with the Communist Party which had legal status in Tunisia. The

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[2] Dated Oct. 4, p. 816.

Tunisian Labor Union, UGTT, which was affiliated with the ICFTU, was a very strong union.

The ultimate aim of the Tunisian Nationalists was complete independence, but their immediate objective was internal autonomy.

The present crisis in Tunisia had its beginnings in 1950 when reforms were sought by the Tunisians from the French. Unsatisfied with the French position, the Tunisians had sent a delegation to Paris to make certain demands. These were rejected by the French with the implication that the existing arrangements were permanent. After negotiations broke down in the fall of 1951, local disorders occurred throughout Tunisia which required the presence of French troops to put them down and restore calm. The French refused to discuss their reform program with the existing Tunisian cabinet. They put all its members in jail and appointed a new cabinet. Further attempts at negotiation on a reform program with this group led to the appointment by the Bey of an advisory group which ultimately rejected the French proposals. However, the Bey apparently left the door open to further negotiations.

Mr. Richey then commented briefly on the substance of the French reform proposals. There would be a majority of Tunisians in the Council of Ministers, an increase in the Tunisian membership in the Civil Service, an all-Tunisian legislative council limited to consultative functions, and local councils with equal representation for the French and the Tunisians.

The Tunisians asserted that these proposals did not meet their desires, were merely paper proposals which, in fact, assured French control of Tunisia and that the decrees for implementing them obscured their real purposes. Senator Green inquired as to what the real purposes were. Mr. Richey indicated that the Tunisians felt that the details of the reform decrees sometimes went counter to their supposed reform purpose.

Ambassador Austin thought that the outline presented by Mr. Richey of the background situation had been well stated. He suggested that there would be an opportunity for fuller discussion later after Mr. Popper had gone into the UN aspects of the case.

Mr. Popper recalled that there had been a tendency to submit various matters for consideration in the UN as a result of the nationalist ferment throughout the Arab-Asian world from as far back as 1946 when the item on the treatment of Indians in South Africa had first been presented. Last year, in Paris, the Asian-African group had proposed an item concerning the alleged violation of human rights in Morocco. Consideration had been postponed on this item as a result of a Canadian proposal. Then, in the Spring of 1952, the Tunisian case had been submitted to the Security Council. It was kept off the agenda only after a bitter debate in which the United States had abstained from voting.

A series of critical dilemmas were presented to the US. The traditional deep-seated feeling of the right of all peoples to self-government ran up against the dangers of "over-rapid development" in the face of the Soviet menace in the world. The Department had believed that it was inappropriate to discuss these matters in the Council, as well as in the Assembly where they had first arisen. The right to discuss such matters, however, had never been opposed and the US had specifically reserved its position on this point. The position we had thus taken brought attacks both from those who favored the cause of the Nationalists, as well as from those who argued simply for the right of free discussion.

Now in virtue of our support for inscription of the item in the agenda, the issue had been narrowed and the right of free discussion was no longer involved. An indication of this was the ease with which the agenda phase had been weathered. The US still felt, as the Secretary had said in his Plenary speech, that negotiation by the parties offered the only hope for a solution. There was a limit to what the UN could do. The influence of the United States would be thrown on the side of moderation. It was hoped that the French would go along with a moderate approach and plainly indicate a willingness to reach a negotiated solution.

There were dangers involved in any UN action, Mr. Popper cautioned. Condemnation of the French or the creation of a commission of investigation, or other measures by which the UN injected itself into this controversy, would not be helpful. Mr. Popper said that it was hoped, if a resolution were to be adopted on this question, that it would set the tone and focus of the matter as above indicated and not over-reach itself. We knew that the Asian-African group would want to go farther, but this would appear to be undesirable. The French Delegation apparently did not have its instructions on the substance and could only fall back upon their previous statement that they would not participate in any discussion on this matter.

Ambassador Austin called upon Ambassador Jessup who would be handling this item in the First Committee. Ambassador Jessup thought that Mr. Popper's statement indicated the lines of the decision which the Delegation should make. He re-emphasized our position as being somewhat in the middle. We would oppose condemnation, mediation, investigation, or any move to bring this item up again next year. The Asian-Africans understood this as our position and "are not excited about it". The first test, said Ambassador Jessup, would come when the order of the agenda items was decided. He hoped that we could avoid the impression of being a party to a scheme for putting this item so far down on the agenda as to nullify any debate on it.

The UK and France would maintain that the Assembly was incompetent, according to Ambassador Jessup. There was also the chance of a French walk-out. He sympathized with the present position of the French Delegation which did not yet know what their instructions would be. Senator Wiley inquired whether the walk-out would be from the UN itself or simply from a discussion on this item. Ambassador Jessup assumed that it would be only the latter, if it did in fact occur.

There was also the important question, said Ambassador Jessup, of the relation to the South African race conflict item. He reported the existence of stresses and strains within the Asian-African group and differing degrees of enthusiasm therein on the various items. While they maintained a uniformity in public, they should be approached by us in private in order for us to be able to urge moderation wherever possible.

The Secretary recalled a long conversation on the previous night with Dr. Al-Jamali, Foreign Minister of Iraq,[3] at which Mr. Plitt had been present. Jamali had urged that Tunisia come first on the agenda of the First Committee. The Secretary had pointed out to him that its present position on the Secretary General's list would mean that it would come up by November 20 and that this would allow at least a full month's debate before the target date for adjourning the Assembly. He had also indicated to Jamali the difficult position the Arab-Asians would be in in any conversations they held with the French Delegation in Schuman's absence. Without him the French Delegation would not get very far. Jamali appeared somewhat impressed by this point. On the substance of the matter the Secretary had also suggested that if they would wait, perhaps Schuman could be persuaded to avoid precipitating a bitter debate over competence. After an inevitable speech by the French on competence, Schuman might be persuaded to get on with the discussion and avoid a French walk-out. The Secretary felt certain that only Schuman could make such a decision. Jamali wanted to think this over too. The Secretary had then re-emphasized his remarks, in the Plenary, of an appeal to reason. He had pointed out the weakness of Schuman's position vis-à-vis French public opinion and suggested that "kicking Schuman around for the fun of it" would be doing a great disservice to the UN. The Secretary stressed the extreme delicacy of this matter in the light of the tensions that exist in the world today.

The Secretary pointed out to the Delegation the stresses in the North Atlantic Council and our strategic interests in North Africa, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff deem of vital importance to our national interest. "We are walking on egg-shells in this, and must do it with all the wisdom we can".

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[3] Memorandum of conversation of Oct. 21, 1952, not printed. (787.00/10–2152)

Mr. Ward Allen raised a supplemental point which might occur at the outset. It was certain that an invitation would be issued to a representative of the Tunisians. The US would favor a representative of the Bey. The French were extremely concerned since the affirmative action required on their part, such as issuing passports and visas, would cause them great trouble at home. If the French were not to take such action, then any Tunisian representative would undoubtedly be an extremist at present in exile.

Mrs. Roosevelt wondered what we had done or were doing to see that the French were really moving on this matter. She recalled instances in Paris when labor and student representatives of Tunisia had come to see her. She could understand the problems with which they were faced, and hoped that if we supported the French, it would be those Frenchmen who had genuine plans and not just paper proposals.

The Secretary pointed out that the matter of North Africa was as vital a factor in French domestic opinion as the question of Germany. With North Africa the French considered themselves a power. Without it they were not. The French man in the street talks about the problems in North Africa, and it was politically very difficult to do anything with regard to North Africa because the constituents were so irate about the matter. The Secretary recalled that he had met with the French cabinet for a half a day last May. He had told them that we could not support them unless we knew precisely to what we were giving our support. The French had had a preference for "secret dickerings". They would certainly not go beyond what was contained in the reform decrees when these were properly drafted. We have told the Tunisians that they should accept what the French were willing to give, not necessarily as final, but as something to work from. The French, of course, feared that this was what would happen and that they would have to go further.

Ambassador Cohen raised the question of whether hearing a representative of the Bey might create a situation wherein the Bey would be pulled in both directions. This would cause a breakdown in his own position, which was one of the few weak bridges that we have there. The Secretary said that this was indeed a difficult point. The Bey was glad to side with the Tunisians in their demands for independence from the French. On the other hand, the Bey was an autocratic ruler who wanted no talk of independence from the Tunisians as far as his authority was concerned. This was a real source of trouble, said the Secretary.

The Chairman then adjourned the meeting in view of the lateness of the hour.

Charles D. Cook

772.00/10-2752

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 27, 1952.

Subject: Tunisia

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary—European Affairs

Mr. Perkins telephoned me to discuss the status of the proposed letter to Foreign Minister Schuman and the oral communication to be made by Ambassador Dunn to him.[2]

Mr. Perkins said that the text of the letter and the oral presentation had been telegraphed to Ambassador Dunn in Paris, and that the Ambassador had replied to the effect that it was most important to send the letter and that he would like to do so today, in anticipation of the French Cabinet meeting tomorrow. Mr. Bruce, however, had suggested that it would be advisable to delay delivery of the letter until next week so as to precede next week's Cabinet meeting; this would reduce the possibility of leaks.

Mr. Perkins went on to say that Ambassador Dunn felt that the message to Schuman could be shortened by dropping the fourth paragraph beginning with the words "in those same conversations" (stressing our view that the General Assembly should not impose a solution but bring about an accommodation between the parties). The Ambassador also wished to drop the sixth paragraph beginning with the words "in this connection" which made the point that he would be compelled on legal grounds to vote in favor of the competence of the General Assembly to deal with the subject if the French pressed for a separate vote on this question. The Ambassador believed that this would be a very controversial point with the French and should be worked out with the French in New York.

I cautioned Mr. Perkins that we must be very careful not to leave the French under any misapprehension about our position on the matter of competence. I said that if the matter were not discussed in the letter it must be raised with the French orally so that the French would not again be disappointed. I said that I had no strong feeling as to whether the paragraph remained in the letter in its present form or whether the earlier, longer version was retained, but I thought that we had to state our position fully in such a way that if there were leaks the whole story, and not just part of it, would be revealed. We agreed that the paragraph should be left in the letter. Mr. Perkins then passed on a suggestion from Ambassador Dunn for an editorial change designed to avoid repetition of the thought that the French goal for the protectorates was autonomy. I agreed that it was sufficient to make this point only once in the letter.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted by Popper.

[2] See footnote 2, *infra*.

I asked Mr. Perkins why Ambassador Dunn was reluctant to make an oral presentation. The reply was that his last experience with such a presentation had been very bad and that such a presentation did not get across to the Cabinet as a whole. I said that we needed active consultation with the French and active participation by them if we were going to work effectively in the Assembly; the French could not sit back and expect us to do all their work for them. I said that Ambassador Dunn must impress two main thoughts on M. Schuman; first, that if the French insist on focusing the discussion on a motion that the Assembly is not competent, the discussion of the French record in North Africa would tend to be subordinated to that motion and, second, that we could not be very effective in helping the French if we had to say that despite the fine French record in the Protectorates we were going to have to vote against them on such a motion. I pointed out that it was precisely this possibility that had led me in the letter to hedge on my own participation in the debate. I believed that the French could not get the full picture on this point unless both the oral and written presentations were made. I also said that if it were possible to delay the presentations until the end of the week, that would be most desirable.

320/10–2852 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, October 28, 1952—2 p. m.

2604. We think idea of letter from Secretary to Schuman (Deptels 2389 and 2418 October 27)[2] is good. Its main value we believe will be in making clear to French that US position re French presence in NA has not changed since Secretary's talks with Pinay and other Cabinet Ministers on May 28[3] and further that US seeks to be as helpful as possible in handling of Tunisian and Moroccan issues in GA. We believe somewhat briefer message from Secretary than that proposed

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[1] This telegram was repeated to USUN for the Secretary.

[2] Neither printed. Telegram 2389 informed the Embassy the Department of State had been looking for a way to allay French worries about the U.S. attitude on Tunisia and Morocco and to induce them to make a forthright statement about their accomplishments and future plans for those areas so that the United States could publicly support them. The Department had discarded the idea of making a public statement in support of the French and instead preferred to send a letter from the Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Schuman. There followed the draft text of a letter, together with instructions for the Ambassador to add orally when he delivered it. In his oral remarks, the Ambassador was instructed to emphasize the fact that no other country could give effective assistance to the French if they did not make a strong presentation at the United Nations regarding their achievements and programs for North Africa. (320/10–2752)

Telegram 2418 made some changes in the wording of the draft letter transmitted in telegram 2389. (320/10–2752)

[3] The minutes of the May 28 meeting are on p. 766.

Deptel 2389, avoiding reference to our position, already well known to French, on competence issue (reiteration of which will not dissuade some elements that we are not seeking to evict France from NA) and making limited reference to our views on type of presentation French should make in GA, will assure more sympathetic Cabinet reaction. Along same line, we would also prefer eliminate oral message. We believe our best hope of leading French to decide on vigorous and effective presentation lies in Schuman's talks with Secretary after his arrival in NY and his appraisal of prevailing GA atmosphere. Text proposed message from Secretary to Schuman revised along above lines contained my immediately following telegram.[4]

Problem of handling NA at GA discussed yesterday evening in some detail with De Margerie prior to receipt reftels. He began by stating that French have apparently not been very successful in convincing US official and public opinion of rightness of French North African policy. He commented that current FonOff thinking was that the more definite, resolute and realistic a course on NA the French could present, the better the chance they had of securing American and other support. He indicated FonOff thinking along following lines although there is strong pressure in Cabinet and Assembly for something much harsher:

Schuman would seek to speak first in Comite 1, would take firm line on question of competence but also make strong statement as to what French had done in NA and what they hoped to do. After that he wld take no further part in debate.

French case wld be presented against background that Africa began at Sahara, that northern littoral was lower jaw of Mediterranean, that its civilization was Mediterranean rather than African or eastern and that French considered its future dependent on development of Franco-Arab cooperation and common action to advance their common interests. Future would thus be along lines of "blending" rather than separation.

Two things are clear. One is that Schuman is having difficulty obtaining Cabinet support for doing anything other than taking adamant position on question of competence. The other is that French opinion is at best confused over US position and for most part believes we are somewhat hostile to France on this issue. We believe Secretary's message would strengthen Schuman's hand in Cabinet meeting tomorrow. We realize problems which public statement at this time would cause in US, nevertheless if we can convince Cabinet we really wish to help rather than injure French on this issue this will undoubtedly be indirectly reflected in press here.

Dunn

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[4] Telegram 2605, Oct. 28, not printed. (320/10–2852) See the footnotes to the letter to Schuman, Oct. 31, p. 837, for the differences among the original draft text, the version in Paris telegram 2605, and the final letter.

Editorial Note

Three telephone conversations concerning the letter to Schuman took place on October 28 between Assistant Secretary Perkins in Washington and Ambassador Dunn in Paris; Perkins and the Secretary of State in New York; and Acting Secretary Bruce in Washington and Dunn. The Secretary told Perkins that the sixth paragraph of the letter (*infra*) should not be deleted, and that Ambassador Dunn should definitely make an oral presentation when he delivered the letter. Attached to the memorandum was a copy of the text of the letter as approved by the Secretary for delivery on October 31. (Memorandum of telephone conversations, October 28, 1952; S/A–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, "Tunisia—Memoranda of conversation")

320/11–352

The Secretary of State to the French Foreign Minister (Schuman)[1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, October 31, 1952.

DEAR MR. SCHUMAN: During the years of our friendship and cooperation, whenever some incident threatened to disturb the harmony between our governments, I have written directly to you with the frankness which our relationship permits and requires. So I am writing you now about the Tunisian and Moroccan items on the United Nations General Assembly agenda.

I fully realize the intense interest with which every Frenchman regards North Africa. I understand his particular concern over this area now at a time when France is bearing such weighty burdens not only in Indo-China but also in Europe. For in Europe, even before completing the reconstruction of her own war damage, France has been preparing the way for the Europe of tomorrow.

Last May in talks with Prime Minister Pinay, yourself and other members of your Government I indicated the views of the United States Government on North African problems. I have not altered the views I then expressed. It was and is my hope that those problems will be handled so as to safeguard the vital interests of France in North Africa and to give satisfaction to the legitimate aspiration of the Tunisians and Moroccans to progress toward the autonomy which the

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[1] The letter was transmitted as enclosure 1 to despatch 989 from Paris, Nov. 3. The despatch informed the Department of State that Ambassador Dunn had delivered the letter to the Foreign Minister on Oct. 31. Enclosure 2 to the despatch, not printed, was a letter from Schuman to Acheson, also dated Oct. 31. Schuman wrote that he wanted to talk to Acheson about the North African debate as soon as possible. He planned to arrive in New York on Nov. 7, and hoped to confer with the Secretary before Nov. 10, when Tunisia was expected to come up for discussion.

French Government has announced as the goal of its programs of reform.

In those same conversations I said to you and your colleagues substantially what I recently repeated in my opening address at the General Assembly, that in such situations as this the role of the United Nations could not and should not be one of imposing solutions but one of furthering agreement between the parties, one of bringing about an accommodation. The primary function of the United Nations in this field, I said, is to "create an atmosphere favorable to settlements which accord with the Charter principles but should be worked out by the parties directly concerned".[2]

Ever since these questions first arose I have been convinced that the United States and other nations can be most helpful by supporting in the General Assembly a vigorous and confident presentation by your Government, setting forth the detailed story of French achievements in North Africa, then going on to describe French plans for the protectorates.

Insofar as procedural as distinguished from substantive aspects of this problem are concerned may I review the attitude of the United States. As you will recall, we abstained in the vote to inscribe the Tunisian question on the agenda of the Security Council last Spring, because at that time we hoped that bilateral negotiations looking to a peaceful solution would begin. For the same reason we opposed the calling of a special session of the General Assembly to discuss a solution. When the negotiations made no progress, the United States decided to vote for inscription at the present session of the General Assembly. As you have already been informed, the United States will also vote for the competence of the General Assembly in this question, in the event, which we believe undesirable, that this question is pressed to a vote. Our position in this regard is based solely on legal considerations. Our vote on October 22 regarding the order on the agenda of the Tunisian and Moroccan questions was cast on what we regarded as a purely procedural matter, dictated by the Parliamentary situation existing at that moment. M. Hoppenot will have reported to you my conversation with him on this subject.[2]

Because of our deep desire that the Tunisian and Moroccan questions be handled in the United Nations in the manner most helpful and constructive to the common cause, I hope that your obligations will permit you to come to New York in time for a full review of arrangements which should be made for proceeding in Committee One. If after we talk it over we conclude that there are ways in which my personal participation would be effective, I shall make every effort to adjust my other obligations to enable me to do so.[3]

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[2] This paragraph had been deleted from the suggested text of the letter transmitted to the Department in Paris telegram 2605, not printed. (320/10–2852)

I am looking forward with great pleasure to the opportunity of meeting with you again and of discussing with you personally not only the North African problem but other problems in which our two Governments have an active interest.[4]

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

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[3] The original version of this paragraph, in telegram 2389 to Paris, read as follows: "To demonstrate our deep desire that these matters be handled in the UN in such a manner as to improve the relationship between your country and the Fr North African protectorates, I am disposed, if my other obligations and the situation permit, personally to represent the US in Comite One when these agenda items are considered in New York." The paragraph used in the source text was the one transmitted in telegram 2418 to Paris. (See footnote 2, p. 835.)

[4] This paragraph had been deleted from the suggested text of the letter transmitted to the Department in Paris telegram 2605, not printed. (320/10-2852)

772.00/11-852

Draft Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 8, 1952.

Participants:	For France:	Foreign Minister Schuman Ambassador Hoppenot Mr. Francis Lacoste
	For the US:	Secretary Acheson Ambassador Jessup Mr. Ridgway Knight

Subject: The Tunisian and Moroccan Items in the UNGA

After a exchange of preliminary remarks which centered on the peculiar difficulties resulting from the transition from one United States Administration to the next, Mr. Schuman referred to the various difficulties which had arisen in the path of the French Government during the past six months. While the Pinay Government had inaugurated a policy of governmental economies and budgetary discipline, this policy has not yet had time for consolidation and difficulties have occurred in the financial and economic fields. The current budget discussion has revealed some nervousness on the part of the Parliament which does not appear to have full and entire confidence in the Government. As a result thereof, the Government is nervous and the resignation forty-eight hours ago of a Cabinet Minister is a bad symptom.

The Foreign Minister then referred to developments in France in the foreign policy domain over the last six months. The Parliament, to a greater degree than the nation, is worried by the present Government's general European policies and, more particularly, by the European

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[1] This draft memorandum of conversation was prepared by Ridgway Knight.

Defense Community. Special mention was made of Mr. Herriot's speech at the recent Radical Socialist Party Congress. Mr. Schuman expressed his personal regret over this development which, while it came from an old man whose outlook had been "over-shot" by events, nevertheless had had some influence in France. However, such incidents should not be allowed to assume exaggerated proportions and should be compared to brief fever spells. While these do not indicate a deep-seated illness, they must nevertheless be treated with care, as one of these fits of nervousness could well lead French public opinion astray. In concluding, Mr. Schuman stressed that on the whole, French foreign policy of the last four years has received extensive popular support and that it was natural that there should now be a mood of hesitation.

I expressed my understanding of the French Government's difficulties and then asked Mr. Schuman what his plans were.

Mr. Schuman answered that he would be here next week and would return to France as soon as possible thereafter, depending on the course which the general debate would take.

Mr. Schuman then proceeded to outline the course of action of the French Delegation concerning the North African items as it had been set by the French Government. The French Government cannot participate in the debate in Committee I. It believes that, as a result of the violent and extreme character of some of the statements which will be made in Committee, France would be put in the position of the accused in the dock. This, French public opinion would not accept. Furthermore, it is essential that France not appear diminished in stature and prestige in the eyes of the local North African populations.

Should France appear to have been humiliated, this would immediately be exploited by the Nationalist elements in Tunisia and Morocco and this in turn would increase France's difficulties in North Africa. In the opinion of the French Government, one of the main difficulties facing it is the reconciliation of the deference which it owes to the UN and to her friends with the safeguarding of her dignity. At first, the French Government had thought in terms of instructing Mr. Schuman to make a statement in Committee I and then leave the Committee Room with no French participation in the activities of the Committee thereafter. Upon second thought, however, it was believed that such a procedural incident might possibly increase France's difficulties by embittering further the subsequent debate in Committee I. Furthermore, such an action on the part of the French Delegation could be interpreted as an act of defiance toward the United Nations, and this the French Government does not desire. Therefore, the French Government decided on another course of action which has been mentioned to no one until now. Mr. Schuman took special pains to impress upon me his great anxiety to maintain complete secrecy on the proposed French course of action until the general debate on Monday.

After I had assured Mr. Schuman that I would respect his confidence, the latter told me that his instructions provided that he should speak only once on the question of Tunisia and Morocco and that this should be in his general debate speech. While referring to other problems, this speech would principally dwell on Tunisia and Morocco. His presentation will avoid polemics, and will set forth the French point of view as impartially and dispassionately as possible. He will say why France cannot accept UN interference in North African affairs. At the same time he will talk about France's accomplishments in that area and refer to the reforms which she intends to implement in the future. He will stress France's desire for negotiations and for an understanding with her Tunisian and Moroccan interlocutors. Once this plenary speech is delivered, the French Delegation will say nothing more concerning Tunisia and Morocco and the debate in Committee I will take place with the French Delegation absent from the hall.

In answering Mr. Schuman, I first referred to my speech in the General Assembly in which I stressed that collaboration, and only collaboration, could provide the key to the solution of the problems of non-self-governing areas. A successful future could only result from the development of good relations between the directly interested parties. The UN could not impose solutions; these must result from bilateral negotiations. I referred to the belief which I had expressed that the only contribution which the UN could make would be the development of an atmosphere which would favor and facilitate such bilateral procedures.

I then went on to say that I had lost no occasion to express these same views in the various conversations which I had had with representatives of the Arab-Asian countries, some moderate, and some extremists.[2] I had pointed out to them that they could do more to destroy the possibility of solutions than anybody else. Should they pursue an extreme and abusive course of action, the resulting resolution could do only harm. I had stressed to them the tremendous importance of the French position in North Africa in the light of the dangers facing the world today. Should confusion result in North Africa, only the USSR would benefit therefrom. I told Mr. Schuman that I had formulated to the Arab-Asians certain tests which I would apply in order to determine their good faith in really desiring a solution. For example, should they make an effort in Committee I to admit Tunisian and Moroccan representatives, I would interpret this as a proof that they were not acting in good faith as this could only dangerously embitter the debate. I had also told them that I would speak in Committee against admitting such representatives as being of no utility. Then I would say that there was no need for commissions of inquiries or for UN "judgments" in the matter, and that all the UN could do would be to seek to create a helpful atmosphere. Zafrulla Khan had expressed his agreement with this and his desire to be helpful. I had told the Arab-Asians that their support of an extreme type of resolution would also be interpreted by me as a lack of good faith on their part and repeatedly urged that they understand the most useful outcome would be a reduction in the tension between France and her North African protectorates and that the matter should be left to France's initiative without meddling by the United Nations. I said that I believed such leaders as Zafrulla Khan and Mrs. Pandit understood and agreed with this point of view but that it was uncertain as to how much influence they could exert on their more extreme colleagues. I also told Mr. Schuman quite frankly that our task in achieving moderation would be rendered considerably more difficult by France's absence from Committee. In this connection I pointed out the definitely unfavorable impression which France's non-participation would have on the Arab-Asian countries who will probably view this as an affront.

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[2] Memoranda of conversation Secretary Acheson and other members of the U.S. Delegation had with representatives of the Arab-Asian countries are in the S/A–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, "Tunisia, Memoranda of conversation".

Mr. Schuman expressed his sincere gratitude for my efforts and especially mentioned his appreciation for our position opposing the admittance of Tunisian and Moroccan representatives. He was especially happy over this US decision as otherwise the door would be open to the troublemaking nationalist representatives now in New York and primed to avail themselves of this opportunity. He said that, while some favorable results appear to have been obtained already in developing an attitude of responsibility regarding the aggravation of the North African items in Committee, it could not be expected that all Arab-Asian countries would display such reason. Mr. Schuman pointed out that the more these countries are pressed by internal difficulties the more bitterly they criticize other countries in order to deflect the attention of their own public opinion from the internal scene. Answering my point about our difficulties resulting from France's absence from Committee I, Mr. Schuman explained that France could not risk having to listen to extremists and inflammatory harangues which she could do nothing to prevent. If placed in this position, it would be not only more difficult to explain to French public opinion, but even more difficult to explain to the local North African populations. Should France answer such charges she would then find herself in the untenable position of engaging in a dispute with parties not qualified to complain and criticize. Mr. Schuman stressed the extreme sensitivity in France relating to North Africa as a whole and therefore the French Government was obliged to take the greatest precautions. Indeed, the Parliament was unanimous in opposing any kind of outside interference and would react violently. As a matter of fact, this would probably result in the Parliament blocking certain concessions which the French Government wished to make to the Tunisians.

Ambassador Hoppenot intervened to say that in accordance with information which he had received and notably from Entezam, Zafrulla Khan was one of the "most excited" Arab-Asian leaders. Mr. Lacoste chimed in to the effect that he was "fanatical". Ambassador Jessup suggested that the explanation might lie in the fact that Zafrulla Khan was under bitter attacks at home. I expressed my opinion that the views which Zafrulla had expressed to me were real and that Zafrulla was an honorable man.

Ambassador Jessup then reverted to the concern which I had expressed over France's silence in Committee I and her total absence therefrom. He emphasized the difficulties which would result for all the friends of France and mentioned the Latin American group which on the whole was desirous of helping.

Mr. Schuman answered that he did not think that the French could be of any real help in the First Committee and that it would be better in his opinion if they provided what help they could in his speech in the general debate. He said that the French Government had seriously considered this matter and had come to the conclusion that a French departure from the Committee after a statement would make matters worse. Such a course of action would probably be interpreted as an act of French defiance and would receive much more publicity than her absence from the start. He said that the French position would be fixed by his speech in plenary which would be "constructive and completely objective," avoiding "polemics".

My French colleague then expressed the importance which France placed on having the debate as brief as possible and the hope that France's friends would understand this. It is most important that the Tunisians should not be led to believe that another intervention of the UN could occur later. Indeed, as long as the debate lasts and a hope of UN immixture persists there can be no possibility of fruitful bilateral action between France and her protectorates. This, according to Mr. Schuman, is definitely more important than the precise kind of resolution coming out of the debate. At the present time, the Bey of Tunis refuses to see the Resident General and the Sultan of Morocco is avoiding conversations with General Guilluame while, until recently, he had been willing to talk rather freely. It was clear that these negative attitudes would persist as long as both rulers believe that an intervention by the UN is possible.

I asked Mr. Schuman what he thought of a resolution which would set forth that the solution must be of a bilateral nature. Mr. Schuman answered that while this would be desirable, it was even more important that there should be an expression of confidence in France. He went on to say that France had no wish for a discussion on the question of the UN's competence and that he would avoid stimulating any discussion of this aspect of the problem. In making his presentation on Monday, he will handle the matter of competence as secondary and accessory.

I then expressed the opinion that the task of the US Delegation would be easier were there a resolution which the United States could support instead of no resolution at all. Mr. Muniz is anxious to help and seems to have considerable influence on his South American colleagues. I expressed my belief that it would be helpful should Mr. Schuman talk to him in order to influence him in drafting a resolution "with which the French could live". Mr. Schuman agreed, but made it quite clear that obviously, in view of France's position, there could be no resolution "officially acceptable to France"; they will work with the Brazilians and with us closely and informally so as to let us know what would or would not be acceptable in fact from the French point of view.

Mr. Lacoste expressed some concern over a tendency which he had noticed among the Brazilian Delegation to think of themselves as "mediators". Obviously, any kind of mediation is unacceptable to France.

I then pointed out the importance which I placed on devising a resolution not unacceptable to the French and which would receive a plurality in the General Assembly. While of course it would be preferable if such a resolution were adopted by the required two-thirds majority, I nevertheless thought that our objective would be on the whole satisfactorily attained if we achieved only a plurality. Ambassador Jessup expressed the belief that the Arab-Asian desire for some kind of a resolution to result from the debate was such that this might in the last analysis influence them towards supporting a moderate resolution rather than securing none at all. Mr. Schuman agreed, but asked that France's friends make no concessions to the Arab-Asians which might be offensive to French public opinion in order to achieve the two-thirds majority required in the General Assembly.

Ambassador Hoppenot pointed out that the preamble and "whereas" clauses could be just as obnoxious as the operative part of the resolution.

I told Mr. Schuman that we should not be under any illusions and that we were faced with a very difficult operation as it was certain that many delegations will not be able to understand the full depth of French feelings in the matter. Mr. Schuman said that the French Delegation would be willing and anxious to provide maximum assistance to the US Delegation through close and constant informal contacts. They will make all data available to us, including the recent exchanges with the Sultan of Morocco which Mr. Knight pointed out were not yet known to us in any detail.

There then followed an exchange of views as to whether the Moroccan and Tunisian items should be bracketed. Mr. Schuman concluded that while he will think it over, he thought on the whole it was preferable to have them come up separately, even though this should tend to lengthen the debate in the UN. In particular, he felt that bracketing Tunisia and Morocco, where the situations differed, might result in unnecessarily worsening the situation in Morocco by assimilating it to the conditions prevailing in Tunisia. Mr. Lacoste observed that the Sultan in contrast to the Bey appeared to be anxious to avoid being indebted in connection with the emancipation of Morocco to anyone, including other Arab countries. Finally, Mr. Schuman pointed out the basic differences in the characters of the Bey and of the Sultan, the former being weak and under the influence of extremists, be they members of his family or nationalist leaders, while the latter was in control of the situation in Morocco, played his own game and "used" the Moroccan nationalists for his own purposes.

A brief communiqué for simultaneous release by both delegations was then agreed, and it was decided that both delegations, including press officers, would refrain from any amplification or speculation thereon.[3]

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[3] The text of the one-paragraph communiqué is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 771.

772.00/11-952

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK,] November 9, 1952.

Participants:

United Kingdom
 Mr. Eden
 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
 Sir Gladwyn Jebb
 Mr. Schuckburgh
 Mr. Johnson

United States
 The Secretary
 Ambassador Jessup
 Ambassador Gross

France
 Mr. Schuman
 Mr. Hoppenot
 Mr. Lacoste

At luncheon, at Sir Gladwyn Jebb's, before the arrival of Mr. Schuman, I summarized to Mr. Eden the conversation which Mr.

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[1] No drafting officer is listed for this memorandum of conversation.

Schuman and I had had yesterday.[2] In the course of the ensuing discussion, Mr. Eden concluded that it would be very undesirable for Mr. Schuman to announce in his speech at the General Debate tomorrow that France would not participate in the debates in Committee I. Sir Gladwyn Jebb thought that France would be wiser to at least occupy the French seat in the Committee, but Mr. Eden did not commit himself on this point.

When Mr. Schuman arrived, accompanied by Mr. Hoppenot and Mr. Lacoste, the three Ministers withdrew and conversed privately.

Supported by Mr. Eden, I suggested to Mr. Schuman the advisability that he should not in his statement on Monday declare that France would not participate in the Committee I debates. Mr. Schuman agreed with this view and said that he would leave the matter in doubt. However, he indicated that his speech tomorrow would make it very clear that France cannot accept any UN interference in North Africa and that France would not enter into any discussion either of the principle or the "modalities" of such interference.

In regard to the French Government's decision that they would not sit in the First Committee when these items are discussed, I said that I understood the French primary concern with the reaction in North Africa. I understood that they hoped the Tunisians and Moroccans would realize that they had nothing to expect from the UN. Stressing the fact that I was not arguing with Mr. Schuman on this point, I merely wished to ask whether Mr. Schuman had considered the following point: Namely, that the reaction in North Africa might be affected more by the opinions developed in the United States and other countries than by the simple act of France's refusing to attend the Committee. In other words, the reaction in North Africa might be a reflex of public opinion reactions in the United States and other countries rather than a direct reaction to the French attitude. I wondered if Mr. Schuman had considered the likelihood that the French position of refusing to attend would not be appealing to public opinion in other countries. It might be interpreted as weakness and it might be said that the French did not dare appear to support their position by argument or that they did not have enough friends to do so. At first Mr. Schuman misunderstood my point and reiterated their primary concern with North African opinion. But when I had repeated my point and again said that I was not attempting to advise the French Government, but merely wished to inquire whether they had thought about these points, Mr. Schuman admitted that they had not thought about them.

Mr. Eden suggested that, if Mr. Schuman felt that some time or other he had to make it clear that the French were not going to participate in Committee I debate—other than by not showing up—he might do that at the end rather than at the beginning of the general debate. Particularly, if the Arabs or other countries behaved very badly, he might then say that it was perfectly clear that there was no sense in the debate and the French were not going on with the debate in Committee I. Eden thought this would be a better course than taking a position at the outset before anyone had said anything. This was particularly so because so far the Arabs have been very moderate. Mr. Schuman first said that he would consider this but later said that he would not make any statement about non-participation on Monday, but on Thursday or Friday, or whenever the end of the debate came, in light of the debate. Mr. Schuman said he thought it was more important to have a doubt about his intervening, and he did not exclude the possibility of a second intervention in the plenary.

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[2] Memorandum of conversation of Nov. 8, *supra*.

I then said that I hoped Mr. Schuman had not gotten any wrong impression from our talk yesterday, as to the position of the United States in this matter. So far as the United States was concerned—Mr. Eden would speak for the British—we could not be substituted for France. We could be friends of France, but we could not act for them; we could not be the lawyers for them; we could not make the arguments which France would have made if they were there. Therefore, we would have to do the best we could with the situation which the French position presented, and not pretend that we were France. Mr. Eden agreed.

Mr. Schuman said he quite understood that we could not identify ourselves with France, and he would not ask the friends of France to so identify themselves and take the position which France was vacating.

Mr. Eden then said that he was leaving New York next Friday and this matter would not arise in Committee I until the following week. If it would be useful for Mr. Schuman, Mr. Eden would return from Ottawa and spend two or three days the week beginning November 17. Mr. Schuman said that would not be necessary because he was leaving New York this coming Saturday and would have to be in the Chamber on Monday, the 17th. I said that I would be in Washington when General Eisenhower was meeting with the President and that I would leave New York not later than the 21st to go to Ottawa and that it was not my expectation to return to the General Assembly after visiting Ottawa. Mr. Eden and Mr. Schuman accepted that as natural and did not expect me to be in New York after the 21st. I also left the impression that it was doubtful that I would be in the chair for the American delegation during the debate, except possibly once. That did not seem to disturb Mr. Schuman.

Regarding the French attitude, Mr. Lacoste told Mr. Jessup that it was quite clear to him that neither Mr. Schuman nor the Government in Paris appreciated that Mr. Schuman was going to sit through the plenary in which he would listen to the same attacks and be exposed to exactly the same situation which he hoped to avoid in Committee I.

When the advisers had joined us, I asked Mr. Schuman to let us have as soon as possible a copy of the speech which he will make tomorrow, so that we would be in a position to prepare any suitable comment for reply to press inquiries about the US reaction to the speech. He agreed to let us have a copy tomorrow.[3]

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[3] An unofficial translation of an advance copy of Schuman's speech is in the S/A–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, "Tunisia". Some excerpts are in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 24, 1952, pp. 839–840.

Editorial Note

USUN telegram Delga 228, November 20, reported that the French Delegation had received instructions from Paris to absent itself from Committee I discussions on Tunisia and Morocco. The French Representative intended to so inform the Brazilian Representative that afternoon and confirmed to the United States Representative that the Brazilians categorically refused to introduce their resolution in the absence of the French. (320/11–2052) A memorandum for the record by Ridgway B. Knight, dated November 21, said he had suggested to Ambassador Jessup on the telephone that he try to convince the Brazilians to introduce their resolution regardless of French actions. Knight also suggested to Byington in New York that if the Brazilians would not change their position he might discreetly check the possibility of having another delegation introduce a moderate resolution. (772.00/11–2152) By December 5, the day after the Pakistani Representative had presented the Arab-Asian resolution on Tunisia in Committee I, two members of the French Delegation informed Ambassador Jessup and other members of the United States Delegation that they had been successful in gaining support of most Latin American delegations for the Brazilian resolution, which was going to be introduced even without French participation in the committee. The participants at the meeting discussed the timing of the Brazilian resolution and decided it should be introduced on December 8, before Ambassador Jessup spoke in the Committee I debate. He would then be able to support it in his speech. (Memorandum of conversation, December 5; S/A–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, "Tunisia, Memoranda of conversation") The text of the Brazilian resolution, transmitted in USUN telegram Delga 336, December 6 (320/12–652), called for Franco-Tunisian talks on an urgent basis to promote self-government for Tunisia and expressed confidence that France would work to that end. It was introduced by the Brazilian Representative on December 8 and was cosponsored by

Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Editorial Note

USUN telegram Delga 310, December 2, transmitted the text of a resolution on Tunisia handed to the Secretariat that day by 13 members of the Arab-Asian group. Sponsors of the resolution were Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. The resolution recommended that negotiations be resumed between the French and the true representatives of the Tunisians, and further recommended that the General Assembly "appoint a commission of good offices consisting of A, B and C to arrange and assist in the proposed negotiations." (320/12–252) The Representative from Pakistan opened the debate on the Tunisian question in Committee I on December 4 and followed his statement with the introduction of the Arab-Asian resolution.

320/12–352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 3, 1952—3:08 p. m.
PRIORITY

3153. First substantive pt likely to come up Tunisian debate now scheduled start tomorrow afternoon is question of admitting Tunisian rep.[2] Text US remarks as now approved and which will be made by Jessup fols:

"1. My govt is opposed to having this comite invite Salah Ben

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Knight, who also signed for the Secretary.

[2] On Oct. 28, at a meeting between members of the U.S. and French Delegations, the French said they could not agree to any form of Tunisian participation in Committee I. The French position was that under their treaty rights France was responsible for the foreign affairs of Tunisia, and there could be no concessions on that point. (Memorandum of conversation, Oct. 28, 1952; S/A–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, "Tunisia, Memoranda of conversation") On Nov. 14, Salah Ben Youssef, a Tunisian representative of the Bey who was at the UN session, and Bahi Ladgham, director of the Tunisian office in New York, met with Ambassador Jessup and Edwin Plitt. They asked for help in seeking "a more forward looking mutually acceptable association between France and Tunisia," but did not specifically ask the United States to support their participation in Committee I. (Memorandum of conversation, Nov. 14, 1952; S/A–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, "Tunisia, Memoranda of conversation")

A draft memorandum on the question of Tunisian participation, dated Nov. 15, listed the relevant precedents in the United Nations governing participation in the Political Committees of the General Assembly of representatives of *de facto* authorities and nongovernmental organizations and groups. It suggested that the United States oppose all attempts to hear nongovernmental Tunisian groups and stated that this position was legally and politically strong enough to receive substantial support from many other delegations. The situation with regard to

Footnote continued on following page.

Youssef (a representative of the Bey Tunis) to participate in our present debate.

2. Situation which we are here considering has caused concern to many states who are anxious Tunisian question be amicably resolved. At this time however, we are not gathering evidence from which to pass judgment on merits controversy. It wld be most unfortunate for GA in this case and at this time attempt convert itself into court. Regardless legal validity or wisdom such course action, let me point out it wld require special and extended procedures that might take several yrs. I do not think we wish embark such course this GA.

3. If question is one of determining whether presence of ——— wld be practically advantageous in terms of aiding us to reach approp disposition of this item on our agenda, my del feels that answer wld be in negative. As we shall undertake explain in more detail later, we feel only possible way in which matter can be handled is for Assembly help create atmosphere favorable continued friendly negots between France and Tunisia. We do not believe that participation Mr. ——— in our debates wld be conducive to creating that atmosphere.

It seems to us that at this stage of controversy primary function of comite is to let all members UN express, and if possible, reconcile different judgments and policies their govt with respect this question. In this way both parties may become aware of views of members UN which, however divergent, I am sure will be unanimously in favor peaceful settlement of controversy. (Immed preceding sentence to be redrafted.)

(*Note:* Fol paras nos 4 and 5 are not to be included if rep of Bey is to be invited.)

4. Posit we are taking here is based upon concept of function of GA and its comites which we have consistently upheld since beginning UN. We have consistently advocated that GA shld be most liberal in permitting participation in its deliberation of states and of *de facto* governing auths but shld, on other hand exercise great care in permitting any participation in its discussion by indivs or non-governmental groups. More than five yrs ago, in spring of 1947, GA was confronted with some 13 requests of non-governmental orgs to be heard on Palestine question. Amb Austin strongly opposed motion which wld have permitted participation these non-governmental orgs in GA deliberation, and he was ably supported this posit by many members of GA, including reps Egypt and Syria. I am glad to say that view of US and of Egypt and Syria was supported by majority in this case.

Footnote continued from preceding page.

hearing a representative of the Tunisian Government was entirely different. The contention that only the French Government was entitled to speak for Tunisia in foreign affairs would receive practically no support in the General Assembly. The memorandum concluded that preventing a representative of the Tunisian Government from participation by attacking his representation status was unpromising, and that it seemed preferable to resist such a request on general political grounds. (US/A/C.1/2541; S/A–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, "Tunisia") The Jessup files contain other memoranda discussing various points in the Nov. 15 memorandum, but no document stating when or how the final decision was reached. A memorandum by Plitt, dated Nov. 20, noted that Salah Ben Youssef had been sitting in the Committee I deliberations with the Lebanese and Iraqi Delegations. French Delegates had protested to them and also to the Committee I Chairman.

Practice of GA that has evolved over period of yrs is to permit participation of individuals, as opposed to states, only under exceptional circumstances. While it is true that on number of occasions individuals have been permitted to participate in debates Comite 4, this is clearly one of exceptional circumstances. This was well pointed out as far back as 1947 by reps of Syria, who stated: ‘In refutation this point of view, I need add nothing to what has already been said by rep of US. He has referred to Arts 2, 32, 35 and particularly to Art 10. It seems to me Art 71 is exception confirming general rule that in regs and procedure of UN—and particularly in procedure—arrangements suggested can be applied only to Econ and Soc Council and not other organs, because it is specifically stated only states may take part in discussions of other *positions*.’ Other instance where a Polit Comite permitted extensive participation by non-governmental orgs and groups—matter of disposition former Ital colonies—was likewise exceptional situation in that GA was called upon impose on all parties a compulsory and binding decision concerning disposition former Ital colonies. In this situation, Polit Comite had no choice but to hear views of all elements of population of various colonies and embarked upon complicated, elaborate and extraordinary procedures over period several yrs in order carry on its extraordinary functions. Let me reiterate that we have consistently taken position over yrs that except in special circumstances, and such special circumstances do not here exist, discussion in Polit Comite GA shld be confined to states.”

5. Let me further point out that not in any instance in history GA has a Polit Comite permitted participation in its discussion of rep non-governmental org or group contrary to wishes of governing auths responsible for territory.

6. I repeat that what we are dealing with is purely matter of how best comite can order its work. From this point of view it is difficult to see how participation of Salah Ben Youssef (rep of Bey of Tunis) wld assist GA to advance toward objective this debate.”

Impossible predict now when Jessup will make this statement and gen statement but are instructing USUN wire you niact soonest so that you may set your release dates in Paris.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] On Dec. 10, after a debate in which 27 representatives took part, Committee I rejected a motion by Pakistan requesting the Bey of Tunis to appoint a representative to sit in on the committee debate. Ambassador Jessup spoke and voted against the invitation to the Bey. Warren E. Hewitt and Leonard C. Meeker, I/UNA, members of the U.S. Delegation, sent a memorandum to Ambassador Jessup, dated Dec. 12, concerning the statement of Dec. 10. They stated they were surprised to note the emphasis on the legal argument against an invitation to the Bey to send a representative. According to Hewitt and Meeker, an early position paper on Tunisia provided for U.S. concurrence in such an invitation, reflecting the view that such a procedure was legally proper; after the United States learned of French opposition, the decision was made to oppose the hearing of Tunisian representatives. Hewitt and Meeker understood that the changed position was based on policy considerations, rather than legal ones, and that public statements would reflect that fact. The memorandum concluded with a list of reasons why U.S. opposition should not be based on legal grounds. (S/A–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, "Tunisia")

772.00/12–952 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jones) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, December 9, 1952—1 p. m.

200. We venture fol comments re Hached assassination.

1. There are three reasonable theories re killers: (*a*) French extremists of red-hand variety; (*b*) Communists; and (*c*) other Tuns.

2. Great mass Tun population accepts theory (*a*) and this acceptance will henceforward be polit factor. Difficulty with this theory is that killing hurts rather than helps French. Thus killers must have been both anti-Hached and anti-French Govt policy here. Such views exist fairly widely among French reactionaries but expert and coordinated manner in which killing conducted implies surprising degree organization and irresponsible will to direct action.

3. From point of view of "who gains most" theory (*b*) (Communists) is most likely. By Hached rubout sworn anti-Commie was liquidated at time and in manner best calculated sow dissension between Fr and Tuns, and between Arab-Asians and NATO powers. If Commies responsible new life must recently have been injected into local Commie organ which Fr have assured us was closely watched and moribund. It is possible that bombing of Arabs in recent weeks in manner cast suspicions on Fr auths and show up ineffectiveness security measures may have Commie direction. If so, efficiency of efforts indicates Fr (or at least Western) Commie direction. We doubt locals wld be up to it.

4. Re theory (*c*) (other Tuns) it is probable that Palace has been center of Byzantine manoeuverings of personalities among whom only Hached and Chedly appeared have capacity to inject or order. Proletarian Hached was unusual figure at Palace where his brains and ability likely made him enemies. Bey reported have "feared" him. Other sources of Tun enemies might be USTT (Commie union), rich pro-Fr Tuns (land-owners and employers) and rivals inside UGTT and Neo Destour. It is conceivable that such personal enemies might have sought to destroy rival and hurt France simultaneously. Best support for this theory is alleged evidence truck driver who offered Hached lift. He states that as Hached about to get into his truck another car came along whose occupants Hached recognized as acquaintances who cld get him to hospital faster.[2]

5. We think facts now do not warrant drawing conclusions.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Cairo, London, Algiers, Naples, and Rabat.

[2] Telegrams 194 from Tunis, Dec. 6, and 3353 from Paris, Dec. 8, reported the following account of Hached's death. He had been driving alone in his car when he was overtaken by another car, whose occupants fired a machine gun at him. That car left and Hached, who had been wounded in the wrist, flagged down a truck. According to the testimony of the French truck driver, a second car then arrived on the scene. Hached told the truck driver he knew the occupants, who appeared to the driver to be Tunisians, and would have them take him to the hos-

6. Death of Hached, curfew and arrests following it[3] have worsened prospects for early Franco-Tun settlement. Tun confidence Fr honesty and goodwill toward Tunisian autonomy now at rock bottom and legend spreading that understandable action Fr in burying Hached quickly and far away only part deliberate hushup tactics auths. Arrest 11 Neo-Destour-UGTT leaders strips these organs virtually to point impotence and as *New York Times* Correspondent remarked today "Tun nationalism is not sufficiently profound to automatically produce replacement leaders". Fact remains that until memories fade somewhat Fr will have take into account passively distrustful Tun public disinclined believe anything they say. Thus it wld have to be seen whether any deal made now with Bey wld gain popular acceptance. We doubt it.

7. We think murder has made it clear that departure Hauteclocque and Garbay and their replacement by new team (preferably with sufficient stature to flatter Tuns) is prerequisite for progress. Present incumbents now too identified with repressive measures of present and past to give Tuns room to hope for new deal. Only such hope likely move Tuns from sullen intransigence.

JONES

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pital. Hached's body was later found by the side of a road, and an autopsy showed wounds in the kidney and wrist from a burst of fire from the first car and fatal wounds in the heart and head from another weapon. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.

[3] Telegram 191 from Tunis, Dec. 6, reported that the heads of UGTT and Neo-Destour had met on Dec. 5, to jointly reelect new UGTT leadership. Since that meeting was considered contrary to martial law, security authorities were arresting the persons considered responsible for the meeting. (772.00/12-652)

772.00/12-1052 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil[1]

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1952—6:02 p. m.

640. Pls avail yourself earliest opportunity convey to FonOff expression US appreciation for Brazilian action in introducing their res on Tunisia in Comite I UNGA. Also express our pleasure and satisfaction at Brazilian Del's firmness in opposing amendments thereto.

FYI USUN had detected at one time signs among Brazilian Del of willingness to consider amendments for sake of obtaining substantial majority for its res.[2] This wld have created serious difficulty as present text is already max which US can support without serious

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[1] This telegram was drafted and signed by Knight and was cleared with the offices of Popper (UNA), Cottrell (ARA), and Cyr (AF). It was repeated priority to Paris and to USUN.

[2] Representatives of the Brazilian French, and U.S. Delegations met on Dec. 9, the day following the introduction of the Brazilian resolution on Tunisia

Footnote continued on following page.

repercussions on US–Fr relations. As it is Fr will resent any UN res of any kind on Tunisia which they insist is internal affair. When Jessup expressed US support for Brazilian res in Comite I on Oct 8[3] he supported a specific text and we wld be obliged to oppose any substantive amendments intended placate Arab-Asian group. Any split between moderate elements in UN cld well ensure either adoption or at least larger vote for more extreme Arab-Asian text. While attitude of Brazilian Del has firmed up noticeably in last 48 hrs we think that above *démarche* rptd to Brazilian Del NY shld serve to strengthen Muniz's hand shld there be new pressure within his Del favoring acceptance amendments. Furthermore not impossible that Fr Govt might make strong *démarche* in Rio in critical vein and in this case our complimentary action shld serve mitigate it and help retain Brazilian Del's coop which has been very useful so far.

For Paris Emb:

You may wish to approach FonOff to forestall critical Fr *démarche* in Rio which we think wld have harmful effects in NY.[4]

ACHESON

Footnote continued from preceding page.

and Ambassador Jessup's speech. A member of the French Delegation had been dismayed by the news of an approach to the Brazilian Delegation by a representative from Pakistan. The Pakistani Representative suggested the Arab-Asian delegations would support Brazil's resolution if it were strengthened. The Brazilian Representative had made no commitments, but the French were upset that he had not immediately rejected the offer.

Members of delegations friendly to the French suggested that the Arab-Asian delegations might vote for the Brazilian resolution if it were amended. After discussion with both the Americans and the French, the Brazilians agreed to reject any amendments to their resolution and to try to gain support of other Latin American delegations for that position. A Brazilian Delegate expressed the opinion, however, that it would not be possible to prevent the Arab-Asians from waiving priority on their resolution in favor of the Brazilian one. The problem with that solution would be the adverse French reaction to any resolution, even the one sponsored by the Latin Americans, if the Arab-Asian group also voted for it. (Memorandum of conversation, Dec. 9, 1952; USUN files, "7th GA Memoranda of conversation, 11/21–12/31/52")

[3] Ambassador Jessup's speech is not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 848.

[4] On Dec. 12, the Political Committee rejected the Arab-Asian draft resolution on Tunisia by a vote of 27 to 24, with 7 abstentions. The Committee subsequently approved the Latin American draft resolution, and, on Dec. 17, that resolution was enacted by the General Assembly as resolution 611 (VII) by a vote of 44 (U.S.) to 3, with 8 abstentions. The Arab-Asian states voted for final passage of the resolution.

772.00/1–753 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jones) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, January 7, 1953—10 a. m.

225. Following from Grellet January 6 regarding current political situation:

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Cairo, London, Algiers, Naples, and Rabat.

1. Resident General anxious comply promptly with UN resolution regarding bilateral negotiations on reform program, but political lull likely until new government takes over in Paris.

2. Residency technicians working out administrative plans for forthcoming municipal and caidal elections to replace hitherto appointed councils. Certain enabling legislation necessary including decree prescribing system for drawing up electoral lists, etc. Residency hopeful Bey's present cooperative mood will continue and he will not delay sealing this. Total of 64 municipalities will vote for first time, and, if all goes well (and security situation remains calm), machinery should be ready for elections to be held in smaller communities by mid-March. Large towns present more complicated problems so doubtful if municipal elections in Sousse, Sfax and Bizerte can be held until May. Caidal council machinery easier to organize because of more homogeneous electorate.

3. Neo-Destour, badly disorganized and confused, is apparently split on policy toward elections. One faction advocates boycotting them completely because December 20 reform decrees were sealed by Bey under "duress". Other group favors entering candidates and making as strong show as possible. Latter argue that since Chenik Government, in which Neo-Destour represented, agreed to municipal elections boycotting them now would be bad politics.

4. Tunis City presents special case. Having had elected municipal council since 1945 it is outside purview of new reform. However, question still undecided whether new council will be elected by second-degree suffrage, as formerly, or by direct suffrage as provided by reform decree for other municipalities.

5. Queried representatives thinking regarding balance of reform program, Grellet said much would depend on political tendencies of next French Government. Hauteclocque plans go Paris for instructions as soon as new government installed. Strategy currently in favor at Residency is to handle financial council decree separately, and try induce Bey to accept this by tying it in with fiscal year 1954 budget due April. Residency can present Bey with three alternatives:

(1) Continue unsatisfactory arrangement under which, for lack of duly constituted organism, present budget was approved by non-elected Council of Ministers (Tunis telegram 110, paragraph 2); [2]

(2) Revive Grand Council, which Bey on record as opposing;

(3) Seal decree creating mixed financial council, a more democratic and efficient body than Grand Council. Residency believes that as April 1 deadline approaches chances good that Bey will overcome his former objections.

6. Bey January 1 sealed minerals legislative decree (Tunis telegram 222, paragraph 7 and 207, paragraph 1C).[2]

Jones

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[2] Not printed.

772.00/2–353 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jones) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, February 3, 1953—4 p. m.

244. 1. Resident General returned last week from 18-day consultation Paris with assurances that (*a*) his policy of firm hand to control disorders endorsed, (*b*) new French Government prepared go farther when Franco-Tunisian conversations resumed than 1952 reform program, and (*c*) start negotiations and their pace dependent on Tunisian willingness cooperate faithfully with French in seeking settlement.

2. Following is summary these points as outlined informally by Grellet in frank talk February 2 (despatch follows):[2]

a. Resident General determined not to release potential troublemakers prematurely and thus jeopardize important municipal and caidal elections. Political detainee situation continuing study but little prospect releases while current bomb attacks continue.

b. Mayer and Bidault both personally acquainted with Bey and Tunisian leaders, feel time for settlement approaching. French Government in proper circumstances would, therefore, abandon last year's rigid concept re seven-point reform program ("this far can France go and no further") and substitute notion that "more cooperative Tunisians are, more they will get". Palace has intimated to Resident General that Bey will soon propose resumption of dialogue by direct conversations rather than mixed commission. Re substance, Bidault acknowledges importance Tunisian face-saving; hence, will not insist Bey seal five remaining decrees last year's program, but willing consider Tunisian suggestions re even far-reaching changes. For example, Paris might be prepared yield considerably on two thorny issues: (*a*) "homogeneity" of Tunisian Cabinet and (*b*) Civil Service positions reserved for French. Ref (*a*) principle of parity has in fact already been abandoned; in addition, French might replace their PTT and Housing-Reconstruction Directors by Tunisians thus making Cabinet line up 9 to 4 instead of 7 to 6. Public Works eventually might have Tunisian head with French Deputy having wide powers, as part of general government reorganization. On Civil Service reform, instead of reserving over 200 specified higher posts for French, competitive examinations open to both French and Tunisians envisaged together with virtual elimination of French jobholders from lower categories. French hope these steps will go far assauge Tunisian sensibilities. Groundwork for more liberal approach now being laid carefully and even Colonna reported favorable provided protection French interests guaranteed.

c. French Government now feels more strongly than predecessor that legislative council should be elected from onset. (Bey had proposed appointive council to be replaced gradually by elected members.)

d. French Government not disposed yield on principle Franco-Tunisian parity for financial council because this essential to insure workable budgetary procedure.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Cairo, London, Algiers, Rabat, Naples, and Tripoli.

[2] Despatch 228, Feb. 5, 1953, not printed. (651.72/2–553)

3. Grellet repeatedly emphasized that he was describing thought trends rather than decisions and said much depends on attitude Tunisians: If bombs stop and French meet with Tunisian cooperation he thought French might be prepared go even further than points he outlined. Residency now possesses room to maneuver when talks are resumed and this is new element.

4. *Comment:* Particularly encouraging are two aspects Bidault's thinking:

(1) Former rigidity being abandoned, and (2) French now appear to appreciate importance to Tunisians of psychological factors. (See Tunis despatch 203 of January 22.)[3]

We think there is fair chance that tact, consideration for saving Tunisian face, and granting of the shadow of power (while retaining as much substance of power as necessary) may succeed where less flexible and imaginative approaches failed. How these intelligent ideas will stand up against the multiple attack of ND legal rights, French Nationals in Tunisia, politicians in Paris and the egregious sniping of the Arab-Asians remains to be seen. As of now, the ideas which the Resident General brought back from Paris are still untested but he is prepared to move as soon as Bey is ready.

JONES

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[3] Not printed.

772.00/2-1353 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jones) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, February 13, 1953—5 p. m.

250. Grellet with apparent candor yesterday gave us an extended horizon tour divisible into four headings; (1) palace, (2) Residency, (3) election plans, and (4) Communist resurgence.

1. No longer under pressure from Tunisians and ND and fearful diminution of his absolute personal power which he has just begun to appreciate Bey now veering away from idea of early resumption dialogue on reforms. French have always believed his protestations re desire institute democratic reforms largely poppycock and find confirmation in his recently expressed preference for *status quo* in which he is free from the necessity of taking decisions or from such annoying encumbrances as a legislative council. Rumors current re new instances graft, corruption and immorality in Tunisian Government and Bey local entourage (see Tunis despatch 241, February 12).[2] Bey showing inclination lay low and go slow. *Comment:* We opined to Grellet that French could not afford to let Bey's velleity block early reform

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Cairo, London, Algiers, Naples, Rabat, and Tripoli.

[2] Not printed.

talks. Grellet agreed, but we suspect French Government with other worries is also not eager to come to grips with tough problem and hence is not adverse to delay blamable on Bey. Danger is that French may lose their chance by waiting too long.

2. Residency

a. Détente with Tunisians seems automatically involve increased tension between Residency and local French population and Grellet admitted Tunisians far less troublesome than French nationals of Rassemblement stamp who, having made no protest when decrees re municipal and caidal elections were in draft, are now assailing Residency privately and in press for having sold French interests down river. (See Tunis despatches 240 and 242, February 12.)[3] Both locally and in Paris attempts being made to pressure Resident General into undoing even so minor a reform as elected all-Tunisia Caidal Councils. So far French Government has backed Resident General but such activities have in past been strong enough to get Resident Generals recalled (Perillier). *Comment:* It will take courage for French Government to stand fast against local French lobby but failure do so now may destroy few remaining hopes for settlement. We think Hauteclocque moving in right direction and should not be changed now.

b. Curious development is sudden denigration reputation Secretary General Pons who for months has been inactive bystander. Nonetheless, Bey, local French, ND and Paris suddenly seem to have fixed on Pons as responsible for all failures and misunderstandings. Grellet says Resident General supporting Pons (we doubt this) and insistent that he leave honorably with a promotion. Fact remains that making scapegoat of Pons might help rehabilitate Hauteclocque with Bey and Tunisians.

c. When asked status renewal RR concession (Tunis telegram 222, paragraph 7)[4] to which Bey objected Grellet said SNCF official had made survey here which Paris studying. This official told Resident General privately that CFT renewal contract submitted to Bey was unreasonably favorable French investors who sought large profits guaranteed against risk. We gather exigent CFT proprietors not popular with Resident General but that compromise proposal along lines hydroelectric concession (i.e. third each SNCF, CFTA and Tunisian Government) in offing. *Comment:* Bey seems have been right this time and Resident General embarrassed. Since Tunis would thereby be more closely identified with Metropole it is hard to see why French don't grant Bey's wish have SNCF operate here.

3. Elections.

While dates not settled Grellet forecast about April 15 for Caidal and first week May for municipal elections (paragraph 2 Tunis telegram 246).[4] Greatly to its relief Residency gathers from ND leaflets that party will probably participate in elections. Residency was fearful boycott after which ND would claim as supporters all those failing to

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[3] Neither printed.
[4] Not printed.

vote. Grellet believes ND candidates sure win certain areas but thinks non-ND men likely win over ND in many places. No decision taken re possible release political detainees before elections.

4. Grellet said resurgence Communist activity reported from Morocco and Algeria has had slight echo here. Police have evidence strongly implicating Commies as perpetrator recent bomb outrages though ND members believed to have planned attacks. Police embarrassed by recent escape Ennafaa, [garble] TCP, from detention and look forward to sending him to prison for two years when recaptured. "Universite Universelle", fellow-traveling cultural group [garble] has scheduled first meeting in over year with prominent Commie sympathizer presiding.

JONES

320/2-2053 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jones) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, February 20, 1953—2 p. m.

254. Tunis roundup.

1. Residency advises that Resident General has sent Grellet to Tunis [*Paris?*] for few days to assist Secretary General Pons and Finance Director Fraisse in negotiations for larger slice for Tunisia of French investment plan. Grellet will also discuss election dates and arrangements with Foreign Office. Residency source hinted to us today that caidal elections may be postponed until after *ramadan* (paragraph 3, Tunis telegram 250)[2] since time required instruct rural population re voting procedure. Same source said Neo Destour has instructed party members to register for vote but to abstain election day, thus attempting prove that Tunis capable voting but unwilling participate French-imposed reforms.

2. Residency reportedly broadening its contacts among Tunisians who are coming to it in greater numbers with expressions of friendship. At palace Ben Salem said to be advocating accommodation with France and this has led to tension between him and Prince Chedly. In recent speech Tunis audience, Resident General stated native population could only be good friends of France if they were first good Tunisians. *Comment:* This is good line.

3. Residency intelligence chief admitted today that resumption bomb incidents source concern and that police have caught red-handed only one bomb-thrower who said unknown man had given him 500 francs to carry parcel which resulted in deaths two children (Tunis

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Cairo, London, Algiers, Rabat, Naples, and Tripoli.

[2] *Supra.*

telegram 233).[3] Pressed on point whether police had succeeded in establishing link between bombings and Communists (paragraph 3, Tunis telegram 252),[4] source replied "we are without proof". He said also that while regular Tunisian Communists hold meetings and write letters, their activities innocuous. Residency refuses them exit visas to attend Communist conferences abroad, invitations to which are mailed here mostly from Prague and Vienna.

4. Same source said investigation Hached murder stalled.

JONES

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[3] Jan. 19, not printed. It reported on incidents of violence during the previous weekend and said the hypothesis of the Residency was that the Neo-Destour and UGTT leaders had forbidden terrorism but their discipline was inadequate to halt it. (772.00/1–1953)

[4] Feb. 16, not printed. It contained another report on violence in Tunis. Paragraph 3 said the current theory was that the incidents were the product of Communist exploitation of inexperienced members of the Neo-Destour, whom the party was unable to control. (772.00/2–1653)

772.00/3–1753: Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jones) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, March 17, 1953—11 a.m.

265. Following substance views expressed by Resident General after farewell dinner Residency last night:

1. Tunisia political tensions gradually quietly lessening and there is steady drift among Tunisians toward idea reasonable settlement with French. Senseless, patternless bombings do not disturb appreciably this trend. Resident General said he had that day been shown copy of what purported be letter from former Prime Minister Chenik addressed to Tunisian personality in which former expressed conviction that Tunisians must reach settlement with French and willingness head Government established for this purpose. Resident General said that if true this was very good news since he hoped resume negotiations for settlement shortly after elections which would establish cadre of elected representatives with whom he could work. He would, however, be faced with problem easing out Baccouche and members his Cabinet; [garble] were courageous men who had stood by France at difficult time and they could not be "thrown away".

2. Resident General delighted with performance two infantry battalions made up of Tunisian reservists who were called up for recent Beja manoeuvers (Tunis telegram 264).[2] Resident General overruled advice to effect that it would be dangerous to form all-Tunisian units at this time; Resident General insisted on "vertical" mobilization. Tuni-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Cairo, London, Algiers, Naples, Rabat, and Tripoli.

[2] Mar. 14, not printed. It reported, among other matters, that General Guillaume had been there for 3 days of military maneuvers in the Beja area. (320/3–1453)

sian troops worked well and enthusiastically and at end manoeuvers several hundred Tunisians offered enlist for regular service. I suggested that presence in Korea of unit Tunisian volunteers under French officers might go far toward raising Tunisian morale and at same time influence world public opinion re Tunisian problem. Resident General said idea worth considering; said Tunisian volunteers are fighting in Indochina. (Today General Garbay also spoke highly of units officered and manned by Tunisians.)

3. Resident General believed that recent rains have alleviated drought central and southern Tunisia.

4. Albert Bessis, leading Tunisian lawyer (Tunis despatch 219)[3] yesterday also spoke of lowered political tension (paragraph 1 above). He believes that by "giving a little" French can achieve settlement before year end. He is glad French going easy on Hedi Nouira (Tunis telegram 261)[4] since latter will probably be among those with whom French will have to deal.

JONES

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[3] Not printed.

[4] Mar. 6, not printed. It reported the French police had announced a roundup of 11 persons charged with publishing Neo-Destour propaganda without advance permission. Hedi Nouira, Secretary General of the Neo-Destour and one of its most respected members, was still at liberty. (320/3-653)

320/4-1453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1953.

Subject: Security Council Consideration of Tunisia.

Participants: Jean Pierre Benard, Counselor, French Embassy
John E. Utter, AF

I took the opportunity of a visit from Mr. Benard to discuss with him reports from New York that the Arab-Asian delegations would try to raise the Tunisian question in the Security Council. (New York telegram 602 of April 8.)[1] I told him that information from Arab sources indicated that such action by these delegations was largely motivated by frustration at what they considered French dawdling in solving the Tunisian difficulties, and in particular, by their concern over reports of capital punishment meted out to Tunisians for political offenses.

It appeared to us that the latter complaint could be handled best by the French revealing the facts, which according to our information from Tunis, did not correspond to the figures produced by the Arab-Asians. I told Benard that we would welcome the most recent information on this subject. (He subsequently furnished me with the following statistics:

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[1] Not printed.

Since 1952 there have been 23 Tunisians condemned to death (two in absentia), for crimes committed during the political troubles in the Regency.

Three were executed in December 1952 and five sentences were commuted to forced labor for life.

Of the remaining 15 one only has sought clemency after appeal and the other 14 who have appealed have not received judgment.)

I told Benard that the general consensus in the Department was against having the Tunisian issue raised in the Security Council at this time, principally because we could not see how the Arab-Asians could show prima facie a case of real or potential threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, we considered that sufficient time had not elapsed since the last Assembly for the French and Tunisian Governments to have worked out mutually acceptable solutions.

772.11/4–1953: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, April 19, 1953—1 p. m.

5563. Paris papers April 18 carry text of two notes Bey reportedly addressed to Prime Minister Baccouche. April 2 note complains that caids, Khahfaliks and Kahias named by simple ministerial letter without Bey's knowledge which constitutes attack on his sovereign prerogatives. States Bey cannot accept Minister of State's excuse that such action was result presidential pressure. Requests Baccouche bring end to such machinations and to protest if allegations of Minister of State not without foundation. April 16 note comments that in sealing decrees "under conditions which you know" relating to organization of elections, Bey thought government would relax severity of state of siege during election period to permit holding of public meetings, exchange of ideas and free expression of voters. States that complaints received of arrests and pressures brought on voters indicates nothing has been done in this direction. Accordingly, requests Baccouche take necessary measures as quickly as possible.

Re above, Basdevant, Foreign Office tells us: 1. Foreign Office naturally not pleased over notes but not unduly disturbed. Realizes road ahead has many obstacles but is determined persevere in efforts to establish institutions such as caidal and municipal councils which will provide better gauge of Tunisian opinion than Neo Destour or Beylical entourage.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis.

2. Foreign Office very pleased with results of elections to date. As of evening April 17, voting was averaging 58 percent of electorate. In its view, April 16 note is Neo Destour maneuver to discredit elections and reflects latter's failure to obtain high rate of abstention in voting.

3. Bey easily influenced. Taharbenamar, President Tunisian Chamber Agriculture, who recently returned to Tunis from Paris may have been key figure in maneuver and may well have led Bey to believe that Paris circles, including Foreign Office, favored postponement of elections. This is not an impression he could have derived from his Foreign Office contacts as Foreign Office has steadfastly opposed postponement.

4. Re statements in April 16 note:

(*a*) Residency reports to Foreign Office have not even mentioned arrests and have emphasized calm prevailing in election centers. Foreign Office does not doubt that some arrests have taken place but on very limited scale.

(*b*) Reference to sealing decrees "under conditions which you know" probably intended to suggest French pressure. If this is case, strange that Bey has not raised issue before this since he has signed not one but a number of decrees concerning elections over a period of several months.

(*c*) No commitments made to Bey re relaxing of state of siege.

(*d*) Foreign Office has various evidences that Neo Destour has been threatening voters.

5. Re April 2 note, various caidal posts have been made vacant by resignations, illnesses, etc. When definitive appointments are made Bey will be consulted. Posts at present filled by temporary substitutes without reference to Bey, following usual procedure.

6. New developments have not changed Foreign Office position on either caidal or municipal council elections.

They will proceed as scheduled.

DILLON

772.00/5-453 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, May 4, 1953—7 p. m.

5783. Re Tunisia, Basdevant, Foreign Office, tells us:

(1) Following assassination Kastalli [2] and attempted assassination Dr. Ben Rais, Minister of Commerce, and Tunisian police officer on May 2, Foreign Minister Bidault sent message to Bey through Resident General requesting Bey to issue statement condemning terrorism, calling upon populace to observe calm and inviting populace to vote in

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis.

[2] Tunis telegram 290, May 2, reported the assassination of Chadly Kastalli, Second Vice President of the Tunis Municipal Council, by an unapprehended murderer. (770.00/5-253)

municipal elections. Bey in customary manner took note of message and indicated he wished think matter over. On May 3, during routine visit Dupoizat, Secretary General, which had been arranged before Bidault's message, Bey stated he agreeable to making statement re terrorism and appeal to calm but considered proposed invitation to voters unnecessary as his sealing of various election decrees indicated his support of elections.

(2) Foreign Office considers Neo-Destour responsible for May 2 violence, believes N–D, having failed in its efforts to prevent success of caidal elections, is resorting to more drastic terroristic tactics to obtain failure municipal elections.

(3) Although reports still fragmentary, Foreign Office understands voting in May 3 municipal elections ranged generally between 50 percent and 60 percent of registered Tunisian voters, principal exception being Tunis where only about 10 percent of registered Tunisian voters participated. While Tunis results disappointing, some comfort derived from fact that in 1946 elections only 15 percent of Tunis electorate voted and that while proportion now lower, electoral base has been considerably enlarged. Undoubtedly Neo-Destour threats have had their effect in Tunis.

(4) French Government remains resolved to proceed with municipal elections.

DILLON

772.00/5–653

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 6, 1953.

Subject: French Opposition to Inscription of Tunisian-Moroccan Item on the Security Council Agenda.

Participants: Jean Pierre Benard, Counselor, French Embassy
John Utter—AF

Mr. Benard called to tell me that he had received an answer from Paris regarding the attitude his Government would take if the Arab-Asian States sought to raise the questions of Tunisia and Morocco in the Security Council. He stated that the French Government would be opposed to the inscription of this item on the Security Council agenda for two reasons: (1) This would be contrary to the definite and established policy of France that the United Nations, whether in the General Assembly or the Security Council, was incompetent to treat such "purely domestic" questions; (2) no cogent arguments could be produced by the Arab-Asians to prove that the situation in Tunisia and Morocco was a danger to international peace and security.

After making it quite clear that the French Government would not entertain the suggestion made by the French Delegation at the United Nations in New York to accept inscription in the hope that the matter could be pigeonholed, Mr. Benard asked what the attitude of the United States would be in the event that the Arab-Asians seized the Security Council with the Tunisian-Moroccan item. I replied that I could not give him a firm answer at this time, but that the general view in the Department was that the Arab-Asians did not have sufficient grounds to base a request for inscription and further that insufficient time had been give to France and the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments to implement the resolution passed by the General Assembly in December 1952.

320/6–853 : Telegram

The Consul at Tunis (LeBreton) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, June 8, 1953—6 p. m.

304. Tunis roundup.

1. With Prime Minister, Resident General and Minister Delegate in Europe, governmental interregnum in Paris and Ramadan nearing its weary end, political activity here nil during past fortnight.

2. Security officials concerned at continuing series minor terrorists episodes, mostly in Sahel and remote Cape Bon reaches where violence not unusual, but occasionally in Tunis area as well. Authorities apparently do not connect these latest crude outbursts with Kastalli plot (Tunis telegram 299) [2] and as yet unable ascribe them to anything more significant than *fellaga* (bandit) activity.

3. Nevertheless, Resident General's announced policy of clemency (Tunis despatch 333) [3] being implemented. All 9 labor leaders released from enforced residence last week. If state of public security remains reasonable satisfactory plan is to free 70 of remaining 140 political retainees immediately after Ramadan. Residency admits those to be released are lesser lights; more important (i.e. dangerous) ND chiefs such as Hedi Chaker, Mongi Slim, et cetera to remain,—as "hostages" (in their phrase). Equating clemency with continued calm proving somewhat difficult task.

4. UGTT leaders Boudali and Khiari have been granted permission attend ICFTU Conference Stockholm. Former permitted return from France last week when others released.

5. Masmoudi probably to be given provisional liberty soon, having now been interrogated in presence his lawyer who successfully challenged competence military tribunal his case.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Cairo, London, Algiers, Naples, Rabat, and Tripoli.

[2] May 22, not printed. It reported that more than 45 persons had been rounded up for questioning in the Kastalli assassination. (320/5–2253)

[3] Not printed.

6. *Comment:* French apparently making serious effort carry general amnesty of nationalists as far as public safety will permit. When this last attempted (in autumn 1952) short period calm followed broken by Hached murder and upsurge violence necessitating new arrests.

LEBRETON

330/6–1253 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 25, 1953—6 : 57 p. m.

506. For Lodge from Secretary. Re Tunisia–Morocco. Urtels 801, 821.[2]

While I agree we need not reveal Arab-Asians how we would vote re inscription unless specifically asked, I do not feel we can evade point if asked directly. Think highly unlikely Arab-Asians now under any illusion concerning our stand as on my recent trip to Near East,[3] I repeatedly stated that while there might be differences between British, French and ourselves relating to Near East and African problems, which differences were matter private discussion, they must not expect us to differ openly and formally with our British and French friends because under present world conditions such an open breach could not be afforded. I feel strongly that it is preferable to maintain frank and open disposition and not attempt as tactical matter to keep Arab-Asians guessing.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram was drafted and signed by the Secretary.

[2] Neither printed.

[3] For documentation on the Secretary of State's trip to the Middle East, see volume IX.

772.00/7–2453

The Consul at Tunis (LeBreton) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, July 24, 1953.

No. 10

Subject: Resident General de Hauteclocque Voices Liberal Views on the Tunisian Situation

Ambassador de Hauteclocque, Resident General of France in Tunisia, received Mr. John Utter, Director of the Department's Office of African Affairs, in his office on July 16 for a review of the current situation in Tunisia.

In the course of this conversation, which lasted over an hour and at which I was also present, M. de Hauteclocque made the following points, among others:

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[1] This despatch was repeated to Paris, Cairo, Algiers, Rabat, Tangier, Tripoli, and Rome for Maffitt.

1. The basic issue, he said, is whether not only Tunisia but the whole Maghreb is to be integrated into the Western community, or whether it will be drawn into the reactionary, anti-democratic Arab bloc. If the latter course should prevail, not only will the encouraging results of decades of French presence be totally destroyed, but also the defense of the Western community of nations will be severely jeopardized. France's mission is to counteract the evil forces that are seeking to interfere with Tunisia's progress along liberal Western lines in order to associate it with a group of new Eastern nations whose mentality and way of life are fundamentally antagonistic to our own.
2. He stated categorically that he would not under any conditions depose the Bey. He thinks that the deposition of Moncef Bey was a capital blunder.
3. The Resident General is a proponent of Tunisian independence, but not the spurious independence that the Neo Destour is clamoring for. There is no such thing as unencumbered independence these days, and in any realistic concept Tunisian independence must be mortgaged by certain other fundamental rights: the safeguarding of the personal interests and economic contribution of the European community resident here, and the higher requirements of Western defense resulting from the country's strategically important position.
4. M. de Hauteclocque was for awhile a supporter of the "association" idea, as between the Moslem and the non-Moslem communities in North Africa. He is gradually changing his ideas on this point and coming around to the view that the psychological gap between the two is too great for the twain to ever meet. He tends now to favor the idea of developing two groups, with all Europeans together in one and the Moslem community in the other. He believes therefore that France should liberalize its policy toward the Italian, Spanish, Greek and Maltese minorities, and not only give them all the benefits that Frenchmen enjoy, but encourage immigration from these countries as well.
5. He also believes that the "protectorate" formula is unworkable today. In the less complex international political relationships of the nineteenth century, the idea may have had merit, but even then it presupposed the same basic objectives on the part of the protecting and protected powers and their respective representatives. Today it has become a nuisance for France to be obliged to protect and support a Bey like the present one. He would like to see the treaties renegotiated, but offered no suggestion as to how this might be accomplished.
6. The Resident General is convinced that a resurgence of nationalist violence can be expected by next October, the Neo Destour being headed by extremists with no sense of conscience or balance. Both Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef are deranged. (This observation on the surface may appear inconsistent with the alleged new conciliatory policy of the Neo Destour reported in Tunis despatches 358 June 28 and 2, July 2.[2] His remarks, however, carried the clear implication that any softening of the Neo Destour line represents a mere shift of tactics, and that its long-range political strategy remains implacably hostile to France.)

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[2] Neither printed.

(Mr. Utter at this point sought to impress the Resident with the desirability of France's having something tangible to show by way of liberal reforms before the approaching session of the General Assembly.)

7. Scoffing at the irresponsible nationalist charge that France governs Tunisia by "direct administration" M. de Hauteclocque commented on how frequently he has been overruled by Prime Minister Baccouche on projects that he deemed desirable.

Comment: Despite a painful attack of lumbago, the Resident General was in a mellow mood, relaxed and apparently at ease with his visitors. At the outset he remarked on the futility of trying to impress Mr. Utter, a good friend of both France and Tunisia, who not only speaks impeccable French but has served here many years and knows the country well. Hence he could speak freely. The impression he left with both of us was one of absolute frankness and sincerity, tinged with a sense of frustration that he was reluctantly obliged to admit. He finds the problem fascinating and absorbing ("passionnant"), he has no personal axe to grind, and he deplores the fact that no solution is in sight. We gathered he just doesn't know what the next step ought to be, and is continually torn between his desire to liberalize the administration and his duty to maintain order.

He observed that his government is finding him another post and therefore he will probably not be here much longer.

DAVID LEBRETON, JR.

320/9–553

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1953.

SD/A/C.1/431

THE TUNISIAN PROBLEM

THE PROBLEM

Fifteen Arab-Asian states have placed on the General Assembly's provisional agenda the "Tunisian Question", and will charge that France has failed to conduct its relations with Tunisia in accordance with the 1952 General Assembly resolution, describe the situation as a potential threat to peace and security, and ask the Assembly to consider steps necessary "to prevent the further deterioration of the situation."

UNITED STATES POSITION

1. The United States should support inclusion of the Tunisian problem in the Assembly's agenda. (This position must be kept in strictest

confidence and must not be revealed to anyone without explicit authorization by the Secretary.)

2. The United States should concert with the French mutually acceptable plans on the place which the Moroccan and Tunisian items should be given on the Committee's agenda.

3. The United States should oppose any move to provide a hearing for a representative of the Bey or for any unofficial Tunisian spokesman.

4. Assuming that discussion of the Tunisian problem will take place after the Moroccan debate, the United States should express the following views: (*a*) Discussion of the Tunisian problem, allowing for certain differences between it and the Moroccan question, might well be shortened to avoid undue repetition and to avoid undue tension over these issues. (*b*) While there is international interest in the progress of Tunisia toward self-government, the situation hardly endangers international peace and security. (*c*) It will not help for the Assembly to sit in judgement on the conduct of France and Tunisia in their negotiations of the past year. (*d*) As in the case of Morocco, we are deeply interested in the orderly development of self-government for Tunisia; we note that certain reforms have already been applied in Tunisia and expect that France will work out additional steps in that direction.

5. While the United States would prefer to have no Assembly resolution on the subject, we are prepared to support a resolution expressing the continued hope that the parties will move forward on the path of direct negotiations toward agreed solutions, in line with last year's resolution. The United States would strongly oppose any resolution condemnatory of French conduct, providing for the establishment of any United Nations machinery to deal with the problem, or calling for a report of the parties to the General Assembly on the progress of their negotiations.

Comment: The United States supports the continued French presence in North Africa and we are committed to France in that respect. While Tunisia is not, perhaps, as directly important to us in terms of strategic air power, it does play an important part in the over-all French defense position in the Mediterranean. At the same time we wish to preserve as far as possible the friendship and confidence of the North Africans themselves, and demonstrate to the Arab-Asians and to the world generally our support for the orderly progress of dependent peoples toward self-government, as the Secretary pointed out in his June 1 address on the Middle East.

There appears to be little doubt but that the Assembly will approve inclusion of the Tunisian question on its agenda and that the matter will be discussed, though some effort should be made to avoid having as extensive a debate as on the more crucial Moroccan problem. Given the Assembly's wide competence under the Charter, which we recognized last year, we could not argue that mere absence of danger to international peace and security should rule out discussion of the Tunisian question. If we are to be in a position to help guide Assembly discussion toward a moderate conclusion, we can hardly oppose, or even abstain, on the vote on inclusion of the question on the agenda. Not only the Arab-Asians but many of our Latin American neighbors will certainly regard the question of inclusion as a test of the principle of freedom of discussion in the "town meeting of the world."

United States opposition to inviting a representative of the Bey or of the Tunisian Nationalists should be based on the following grounds: (*a*) It is undesirable for the Assembly to give the appearance in its discussion of making an investigation or of involving itself in controversy concerning representative Tunisian spokesmen. (*b*) An invitation to a Tunisian spokesman by the Committee might stimulate disorders and increased tension in the area.

It must be anticipated that, as last year, the French Delegation—after protesting the accusations made against France by the Arab-Asians—will refuse to participate in further discussion of the Tunisian question, basing its position on the ground that this problem lies beyond the competence of the General Assembly because of Article 2/7 of the Charter.[1]

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[1] The question of Tunisia was taken up by the UN General Assembly, but an Arab-Asian draft resolution calling for steps to insure the realization of Tunisian sovereignty and independence failed of adoption by a vote of 31 to 18 (U.S.), with 10 abstentions, because it did not receive the ⅔ majority needed for an important question. The United States opposed the resolution because it felt that passage might exacerbate relations between France and Tunisia.

772.00/9–2753: Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, September 27, 1953—6 p. m.

36. New Resident General Voizard[2] in maiden speech to Bey yesterday and before government officials and foreign representatives at Residency reception today expressed confidence that vexing problems could be solved and unrest allayed by mutual French and Tunisian effort and good will.

While moderate and conciliatory tenor of speeches anticipated, warmth of Voizard's reception by Bey and Tunis officials after twenty months of increasing coolness indicated high Tunisian hopes that Voizard's words would be followed by proofs.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Algiers, Cairo, Rabat, Tripoli, Tangier, and Rome.

[2] Despatch 796 from Paris, Sept. 16, reported that on Sept. 2 the French Council of Ministers had approved the appointment of Pierre Voizard as the new Resident General of Tunisia. Voizard had been Minister of State of the Principality of Monaco. (772.11/9–1653)

Most significant note was Voizard's use of phrase "Tunisian sovereignty" in describing atmosphere in which France intends to pursue the harmonious evolution of Tunisian institutions. Phrase avoided by predecessor.

Whether Voizard's advent means major change in French policy cannot yet be determined. At least he was well received without untoward incident.

HUGHES

772.00/11-2453

The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 100

TUNIS, November 24, 1953.

Subject: Reporting Conversation With the Director of the Resident General's Cabinet

Mr. Pierre Fourier-Ruelle, new Director of the Resident General's Cabinet, in a conversation with the reporting officer on November 18, confirmed that there would be no announcement regarding Resident General Voizard's future program for Tunisia until after the Presidential elections in France. He stated that the Resident General would proceed to Paris after the new French President is installed in office for further consultation with the Metropolitan Government at which time he would submit his recommendations regarding a program for Tunisia. Such a program, of course, must be approved by the French Government before it can be implemented by the Resident General. Fourier-Ruelle implied that disclosure of France's future plans for the Protectorate would probably not be made until the early part of January, 1954.

When asked if he could give any indication of the nature of the recommendations which Mr. Voizard would carry to Paris, Fourier-Ruelle replied in the negative. He said that the Resident General's recommendations had not yet been finalized and that at the present time he was continuing his conversations with local Tunisian and French political groups in an effort to forge agreement among them on a common program. He stressed that this undertaking required the utmost in tact and diplomacy on the part of Mr. Voizard and involved "give and take" by all the various political groups concerned. The Resident General is working closely with the Bey whom he consults on all matters of importance before taking any action thereon. He believes that the majority of Tunisians look to the Bey to represent their interest, as he is the focal point of Tunisian political thinking.

When asked if the Residency had any apprehension that the delay in announcing Mr. Voizard's program might result in impatience on the part of the Tunisians and thus lead to resumption of acts of terrorism, Fourier-Ruelle replied quite emphatically that it was inaccurate to say that the Resident General was delaying action at the present time. Adverting to the political discussions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, he stressed that these discussions were absolutely essential and represented constant progress on the problem. After stressing the delicate nature of the discussions, and the amount of patience and tact they required of the Resident General, he observed that, while he personally had had several years' experience in the diplomatic field, it was not until after his arrival in Tunisia that he had come to appreciate the meaning of "diplomacy". He commented that even if the Resident General had returned from his ten day trip to Paris in early November with an approved program for Tunisia, it would have been psychologically wrong for him to have announced it at that time. Such a plan, regardless of its substance, would have been unacceptable to the Tunisians as a program "hatched in Paris." He confirmed that Mr. Voizard is intensely concerned with economic and social problems and believes that the neglect of these problems which has been in evidence during the past two years has been a major contributing factor to the present political situation. The Resident General is personally reviewing and studying each of the Protectorate's economic problems in an effort to find solutions thereto and believes that economic and political progress must go hand in hand. The Director stated that the Residency did not anticipate any disorders or trouble between now and the time that future plans are announced.

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[1] This despatch was repeated to Paris, Algiers, Rabat, Cairo, Tangier, Tripoli, and Rome.

Fourier-Ruelle confirmed the falsity of recent press reports that Habib Bourguiba was insane and had been removed from La Galite. He stated that following the appearance of these reports he had sent a personal representative to see Bourguiba who was found to be in good health and perfectly sane. He added that, of course, Bourguiba was a fanatic and that one had to remember this in commenting on the state of his mentality. When asked if Mr. Voizard had had any contact with Nationalist leaders, he replied that, of course, we knew that he had seen former Prime Minister Chenik (actually the Consulate General has no previous knowledge of such a get-together); he added that there was no contact with the element considered responsible for the disorders, and cited Hedi Nouira as the type of responsible nationalist with whom the Resident General felt he could deal. He stated that there had been no further progress on a solution to the Hached murder, which remained a "complete mystery". No trouble is anticipated in connection with the announcement by the UGTT of plans to commemorate on December 5 the first anniversary of Farhat Hached's assassination. The UGTT has asked all workers to consecrate this day by observing 5 minutes of silence from 8:15 to 8:20 in the morning and by attending in full force inter-union meetings organized on that day by all regional district unions.

Fourier-Ruelle concluded the conversation by expressing the appreciation and thanks of the Residency for the position which the United States had taken on the Tunisian question in the United Nations. He was of the opinion that as a result of the recent vote in the UNGA the Tunisians would now be convinced that they could no longer look to the UN for assistance, and that they thus would be better disposed toward working with France toward a solution of present problems. This in turn, of course, would facilitate Resident General Voizard's task here.

Comment: It is clear from the remarks of Mr. Fourier-Ruelle that the Resident General is working quietly and determinedly, through the Bey, and with the Tunisians and the French in an effort to formulate a compromise program for presentation to Paris which will have the prior support and approval of the various dissident political groups in Tunisia. If he is successful in achieving this difficult objective before returning to Paris he will have crossed what, at this juncture at least, appears to be the major obstacle to further progress on existing political problems. While many more obstacles remain to be surmounted before a solution to the Tunisian problem is achieved, the refreshing and experienced manner in which Resident General Voizard is approaching the problem is most encouraging.

MORRIS N. HUGHES

772.00/12-253

The Counselor of Embassy in France (Joyce) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 1467

PARIS, December 2, 1953.

Subject: Tunisian Developments

The following are the highlights of recent conversations regarding Tunisian developments between the reporting officer and the two officials in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs most directly concerned with Tunisian problems—M. Geoffroy Chodron de Courcel, Director of Afrique-Levant, and his assistant, M. Jean Basdevant, Chief of the Protectorate Section.

Reform Program

Both informants indicated that no spectacular developments are to be expected in the immediate future. The Resident General has been having very wide consultations in Tunisia, and it is through these consultations and his conversations with the Bey that he expects to be able to arrive at his own conclusions of the nature of reforms which might be feasible. The Bey has indicated to the Resident General that he favors such an approach and that he believes that the problem of working out a Franco-Tunisian understanding should be handled quietly and without fanfare. This, M. de Courcel added, was in fact the approach of Resident General Mons, the predecessor of M. Perillier. Mons had worked quietly and unspectacularly in establishing a good relationship with the Bey and gaining the confidence of nationalist elements. During his regime a number of significant reforms were accomplished. M. Perillier's approach, he continued, was too spectacular and encouraged ever-increasing demands on the part of the Neo Destour.

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[1] This despatch was repeated to Tunis and Rome.

M. de Courcel suggested that, viewed in retrospect, the handling of the reform program of June, 1952, was a mistake. The publicity attending it encouraged the Tunisians to reject it. It had not had the result of calling off the U.N. consideration of the problem, the Arab-Asiatic states were dissatisfied with it as not going far enough, whereas the French colons were dissatisfied because it went too far. While the French are not standing on the 1952 program and are prepared to consider modifications and revisions, for all practical purposes, however, the range of possibilities in reform measures at this stage is rather limited. The basic problem to be resolved remains the same: determining the nature and functions of the new institutions to be established, which will recognize Tunisian aspirations for ever-increasing autonomy and which, at the same time, will protect legitimate French interests.

It is expected that after M. Voizard has reached his conclusions as to reform measures which might be taken up with the greatest possibility of success, the Bey will have to determine whether he himself wishes to participate in more detailed discussions on specific measures or whether he will prefer to designate several Tunisians to pursue the problem with the Resident General on his behalf. M. de Courcel did not believe that Neo Destourians would be designated in the latter case. It was anticipated that these designees, while recognized as Tunisian nationalists, would not be identified with the Neo Destour or, on the other hand, known for pro-French sympathies. Responsible Neo Destourians let it be known that they do not wish to participate in the present Tunisian Government or in the anticipated negotiations between the French and Tunisians since they might be forced to take extreme positions and endanger the possibilities of reaching an understanding. M. de Courcel was hopeful that within the next few months the Resident General would have made headway in tackling some of the problems. One of those problems of concern to the Ministry is that of the Tunisian budget. It would like to have the budget for the coming fiscal year examined by a financial council such as that envisaged in the 1952 program. However, it may well be that the Resident General will conclude that this is not a favorable issue on which to reach an understanding at this time.

Bourguiba

Questioned regarding Bourguiba's status, M. de Courcel said that there were no plans for transferring him from Galite Island, although, of course, the Resident General might make such a decision at a later date. The latter had recently permitted Mme. Bourguiba to visit her husband and the French had assured themselves that his health was satisfactory and that he was not suffering any hardships, despite Cairo reports to the contrary. M. de Courcel made it quite clear that neither the Ministry nor the Resident General viewed Bourguiba as the key to the problem of obtaining Tunisian agreement to reform measures. Even Neo Destourians in Tunisia had told him that Bourguiba was not a satisfactory person to deal with. While he gave the appearance of being a man of reason and moderation, he could not be depended upon to live up to agreements made with him. He could be characterized, M. de Courcel concluded, as unstable and unreliable.

Reported Misunderstanding between Messrs. Voizard and Baccouche

The Paris newspaper, *Le Monde*, in its issue of December 2, carried a report from Tunis that certain difficulties had arisen between the Resident General and Prime Minister Baccouche, presumably because certain decisions appeared to the latter as a renewal of direct administration. These difficulties, *Le Monde* added, had been straightened out following a meeting between the two principals.

Questioned about this report, M. Basdevant said that he could throw no light on it. So far as he knew, relations between Messrs. Voizard and Baccouche were very friendly and the former, in his reports to the Ministry, had made no mention of any difficulties with M. Baccouche.

Reported Cabinet Changes in Tunisia

Le Monde, on December 2, also referred to reports from Tunis of a pending change in the Tunisian cabinet, which, however, was not expected to take place before the end of January, that is, after the installation of the new French president and the forming of the new French cabinet which will follow.

Messrs. de Courcel and Basdevant both indicated that no cabinet changes in Tunisia were envisaged for the present. The present cabinet was concerned exclusively with internal administration and it was generally agreed that it should not be burdened with the additional responsibility for negotiation. However, if and when some concrete progress is accomplished in obtaining agreement on reform measures, they felt that cabinet changes would undoubtedly follow and that new appointments would be political in character. It would be premature, they indicated, to elaborate further at this stage.

ROBERT P. JOYCE

772.00/2-2354 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, February 23, 1954—8 p. m.

3037. Re Tunisian reforms, Basdevant Foreign Office tells us that:

(1) Within next few days French Government should reach decision on reform proposals which Resident General Voizard discussed yesterday with Foreign Minister Bidault. Voizard will then return to Tunisia and after obtaining Bey's approval will proceed at once with Cabinet changes and promulgation of reforms.

(2) New Cabinet will include General Saadalah, Belkhodja, Ben Salem but not Ben Rais and Ghacham, Ministers of Commerce and Health respectively in present Cabinet who will be given other important posts in compensation.

(3) Mzali will take title of President of Council, and not Prime Minister. Ministry will have Tunisian majority. Two new ministers being created, one for religious institutions and one for reconstruction. Powers of Secretary General will be considerably reduced.

(4) All Tunisian Assembly to be created with members elected by two-stage elections. Will have consultative powers only but certain arrangements are envisaged which will virtually assume that its advice will be followed. Elected French delegation attached to Resident General will sit with Tunisian Assembly when budgetary and economic matters are being discussed. Basdevant indicated all details regarding these two bodies not yet finalized but they will have features making them more attractive to Tunisians than those proposed in the June 1952 reforms.

(5) Reforms re civil service and creation of administrative tribunal will be taken up later as they are considered less urgent.

ACHILLES

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis.

772.00/3-154 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, March 1, 1954—7 p. m.

3132. Re Tunisian reforms Basdevant tells us:

(1) Limited Cabinet meeting held February 27 at which Voizard's proposals for forming new Tunisian Government and promulgating reform measures discussed and approved unanimously.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis.

(2) Voizard departed Paris for Tunis this morning and expected see Bey this afternoon. If present plans materialize, Mzali Government will be invested tomorrow [2] and reforms will be promulgated three or four days later.

(3) Despite report in newspaper *Akhbar* attributing remarks to General Saadallah which implied he would not participate in Mzali Government, Foreign Office understands his remarks twisted and that he is prepared to participate.

(4) In addition measures mentioned earlier (reported Embtel 3037, February 23)[3] reform program will also provide for extending terms of municipal and caidal councillors from six to nine years, one third to be elected every three years. Elections for one third of membership will take place 2 months after promulgation of decree. In cases where present vacancies constitute less than one third of full membership, necessary number of councillors elected last year will resign on basis drawing lots. This proposal elaborated by Voizard in compromise effort meet criticism of composition of present municipal and caidal council which emerged from 1953 elections.

(5) In discussion budgetary matters, Tunisian assembly will sit with French delegation and with representatives certain economic bodies such as Chambers of Commerce, Agriculture and Mining.

(6) At some point Bey expected make public statement in support reform measure but not yet known whether this will be at time of promulgation or when elections are held for Tunisian assembly and French delegation.

(7) Opposition is coming as expected from Rassemblement Francais, Neo-Destour and UGTT. Remains to be seen whether latter two will attack reforms only or Bey as well.

(8) While details of reform measures elaborated by Voizard with Mzali whom Bey designated for this purpose, measures themselves received Bey's approval before Voizard came to Paris.

Basdevant requests we treat above information very confidentially until it has been made public in Tunisia since Foreign Office believes it important that Tunisian identification with reform program be emphasized.

ACHILLES

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[2] Tunis telegram 63, Mar. 2, reported the Bey had installed the new Cabinet that morning and announced it was a first step toward implementing the promised reforms. The Cabinet consisted of: Council President Mohamed Salah Mzali, Public Health Director Mohamed Ben Salem, Agriculture Minister Abdel Kader Balkhodja, Commerce Director Mohamed Hadjouj, Justice Minister Tahar Lakhdar, Labor Minister Chedly Ben Romdane, Housing and City Planning Minister Noureddine Zaouche, and Musulman Institution General Mohamed Saadallah. (772 00/3-254)

[3] *Supra.*

772.00/5–2654

The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, May 26, 1954.

No. 251

Subject: Transfer of Habib Bourguiba.

After having lived in exile for over two years on the small island of La Galite off the north coast of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba has been transferred to l'Ile de Groix, seventeen kilometers southeast of Port Louis in Brittany (Tunis' confidential telegram No. 86, May 23, 1954).[2] The final decision of the French Council of Ministers was announced by the Resident General on the evening of Thursday, May 20, 1954. Bourguiba left La Galite at 1:00 A. M. of Friday the 21st by Coast Guard boat for Bizerte, and was flown to l'Ile de Groix on a French military plane.

The transfer of Habib Bourguiba marks a milestone in the administration of Pierre Voizard as Resident General. Ever since Bourguiba's exile, January 18, 1952 the Neo-Destour Party and other Tunisian nationalists who follow the Neo-Destour line have been agitating for the release of the "Supreme Combatant" or, barring that, at least for his transfer to a place more amenable to his health which allegedly suffered from the damp climate at La Galite. On the surface, at least, the agitation has borne fruit and Bourguiba will now be able to live in a villa, mix with the local population, and receive visitors and press representatives. According to press reports he will have complete freedom of the island, will be able to have free use of the telephone and, of course, have much more ready access to any medical facilities he may require, l'Ile de Groix being about seventeen kilometers by ferry from the French mainland. It has also been reported that during the coming summer he will be authorized to travel to one of the thermal baths on the continent for his health . . .[3] something that the Neo-Destour has been demanding for many months. It is also reported that certain members of his family will eventually be allowed to join him, but they are not now permitted to live with him.

As expected the Neo-Destour is only partially satisfied with this latest concession on the part of the French Government. While M. Masmoudi, delegate of the Neo-Destour in Paris, stated to members of the press that the transfer appeared to mark the ". . .[3] return of good sense to France", he emphasized that this move would in no way effect the attitude of his party nor the goals that have been set.

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[1] This despatch was repeated to Paris, Cairo, Casablanca, Algiers, Rabat, Tripoli, and Rome for Maffitt.

[2] May 23; not printed. It reported the Arab press had openly criticized Bourguiba's transfer. It claimed it was not an improvement, that Bourguiba was still a prisoner, and that Neo-Destour remained firmly opposed to the Mar. 4 reforms. (772.00/5–2354)

[3] Ellipsis appears in the source text.

M. Mongi Slim in an official statement on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Neo-Destour stated that the transfer of Bourguiba could not be considered as an amelioration of the coercive regime to which he has been submitted for the past two years. He pointed out that Bourguiba is still a French hostage, deprived of his liberty and of his right to live and circulate freely in his own country; that the Neo-Destour remains unalterably opposed to the reforms of March 4th which lead only to co-sovereignty, and that the party is resolved to pursue its policy of striving for the restoration of the liberty and sovereignty of Tunisia.

Comment: Regardless of adverse criticism on the part of the Nationalists, based mainly on the claim that the climate of l'Ile de Groix will be no more conducive to Bourguiba's good health than that of La Galite, the fact remains that the transfer of Bourguiba at this time was an excellent psychological move on the part of the French. While the Neo-Destour Party will undoubtedly continue to press for the liberation of their leader and his return to Tunisia, it will be robbed of one of its principle talking points, namely, the state of his health and the harsh conditions under which he was compelled to live while on La Galite. Further efforts on behalf of Bourguiba's liberation will, of necessity, have to be based on political rather than humanitarian grounds. It is interesting to note that the French authorities have permitted the publication of strong anti-French sentiments by Neo-Destourians, as though to prove their promise on freedom of the press.

MORRIS N. HUGHES

772.00/5-2854 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS, May 28, 1954—9 p. m.

4587. In discussion today with Emb officer, Basdevant FonOff stated that Voizard's statement following assassination of five French *Colons* in Kef region accurately reflects govt's attitude.[2] In statement Voizard declared nothing would be neglected to discover and punish assassins and that all steps would be taken effectively to protect Tunisians and French living in cities or country against aggression by outlaws. Govt does not wish to give political flavor to this attack or to suggest that it bears resemblance to terrorist activities during Hauteclocque regime.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Malta, and Rome for Maffitt.

[2] Tunis telegram 88, May 28, reported the murder of five French colonists. The assailants left a note on the bodies warning against French colonialism. Despatch 255 from Tunis, June 1, transmitted a summary of Voizard's speech regarding the action to be taken by the French against terrorists. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.

Basdevant implied FonOff regretted tone of residency statement on assassinations and trying play it down, while recognizing it was issued at time when emotions running high.

FonOff has considered possibility that assassinations may have been reprisal for killing of eight *fellagahs* earlier in week but has no specific evidence.[3] It is not inclined to link act to Bourguiba's transfer despite somewhat inflammatory nature of latter's statements to press. FonOff continues to believe direction and material support for *fellagahs* comes principally from abroad, particularly Cairo and Libya. So far there is no evidence of Neo Destour sponsorship.

While vigorous efforts will continue be made to liquidate *fellagahs*, no new measures of repression envisaged for Tunisians as such.

DILLON

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[3] Tunis despatches 239, May 19, and 252, May 26, reported on *fellagah* activities and French countermeasures. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.

771.00/6–1654

Memorandum of Conversation, by John Bovey, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1954.

Subject: Moroccan and Tunisian Problem in the United Nations

Participants: NEA/P—John A. Bovey, Jr.
and
Mr. Keshishian, New York correspondent of "Al Ahram" and other Arab papers in Cairo, and ex-correspondent of "El Alaam" and "Istiqlal" in Morocco

Mr. Keshishian inquired as to the Department's position in any forthcoming discussion of the Moroccan and Tunisian problem in the United Nations. I stated that I was unable to answer this and did not believe that any decision had been taken on this matter since the occurrence or circumstances of any such debate were unknown at present. I asked Mr. Keshishian whether he thought that the matter would come up, and if so, who among the Arab states would carry the ball. He replied that it would most certainly come up and that it would probably be by a joint effort of the Arab states. He said his information was that the campaign would be set up at the forthcoming conference in Djakarta. I gathered that this and other statements were based on corridor talk at the UN in New York. Mr. Keshishian appears to be in frequent contact with members of the Near Eastern delegations as well as with Moroccans and Tunisians, though he has never been in North Africa. His principal beat is the U.N.

Mr. Keshishian said that his Moroccan and Tunisian friends were greatly disappointed that Mr. Dulles made no allusion to North Africa in his recent address on colonialism to the Rotarians. I tried to explain that he was speaking specifically of Indo-China and could hardly be expected to enumerate all the areas in the world where this problem existed, not to mention the number of our allies to whom such a catalogue would be offensive.

Mr. Keshishian replied that Moroccans and Tunisians were increasingly restive and disappointed with the United States since the Acheson and Jessup declarations before the United Nations, which had aroused high hopes, had not been followed by any concrete assistance or betterment.

Mr. Keshishian felt that nationalists such as Balafrej and el Fassi were extremely skeptical as to the outcome of the Lacoste mission and were of the opinion that with the best will in the world the new Resident would not be able to survive the onslaught of the colons and the conservative bureaucracy. A change of tack in the metropole was necessary, Mr. Keshishian said, and he agreed that the solution to the problem really lay there. The only ultimate solution, he said, was the independence of the two countries.

He asked whether there was any talk of the return of Moulay Abdullah, the Sultan's second son, to succeed ben Arafa. I said that there had been some discussion of it as a possibility and asked whether his friends thought this would really do any good. He stated that the Moroccan masses—he included the rural as well as the urban populations, though at present to a lesser degree—were extremely attached to the ex-Sultan and his family, but said his friends were skeptical that Abdullah would do the trick. The Istiqlal favored a plebiscite, he said, and short of the return of Sidi Mohammed V, he thought the people's choice would be with Moulay Hassan and that any other change would not materially alter the situation. What the Istiqlal really wanted, he said, was a constitutional monarch along the lines of Feisal in Iraq or Hussein but with a revered figure such as Sidi Mohammed V as the symbol of Moroccan aspirations. I said that I thought that this idea was associated rather with Benjelloun's *Parti Democrate d'Independance* and that the Istiqlal had tended to put its eggs in the basket of an absolute theocratic Sultanate. He said he did not think this was the real Istiqlal aim, but admitted that Moroccans as a whole were probably at present more interested in the symbols of sovereignty than in any program of reforms or their direct participation in government.

Mr. Keshishian said that in Tunis where the Bey was less closely associated with the movement and where the degree of evolution was greater, leaders such as Bourguiba could be brought back without the loss of face for the French which could result in Morocco from changing the head of the state. He maintained that El Fassi had a considerable popular following in Morocco.

I asked him whether he thought that El Fassi or Balafrej and other veterans of Moroccan nationalism were sufficiently in control of the movement to be able to influence more extreme elements and halt the present wave of terrorism even if French policy should take a favorable turn for the nationalists. He said he thought they could halt it, but he did not know how long this would be the case. I suggested that in that event they might well have done so in order to give Mr. Lacoste an even break during the exploratory phases of his mission; this would certainly constitute a far more interesting demonstration of power and responsibility for foreign consumption than the stepped-up terrorism which had followed the news of Lacoste's appointment. He dodged this one by reiterating his own skepticism as a Syrian concerning France's ability to change course in colonial matters, and spoke rather emphatically of what he considered the scant attention given in the United States and in the Department to Arab opinion, especially that in the dependent areas. He contrasted Arab public relations with those of Israel in this respect.

Mr. Keshishian said finally that while he understood the United States' embarrassment because of our commitments to our NATO allies, he really didn't see how we could justify much longer a so completely pro-French stand (particularly in the U.N.) regarding an area which was not threatened directly by Soviet aggression. I tried to explain that Soviet imperialism was an urgent problem which certainly had a bearing on North Africa because of the vital interrelation between Africa and Europe. He said he didn't see how this interrelationship could be useful to us in the long run except on the basis of independent North African allies, friendly to France and to us.

772.00/7–354: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, July 3, 1954—1 p. m.

34. Basdevant, now in new Ministry Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs, tells us no report yet received from Voizard following meeting with Bey yesterday. Although Mzali had informed Bey his government would carry on only until return Voizard to Tunisia,[2] French hoped

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Malta, and Rome.

[2] Tunis telegram 98, June 17, reported that Council President Mzali had tendered his Cabinet resignation to the Bey that morning, after every member had received a death threat. Since it was considered useless to name a new Cabinet until the new French Government became viable, the Residency believed the Bey would not accept the resignation unless Mzali agreed to remain as a caretaker for some time. (772.00/6–1754)

Bey would be able persuade Mzali remain in office until new government formed. If this not acceptable, Voizard planned propose to Bey that chief official of each ministry be designated as member temporary caretaker government. Basdevant's thought likely that within few weeks latter would be succeeded by new government containing neo-Destour elements but he expressed doubt that Bourguiba himself would be brought into government. (Embtel 22, July 1. repeated Tunis 1.)[3]

Basdevant emphasized, however, that both Moroccan and Tunisian situations were in state of flux, that new government in its preoccupation with Indo-China and EDC had not yet reached any decisions on Moroccan or Tunisian policy but that following visits of Voizard and Lacoste, who arrived today from Rabat, stage rapidly being reached when new government's policy will be defined.

DILLON

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[3] Not printed; the Embassy reported receiving information that Bourguiba would be brought to Paris within the next few days for the purpose of negotiating the formation of a new Tunisian Government containing more representative nationalist elements. (772.00/7–154)

772.00/7–2254

The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, July 22, 1954.

No. 20

Subject: Political Events in Tunisia as Affected by Mendes-France Triumph and Habib Bourguiba Transfer.

Political events during the past week were highlighted by the transfer of Habib Bourguiba from l'Ile de Groix to Amilly (Tunis' Despatch No. 17 dated July 20, 1954)[2] and the announcement of the cease-fire agreement in Indo-China. The latter, insofar as it will insure the Mendes-France Government's remaining in power, will have a profound effect on the immediate future of Franco-Tunisian relations.

The transfer of Bourguiba was, as previously reported, a highly encouraging move on the part of the French Government as far as the Tunisian Nationalists are concerned. In his brief statement to the press Bourguiba said that he considered his transfer to be but a prelude to a definite change in policy on the part of the French and that he believed that the present terrorist activity would subside of its own accord. He also stated that he was ready at any time to enter into discussions, even on the basis of the Treaty of Bardo.

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[1] This despatch was repeated to Paris, Cairo, Casablanca, Algiers, Rabat, Tripoli, and Rome for Maffitt.

[2] Not printed; it reported hostility on the part of large numbers of the French residents of Tunisia to the transfer of Bourguiba and the apparent attitude of the Mendès-France government toward Tunisian affairs. (772.00/7–2054)

Bourguiba's statement concerning the cessation of terrorist activity appears to be an indication that he is, or at least considers that he is, the moving force behind this activity. It will be interesting to observe whether, in the face of his recent transfer and the obvious intention of the Mendes-France Government to make further concessions to the Tunisian Nationalists, terrorism comes to a halt or continues. In the latter event it will be a definite indication that others beside Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour are directing the activities that have caused turmoil throughout the country during the past several months. These possible sources include the ever present Communists, who are strongly suspected of backing the *fellagah* from the outside, the followers of Salah Ben Youssef, and the Arab League.

It is understood that the large *fellagah* bands having fallen back to the mountains of Central Tunisia and currently under a state of semisiege by French troops will have no recourse but to continue to fight for their own preservation. They could obviously expect little consideration at the hands of the French troops if forced to surrender and, with the bulk of the outlaws facing long prison sentences at the least they might choose to fight on, especially if supported by a continued flow of reinforcements and supplies from Libya. Their only alternative, in the event that the Neo-Destour makes terms with the French, would be to attempt to fight their way south and across the Libyan border from whence they came.

It is, of course, too early to expect any concrete results of the apparent change in French policy. The transfer of Bourguiba was only the opening move in what is expected to be a complete change of French policy vis-à-vis Tunisia.

If the terms of the cease-fire in Indo-China seat the Mendes-France Government firmly in the saddle—and it now appears highly likely—one may expect immediate action on the part of Minister Christian Fouchet towards sweeping reforms in both Tunisia and Morocco. Because of the seriousness of the terrorism in Tunisia, it is probable that the first steps will be taken by the French Government in that Protectorate. Invitations to prominent Tunisians to come to Paris for exploratory conversations have already been accepted and three of them—Tahar Benn Ammar, President of the Tunisian Chamber of Agriculture, Aziz Djellouli, former member of the Baccouche Cabinet, and Naceur Ben Said, ex-Caid of Sfax, have already had interviews with Minister Fouchet, and Ben Ammar with Habib Bourguiba. Others expected later are ex-Prime Minister M'Zali, who is now in France, Hussen Abdelwahab, ex-Minister of State, Dr. Materi, former member of the Chenik Cabinet, and Dr. Ben Rais, ex-Minister of Commerce in the Baccouche Cabinet. Incidentally, Dr. Ben Rais departed suddenly for France upon the urging of Residency officials who learned that his life was in danger from terrorists. The Residency has also urged Dr. Ghacham, Baccouche's Minister of Health, to leave at once in view of the serious threats he has received from Nationalist extremists, but he has not yet departed. These visitors, together with others and prominent French residents of Tunisia, will in due course form a mixed commission to discuss with the French Government fundamental reforms that are expected to be based upon the principles of far-reaching internal autonomy for the Tunisians which will, at the same time, recognize the legitimate rights of the French residents and the basic principle that the French Government will remain in Tunisia and have control of foreign affairs, finances, military protection, and a measure of control over the judiciary. How the mixed commission will be formed and by whom is not yet known. Nor is it known what part Resident General Voizard will play in those negotiations. The Residency does not believe that a new cabinet will be appointed until the work of the mixed commission has progressed, there being no point in naming another interim government because the present incumbents, headed by the French Secretary General, are competent to keep the government functioning during the interim period.

It is significant to note that Monsieur Voizard has not yet been called to Paris to meet with the government officials and the prominent Tunisians. While he will doubtless be called in due course when his presence is needed, the fact that conversations are being held without him may indicate that the Mendes-France Government may be contemplating a change in that office. One or two Residency officials have expressed cautious concern over that possibility, but state that M. Voizard intends to go to Paris soon. Most observers appear to feel that the replacement of M. Voizard at this time would be most unfortunate. He has not been given a real chance to succeed or to fail as Resident General, and may be considered to have achieved some success in his ten months at this post especially through reestablishing good relations with the Bey and through convincing all walks of French and Tunisian life of his abiding interest in their welfare. The fact that his operations were closely controlled by the former French Government coupled with world political and military events conspired to destroy the peaceful period that he had worked diligently to maintain for many months. It will be very difficult to find a successor as capable and steady as M. Voizard, and one who knows Tunisia and the people as well as he does.

MORRIS N. HUGHES

772.00/7–2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, July 27, 1954—7 p. m.

376. All signs point to early government action on Tunisian problem with Cabinet consideration of program under preparation by Protectorates Ministry expected July 31. According Basdevant of latter Ministry, government will publicly define its policy vis-à-vis Tunisia, stating final objective to be attained as well as sequence of steps leading thereto. It is hoped that Bey, on basis this program, will shortly thereafter be in position name new Tunisian Prime Minister who will form a new government incorporating all important Tunisian elements, including Neo Destour. This is particularly desirable to give maximum effect to new government's anticipated appeal for end of terrorist activities.

Minister Fouchet in conversation with Ambassador today stated that Tunisians had evolved to point that in general they were now able to administer their own internal affairs. France would retain control over foreign affairs and defense and for time being over finance. Rights and status of French in Tunisia would have to be assured. On basis this statement and general acceptance of view that new program will have Bourguiba's [approval?], Embassy concludes that it will very substantially meet Neo Destour demands as persistently expounded by Bourguiba, i.e., all-Tunisian Government responsible to elected all-Tunisian assembly, Tunisification of civil service, and ultimate replacement of present protectorate relationship with new form of Tunisian-French association. Implementation of program will, of course, be spread over a period of years.

Current speculation on candidates for post Prime Minister seems to narrow down to Aziz Djellouli and Tahar Ben Ammar, both of whom reportedly met with Bourguiba following their consultations with Fouchet in Paris last week. In any event, both expected to be in new cabinet but not Bourguiba himself. In recent press statements, latter has clearly suggested that he would be prepared approve Tunisian Cabinet without being member thereof.

Several Paris newspapers today suggest possibility that a well-known person having long experience in overseas problems might be sent to Tunisia on temporary mission to put new program into effect. One name cited is Albert Sarraut, President of the Assembly of the French Union. Embassy has no confirmation this point but believes it would be logical development as it would highlight and perhaps dramatize importance of new program. In addition, it would enable government to keep in background Resident General Voizard, identified by both Tunisians and French Colonials with program which misfired.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Tangier, and Rabat.

At present, Embassy believes government does not plan to have debate in Assembly on Tunisian policy although this would be precipitated by interpellation.

DILLON

772.00/7-2854 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, July 28, 1954—4 p. m.

5. Voizard goes Paris today and strong indications he will be replaced. Residency officials admit Voizard not popular with Mendes-France and especially Fouchet. Many French residents now openly oppose him for do-nothing attitude regarding assassinations. Residency protocol chief stated widow of French Colonel Paillonne murdered Saturday refused attend husband's military funeral yesterday if Voizard present and he did not appear.[2]

As Boisseson can not return some days command temporarily shared between Latour and Cabinet chief Fourier Rouelle. Latter unable confirm Paris rumors that Sarraut to be Resident General or Aziz Bjellouli next Prime Minister but believes new Cabinet will be named soon. All operations conducted Paris. Residency also indicated clean sweep its personnel probable and restaffing with no non-political officers.

While recognizing Voizard has not given firm leadership since his March 4 reforms proved unpalatable and failed stamp out terrorism Paris faces extreme difficulty finding succesor of same ability to satisfy enraged French and pacify Tunisians.

HUGHES

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Algiers, Rabat, Tangier, Casablanca, Cairo, Tripoli, and Rome for Maffitt.

[2] Despatch 25 from Tunis, July 28, reported the assassination of Lt. Col. Henri de la Paillone, Director of the Central Administration of the Tunisian Army and Chief of the French Military Mission in Tunisia, on July 24. Many of the French residents of Tunisia considered Voizard indirectly responsible for the assassination because they blamed him for failing to take adequate protective measures. (772.00/7-2854)

772.00/7-3154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS, July 31, 1954—2 p. m.
PRIORITY

448. Paris press today gives front-page attention to yesterday's Cabinet meeting on Tunisian reform program. Communiqué issued at close

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Rome, and Malta.

of meeting stated that Mendes-France "in a general exposé on Tunisian affairs, and after having retraced the difficulties which had arisen in the course of last years, gave details on new impetus which would characterize Franco-Tunisian relations in the desire to guarantee French interests and to meet the aspirations of the Tunisian people through realization of internal autonomy of Tunisian state. The Council of Ministers gave full agreement to Mendes-France." Press stressed growing opposition of Socialist Republicans, moderates and many radicals to any measures leading to granting of internal autonomy, and reported that Minister Defense Koenig had threatened resignation in protest against program submited to Cabinet. However, Cabinet crisis apparently averted for at conclusion meeting lasting almost five hours approval was given to Mendes-France.

Press also announced that General Boyer Delatour replacing Voizard as Resident General, Voizard being assigned other functions and being raised to grade of Grand Officer of Legion of Honor.

Mendes, accompanied *inter alia* by Marshal Juin, Minister of Protectorates Fouchet, and Decourcel of latter Ministry, departed Paris by plane early this morning for Tunis, Mendes being received at noontime by Bey, arrangements having been made by Pelabon, director of Mendes Cabinet, who arrived Tunis yesterday. According to Basdevant of Protectorates Ministry, Mendes will make statement to Bey (to be made public in Tunis later today) announcing French Government's readiness to accord internal autonomy to Tunisia while at the same time making clear permanence of "French presence" in Tunisia and necessity of assuring interest of France and of French in Tunisia. This to be accomplished by conventions to be concluded between French and Tunisian Governments. Mendes will call upon Bey to name Tunisian to form new Tunisian Government to negotiate details of new French-Tunisian relationship within framework of principles indicated above. Mendes will also state firm intention of French Government to restore and maintain order in Tunisia.

Mendes will probably return Paris today or tomorrow but Fouchet expected remain on in Tunisia for consultations. While new government can probably be formed fairly rapidly as result extensive consultations carried on during past several weeks by Fouchet with representative Tunisian personalities, Basdevant under no illusions that negotiations on details of agreements will be quickly concluded. Basdevant pointed out that General Boyer not named Resident General but only entrusted with responsibilities of Resident General. Since negotiations will be carried on at government level between Tunisian and French Governments, post of Resident General for moment loses some of its importance and a political figure not required. After conclusion final agreements between governments, new appointments will undoubtedly be made.

It now appears certain that Tunisian program will be discussed in National Assembly. On August 10 latter is to fix date for interpellations which have been introduced on Tunisian situation. Pressure on Mendes from right has been mounting steadily and debate may well be stormy. However, Mendes success in obtaining Cabinet approval of program, inevitably disagreeable to some members his Cabinet, and his dramatic trip to Tunis, lead us believe he prepared put full force his position and prestige into carrying program to successful conclusion.

DILLON

772.00/8-354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, August 3, 1954—8 p. m.

479. Basdevant of Protectorates Ministry today gave us further details re Tunisian reform program:

1. Government being formed by Tahar Ben Ammar will include 4 French members in accordance with March 4 reforms but will in fact be all-Tunisian since latter will not participate in decisions to be reached in negotiations with French Government. Upon completion negotiations they will be replaced by Tunisians. French envisage that Government will include several Tunisians with title Minister of State whose job will be conduct negotiations. It is hoped thereby avoid mistake of '50 when member Chenik Government attempted negotiate and administer at same time.

2. Present French plans call for negotiation following conventions:

a. Military—supplementing and modernizing military provisions of Bardo Treaty.

b. Diplomatic—providing closer definition of nature French representative of Tunisian interests.

c. Cultural—providing for teaching French language in Tunisian schools, recognition diplomas et cetera.

d. Civil service—establishing rights of French to existing jobs but providing that new recruitment will be Tunisian.

e. Financial and economic—providing for some form of control over budgetary expenditures so long as French Government called on meet budgetary deficits and finance economic development programs. However, Minister of Finance will be Tunisian.

f. Establishment—specifying status of French residents in Tunisia, their participation in various Tunisian bodies such as municipal councils, economic chambers et cetera.

g. Judicial—establishing judicial arrangements applicable disputes between French nationalists, between French and Tunisian nationalists et cetera.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Malta, Rome, Tangier, and Algiers.

3. As cover to conventions mentioned above French Government now contemplates overall treaty but not certain yet whether it would replace or only supplement Bardo Treaty. It would provide for arbitration any action taken by Bey or Tunisian Government in contravention of conventions, with suspension of action until finding reached. This considered highly important for protection French interests since residential visa of beylical decrees is to be eliminated.

4. While Mendes, in his declaration to Bey, outlined general principles of new program, he avoided detailed reference to conventions French Government had in mind. However, general nature of conventions discussed by Minister Fouchet with various Tunisian personalities called to Paris for consultation and apparently found reasonable.

DILLON

772.00/8–454: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS, August 4, 1954—7 p. m.

492. Parliamentary critics of Mendes' Tunisian policy gathering forces for debate in National Assembly on August 10, at time Assembly called upon to fix date for discussion of several interpellations on Tunisia. The following is résumé of principal manifestations this parliamentary interest during past twenty-four hours as reported today's press:

1. Stormy encounter took place during Mendes' appearance yesterday afternoon before radical group. Former Minister Martinaud-Deplat criticized government policy, in which he was joined by Rene Mayer, and demanded immediate debate before group. Mendes reportedly refused "premature internal debate" but proposed that he explain his viewpoint immediately before opening of assembly debate on August 10. Group decided to send delegation to Mendes before debate to inform him of viewpoint of radical and radical-socialist parliamentary groups.

2. Deputies representing independents, peasants and WRS groups met with national center of independents under presidency Pinay and issued communiqué expressing astonishment over breaking of treaties with regency which they accused government of having accomplished in Tunisia without prior parliamentary consultation. Called for meeting Thursday of Directing Committee of National Center to organize position in National Assembly to any program of abandonment.

3. Protectorates Minister Fouchet, who returned Paris from Tunis last evening, met this morning with Social Republican Group including Senator Puaux representing French in Tunisia, and encountered lively opposition. He later appeared before Foreign Affairs Committee of National Assembly to provide clarifications of program.

4. Mendes this morning received parliamentary delegation rep-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Tangier, Algiers, Rome, Malta, and Cairo.

resenting French of Tunisia, including Senators Colonna and Puaux, and La Forest, Vice President of France-Tunisia Inter-Parliamentary Group. Following interview, Colonna stated Mendes did not convince them on value of guarantees envisaged for maintance French presence in Tunisia.

Comment: Debate will be stormy, but there is no indication as yet that government will not survive this test. In Embassy view principal danger lies in possibility that opposition elements may try to play up recent references by Bourguiba and Sahah ben Youssef to independence as ideal of Tunisians and force government to specify nature of guarantees that will assure French "presence", thus forcing positions of both Tunisians and French before negotiations begin.

DILLON

651.72/8–2654

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, August 25, 1954.

Participants: Ex-Commerce Minister Hadjoudj
Ex-Health Minister Bouhageb
Minister Delegate Boisseson
Consul General Hughes

Subject: Outlook for Franco-Tunisian Negotiations

As a dinner guest in the home of former Minister of Commerce in the Mzali Cabinet, Dr. Mohammed Hadjoudj, I had an opportunity last night to discuss with him and Dr. Aly Bouhageb, ex-Minister of Health in the Kaak Cabinet, some aspects of the present political situation facing the Tunisians. Also present was Minister-Delegate Boisseson, now Acting Resident General.

The gist of the conversation was speculation on how rapidly and successfully the forthcoming negotiations between the French and Tunisians would progress. M. Boisseson announced the return of Resident General Latour for today noon, and said he expected him to call on the Bey at once and then begin making arrangements with Prime Minister Ben Ammar. He said that while the plenary meetings of the negotiators would be held in Tunis, the real business of setting up Tunisia's internal autonomy would be conducted in Paris. For that reason, he thought, Habib Bourguiba would desire to remain in France for a while longer, and that it was better that he do so. When I inquired about the movements of two other Neo-Destour leaders, Salah Ben Youssef and Hadra, my host stated that while they were free to return to Tunisia from their voluntary exile, it would be healthier for them to await the expected general amnesty for political offenders. He thought it probable that they also would find it convenient to be in Paris during the negotiations.

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[1] This memorandum was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to Tunis despatch 47, Aug. 26. The despatch reported that the Tunisian Prime Minister and Minister of State had returned from Paris, where they had conferred with French political leaders regarding the forthcoming negotiations on Franco-Tunisian relations. The despatch suggested that this memorandum might throw some light on factors affecting the negotiations and their probable outcome. (651.72/8–2654)

Drs. Hadjoudj and Bouhageb then expressed their convictions that nothing could be foretold about either the agenda or the problems of the Franco-Tunisian negotiations until the EDC question had been resolved. They said that the entire climate of the negotiations depended upon the success or failure of the EDC. Dr. Hadjoudj explained that the attitude of the Tunisian Nationalists toward France will be conditioned by whether France determines to wreck EDC plans and thereby possibly alienating its two powerful allies, the U.S. and Britain, or whether in agreeing to some modified form of EDC, the Mendes-France Government then falls with no vote of confidence, leaving France in a politically chaotic condition.

In their view, the EDC question overrides in importance every other problem with which France is concerned, and will have a profound effect on all Europe and North Africa.

M. Boisseson was not inclined to take as serious a view of the possible failure of the EDC negotiations as did the other two. He observed that there seemed to be a better than even chance that Mendes-France would receive a vote of confidence because he believes that a compromise may be reached over EDC which will be accepted reluctantly, by the French public.

He pointed out that M. Mendes-France had achieved powerful backing and is such an able negotiator that he will be able not only to survive politically but may possibly come out of the affray stronger than before. In that event, he felt sure that the future negotiations between his country and Tunisia would have every chance of satisfying both parties. He added that one of the principal obstacles is and will be the determined opposition of the French in Tunisia, but even that problem, he said, will eventually be solved simply because as events are developing there is no reasonable alternative to the general principles on which the forthcoming negotiations will be based. Dr. Bouhageb said that while he felt there would be a long hard struggle with framing a new set of reforms for Tunisia, he believed that if the present atmosphere of cooperation can be maintained and if Habib Bourguiba can be encouraged to maintain his present attitude, the negotiations should eventually be successful and a proper base be laid for the future welfare of Tunisia.

772.00/9–154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, September 1, 1954—8 p. m.

931. Protectorates Minister Fouchet and Director De Courcel depart Paris September 3, for Tunisia to initiate negotiations on following day on French-Tunisian conventions envisaged in Mendes-France statement of July 31, to Bey.[2] After opening statements by both sides, discussion expected center on reaching agreement on how negotiations will be carried on. Present French thinking is that French-Tunisian committee should be formed to negotiate each convention and that committees set up to negotiate conventions on rights and interests of French in Tunisia and Tunisians in France, and on administrative and technical assistance should have first meeting within ten days in Paris. Basdevant doubts that other conventions could be tackled before October in view preparatory work required. Fouchet will have overall charge of negotiations for French and both French and Tunisians expected designate experts to head their respective negotiating teams for each convention.

Basdevant did not envisage Bourguiba's early return to Tunisia particularly since he will wish to be on hand in Paris area during negotiations. His appeal for additional measures of clemency (together with that of Salah Ben Youssef) has been noted. Basdevant implied that although French have already gone long way in this direction they would probably be prepared to go further on request of Tunisian Government as gesture of cooperativeness.

DILLON

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Rome, and Malta.

[2] See telegram 448 from Paris, July 31, p. 887.

651.72/9–754 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, September 7, 1954—8 p. m.

1001. Basdevant of Protectorate Ministry who participated with Minister Fouchet and De Courcel in September 4 ceremonies in Tunis opening French-Tunisian negotiations[2] today made following comments to us on Tunisian developments:

1. French visitors well received and agreement on procedural problems re negotiations cleared up very quickly.

2. Negotiations scheduled to be resumed Paris September 10 but may be delayed until 11th. Uncertain whether Tahar Ben Ammar will accompany Tunisian Ministers of State Masmoudi, Slim and Djellouli.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Rome, and Malta.

[2] Tunis despatch 54, Sept. 9, also reported on the opening session of the negotiations. (651.72/9–954)

3. Jacques Lucius (former Secretary General Moroccan Protectorate) and Pierre Chavenet (director of French Civil Service) handling negotiations on French side of conventions on rights and interests of French in Tunisia and convention on administrative technical cooperation respectively.

4. Any illusions that Neo-Destour not calling tune within Tunisian Government dispelled during visit. Emphasized by after-dinner conversation between French visitors, Ammar, Masmoudi and Slim in which latter two did all of talking for Tunisian side. On other hand French found them intelligent, reasonable, at least on procedural matters, and not hot-headed.

5. Although Tunisian population admittedly pleased by reform proposals, it was quite evident to French visitors that popular demonstrations and acclamations were largely staged by Neo-Destour.

6. Despite statement such as that attributed Salah Ben Youssef in September 6 press conference Cairo that "we will negotiate future the return to Tunisian state of responsibility for defense and foreign affairs", French visitors found no indication that Tunisian interlocutors were wavering in acceptance of principles on which internal autonomy being returned to Tunisia as enunciated in Mendes' July 31 statement to Bey.

DILLON

651.72/9–2354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, September 23, 1954—7 p. m.

1243. Basdevant of Protectorates Ministry today gave us following summary recent developments re Tunisia:

1. Franco/Tunisian agreement reached on principles to govern convention administrative and technical cooperation. Experts making good progress in drafting text. Re convention on rights and interests of French, discussions re principles still proceeding at Ministerial level but it has become apparent that agreement on some points will depend on outcome of discussion on related points arising in connection other conventions. Present plan is for experts to begin drafting on basis principles on which agreement already reached, leaving drafting of certain portions of convention in suspense until discussions on other conventions have led to agreement.

2. On French side, there have been meetings to discuss judicial, military and cultural conventions but no meetings yet with Tunisians. Judicial convention will probably be taken up at Ministerial level September 27, military convention September 29 and cultural convention

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Tangier, Rabat, Casablanca, Algiers, Cairo, Malta, and Rome.

in following week. As in case first two conventions, agreement will be sought on governing principles before drafting is undertaken.

3. Continuation of *Fellaga* activity in Tunisia of concern to French who have noted that despite various measures taken by Resident General to meet problem, ranging from offers of pardon to vigorous efforts of French forces to wipe out movement, Tunisian Government has been silent and has taken no steps to associate itself with French effort. Basdevant expressed doubt that *Fellaga* were under Neo-Destour orders and based on his conversations with Tunisian Ministers, felt that they were irritated by *Fellaga* activity which could be interpreted as opposition to their own collaboration with French Government. Desirability of Tunisian Government taking some action of its own has been called to their attention without result as yet.

4. Although no instructions have yet gone out, French Government plans to authorize return to Tunisia of Mohamed Badra, former Tunisian Minister of Commerce and Ali Bellouan, former Destourian Youth leader, both living Cairo.

Comment: Minister Fouchet told Utter last week French Government hoped to remove Badra, who is well-regarded from influence of Salah Ben-Youssef.

DILLON

772.00/10-154 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, October 1, 1954—2 p. m.

21. Estimate present situation by Minister Seydoux:

1. Paris negotiations proceeding rapidly to agreement general principles but delays result when unconfident Tunisians faced with details of agreement. Because unprepared they become suspicious and journey to Bourguiba and Ben Youssef for approval.

French and Tunisian public will not be informed of agreed conventions until negotiations completed else negotiators particularly Tunisians risk extremist intimidation delaying signature.

2. Local French showing more conciliatory attitude toward internal autonomy. Even die-hard colonists seem accept loss of privileges and power as inevitable price of remaining here but attitude easily changed in event anti-French demonstrations ensue.

3. Resident General moving gingerly against *Fellagah* to avoid prejudice reform negotiations. Although able wipe out [garble] *Fellagah* he fears repercussions and proposes use suasion and threats until hand is forced.

Seydoux averted to alleged *Fellagah* training in Tripolitania implying belief in some evidence and offered supply me with all factual data available.

He hinted at British connivance while stating financial and moral support doubtless supplied *Fellagah* by Arab League and said no proof Communist aid. He asked whether he had such reports. I said no re British and only rumors on League and Communists.

4. Resident General emphasized one important objective his job here is maintain closest possible relations with me there at assuring that State Department currently informed of true French intentions in Tunisia. He felt that US attitude will weigh heavily in outcome of Tunisian experiment which may set precedent for Morocco.

Opposed to Seydoux opinion one prominent Neo-Destour sympathizer told me yesterday that attitude local French still uncompromising and overbearing, that officials are filling all possible jobs with Frenchmen instead of beginning train Tunisians, that *Fellagah* would cease operations if French stopped pursuit and might surrender arms to mixed commission but never to French military and that *Fellagah* are still supported by nationalists constitution only strength to rely on if negotiations fail. That may be reason Destour controlled government has not moved to stop *Fellagah*. He admitted some aid from Arab League and from Tripoli but certain of no Communist aid which rejected many times by *Fellagah* supporters.

HUGHES

772.00/10-2854 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, October 28, 1954—noon.

29. Important meeting of Neo Destour council planned for Saturday now postponed until early November partly because Latour flew Paris yesterday for new instructions re treatment *Fellagah* situation and partly because Destour leaders unready make critical decision on *Fellagah*. Announced purpose of meeting to examine all political problems but emergency is *Fellagah* activity which adversely affecting Paris negotiations and Bourguiba and other leaders worried. Mongislim and Masmoudi delaying return to Tunis until meeting called and Premier Ben Ammar will go Paris after Mouled November 6.

Destour party position extremely delicate: Passive treatment of *Fellagah* in face French demand for suppression might damage negotiations to point that internal autonomy offer be reconsidered; openly condeming *Fellagah* runs risk that nation might not follow party lead whereupon *Fellagah* continue and Neo Destour loses face and respect with result leaders become vulnerable to threats and attacks as enemies of liberation and lose value as negotiators.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, Cairo, Rabat, Casablanca, Algiers, Tripoli, Rome, and Tangier.

Seydoux said while Destour meeting could stir trouble if anti-French sentiments voiced, no grounds to prohibit meeting which will be closed and no demonstrations permitted. He considers negotiations going well enough for favorable report by Destour ministers and party too delicate to invite turmoil.

He opined *Fellagah* will soon seek truce because munitions scarce and French victories increasing but doubted that French grant any truce preferring stand by amnesty offer (he refused speculate whether Latour would get different orders).

In view potential danger to negotiations and Neo Destour dilemma on *Fellagah* many observers feel moment ripe for Mendes-France make some new offer or announcement re Tunisia.

HUGHES

772.00/11–2254 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, November 22, 1954—8 p. m.

2182. After eight-hour meeting November 20, agreement reached between Protectorates Minister Fouchet and Tunisian Prime Minister Ben Ammar on joint appeal to be issued by Resident General and Tunisian Government to *Fellagahs*, calling upon latter to lay down arms on return to villages without fear of punishment. Announcement expected today after clearance of text by Bey and Mendes. Delegates of French and Tunisian Governments are to contact *Fellagahs* and, zone by zone, to make offer known and to work out surrender of arms with *Fellagah* leaders. No time delay specified nor did agreement provide that Tunisian Government would denounce *Fellagahs'* offer. However, it is well understood that if they do not surrender arms within reasonable time of being informed of offer, French will consider themselves free to pursue them. During period in which *Fellagahs* in particular zone being contacted by delegates, French military forces will not take action in absence *Fellagah* attacks.

Protectorates Ministry tells us confidentially that during November 20 discussion, Tunisians made two demands which French found unacceptable. They asked that French colons also surrender their arms and that French grant total amnesty. On this last point French agreed that when conventions ratified, they would introduce a general amnesty law (which does not mean total amnesty).

In Ministry view, principal factor which led Tunisians to agree to French proposal on *Fellagahs* was violence of French reaction to Neo-Destour Council resolutions and to Bourguiba's statements referred to in Embtel 2141, November 19.[2] They feared that as result, negotiations on conventions might be broken off which they do not want. Ministry officials do not appear overly optimistic that appeal to *Fellagahs* will be fruitful; much, they recognize, depends on goodwill of Tunisian Government, only attitude of Neo-Destour and latter's influence on *Fellagahs*, and external factors such as attitude of North African extremists in Cairo. But in any event, agreement has made it possible for negotiations on convention to be resumed and both sides agree that tempo of negotiations is to be stepped up. Present hope is that agreement on principles applicable to the several conventions can be reached within ten days or so, with drafting of texts of conventions to take another month.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Tangier, Rabat, Algiers, Rome, Malta, and Cairo.

ACHILLES

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[2] Not printed; it reported a tempest had been stirred in the French press by a message by Bourguiba to the Neo-Destour National Council in Tunisia and recent press interviews, especially with the *New York Times*. (772.00/11-1954)

771.00/12-354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 3, 1954—7 : 12 p. m.

Gadel 133. Verbatim text. Re Morocco–Tunisia. Following draft texts being furnished USGADel as basis possible US statements in GA Committee on North African items:

1. *Morocco* "The US has always been convinced that progress toward increased self-government for Morocco can best be achieved, as in case of Tunisia, through method of direct negotiations and agreements between France and Moroccans. This is method recommended by Assembly in its resolution on Morocco December 19, 1952, and we believe no other method is so likely achieve desired goal. At same time, I am sure we all realize that, if progress seems slower in Morocco than in Tunisia, this is because Moroccan situation is more complex. We deplore any measures such as acts of terrorism and violence which would interfere with orderly political development and social and economic progress of Moroccan people.

Despite setbacks and slower rate of progress evident in Morocco, US feels there is good reason to hope that method for solution in Tunisia can set pattern for future settlement in Morocco. We believe it in interest of France and Morocco that this course be followed as actively and persistently as circumstances will permit. For that reason we believe this course is also in the best interests of UN and of fulfillment of United Nations principles in respect of peoples who have not yet obtained a full measure of self-government."

2. *Tunisia* "I wish to say only few words on question of Tunisia because, in view of my Government, present outlook for substantial

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Mangano (UNP) and cleared in the offices of Utter (AF), Fisher (WE), Jernegan (NEA), Dean Brown (EUR), and Popper (UNP). It was repeated to Tangier, Tunis, and Paris.

progress in self-government for Tunisia makes extended discussion in Assembly neither necessary or desirable. We believe current negotiations between France and representatives of Tunisian Government are in accordance sense of Assembly's resolution of December 17, 1952 recommending bilateral negotiations this problem. Surely, with these long-awaited and important negotiations actually in progress now and with conciliatory atmosphere which surrounds them, we can take satisfaction in fact that methods of settlement suggested by Assembly in 1952 are being applied.

Let us remember that, in his address of July 31, France's Prime Minister stated publicly: 'The internal autonomy of the Tunisian State is recognized and proclaimed without reservation by French Government; we intend at one and same time to assert this in principle and to enable it, in action, to be sanctioned by success.' M. Mendes-France confirmed this policy to members of this Assembly on November 22, expressing his faith in 'the future of a liberal policy of mutual understanding and political, economic and social progress.' We understand that France and the Tunisian Government jointly are taking steps to ease the tensions and difficulties aroused in Tunisia by extremist and sometimes fanatical elements. We wish all success to this constructive, cooperative move. In conclusion I wish to say my Government is greatly encouraged by these developments and over prospect that governments and peoples of France and Tunisia will in their mutual relations continue firmly along path of conciliation and progress."

These items due come under discussion at UN about December 8, Tunisia coming first. North African debate scheduled for French Assembly December 10 which will be difficult and possibly critical for Mendes-France, with gravest implications for prospects early ratification Paris-London accords. US statements at UNGA will have exceptional importance this context and USGADel is requested advise soonest re final texts as proposed for delivery. We suggest that if at all practicable USGADel withhold any statement on Morocco until after completion French Assembly debate, and not speak on Tunisia until actually required by course of debate.

Any substantive comments invited.

DULLES

771.00/12–654 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 6, 1954—8 p. m.

2387. I have read with great interest texts drafted for possible U.S. statements during UNGA debate on Morocco and Tunisia (Deptel 2045).[2] I concur with Department's view that interrelationship between difficult North Africa debate which Mendes-France will have in assembly December 9 and 10 and U.S. statements in UNGA of great importance. In view delicacy of situation it would be best for our statements on both items to follow French Assembly debate which is scheduled conclude night December 10. At that time I believe effect of these statements will be most helpful here, especially that on Tunisia. As stated in Deptel 2045 Moroccan situation is much more complex and progress on scale envisaged in Tunisia is difficult now both because of greater political immaturity Moroccan people and dynastic problem which requires settlement satisfactory to both sides.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to USUN, Tangier, and Tunis.

[2] Same as telegram Gadel 133, *supra*.

I would have no particular comments on Tunisian draft but believe U.S. remarks on Morocco might emphasize less similarity with Tunisian case for reasons mentioned above. Specifically first sentence in second paragraph might read "Despite slower rate of progress evident in Morocco, U.S. believes that example of Tunisia will remain in minds of both French and Moroccans as the type of approach which may help in settling the Moroccan problem".

It seems fortunate that Tunisia will be heard first in view of present favorably developing situation there. While major points remain to be settled in Franco-Tunisian negotiations, success of amnesty program for *fellagah* has created currently favorable atmosphere for talks.[3]

DILLON

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[3] On Dec. 17, the General Assembly approved by a vote of 56 (U.S.) to 0, with 3 abstentions, a resolution postponing consideration of the Tunisian question for the time being in view of the ongoing Franco-Tunisian negotiations, which were being viewed with the confidence that they would lead to a satisfactory solution of the problem.

772.00/12–2954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 29, 1954—8 p. m.

2739. Protectorates Ministry (Basdevant) tells us Mendes met with French negotiators this morning to review major issues on which agreement not yet reached with Tunisians. Assuming favorable vote today on Paris accords, Mendes expects be able give major attention to Tunisian negotiations and is scheduled to meet with Tunisian Ministers tomorrow in effort to find solution to these outstanding issues. So far there has been no "given" Tunisian side and in fact, Tunisian position has hardened in last weeks. On French side, Assembly North African debate on December 10 presages rough going when Tunisian conventions come before Assembly for ratification, and thus Mendes finds himself circumscribed in making further concessions. Hence, outcome these stepped-up negotiations difficult to predict.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, Casablanca, Rome, Malta, and Tripoli.

According Basdevant, following are principal issues to be settled:

1. Arrangements governing stationing of French forces in Tunisia to carry out defense responsibilities.

2. Responsibility for internal security. (French prepared transfer responsibility for police functions to Tunisians by steps, with fixed time limits. Tunisians want assume immediate responsibility. Both agree that Director of Security and certain number of high-ranking security officials should be French. French believe Tunisians will also agree that intelligence organization—Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire—should remain under French control as it is linked to French defense responsibilities.)

3. French participation in Tunisian non-political institutions. (Tunisians have agreed to French participation in municipal councils but want French councillors designated by Bey, whereas French want them elected. Tunisians have objected to French participation in Tunisian Assembly dealing with economic matters even though French agreeable that such a body have only advisory powers. French still hopeful Tunisians will give way here.)

4. Jurisdiction over French in Tunisia. We gather that police issue is one giving French Government most concern. It has been given so much attention by French Parliamentarians and by prominent Tunisians that it will be difficult to find politically acceptable solution.

New problem may arise over Tunisian ratification of conventions since UGTT Secretary General Bensalah has questioned Bey's authority to ratify. Basdevant indicates that in French view there can be no question of Bey's authority and that French would not view favorably any proposal to submit conventions to a Tunisian Assembly for ratification. This could only lead to demagoguery and delay.

DILLON

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

PRINCIPAL POLICIES AND PROBLEMS IN RELATIONS WITH THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA[1]

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "South Africa, Negotiations"

Report by the Director of Raw Materials (Johnson), Atomic Energy Commission[2]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1952.

PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTARY HEADS OF AGREEMENT (INCLUDING ADDENDUM) BETWEEN THE ATOMIC ENERGY BOARD OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMBINED DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider approval by the Commission of the proposed Supplementary Heads of Agreement (including an Addendum) (AEC 101/60) modifying the Heads of Agreement entered into between the Atomic Energy Board of the Union of South Africa and the Combined Development Agency on November 23, 1950.[3]

DISCUSSION

2. The 1950 Agreement provided for a uranium production programs from South Africa gold mines and the sale of the uranium produced to the Agency. The program now in effect covers the construction of uranium recovery facilities at six mines and an annual production estimated at 1200 tons of U_3O_8 per year.

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[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. ii, pp. 673 ff. and 842 ff. and *ibid.*, vol. v, pp. 1427 ff.

[2] This report is attached to a memorandum by the American Secretary, Combined Development Agency (John A. Hall) to the American Secretary, Combined Policy Committee (R. Gordon Arneson). Also attached as Enclosures "A" and "B" are respectively the text of the "Supplementary Heads of Agreement" and the text of the "Addendum" to the "Supplementary Heads of Agreement." Neither is printed.

The function of the Combined Development Agency (CDA), whose membership included the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, was to secure control and insure development of uranium and thorium supplies located outside the jurisdiction of the member States. The CDA operated under the direction of the Combined Policy Committee composed of representatives from the member States. For further documentation on U.S. atomic energy policy, see volume ii. For previous documentation on U.S. atomic energy policy and the Union of South Africa, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. i, pp. 685 ff.

Jesse C. Johnson headed the U.S. part of the U.S.-U.K. team which negotiated the Supplementary Heads of Agreement described in this report.

[3] Not printed. (Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "South Africa")

3. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (AEC 101/49) approved by the Commission and the Agency, negotiations were undertaken to expand South African uranium production by 1,000 to 1,500 tons of U_3O_8 annually. In oral discussions a production goal of 3,000 tons per year was generally considered desirable and probably feasible on the basis of available information. It was recognized from reports received from South Africa that any major expansion of the 1950 program would create serious problems for the South Africans and that higher prices and other inducements might have to be offered if negotiations were to be successful. Negotiations began early in November and members of the American Side returned to Washington about December 17.[4]

4. At the request of the Agency, the mining industry had its technical staff make a thorough study of the feasibility of a major uranium expansion program. The study covered all phases of the program, such as the potential uranium producers, construction problems and timetable, operating problems, labor supply, power and material requirements and the over-all impact on the South African economy. On the basis of the engineering and technical report, the mining industry and the South African Government representatives agreed that a production rate of 3,000 tons of U_3O_8 per year was feasible and could be reached in 1955 or 1957 depending upon whether the favorable or unfavorable contingencies materialized. It was their judgment that the end of 1956 was a reasonable safe target date.

5. The Supplemental Heads of Agreement and Addendum as now drafted cover an undertaking on the part of the South African Atomic Energy Board to take steps immediately "to expand the previously agreed programme of production with a view to achieving, from sources within the Union of South Africa, an output of 3,000 short tons of uranium per year by the end of 1956." A condition to his undertaking on the part of South Africa was an increase in the 1950 price schedule[5] and the limitation of capital risk to uranium production and the assumption of this risk by the Agency under certain conditions described subsequently in this paper.[6] Also

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[4] Documentation on these negotiations is located in file 103 AEC.

[5] The proposed price increase ranged from 7 to 18 schillings per pound of U_3O_8, roughly equivalent to $1.00 to $2.50. This would raise the cost of an average pound of U_3O_8 from $9.10 to $10.50, excluding the cost of calcining, packaging, and transportation to the United States.

[6] The proposed agreement retained the 100-schilling or $14.00 per pound ceiling price, but allowed that, whenever the price of uranium reached the 100-schilling ceiling level, the mining company could notify the Combined Development Agency of its desire to discontinue production. The Agency could then negotiate with the mining company (through the Union Government's Atomic Energy Board) for a special price arrangement. If a new arrangement could not be reached, then at the Agency's request the mining company was required to continue operations on the basis of cost of production (as defined in the Heads of Agreement of 1950) plus a margin of 10 schillings or $1.40 per pound. The Agency retained the authority to terminate such an arrangement at any time upon 3 months' written

Footnote continued on following page.

involved was a commitment to assist the South African Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) in arranging a loan to finance a power supply equivalent to the requirement of the uranium program. This would be a public utility loan and would not be tied to, or a charge against, uranium production.[7] The Agency's responsibility for arranging loans for uranium production plants remains unchanged.

[Here follows a detailed, technical discussion of the abovementioned provisions of the proposed Supplementary Heads of Agreement.]

16. The Supplementary Heads of Agreement and Addendum were agreed upon and initialled by representatives of the Agency and the South African Atomic Energy Board but are subject to review and approval by the three Governments—the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Since the Chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Board and the representatives of the U.K. Ministry of Supply were prepared to sign in South Africa, it would appear that final approval is now a matter for decision by the Commission and such other U.S. Government agencies as may be concerned. Formal approval will involve signature of the documents by the authorized representative of the Agency and the Chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Board.

STAFF JUDGMENTS

17. It is the understanding of the Office of General Counsel and the Division of Finance that the ore procurecent contemplated in the proposed modification of the Heads of Agreement is justified as being in furtherance of the presently authorized United States atomic energy program. On this basis the Office of General Counsel has no legal objection, and the Division of Finance has no fiscal objection to the recommended action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. In view of the urgent need for expanding uranium production to meet the Commission's presently authorized program, including stockpiling uranium ore if possible, it is recommended that the Atomic Energy Commission:

a. Approve the Supplementary Heads of Agreement and Addendum

Footnote continued from preceding page.

notice. Upon termination by the Agency, the mining company could either repay the unamortized balance of the capital loan and acquire the uranium production facilities, or it could transfer ownership of the facilities acquired by the loan to the Agency and thereby be relieved of the obligation for repayment. The Agency would then assume responsibility for loan repayment. Also, under the proposed agreement, the Agency agreed to purchase a greater quantity of uranium than it had under the 1950 Heads of Agreement.

[7] *Export–Import Bank of Washington: Fifteenth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period July–December 1952*, p. 60, indicates that on July 10, 1952 the Board of Directors of the Export–Import Bank authorized a credit of $19,600,000 for the Electricity Supply Commission of the Union of South Africa.

(AEC 101/60) and request the concurrence of the Combined Policy Committee in this action.

b. Authorize on behalf of the United States the signing of these documents by the Chairman of the Combined Development Agency after the concurrence of the Combined Policy Committee has been obtained.[8]

c. Note that decision at the earliest possible date is important because the proposed program not only involves new sources of production but an expansion of uranium production facilities now under construction; that the present program is being held up as construction has reached a stage where a decision on expansion must be made immediately to avoid serious delays in completing the plants; and that orders for U.S. steel and equipment must be placed soon in order to assure 1952 deliveries.

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[8] On Jan. 7, 1952, the American Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee forwarded a copy of the Supplementary Heads of Agreement to the members of the Committee for their concurrence. On Jan. 21, 1952, the American Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee informed the American Secretary of the Combined Development Agency that unanimous concurrence had been obtained. (Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "South Africa, Negotiations")

Editorial Note

On March 20, 1952, the highest court in the Union of South Africa, the Appeal Court, delivered a unanimous decision that the Separate Representation of Voters Act (May 1951), under which approximately 38,000 Colored citizens were to be removed from the common voting rolls in Cape Province, was null and void and that the Union Government had acted unconstitutionally in attempting to place the Coloured voters on a separate voters roll. Documentation on this subject is located in files 745A.00 and 845A.411.

845A.411/3–2152 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL CAPETOWN,[2] March 21, 1952—5 p. m.

39. Re Embtel 37, March 20.[3] Tense atmosphere in Capetown following govt's reaction to appeal court decision. Govts implication that it will try by parliamentary means reverse appeal court ruling has given rise to uneasy rumors. This afternoon leader of opposition tried to move that House immediately debate Prime Min's statement of yester-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Pretoria for Col. John J. Davis, Army Attaché at Pretoria.

[2] The Embassy Chancery was maintained at Capetown during sessions of the Union Parliament; otherwise it was located at Pretoria.

[3] Not printed. The telegram reported the Appeal Court decision concerning the Separate Representation of Voters Act. (845A.411/3–2052)

day[4] as matter of urgent public importance. Pro-govt speaker ruled not matter of urgency and debate must await introduction govt proposals which may not be made until after recess month hence. Ineffectiveness of opposition leadership concern to followers. Rumors that torch commando[5] meetings will result in clashes with Nationalists[6] and veiled allegations that govt may covertly provoke native riots Apr 6 to show country that courts shld not interfere with *Apartheid* program reflect disturbed atmosphere here. Opposition speakers claimed in parliament today that country is afraid of what govt may do. Full background appeal court case in Emb despatch 370, Dec 10, 1951 and ref therein.[7]

GALLMAN

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[4] On Mar. 21, 1952, the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, Dr. Daniel F. Malan, announced his intention to introduce legislation to place the sovereignty of the Union Parliament beyond doubt and thereby negate the Appeal Court's decision. (Telegram 40, from Capetown, Mar. 22, 1952; 845A.411/3–2252)

[5] Reference is to the Torch Commando Movement, originally called the War Veterans' Action Committee, formed among exservicemen, all of European origin, during 1951 to protest the Separate Representation of Voters Act.

[6] Reference is to members of the National Party of South Africa, which constituted the majority party since 1948 and which was headed by Dr. Malan.

[7] Not printed. (845A.411/12–1051)

745A.00/4–852 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa, at Capetown[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 8, 1952—5:49 p. m.

223. Indian Amb Sen delivered *aide-mémoire* Apr 7,[2] expressing concern present tense situation SoAfr[3] which he said susceptible spreading and causing wide repercussions throughout Africa, Asia. Made strong appeal to US Govt exert its influence with Malan Govt to insure that civil resistance campaign be handled in way not antagonize conflict between races, and to bring about change in SoAfr racial policies which injuring causes world peace. Dept stated careful consideration wld be given this msg.[4] Similar communication addressed UK Govt London. Dept consulting Brit Emb Wash. Embs comments wld be appreciated.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was also sent to New Delhi and London.

[2] Not printed. The Indian *aide-mémoire*, dated Apr. 7, 1952, and the memorandum of conversation between Ambassador B. R. Sen and the Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Burton Y. Berry, dated Apr. 7, 1952, are located in file 845A.411/4–752.

[3] On Apr. 6, the non-European South African population held massive demonstrations against the government's racial policies. (Telegram 56 from Capetown, Apr. 7, 1952; 745A.00/4–752)

[4] According to the memorandum of conversation, dated Apr. 7, 1952, Acting Assistant Secretary Berry told Ambassador Sen that "the Department has been concerned over the situation in South Africa, and that we were relieved that the demonstrations on April 6 were, according to the reports which we have received to date, not accompanied by violence." (845A.411/4–752)

845A.411/4-752

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry)[1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] April 10, 1952.

Subject: Request of Indian Government that the United States make representations to the South African Government regarding South African racial policies.

The *aide-mémoire* which the Indian Ambassador left with us on April 7, 1952 asks that the United States use its influence with the South African Government (1) to insure that civil resistance is handled so as not to intensify antagonism and conflict between the races, and (2) to bring about some change in South African racial policies.

I am fully mindful that racial tension has been building up in South Africa and that the racial policies which the present government is pursuing are intensifying this development. At the same time it is unfortunately clear that these policies have the general support of the white population in South Africa, notwithstanding the position taken by the Opposition on the Separate Representation of Voters Act.[2] The Nationalist Government now in power is extremely sensitive to what it regards as unwarranted interference by the United Nations in its internal affairs. In the present strained political atmosphere in South Africa, no representations which we might make would result in the slightest alteration in basic South African racial policies. It is equally certain that such representations would be deeply resented and would adversely affect United States-South African relations. This would be particularly true if the United States' representations were made at the request of the Indian Government or, for that matter, at the request of any third government.

It is extremely doubtful whether any outside influences are likely to be helpful at this time in bringing about a change in South African racial attitudes. In fact outside pressure is much more likely to exacerbate the situation. Whatever influence for good the United States can exert on South Africa cannot be applied effectively through formal representations. Rather it must be exerted subtly, by indirection and over a period of time. Our Embassy at Cape Town has been giving earnest consideration to ways in which we might further the development of more enlightened racial attitudes in South Africa. I am fully convinced, however, that formal representations, far from accomplishing their purpose, would make it more difficult, if not impossible, for this government to exert a constructive influence in the future.

In view of the considerations outlined above, EUR is strongly opposed to making any representations to the South African Government in response to the Indian request. Furthermore, EUR does not believe that even as an independent act, without Indian prompting, such representations would be helpful or desirable at this time. In the circumstances I would suggest that the Indian Ambassador be told we appreciate the concern of his Government at developments in South Africa but that we do not believe any representations by us to the South African Government would be helpful. In fact, such representations might worsen the situation.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by J. Harold Shullaw (BNA).

[2] See editorial note, p. 905.

I am sending a copy of the Indian *aide-mémoire* and a copy of this memorandum to Ambassador Gallman for his information and comments. Upon receipt of those comments, we will give consideration to a general instruction to the Ambassador on means by which he can indirectly influence South African attitudes on racial questions. This problem was covered in his briefing sessions in the Department and has figured in his correspondence with officers of the Department since his arrival in South Africa.

Since dictating the above Cape Town's telegram 58 of April 10 [3] has been received which confirms the views expressed herein, that representations to the South African Government would only exacerbate the situation.

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[3] Not printed. In this message, the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, Waldemar J. Gallman, noted: "I have felt right along that about all that can be done here on this issue is for me to be on so friendly and informal basis with Malan and members of his Cabinet that whenever atmosphere shld appear propitious, when I am with them, I can inject a word of caution and make some suggestions. In my contacts with these officials, I am finding them daily more approachable, open and friendly. I wld advise against any formal approach to them here now on this issue, under specific instructions. I think we can only bide our time and as occasion arises make some friendly suggestions." (Telegram 58 from Capetown, Apr. 10, 1952; 745A.00/4–1052)

Editorial Note

During the year 1951, exports of manganese ore from the Union of South Africa to the United States fell far below the contracted amount for that year and far below the level of manganese exports to the United States for 1950: 428,059 long tons in 1950 as compared to 311,909 long tons in 1951. (Telegram 24 from Capetown, February 29, 1952; 445A.119/2–2952) On April 2, 1952, the Union's Minister of Commerce, Eric H. Louw, informed Ambassador Gallman that the Union's exportable surplus of manganese for 1952 to all countries was estimated at approximately 700,000 long tons. The Minister did not comment on how much of this total would go to the United States. (Telegram 52 from Capetown, April 3, 1952; 445A.119/4–352) For documentation on this subject, see files 445A.119 and 845A.2547 and *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume V, pages 1427 ff.

445A.119/4-1752

Memorandum by William L. Kilcoin of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs to the Director of the Office of International Materials Policy (Brown)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1952.

AFRICAN MANGANESE AND CHROME

The dangers inherent in proposals for adoption of a discriminatory allocation policy to coerce South Africa to increase manganese and chrome railings[1] were stressed in our memo of April 10 to Mr. Liebhafsky.[2]

We emphasized particularly that pressures of this kind would strain our friendly relations and might invite retaliation in other areas in which we require South African cooperation and support.

There are, moreover, a number of other considerations of a very practical nature, aside from possible impairment of our relations, which might give us pause. These can be briefly summarized as follows:

1. South Africa is in a stronger bargaining position than the United States. If discriminatory and retaliatory measures should be evoked by the two countries, we would be immeasurably the losers. In addition to chrome and manganese, South Africa is a large producer of high grade asbestos and other materials which we urgently require. A slowdown of production or diversion of these materials would have a serious effect on our defense economy. Furthermore, because of the United States interest in the planned uranium production in South Africa, it is unlikely that the US Government would be willing to consider any measures which might have repercussions on this program. Restrictions or curtailment of US exports would probably seriously inconvenience and dislocate the South African economy, but except for sulphur, a few other raw materials, automotive and agricultural implements and industrial machinery spares and components and petroleum products, alternative sources of supply could probably be found. As US firms moreover dominate many of these industries in South Africa, it is questionable if discriminatory measures of an effective nature could be applied.

2. There is influential support in South Africa for a policy to curtail exports of manganese ores in order to conserve reserves for the Union's future needs. The present policy is to permit unrestricted exports (this, of course, is limited by capabilities of railroads to move ores) but any undue pressures might result in a reversal of this policy. The Minister of Commerce, Mr. Eric Louw has stated that the South

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[1] Studies proposing this course of action were being prepared within the Metals and Minerals Staff. On Feb. 20, 1952, the Chief of the Metals and Minerals Staff, Harlan P. Bramble, forwarded to the Director of the Office of International Materials Policy, Winthrop G. Brown, a memorandum entitled "Strategic Materials from Union of South Africa," which suggested that the United States utilize South Africa's need for U.S. steel and equipment as a lever in negotiations. (845A.2547/2-2052)

[2] Not found in Department of State files. Herbert H. Liebhafsky was attached to the Metals and Minerals Staff.

African supply of manganese is not inexhaustible. It is BNA's impression that he would favor curtailment of exports and he might seize on any suggestions that we were considering adopting a discriminatory allocation policy to vigorously press for limitations.

3. U.S. capital investments in South Africa are substantial and are expanding. At the present time US capital can operate freely in South Africa and is welcomed. Capital transfers to non-sterling countries are subject to discretionary treatment and the general policy is freely to permit repatriation of capital as well as transfer of dividends, interest, etc. The party in power, however, is ultra-nationalistic and should we apply restrictive measures, South Africa might retaliate by granting less favorable treatment to American capital investments on the Union.

In sum we need more from South Africa than she does from us. If discriminatory measures were instituted by both countries we would be the heavy losers. We feel therefore it would be extremely unwise to pursue these proposals further.

745A.00/5–252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 2, 1952—7:59 p. m.

2427. ReDeptel 2143 rptd London 5051 Capetown 223.[2] Dept May 2 handed Ind Counselor reply Ind *aide-mémoire*[3] re situation South Africa.[4] US reply contained factual account US position toward question treatment persons of Ind origin in SoAfr, pointing out US "has supported view UN competent consider question" and has recognized procedure offering most promise ultimate settlement differences such as India–SoAfr was direct negots between parties. Referred our support suggestion last GA of appt impartial third party who through conciliation might bring parties into direct negots, and adoption this suggestion in GA Res Jan 12.[5] Stated US cognizant possibly wide repercussions if tension led conflict but expressed doubt any influence brought by another govt wld be helpful and probability formal representations wld be resented and might exacerbate situation.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Capetown.

[2] Dated Apr. 8, p. 906.

[3] For information on the Indian *aide-mémoire*, dated Apr. 7, 1952, see *ibid.*

[4] The U.S. *aide-mémoire*, dated May 2, 1952, and the memorandum of conversation between I. J. Bahadur Singh, Counselor of the Embassy of India, and Donald D. Kennedy, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, dated May 2, 1952, are located in file 845A.411/5–252.

[5] For documentation concerning the U.S. position on the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, during the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. II, pp. 842 ff.

General Assembly Resolution 511 (VI) of Jan. 12, 1952 is printed in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20*, UN document A/2119.

Dept saw copy UK *aide-mémoire*[6] which in line projected UK reply as reported London's 4576[7] to Dept rptd New Delhi 100 and Capetown 15 except no ref to pt C first para[8] and in addition referred UK doubts re competence of UN in matter.

ACHESON

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[6] Not printed. The U.K. *aide-mémoire*, dated Apr. 24, 1952, refused the Indian request on the grounds that such an approach would constitute intervention into the internal affairs of the Union of South Africa, would probably not achieve the objective desired by India, and might exacerbate feeling within the Union of South Africa on this subject. The document also repeated the U.K. position that public discussion of this question within the UN General Assembly was not the best means to secure a settlement, that it was doubtful whether the United Nations had competence to deal with this matter, and that direct negotiations between the parties involved provided the best means for reaching a settlement. (845A.411/5-252)

[7] Not printed. (745A.00/4-1952)

[8] Reference is to the Embassy in London's statement that the U.K. *aide-mémoire* would include the following point: "any such attempt might very seriously embitter South Africa's relations with UN because of SA resentment."

NAC files, lot 60 D 137, Documents

Memorandum by the National Advisory Council Staff Committee to the National Advisory Council

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 1310

[WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1952.

Subject: U.S. Position on South African Import Restrictions

Problem

The Government of the Union of South Africa has requested comments from the U.S. Government on a memorandum (attached as Appendix A)[1] which it proposes to send to the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, describing an intensification of import restrictions. The U.S. must decide whether it wishes to comment at this time on the South African memorandum, and if so, what the nature of its comments should be.

Discussion

1951 Import Control System

Since the beginning of 1951 the South Africans have maintained an import control system which was generally non-discriminatory for imports financed from the proceeds of South African gold production and current export proceeds, but did discriminate against the dollar area to the extent that capital inflow from soft currency countries exceeded capital inflow from hard currency countries.

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[1] Not printed. The document was delivered to the Department on Apr. 14, 1952. On Apr. 18, the Department conveyed to the Embassy in Capetown its preliminary position: "to tell SoAfr we will not object proposed action but suggest deletion from memo of references action as aid to UK and emphasis necessity restrictions as result decreased fon exchange receipts." (Telegram 231 to Capetown, Apr. 18, 1952; 394.31/4-1752) In response, Ambassador Gallman informed the Department that the Embassy had learned that the Union Government placed "great store in basing proposals on aid to UK as part Union contribution sterling convertibility" and that the Union might, therefore, resist any attempt to delete this justification. (Telegram 74 from Capetown, Apr. 21, 1952; 394.31/4-2152)

Just prior to the institution of this system the IMF described the proposals as "a welcome and substantial relaxation of discrimination" and added that "a judgment cannot be made respecting the need for the discrimination which will continue in effect until the new system can be evaluated in the light of its functioning under the conditions prevailing after it comes into operation." There has been no subsequent IMF statement with respect to the South African system.

The U.S. did not object to the conclusions drawn by the IMF. On October 13, 1950, the NAC stated that "The Council still considers that there is no adequate basis on financial grounds for the maintenance of discriminatory import restrictions by the Union."[2] Nevertheless, the NAC action advised the U.S. Executive Director in the Fund not to ask the Fund at that time to propose the complete elimination of discrimination in view of the major improvement in this respect contemplated by the new plan. The NAC Staff also noted the delicate background of the problem.

Current Proposals

The South African Government now proposes to reduce the value of import licenses to be awarded on a non-discriminatory basis to a level below the level of export earnings, plus gold production. This will mean either that South Africa will increase its holding of gold and foreign exchange or that the value of imports allocated on a discriminatory basis will be in excess of the inflow of capital from soft currency countries. Presumably the South African Government has the second of these alternatives in mind.

The South Africans propose to take this action because "not only as a member of the sterling area, but also on account of its close commerical, financial, and strategic connections with the United Kingdom, South Africa is vitally interested in assisting the sterling area." The South African memorandum indicates some deterioration in South Africa's balance of payments from which South Africa might argue that an increase in the level of restrictions is justified; the memorandum does not contend that the balance of payments position of South Africa itself requires the imposition of additional discriminatory measures.

South Africa proposes to reimburse the United Kingdom in gold or dollars to the full extent that any deficits with the European Payments Union by the Union of South Africa have the effect of requiring gold or dollar payments by the United Kingdom to EPU, or of reducing the amount of gold or dollars received by the U.K. from EPU. (It is not clear what the position has been heretofore.) In addition, the Union of South Africa will continue to finance its own deficits with the dollar area and will guarantee to the United Kingdom a minimum of 150 million in gold during 1952.

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[2] See NAC files, lot 60 D 137, document 88.

The South African memorandum suggests that the proposal is a temporary measure resulting from exceptional circumstances unforeseen when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was drafted.

The memorandum also indicates the expectation of the South African Government that under the contemplated procedures, the "proportion of hard currency imports which already increased from 24 percent in 1950 to 28 percent in 1951 would show a further increase in 1952." The memorandum explicitly indicates that the share of the US in the South African market would not be reduced as the result of discrimination restrictions below the percentage it obtained in 1951. In this connection the South African Government stresses that, rather than intensify discrimination against hard currency countries further, it is prepared to reduce its dollar reserves by $28 million.

Issues Raised by the South African Proposal

The South African memorandum raises several issues on which the U.S. Government must take a position:

(1) Should sterling area countries be required to justify their actions on the basis of the balance of payments position of each individual country, or should the balance of payments position of the sterling area as a whole be the determining factor?

(2) Is discrimination justified as a means of maintaining or encouraging a flow of capital?

(3) Is the Union of South Africa justified in discriminating in favor of members of the European Payments Union, as against the dollar area, when it is meeting a substantial percentage (at present 80 percent) of that deficit in gold or dollars.

The Sterling Area Issue.—The question of whether the Union of South Africa was justified in discriminating against dollar imports was reviewed in the report of a Working Party at the Third Session of the Contracting Parties to the GATT in June 1949. The British Government argued that discrimination by South Africa was important to the financial position of the United Kingdom and the sterling area. The U.S. took the position that these considerations did not provide a justification for discrimination. Appendix B[3] is an excerpt from the final report of the Working Party which contains the statements of both the British and the U.S. representative.

The issue arose again in the IMF end Torquay discussions in 1950. Once again the United States insisted that sterling area countries which held independent memberships in the International Monetary Fund and the GATT be treated as separate individual members and required to justify their policies on the basis of the economic and financial position of each individual country. In an effort to avoid a serious disagreement with the United Kingdom at that time, the

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[3] Not printed.

United States was prepared to see documents drafted in a manner which would not completely foreclose the possibility of treating the sterling area as a unit. The U.S. insisted, however, that there be no attempt to draft the documents in such a way as forever to foreclose the treatment of sterling area countries on an individual basis. A rather serious disagreement between the U.K. and the U.S. did develop in the discussions within both the IMF and the GATT. Both countries made their positions quite clear, and neither attempted to compromise. Over British protests the IMF approved studies, the conclusions of which recommended different treatment for different countries within the sterling area. The GATT Working Parties simply filed reports stating the position taken by each country.

At the time of these discussions in 1950, the international financial position of the United Kingdom and of most of the sterling area countries was relatively good and the U.S. was pressing for relaxation of discrimination by the U.K. itself, although this pressure was tempered by the anticipation of a worsening in that position associated with an increase in defense efforts.

In the nine months ending March 31, 1952, however, sterling area reserves declined nearly $2.2 billion. Both over-all and dollar balance of payments deficits were being experienced by the United Kingdom and by all of the larger independent sterling area countries, except the Union of South Africa. So far as can be ascertained, the Union of South Africa also experienced a deficit in its over-all balance of payments in 1951 which was not quite fully covered by the inward movement of capital but the South African deficit with the dollar area was not by any means as great as current gold production. While South Africa's gold and foreign exchange holdings (including sterling) fell during most of 1951, its holdings in the first ten weeks of 1952 for which data are available remained virtually unchanged, indicating that any overall balance of payments deficit incurred during this latter period was being covered by inward capital movement. Thus it is exceedingly doubtful that the balance of payments position of the Union of South Africa itself could be adjusted to justify intensification of discriminatory restrictions.

Although South Africa does not participate in the sterling area dollar pool, acceptance of an intensification of discrimination against the dollar area in this case would imply acceptance of the theory that all countries in the sterling area are entitled to pursue a uniform policy to be justified on the balance of payments position of the area as a whole. The US has not found this theory acceptable in general and has objected particularly to its application to South Africa as a nonparticipant in the dollar pool.

Discrimination as a Means of Encouraging Capital Inflow.—The flow of sterling capital to South Africa has been quite irregular since the war, and at times has contained large components of flight capital. Although further study of the situation is required it seems probable that the capital flow of recent months has been associated with long-range investments for the most part.

There has always been a question as to the propriety of the U.K. permitting unrestricted movements of capital to other sterling area countries at a time when it is receiving financial aid from the United States. The U.S. has previously contended that South Africa should obtain its legitimate capital requirements in the dollar area, and has felt that the necessary financing could be secured in New York, although, admittedly, the terms might be less advantageous.

The acceptance of the South African-United Kingdom argument would represent the acceptance of a principle which might have far-reaching results in U.S. trade and financial policy. If countries are able to discriminate by their control of capital movements we have a wide-open door to discriminatory methods having no necessary connection with balance of payments considerations.

Discrimination in favor of EPU.—It is not clear from the South African memorandum quite how imports from European countries will be handled. Presumably, countries in the European Payments Union will be allowed to bid both for the general and universal permits, and for the restricted permits on which dollar area suppliers may not bid. If this is true and if the South Africans are prepared to meet deficits with EPU countries in gold and dollars to the extent gold and dollars are required in British settlements with EPU, a further element of discrimination arises. If the United Kingdom should have a deficit with EPU in April of the same size that it incurred in March, the full quota would be reached and thereafter, until the position were reversed, deficits would have to be settled on a 100 percent gold basis. In this situation there could be no financial advantage to the Union of South Africa in buying goods from the European Continent which it would not buy from the dollar area. Even with sterling-area EPU settlement in the 60 percent or 80 percent brackets, the advantage to be gained is hardly sufficient to justify the same degree of discrimination as exists in the transactions in trade with the U.K.

Conclusions

The measures proposed in the South African memorandum involve a continuation of an unsatisfactory import policy amended to favor the sterling area on a more discriminatory basis than that which prevailed in 1951. The discriminatory element in the 1951 system had as its purpose the maintenance of an inflow of sterling capital. The additional discriminatory element now proposed has placed special emphasis on assistance to the United Kingdom. Viewing the proposals in these terms, the US could come to the conclusion that it should object to the South African proposals.

On the other hand it is noted that South Africa has shown some recognition of its responsibility, as a member of the Fund and a Contracting Party to the GATT, not to formulate trade policies in disregard of the interests of the US and other hard currency countries. It has made that plain by underlining its expectations that the new measures will operate to allow hard currency countries a percentage share of the South African market at least as favorable as that in 1951, that if necessary to achieve these expectations it will reduce its monetary reserves by $28 million, and that the added elements of discrimination in its import control system will be temporary. Consequently, it is not possible to predict how much of an intensification of discrimination will actually result therefrom. Moreover, these measures are put forward at a time when the currency balance-of-payments position of the U.K. and the level of gold and dollar reserves in London are significantly less favorable than they were in 1950 when the previous South African measures were considered.

Since it is anticipated that the sterling area issue[4] will come to the fore in connection with the forthcoming IMF consultations as well as in the GATT forum, it would seem most appropriate for the U.S. not to take a firm position at the present time but to reserve its freedom of action to the greatest extent possible.

Accordingly, the answer to the South African *aide-mémoire* might include the following major points:

(*a*) The U.S. appreciates the opportunity which has been given it to examine the proposed submission to the Contracting Parties to the GATT.

(*b*) The measures which South Africa proposes to take raise serious questions of principle for the U.S., particularly in terms of their consistency with the Fund and GATT, although the U.S. has noted particularly both the effort South Africa has made to mitigate the impact of the measures on hard currency countries and the fact that these measures are to be of a temporary, emergency character.

(*c*) The United States wishes to make a thorough examination of the problem and cannot comment further at this time. The United States notes that the matter will be considered in the Fund and the GATT some months hence and must reserve its rights in the matter. In its examination of the problem the United States will give careful consideration to the points raised by South Africa.[5]

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[4] For additional documentation on this subject, see volume I.

[5] On May 9, 1952, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Willard L. Thorp, handed Ambassador Jooste a note containing the above-mentioned points. Jooste said that his government would be disappointed over U.S. failure to indicate what position it would take on this subject. (Telegram 239 to Capetown, May 9, 1952; 394.31/4-2152)

411.45A9/5–1352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa, at Capetown

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 21, 1952—6:03 p. m.

251. Concur you see PriMin (Embtel 89).[1] Consensus Dept and defense agencies that dipl representations not likely move SoAfr Govt and we cannot rely on good will to obtain manganese and chrome we need. Urinfo only, US needs minimum 350,000 tons manganese and 250,000 tons chrome in 1952 and probably 1953 just to avoid cutback in production with nothing for stockpile.

Propose you approach PriMin and Dept simultaneously call in SoAfr Amb. We wld state forthwith our need for 500,000 tons manganese and 300,000 tons chrome and ask what SoAfr needs to undertake to move this tonnage for US. We recognize we are asking them to place further burden on railway system. Our request however is for special assistance in light of our common defense effort for short run emergency only. If SoAfr unwilling commit itself to large tonnage in future, US will endeavor develop supplies elsewhere but cannot reasonably replace SoAfr tonnage in short time. (See Dept A–87, Feb 16)[2] By 1955 US cld be in position to meet its needs without large scale shipments from SoAfr. We consider it in interest of both countries, however, that US continue to import substantial quantities of manganese and chrome from there. MTG our urgent requirements now wld not affect SoAfr long range conservation program. US Govt not unltd in what it can do help SoAfr but willing consider reasonable requests by Union.

Believe here ans of Sauer and Louw part of same stalling tactics SoAfr has followed for some time. There are some hints from both govt and private sources (including Sacco of Associated Manganese Mines who does not wish to be quoted) that SoAfr really has in mind *quid pro quo* of materials and loans. These rumors not taken at face value but belief here matter shld be brought to a head.

Dept has been unable develop special inducements thought likely to appeal because we have no idea what they want. Purpose is to open way for SoAfr Govt to state desiderata. Among things U.S. can consider are (*a*) assistance in supply of materials and if necessary, (*b*) loans of reasonable size for modernizing or for other specific projects.

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[1] Not printed. In this telegram, the Embassy reported that the Union's Minister of Transportation, Paul O. Sauer, had informed the Embassy in writing that the Union Government had decided to restrict the export of manganese to 500,000 tons annually for all destinations. Ambassador Gallman then reminded the Union's Minister of Commerce, Louw, that the United States had estimated its needs for South Africa manganese during 1952 at 750,000 long tons. Gallman proposed to the Department of State that he next broach the subject with the Union's Prime Minister. (411.45A9/5–1352)

[2] Not printed.

Re (*a*) U.S. not willing exceed IMC allocations. re (*b*) SoAfr must apply to Eximbank and present full details to justify loan. Essential you limit discussions to obtaining info, without making any type of commitment. FYI, IBRD loans cannot be used in this manner since it is internatl institution.

No attempt here to place pressure on SoAfr. Pending licenses in U.S. to be processed as usual. Intend request be made in atmosphere mutual self help.

Request ur views soonest so coordinated approach can be arranged.

ACHESON

745A.00/6–1152

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 11, 1952.

Subject: Constitutional crisis and possible internal disorders in the Union of South Africa.

Discussion:

The Nationalist Government of Dr. Malan, which came to power on the color issue, in 1948, appears to be firmly in the saddle. Most political prophets are of the opinion that it will be returned to office in the next general election to be held within the next twelve months. The Opposition lacks effective leadership since the death of Smuts[2] and has been consistently outmaneuvered by Dr. Malan and company.

In recent months, however, racial tension has increased at such a rate, primarily because of the Government's heavy-handed *apartheid* policies, as to raise the possibility of serious disorders within the next few years. An increase of crime among the natives (Africans) and a growing disrespect for the police and the authority of the European are symptomatic of the deterioration in race relations.

In the past there has been no unity between the eight million natives, one million coloreds, and 300,000 Indians. There is still no unity in general, but the leaders of these several non-European groups are being forced to make common cause because of the Government's stubborn attack on the few rights which they possess. The most recent example is the Government's decision to deprive the relatively few colored voters (50,000), of their right to vote with whites in the Cape Province.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Shullaw (BNA) and Musedorah Thoreson (BNA).

A note, from Perkins to Lucius Battle, attached to this memorandum read: "I don't know if the Secretary wants to take the attached up while he is in London. However, I do think that the situation is disturbing and if the Secretary has not been following it he ought to know something of our worries about South Africa." Below this message is a handwritten notation, presumably by Battle, which reads: "as far as I know this was never discussed." Secretary Acheson visited London between June 23 and 28, 1952 for talks with the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom. For a description of Acheson's trip to London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rio de Janeiro, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1544 ff.

[2] Jan Christiaan Smuts, former Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa and leader of the United Party.

At the same time, the Malan Government's attack on the constitution in the case of the legislation on colored voters and its refusal to accept the verdict of the High Court that it had acted in an unparliamentary manner in passing this legislation has sharpened the racial cleavage between English speaking and Afrikaans speaking South Africans. The English element fears that Malan and his Government are heading in the direction of an Afrikaner Republic in which its interests would be subordinated to those of the Afrikaners. This fear led the Natal Provincial Council on June 5 to pass a resolution calling upon the Union Government to convene a constitutional convention to reaffirm the Act of Union and entrench all rights contained therein. There has been considerable talk in Natal, which is predominantly English-speaking, about secession from the Union. Responsible opinion, however, opposes such talk as unrealistic.

There is little prospect of the United Party, which largely represents the English group, attempting to do anything except by Parliamentary means to defend its interests. The Torch Commando, however, is another matter. This organization, founded about a year ago by war veterans, is militant and while unarmed is a potential but not immediate threat to the internal security of the country, if the Government further exacerbates relations between the white sections of the population. The foregoing statement is based on reports from our military attaché that 75% of the Union Defense Force belongs to the Torch Commando. The commandos belonging to the UDF would have access to arms. Government interference in the Defense Forces in the form of preference for Afrikaners over English South Africans has lowered morale in the forces and increased the appeal of such an organization as the Torch Commando.

The Skiet Commandos are civilians, farmers for the most part, organized primarily for internal security. They are sold rifles and ammunition at a discount and are supposed to have periodic target practice. Although they are an ineffective military force, they number 80,000 of which 40 to 50 thousand are ardent young Nationalists. The danger is that these young Nationalists might clash with the young Torch Commandos if the situation should get out of the hands of the more circumspect elements.

Our military attaché at Pretoria has previously reported that the present constitutional crisis in South Africa contains no threat to internal security. He has now altered his view and suggests that internal security is threatened. He adds in his report that, if serious trouble comes, it will probably not be earlier than six months from now:

Any serious disturbances in South Africa could have a direct bearing on our ability to get manganese, chrome, and uranium. It would also have a damaging effect on Commonwealth relations and present great difficulties to us in our relations with South Africa. The future course of developments in South Africa is unpredictable. It is clear, however, that the situation is disturbing and that South Africa is heading for serious trouble.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that during your conversations with Mr. Eden[3] you

(1) Express our growing concern over increased racial tensions in South Africa which have resulted from the extreme measures taken by the Government;

(2) Inquire regarding the British estimate of the situation;

(3) Ask Mr. Eden whether he thinks there is any effective action the United Kingdom or the United States can or should take to bring about a moderation of present South African policies.

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[3] Sir Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

394.31/6–1352 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL CAPETOWN, June 13, 1952—noon.

117. Birch had long unsolicited luncheon talk yesterday with De Waal Meyer, Secy Commerce and Industries, on Union's proposal aid UK within framework GATT (Deptel 239, May 9, 1952 and related NAC documents).[1] De Waal Meyer noted for frankness but used so little restraint in criticizing GATT and failure US express immediate support Union proposals, obvious he wished careful note made his remarks. Fol summarizes his more important observations:

(1) Union greatly disappointed US note May 9 to Jooste. It stated nothing and left matter up in air.

(2) If aid Brit proposed by Union fails secure GATT acceptance, Louw and Havenga[2] prepared recommend to Cabinet Union's withdrawal from GATT. Recognize action wld offend other members, but certain Cabinet wld approve this course if recommended.

(3) Union tired of playing role of internat whipping boy and out of patience "certain members" US delegations who approached GATT on doctrinaire legal basis and completely lost sight fundamental purpose to retain GATT as flexible instrument. US shld take strong lead in supporting Union's current proposal aid Brit in econ crisis and summarily silence dissident voices within US delegation. This wld

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[1] None printed, but see footnote 5, p. 916.

[2] Nicolaas Christiaan Havenga, Deputy Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

take wind out of sails other GATT delegations which delight in attacking So Africa on slightest provocation.

(4) Union was by far foremost in discharging letter and spirit of GATT obligations and had exercised great patience in meeting detailed requirements and constant criticism its trade practices.

De Waal Meyer delivered foregoing in friendly manner and stressed he believed in plain talk. Birch countered with statement US appreciated opportunity examine Union proposals, as mentioned Dept's note May 9, 1952, and observed De Waal Meyer had no reason assume in advance of indication our final position that US wld be hostile Union's viewpoint. He also mentioned matter was under careful study and complexity problem in relation GATT necessarily entailed some further delay in formulating position on implications So African proposal.

De Waal Meyer is one of our best sources of info. He is invariably frank with us. We know the Dept will keep this in mind in dealing with his remarks on Union Govt's attitude toward GATT.

GALLMAN

445A.119/6–2152 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

SECRET PRETORIA, June 21, 1952—noon.

225. Have just recd from Forsyth, Secretary External Affairs,[1] secret note on manganese and chrome in reply *aide-mémoire* left with Prime Minister June 5[2] (Emb 108 June 5, Dept's 254, June 10 and Emb's 114, June 11)[3] . . .:

. . . .

In *aide-mémoire* June 5 no offer was made provide railroad equipment. I merely inquired what Union Govt might need in way railway equipment and supplies to move minimum amount manganese and chrome we look to South Africa for.

In final paragraph my *aide-mémoire* June 5 I stated in substance that in making our minimum needs known I wanted at same time to point out that US Govt does not have unlimited means at its disposal assist South Africa but was willing consider reasonable requests.

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[1] Douglas D. Forsyth, Secretary for External Affairs, Union of South Africa.

[2] Not printed. The United States *aide-mémoire* of June 5, 1952 informed the Union Government that, in order to carry out its defense program, the U.S. Government would require an "absolute minimum" of 500,000 long tons of manganese and 300,000 long tons of chrome from the Union of South Africa during 1952. The U.S. Government asked the Union Government what South Africa would need in the way of supplies and equipment to undertake to transport these required amounts. The *aide-mémoire* emphasized that the request "is one for special assistance in carrying out our common defense effort" and that the supplies were "urgently needed." (Despatch 158 from Capetown, June 5, 1952; 411.45A9/6–552)

[3] None printed. (411.45A9)

There are two favorable aspects, as I see it, Union Govt reply. Prospect it held out for first time that we get definite tonnage commitment from Union Govt and prospect that our minimum requirements will be met for 1952 and 1953. Any acknowledgement we make of understanding that annual export 500,000 tons can not go beyond 1953 shld of course be worded such way that door wld be left open for later review situation. This might be done by expressing hope that outlook for peace by 1954 will be brighter than today.

It is customary Prime Minister and members Cabinet take several weeks vacation after close Parliamentary session and before returning Pretoria. Consequently, personal interviews out of question. Dept's reply,[4] particularly to issues appearing paragraphs 6 and 8 above, will therefore have to be passed on by me to External Affairs but in doing so I wld request that Prime Minister and responsible Ministers be promptly informed wherever they may be.[5]

Text note from External Affairs being forwarded by air.[6]

GALLMAN

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[4] The Department's reply noted that the general belief within the Department of State was that the Union Government's reply was favorable and that Ambassador Gallman should convey to the Ministry of External Affairs U.S. appreciation for the reply. The Department agreed with Gallman that any acknowledgement of the 500,000 ton level for manganese should be worded in such a way "that door left open for later review situation." Gallman was also instructed to convey to the Union Government U.S. assurances that efforts to develop alternate supplies would continue, but to couple this with the hope that South Africa would continue to accord the U.S. liberal treatment in access to supplies as "world supply situation and their economy permit." The Department also maintained that it would be impossible to give assurances that all South African manganese would be used for defense purposes. It was also to be explained to the Union Government that the U.S. steel industry was key to the U.S. defense effort and that "all minerals used cld probably appropriately be classified as for defense, defense supporting, or for essential needs for own civilian economy and that of the free world." The Department informed the Embassy, for its own information, that part of the manganese was destined for the United States stockpile. (Telegram 272 to Pretoria, June 27, 1952; 445A.119/6–2152)

[5] Ambassador Gallman and Secretary Forsyth later agreed to a compromise statement under which the United States affirmed that its steel industry constituted the keystone of its defense effort and that defense and defense-supporting needs had first priority. (Telegram 4 from Pretoria, July 3, 1952; 411.45A9/7–352 and telegram 8 to Pretoria, July 8, 1952; 411.45A9/7–352)

[6] Despatch 529 from Pretoria, June 21, 1952; 411.45A9/6–2152.

Editorial Note

On June 24, 1952, Acting Secretary of State David K. E. Bruce and Ambassador Jooste of the Union of South Africa signed an agreement concerning participation of Union of South Africa forces in the United Nations operation in Korea. A briefing memorandum prepared by the Legal Adviser's office for the Acting Secretary described the agreement as follows:

"Under the agreement the United States agrees to furnish the South African forces with needed materials, supplies, services, and facilities which South Africa is unable to furnish. Reimbursement for such materials, supplies, services, and facilities will be accomplished by South Africa upon presentation of statements of accounts by the United States and will be effected in U.S. dollars. Other provisions of the agreement pertain to classified items, specialized items, or items in short supply which will be returned to the United States upon request, the waiver of claims, the furnishing of Korean currency to the South African forces, and the acceptance and carrying out of directives and policies of the Commander of the UN forces in Korea." (795.5/5–2752)

Text of agreement is in *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 3 (pt. 3), pages 3990–3992.

745A.00/7–1152

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor) to R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1952.

SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL SITUATION

I refer to your memorandum of July 11[2] stating that the Atomic Energy Commission has asked the Department for a statement whether the political disturbances in South Africa might affect our uranium ore procurement program in that area.

Tension has been growing in South Africa since controversy has arisen between the two white factions in the country over the interpretation of certain clauses in the South Africa Act.[3] The division in the white population has augmented the unrest already demonstrated by the non-white population following the enactment of certain legislation designed by the government to implement its policy of separation of the races. The fact that a General Election has been scheduled for May 1953 has added pre-election fever to the already tense situation.

It is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy the turn of events which might occur in South Africa during the next few years. Our military attaché in the Union is of the opinion that internal security has been threatened by the division in the ranks of the white population over the constitutional issue. The greatest danger appears to lie in the possibility of clashes between the youth elements of the

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Thoreson (BNA).

[2] Not printed. (745A.00/7–1152)

[3] Reference is to the constitution of the Union of South Africa, adopted in 1909.

Torch Commando (anti-government) and of the Skiet Commando (pro-government). At political rallies so far, however, the Torch Commando has exercised planned restraint to avoid open clashes which might have serious consequences. In addition, there have been no serious consequences arising from the mass defiance campaign by the non-whites on June 6.

If the situation thus remains controlled, the danger of a threat to internal security will be considerably lessened. The South African police force is an effective unit which, it is believed, will be able to control any disturbances unless civil war should break out. While such eventuality cannot at this time be completely discounted, it is an improbability.

In summary, as far as can be foreseen at present, it is unlikely that the political disturbances in the Union of South Africa will affect our uranium ore procurement program in that area.

We believe this statement is consistent with the views held by Ambassador Gallman as we interpret and evaluate his reports. In view of the importance of the question, however, we are sending a copy by air to the Ambassador asking for his comments.[4] I suggest in forwarding this to the Atomic Energy Commission you point out that, if the Ambassador currently feels any of this should be modified or changed, we will advise further.

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[4] On July 30, 1952, Ambassador Gallman, in a letter to Thoreson, confirmed that "the memorandum of July 18 in my opinion is an accurate and sound summary statement of the situation as it exists today." (745A.00/7-1152)

Editorial Note

On September 8, 1952 the Indian Alternate Representative to the United Nations, Rajeshwar Dayal, informed an officer of the United States Mission to the United Nations that the Government of India within the coming week intended to propose that the matter of racial conflict in the Union of South Africa be inscribed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. Dayal explained that the racial situation in South Africa was different from that in the southern United States. The United States, according to the Indian diplomat, was sincerely striving to solve the problem and each year showed some progress; but in the Union of South Africa the Afrikaners, who dominated the country, had no desire to solve the problem and only aggravated it. When the United States diplomat suggested that the inclusion of such an item might clearly contravene Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, which excluded United Nations intervention in matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state", Dayal replied that his government envisioned this item as merely a continuation of the item previously considered by the General Assembly, which concerned the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. India was now expanding consideration to include Negroes. When the United States diplomat, speaking personally, speculated that the introduction of this new item might increase the possibility of the Union of South Africa withdrawing from the United Nations, Dayal said that he did not expect the Union Government to withdraw, but considered it a risk which he and his associates were willing to take. (Telegram 223 from New York, September 9, 1952; 745X.00/9-952)

845A.411/12-1252

The Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor) to the Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1952.

DEAR WALDY: I mentioned this matter to Sappington [1] the other day but this letter should reach you well ahead of his arrival.

You undoubtedly noted the press reports that the Indians intend to raise at the General Assembly this fall another item bearing on South Africa entitled "Malanism" which, as far as we can gather, they intend as an item which would bring about a full discussion and I suppose result in their opinion in some form of censure by the Assembly of the racial policies being pursued in the Union of South Africa. I would very much like your judgment as to your feeling of what the impact of this action may be on the question of South African relations or, in fact, membership in the UN. As you know, I have long held the feeling myself that their talk about withdrawal, etc., was not by any means pure bluff. I have the feeling that this new subject, if accepted by the Assembly for discussion, may well be the straw which would break the camel's back and at a minimum result in a complete boycott of this session of the Assembly or that it might even result in South Africa's withdrawal from the organization. Either would be bad and the latter alternative, of course, would be very serious indeed.

In addition to your own personal opinion I hope very much that you will have the Embassy report in detail reactions in the Union as they develop. So far the South African Embassy here has not mentioned this question to us and I have not raised it with Jooste. You have seen, however, the memorandum of conversation between Ben Gerig and

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[1] James C. Sappington, III, First Secretary of the Embassy at Pretoria.

Jooste re Southwest Africa.[2] As is always the case in this type of problem in the Assembly, it will be very difficult to take a position which would appear in any way to be in support of South Africa.

Of course, no one here would even think of attempting to defend the racial policies. On the other hand, there are constitutional grounds such as the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter which could be invoked although the chances of majority support for this in the General Assembly probably are not great. The Eur tentative position is that the Assembly should refer the competence issue to the International Court for an advisory opinion. We would probably have no allies in or out of the Department for this position. I hope, therefore, if the facts warrant it that you will "pull no punches" in reporting South African attitudes and reaction on this.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours, HAYDEN RAYNOR

P.S. Your telegram 63 has just come to hand and I see Forsyth's comment[3] is very much along the line of what I feared the South African reaction might be.

I hear you are coming to Washington shortly and will look forward to discussing this whole matter with you.

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[2] Not printed. Ambassador Jooste informed Benjamin Gerig, the Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, that the South African Government had directed Jooste to confer with the UN *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa and that Jooste was prepared to go "somewhat farther" than he had previously. Jooste said, however, that due to the forthcoming elections in the Union of South Africa, his aim would be to "keep the door open", and that most likely the Committee would be unable to make a definite report to the General Assembly. Gerig and Jooste tended to agree that during the forthcoming General Assembly session it might be preferable for the Committee to consider standing on the terms of the existing mandate for South West Africa. (Memorandum of conversation by Gerig, Aug. 20, 1952; 745X.00/8–2052)

[3] Sept. 11, 1952, not printed. Forsyth told Gallman that if the Arab-Asian group introduced the subject of the passive resistance campaign within South Africa, which was a purely domestic matter, this would open the door to a "first class fight." And if the group received any encouragement, serious consequences would follow. Forsyth was convinced that South Africa would then seriously consider withdrawing from the United Nations. On South West Africa, Forsyth said that he did not think that Jooste's proposal to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa would get very far. (745A.00/9–1152)

Jooste's proposal, made first on Sept. 8, 1952 and then in greater detail on Sept. 23, called for a revival of the "sacred trust", which was the essence of the League of Nations mandate and for a revival of South Africa's international responsibility for that trust by accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with regard to the administration of South West Africa. To that end, the Union Government suggested that a new instrument should be concluded and proposed the three remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers on World War I—namely, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as the other party to the instrument. Jooste reminded the Committee that, despite the ICJ opinion of 1950, his government still maintained that the Mandate for South West Africa had lapsed with the League of Nations and that South Africa, therefore, no longer had any international responsibility with regard to the administration of South West Africa. (Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa to the General Assembly, Nov. 21, 1952, UN document A/2261)

Editorial Note

On September 12, 1952, the Delegations of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen requested that the question of race conflict in the Union of South Africa, resulting from the policies of *apartheid*, be placed on the agenda of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly. An explanatory memorandum stated that "the race conflict in the Union of South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the South African Government is creating a dangerous and explosive situation, which constitutes both a threat to international peace and a flagrant violation of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations." The memorandum listed the various legislative measures, adopted by the South African Government, which had the declared objective of securing a permanent white superiority over the nonwhite peoples who constituted a majority of the population. It affirmed that the policy of *apartheid* challenged what the United Nations stood for and violated specific recommendations adopted by the General Assembly. (UN document A/2183)

745A.00/9–1252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa, at Pretoria

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 12, 1952—7:06 p. m.
NIACT

38. For Ambassador. FYI Secy has appointment with Havenga Tues.[1] SoAfr Emb reports Havenga call courtesy only. Secy, however, being briefed on possible subjs Havenga might raise. Also recommending to Secy that he give Havenga pat on back for SoAfr Korean effort and reaffirm jets will be made available before end of year.[2] Also recommending to Secy that he take initiative in expressing concern re SoAfr's unhappy position in UN pointing out public opinion this country makes it increasingly difficult US maintain moderate position it has assumed in past and importance in general interest free world of not alienating Asian opinion. Point wld be included that if SoAfr cld assume more accommodating position on some single issue such as Southwest, in our view this wld have some moderating effect on attacks they regularly receive on other questions. End FYI.

Your comments on above requested. In addition, Dept considering wisdom Secy in some way mentioning desirability of moderation re

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[1] Sept. 16.

[2] Documentation on this subject is located in file 745A.5622. See also the summation of developments contained in the briefing memorandum prepared for Havenga's visit, *infra*.

SoAfr domestic policies. Dept recognizes fully extreme delicacy this question and with most SoAfrs wld not consider Secy mentioning subj. In view Havenga's past record, however, tentatively feel might be possible do so with him, pegging any comment made on investment angle. If suitable opportunity arose under this procedure Secy cld say that he felt Havenga shld know that Dept receiving indications that certain Amer companies which might otherwise desire make important investments SoAfr seem to be hesitating because of apprehension their part as to future stability in Union in view policies now being pursued. Your views urgently desired re (*a*) desirability touching on this subj at all (*b*) as to wisdom this as against alternative pegs on which to hang it.

Reply to be useful shld arrive by Mon morning Wash time.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] On Sept. 15, 1952, Ambassador Gallman informed the Department that he "fully support[ed] all recommendations outlined first para Dept's telegram." In regard to the South West Africa question, Gallman stated that in talks with South African officials he had suggested that they adopt a "practical attitude", that the matter of the Union's administrative control of South West Africa was not being questioned or threatened by a foreign source, and that the Union Government could well afford to make periodic administrative reports to the United Nations. Gallman also noted that during his recent visit to South West Africa, business and professional men spoke of the area as "our country", that is, as something quite distinct from the Union of South Africa. Finally, Gallman cautioned against touching on the Union's domestic politics directly with Havenga, as while Havenga was "quite broad and liberal", he was also "a sensitive Afrikaner and a loyal member of Malan's govt." Comment in this area, Gallman advised, should be limited to the impact which the current trend in South Africa (i.e. its racial policies) had on investment plans of American companies. (Telegram 65 from Pretoria, Sept. 15, 1952; 745A.00/9–1552)

611.45A/9–1652

Memorandum by Armistead M. Lee and Musedorah Thoreson of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 16, 1952.

SUMMARY OF CURRENT UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEMS

UN Problems

South West Africa. The question of the international status of South West Africa has been before the General Assembly since 1946.[2] South

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[1] This memorandum was prepared to brief Secretary Acheson prior to the visit of Deputy Prime Minister Havenga. A note attached to the memorandum, from Jeffrey C. Kitchens, Assistant Chief, Policy Reports Staff read: "Mr. Secretary, This is additional background for conversations with Havenga. Not necessary before 2:30 meeting, but probably useful before dinner." Both the note and attached memorandum are marked "Sec. Saw."

[2] South West Africa, once a German colony, was placed under the administration of the Union of South Africa as a League of Nations mandate following World War I. In 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, and 1951, the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions stating the opinion that South West Africa should be placed under the International Trusteeship System, and that a Trusteeship Agreement should be submitted concerning the Territory.

Africa has refused to submit the mandate to trusteeship, and in 1947, discontinued submitting reports on the territory after a report was the subject of much vituperative comment. We supported the GA request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. The ICJ advised that it was not obligatory for South Africa to submit South West Africa to trusteeship, but that it should continue to administer the territory in the spirit of the mandate, including the submission of reports to the GA.[3] An *Ad Hoc* Committee was established to negotiate with South Africa on the question. The Union has not accepted the ICJ opinion, having taken the position that UN membership is much broader than the League of Nations and as such is not competent to pass judgment on its administration of the territory. It has offered to follow what it considers to be the spirit of the mandate by submitting reports to the three remaining Principal and Allied Powers. This has not been acceptable to the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The *Ad Hoc* Committee is now in session. Ambassador Jooste has been designated to negotiate with the Committee. He apparently believes that little constructive can be accomplished this year, in as much as this is election year in South Africa. He believes, however, that if the door is not shut, it may be possible subsequently to proceed toward a solution of the problem.

Our position on this question is that it would be desirable for South Africa to submit South West Africa to trusteeship, but that failing such action, it should carry out the ICJ opinion.

People of Indian Origin in South Africa. This item was placed on the agenda by India in 1946 and, except for 1947, has been on the agenda at every session.

The lack of franchise appears to be the underlying grievance of the South African Indians. There is reason to believe that the moderate Indian National Organization group would accept a limited franchise, but the larger Indian Congress would not accept less than complete franchise. In addition, the Group Areas Act, if put into effect, will mean that the Indians of Natal will be moved into an area reserved for them only and will cause severe hardship to those now operating businesses and professions in other areas. Indians are already subject to other *apartheid* laws.

The GA has passed resolutions each year urging the parties to negotiate their differences. South Africa has professed a willingness to negotiate directly, but not within the terms of reference of the UN resolutions, since they consider the entire problem, including the Group Areas Act,[4] a domestic question. India and Pakistan are not willing to negotiate on this basis, and the matter remains deadlocked.

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[3] The International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued this advisory opinion on July 11, 1950.

[4] The Group Areas Act, adopted by the Union Parliament in June 1950, established machinery for the segregation of the races by residence, occupation, and trade.

The U.S. position on this question has been to try to be a moderating influence to avoid the adoption of a severely condemnatory resolution.

The New Indian Item Condemning Apartheid. Without first discussing their plan with the U.S. or the U.K., the Indian Government announced their intention of raising in the GA the general issue of *apartheid* in South Africa (as a separate item in addition to the pending question of the treatment of persons of Indian origin). They have gained the support of the Arab-Asian caucus and have now circulated an *aide-mémoire* announcing their intention to ask the Assembly to

> "(*a*) take note of the passive resistance movement as an effort on the part of the victims of *apartheid* to end a system which is a threat to peace;
>
> (*b*) express strong disapproval of the policies which have caused the movement to be launched; and
>
> (*c*) recommend to the South African Government that, in the interests of peace, their racial policies be revised, in accordance with the principles of the Charter."

We have not yet reached agreement within the Department as to what position our delegation should take on this item.

Other Problems

Jet Aircraft for South African Squadron in Korea.[5] Having been unable to obtain jets for the South African squadron (which has served in Korea since September 1950 as part of a U.S. fighter wing), the South African Government told us last February that they would have to withdraw the squadron. They yielded, however, to our urging that they delay this step, and we were finally able, this summer, to give them a firm commitment that the squadron would be converted to jets at the same time the U.S. squadrons still flying Mustangs were converted, during the last quarter. The South Africans thereupon decided not to withdraw their squadron.

Proposed Visit of Minister of Defense Erasmus[6] *to Korea.* The Department was informed in August that Minister of Defense would like to go to Korea this fall to visit the South African squadron, now that arrangements were being made to supply it with jets, if such a visit would be convenient. The inquiry was transmitted to Defense, who sent a message to General Clark's[7] headquarters. A telegram was received from Tokyo by Defense on September 15 approving the visit.

U.S. Manganese Requirements from South Africa. The U.S. urgently needs increased supplies of manganese from South Africa to compensate for supplies formerly received from the USSR. South African

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[5] Documentation on this subject is located in file 745A.5622.

[6] Francois Christiaan Erasmus, Minister of Defense.

[7] Gen. Mark W. Clark, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief United Nations Command, Far East.

Exports have been decreasing for the past year because of transportation difficulties and the desire of the South Africans to conserve supplies for its own steel industry. Ambassador Gallman made representations to the Prime Minister, following unsuccessful attempts to obtain commitments from other Cabinet Ministers, to obtain assurances of a continued flow of manganese at an annual rate of 500,000 tons at least through 1953. A commitment has been received that South Africa will endeavor to export up to 500,000 tons to the U.S. but it was pointed out that the U.K. is pressing for an increse in manganese supplies also. We are endeavoring to work out a joint approach to the problem with the British but no solution has yet been reached.

Manganese is essential to all steel production, and South Africa is our second most important supplier. We have stressed to South Africa the importance to the defense effort of the free world of our obtaining our essential requirements.

South African Discrimination Against Hard Currency Countries.[8] South Africa has maintained exchange and import controls for balance of payments reasons since 1948. The controls have been applied with varying degrees of intensity against hard currency areas in order to ensure the accrual to the U.K. of a certain amount of South African gold in return for the U.K.'s assurance that capital exports to the Union would not be restricted, and that the U.K. will continue to purchase such non-essentials as wine and fruit. South Africa is not a member of the sterling area dollar pool.

Under both the IMF and GATT, exceptions are made for discrimination only for balance of payments reasons, except in certain specified circumstances which do not apply in this case. The U.S. view has been that although South Africa's balance of payments position may justify over-all restrictions, there is considerable doubt as to the justifiability of discriminatory restrictions in view of South Africa's gold production of approximately £140,000,000 annually. This point has been made clear to the South Africans but has not been pressed because it was felt that the last few years have not been appropriate to challenge various sterling area arrangements.

South Africa has announced that it will be necessary to intensify restrictions against hard currency countries in 1952 further to assist the sterling area during the present financial crisis. This brings into prominence questions of policy regarding our position with regard to the sterling area, e.g., (1) is discrimination justified as a means of maintaining or encouraging a flow of capital? (2) should sterling area countries be required to justify their actions on the basis of the balance of payments position of each individual country, or should the balance of payments position of the sterling area as a whole be the determining factor? (3) is the Union of South Africa justified in discriminating in favor of members of the European Payments Union, as against the dollar area, when it is meeting a substantial percentage of that deficit in gold or dollars.

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[8] Documentation on this subject can be found in files 445A.116 and 845A.10.

When consultations on the South African restrictions came before the IMF in August, the U.S. position was that this is not a propitious time to raise these questions even though they involve principles to which we are firmly committed. The U.S. Executive Director on the Fund, therefore, requested an indefinite postponement of the South African case. The Canadians supported the request, which was agreed to. It is doubtful, however, that the issue can be postponed for long.

Uranium Production Commencing This Month.

The first of several extraction plants, designed to obtain uranium oxide from the residue of gold mines, is coming into production this month at the West Rand Consolidated Mine at Krugersdorp. These plants have been erected with the assistance of a $35,000,000 Export-Import Bank loan guaranteed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, which was granted last year to six South African Gold mines. Although the uranium content of the gold-bearing ores is relatively low, the vast quantity of ore treated at the gold mines makes the extraction of uranium oxide from the mine tailings a feasible proposition, and South Africa is expected to be one of our major sources of supply. An additional $20,000,000 has just been authorized by the Ex-Im Bank to the Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa, for the construction of power plants needed to supply the requirements of the uranium extraction plants.

[Annex]

Memorandum by Musedorah Thoreson of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs

SECRET

CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA[9]

South Africa's capital requirements during the last decade have increased sharply and will continue to be heavy for years to come. South Africa relies strongly on external capital, and it is estimated that approximately £70,000,000 annually will be required from overseas during the next few years. The South African Government has already resorted to extensive borrowings, not only in its traditional market, the United Kingdom, but also, for the first time in its history, in the United States and Switzerland. Private investments also have attempted to attract foreign capital participation either in equity or portfolio form.

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[9] Documentation on this subject is located in file 811.05145A.

On numerous occasions both Government and private interests have stressed the desirability of expanded capital inflow for investment from the United States. The Government has given assurances that remittances of earned profits, dividends, or interest or the repatriation of the original capital investment will be freely permitted. The value of American owned assets in the Union increased from $86,600,000 to $150,000,000 in 1950. Since 1950 there has been substantial investment from the United States; e.g., the Export Import Bank has made loans totaling approximately $55,000,000 during the past two years in connection with erection of uranium production plants; Socony-Vacuum in 1951 began construction of a refinery at Durban, Natal, which will cost around $14,000,000; Kennecott Copper has invested over $11,000,000 in gold mining operations in the new Orange Free State development. General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Nash, Studebaker, and other American automobile firms have established assembly plants in South Africa; Firestone, Goodyear, and General Tire and Rubber Company have plants in South Africa; and other American firms have manufacturing or assembly plants. Among a number of American firms planning to begin manufacturing in South Africa are International Business Machines, Frigidaire and Nash-Kelvinator. Bethlehem Steel has established an exploration company with a view to the erection of a steel mill in Southwest Africa if conditions warrant. The expanding economy of South Africa and the nearness to other African markets offer encouraging prospects for American investment.

During the last six months, however, reports of tension in the Union emanating from the white-black conflict and from the division in the ranks of the white population over the constitutional issue have resulted in a diminution of the enthusiasm of U.S. firms for South Africa. The Department has had several inquiries from important investors in the Union (Caterpillar Tractor, Socony Vacuum, and also the Atomic Energy Commission) for comment on the political situation in the Union as it might affect present or potential investment. The Department was also informed by an official of the Export Import Bank that, upon inquiring in New York as to possible private participation in loans under consideration to South Africa, the Bank was informed by several New York banks that they would not "touch" South Africa now.

Basically the South African economy is sound and, given a stable political situation, it seems likely that U.S. capital would flow freely to South Africa. This would be desirable not only commercially but from an international financial standpoint in that it would relieve South Africa's dependency upon dwindling United Kingdom capital and thereby contribute to the over-all sterling area balance of payments deficit.

Moderation of South African policies which would provide a more healthy social climate would do much to relieve present tension and would thus promote a more favorable climate for potential investment. South Africa's plans for continued expansion of mining, secondary industry, transport, soil conservation and irrigation, and agriculture will require enormous amounts of capital of which only a part can be raised in the Union. Thus, if economic development is to progress, it is imperative for the Union to be able to continue to obtain substantial capital from overseas. If the South African Government can be made to understand that there is a genuine hesitancy on the part of business to invest in a country in which political stability is being undermined by racial tensions are growing daily as the result of acts of the Government, it may be that this hard economic fact may have a sobering influence.

It may be that Mr. Havenga will point out that non-sterling capital inflow was the largest during the first six months of 1952 than it has ever been. (Swiss loans, £7 million; U.S. £11.6 million.) This represents drawings on loans previously made to the Government except for a £2 million made by Kennecott Copper to the Virginia Gold Mining Company in which Kennecott is already heavily interested.

745A.00/9–1552 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa, at Pretoria

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 19, 1952—6:21 p. m.

43. During courtesy call on Secy sixteenth [1] Havenga said he understood why it was impossible raise gold price now but was encouraged by trend and believed his view wld eventually prevail in view need for nations to increase monetary reserves. Expressed regret necessity SoAfr discrimination US trade in order insure Brit investment, supply SoAfr gold for UK and maintain Brit market for wine and fruit. Secy said we understood problem but cannot waive on matter of principle though we had not pressed issue. Havenga gratified Secy assurance early conversion jets SoAfr squadron.

At Emb dinner Secy told Havenga our concern re effect SoWest Afr issue upon Union's already strained relations in UN and expressed hope SoAfr cld make some concession. Havenga receptive and indicated intention use his influence this end. Secy also mentioned hesitancy US investors due uncertainty polit situation but Havenga unimpressed. Said he personally knew major US interests investing SoAfr and had reassured them on future stability. On basis your advice Embtel 65[2] no direct reference made SoAfr domestic crisis. Briefing papers and memo of conversations being airmailed.

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[1] Memorandum of conversation for this meeting (not printed) is located in Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 53 D 344.

ACHESON

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[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 928.

845A.411/9–1252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 29, 1952—5 : 18 p. m.

943. In response urtels 1086[2] and 1088[3] fol is Dept's preliminary thinking on SoAfr racial question submitted to GA:

1. We view this new question in context our gen pol on UN consideration charges of violation of human rights:

(*a*) Preamble of Charter, Art 1, para 3 and Arts 55 and 56 brought promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms within scope of Charter. On other hand, Art 2, para 7 prohibits UN intervention in matters essentially within domestic jurisdiction.

(*b*) Within wide limits rights of individual in relation to community in which he lives must be determined by his community. Normally, we must accept judgment of each community as to rights and freedoms of its citizens.

(*c*) However, in our view, Art 2, para 7 cld not be intended to put an absolute ban on consideration in UN of situations involving charges of governmental policy of systematic and widespread violations of provisions of Charter.

(*d*) Whether or not a specific measure by UN wld constitute technical intervention within meaning Article 2, it is matter of highest polit wisdom to proceed cautiously in this delicate field of human rights. At this stage of UN development, Assembly shld devote itself primarily to finding ways of composing differences and securing universal agreement on an acceptance of common standards of basic human rights. GA must exercise greatest care to refrain from making recommendations which might not only be ignored but may in fact create greater intransigence and aggravate position of individuals most deserving of our sympathy and assistance.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Pretoria and to New York.

[2] Evidently misnumbered. Telegram 1186 sent from New Delhi on Sept. 17, 1952 informed the Department that the Indian Ministry for External Affairs had requested a response to its *aide-mémoire*, as described in New Delhi 1088. (845A.411/9–1752)

[3] Not printed. In this telegram, Ambassador Chester Bowles, on Sept. 12, 1952, reported that he had received from the Indian Government an *aide-mémoire* conveying the Indian intention to propose that the current session of the UN General Assembly consider a resolution which recommended a change in South Africa's racial policy so as to conform to the UN Charter. The Indian Government intended to raise this matter independently from the question of Indians in South Africa, and it had urged the United States to support its position. Bowles "earnestly" hoped that the Department of State could associate itself with the Indian effort, as it would "mean much in strengthening US position [in] Asia [and] help convince doubters as to our basic views on racial discrimination." Bowles maintained that this issue was of "utmost importance to GOI" and he emphasized that India and other Asian nations viewed this General Assembly session as "indeed test of effectiveness of UN itself in providing a forum for non-Commie liberal viewpoint." (854A.411/9–1252)

2. US followed above gen policy in GA in case concerning treatment Inds in South Africa. When wave of indignation brought before UN mass persecutions of religious and polit groups in satellite countries we followed same gen policy. However while in Ind case GOI urged and obtained our support for its complaint, Ind rep in satellite case assumed attitude of detached silence throughout extensive debate in 3 GA sessions and abstained on every measure, however moderate, adopted by large majority of GA.

3. According to our present thinking US will vote for inclusion of new question on GA agenda. However considerable number UN membs take more conservative view as to UN jurisdiction in this field than US. They will probably point out that in satellite case, independently of Charter provisions, there existed express peace treaty provisions obligating ex-enemy states to assure basic human rights to their people; similarly in Ind case long history of intl negots between Ind and Union made this question of intl concern quite aside from Charter provisions on human rights. In new case, however, they will argue, Assembly wld deal for first time with complaint of human rights violations solely on basis of Charter provisions which under Art 2(7) it cannot do. Consequently if we are correct that there will be genuine difference of opinion on GA jurisdiction the US is inclined to the view that GA shld request advisory opinion from ICJ. Reference to ICJ may make it more difficult for Govt of Union of SA to seize upon GA consideration of this question as pretext for its withdrawal from UN. We wld deplore withdrawal of any memb or group of membs from UN. We do not wish Union of SA to withdraw. Its continued membership in UN might in long run be moderating element in its policies.

4. US is distressed at intensification of racial conflict in SA. Fundamental principles of Amer democracy, embodied in UN Charter necessarily lead US Govt to disapprove any policy of governmentally imposed racial discrimination. If Assembly proceeds to consider question we shall seek to help through temperate discussion bring out intl concern over situation. We feel that beyond such expression of concern, an Assembly res cld not ameliorate situation and might only stiffen Union determination to carry racial policies to critical extremes. We believe condemnation of Union wld be harmful because it is not practical means to help those whom we wish to help. We shall also stress that violation of human rights are occurring not only in SA but also elsewhere in world, notably beyond Iron Curtain, and that GA shld not lose sight of overall situation and necessity for all govts (includ-

ing US Govt) do their best in promoting actively universal respect for human rights. GOI will agree that none of us are perfect and that all of us in UN must exercise greatest self-restraint in castigating frailties which in varying degrees we all share.

In this connection we were interested note statements made by Ind rep on UN Subcomm on Prevention of Discrimination on Sep 24 pointing out evils of discrimination exist in different form in his own country as well as others and all charges shld be approached with detached air without "holier than thou" attitude.

Acheson

845A.411/10–152 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRETORIA, October 1, 1952—2 a. m.

84. Having in mind particularly prevailing temper in South African Govt circles, I very much like tenor of Dept's preliminary thinking on South African racial problem before Gen Assembly (Dept's 52 Sept 29).[2] I am especially happy about thought being given to possible request for advisory opinion from ICJ on GA jurisdiction.

I am convinced that any action condemnatory of South Africa at this juncture will lead South Africa Govt very seriously to consider withdrawal from UN.[3]

Gallman

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[1] This telegram was repeated to New Delhi.

[2] Same as telegram 943, *supra*.

[3] The Embassy in New Delhi also found the Department's preliminary thinking on the South African racial question, contained in telegram 943 of Sept. 29, to be "most helpful and encouraging." The Embassy maintained that a U.S. vote for inclusion of the item on the agenda would "go long way toward convincing Arabs and Asians US continues maintain principle full discussion disputed issues" and would place the United States in an advantageous position to "dispel belief skillfully and ruthlessly fostered by Commies that US only interested in furthering cause of White race in [garble] growing struggle against colored peoples." The Embassy also hoped that it would not become necessary to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice, as an unfavorable response from that body would only increase Arab-Asian bitterness and frustration. (Telegram 1468 from New Delhi, Oct. 7, 1952; 845A.411/10–752)

Editorial Note

On October 3, 1952 Legal Adviser Adrian L. Fisher conveyed to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, John D. Hickerson, the opinion of the Legal Adviser's Office that the United Nations General Assembly did possess jurisdiction to discuss the question of racial conflict in the Union of South Africa and to adopt a resolution which expressed disapproval of South Africa's racial policies and which recommended that the South African Government revise them. The Legal Adviser based this opinion on Article X of the United Nations Charter, which granted to the General Assembly jurisdiction to deal with any question within the scope of the United Nations Charter and on Article 1(3), Article 13(1)(*b*), Article 55, and Article 56, which placed the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms within the scope of the United Nations Charter. Fisher maintained that Article 2(7) posed no barrier to General Assembly discussion or recommendation on the racial policies issue, as neither discussion nor recommendation constituted intervention and as "the question [i.e. South Africa's failure to fulfill its international obligations under the UN Charter] does not relate to a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa." As for the possibility of referring the competency question to the International Court of Justice, Fisher advised that since the United States saw no substantial legal question on the Assembly's competence, the "United States would not naturally on its own initiative seek to have the General Assembly request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice." Only if other governments challenged the General Assembly's competence on this question would the United States have a positive interest in seeing the matter decided by the Court. Fisher, however, qualified this latter point by noting that the United States should support referral to the Court, only if the governments requesting such a referral had a real interest in settling the matter through adjudication. The memorandum is marked "Sec Saw." (845A.411/10–352)

845A.411/10–2052

Department of State Position Paper [1]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 5, 1952.

SD/A/C.1/395

QUESTION OF RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Problem

To determine the United States position with respect to "the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa."

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[1] This paper, prepared for the use of the United States Delegation to the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly, was drafted in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. It is marked at top "subject to Final Clearance." For a description of two meetings, attended by representatives of the Bureaus concerned, which preceded the drafting of this paper, see memoranda by Armistead Lee (BNA), dated Aug. 28, 1952 and Sept. 11, 1952, respectively (645A.91/8–2852 and 645A.91/9–1152).

Recommendations

1. The United States should vote for inclusion of this item in the agenda of the Assembly.*

2. The United States Delegation should avoid taking any initiative in this case. Through informal discussions with appropriate delegations, however, it should urge the necessity for and the wisdom of a moderate, cautious approach to this difficult problem.

3. The United States believes that the General Assembly has competence to consider this matter. However, if as expected, a genuine difference of opinion develops over the question of competence, and a proposal is made to refer the competence issue to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, and it receives a measure of support, the United States should support such a proposal on the ground that since there is a genuine difference of opinion on this matter, an impartial judicial determination is an appropriate and practical method of resolving it.† The United States should not initiate such a proposal. If such a proposal does not prosper and a resolution is introduced declaring that the General Assembly considers itself competent to consider the matter, the United States Delegation should vote in favor of it.

4. If the Assembly proceeds to consider the item on its merits:

a. The United States should point out that the problem of racial coexistence and inequalities of status, as well as the problems of observance of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms generally, are not peculiar to any nation but exist in many countries; nevertheless, under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter each Member of the United Nations undertook the obligation to promote universal respect for basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United States should clearly state its opposition to racial oppression and denial of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.

b. If advisable, the United States should suggest in private conversations that, while we hope that Assembly discussion will impress upon the Union of South Africa the tenor of world opinion, adoption of a resolution will not contribute to amelioration of the situation and, on the contrary, may stiffen South African determination to carry its *apartheid* policies to critical extremes and may result in South African withdrawal from the United Nations.

c. If a resolution addressed specifically to the South African situation is pressed, the United States should support a resolution expressing concern over the situation in the Union of South Africa and expressing the hope that the policies of the South African Government will be guided by the purposes, principles and provisions of the Charter. The Delegation should consult the Department with respect to its vote on any proposals which go beyond the above. The United States should discreetly seek to discourage adoption of a resolution condemning South Africa.

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*See paper (SD/A/276) on the position to be taken by the United States Delegation in the General Committee to the effect that its recommendations to include items in the agenda are without prejudice to the question of competence. [Footnote in the source text. The paper is not printed.]

†Further United States efforts, if any, to encourage such a proposal must be decided upon in the light of the results of current conversations with the British and Canadians. [Footnote in the source text.]

d. If support develops for a more general resolution not limited exclusively to the South Africa situation and reminding all Members of their obligation to promote human rights, the United States should support and encourage such a resolution.

320/10–852

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1952.

Subject: South African Views on General Assembly Items.

Participants: Ambassador Jooste, South African Embassy
Mr. J. S. F. Botha, Second Secretary, South African Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA
Mr. Paul Taylor, UNP
Mr. Ward Allen, EUR
Mr. Armistead Lee, BNA

Ambassador Jooste called, at his request, to discuss the forthcoming General Assembly. He indicated that he would like to have a brief talk with the Secretary some time next week in New York.

South African Candidacy for General Committee

[Here follows a discussion of the Union Government's interest in the election of a South African Vice President on the General Assembly's General Committee.]

Request for U.S. Position on Indian Resolution on Apartheid

The Ambassador asked whether I could tell him what the U.S. position would be on the new Indian item. I replied that our position was not yet definite, and that it was before the Secretary for consideration right now. I said that we were all extremely unhappy about this item and that the Secretary himself was deeply troubled. I could tell him, in strictest confidence, that the Legal Advisor had submitted an opinion to the effect that the Assembly was competent to discuss this question. We were aware, of course, that the British and French lawyers had reached an opposite conclusion. I said that I could envisage that in view of the sharp disagreement on the competency question, the best way out of the impasse might be to ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the application of Article II (7)—as we had tried to do in 1946 on the original Indian complaint. I said that I realized that this would not please South Africa, that it might not please Britain and France on the one hand, or India on the other, but that it might be the best way out. At least, it could buy some time.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Lee (BNA).

Mr. Jooste said that if South Africa should get an adverse decision from the Court on this issue, it would mean the end of South Africa's membership in the United Nations.

In response to my inquiry as to whether he really expected South Africa to withdraw from the UN on this issue, the Ambassador said that he was not sure just what his Government had in mind. Dr. Malan, in a speech a few days ago, had said that South Africa had a perfect right to withdraw from the United Nations and would not hesitate to do so if the UN persisted in interfering in her domestic affairs.

South African Position on UN Competency

Mr. Jooste then explained, with considerable feeling, his own and his Government's views on the competency issue as it affected the new Indian item. If it were claimed that this matter was a "threat to the peace", then any complaint against the domestic policies of any Government could be so stigmatized. This, he said, was a line of reasoning used just before World War II by certain countries as an excuse for aggression. The only other conceivable grounds for a claim of competency was that of human rights, but it was universally admitted, he said, that the Declaration of Human Rights was a statement of aims, not a binding treaty commitment.

He stressed that this was an issue on which the opposition in South Africa felt every bit as strongly as the Government, as was quite evident from Opposition press comment.

South Africa rejected, he said, the notion that mere discussion of a subject such as this did not constitute intervention. The evidence was all too clear of the incendiary effects within South Africa of UN discussion of their race relations in the past. The "race problems in South Africa", he said, "are largely the creation of the United Nations." It was a situation to which the General Assembly's 1950 resolution against incitement to aggression [2] might well apply. The Defiance Campaign in South Africa is the product of just this sort of incitement. Even Manilal Gandhi, the son of the Mahatma,[3] recognized it as a Communist-inspired movement and refused to have anything to do with it.

I replied that I could not comment, that I did not feel I had the answer to their problem. I said that I appreciated their difficult position, heavily outnumbered as they were by natives within the Union and in the rest of the continent. In my heart, I said, I felt that they were not following the right course, but I knew that this was their own problem, which they would have somehow to solve themselves.

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[2] Reference is to General Assembly Resolution 381(V) which condemned "all propaganda against peace," including "incitement to conflicts or acts of aggression."

[3] Mahatma Mohandas Gandhi, Indian leader who led a passive resistance campaign in South Africa during the early 20th century.

Why, asked the Ambassador, should we invite the hostility of the rest of the world? We have no desire to suppress the natives, he said; on the contrary, we wish to raise them to a higher stage of culture, but we are convinced that this can only take place by means of separate development. He regretted the fact that because his Government could not compromise its position on the competency issue, he would be prevented from discussing the merits of the item in the GA because, he said, South Africa could make a very persuasive case on the merits. I expressed my own regret at hearing this. I explained that we had been urging the French to make a strong statement of their own case in Tunis and Morocco,[4] after making it clear if they wished, that they had not changed their view of the Assembly's lack of competence.

Summing up, Mr. Jooste said that the issue of General Committee membership, which he had raised at the outset, was minor by comparison with two main points he wished to leave with us:

(1) South Africa regarded the issue of Article II (7) as all-important. It mattered little what some UN members said, but if the United States, with its record of objectivity, should say that on an issue such as this new Indian proposal that the Assembly was competent, despite the express understanding at San Francisco that Article II (2) had an overriding effect over the human rights clauses of the Charter, then South Africa would feel that she was without any protection.

(2) He recalled the Secretary's expressed hope, the other evening, that at least the Southwest Africa issue might be settled in this session. He thought that the door could certainly be kept open, but all would depend on what happens with the new Asian-Arab accusation. In view of "this new threat", the people of South Africa are in no mood to let the United Nations have any role in the Southwest. He hoped that this point could be conveyed to the Secretary. He (personally) was most anxious to keep the door open, and he took the occasion to mention that Mr. Gerig, the U.S. member of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, had been most understanding and helpful in trying to reach an area of agreement.

In my summing up, I reminded the Ambassador that I mentioned the Legal Advisor's opinion in strict confidence. I recalled that the United States has always insisted that inscription of an item does not raise the issue of competency. I conclude by reviewing my reasons for favoring a reference to the Court as the best solution at this stage in a very difficult and embarrassing problem.

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[4] For documentation concerning U.S. interest in General Assembly consideration of the Moroccan and Tunisian items, see pp. 509 ff. and 665 ff.

845A.411/10-952

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1952.

Subject: Position Paper on Question of Race Conflict in South Africa

Reference is made to the above-cited Position Paper (SD/A/C.1/395, dated October 5, 1952),[2] which was submitted to NEA for final clearance, and to the meeting on the subject which took place in the Secretary's office today.[3] Following is a summary of the points which I endeavored to make:

NEA concurs in general in Recommendations Nos. 1, 2 and 4. NEA has, however, grave reservations regarding the concept of referral to the ICJ, for the following reasons:

1. The question of race conflict in South Africa is a matter of deep emotion to the Arab-Asian group in general and to India and Pakistan in particular. The latter two states are fully committed to seeing this matter through, and will not only strongly contend that the UN is competent to discuss the issue but will regard any effort to refer the matter of competence to the ICJ as an obvious subterfuge designed to sidetrack and postpone action on the substantive issue of human rights, undertaken by the White Western "imperialist" powers on behalf of South Africa. Quite aside, furthermore, from their interest in the substance of the matter, the Arab-Asians also strongly resent failure to inscribe and discuss matters of concern to them when we frequently are in the position of urging them to support matters of concern to us. (See Tab A, remarks of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan re the case of Cardinal Mindszenty.)[4]

2. A vote for referral to the ICJ would not only be resented by the Arab-Asians but would gain us no credit with the South Africans, who may be expected to be adamant in their insistence that the UN is not competent. Although the UK and the Australians have informed us they do not consider the General Assembly competent to discuss this matter and plan to vote against inscription, the UK has indicated that they will "go underground" after the vote on inscription and take no further part in the debate. If these who challenge the General Assembly's competence do not care to go to Court and may not

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[1] This memorandum was drafted in the Office of South Asian Affairs (SOA) by the Officer in Charge of India-Nepal-Ceylon Affairs, William Witman.

[2] *Ante*, p. 938.

[3] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

[4] Not printed. Tab A is entitled "Statement of Sir Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) on Inclusion of the Moroccan Question on the Agenda of the General Assembly, December 13, 1951" and is referenced as UN document A/PV.354, p. 246. He noted that the trial of Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty had been placed upon the agenda of the General Assembly by a very large majority, despite the contention, given in opposition, that this was a matter completely within Hungary's domestic jurisdiction. "The manner in which this [i.e. the Mindszenty] question is determined by the General Assembly," Zafrulla Khan maintained, "will provide us with a measure, a standard, a yardstick which we should, those of us in Asia and Africa, apply to similar questions when we are invited to assist in placing matters upon the agenda of the General Assembly."

accept the Court's opinion, why should other members press for a reference to the Court?

3. While it may be argued that a "genuine difference of opinion" exists on the question of competence, our Legal Advisor's office is not only convinced of the competence of the General Assembly in this respect but anticipates that a majority of the Court is likely to adopt a similar view. The proposal for referral to the Court may therefore be expected to have the following effect:

a. to produce in the General Assembly a violent reaction and bitter debate on the part of the Arab-Asians on a case on which we should already have voted for inscription, thereby likewise increasing the chances of South Africa's walking out of the UN;

b. if adopted, to transfer to the ICJ the debate, in which South Africa may refuse even to appear;

c. in the event of an ICJ decision affirming competence, to return the issue to the General Assembly under circumstances greatly strengthening the position of those states desiring to see the strongest possible action taken against South Africa. Such action would most likely be stronger than action proposed by the Indians this year and thus would be more likely to force South Africa out of the UN;

d. in the unlikely event of a negative decision of the Court, to produce a feeling of complete frustration and disillusionment on the part of the Arab-Asians which will have the most adverse effect on future efforts of ours to obtain their support on other issues, and possibly result in their writing off the UN as a forum in which they can discuss matters of the deepest concern to them. (See Tab B, statement of the Prime Minister of India re the Tunisian case);[5]

e. to enable the USSR once again to pose as the champion of the under-privileged, non-white, colonial peoples, and of the small nations estopped by the Western White "imperialists" from airing their legitimate grievances;

f. to risk exposing the US to a possibly most embarrassing precedent if the Arab-Asians or the Soviets should ever place on the agenda the questions of racial discrimination in the US or of our restrictive immigration quotas. It would presumably be easier for us to contend non-competence in the General Assembly without an affirmative opinion in the South African case than it would be if we were forced into the position of ignoring an ICJ opinion which clearly established the competence of the Assembly to deal with the South African situation. On the other hand, the US should face this problem honestly and objectively, bearing in mind all the possible implications, legal and otherwise, with regard to racial discrimination and segregation in the US. We cannot urge a course of action upon others, which we would not adopt for ourselves, nor should we essentially nullify Article 2 (7) of the Charter. We should be frank in discussing this matter with our Arab-Asian friends.

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[5] Not printed. Tab B is entitled "Statements by Prime Minister Nehru and Government of India Regarding Failure of UN to Permit Discussion of Tunisia and Other International Questions."

NEA fully concurs in necessity for and the wisdom of a moderate, cautious approach to this difficult problem. It is gratifying and most helpful in this potentially explosive case that its chief protagonists, despite the depth of their feelings in the matter, have been relatively restrained in their exposition of the case and avoided the use of violently condemnatory language in the Resolution which they propose to present. Indeed, it may be argued that if any action at all is taken in this case, as is in any event likely, it could hardly be more moderate and less objectionable than in the form in which it is proposed. In NEA's view, the greatest danger which exists is the extreme exacerbation of feelings on both sides which would result if the Arab-Asians are frustrated in their effort to obtain some sort of action, i.e., the passage of the kind of Resolution which they propose.

Time at the Secretary's meeting did not permit me to put forward the following alternative course of action, which may now be academic. However, since the presently agreed Position Paper may necessarily have to be modified in the light of developments, it may be helpful to record here what NEA considers to be an exceptional opportunity to take advantage of Madame Pandit's[6] leadership and friendly feelings toward the US:

> The Arab-Asians are aware of the explosive nature of their proposal, and will consider our position to be a crucial test of the validity of our moral position. Following on the heels of their bitterness over our position on the Tunisian case,[7] it is likely that they expect us to oppose them on this issue, and are therefore prepared for a real battle to achieve their purpose. If we could express to them in advance, and particularly to Madame Pandit, the leader of the Indian Delegation, our sympathy with their concern over the situation in South Africa and our fear that immoderate action in the General Assembly might exacerbate that situation and result in driving South Africa out of the UN, we might be successful not only in toning down still further the proposed Resolution but also in freezing the Indian position at that moderate point, obviating the risk of a later more violent Resolution. If the Indians should agree to this moderate position in exchange for our support, we could endeavor to persuade South Africa to recognize that such a Resolution is the mildest which could possibly be expected, and therefore to limit its statements in the General Assembly to a firm insistence on non-competence, without walking out. Simultaneously we could urge the other states who oppose competence (UK, etc.) not to provoke violent debate. The net effect of this position would be a mild and practically unopposed debate on a restrained Resolution which would presumably be adopted quickly and disposed of. Thus we should be in a much better position to exert our influence for moderation in other cases, such as Tunisia and Morocco, where

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[6] Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Permanent Representative and Head of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations.

[7] On Apr. 14, 1952, the United States had abstained on three votes in the UN Security Council, which would have placed the Tunisian-French dispute on the Security Council agenda. The measures failed for want of a requisite majority.

the same group are the protagonists, and possibly obtain their support for other cases (e.g. Korea), which are of major importance to us.

IO files, lot 71 D 440

Minutes of the First Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, October 13, 1952

[Extract][1]

SECRET NEW YORK, October 23, 1952.

US/A/M(Chr)/238

. . . .

This session of the Assembly, in the Secretary's opinion, would be particularly difficult, especially when the United States has no great constructive program to offer as it has had in the past. This time we will see the former dependent areas arrayed against the European colonial powers, making for many difficulties. The Secretary recalled the problem of Morocco that had faced the 6th Session.[2] It had been decided then that it was not a good idea to force France to make a choice between its interests in NATO and its interests in North Africa. Therefore, postponement had been sought. This treatment had probably succeeded in alienating both sides. It would not be wise to seek postponement again. Equally, or perhaps more difficult at this Session, would be the item on the racial policies of South Africa. In both of these cases the United States would vote to inscribe the item on the agenda, and agreed that the Assembly had competence to discuss them. The important objective would then be to avoid exacerbating relations between the opposing sides. There was really very little that the Assembly could do. If discussion could be held, however, in an atmosphere of restraint and mutual respect, the United States might succeed, by talking with both sides and with others, in reducing the temperatures and heated tempers. From Casablanca to Indonesia there was a vast area of potential and actual unrest which is of concern to us; on the other hand, we must not allow those matters to endanger our security interests in the NATO area. As to the South African items—one consideration is that our principal reliance for uranium lies there. He cautioned against taking hold of glowing principles and dropping these other important considerations.

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[1] Among those parts of the Minutes not printed is a list of 40 people present, including the Head of the U.S. Delegation, Secretary of State Dean Acheson; and United States Representatives to the Seventh Session, Ambassador Warren R. Austin; Eleanor Roosevelt; Senator Theodore F. Green; Senator Alexander Wiley; and Ambassador Ernest A. Gross. The agenda for this meeting included: welcoming remarks, remarks by the Secretary, delegation organization and procedures, delegation press policy, administrative arrangements, and Plenary and General Committee problems (Chinese representation and General Committee slate). The extract is taken from the section entitled "Remarks by the Secretary."

[2] For documentation on U.S. interest in this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. II, pp. 135 ff.

The US Delegation should talk with the other Delegations and show them that these very difficult problems could not be solved by extreme measures. The Secretary felt that time, relaxation of tension and an absence of recriminating charges were the only hopes for solving these problems.

. . . .

IO files, lot 71 D 440

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs (Allen)

SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 14, 1952.

SD/A/285

Subject: Proposed Item on South Africa Racial Policies

Participants: Ambassador Jooste, Chairman of the Delegation of the Union of South Africa
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Gross
Mr. Allen

As to tactics in the handling of this issue, Ambassador Jooste stated that his Government desires to have the question of the competence of the UN dealt with at the outset and as an issue separate and apart from the merits of the case. They hope thus (1) to obtain a clear-cut decision by the Assembly on the competence question, and (2) to avoid, in so far as possible, the acrimonious debate which necessarily accompanies any discussion of the substance of the issue. In order to accomplish this, Ambassador Jooste has decided not to make the fight in the General Committee but merely to make a brief statement there placing South Africa's position on the record and to raise the competence question for debate in the Plenary Session when it considers the recommendation of the GC that the item be inscribed.

The Secretary, stating his complete agreement with the tactical desirability of not precipitating a fight on the competence issue in the GC, expressed doubt as to the wisdom of seeking to obtain a separate decision on the issue in the Plenary. He pointed out that South Africa's second stated objective of avoiding acrimonious debate could probably not be accomplished by this means. He suggested that in terms of the desirable result of keeping the discussion moderate and avoiding any or a bad resolution, South Africa would obtain more support if competence and merits were considered together. Those Delegations who agree with South Africa's view on competence would certainly be opposed, for that reason, to any resolution which might be proposed. Moreover, some of the Delegations who believe the UN had competence would still oppose a proposed resolution as politically undesirable.

As to the United States position, the Secretary stated that we would vote for inscription of the item. Although we had in the case of Morocco and Tunis in the past year departed from our established position of permitting inscription and discussion of all items, we felt it necessary in this Session to return to the traditional view and would therefore support inscription of the Tunisian and Moroccan items as well. As to the competence of the GA, the Secretary stated that although there remains some difference of view within the U.S. Delegation, our present thinking is that the UN has competence to look into the problem of the racial policies of South Africa, to consider the matter, although whether it is competent to do anything about it is another question. He added that our present thinking along these lines on intellectual grounds must of course necessarily be conditioned to an undetermined extent by complicating factors of our own domestic and public opinion situation. In short, therefore, if the competence issue is precipitated in the Plenary we would not be able to state that the UN is without competence to consider the problem, despite our strong disinclination to find ourselves on opposite sides with South Africa. The Secretary pointed out that in our view the UN should be exceedingly careful in assessing its responsibilities and abilities under the Charter in the human rights field. The UN is enjoined to work for international cooperation in the promotion of human rights, but in the present case there is very little that the UN can and should do vis-à-vis the policies of South Africa in terms of actual results. He hoped that we might perhaps be able to prevail upon the Indians and other proponents of this item to take a moderate and reasonable attitude and to see the practical limitations of the UN in this field.

Ambassador Jooste pointed out that while the suggested tactics of permitting the issues of competence and substance to be considered together might work in an ordinary court of law, such a tactic has proved very unproductive for South Africa in past GA consideration of the problem of the treatment of Indians. He agreed that it would be impossible in Plenary, in raising the competence issue, to avoid acrimonious statements by the Arab-Asians on the substance and added that indeed there was some indication that the Arab-Asian group did not desire a specific resolution on the subject but would be content with discussion. However, discussion itself can be one of the most effective forms of intervention in the domestic affairs of South Africa, and UN discussion in the past has in his view proved to be a major impetus to the present passive resistance movement. However, if such discussion is confined to the Plenary as incidental to the competence issue, the South African Delegation intends to ignore it so far as possible and to avoid being drawn into a debate. However, if the question is referred to the Committee, it is very likely that the South African Delegation would not be in a position to participate in any discussion and thus to answer any of false and distorted charges. The Committee would be certain to invite the Reverend Michael Scott [1] and others to appear before it, and the consequences of such action in South Africa would be very grave; they might even "blow South Africa out of the Organization."

In response to a question, Ambassador Jooste stated that it was the intention of his Delegation to argue this question of competence in the Plenary on a motion of non-competence of the GA and not on the technical ground of opposing admission of the item to the agenda, although he conceded that it amounted to the same thing. He did not desire to make any comment either for or against the possibility of referring the competence question to the International Court of Justice.

Although other tactical possibilities of avoiding a fight on the competence issue in the Plenary were touched upon, Ambassador Jooste made clear that his Government believes this is the only practicable course open to it. The Secretary stated that we would, of course, in our continuing consideration of the problem, give the views which the Ambassador had expressed the most careful consideration.

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[1] An Anglican priest and former resident of the Union of South Africa who, at the request of the Chief of the South West African Herero tribe, spoke in behalf of the South West African tribal chiefs before the United Nations. Scott had addressed the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly as early as 1949.

320/10–1552

Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 15, 1952.

Subject: Possible Reference to ICJ of the Question of the UNGA's Competence to Deal with the Question of Race Conflict in South Africa.

Participants: Miss Barbara Salt, British Embassy
Mr. Raynor, BNA
Mr. Lee, BNA
Mr. Wainhouse, UNP
Miss Brown, UNP

At the outset, Miss Salt recalled her previous conversation with Mr. Stein and Mr. Allen,[1] in the course of which she had been asked to ascertain from the Foreign Office whether the UK would be willing to initiate action in the General Assembly for reference to the ICJ of the above question or, alternatively, to arrange for the introduction of such a proposal by some other delegation. Miss Salt stated that the Foreign Office was not in favor of reference of this question to the Court and in fact would oppose such a proposal. The reasons for this position, Miss Salt explained, stemmed from the fact that the views of the Foreign Office were clear and categorical on the question of competence:[2] (1) this question was clearly covered by Article 2(7); (2) the ICJ would not be likely to give an opinion based on legal reasons but would probably be motivated by political considerations which might result in a woolly decision which would whittle away Article 2(7). She also mentioned the obvious difficulty of achieving a suitably worded reference to the Court.

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[1] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files. Eric P. Stein was attached to the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

Miss Salt referred to the Department's feeling that reference of this matter to the ICJ would probably prevent a South African walkout and would in any event result in a year's postponement. On this point, the Foreign Office doubted whether South African reaction would in fact be moderated by the Court reference. Mr. Raynor noted that Ambassador Gallman thought that South Africa would abstain on a resolution referring the question to the Court. Miss Salt doubted whether the position and tactics of the Union Government were really settled at this time.

Mr. Raynor said that the Department had never thought that South Africa would like the idea of Court reference, but he suggested that it would be less unattractive than some other types of action. On the basis of past experience, he believed that South Africa would be likely to take a neutral attitude rather than violently oppose Court reference. Miss Salt repeated that the Foreign Office was not sure a Court reference would prevent a strong South African reaction.

Miss Salt stated that the Foreign Office regarded as extremely vital the preservation of the integrity of Article 2(7). For this reason, the Foreign Office felt that even an illegal debate in the Assembly on this question, despite the fact that, in a sense, it would establish a precedent, was a lesser evil than whittling away Article 2(7) by proposing reference to the Court, thereby implying existence of a question as to the meaning of Article 2(7). Miss Salt added that the Foreign Office views as an extremely serious development using unconstitutional methods in a deliberate attempt to stir up trouble and believes it essential to take an absolutely firm position against such efforts.

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[2] On Oct. 13, 1952, the First Secretary of the British Embassy, Ronald Belcher, informed Armistead Lee that, in the opinion of the British Legal Adviser, the prohibition against intervention, contained in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, included consideration and recommendations by the General Assembly or other organs of the United Nations which were directed at purely internal affairs. The British Legal Adviser held that, while the United Nations was competent to consider a general question in the human rights field which involved all members or a number of members, it was not competent to consider an issue such as the Indian proposal on *apartheid*, which was confined to the domestic policies of a single country. (Memorandum of conversation by Lee, Oct. 13, 1952; 320/10-1352)

Mr. Wainhouse said that we were troubled by the difference in position between the British and ourselves on this question and had thought in these circumstances that reference to the ICJ was one way out. Our own prediction as to what the Court might do was a bit different from that of the Foreign Office because we thought it likely the Court would throw the question back to the Assembly as a political matter which in essence only the General Assembly could decide. Miss Salt commented that this result would likewise make the British most unhappy.

Mr. Raynor said that, on a completely informal, personal basis, he wished to mention an idea that had been discussed within the Department, namely, that the question of the over-all role of the UN in the human rights field might be referred to a committee of eminent persons who would review the matter as a question of general policy. Miss Salt was inclined to think that London would take an equally dim view of this idea since the Foreign Office was reluctant to take any step implying that a shadow of doubt existed on the interpretation of Article 2(7). Mr. Wainhouse said that the idea posed some difficult issues, and UNA had doubts as to its wisdom. The question of the membership of such a special committee was touched upon briefly, the need for a nucleus of members familiar with UN practice and for inclusion of eminent legal authorities being recognized as essential to a balanced approach. In response to Miss Salt's question whether this idea should be referred to London, Mr. Raynor replied in the negative.

After referring to the conversation which Mr. Vallat recently had with Messrs. Fisher and Tate,[3] Miss Salt said that she would leave informally a paper which had been prepared in the Foreign Office on the 2(7) question. She cautioned that it was not a formal opinion of the Legal Adviser. (A copy is attached.)[4]

Mr. Lee mentioned as another possibility a generalized discussion on the question of separate development versus integration in the multi-racial society. An academic debate in the Assembly on the general problem of multi-racial societies might clear the air and frighten people away from direct discussion of specific cases. Mr. Lee said that he had asked Ambassador Gallman whether South Africa would be as opposed to discussion of their situation in this general context. The Ambassador had thought the South Africans would not react as strongly.

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[3] No record of this conversation could be found in Department of State files. F. A. Vallat was the U.K. representative on the UN Special Committee for the Consideration of the Methods and Procedure of the General Assembly for Dealing with Legal and Drafting Questions; Adrian Fisher was the Legal Adviser of the Department of State; and Jack B. Tate was the Deputy Legal Adviser.

[4] Not printed. The document is entitled "Informal UK Legal Opinion on Article 2(7)."

Miss Salt noted that the Indian *aide-mémoire*[5] had not invoked Article 14[6] and in this connection pointed out that the British position was that Article 2(7) takes precedence over Article 14. Thus, if Article 2(7) means what it says, only Chapter VII is excluded from its application.

There was a brief discussion of the question whether some other state, possibly one of the Scandinavian members, New Zealand, or Canada, might wish to take the initiative in proposing Court reference. However, Mr. Raynor and Mr. Wainhouse stated that the United States would wish to review its position on reference to the ICJ in the light of the UK position before deciding whether to press the matter further.

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[5] Presumably, reference is to the *aide-mémoire* sent by India and 12 other powers to the UN Secretary-General on Sept. 12. For a summary, see editorial note, p. 927.

[6] Article 14 of the UN Charter reads: "Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair, the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."

Editorial Note

On October 17, 1952, the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 45 (United States) in favor, 6 opposed, with 8 abstentions, decided to accept a recommendation from the General Committee to include the matter of race conflict in the Union of South Africa as an item on the Assembly's agenda. Earlier that day, the Representative of the Union of South Africa, supported by the Representatives of Australia and the United Kingdom, had requested that the General Assembly decide whether that body was competent to consider such an issue, before the vote was taken to place the item on the agenda. The President of the General Assembly ruled that the South African proposal was in order, but that judgment was over-ruled by the Assembly. The vote was 10 in favor of the President's ruling, including the United States, 41 opposed to the ruling, with 8 abstentions. Following its placement on the agenda, the item was referred to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which considered the question between November 12 and 20, 1952.

INR–NIE files[1]

National Intelligence Estimate

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 20, 1952.

NIE–72

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA[2]

THE PROBLEM

To access the strategic importance of the Union of South Africa; analyze the political and racial situation in the Union; and estimate future developments which may affect US interests.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The strategic importance of the Union of South Africa arises chiefly from its substantial production of chromite, manganese, and amosite asbestos; from its potential production of uranium; and from the fact that in event of general war the Union's bases and port facilities would be valuable, especially if the Suez Canal were closed.

2. We believe that under present conditions the Union will probably remain for at least four years unable to meet its commitment to provide a full armored division for Middle East defense within three months after the outbreak of war. If war should break out now, South Africa could not provide the division in less than one year, even with prompt, substantial, outside material aid.

3. The chief immediate problem in South Africa is the extreme political tension between the Nationalists and the Opposition. Nationalist and Opposition leaders will endeavor to avert civil war, but because they intend to press their positions to the limit, short of such a conflict, and because they may miscalculate their ability to control their followers in inflammable situations, the possibility of civil war cannot be excluded.

4. Over the long run the repressive racial policy of the whites will almost certainly lead to rebellion of the non-white population. Communist influence, presently small, will probably play an increasing part in stimulating unrest.

5. The tensions in South Africa are unlikely for the next several years to interfere seriously with the export of strategic materials, but they may limit the Union's ability to dispatch forces outside the coun-

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[1] Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Intelligence Estimates, retained by the Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

[2] According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 16 October 1952."

try in event of war. In the longer run, when rising racial tensions erupt into widespread disorders, the outflow of strategic materials will be hampered or even halted.

6. Racial tensions in South Africa will almost certainly have an increasingly adverse effect on race relations elsewhere in Africa and on the relations of India and the rest of Asia with the West. If the UN intensifies its criticisms of the Union's racial policy, the Union may carry out its threat to withdraw from the UN.

DISCUSSION

The Strategic Importance of South Africa

7. *Economic.* The strategic economic importance of the Union of South Africa arises primarily from its large-scale production of chromite, manganese, and asbestos. From the Union come about one-quarter of the West's supply of chromite (including practically all chemical-grade cromite ore), one-quarter of total Western manganese supply, and the entire Western supply of the strategic grades of amosite asbestos.* South African production of corundum, antimony, and industrial diamonds is also important. The Union is also a potential source of other strategic materials. Under US contracts, the production of uranium, as a by-product of gold mining, is just beginning. This development promises to make the Union of South Africa a substantial source of uranium. In addition, the Union's gold production is important to the financial stability of the UK and the Sterling Area.

8. *Military.* South Africa's armed forces are at present undermanned, poorly trained, and inadequately equipped. Their regular strength totals less than 6,600 and their reserves less than 28,000 men. One fighter-bomber squadron, with US equipment, is serving in Korea. The Nationalist Government is apathetic regarding military matters. Although the current military budget has increased some 35 percent over the previous fiscal year, and stands at 12.9 percent of the total national budget, it constitutes only about 2 percent of the Union's national income. Moreover, the Government's administration of the military establishment has been inept and its appointments and promotions in the three services have been largely based on political rather than professional qualifications. Morale in the services is low, retirement of able officers has accelerated, and few inducements exist to attract recruits. Union armed forces are almost completely dependent upon external sources for armaments.

9. Despite its present military weakness, South Africa has considerable military potential. In World War II the South Africans demonstrated excellent fighting qualities and technical adaptability. By

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*The US stockpile of chromite and manganese is great enough to offset for three or four years a total loss of the South African source of supply. The US stockpile of the strategic grades of amosite asbestos is very small. [Footnote in the source text.]

mid-1943 about 225,000 were serving.† Given time and equipment, substantial ground and air forces could again be made available for Middle East operations, and naval and air forces for operations in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

10. South Africa has made a commitment to the UK to contribute one armored division for the defense of the Middle East within three months after the outbreak of general war. The Government has, however, made little preparation to meet this commitment. We estimate that at least one year would be required for such a division to be organized, trained, and transported to the Middle East, even if the equipment were made available promptly from outside sources.

11. The Union's naval, air, and port facilities would also be of considerable value in event of general war, as in World War II, especially if the Suez Canal were denied the West. These facilities, including the British controlled naval base at Simonstown, would be useful for ship and aircraft maintenance work, air and sea operations against submarines, convoy organization and protection, storage and resupply operations, and troop staging operations.

The Population

12. The two chief problems confronting South Africa—the present extreme tension between Government and Opposition and the steady deterioration of race relations—arise primarily from the conflicting aspirations and outlook of the Union's heterogeneous population elements. There is a basic division between the dominant white minority of 2.6 million and the ten million Natives, Coloreds, and Asiatics. In addition, the whites themselves are divided into two hostile political groups, the Nationalists, predominantly Dutch-descent Afrikaners, and the Opposition, mainly of British descent.

13. *The Whites.* The Union's white, or "European," minority totally controls the political and economic life of South Africa. About 60 percent are Afrikaners. These speak a simplified version of Dutch called Afrikaans, and most belong to the intensely conservative Dutch Reformed Churches. The Afrikaners have been predominantly rural, but an increasing number are entering business and the professions.

14. The remaining 40 percent of the white population is largely of British descent. This group is mainly urban and commercial, and is economically the more powerful. While antagonism between Afrikaners and British antedates the Boer War, the two groups have a common interest in the perpetuation of white supremacy and in the economic development of South Africa.

15. *The Non-Whites.* The non-European population includes 8.5 million Natives (Bantu negroes), 1.1 million Coloreds (mixed breeds),

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†The Union did not and will not permit non-whites to serve in combatant status, though it uses them in auxiliary services. [Footnote in the source text.]

and 365,000 Asiatics (mostly Indians). These three groups have little in common except dislike of the whites. The large Native majority is divided into several major linguistic groups and hundreds of tribes speaking many dialects. It is largely illiterate. Only a few thousand Natives have had a secondary education and there are few college graduates and professional people. About 40 percent of the Natives are engaged in primitive agricultural pursuits in the native reserves, about one-third live in or near white urban areas, mostly in slums, and the remainder work on white farms. The Natives do most of the unskilled manual labor.

16. The Coloreds and Asiatics are better educated and culturally more advanced than the Natives. The Coloreds, 90 percent of whom live in Cape Province, regard themselves as an adjunct of white society. They work for the whites as waiters, factory workers, artisans, and farmhands. The Asiatics, of whom 82 percent live in Natal Province, are mostly Indians. They maintain close cultural relationships with India, and many are graduates of Indian or British universities. Although a small number are wealthy businessmen, most are small traders, truck gardeners, waiters, and workers in light industry.

The Nationalist-Opposition Controversy and the Prospects of Civil War

17. *Character and Policies of the Nationalist Government.* The Nationalist Party of Prime Minister Malan came to power in May 1948 with a slim majority of five Assembly seats, although it received only 42 percent of the popular vote. It has since increased its majority to thirteen seats by winning one by-election and sweeping the South West Africa‡ election in 1950. The Malan Government represents an extreme, anti-British, Afrikaner nationalism. The Cabinet is wholly Afrikaner, and the Nationalist Party and its supporters almost entirely so. The Party finds its main inspiration in the ideals of the early Boers: racial purity (free even from British admixture), white supremacy, republicanism, and a patriarchal society founded on the teachings of their church. The Party's implicit authoritarianism is evident in the Government's encroachments on civil liberties and in its moves to insure for the Afrikaners a permanent grip on political power in the Union.

18. A fundamental element of the Nationalist Party program is its policy of *apartheid*, meaning strict racial segregation, designed to insure continued white supremacy. Segregation has been practiced by the whites for generations, but influential Nationalists believe white

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‡The former German colony of South West Africa was mandated to the Union by the League of Nations in 1920. In 1949 the Union passed a law granting South West Africa representation in the Union Legislature, and the first election based on that law was held in 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]

superiority divinely ordained and they carry the policy to extremes. The Government has deprived non-Europeans of scanty privileges they had previously enjoyed, has intensified segregation regulations, and has launched a program involving the physical transfer of long-established non-European communities. The Nationalists allege that more thorough segregation will facilitate the economic and social development of the non-Europeans and minimize inter-racial friction.

19. *The Parliamentary Opposition.* The large United Party of the late Field Marshal Smuts leads the Opposition. In 1948 it won 49 percent of the popular vote, seven percent more than the Nationalists, but—due to gerrymandering and over-representation of rural areas—only 43 percent of the Assembly seats. The Party's supporters are mainly of British descent, but include a substantial minority of moderate Afrikaners. The party leader has invariably been an Afrikaner. Because of a membership varying widely from liberal to conservative, the relative disinterest in politics of much of the English-speaking community, and the current unimpressive leadership, the United Party has virtually no positive program of its own and has confined itself largely to criticism of Nationalist programs. There is also a small Labor Party, composed mostly of intellectuals and English-speaking workers, which cooperates generally with the United Party.

20. *The Torch Commando.* Two years ago certain United Party leaders created the Torch Commando as a device to arouse and exploit popular alarm over the Nationalist threat to constitutional democracy. It is primarily an urban organization, well financed and energetic, with a membership of about 250,000. Its membership is mostly English-speaking, but includes an important minority of anti-Nationalist Afrikaners. Many thousand war veterans constitute the hard core of the Commando. A number of distinguished retired soldiers and civilians are members, and a majority of the permanent and reserve forces are members or sympathizers. With organized branches in many towns, The Commando has concentrated on expanding its membership, holding rallies and protest meetings, generating anti-Nationalist sentiment, and getting its voters registered. Although its membership overlaps that of the United and Labor Parties and its leaders work closely with the United Party, many Commando members are dissatisfied with the cautious conservatism of the United Party leadership.

21. *Issues Between the Parties.* There is a large area of agreement between the Nationalists and the white Opposition over national policies. Foreign policy is not an issue, except that the Opposition firmly supports the Commonwealth tie. Both groups favor territorial expansion and resent foreign criticism of the Union. Both are strongly anti-Communist. Both stand for white domination and a large measure of racial segregation, but the Opposition criticizes Nationalist racial policy as needlessly provocative and economically impracticable. It is

also strongly aroused against the Nationalists' grants to administrators of sweeping powers over civil liberties and the press without allowing appeal to the courts.

22. The issue which above all has inflamed relations between the Nationalists and Opposition has arisen over the Government's recent efforts to override legal and constitutional checks in order to perpetuate itself in power. Last year the Government passed, as part of its segregation program, an act which transferred Colored voters from the common electoral rolls. Since the Coloreds regularly vote United Party, the effect of this act would be to insure Nationalist victories in a number of marginal constituencies. The act, however, was declared invalid by the Supreme Court, on the grounds that such a change in the "entrenched clauses" of the South Africa Act of 1909 (the Union "constitution") required a two-thirds majority of both houses of Parliament sitting together. The Nationalists then passed a second act which establishes Parliament itself as the highest "judicial" body empowered to pass on the validity of its own acts. This attempt to circumvent constitutional checks has resulted in antagonism greater than at any time since the Boer War.

23. The Supreme Court will almost certainly rule in the near future that the second act is also invalid on the same grounds. We believe that the Government will probably defy this ruling and proceed to transfer the Colored voters, unless it is convinced that such a course would provoke civil war. Defiance of the Supreme Court will raise tension to extremes, for the Opposition has declared its intention to "defend the Constitution" against Nationalist "dictatorship" and to "meet force with counterforce," while the Nationalists, with equal passion, are determined to place the supremacy of Parliament beyond constitutional checks and to carry out their program.

24. The next general election is expected in May or June 1953, although it may be called as early as February. The election campaign will be even more heated than usual. The Nationalists, solidly supported in the rural areas and bolstered by such devices as a redistricting of constituencies and the prospective transfer of the Coloreds, will probably win another 5-year term. If the aged Malan retires or dies, his successor as Prime Minister will probably be the able and emotional extremist, Strydom, perhaps after a short interregnum under the moderate Havenga. Strydom, even more than Malan, would carry forward present Nationalist policies.

25. *Prospects for Civil War.* All whites desire to avoid an armed conflict primarily for fear of jeopardizing white control over the large non-white majority. In addition the Nationalists, although determined to carry out their program by one means or another, will probably take care not to provoke an armed conflict in which they would be opposed by half of the white population, including most veterans and

most of the regular military establishment. Although some hot-heads in the Torch Commando already advocate armed resistance to what they regard as in effect a Nationalist *coup d'état*, we believe that the conservative leadership of the Opposition can and will restrain them, at least until the next general election has been held. If the Nationalists should win that election, and if they should then take steps further to entrench themselves in power, the danger of armed reaction by the Torch Commando would be great. Even in that case, however, given the general fear of the consequences of civil war on white supremacy, we believe that the leaders of both parties and influential business interests would exert themselves to avert such a conflict. However, because leaders of both parties wish to press their positions to the limit, short of civil war, and because they may miscalculate their ability to control their followers in inflammable situations, the possibility of civil war cannot be excluded.

26. Should civil war occur, we believe that it would be prolonged and disorder would be widespread. The Nationalist Government could count on the loyal support of the roughly 20,000 South African police, whose key officials are Nationalists. The police serve as both local police and national *gendarmérie*; their morale, training, and efficiency are excellent. The government could also rely on most of the *Skiet Commando* units, about 500 of which are organized throughout the country, with a membership totaling about 85,000, almost entirely Afrikaners. Their mission is mainly to insure internal security in their local areas. Though equipped with rifles, these units are untrained and have little military effectiveness. A minority of the armed forces would also remain loyal to the Government. The Opposition forces would include most of the war veterans and younger members of the Torch Commando, as well as the majority of regular, reserve, and retired military personnel. Though virtually unarmed at present, the Torch Commando could rapidly become a formidable force. It could almost certainly acquire plenty of arms through its numerous supporters in the services. It is already organized on military lines and centrally directed. Neither side would arm non-Europeans.

27. We believe that, if civil war should occur, the Opposition would have a better than even chance of overthrowing the Government; we cannot, however, estimate subsequent developments in the Union.

The Race Relations Problem

28. A longer range threat to South African stability is the growing hostility of the non-white population toward the dominant white minority. This hostility had been increasing for years before the Nationalists came to power. Since 1948 the severe repressions by the Nationalists have sharply stimulated the ominous trend in relations between the races. The desire to overthrow white domination is latent throughout the non-European community, and certain advances have

been made in the past few years toward organizing for this purpose. Influenced by the equalitarian tenets of western liberalism, by the political advances of non-Europeans elsewhere, and to a limited extent by Communists, the leaders of urban non-European groups have demonstrated some capacity to organize united actions. The current series of deliberate violations of racial regulations is a joint project of Indian and Native organizations. These organizations have also cooperated with Colored bodies in resisting the Government's attack on the Colored franchise. This passive resistance campaign is almost certainly an early step in a program to overturn white supremacy.

29. Generally, however, the non-Europeans are disunited and as yet appear to be poorly organized. While existing intelligence on this subject is scanty, they appear to have no widely recognized central leadership. Except among the small, educated elite, cultural differences are great between Colored, Native, and Indian; and even within each group suspicions and enmities hamper the growth of non-white unity. Native organization is rudimentary. Local or tribal leaders have their few hundreds or thousands of followers, but the masses are politically apathetic and largely absorbed in day-to-day problems of mere existence. The attitudes of the few educated native leaders are not typical of those of the majority of natives, and there is no evidence that they are effectively converting or even contacting most of those whom they claim to lead.

30. For some years the non-Europeans' leaders will be too few and too inexperienced, their economic and arms resources too meager, and their unity and organization too weak for an effective nation-wide revolt. The knowledge that the Government would react harshly is another deterrent. Local urban disorders may come earlier, but they will almost certainly be ruthlessly quelled. Even if the Nationalists and Opposition were to fight an early civil war, the non-Europeans would almost certainly be unable to exploit the situation effectively.

31. Nevertheless, we believe that race relations will continue to deteriorate, and will eventually produce a serious challenge to white domination. The prospective continuation of the harsh race policy will stimulate the non-white resistance movement, so that major disorders and widespread rebellion appear almost certain in the long run. More moderate treatment would not alter non-white aspirations for equality, although such benefits as better housing and economic opportunity and more freedom of movement would slow the pace toward rebellion.

32. *Communist Influence.* The small South African Communist Party publicly dissolved itself in June 1950, shortly before the Parliament voted to outlaw it. Its membership was only about 2,000 with a hard core of some 400 active workers. A fourth of the membership was white, and the bulk of the remainder were Indians, though Communism was spreading among the Coloreds. It made very slight prog-

ress among the Natives, although they had long been a major target. Forced underground, the Party's influence remains small. White workers will not tolerate Communist opposition to the color bar. Among non-European groups, the spread of Communism is hampered by the internal dissensions over tactics, lack of organizers, and the ignorance, conservatism, and distrust of the masses. Moreover, civil officials are alert to suppress its influence.

33. However, the Communist Party's longer run prospects among urban non-Europeans appear good. As non-European grievances multiply under repressive Nationalist policies, increasing racial tension and sporadic violence should expand the opportunities for Communist exploitation. A number of the top non-European leaders are Communists. The Nationalist actions against the Coloreds will probably turn more of them to the Party, creating a reservoir of educated party workers. Though Communist progress will not be swift among the mass of the Natives, the Communists may have greater success in acquiring positions of leadership among the Native organizations.

External Effects of Prospective Developments

34. Repression of the non-Europeans in the Union is inevitably deepening the suspicions and dislike of whites by non-whites elsewhere in Africa, particularly in British Central and East Africa, and thus contributing to instability there. The continuation of Nationalist racial policies will confirm the belief of the non-European intelligentsia in the British colonies that similar measures would be likely in their own areas if the British Colonial Office relinquished control. The Nationalists' racial measures, well-advertised in those areas, are helping to undermine Britain's efforts to find a basis for racial partnership in its colonies.

35. Prospective developments in the Union will almost certainly further isolate the Union from a majority of UN members. Moreover, failure of the US and UK to take a firm stand in the UN against South Africa would expose them to charges of race prejudice and support for colonialism, and would probably create another divisive issue between the Western and Asian powers. If the US and UK took a stand against the Union, it would cost them a significant measure of South African cooperation.

36. The internal tensions in the Union probably will not in the short run have any greatly adverse effects on the flow of strategic materials to the US and UK. All white South Africans are interested in the maintenance and expansion of commerce. However, the internal political situation will probably divert attention and energies from existing production and transport problems, and deliveries of the materials will probably fall short of US and UK expectations. In the longer run, when rising racial tensions erupt into widespread disorders, the outflow of strategic materials will be hampered or even halted.

Probable Foreign Policies

37. Though many in the Nationalist Party are disposed toward isolationism, South Africa's desire for US–UK markets and capital, its need for allies, and its fear of Communism will lead the government to continue to cooperate with the Western Powers.

38. The Nationalist Government currently regards Commonwealth membership as temporarily useful. However, the old Afrikaner aim of an independent republic, the diametric difference between Britain's racial policy in Africa and that of the Union, Britain's probable opposition to the Union's expansionist aspirations, and South African irritations with India will probably lead in time to replacement of the Commonwealth tie by a bilateral relationship with the UK. As an interim step the Union may declare itself a republic (like India) while remaining in the Commonwealth.

39. The Nationalists denounce the UN as futile and meddlesome; they may carry out their threat to withdraw if the UN intensifies its criticisms of the Union's racial policy.

40. South Africans have long aimed to extend the Union's rule and influence in Africa. The present Government has urged the UK to cede the British protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. Almost certainly, however, this aspiration will be frustrated for the foreseeable future by Britain's firm opposition. The Nationalists also have cultivated relations with the white settlers in Central and East Africa and may have deliberately encouraged Afrikaner emigration into Southern Rhodesia. They hope within perhaps a generation to absorb the Rhodesias.

41. Since virtually all whites are anti-Soviet and since both major parties would almost certainly desire to help defend Africa, the Union Government would make a strong effort to send forces to the Middle East as soon as possible in event of general war. On the other hand, the Nationalist Government will probably not in peacetime improve substantially the effectiveness of its armed forces. We therefore believe that under present conditions the Union will probably remain for at least four years unable to provide a full armored division for Middle East defense within three months after the outbreak of war. If war should break out now, South Africa could not provide the division in less than one year, even with prompt, substantial, outside material aid. Moreover, rising racial tension will increase manpower and equipment requirements to insure internal security; and, if war should break out while the controversy between the white groups remains intense, recruitment for foreign service would probably be handicapped by the preference of men to remain at home and support the interests of their group.

42. As an ally in the event of war, South Africa would be available to the West as a base. As a non-belligerent—an unlikely status in event

of war on a scale sufficient to make its facilities important to the West—the Union could probably be persuaded to cooperate by economic inducements or pressures on the part of the UK and US.

845A.411/10–2452

Memorandum by the United States Deputy Representative on the United Nations Collective Measures Committee (Bancroft) to the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Fisher)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 24, 1952.

Subject: South African Question in the General Assembly.

In a conversation with the Secretary last week relating to his speech in the general debate, he talked a little about our attitude on the South African question. I am setting down my recollections of what he said in case they might be of help to you. There were present at this conversation Messrs. Jessup and Shulman.[1]

The Secretary said, in the first place, that he was clear that the General Assembly was competent to deal with the South African question. He said that your memorandum reached the correct result, in his opinion, but it was too much of an advocate's memorandum, rather like a brief which might be presented to uphold the constitutionality of the AAA.

He said he was going to see Jooste later that morning and that he was going to try to tell him that the question of competence should not be raised as an isolated issue but should be submerged in the full case. He said it should be like a situation in the Supreme Court where counsel files a motion to dismiss an appeal on jurisdictional grounds. In such cases the Supreme Court often denies the motion but tells counsel that in the brief and argument he can address himself to the jurisdictional question as well as to the merits.

The Secretary said that because of domestic implications it was very important that the South African case should be regarded as not creating a broad precedent and that therefore it should be described as if it involved a dog with a green tail and pink eyes and blue legs, so that it could be distinguished from other cases not having the same precise characteristics. The particular aspects characterizing the South African case seem to be that it was a governmental policy to carry out *apartheid* and that this policy had international implications.

He said that in respect to the action which the General Assembly might take, he hoped that by merging the question of competence in the debate on the merits it might well be possible for states which disagreed on the question of competence to agree on an Assembly resolution or agree to vote against an Assembly resolution. In this way bad resolutions could be beat down without a decision on the competence issue and perhaps a resolution which was not too offensive to the South Africans could be agreed upon.

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[1] Marshall D. Shulman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

It is my recollection, although I am not as clear on this as I am of the foregoing, that the Secretary did not express himself on the question of reference to the International Court of Justice except to say that he had some doubt in his own mind whether that was a good idea.

320/10–2852 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Union of South Africa (Robertson) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRETORIA, October 28, 1952—11 a. m.

116. In view of extent to which we believe US position on Indian UNGA agenda items can influence So Afr course both at home and abroad, we desire give Dept fol views:

If we become aligned or largely associated with Arabic-Asiatic bloc in Union's eyes on So Afr UNGA agenda items and recriminating debates and condemnatory resolutions fol with heavy voting against So Afr as in past, we risk her withdrawal from both UN and Korea, with possible repercussions on her participation in MEDO.[2] So Afr looks to US for leadership in world affairs and wld be sadly disillusioned if that not forthcoming in terms of some sympathetic interest in her complex problems.

Likelihood of So Afr withdrawal from UN has recently diminished by support she has received in UNGA from France, Brit and commonwealth countries. We believe avidity with which Union Govt welcomed this support as improving her UN position points to hope So Afr will not be driven to withdrawal. On other hand nationalists are inflexible on their racial policies, and there is no difference in substance between parties on question "white supremacy;" differences relating primarily to tactics. Important segments within country opposed to So Afr withdrawal from UN which poses important restraining factor against precipitous govt action. To extent US and other major powers show sympathetic interest, this segment will be strengthened. Reverse is equally applicable.

I feel that "in time" we might be able to capitalize, through careful nurturing and endless patience, on existing potential latent forces for moderation in So Afr. One course action was suggested in Embdesp 214 Oct. 8.[3]

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and New Delhi.

[2] United States–United Kingdom plans to establish a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) included a role for the Union of South Africa, as well as several other non-Middle Eastern States. During 1953, the United States shifted its approach to a "Northern Tier" strategy which did not include the Union of South Africa. Documentation on South Africa's involvement in MEDO planning is located in file 780.5. For documentation on U.S. interest in MEDO and the "Northern Tier", see volume IX.

Acrimonious debate and condemnatory resolutions, followed by heavy voting against So Afr, on highly controversial So Afr UN issues in this session cld only serve: To entrench further Nationalist govt in office, enhancing their possibilities for return to power in 1953 election; to shift control within cabinet from relatively moderate leaders Malan, Havenga and Sauer to ardent nationalists Strydom, Swart, Louw, Donges, Erasmus and Verwoerd;[4] to increase racial repression here, to weaken forces for moderation; and to accelerate creation situation favorable to Commie exploitation. Such a development wld only tend toward increasing difficulty for whites and natives live side by side in single geographic area, also posing possible disruptive influences elsewhere in Africa South Sahara. Referral So Afr *apartheid* to ICJ to determine UN competence may gain valuable time and permit passions to cool (Embtel 84 Oct 1.)

Tone of the Secy's UN remarks Oct 16[5] counselling moderation and consideration being given by Dept to possibly requesting an advisory opinion from ICJ on UNGA jurisdiction are encouraging. The position expressed repeatedly in high govt circles here is that "So Afr wld not have approved charter and joined UN except for reassurances by organizers in 1945 at San Francisco that art 2, section 7 wld be controlling over human rights and other charter provisions, 'adding' that So Afr racial policies pose no threat to peace of any other countries."

Indian imperialism and Communism now regarded by So Afr as equally imminent threats. Indian maneuvers at UN regarded here as preliminary measure in flow of Indian imperialism and nationals to Africa, logical outlet for her surplus millions. Indians wld not in circumstances hesitate exploit Commie or Western help, playing one against the other, is a thought expressed in high govt circles here.

In summary, we strongly hope US, in addition to exerting restraining influence in UN re Indian items, can find some way of making clear (1) US friendship for So Afr and understanding that she is faced with grave problems, and (2) US endeavoring find middle course rather than take sides between India and So Afr to disadvantage of latter.

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[3] Not printed. In it, the Embassy advised that a "coordinated Western diplomacy", based upon specific lines of action, could contribute "to the development of a situation upon which Communism could conceivably capitalize in Southern Africa." It recommended that more study be given to the situation, that additional experienced officers be assigned to the post and that consultations be held with other governments having responsibilities in the area. (611.45A/10-852)

[4] Johannes G. Strydom, C. R. Swart, Louw, Johannes M. Donges, Erasmus, and Hendrik F. Verwoerd were all members of the National Party holding Cabinet positions.

[5] Secretary Acheson's address to the UN General Assembly is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 27, 1952, pp. 639-645.

Foregoing takes into account discussions with Prime Min (Embtel 85 Oct 2), Forsyth (Embtel 86 Oct 2), Erasmus (Embdesp 244 Oct 21), Louw (Embtel 107 Oct 22 and Embdesp 249 Oct 23), Donges (Embdesp 252 Oct 27), Strydom (Embtel 113 Oct 27 and Embdesp 253 Oct 27), and Malga (Embtel 115 Oct 27).[6]

ROBERTSON

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[6] None printed.

845A.411/10–3052

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) and the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 30, 1952.

Subject: Position on South African Race Conflict Item

At the request of Mr. Bonbright, and with the approval of Mr. Hickerson who is in New York, I am sending you a draft paper[1] on the question of our position on the South African Race Conflict item.

This paper reflects the consensus, as recorded by Mr. Bancroft, of a staff meeting held in New York yesterday, in which Ambassadors Jessup, Gross, and Cohen, and Mr. Sprague participated. Ambassador Gross is charged with handling this item and Mr. Sprague is charged with handling the case of the Indians in South Africa. The paper in this form has not specifically been considered by the group in New York.

The paper was discussed in the course of a meeting on this subject in Mr. Hickerson's office yesterday afternoon in which the following people participated: Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Sandifer, Mr. Fisher, Mr. Tate, Mr. Bancroft, Mr. Raynor, Mr. Wainhouse, Miss Brown, and Mr. Kotschnig.

Mr. Hickerson plans to discuss this matter with the Secretary and with the above-mentioned group in New York today and tomorrow. He asked me to say in sending this to you that he did not agree with the approach set forth in the attached paper. His position as stated in the meeting yesterday afternoon was that the basic emphasis should be put on the reference to the Court, with the United States taking the initiative on this question. Mr. Raynor also disagreed with the paper. I believe that the others present approved the general approach.

Copies are also attached of the position paper on this subject which the Secretary has had under consideration.[2] It is paragraph 4(*c*) of this paper to which reference is made in paragraph 3 of the attached paper.

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[1] Not printed. The draft paper is entitled "Outline of United States Position on South African Race Conflict Item." With some minor editorial changes, it was forwarded as a substitute position paper to the U.S. Delegation in New York; see telegram Gadel 35, Nov. 4, p. 971.

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[2] Reference is to SD/A/C.1/395, dated Oct. 5, 1952, p. 938.

320/10–3152

Memorandum by the Special Assistant and Planning Adviser, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (Sanders) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] October 31, 1952.

Subject: Treatment of Indians in South Africa[1]

The memorandum which follows is sent to you at the suggestion of Ambassador Jessup.

Attached, as Tab A to this memorandum, is the draft resolution which the Indians apparently will sponsor in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the question of the Treatment of Indians in South Africa.[2]

The draft resolution which India proposes this year is largely similar to the resolution which the General Assembly adopted on this question a year ago. Last year's resolution is attached as Tab B.[3]

There are two types of differences between last year's Assembly resolution and the one which India proposes this year:

(*a*) The Indian proposal this year has a milder preamble, and

(*b*) The Indian proposal this year provides for a United Nations Good Offices Commission in place of a commission consisting of a member nominated by South Africa, a member nominated by India and Pakistan, and a neutral member.

At the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the resolution shown as Tab B was adopted by a vote of 44 to 0, with 14 abstentions. During the voting in Committee on individual paragraphs, the United States abstained on the two preambular and operative paragraphs relating to the Group Areas Act and voted against the provision for inclusion of the item in the agenda of the next Assembly session. In the voting on these three paragraphs, the United States was in a small minority. The United States voted for the resolution as a whole.

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[1] Pursuant to Resolution 511 (VI), adopted by the General Assembly on Jan. 12, 1952, the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa was placed on the provisional agenda of the General Assembly's Seventh Session. Following consideration by the General Committee on Oct. 15 and 16, the General Assembly rejected a formal proposal by the Union of South Africa to exclude the item from the agenda and referred the matter to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which considered the item from Nov. 3–11, 1953.

[2] Not printed. The text of the Indian draft resolution is contained in telegram Delga 77 from New York, Oct. 29, 1952. (320/10–3152) This text was handed to members of the U.S. Delegation by the Head of the Indian Delegation, Mme. Vijaya Pandit.

[3] Tab B is the text of General Assembly Resolution 511 (VI), Jan. 12, 1952. (UN document A/L.27)

The Department position paper on this item calls for a United States Delegation vote in favor of a resolution along the lines of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 1949, 1950 and in January of 1952.

At a meeting this morning of Ambassador Jessup, Ambassador Cohen, and Mr. Sprague, the following points were agreed upon as a recommendation as to how the United States Delegation would deal with the proposed Indian resolution:

(1) The United States should support and vote for the resolution as a whole.

(2) The United States should urge the Indian Delegation to omit from their resolution the paragraph calling on South Africa to suspend the implementation of the Group Areas Act, and should urge the Indians also to omit from their resolution the provisions looking toward automatic inscription of this item on the Assembly's agenda next year.

(3) If the Indian Delegation does not make changes in the resolution along the above lines, the United States should, at an appropriate time in the Committee, indicate its view that these provisions of the resolution should be altered, but the United States Delegation should not itself propose amendments.

(4) If the paragraphs of the resolution in question are voted on separately, the United States Delegate should abstain on the paragraph calling upon South Africa to suspend the implementation of the Group Areas Act, and he should have discretion either to abstain or vote against the final paragraph of the resolution (providing for the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the Assembly's next session).

320/10–2952 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 31, 1952—6 : 11 p. m.

Gadel 32. Re Delga 77,[1] Indians in South Africa.

Since preliminary draft Indian res patterned upon GA resolutions adopted 1949, 1950 and 1952, it is generally satisfactory to Dept. However, we hope GADel may be able induce Indians drop para 8 which provides for automatic inclusion item on 8th GA agenda on ground this para serves no real purpose since India can always submit item in time for inclusion agenda next GA if situation requires, and para 8 implies that GA anticipates GOC will fail.

BRUCE

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

320/11-352

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 3, 1952.

Subject: South African Item on U.N. Assembly Agenda.[2]

The South African item on the Assembly Agenda raises three questions:

1. Is the U.N. competent to discuss the item?
2. Is the U.N. competent to consider a resolution of a general nature relating to human or equal rights?
3. Is the U.N. competent to consider a resolution which deals with specific domestic legislation of South Africa as it affects the human or equal rights of citizens of South Africa?

Since Article I of the U.N. Charter states that the peoples of the United Nations have resolved to combine their efforts to accomplish the aim of a reaffirmation of faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and women, the answer to the first and second questions is properly in the affirmative. The U.N. can certainly call upon its members to fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them under the Charter, in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 2.

It is only with respect to the third question that a difficulty arises.

In the area of domestic action, the Charter in Article 2, paragraph 7, excludes the intervention of the U.N. in matters "which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state", except that such exclusion shall not be permitted to prejudice the application of enforcement measures by the U.N. in case of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression.

It seems difficult to argue that South Africa's racial legislation, however unfortunate or explosive it may be, involves threats to or breaches of peace between U.N. members, nor does it amount to an act of aggression by one of them against another. The legal argument would seem to relate to the interpretation of the essentially domestic nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the South African Government.

It is possible to recognize a difference of view as to the legal question of the U.N.'s competence, and still regard the question as one of interpretation that should be decided on the ground of the broad interests of the United States. In the view of S/P, there are three principal U.S. interests that argue for a strict interpretation of the Charter in this instance:

1. As a practical matter, the intervention of the U.N. in such a question as the racial policy of the South African Government will not

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[1] Source text is marked at top "Sec Saw".
[2] This memorandum pertains to the item, race conflict in the Union of South Africa.

solve the problem. The U.N. could not enforce its views and an attempt to do so would result in a weakening of the prestige and usefulness of the organization. Whatever the permissible breadth of discussion may be, the U.N. was not established to *take action* with respect to all problems in the range of human behavior. We are interested in a strong and respected U.N., and it should be part of our policy to dissuade the organization from attempting action beyond its capacity for effectiveness.

2. As a powerful nation and member of the United Nations, the United States is peculiarly vulnerable to the charge that domestic U.S. action affects other countries and that nearly everything it does might be said to fall outside a loose definition of matters that are essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. It would not serve the policy of U.S. support for the U.N. to accept the competence of an international organization to take action to alter our domestic legislation in the field of human and equal rights, and we could hardly dodge the issue, if the U.S. were directly involved, by abstaining from an expression of opinion on the subject of the U.N.'s competence.

3. Such matters as the South African item are always thorny political problems in which a variety of considerations affecting U.S. policy are involved. Each time the competence of the U.N. to take action on such an item arises, we will find ourselves tugged in several directions, and we will evoke considerable enmity if we attempt to balance our interests on each occasion.

If we decide now upon an interpretation of the Charter that limits the U.N.'s competence on these questions, we will have a position on which we can stand in the future, whether later items relate to other members or to the U.S. itself, and we will not find ourselves repeatedly assailed for misjudgments of the balance of our political interests in every individual case.

Conclusion

Neither the provisions of the Charter nor our own interests require acceptance of an interpretation that concedes U.N. competence with respect to a resolution dealing specifically with South African domestic legislation. An abstention in a matter of such obvious consequence will appear foolish on the part of a member that took so large a part in the drafting of the Charter and the establishment of the U.N., and an abstention will merely accentuate our political problems when similar questions arise in the future. We should vote against the competence of the U.N. in order to protect our own national interests and to secure a precedent on which we can continue to stand—a precedent which will permit us to avoid the difficult political dilemmas that are bound to accompany each item of this kind in the future.[3]

PAUL H. NITZE

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[3] Other offices and principals of the Department of State shared the Policy Planning Staff's dissatisfaction with the position being taken by the Department on the competency issue. A memorandum, dated Oct. 9, 1952, from Assistant Secretary Perkins to Secretary Acheson, disputed the Legal Adviser's opinion (Oct. 3, 1952; see the editorial note, p. 937) on the following grounds: "(1) It proceeds on a theory of the human rights provisions of the Charter which was

320/11–452: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 4, 1952—12:33 p.m.

Gadel 35. Dept requests that you substitute the following for the position paper on the Indian item (SD/A/C.1/395, Oct. 5/52).[2]

1. We shld continue to try to persuade South Africa not to press for discussion and vote on Assembly competence as a separate item.

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not contemplated by any of the framers of the Charter and a contrary theory could be sustained with equally respectable arguments. Indeed, Legal Advisers of the UK and French Governments had reached exactly the opposite conclusion. (2) It propounds a doctrine of the scope of the Charter so broad as to contain elements of danger for the UN and for the continued whole-hearted participation in it of our principal allies. To risk break-up of the UN on the domestic jurisdiction issue would, of course, jeopardize the more important collective security functions in which the nations most subjected to attack for their alleged shortcomings in dependent area matters are our strongest and practically our only supporters. (3) In so narrowly interpreting Article 2, paragraph 7, it would estop the U.S. from ever opposing the jurisdiction of the UN in matters involving the U.S., which our Congressional and public opinion would certainly regard as domestic and with which they would not permit the UN to concern itself (i.e., our immigration laws, U.S. treatment of Communists, segregation laws in our eleven southern states, etc)." (Source text is a carbon copy bearing no indication that it was sent to the Secretary; 845A.411/10–952.) Also on Oct. 9, the Deputy Director of the Office of UN Economic and Social Affairs, James F. Green, sent to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for UN Affairs, Durward V. Sandifer, a memorandum, which argued that the Legal Adviser's opinion and the position paper of Oct. 5 "completely nullify Article 2(7) of the Charter and, in so doing, create serious implications for the future policies of the Department." Green maintained that the Legal Adviser's opinion reversed the U.S. interpretation of Article 2(7), given at the time of its adoption, and could, if adopted as U.S. policy, form a precedent which could be directed against matters considered to be within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. Green did not deny the General Assembly's competence to dicuss any matter contained in the Charter, but he disputed the General Assembly's competence to adopt a resolution which "directs recommendations specifically to a particular State, or which creates a committee of inquiry to investigate conditions in a particular State, or which in other ways seeks to bring pressure to bear upon a particular State." Therefore, Green's "tentative view" was that the U.S. position should be that the General Assembly was competent to discuss the South African item and to adopt a resolution on racial discrimination in general, but that the General Assembly was not competent to address specific recommendations to the Union of South Africa, unless the General Assembly determined that this matter was not "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the Union. (845A.411/10–952) The Under Secretary of State, David K. E. Bruce, also registered his concern by sending a personal message to Secretary Acheson on Oct. 28 which stated: "Doc [Deputy Under Secretary H. Freeman Matthews] and I are gravely disturbed over what might be foreign and especially domestic repercussions of a vote by US in favor of UN competence in South African matter. If some nation could be induced propose reference question of competence to International Court of Justice that might be a way out. Hope you can talk to some of us in Dept before reaching your final decision." (Telegram Telac 38; 845A.411/10–2852)

[1] This telegram was drafted by Hickerson (UNA) and cleared in draft with Fisher (L), Bonbright (EUR), and Bruce (U). Hickerson initialed for all the clearing officers.

[2] Reference is to paper entitled, "The Question of Race Conflict in the Union of South Africa," p. 938.

2. If the question of competence is raised by South Africa in Committee before discussion, the United States should vote that the Assembly is competent to discuss the question.

3. On the substance of the item, we should seek to obtain a moderate, generalized resolution not specifically directed at South Africa. If the question of the competence of the General Assembly to adopt such a resolution is raised, the United States should vote in favor of such competence.

4. If a resolution directed solely at South Africa seems likely to be adopted, and the competence of the General Assembly to adopt such a resolution is raised, the United States should take the position that it would have preferred reference of this question to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion; that, from consultations with a number of other delegations, it has learned that, although there are strongly-held opposing views concerning the competence of the General Assembly, there are also strong objections to seeking an advisory opinion; that, in these circumstances, the U.S. will not itself press for Court reference; but that, in view of the conflicting views on competence and its own doubts about the wisdom of the General Assembly's enacting a resolution directed solely at South Africa, the U.S. will abstain on the question of competence.

5. If the General Assembly votes that it has competence to adopt a resolution directed solely at South Africa, the question of whether the United States should abstain or vote against such a resolution will depend upon its substance. If the resolution is restrained in tone asking South Africa to honor its UN obligations, the United States should abstain because of its doubts about the wisdom of this approach. If the language of the resolution condemns South Africa and is generally so strong that it might do positive harm, the United States should vote against it. The Department should be consulted concerning the vote on particular resolutions.

6. The United States should not take an active role in the discussion of this item. However, after explaining our position in general terms in consultations with key delegations from other countries, the U.S. Delegation should seek to induce a friendly delegation (perhaps Latin American) to introduce a moderate, generalized resolution. Whenever necessary, we should make clear in the General Assembly and to other delegations that the United States is strongly opposed to such discriminatory legislation, but that it is concerned over the wisdom of the proposed approach, and troubled over the sharp differences of opinion on competence within the Assembly. It is clear that in its discussion

and action the General Assembly should earnestly seek to avoid exascerbating this situation.[3]

BRUCE

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[3] Subsequently, these six points became the new U.S. position paper, dated Nov. 10, 1952, on the question of race conflict in South Africa (SD/A/C.1/395/Rev. 1; copy located in UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa").

Editorial Note

Pursuant to the Department's instructions of November 4, 1952, *supra*, members of the United States Delegation in New York prepared a text of a "generalized resolution", as a substitute for the Arab-Asian proposal on the race conflict item. The Delegation's text called "upon all member states to bring their policies into conformity with their obligation under the Charter and to promote the observance of fundamental human rights and freedoms," but did not mention South Africa specifically. On November 6, United States Representative Austin forwarded this text to the Department of State along with the information that Mme. Pandit had handed to United States officials the text of a tentative draft resolution on the race conflict item and had asked that the United States develop the Indian draft into a resolution which the United States could support and even cosponsor. The Indian draft, among other points, called for the establishment of a commission "to study and examine the international aspects and implications of the racial situation in the Union of South Africa in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the UN on racial persecution and discrimination, and to report its findings to the 8th regular session of the GA" and also called for retention of the question on the agenda of the Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly. (Telegram Delga 141, from New York; 320/11–652)

On November 7, the United States Mission in New York forwarded to the Department, over the signature of Secretary Acheson, a revised United States draft resolution, which called for the establishment of a commission "to study, in the light of the present res, the patterns and problems of race relations in nat'l societies and their internat'l implications." The purpose of such a study would be to assist the General Assembly "to consider what the UN under its Charter can usefully do in relation to such problems." The revised draft made no reference to the Eighth Session of the General Assembly and it referred to the Union of South Africa only in a tangential way in a preliminary paragraph. (Telegram Delga 147 from New York) A memorandum from Ambassador at Large Jessup to Secretary Acheson indicates that Acheson saw the attached telegram 147 on November 8, after it was sent (the memorandum is marked "Sec Saw"), but contains no indication that Acheson approved the draft resolution contained in the telegram. In his memorandum, Jessup presented the following arguments in defense of this draft resolution: "1. It should be very satisfying to the Union of South Africa since it avoids any condemnation of pointing an accusing finger at them. 2. Its advocacy would be extremely helpful in our relations with India. 3. In substance it sustains views in which we believe and which we would do well to advocate publicly." Jessup also noted that the reference to assisting the General Assembly in considering what it might do about race relations had the effect of reserving the issue of competency and of broadening the focus of any future General Assembly consideration, so that it would not exclusively center on South Africa. (Jessup's memorandum and the attached telegram Delga 147 are in file 320/11–852.)

In response to telegrams Delga 141 and Delga 147, Acting Secretary Bruce forwarded to the United States Mission at the United Nations two telegrams, drafted and approved within the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, which came out firmly against the proposed Indian draft resolution and stated a strong preference for the first version of a United States draft resolution (as contained in telegram Delga 141 with some minor revisions suggested in telegram Gadel 44) over the second version which mentioned a study commission. Officials within the Bureau of United Nations Affairs felt that provisions for the future consideration of the problem of racial discrimination would "tend to perpetuate discussions of difficult issue without any hope of constructive results." (Telegram Gadel 44 to New York, November 8, 1952; 320/11–652 and telegram Gadel 47 to New York, November 10, 1952; 320/11–752).

320/11–1152: Telegram

The Head of the United States Delegation at the United Nations (Acheson) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, November 11, 1952—7:44 p.m.

Delga 168. Re: Gadel 47,[1] November 10 race conflict in South Africa.

After full staff discussion and Secy's mtg with Sprague, Jessup, Cohen and Hickerson, Sprague replied today to Mme. Pandit (Delga 141)[1] along fol lines:

We have given most careful consideration to this difficult problem. We realize that it will be with us for a long time to come and we wish to make a constructive contribution towards its settlement. There are many delegations which in good faith have grave doubts regarding GA's competency to act in such matters. We also believe it wld not advance solution of problem to point finger at South Africa. We have therefore prepared two drafts of res which wld avoid competency problem and which we believe we could support though we cld not sponsor or co-sponsor. We have strong reservations about creation of a commission as proposed in Indian draft (Delga 141). We wld prefer a res without any commission which while generalized wld put GA on record as opposing type of discrimination being practiced in South Africa. On other hand, if commission were to be established it shld be technical and not political in composition, it shld tie together Assembly's approach to various problems of this type. It shld make a painstaking study of problems of multi-racial societies and endeavor in its findings and conclusions to provide a basis for determining what UN could actually do about such matters.

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[1] Not printed, but see editorial note, *supra*.

Sprague then read draft generalized res substantially as transmitted Delga 141 and amended Gadel 44,[2] and draft combined res as transmitted Delga 147 [3] omitting sixth preambular para beginning "convinced". We have in mind that this para might be reinstated later if it should appear advisable. In giving Mme. Pandit copies of foregoing, Sprague made it clear we could support one or other of these two res but this was as far as we could go. He stressed fact our exchanges of views on this matter and our authorship of these drafts should remain strictly confidential.

She promised discuss with her delegation tonight and give us reply tomorrow.

ACHESON

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[2] Not printed, but see editorial note, *supra*. For text of the draft, see document US/A/AC.61/2 in UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa."

[3] Not printed, but see editorial note, *supra*. For text of the draft, see document US/A/AC.61/3 in UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa."

320/11-1252 : Telegram

The Head of the United States Delegation at the United Nations (Acheson) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 12, 1952—10:27 p. m.

Delga 182. Re racial conflict in South Africa.

In several conversations today, Dayal and Pant (India) conveyed to us answer of Ind del to suggestions contained in two draft resolutions given by Sprague to Madame Pandit yesterday (Delga 168).[1] Dayal and Pant said that Ind del discussed two papers very thoroughly and reached fol conclusions:

1. They cld not agree to an overall inquiry into racial relations. They are concerned with "festering sore" in South Africa, which in their view endangers security of whole continent and of internatl peace. They feel UN must deal with this particular problem of South Africa. While there might be many "pimples" of racial discrimination disease

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[1] Dated Nov. 11, *supra*.

throughout globe, Ind del is not concerned with these "minor difficulties". Ind purpose wld be defeated by agreeing to submersion of crucial problem into an overall academic study which wld only sidetrack urgent situation in South Africa. Gen problem of racial relations is already under study in various other UN organs, UNESCO, etc. Inds see no point in studying race problems outside South Africa, e.g., in Latin America, US or India where development is in right direction. Gen inquiry, moreover, wld "scare" many dels.

2. As regards generalized res not providing for commission, Pant said it contains an "admirable statement" of policy. Purpose of Ind del is to ensure continuing concern of UN in this problem through fact-finding procedure. This purpose cld not be satisfied by generalized res.

As result of Ind position, fol questions arise:

a. Shld US del discretely induce some other dels to introduce generalized res without any commission along lines of our draft (Delga 141)[2] as amended by Gadel 44?[3] Unden (Sweden) took line in comite this morning which wld fit this concept. He and perhaps other Scandinavians as well as some LA del cld be approached. By being able to vote for res along these lines, we wld avoid completely negative attitude on this issue. There is, of course, possibility this res might be amended so as to become unacceptable to us. Another possibility is comite might adopt both this generalized res and Ind res providing for commission of inquiry into South African situation.

b. What shld US del position be on Ind res which we understand has been submitted tonight by eighteen dels?[4]

These questions will be considered in US del meeting Nov. 13[5] in light of Dept's instructions (Gadel 35)[6] and we shall advise Dept of results.

ACHESON

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[2] Not printed, but see editorial note, p. 973.

[3] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[4] The 18 delegations were: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. For text, see UN document A/AC.61/L8/Rev. 1.

[5] The minutes of the delegation meeting, not printed, contain a summary of previous events and a discussion as to how the United States would vote. (Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Nov. 13, 1952; IO files, lot 71 D 440, US/A/M(Chr)/248)

[6] Dated Nov. 4, p. 971.

Editorial Note

On November 14, 1952, the Delegations of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden submitted to the General Assembly's *Ad Hoc* Political Committee an amendment to the 18-power (Indian) draft resolution on the race conflict item which would retain the first three preliminary paragraphs and the final operative paragraphs of the Indian text and substitute, for the remainder, four paragraphs dealing with the race problem in general terms, which originally had been part of the two United States draft resolutions. This Scandinavian amendment resulted from conversations which the United States Delegation held with Representatives of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. At this time, the United States Delegation decided that it would abstain on the Indian resolution if the Scandinavian amendment failed. (Telegram Delga 194 from New York, November 14, 1952; 320/11–1452) The Department concurred in the decision to abstain in telegram Gadel 56 to New York, November 15, 1952. (320/11–1452) See also the Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the United States Delegation on November 14, 1952 in IO files, lot 71 D 440, US/A/M (Chr)/249.

Subsequently, the Scandinavian Delegations decided to introduce their amendment as a separate resolution. On November 20, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee approved both the Indian and Scandinavian resolutions; the former by a vote of 35 in favor, 2 opposed, with 22 abstentions (United States) and the latter by a vote of 20 in favor (United States), 7 opposed, with 32 abstentions. In the case of the Scandinavian text, the *Ad Hoc* Committee voted to delete a preambular paragraph, which recognized that the methods for giving effect to their Charter pledges might vary with circumstances, including the social structure of the State concerned. This paragraph had originally been included in the first United States draft resolution, contained in telegram Delga 141 from New York, November 6, 1952. (320/11–652) Also on November 20, the *Ad Hoc* Committee rejected a motion by the South African Representative, under which the *Ad Hoc* Committee would have determined that, under Article 2(7) of the Charter, it had no competence to deal with this item. The vote on the South African motion was 6 in favor, 45 opposed (United States), with 8 abstentions. On November 15, United States Representative Sprague described the United States position on these three items to the *Ad Hoc* Committee. His statement is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1, 1952, pages 868–870.

On December 5, 1952, the General Assembly considered the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the race question item (UN document A/2276). The Assembly rejected a motion on competence introduced by the South African Representative, and then adopted the two resolutions approved by the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The United States voted on these three items as it had in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, despite a special request by Ambassador Jooste that the United States change its vote. (Telegram Delga 265 from New York, November 26, 1952;

320/11–2652) The text of the resolutions adopted as General Assembly Resolution 616 A and B reads:

A

“*The General Assembly,*

“*Having taken note* of the communication dated 12 September 1952, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the delegations of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, regarding the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa,

“*Considering* that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

“*Recalling* that the General Assembly declared in its resolution 103 (I) of 19 November 1946 that it is in the higher interests of humanity to put an end to religious and so-called racial persecution, and called upon all governments to conform both to the letter and the spirit of the Charter and to take the most prompt and energetic steps to that end,

“*Considering* that the General Assembly has held, in its resolutions 395(V) of 2 December 1950 and 511(VI) of 12 January 1952, that a policy of racial segregation (*apartheid*) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination,

“1. *Establishes* a Commission, consisting of three members, to study the racial situation in the Union of South Africa in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, with due regard to the provision of Article 2, paragraph 7, as well as the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 2 and 3, Article 13, paragraph 1 *b*, Article 55*c*, and Article 56 of the Charter, and the resolutions of the United Nations on racial persecution and discrimination, and to report its conclusions to the General Assembly at its eighth session;

“2. *Invites* the Government of the Union of South Africa to extend its full co-operation to the Commission;

“3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with the necessary staff and facilities;

“4. *Decides* to retain the question on the provisional agenda of the eighth session of the General Assembly.”

B

“*The General Assembly,*

[Here follows a verbatim repetition of the first three paragraphs of part A.]

“1. *Declares* that in a multi-racial society harmony and respect for human rights and freedoms and the peaceful development of a unified community are best assured when patterns of legislation and practice are directed towards ensuring equality before the law of all persons regardless of race, creed or colour, and when economic, social, cultural and political participation of all racial groups is on a basis of equality;

"2. *Affirms* that governmental policies of Member States which are not directed towards these goals, but which are designed to perpetuate or increase discrimination, are inconsistent with the pledges of the Members under Article 56 of the Charter;

"3. *Solemnly calls upon* all Member States to bring their policies into conformity with their obligation under the Charter to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms." (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20*, UN document A/2361)

IO files, lot 71 D 440

United States Delegation Plenary Position Paper[1]

RESTRICTED [NEW YORK,] November 20, 1952.

US/A/3539

TREATMENT OF PEOPLE OF INDIAN ORIGIN IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: REPORT OF THE *AD HOC* POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/2257)

1. *United States Position*

The United States should vote in favor of the resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. This resolution, in its first operative paragraph, establishes a Good Offices Commission consisting of members nominated by the President of the General Assembly, the Commission's task being to arrange and assist in negotiations between the South African Government and the Governments of India and Pakistan concerning the question of Indians in South Africa. Operative paragraph 2 of the resolution requests the Good Offices Commission to report to the General Assembly at its Eighth Regular Session. In the last operative paragraph a decision is made for including the item in the agenda of the Eighth Session. The fourth operative paragraph contains a call upon "the Government of the Union of South Africa to suspend the implementation or enforcement of the provisions of the Group Areas Act, pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 1 above."

If the resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee is voted on paragraph by paragraph in the plenary, the United States should vote as follows: in favor of each of the paragraphs of the Preamble in the resolution; in favor of operative paragraph 1; in favor of operative paragraph 2; in favor of operative paragraph 3;[2] abstain on operative paragraph 4; against operative paragraph 5.

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[1] Prepared for the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly.

[2] Operative paragraph 3 requested the UN Secretary-General to provide the Members of the Good Offices Commission with necessary staff and facilities. (UN document A/AC.61/L.5/Rev. 1)

The United States should vote, under Rule 67, against plenary discussion of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. It will not be necessary for the United States to make any statement or explanation of vote concerning this item.

2. *History in Committee*

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee considered the question of Indians in South Africa at five meetings, and adopted the resolution referred to above.[3] This resolution was sponsored by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen. In the Committee the resolution was adopted by a roll call vote of 41 to 1, with 16 abstentions. It had previously been voted on paragraph by paragraph. Each of the paragraphs was adopted. The United States' voting in the Committee was the same as that set forth in the position section of this memorandum.

3. *Possible Plenary Developments*

The resolution recommended by the Committee seems assured of adoption. It is probable that paragraph-by-paragraph voting will be requested, with perhaps roll call votes on certain paragraphs.[4]

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[3] The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee considered this item between Nov. 3 and 11, 1952. The vote taken on Nov. 11 was 42 (U.S.) in favor of the resolution, 1 opposed, with 16 abstentions. United States Representative Sprague's statement to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Nov. 4 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 24, 1952, pp. 833–835.

[4] On Dec. 5, 1952, the General Assembly, at its 401st plenary meeting, adopted the resolution approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. No vote was taken on individual paragraphs; the United States voted for the resolution as a whole. Resolution 615 (VII) recalled previous resolutions on the subject, noted that South Africa had expressed its inability to resume negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan, noted that South Africa had continued to enforce the Group Areas Act in contravention of previous resolutions, established a UN Good Offices Commission with a view to arranging and assisting in negotiations, requested the Commission to report to the General Assembly at the eighth session, requested the Secretary-General to provide support to the Commission, called upon South Africa to suspend implementation of the Group Areas Act, and called for inclusion of the item in the provisional agenda of the Eighth Session of the General Assembly. The text is printed in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Supplement, No. 20,* UN document A/2361.

745A.5/12–1352 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, December 13, 1952—4 p. m.

2433. During conversation with Mills and Wilkins yesterday Ind Foreign Sec R. K. Nehru stated for info of Emb that Ind Amb in Wash had been instructed by mail Dec 3 to approach Dept re extension military assistance to SoAfr by US.

Nehru said GOI was deeply concerned to learn from SoAfr Union Govt *Gazette* of Oct 17, 1952 that US and SAG had concluded agmt providing for 40 million pounds sterling in procurement of milit equipment in US. Nehru said GOI understood agreement contained two undertakings: (1) asst furnished wld be used to further intl peace and security under UN Charter; (2) milit equipment supplied by US "will be used solely to maintain internal security".

Nehru recalled GOI approached USG 9 months ago on racial question in South Africa to which USG replied in effect that USG did not consider it desirable to make *démarche* to SAG.[1] After that UN considered matter and recently passed res that South Africa racial policy was likely to endanger world peace.

GOI was deeply concerned that milit asst to SoAfr (might be used) against groups opposed to SAG's racial policies and wld thus intensify racial conflict. In that sense US–SAG agmt and UN action wld seem to be at odds with each other.

Mills told Nehru he wld inform Dept of his remarks and that Ind Amb planned approach Dept along foregoing lines.

Bowles

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[1] See telegram 223, Apr. 8, p. 906.

745A.5/12–1352 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 17, 1952—5:02 p. m.

1759. 1. Basis R. K. Nehru's remarks (Embtel 2433),[1] Dept assumes GOI recd garbled report Govt SoAfr *Gazette* announcement Oct 17.

a. SoAfr announced that Govt had allocated forty million pounds for procurement in US and UK, procurement in US to be under Section 408(*e*) agmt.[2] Assume major portion allocated for procurement in UK since total value firm requests to US only few thousand dols (FYI less than $50 thousand).

b. US–So Afr agmt under Section 408(*e*) of MDAA of 1949 signed Nov 9, 1951 [3] substantially similar to US–Ind agmt of Mar 16, 1951.[4] SoAfr promised use equip "to foster internatl peace and security within framework of Charter of UN" in support of purpose and principles of Charter and that equip "required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, or in UN collective security arrangements and measures and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state".

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[1] Dated Dec. 13, *supra*.

[2] Reference is to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. For text of the act, see 63 Stat. 714.

[3] The agreement consisted of an exchange of notes in Washington between Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb and the Union of South Africa Chargé, Jarvie. For a description of the agreement, see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, p. 1459. For the text of the notes, see TIAS No. 2424; 3 UST 2565.

[4] For the text of the Indian and U.S. notes exchanged in Washington on Mar. 16, 1951, see 2 UST 872–874.

2. No evidence that intensity racial conflict in SoAfr is related to state of SoAfr's defenses. Dept considers R. K. Nehru's line of reasoning tenuous and does not accept suggestion US–SoAfr agreement and recent GA action at odds with each other.

Dept believes undesirable engage prolonged discussion GOI this subj. Ind Amb has not yet approached Dept.

Foregoing FYI and for use in informal reply R. K. Nehru ur discretion. Report action taken.[5]

BRUCE

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[5] On Dec. 31, 1952, Ambassador Bowles reported that he had conveyed the substance of Department telegram 1759 during conversations with the Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and with Foreign Secretary R. K. Nehru. The Foreign Secretary responded that any increase in the military effectiveness of South Africa could be used to prejudice the position of nonwhites. Bowles informed the Department that a prolonged discussion was avoided. (Telegram 2605 from New Delhi; 745A.5/12–3152)

Editorial Note

In resolution 570 (VI), adopted on January 19, 1952, the General Assembly reconstituted the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa and commissioned it to confer with the Government of the Union of South Africa concerning means of implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on South West Africa. (For the text of this resolution, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20*, UN document A/2119.) Between March 26 and November 18, 1952, the *Ad Hoc* Committee held a series of meetings and on November 20, 1952, it issued a report to the General Assembly, which detailed the areas of agreement and disagreement between the Committee and the Union of South Africa. (UN document A/2261)

IO files, lot 71 D 440

United States Delegation Plenary Position Paper[1]

RESTRICTED [NEW YORK,] December 19, 1952.

US/A/3559

QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA: REPORT OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE

1. *United States Position*

The United States should vote in favor of this resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee.[2] The resolution would postpone consideration of the question of South West Africa until the Eighth

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[1] Prepared for the use of the U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly.

[2] The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, which dealt with trusteeship matters, adopted the draft resolution on Dec. 16, 1952. (UN document A/2336)

Regular Session of the Assembly, continue the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa as established by Resolution 570 (VI), and request the *Ad Hoc* Committee to report to the Eighth Assembly.

The United States should vote under Rule 67 against plenary discussion of the Fourth Committee report. It will not be necessary for the United States to make a statement on this resolution or to explain its vote.

2. *History in Committee*

This resolution resulted from a suggestion made by Brazil, it was jointly sponsored in the Fourth Committee by Brazil, El Salvador, and the United States and was adopted by a vote of 27 to 8 with 5 abstentions. The Committee rejected, by a vote of 22 to 12 with 4 abstentions, an amendment by Yugoslavia providing for postponement of the question to the "second part of the Seventh Session."

3. *Possible Developments in Plenary*

It is anticipated that the resolution will be adopted without difficulty.[3]

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[3] On Dec. 20, 1952, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without debate. For text of resolution 651 (VII), see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20,* UN document A/2361.

745A.00/2-2453

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 44

CAPETOWN, February 24, 1953.[1]

Subject: Possible Steps to Ameliorate South Africa's Racial Tension

The Embassy has given considerable study to South Africa's fundamental problem of race relations which has taken into account the thoughts and opinions of observers and other individuals directly concerned with that problem. As a result of this study, we have concluded that there are certain steps which any South African government, of whatever party or political complexion, would be well advised to take in an effort to ameliorate racial tension and move towards a solution of the racial problem. For various reasons,—the growing political awareness of the non-White Africans, the beginnings of effective political organization as evidenced by the recently inaugurated and successfully carried out (at least in its initial stage) resistance campaign, and the forthcoming general election in which the racial question and the issues springing from it (such as the constitutional question) will play a major role,—we believe that this is a good time to report our thoughts to the Department.

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[1] This despatch was received in the Department of State on Mar. 11, 1953.

1) We believe that the first step, both in time and in substance, must be consultation between the Government and the responsible and moderate non-White leaders. Such consultations are a part of the United Party policy (see Embassy despatch No. 334 of December 10, 1952)[2] and have been repeatedly urged by Mr. Strauss,[3] the Leader of the United Party, and advocated by that Party in the present session of Parliament. We have been informed that the Prime Minister, Dr. Malan, has been willing to consult with the Native leaders but has indicated that the initiative must appear to come from the latter. We have been further informed, however, that the Native and other non-White leaders have not wished to take the initiative in this matter since they do not feel that there is yet sufficient popular Native pressure behind this movement to provide the basis for successful negotiation with the Government. This is understandable, as the combined Indian-Native organization is only months old and consists of only a small proportion of the vast non-White population. Racial relations have worsened under the Nationalist Government with its rigid *apartheid* policy; the significant beginning of an organized non-White movement of action having a definite purpose has been hastened by that policy, and the absence of recognized channels of Government-Native consultation has reduced the Government's reaction to one of suppression only. The Public Safety and Criminal Law Amendment Bills designed, respectively, to deal with disturbances and the resistance movement, passed by the Government with United Party support in this session of Parliament, are the latest steps in the Government's suppressive course.

Responsibility for the establishment of adequate consultative machinery rests with the Government.

2) The abolition of the pass laws[4] is an essential item on this program. They perform no useful function in society and are a fundamental source of racial tension. The sooner they go, the better for South Africa.

3) The industrial "color bar"[5] is another burning issue in the Native mind. In so far as it lies within its power, the Union Government should abolish the color bar as a fundamental plank of industrial policy. In many cases this would only constitute recognition of what is in fact current practice in industry.

4) The Government should grant freehold rights to urbanized Natives and recognize them unequivocally as a permanent part of the urban community. This is advocated by the United Party, which accepts the economic integration of the Natives (indeed, its followers have benefited by this integration) and looks upon them as a continuing part of South African urban life. The racial issue has become

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[2] Not printed. (745A.00/12–1052)

[3] Jacobus Gideon Nel Strauss.

[4] Reference is to the Population Registration Act of 1950 and subsequent legislation, which provided for the compilation of the entire population as White, Colored, or Native and required the carrying of identity cards.

[5] Reference is to the system, established under the Group Areas Act of 1950, under which the races were segregated by residence, occupation, and trade.

crucial because of the advance of the Native as a result of his urbanization. The Nationalist Party in theory if not in practice looks upon the Natives as transitory in the urban areas. Freehold rights for urbanized Natives will give them roots and security and thus contribute to a greater sense of responsibility.

The legal prohibition against Natives in the Reserves[6] acquiring additional non-Reserve land should be modified in conjunction with programs of assistance in developing Native-owned lands and encouraging a diversified economy.

5) Adequate housing must be provided without delay for the urbanized Native. This is a basic need from the standpoint of family life and all that connotes as the basis of a healthy nation.

6) Educational opportunities for Natives must be increased both as to level and scope. The educational program should have as its goal compulsory primary education for all non-White children and the possibility of further education for those who seek it.

7) Finally, the political franchise must be granted to those non-Whites who can qualify therefor on a reasonable basis. There can be no question of a general franchise for Natives, the vast majority of whom are illiterate, and at this stage totally incompetent to use properly the franchise. The result of a general franchise could be a breakdown of the political structure of the Union, and at the extreme, chaos. It could open the gates to seizure of power by irresponsible elements or by Communists. But on the other hand, political rights are at the heart of the racial issue and are the ultimate goal of the educated and politically aware non-Whites. All of the other steps together will not sufficiently satisfy him or cause him to desist from reaching for the franchise. With increasing political awareness and organization and strength, the Native must inevitably press towards this goal, and if it is withheld from him, in the end he will seize it. It is, therefore, much better to grant him the franchise on a basis which assures orderly political and social development in South Africa than to have him forcefully take it.

Both affording of increased opportunities for non-Whites in the economic and professional fields and the granting of a qualified franchise will require a revolution in thought of the ruling White minority. Therefore, while these goals should be viewed as parts of a whole if the racial issue in South Africa is to be resolved, some steps may have to be taken before others, and the timing of the grant of the franchise may have to be determined in the light of the progress of events after the initial steps have been taken. The important point is that all South Africans should recognize that the whole program is necessary and that their country with all its diversities, is in fact one interdependent community.

For the Ambassador:
James C. Sappington, 3d
First Secretary of Embassy

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[6] Reference is to areas within South Africa reserved for the Native population.

745A.00/3-253

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PRETORIA, March 2, 1953.[1]

No. 410

Subject: South Africa As Seen After Sixteen Months

A little over a year has passed since my arrival in South Africa. While that period has been broken by a two months' stay in Washington, I have nevertheless observed and thought over developments in South Africa uninterruptedly for some sixteen months. I have during that period been in residence both in the administrative capital, Pretoria, and in the legislative capital, Cape Town. I have made rather frequent visits to Johannesburg, two visits to Durban, and one to Port Elizabeth. I spent a week in South West Africa and several days in Swaziland. There have been a number of somewhat extensive and dispersed trips by automobile through the countryside. I feel that an evaluation of the South African scene as I see it after these experiences of the past sixteen months may serve some purpose.

Most of the events and conversations reviewed and evaluated in this report have, of course, been covered in detail by me in separate, previous despatches.

Europeans

[Here follow comments concerning the "friendliness and hospitality" of the European residents of the Union of South Africa, characteristics of various cities in the country, and personality differences between the English and Afrikaner element of the European population.]

Officials

In thirty years in the Foreign Service, I have never served in a country where close, informal working relations with officials were more quickly established. For something comparable to my experience in South Africa, I must turn to the relations I enjoyed in wartime London.

What I have said about relations in South Africa applies to officials of all ranks from the Prime Minister down through men of Cabinet rank into civil service circles.

Members of Dr. Malan's Cabinet struck me as having certain qualifications in common aside from the ready, friendly, and frank way they received me. They whole-heartedly support their Government's policies all along the line, in the international as well as the domestic field. There are no shades of opinion evident in their talk. There is unanimity of views. This may not be wise or intelligent, but it does, when encountered, give the impression of political strength. Views are expressed promptly, to the point, and without equivocation. Whether one agrees or not, one is bound to feel, I think, as I did when I first met these men, and still do, that here is a unified, driving, unswerving political force that will get a large measure of support from the not too discriminating masses and will be hard to beat at any time. These men know what they want, and they are going to work unceasingly to get it. And yet, underneath this show of hardness and apparently blind devotion to a cause, there is present too, and in large measure, love and also understanding of country. These men will not thoughtlessly or deliberately wreck their country. That, too, I felt from the start and still do in talking with them.

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[1] This despatch arrived in the Department of State on Mar. 12.

Dr. Malan, from some things that I had read and heard about him before meeting him in South Africa, I had pictured as dour, totally without a lighter side, provincial in outlook, and withal blind to what is taking place in the world. To a certain extent I thought of his associates in the same way. I soon found that I was mistaken. This applied with especial force to Prime Minister Malan.

Malan, brought up in the Huguenot tradition and the uncompromising atmosphere of Dutch Reformed orthodoxy, quite naturally has an essentially serious outlook on life. There is, though, a lighter side to his nature. That is apparent above all in his home life. He is relaxed and most sociable in the presence of his wife, and his relations with his children, particularly with his eight year old adopted daughter, are the free, easy, companionable ones generally associated with someone half his age. Then, too, he has a delightful, quiet sense of humor.

At the time last year when it became necessary for me to appeal directly to him for assistance in stepping up manganese exports to the States, the steel strike was on at home. President Truman's move a few days earlier to take over the steel industry had just been declared unconstitutional. This court action at home practically coincided with the action in South Africa of the Court of Appeals in declaring the Separate Voters' Act unconstitutional. The American court action and the South African court action were, as I was to learn during this talk with Malan, fresh in his mind. I based my appeal for increased manganese shipments on the needs of our steel industry to meet the requirements of Western rearmament. When I finished, Malan smiled broadly and said, "But it seems that your court is of no more help to your President than our court is to me."

I should add that he followed this up with the assurance that he would try to arrange for us to get bigger shipments of manganese, and, incidentally, increased shipments have been taking place since that talk with him.

One further example of Malan's sense of humor may bear telling.

When I made my farewell call on him before leaving for Washington last October to serve on one of the Selection Boards, I told him at the very outset of our talk that I was going home to work on promotions for Foreign Service officers. He gave no indication that my opening remark had made any impression on him. We immediately launched into a half hour's talk on South Africa's relations with the United Nations, her relations with Britain, her position in the Commonwealth, her responsibilities in the defense of the African continent, and her potential role in the Middle East. When the time came for me to leave, Dr. Malan, quite to my surprise, turned to my opening remarks and said that he hoped that while I was in the States occupied with promoting Foreign Service officers, I would also find the time to do a little "promoting" for South Africa. "We need it badly," he said, with an expression part jocular, part serious.

Malan, I have found, is far from insular. He is thoroughly alert to the threat to the free world emanating from Moscow. The participation of the South African air squadron in Korea has had his personal support. He takes close personal interest in the planning for the defense of the African continent. The development of the Middle East Defense Organization he follows intently. He feels that Africa, if Africa is to be saved for the West, must have represented in Africa a strong Britain, and the sympathetic bearing and ready response he gave me to our pleas for more manganese show clearly that he appreciates the role we are playing in building up the armed resources of the free world.

Natives

The one big question facing the country is clearly how the relatively small group of Europeans is over the years to adjust its relations with the far larger and growing Native group, which is slowly becoming more conscious and sensitive about what it regards as a position of inferiority on its homelands.

Frequently South Africans have turned to me and said: "You can understand our race problem. You have the same problem in the States." The situations are of course vastly different, as I try to explain. Our Colored population comes from a stock seized in its homeland and forcibly transplanted to what became a predominantly white continent. In South Africa we have a handful of Whites who penetrated a Black continent and succeeded in getting a toe-hold. Something comparable in race relations with us would have developed had the original colonists in Jamestown, for example, succeeded over the centuries in spreading no more than thinly some way into the interior into country occupied by Indians, that is, live Indians.

From my observation of the Natives and my experience with them in the cities, in the countryside and in my home, I would say that they have many admirable qualities. My wife and I have found them for the most part to be kindly, gentle, responsive to understanding treatment, willing and even anxious to learn, and with a capacity to learn. My wife and I have found them invariably respectful. They have a keenly developed sense of justice. Very importantly, they are not lacking in a sense of humor. It is a rich and potentially rich human element. Some can combine shrewdness with humor of a sly kind in a way that can be most entertaining.

[Here follows an anecdote relating to Gallman's domestic staff and a discussion of the definition of the word "*apartheid*".]

What runs through the different variations of *apartheid*, it will be seen, is separateness. The big problem, it seems to me, in trying to work out any kind of separate development arises mainly from the already large infiltration in the cities of Natives and Asiatics. How these people at this stage are to be drawn apart, away from their present homes, and to a certain extent their present jobs as well, and resettled under conditions designed to afford an existence quite apart from the country's activities, is beyond me. But I may have a misconception of what is really meant by "*apartheid*" and what is planned under that designation. My difficulty arises from my failure to find a clearly and comprehensively worked out program in this field. I have heard and seen the term widely used. I have not seen a detailed plan showing just what is meant by it and what really can be done in its name. Meanwhile, the Native and Asiatic population is growing in numbers and in consciousness and sensitivity about living under conditions of inferiority. Articulate leaders are coming to the front among them. Work in organizing them in disciplined groups, responsive to responsible leadership, goes on. In this connection, it is well to stop to consider how much work in the field, in the home, in the mines, in the factories, in building, in road construction and maintenance, in short, in the whole field of activity that makes life possible in South Africa is in the final analysis done by the Native. The time could come, if racial relations are not worked out with understanding, where a mere word or a nod could lead to the almost complete economic paralysis of the country.

I could not detect, during the early months of my residence in South Africa, evidence of close-knit organization among the Natives. I found no basis for feeling that, were forceful leadership to emerge now, there would be any effective degree of disciplined response. It appeared to me on that first, necessarily superficial, appraisal that the day was far distant when a sufficient number of Natives would have reached the stage of organization where, with a signal from the top, they could seriously threaten the country's economy or even public peace. Fixing any time limit within which such development might take place could be at best only a guess. However, in those first months here, I would say to myself that from twenty-five to fifty years were needed before any impressive measure of organization among the Natives could be achieved. But then, last June the passive resistance campaign against discriminatory laws and conditions got under way. It started as a combined Native and Indian campaign, under combined Native and Indian leadership, a new development. The widespread, disciplined response to this call for action came as a surprise, not just to me, a newcomer, but also to European observers of many years' residence in South Africa. I have had to revise radically my estimate. I should say now that within five to ten years at the most organization among the Natives can be brought to the pitch where through strikes, for example, even of the sit-down or slow-down type, the economy of the country could be paralyzed in whole or in part, with incalculable monetary losses in mines, factories, and in the field of transport and with no end of inconveniences arising in homes and at a hundred points in the daily life of the average resident in South Africa. And over it all, with such a breakdown, would hang the threat to public health.

The problem of race relations in South Africa is a very complex one. Who can give a definitive solution? I doubt whether anyone can. It probably will have to be worked out on a day-to-day basis over the years, with a willingness to learn from experience and with the application of endless patience and understanding. And I think that it has to be left largely to those on the spot. It is they who have had the experience gained at first hand. The magnitude of the problem, moreover, as I see it, calls for the united effort of the two main white groups in the country. They can ill afford the luxury of political rough and tumble to a degree paralyzing constructive effort.

Internal Situation

There is no doubt that with the emphasis given *apartheid*, with stricter application of discriminatory laws and regulations, and with attempts through legislation further to reduce rights of Natives, Coloreds and Indians, relations between Europeans and non-Europeans have during the last few years been steadily becoming more strained. With racial issues playing a part in the current election campaign, more than ordinary attention is being called to discriminations, and already tense feelings have been exacerbated. This situation has during recent months precipitated a number of riots. While the trouble has mainly started among non-Europeans, before it has run its course Europeans too have become involved. The question actually arises of how imminent trouble is on a scale seriously affecting public security and the country's economy. Are the elements present that any day disorders of such proportions might break out, and is the ground already prepared for Communism widely to take root?

I think the worst can happen within a matter of years if the present trend is not arrested and the non-Europeans are not given the hope and means to improve their present lot. I do not think, however, from my observations on the spot that the country is now threatened with disorders on a scale that would lead to a breakdown of the country's economy or internal security. The current peaceful resistance campaign is effective to the extent of causing the Government concern. It is at best, though, local and spasmodic in its effects. Non-Europeans are still not so widely or largely organized that they can threaten the country with disaster. As for the Communist threat, while Communist agents could, even now, step into the situation and give direction that might momentarily cause suffering and loss among European communities, the masses of non-Europeans are still today too largely illiterate and indifferent to respond in threatening degree to Communist propaganda and leadership. As I weigh what I have seen and heard over the past sixteen months, I would say that, fortunately, South Africa still has the time to avoid disaster, but it must act with the utmost intelligence, tact, and detachment now.

Commonwealth and International Relations

Turning to the field of international relations, the most immediate problem in the case of South Africa is her position within the Commonwealth. Much publicity, particularly abroad, is given to the supposed determination of the present Government to establish a republic, to be followed eventually with complete withdrawal from the Commonwealth. No Government official has ever even intimated to me that the present Government wants a republic now outside the Commonwealth, and I have had many talks over the past year or so with Prime Minister Malan and members of his Cabinet. Let me review what Dr. Malan himself has said to me.

In substance, he has said that he would like to see South Africa enjoy the same degree of freedom of action that India does, with the same relationship with the British crown. He has made a special point in his talks with me that in the Commonwealth Conference in London in 1949, it was unanimously held that India could enjoy all this freedom of action and still remain in the Commonwealth. For hard, practical trade and currency reasons, Dr. Malan and his associates have made it plain to me that they want to see South Africa in the Commonwealth. In any event, even an extremist like the present Minister of Lands, Strydom, has publicly matched Malan's public words that not even the status of republic within the Commonwealth would be sought without first trying to ascertain public opinion.

As for the present Governmental attitude on relations with Great Britain, I can also cite the Prime Minister as spokesman. In a talk I had with him not so long ago, he referred to the British Government's tendency to turn more and more power over to the Natives in her African colonies. This tendency he deplored, not just because he thought the actions premature but because Britain, by so doing, was eliminating herself step by step from Africa. "And Africa," Malan said with feeling and emphasis, "to be saved for the West must have present in Africa a strong Britain." I believe that sets the tone very well of the present Government's attitude toward the United Kingdom.

In the paragraphs which preceded, devoted to my impressions of Europeans generally and specifically to Government officials, I called attention to the instinctive friendliness that exists in South Africa for Americans. There is a most encouraging reservoir of good will in the country on all levels and in all sections of society for the United States. That obviously facilitates the work of the Embassy and our Consulates. I recognize that whatever I have personally accomplished is in no small measure due to this ready, widespread good will.

It seems appropriate here to review some of the problems I have dealt with myself. The results of my efforts will be cited as an indication of the kind of relations existing between the United States and South Africa.

One of the first tasks given me was to see whether manganese exports to the States, so badly needed in our rearmament program, could not be stepped up. In talks with various Cabinet Ministers and with the Prime Minister himself, the Government's assistance was happily secured and shipments are now going to the States in quantities sufficient to meet our needs. Both in 1951 and 1952 when it appeared that South Africa might withdraw from the United Nations in protest against resolutions interpreted here as interferences in domestic affairs, I expressed directly to the Prime Minister the hope that South Africa would not take that step. I got the assurance that only under extreme provocation would the step be taken. The Department's efforts were supplemented by an appeal by me directly to the Prime Minister at the time it appeared that South Africa might withdraw her air squadron from Korea. Our efforts in this respect up to now have been successful. Through talks with South African officials both in Washington and here, I think we have succeeded in no small measure to keep alive South Africa's interest in the defense of the African continent and to stimulate and keep alive interest in the Middle East Defense Organization. There is, in a word, as I have found, constant readiness among South African officials to listen to and weigh what we have to say on the problems of the day and to meet, wherever possible, our suggestions and requests.

South Africa, in spite of her geographic isolation, is not blind to what is going on beyond her frontiers, as shown, for example, by her readiness, as already pointed out, to do her share in the defense of Africa as a whole and to play a role in the defense of the Middle East. And she has shown that she will not rashly and blindly withdraw from the United Nations. Prime Minister Malan has on a number of occasions said to me, with emphasis, that South Africa wants to work closely with the free nations of the world, in and outside the United Nations, in meeting the ever-present threat of militant Communism and, in general, in building up a stable, free world. From personal observation and experience, I can say that South Africa is not the narrow, isolationist country pictured in some of the sensational stories published abroad.

Future Prospects

The most difficult and pressing problem facing South Africa is, of course, the problem of working out a peaceful, stable way of life between the relatively small white group and the far larger and fast-growing non-white groups. The seriousness of the problem is heightened by the fact that whatever is done in South Africa in this field will have repercussions far beyond the frontiers of the country, certainly throughout the African continent.

As I have indicated before, the present status of race relations gives cause for very serious concern; but there is still time, fortunately, if it is used in timely fashion, to avert disaster, and the one heartening aspect of the situation is that today voices calling for detached, tolerant study of the problem are being heard with increasing frequency from every part of the country and from varying walks of life. Churchmen, even some among the literal-minded Dutch Reformed pastors, are calling more and more for reconciliation of the Christian principles of the dignity and equality of man with the way of life open to non-whites. Race study groups are earnestly searching for ways and means of assuring a harmonious future. In academic circles, ideas are constantly born and tested. The problem is out in the open, and discussion is daily becoming freer. In some circles of the Government and business it is now being said that non-whites should have non-white representation in Parliament, not tomorrow but today. As I see it, if these forces of intelligence, tolerance and vision have their way, then we can view the future calmly. If they are ignored, I am afraid there will be endless suffering and a period of chaos, with the European as we see him today at last physically eliminated from the scene or in any event reduced still more in numbers and shorn of all authority.

It is to the immediate interest of the United States that stability prevail in South Africa, and that quite apart from the all important humanitarian considerations entering the picture. For our program of building up a strong free world to counter Soviet armed power, we need South African strategic supplies and, very importantly, her uranium. In the latter field of development we have taken the lead not only in so far as techniques are concerned but also in supplying the money. It is a big stake on both scores. Peace in the mines, in the homes and on the street is essential. We recognize that. I myself am only too sensitive to all that, and I am constantly watching and waiting for the right moment to put in a friendly word of caution or a friendly suggestion in circles where something good might come of it.

As of today, as I pointed out above when making some observation on the Natives, neither internal security on a country-wide extent nor the economy of the country is threatened through anything that might arise from the present status of race relations. However, in my opinion, the degree of response and responsibility being shown by scattered non-whites during the current passive resistance campaign indicates that between five to ten years, unless material amelioration in race relations takes place, non-white groups will be organized well and widely enough to paralyze the country within a matter of days. This need not be. If intelligence and tolerance are applied, accompanied with a liberal immigration policy bringing much needed skilled labor into the country, this country, with its rich human element and apparently limitless natural resources can look forward to a very full life. But to have that, even if the danger of eruptions from unhealthy race relations is eliminated, the people of South Africa must be on their guard against other rather insidious dangers that are always present. The country has a dangerously delightful climate, and it takes character not to yield to its lures and forsake desk and bench too often for the sunshine and beauties of nature. The country is isolated geographically, without the stimulus of competition of similarly developed and developing countries as neighbors. This, plus the fact that in the last analysis most work, or at least a goodly part of every job, is left to a Native to do, whom all too often no one has taken the trouble properly to train, tends toward lowering of standards of life and, unfortunately, does so quite unperceptibly to most South Africans.

W. J. GALLMAN

Editorial Note

The general election, held in the Union of South Africa on April 15, 1953, brought a decisive victory for Dr. Malan's National Party, which more than doubled its overall Parliamentary majority. This general election, the first since the National Party had gained power in the election of 1948, in effect constituted a popular endorsement of the *apartheid* legislation adopted by the Malan government during the past 5 years. The Embassy in Pretoria reported that the National Party had run on the issues of *apartheid*, white supremacy "strong government", Parliamentary sovereignty, and anti-Communism and that the Nationalists interpreted their victory as indicating a clear popular "mandate" to carry out their legislative program. Shortly after the election, Dr. Malan noted that the National Party was only 12 to 13 votes short of the two-thirds majority in Parliament needed to establish Parliamentary supremacy over the South African courts and to remove the Colored voters from the common voting roll. (Despatch 484 from Pretoria, April 27, 1953; 745A.00/4–2753)

745A.00/4–2053

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1953.

Subject: Informal Approach to South African Prime Minister

The attached telegram [1] is based on an idea which came to me last Friday that this particular moment, following a larger than expected victory by Malan, might be the one occasion when in a very informal way Ambassador Gallman could say a few things to him which otherwise would not only probably be useless but very possibly counterproductive. There is no guarantee, of course, that it will do any good now but I have a feeling that this may be the one moment when Gallman can have this kind of a talk. Even so, you will note that we will leave the matter to his discretion as he may feel that even now such a talk would do more harm than good.

I believe you could clear the attached yourself but if you feel it should be sent through General Smith,[2] if you will let me know we will promptly prepare a covering memorandum to him.

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[1] *Infra.*

[2] Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State. A handwritten note below indicates: "Telegram initialed by Mr. Hickerson and sent out April 21, 1953. Mr. Raynor's office called. 11 : 15 a. m."

745A.00/4–2153 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa, at Pretoria [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 21, 1953—2 : 35 p. m.

149. For the Ambassador. As you know Dept has long been concerned by developing racial friction South Africa which can well lead domestic instability encroachment of Communism and at worse to most serious type of situation which would have international as well as domestic repercussions. Dept has also long felt as you know that this type of problem largely domestic is one on which direct representations by this or other foreign governments would not only be useless but very probably counter-productive. However Dept wondering if present might

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Raynor (BNA) and Lee (BNA), approved by Raynor, and cleared by Hickerson (UNA). Telegram also sent to London.

not be one occasion which may not reoccur when you might appropriately make certain informal comments to Malan in course congratulations electoral victory. Dept thinking of very informal approach prefaced by ample statements we recognize South Africa's problems are domestic responsibility but that in interdependent free world we cannot escape involvement. Thus, our behind scenes efforts at UN to get Arab-Asian apartheid resolution withdrawn or modified were criticized as dictated by US strategic and economic interests South Africa, and even Exim loan to ESCOM[2] has been attacked as abetting suppression natives.

Because of friendship we feel for South Africa (which we believe has tremendous capacity for economic development and potential under favorable circumstances for discharging continent-wide responsibilities) we are deeply concerned over developments. Moreover US has important private investments but businessmen are becoming increasingly anxious re racial situation as it affects stability of industry. US Government especially concerned with stability connection uranium operations. Furthermore we have been worried re international implications not only those of past which have clouded South Africa's participation in UN and increased difficulty of orienting new Asian nations to the West but also with possible repercussions elsewhere in Africa should serious trouble develop in the Union.

Should Malan raise issue US press reactions election result you may assure him hostile editorials such as *N.Y. Times* April 17 entitled "Victory for Evil" in no way inspired by Dept but reflect view US public opinion apparent retrogressive tendency racial policy in Union. Might mention US observers particularly shocked at "black peril" and Mau Mau themes in election campaign which must surely enflame passions both sides.

Approach could then continue along line now Malan has increased his majority and defiance campaign subsided he is in unique position lead from strength in wise statesmanship. Could he not now take steps which would result in easing tensions? You could say it is not for us suggest what steps should be taken but that we believe there must be some (e.g. some dramatic move to improve native housing or consultation with "National Minded" faction of ANC[3]) which would be politically feasible and have quieting results both in SoAfr and abroad.

Such an approach could be made as based on instructions pointing out that you were asked express these views informally and not by way of formal representation. Alternatively it might be better you make them on your own indicating you are not instructed in the premises but are confident views you expressed are those Washington. Additional points to include will undoubtedly suggest themselves to you.

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[2] Reference is to the Export-Import Bank loan to the Electricity Supply Commission of the Union of South Africa. See footnote 7, p. 904.

[3] Reference is to the African National Congress, a voluntary political organization which sought to advance the interests of Black South Africans.

In your discretion you are authorized carry out approach either basis. If you think an approach of different type would be more effective Dept would appreciate your views and also would desire your views if you feel as you well may that even this particular time approach of this general nature would be unwise.

Dulles

745A.00/4-2753 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

SECRET

Pretoria, April 27, 1953—6 p. m.

262. Had long, unhurried, very friendly talk with Prime Minister Malan this morning (Embtel 256, April 22).[1] Asked Malan whether he had received copy of President's speech (Embtel 246, April 17).[2] He said [garble] Capetown but was then and until now pre-occupied with election matters. He had it at home, where he wanted to study it carefully. He was glad South African press, in spite of election news and comment, had given so much space to it. Peace gestures by Malenkov[3] should be treated cautiously. Not first of such gestures by Moscow and nothing came from any of them in past.

I congratulated him on his party's election victory. Said I was impressed with his party's organization. He thanked me and said opposition better organized this time than ever before and had much more money than Nationalists.

His government now in strong position, I commented. I had noted his conciliatory gestures toward English-speaking elements since election (Weeka 478, April 24).[4] Speaking now as his friend and friend of South Africa and being conscious of concern felt at home both in and outside government over disruptions that might arise from racial tensions, could not some accompanying reassuring move be made by his government in field of native relations. Could not native leaders be invited for direct talks. Malan replied that even before his government came to power, natives themselves had said they would have nothing to do with natives' representative council, which had been intended by such liberals as Hofmeyr[5] to serve as common meeting place. When his government came to power, there was, therefore, no permanent body for common consultation. The need had been filled and would continue to be filled by his Minister for Native Affairs, who personally visits reserves and is in personal contact with native groups to far greater extent than any previous Minister for Native Affairs. As for Coloreds, when "once they have been removed from common rolls", government plans establish statutory body of Coloreds, elected by Coloreds for handling affairs of Coloreds. Before leaving this subject, he did want to give me the assurance that his government would serve interests not of just one group of people of South Africa but interests of all the people in the country.

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[1] Not printed. In response to the Department's telegram 149, Apr. 21, *supra*, Gallman stated, in telegram 256, that prior to receipt of the telegram he had decided to make an approach to Prime Minister Malan on the race question and had requested an appointment to see him. Gallman's plan was to discuss President Eisenhower's speech of Apr. 16, congratulate Malan on his party's victory, and then suggest that in his strengthened position Malan could make some move, such as an invitation to native leaders for direct talks. (745A.00/4-2253)

[2] Not printed. (611.00/4-1753). Eisenhower's speech, made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and broadcast nationally, contained an appeal for the reduction of the burden of armaments through international agreements. It is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 599-603.

[3] In a brief statement on foreign policy made to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (Soviet parliament) on Mar. 15, 1953, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Georgiy Maksimilianovich Malenkov spoke of the Soviet Union's readiness to settle peacefully all unresolved and disputed questions with other nations, including the United States. For documentation regarding the Malenkov statement, see volume VIII.

No basis for fear language rights of English-speaking element would be interfered with, he continued. In fact, Union, which has in effect become sovereign has no quarrel with Britain. Union wants strong Britain and, under US leadership, wants to cooperate with Britain and rest of Western world in struggle against Communist threat from East.

Malan leaves for coronation[6] May 14 returning about June 15. On way back will visit flood devastated area Holland and Israel at invitation of Israeli Government.

GALLMAN

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[4] Not printed. In this telegram the Embassy reported that Malan was making an open bid to obtain the support of the 12 to 13 members of the Opposition needed to constitute a two-thirds majority in Parliament for the Nationalists. (745A.00(W)/4–2453)

[5] Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, leader of the liberal wing of the United Party until his death in 1948.

[6] Reference is to the coronation of Elizabeth II, Queen of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of her other Realms and Territories, on June 2, 1953 in London.

745A.00/6–1953

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 19, 1953.

Subject: Ambassador Jooste's (South Africa) Call On You On Monday, June 22.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Raynor (BNA).

Discussion

Ambassador Jooste requested this call following a talk he had with you at some social function as he then received the impression that you wanted to talk to him further with respect to South Africa. We understand he plans to continue his exposition of the South African problem as he sees it.

For your background, you may be interested in some of the impressions gained by Mr. Raynor, Director of BNA, who has recently returned from a survey trip to the Union. Highlights thereof are attached.

Mr. Raynor will be available if you desire him to be present during the Ambassador's call.

Recommendations

(1) That you listen to Ambassador Jooste's exposition of the situation comparing it mentally with the general observations outlined in the attachment.

(2) That in the course of the conversation you find an opportunity to make the point that actions implementing the Group Areas Act or removing the colored from the voting rolls are bound to increase adverse public opinion in this country and thus limit the freedom of action on the South African cases which the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly will have this fall. (It is important that this observation not be made in a manner which the Ambassador could construe as a threat but stated by way of friendly advice.)

[Annex]

JUNE 19, 1953.

IMPRESSIONS FROM A VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA

1. The present Nationalist government is firmly in the saddle.

2. The Government holds the strongest kind of conviction that its present *apartheid* policy is correct. It is determined to carry it out and in the months ahead further implementation of the Group Areas Act in the major cities and an all-out effort to get the two-thirds vote in Parliament required to remove the Cape Colored from the common electoral roll can be expected. Both of these actions will intensify adverse public opinion in the United States and make it more difficult for the United States to play a moderating role in the UN discussion of South Africa.

3. There is no possibility of South Africa agreeing at this time to the minimum conditions acceptable to the UN on the status of Southwest Africa.

4. There has been a tremendous industrial and mining development in the Union. Further expansion will require not only foreign capital for the enterprises themselves but for underlying services such as the railways which are in bad shape. South Africa now has an International Bank loan application for railway rehabilitation pending.

5. The resistance movement among the natives has at least momentarily died out and there are signs that the *rapprochement* between the natives and the Indians is not a firm one. The extreme measures taken and to be expected by the present government must be building up bitter hatred which it would appear would cause serious trouble at some future date. Practically all objective observers in the Union, however, feel that the government has the means for some indefinite period ahead (five to ten years or possibly even longer) to control the situation by force, which they are perfectly able and willing to do. A conclusion reached was that while the situation, as we would view it, is most likely to get considerably worse before it gets better, it is unlikely to "blow up" in the near future.

6. The cleavage between the Afrikaners and the English-speaking European group is deep and the feeling bitter. It is felt, however, that the country will not be likely to break up over this issue.

745A.00/6–2253

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1953.

Subject: South African Problems

Participants: Ambassador Jooste, South African Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA

Ambassador Jooste opened the conversation by stating that he wished to elaborate somewhat on the background of the problems facing South Africa which came to the fore each year in the UN. He explained the fundamentals behind the development of the South African policy of *apartheid*. He said the European South Africans realized that something must be done for the natives, the natives must be given hope for a better life, they could not be kept in their present position forever, etc. He added that it was equally clear that his could not be done on an integrated basis as this would mean that the European population would be submerged and absorbed. Hence, the South

Africans were attempting to develop the concept of the development within the same country of separate societies.

He added that the discussion of this problem, condemnatory resolutions, etc., at the UN were having the effect of making the carrying out of this policy most difficult indeed. There was discussion at this point as to whether the UN was going further than it should go on matters of this type which were primarily questions of domestic jurisdiction.

The Secretary, after pointing out that he had not visited South Africa (the Ambassador had expressed regret that the Secretary on his several trips had not been able to get to South Africa) and that he had not gone into this question with his advisers, had the personal impression that the Europeans in South Africa were sitting on a keg of dynamite and that the present policies would lead to some kind of an explosion.

The Ambassador said that he fully realized that they were sitting on a keg of dynamite but he said that the Europeans were the ones who would be blown up when the keg exploded. Hence, there was full realization that the problem must be solved and that this was what they were trying to do but that UN intervention was making it most difficult indeed. He appealed for a sympathetic understanding of the South African problems in the UN. He pointed to the fact that he had failed by a matter of one vote to stop the establishment last fall of the Commission on *apartheid* and pointed out that the U.S. had abstained on the vote.[1] He said this had resulted in the development of a certain antagonistic feeling in the Union towards the U.S. and he mentioned this fact not by way of recrimination but because he thought the Secretary should know of this feeling.

On leaving the Ambassador stated that he would like to continue these talks so that the Secretary would have a better background on the South African questions before the meeting of the General Assembly this fall.

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[1] Apparently reference is to the Commission, established under resolution 616 A (VII) for the purpose of studying the racial situation in the Union of South Africa and reporting to the General Assembly. See editorial note, p. 976. This resolution, on which the United States abstained, was adopted in the General Assembly by a vote of 35 in favor, 1 opposed, with 23 abstentions. The vote on the first paragraph, which established the Commission, was 35 in favor, 17 opposed, with 7 abstentions (including the United States). Within the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, votes on individual paragraphs ranged from 44 in favor, 1 opposed, with 12 abstentions to 32 in favor, 7 opposed, with 18 abstentions. The *Ad Hoc* Committee adopted the resolution as a whole by a vote of 35 in favor, 2 opposed, with 22 abstentions. The *Ad Hoc* Committee also rejected a motion by South Africa on competency by a vote of 45 opposed, 6 in favor, with 8 abstentions.

745A.00/8–1353

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAPETOWN, August 13, 1953.[1]

No. 57

Ref: Embassy's Despatches No. 410 of March 2, No. 488 of April 29,[2] No. 559 of June 11,[3] and No. 14 of July 30, 1953.[4]

Subject: Further Evaluation of the South African Scene

In Despatch No. 410 of March 2, 1953, I gave an evaluation of the South African scene as I saw it after somewhat over a year in the country. Six months have now passed since that appraisal was made. I feel it might be well once more to take an overall look at developments.

During these past six months I have talked freely and widely about the trend of internal developments with a considerable number of people. These people, I think, make up a good cross section of the thoughtful, responsible element of the population. There were among them Government officials, members of Parliament, party workers, and representatives of business and the professions.

Basically, I should say, the situation is pretty much as I described it early in March of this year. There is no immediate threat to public security from action by any widely organized group of non-Europeans. No visible, comprehensive and really significant advance has been made during these past six months in organization among the non-European element, which is attributable in part to Government sponsored restrictive legislation. There has been, however, I think, a constant, steady growth of sensitivity among non-Europeans about discriminatory treatment and of the conviction that action, not necessarily violent, must be taken to assure a life of some measure of dignity, opportunity, and comfort. Things are shaping up, I should say, where a leader or leaders of intelligence, character and vision could, before too long, get a fairly wide response to appeals for enlarged and more effective organization. The growing consciousness I have mentioned I sensed from public statements made during the past few months by Native leaders and European students of race relations, and from talks I have had myself with Natives and some Coloreds outside the leadership group. There have also continued the usual sporadic and scattered nonviolent demonstrations against discriminations.

But from the talks I have had during these past six months with

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[1] This despatch arrived in the Department of State on Aug. 28, 1953.

[2] Not printed. In this despatch, the Embassy conveyed an account of a conversation between Gallman and Malan. (745A.13/4–2953)

[3] Not printed. In this despatch, the Embassy reported on the formation of new political parties within the Union of South Africa. (745A.00/6–1153)

[4] Not printed. In this Pretoria despatch, Gallman reported on a trip which he had taken to Mozambique and the Rhodesias. (123 Gallman, Waldemar J.)

South Africans both in and outside the Government, I have also sensed a growing awareness of the need for positive action in easing growing tension among non-Europeans if ultimately widespread disruptions or even disorders are to be avoided. These particular talks with Government officials which I have mentioned I should explain were mainly with the civil servant class.

I have been following a standard approach during these past few months in sounding out opinion on how best to proceed to meet the number one problem, adjustment of white-black relations. I generally start with the observation that the complexity of the problem makes it virtually impossible, even with the best will imaginable, to draw up now a comprehensive, definitive plan for peaceable regulation of white-black relations. A long-term solution must be approached on a day-to-day, trial-and-error basis motivated by good will and an honest desire to find a just and balanced answer. Time is therefore essential, and to gain time some "safety valves" must be devised. Could not time be won in a more or less tranquil atmosphere by officially meeting with and maintaining pretty continuous contact with Native leaders—and they are as yet few in number—those few who have up to now emerged from the mass? Such contact, it is to be understood, of course, would be maintained without the intention of furthering only the personal position of the few leaders at the expense of the mass of Natives but with the sincere intent of working toward a long-term solution for the benefit of the mass of Europeans and Natives alike.

I have been struck with the unanimity of response to this line of reasoning. From Government officials of the civil servant class, party workers from both Nationalist and United Party camps, and from professional and business men the reaction has been the same. Contact and discussion with Native leaders, the consensus is, would serve as a "safety valve" and result in gaining essential time. During my recent trip through the Rhodesias, I tried out the same line of reasoning, and from officials and non-officials as well I got the same kind of reply as I have been getting in South Africa.

Shortly after the general election in April I tried unsuccessfully, during a talk with Prime Minister Malan, to get him or some members of his Cabinet to meet face to face with Native leaders.[5] On August 14 Malan is to receive a group of Coloreds, at their instance, who will give him their views on the Government's attempt to remove Colored voters from the common electoral rolls. While this group can speak for only a part of the Cape Coloreds (the "moderate wing" as Malan described it to me a few days ago) and while the move is probably meant primarily to confuse the European political opposition, nevertheless direct contact with a non-European element will at last take place on the Prime Minister level, and that is something to be noted. Also to be noted in this connection are the humanitarian provisions on the treatment of Natives appearing in the program of the recently founded Liberal Party[6] and, although to a lesser extent, also in the program of the new Natal Federal Party.[7] The need for direct dealings and exchanges with Native leaders is gradually being more widely recognized.

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[5] See telegram 262 from Pretoria, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 997.

A word about the atmosphere prevailing at the Cabinet level. In my talks in those circles I have been struck with how generally the future is viewed pessimistically. Not so long ago at my home one evening, two very prominent and very articulate and loquacious Cabinet members, in answer to my question as to how they viewed the future, replied without any hesitation, "most gloomily." One, the father of several children, added that he feared very much for their future.

The Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir John Kennedy, when I had my talk with him in Bulawayo last month, asked me whether members of Malan's Cabinet really feared the future or whether they were playing some game in saying so. A number of them, he explained, in recent visits to Rhodesia had in talks with him viewed the future of European-Native relations in the Union very pessimistically. I told Sir John that Cabinet members in talks I had had with them struck the same note and that I got the impression that they were sincere and really did fear the future.

Fear, I do believe, is the prime moving force behind the program of restrictive measures sponsored by the present Union Government. These men see a handful of whites in the midst of what to them seems countless blacks, a handful that has brought to this part of the continent Christianity and Western civilization in the nature of agriculture, mining and industrial methods, productive of vast wealth for which whites beyond the continent have benefited as well. They want to maintain their position in the same way as they always have, for themselves and their children, and they tell themselves that this is for the benefit of the whole Western world too. They are only too aware of the stirrings for an ampler way of life, materially and politically, among the Natives; but instead of weighing facts, particularly the fact of the ever growing disproportion in numbers between whites and blacks, with some detachment, they are seized with fear and the result is panic, and ever more restrictive, legislation. That fear, on that high level, must be overcome before one can view the long future with any measure of calmness. Fortunately, some forces are at play, as I have tried to indicate above, making gradually for a factual approach to the problem of white-black relations.

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[6] The Embassy in Pretoria reported that the Liberal Association of Capetown founded the Liberal Party on May 9, 1953. The Party's first statement of principles affirmed, among other points, the essential dignity of every human being, irrespective of race, color, or creed. Although its leadership was European, party membership was also open to non-Europeans. (Despatch 559, June 11, 1953; 745A.00/6–1153)

[7] Apparently reference is to the Union Federal Party. The Embassy in Pretoria reported that the Union Federal Party, organized in Johannesburg following the Apr. 15 election, was the latest expression of "English nationalism" in the Union of South Africa, which was sometimes called "the Natal stand", i.e. loyalty first to the British Crown and all the traditions it represented. Most of the Party's leaders and members had been active in the Torch Commando movement. The Party's principal proposal was for a federated Union of South Africa. (Despatch 559, June 11, 1953; 745A.00/6–1153)

I would, then, sum up the situation as of today with the observation that there still is not that degree of organization among Natives to cause one to expect nationwide disorders, threatening internal security on a nationwide scale. Awareness among Natives of their present mean way of life and a desire for an ampler one are, however, growing day by day, and no opportunity should be lost to encourage those who recognize the trend, in their efforts to spread the light.

My staff and I are trying quietly and unobtrusively to do that.

W. J. GALLMAN

UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa"

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Murphy) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1953.

RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA—UNITED STATES VOTE ON INCLUSION IN AGENDA

The Secretary has asked us to reconsider the question of how the United States should vote on inclusion of the *apartheid* item in the agenda.

On reconsideration, we still feel that the United States should continue to vote in favor of inclusion of the item, but should oppose any action censuring South Africa. There are listed below the points which have led us to this decision, and thereafter the arguments which might be used in pressing for a negative vote.

I will be glad to discuss these points with you at your convenience, with a view to working out a revised position paper to present to the Secretary.

Factors Favoring an Affirmative Vote.

1. Fundamentally we have based our position on the competence of the Assembly to discuss all matters "within the scope" of the Charter (Article 10). The Charter is replete with references to human rights. For instance, Articles 55 and 56 provide that all members should cooperate in promoting universal respect for and observance of human

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Popper (UNP) and Stein (UNP).

rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. It is charged that South Africa has embarked upon a *governmental* policy designed not to promote but to suppress systematically certain basic human rights. We do not think it can be argued that Article 2, Paragraph 7 prevents even a *discussion* of these charges, or that, even if the *apartheid* policy is a domestic matter, such a discussion constitutes "intervention" within the meaning of this paragraph.

2. This item was included in the agenda last year by a vote of 45 for inclusion, 6 against (Colombia, Australia, France, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom), with 8 abstentions. It is safe to assert that we will not be able to prevent the inclusion of this matter on the agenda this year; only a simple majority is required for inclusion.

3. The Seventh General Assembly set up a commission to study the international implications of the *apartheid* policy, asked the commission to report to the Eighth Session and decided to include this item on the agenda of the Eighth Session.[2] There is no precedent in the Assembly's history for refusing to consider a commission report for which it has asked. In fact when the Soviets opposed the inclusion of the Greek and Korean items on the agenda we branded their position as absurd on the ground that in both cases the Assembly had set up commissions whose reports it could not refuse to review.

4. A reversal of our past position will be dramatized as a United States repudiation of the principle of free and open discussion in the Assembly. The United States will also be accused of sympathizing with the Malan policy and of siding with the white, "colonial" powers. Coming just after our stand on India as a participant in the political conference and our position on Morocco in the Security Council, the impact on public opinion in Asia and the Middle East will be serious. Our ability to win support for *any* of our policy objectives in the General Assembly will be reduced to a minimum, and Soviet influence in the Assembly correspondingly increased.

5. There will be an adverse reaction among substantial sections of United States public opinion.

6. We are pressing at this Assembly for a condemnation of Soviet forced labor practices, and we may decide in the future to bring other charges against the Russians for human rights violations. Can we expect support for such cases if we oppose discussion of *apartheid?*

Factors Favoring a Negative Vote.

1. It would definitely improve our position vis-à-vis South Africa,

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[2] General Assembly resolution 616 A (VII); see editorial note, p. 976. On Mar. 30, 1953, the General Assembly decided, on the proposal of the President of the General Assembly, that the Commission should be composed of the following persons: Dantes Bellegarde, Henri Laugier, and Hernán Santa Cruz, who were to serve in a personal capacity.

the United Kingdom, France and Australia. In strategic terms, this is clearly in our interest.

2. General Assembly resolutions have not caused South Africa to moderate its policies, and will not do so. Why should we agree to a repeat performance, year after year, in the Assembly? Why not confine Assembly action to matters in which it can make an effective contribution?

3. The Assembly last year debated this item at length, so that the issue of free discussion in the United Nations does not arise.

4. If we continue to permit discussion of such subjects, the Assembly will encroach farther and farther into the field of domestic jurisdiction. In the end, our own domestic policies may come under scrutiny.

UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa"

Department of State Position Paper[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1953.

SD/A/C.1/425

TREATMENT OF INDIANS IN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Problem

The Seventh General Assembly established a Good Offices Commission (Cuba, Syria, Yugoslavia) to arrange and assist in negotiations between South Africa and India and Pakistan on the question of treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa.[2] The Commission will presumably report failure to bring the parties together. This item was automatically included in the provisional agenda of the Eighth Session by the Assembly's action last year.

United States Position

1. Any solution to this problem lies in the resumption of direct negotiations between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Governments of India and Pakistan.

2. The United States should support a resolution which recommends direct negotiations and which follows generally the lines of the resolutions previously adopted by the General Assembly.

3. In the light of the negotiating situation, the Delegation should consider whether it would be advisable to seek to persuade Pakistan

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[1] This paper was prepared for the use of the U.S. Delegation to the Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly. A memorandum by Assistant Secretary Murphy to Secretary Dulles referred to this paper, among others, as a draft and indicated that it had "cleared with all of the interested Bureaus, except as follows: EUR believes that we should abstain or vote against the type of provisions outlined in recommendation 3, rather than follow our past voting pattern." (Sept. 4, 1953; Hickerson-Murphy-Key files, lot 58 D 33, "Notes/South Africa")

[2] UN General Assembly resolution 615 (VII).

and India to avoid the inclusion in their proposals of certain features of past General Assembly resolutions which, it may be argued, have presented an obstacle to the resumption of direct negotiations. These provisions are:

a. references to the Group Areas Act and to the fact that South Africa has proceeded with implementation of this legislation despite Assembly recommendations that implementation be suspended;
b. characterization of the policy of *apartheid* as being based on doctrines of racial discrimination, which has implied a criticism or condemnation of South Africa.
c. the establishment of United Nations commissions or agencies to play a role in the negotiations.

4. The United States should vote against any provision calling for automatically placing the item on the agenda of the Ninth Session, but the inclusion of such a provision should not of itself change the United States vote on the resolution as a whole. In voting on other individual paragraphs of the proposed resolution, the United States Delegation should bear in mind the voting pattern it followed on similar provisions at previous sessions. In the past, the United States has abstained or voted against references to the Group Areas Act and has voted for characterization of the *apartheid* policy as being based on doctrines of racial discrimination and for the establishment of United Nations agencies to assist in bringing the parties into direct negotiations.

Comment

Last year's resolution, in addition to establishing a Good Offices Commission also called upon the Union Government to suspend implementation of the Group Areas Act. This spring, India protested to the United Nations regarding new discriminatory measures initiated by South Africa.[3] Subsequently, South Africa informed the United Nations that the Indian question fell within its domestic jurisdiction and that it consequently did not recognize the Commission.

In view of its position denying the competence of the United Nations on the ground that the matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction, South Africa is unlikely to respond affirmatively to any United Nations resolutions. At the same time, for reasons of domestic opinion and national prestige India cannot afford to cease pressing its case in the Assembly. There may be some prospect for bringing the parties together outside the United Nations; it is conceivable that if this year the Assembly adopted a resolution merely calling upon the parties to negotiate, bilateral discussions might be resumed. However, India will probably insist on including provisions such as those in past resolutions regarding the Group Areas Act and establishing United Nations machinery to assist in the negotiations.

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[3] On Mar. 9, 1953, the Permanent Representative of India addressed to the Secretary-General a communication which focused attention on the intended early proclamation, by the Union Government, of further implementation of the Group Areas Act, in deliberate disregard of previous GA resolutions. A text of the document is annexed to the report of the Good Offices Commission. (Sept. 14, 1953, UN document A/2473)

UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa"

Department of State Position Paper[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1953.
SD/A/C.1/426

RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA RESULTING FROM POLICIES OF *APARTHEID*

The Problem

Thirteen Arab-Asian states submitted for inclusion in the agenda of the last General Assembly the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the *apartheid* policy of the Government of the Union of South Africa. The Assembly established a Commission to study the question; the Commission will report its conclusions to the General Assembly at the forthcoming Session. It also decided to retain this item on the provisional agenda of the 1953 Session.

United States Position

1. The United States should vote for inclusion of this item on the agenda. (For explanation, see comment below.)

2. While stressing its opposition to race discrimination, the United States should take the position that the Assembly has already fully discussed the *apartheid* problem and that further substantive action would be ineffective and undesirable. Subject to the Department's comment on specific proposals, this should be the criterion by which the Delegation should be guided in the voting. In particular, the United States should oppose any formal approval of the Commission's anticipated conclusions critical of South Africa, or the continuation of the Commission.

3. As a means of disposing of the mater, the United States could support a general resolution similar to one passed in 1952, calling upon all states to bring their human rights policies into accord with Charter principles.

4. The United States should vote against any proposal automatically including this item on the provisional agenda of the Ninth Session.

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[1] This paper was prepared for the use of the U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs, Robert D. Murphy, to Secretary Dulles referred to this paper, among others, as a draft and indicated that it had been cleared with all interested bureaus. (Sept. 4, 1953; Hickerson-Murphy-Key files, lot 58 D 33, "Notes/South Africa")

Comment

This item is already included in the provisional agenda as the result of action by the Seventh General Assembly. It was placed on the agenda of that Session by an overwhelming vote of 45–6–8; consequently it would be unrealistic to assume that our opposition to inclusion would result in deletion of the item from the agenda. Moreover, the Assembly has never asked a commission for a report and then refused to consider this report by reversing a prior decision to retain the item on its agenda. The United States last year favored discussion of this problem. The United States representative stated that the Assembly has the right to discuss this matter and that Article 2(7) cannot be taken as a bar to this right. This statement reflects the fact that the Charter is replete with references to human rights; and in particular United Nations Members have pledged themselves to cooperate in promoting respect for human rights (Articles 55 and 56). However, the United States opposed any Assembly action censuring South Africa and abstained on the proposal to establish the Commission. If the United States should now oppose even the inclusion of this question in the agenda it would open itself to propaganda charges of not only seeking to block free discussion but also of sympathizing with the Malan policy. Finally, our opposition to inclusion might seriously affect the Assembly support for our own charges against Soviet Communism based on its suppression of basic human rights (e.g., forced labor).

The Report of the Commission will undoubtedly indicate failure to make any progress in dealing with the problem. Discussion of the report should be utilized to demonstrate that there are no practical advantages in further Assembly action.

IO files, lot 71 D 440

Department of State Position Paper[1]

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1953.

SD/A/C.4/123

QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA: REPORT OF THE *AD HOC* COMMITTEE ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA

The Problem

To deal with the situation brought about by the inability of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa and the Union of South Africa to agree on measures for implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice to the effect that the mandated territory of South West Africa be placed under a form of United Nations supervision. Although this question was postponed by the Seventh General Assembly, and the *Ad Hoc* Committee (of which the United States is a member) was asked to continue its efforts to negotiate an agreement with the Union, meetings between the Committee and representatives of the Union have proved fruitless.[2] Under the circumstances it is unlikely that the Assembly will continue this Committee, but efforts may be expected to put pressure on the Union to proceed with implementing the Court's opinion or to condemn the Union for not having done so.

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[1] This paper was prepared for use of the U.S. Delegation to the Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly.

United States Position

1. The United States should continue to support implementation of the Court's opinion.

2. The United States should take the position that it would be inappropriate to urge the Union to place South West Africa under trusteeship as such a proposal would go beyond the Court's opinion. In the event that a proposal to this effect is nonetheless put to a vote, the United States should abstain.

3. The United States should seek to keep the door open to a possible future agreement between the Union and the United Nations regarding South West Africa. Consequently, while it might concur in a resolution regretting the failure thus far to implement the Court's opinion, it should oppose an overtly condemnatory resolution.

Comment

The disposition of the mandated territory of South West Africa has been a subject of discussion in the United Nations since 1946. The

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[2] On June 25, 1953, the Representative of the Union of South Africa repeated to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa his government's position that South Africa had no binding responsibility to the United Nations for the administration of South West Africa; and he reiterated the South African proposal that a new instrument, concerning the administration of the territory, be concluded between the Union of South Africa and the three remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers of World War I (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The South African Representative then asked whether the Committee as a whole had decided formally to reject this proposal. The formal response of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was delivered to the Representative of the Union Government on July 10, 1953. It stated that the South African proposal "did not provide for means for implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and did not recognize the principle of supervision of the administration of South West Africa by the United Nations." The Committee, which had been commissioned under resolution 570 (VI) to seek means of implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, therefore, stated that it was unable to accept the proposal as a basis for detailed discussion. The Committee also noted that "negotiations for a new international instrument could be undertaken only by the United Nations, acting through an agency appointed by any responsible to it." (Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa to the General Assembly, Sept. 21, 1953, UN document A/2475) A draft of the Committee's response and an explanatory memorandum were forwarded to Secretary Dulles by Sandifer (UNA) on July 6, 1953. A handwritten note attached to the draft indicates that it was approved by Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, but that the Secretary did not see it. (ODA files, lot 60 D 512, "South West Africa, 1953")

Union considers the League of Nations mandate non-existent and wishes, in effect, to assimilate the territory to the Union.

The United Nations objects to such assimilation, especially under present segregation policies of the Union; urges trusteeship or some other form of United Nations supervision; and has appointed a Committee of five (Thailand, Norway, Syria, Uruguay, and the United States) to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with the Union.

The International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion on the matter in 1950, *inter alia*, as follows:

a. The mandate continues in force;
b. It cannot be altered unilaterally
c. The supervisory function of the League should be exercised by the United Nations, but in a manner which would not "exceed" the supervision applied under the Mandates System.

The Union Government rejects the Court's opinion and has made a proposal that an Agreement might be made with the three remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers (United Kingdom, France, United States) as principals, but not as *agents* of the United Nations. The United States and the United Kingdom have indicated they would consider this only if approved by the United Nations. The United Nations, however, finds this unacceptable.

The United States and the United Nations have approved the advisory opinion of the Court and this has been the basis of the negotiations.

As the Union of South Africa rejects the opinion. especially the provision for United Nations supervision, no arrangement satisfactory to the General Assembly and the Union has been found.

In its most recent communications to the representatives of the Union (July, 1953), the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa sets forth in detail the reasons for which the Union's proposal is unsatisfactory and urges the Union to accept the principle of international supervision "so that the negotiations concerning South West Africa may be brought to a satisfactory conclusion". To date there has been no reply to this communication from the Union.

IO files, lot 71 D 440

Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Eighth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, October 14, 1953

SECRET NEW YORK, October 26, 1953.

US/A/M(Chr)275

[Here follow a list of 47 persons present at the meeting, including United States Representatives Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Governor James F. Byrnes, and Frances Bolton; a brief mention of an administrative matter; a background description of the question of the Indians in South Africa; and a summation of the United States position on this item as contained in the paper of September 4, 1953, page 1007.]

Mr. Meeker noted the following long-range aspects the Delegation would wish to consider. First, there was concern felt by the United States and others at what was happening to the individual and human rights of the people. Second, if the situation became worse, there would be fear for the future of the Union of South Africa. Another consideration was the strong interest of the United States in obtaining uranium there. It was also felt that the General Assembly should not debase its currency by adopting too many resolutions which would be disregarded.

Ambassador Lodge called upon Mrs. Bolton as the Delegate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on this item to express her views.

Mrs. Bolton related a conversation she had had with Ambassador Jooste of the South African Delegation. In discussing the question of why South Africa carried on its discriminatory practices, Ambassador Jooste had said they did so because of a fear of being taken over if the groups were not separated. They feared being overwhelmed and done away with. He showed no concern for the Indians and Mrs. Bolton gained the impression of a very closed-minded attitude.

Mr. Ward Allen reported he understood the South Africans continued to be willing to meet with the Indians and Pakistanis with or without an agenda but would not do so within the framework of a United Nations resolution. Mrs. Bolton, however, pointed out that the Indians had a certain justification for their refusal to negotiate while the Group Areas Act was being implemented.

Mr. Taylor raised the question of what our line should be under paragraph 3 of the Department's position (SD/A/C.1/452).[1] Mrs. Bolton thought we should do everything we could to bring the three governments together into conference.

Mr. Meeker wondered whether, in light of the Moroccan situation,[2] and others, we could expect to persuade the Indians and Pakistanis to drop certain elements from their probable draft resolution, or whether it would be better merely to have general discussions with them. Mr. Satterthwaite did not believe we could get very far in view of the emotional aspects, and thought it would be better to conduct general discussions.

Ambassador Lodge thought there was very little we could do on this subject in relation to the Moroccan item saying that if we went any distance on the latter, the French would think we wanted to take over Morocco. He thought we would risk doing more harm than good.

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[1] Reference is to document SD/A/C.1/425, dated Sept. 4, 1953, p. 1007. Apparently this document and several others were subsequently renumbered.

[2] For documentation on U.S. interest in the General Assembly's consideration of the Moroccan situation, see pp. 599 ff.

Mr. Carey spoke briefly on the doubts which had been raised about the utility of United Nations machinery. He said that not only the parties involved but the great governments of the world were concerned. He felt there ought not be any reservations about such utility. In connection with the hesitancy about too many resolutions, he pointed out that the United Nations existed for the purpose of resolving disputes. He felt we should continue to explore the possibility of using United Nations machinery and did not believe we should advocate a resolution indicating doubt. He favored an approach expressing hope.

Dr. Mayo felt the matter came down to a factor of time. He felt we might not have the machinery which would correct the situation immediately and what we were after was to provide the necessary time.

In answer to Mr. Carey, Mr. Meeker expressed the view that the doubts were not addressed to the functions of the General Assembly, but related to experience with Good Offices Commissions and similar efforts. Perhaps for the 8th session, we need a slightly different appeal.

Mr. Satterthwaite expressed the hope that the South Africans would sit in on the debate on the item.

2. *Plenaries*

Mr. Taylor reported that a new series of plenary meetings had been set for the end of the following week, probably Friday,[3] to take up the resolutions passed thus far in the committee.

The meeting then adjourned.

Bess N. Trinks

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[3] Oct. 16.

UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa"

Memorandum by Armistead Lee of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs to the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs (Allen)

SECRET [Washington,] October 15, 1953.

Attitude of South African Moderates Towards UN Debates and Resolutions on *Apartheid*

While Ambassador Gallman's telegram of October 7 [1] reaffirms that "virtually all white South Africans" are of the opinion that UN discussion of the Indian and *apartheid* items are "unwarranted interference in the Union's domestic affairs", this may not be exactly what Mrs. Bolton wanted to know. As I understand it, she was asking whether the total impact of the UN debates and resolutions was an encouragement to those moderate and liberal South Africans who are opposing the *apartheid* policies of the Nationalist Government.

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[1] Not printed. On Oct. 2, 1953, during a meeting of a working group of the U.S. Delegation in New York, U.S. Representative Frances P. Bolton raised the question of whether General Assembly debates and resolutions were in any way helpful to moderate groups within the Union of South Africa, or whether they were counterproductive, or had no observable effect. (Telegram Delga 56 from New York, Oct. 2, 1953; 320/10–253). Consequently, the Department of State forwarded telegram Delga 56 to the Capetown Embassy and requested a specific

This is one issue which has been foremost in our minds here in BNA ever since the Indians first proposed an item on "race conflict" for last year's Assembly. We consulted Ambassador Gallman on this point last fall, when he was in Washington,[2] and his judgment then has been confirmed by subsequent events. We have encouraged the Embassy to give special attention to reporting events bearing on this subject during the past year. These reports have all led to the same conclusion. This conclusion has been further confirmed by non-official Americans who have visited the Union (like Douglass Steere of the Friends Service Committee) and by liberal South Africans with whom we have talked here (Professor Houghton of Rhodes University and Cedric Hahn, whose distaste for the racial policies of his Government has caused him to resign from the South African Embassy here). Finally, our judgment on this point was confirmed as a result of the recent visit to the Union by the Director of our Office, Mr. Hayden Raynor, who made a point of sounding out such liberals as Mrs. Margaret Ballinger, M.P., Natives representative in Parliament and President of the newly-formed Liberal Party, as well as Professor Leo Marquardt who (together with Alan Paton) is one of the Vice Presidents of the Liberal Party. He also talked to Father Huddleston, the Anglican priest whose work in the native slums of Johannesburg is internationally known.

Briefly, the conclusion is that condemnatory resolutions by the UN, directed against the conduct of race relations in South Africa, arouse the resentment of both moderates and reactionaries, and that its total effect is to mobilize behind the Government many Europeans who are basically opposed to the Nationalist Government's racial policies.

The proof of this is to be found in the references to UN interference in the Parliamentary session and in the campaign preceding the general elections last April. So far from being embarrassed by the attacks on South Africa in the United Nations, the Nationalist Government appeared to go out of its way to remind the voters of what had hap-

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comment (Telegram 30 to Capetown, Oct. 5, 1953; 320/10–253) Ambassador Gallman's response, dated Oct. 7, 1953, was: "on basis our observations and exchanges we have been having with observant South Africans, we must reiterate that virtually all white South Africans are of firm opinion that UN discussion of Indian and *apartheid* items are unwarranted interference in Union's domestic affairs." (Telegram 33 from Capetown, Oct. 7, 1953; 320/10–753)

[2] No record of this conversation could be found in Department of State files.

pened in the 7th General Assembly. It was mentioned in the Government's Speech from the Throne, and in numerous speeches by Government leaders during the pre-election session. The Government gloried in its role of defending South Africa from interference by the UN, and by Asian and Arab countries whose caste-ridden and feudal societies hardly qualified them to point the accusing finger.

By contrast, the Opposition, fighting desperately for the marginal voters, was put on the defensive by the UN issue. They were compelled to take a "me-too" position whenever the subject was raised, and to insist that this was not an election issue.

I would not go so far as to say that UN interference was *the* decisive issue which beat the United Party in the elections. I do feel quite positive, however, that its total effect was to help the Nationalists. Both Mr. Hahn and Professor Houghton, an economist and liberal-minded South African specialist on native affairs, were quite emphatic when questioned on this point. Houghton mentioned also that the Nationalists had another gratuitous windfall, on the very eve of the election, when Nehru made a speech attacking the South African Government. He thought that this had won a number of marginal voters to the Nationalists at the eleventh hour.

That some of the moderate leaders of the African National Congress appear to be aware of this aspect seems borne out by the fact that Dr. Moroka, who was then President of the African National Congress, declared publicly in regard to the Passive Resistance Campaign (which the ANC was conducting) that this was a *domestic* issue. Another moderate native leader . . . did not expect the UN debate to do any good, although he did think that the U.S. Government, acting outside the UN, might achieve somthing by tactfully urging the Government to meet with the native leaders.

I do not wish to give the impression that all of these sources are unanimous in believing that the United Nations should have nothing to say on the subject of race relations, or that any action by the UN is an obstacle to the forces of moderation in South Africa. Many of them seem to feel, as we do here in BNA, that the UN can help if it stays within its Charter limitations in this field. It can help by stating, and restating in more explicit terms, the general standards of human rights incumbent on all members while avoiding a condemnation of the domestic policies of any one member nation.

It was with this purpose in mind that we supported the Scandinavian resolution last year. Although it was finally adopted, whatever help it might have afforded liberal elements in South Africa was much diminished by the fact that it failed to replace the Arab-Asian resolution establishing the *Apartheid* Commission. I think it significant that published statements of the Liberal Party of South Africa, while referring occasionally to the ill will which the Nationalist racial policies have caused abroad, have carefully refrained from drawing attention to the statements of Michael Scott or the activities of the UN Commission meeting in Geneva.

You will understand why the above arguments cannot be used in public statements, except in the most general terms. We can hardly urge, in a public forum, that a given course of action by the UN should be avoided because it serves to perpetuate in office the Government of a member state with whom the United States enjoys friendly relations. But in private conversations with other delegations much of this could be said . . . . It is a pity that the Indians should not be more aware of how much their efforts both within and outside the UN last year, helped to keep Malan's Government in power.

320/10-2153 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, October 21, 1953—5 p. m.

Delga 144. Re: Indians in South Africa

Mrs. Bolton and working group have given thorough consideration to resolution tabled by 17 powers (A/AC.72/L.10).[2]

Group agreed this is not a good resolution from viewpoint of our objective to get parties resume their negotiations. Extensive criticism of South African Government and legislation particularly unhelpful.

It appears almost certain that no alternative resolution will be offered and 17-power resolution will pass regardless of US vote. It is conceivable that some of objectionable provisions such as reference to immigrants amendment bill [3] might be defeated in plenary under ⅔ rule. Crux of operative part of resolution is continuation of GOC with increased authority. Although GOC most likely will not be helpful it would be difficult for us not to support its continuation.

In view of above, Mrs. Bolton and working group agree in paragraph-by-paragraph vote US should vote against entire paragraph beginning with "expresses its regret",[4] against following paragraph beginning with "considers"[5] and against last two paragraphs of resolution.[6] We should vote yes on remaining paragraphs.[7]

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[1] Marginal notation by an unidentified source states: "Lodge cleared the telegram. Told Mrs. Bolton to do what she thinks right."

[2] Not printed. The draft resolution was tabled in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Oct. 16, 1953 by Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. The Committee considered this item from Oct. 16 to 29. A text of the draft resolution is in telegram Delga 125 from New York, Oct. 16, 1953. (320/10-1653)

[3] The Immigrants Regulation Amendment Act, adopted in September 1953, restricted the ability of Indian women and children, born outside the Union of South Africa, to join their husbands and fathers in South Africa.

Whether or not any of objectable paragraphs is eliminated, Mrs. Bolton and working group (with one dissent) believe US should vote for resolution as a whole.

Choice is between abstention and affirmative vote. Latter appears preferable because:

(*a*) As matter of principle great power like US should not abstain on an important political matter where there is no other resolution on which we would take definite stand.

(*b*) We supported Indian resolution on this subject last year. A switch from affirmative vote to abstention will be interpreted to effect that new administration is moving closer to "colonial powers" in every area. This interpretation will be strengthened by more negative attitude we shall take in *apartheid* case and by our vote on North African issues.

LODGE

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[4] This section of the draft resolution reads: "Expresses its regret that the South African Government: (*a*) Has refused to make use of the commission's good offices or to utilize any of the alternative procedures for the settlement of the problem recommended by the four previous resolutions of the GA; and (*b*) Has continued to implement the group areas act in contravention of the provisions of three previous resolutions; (*c*) Is proceeding with further legislation contrary to the charter and the universal Declaration of Human Rights including the Immigrants Regulation Amendment Bill which seeks to prohibit the entry into South Africa of wives and families of nationals of Indian origin."

[5] This section of the draft resolution reads: "Considers that these actions of the Union Government are not in keeping with its obligations and responsibilities under the charter of the UN."

[6] These two paragraphs called again upon South Africa to refrain from implementing the Group Areas Act and for inclusion of this item on the provisional agenda for the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly.

[7] The remaining paragraphs of the draft resolution recalled, in detail, previous resolutions, earlier actions taken by the General Assembly, and the report of the Good Offices Commission; decided to continue the Good Offices Commission; and requested the Commission to report to the next session of the General Assembly. (UN document A/2473)

320/10–2453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 24, 1953—1:04 p.m.

Gadel 41. Re Indians in South Africa.

1. Department agrees with GADel's appraisal 17-power draft resolution (A/AC.72/L.10),[1] particularly that inclusion of contentious

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[1] See telegram Delga 144, *supra*.

paragraphs re South African Government and legislation likely to continue to impede or even frustrate entirely any possibility for resumption direct negotiations. GADel's plans for US vote in paragraph-by-paragraph vote on resolution consistent with position paper and past US voting pattern. While we would have preferred that GA simply call on parties to resume negotiations, we agree would be difficult for US not to support continuation GOC, despite fact utility any UN conciliatory machinery doubtful.

2. Department considers that sub-paragraph C of second operative paragraph referring to Immigrants Regulation Amendment Bill definitely inappropriate for GA action. In past US has seriously questioned policy and wisdom of specific reference by UN to domestic legislation in Union. In fact, GADel may find it desirable to point out informally that any GA reference this new legislation quite likely to be counter-productive. Department suggests analogy made by Dayal to case of Soviet wives, raised by Chile in 1948, not in point since our understanding is that new South African legislation simply places Indian-born wives and children of South African Indians on same basis as other immigrants.

3. Regardless of outcome of voting on objectionable provisions of resolution, Department agrees with GADel view that US should vote for resolution as a whole, taking account reasoning advanced Delga 144 and importance not compromising basic US position on racial discrimination.

DULLES

Editorial Note

During deliberations by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the item, the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, the 17 powers presented a revised version of their draft resolution, which incorporated minor drafting changes. (UN document A/AC.72/L.10/Rev. 1) On October 28, 1953, the Political Committee adopted an amendment proposed by Costa Rica, which changed paragraph 5(*b*) of the revised draft to read: "express its regret that the South African Government: has continued to implement the Group Areas Act in spite of [formerly "in contravention of"] three previous resolutions." The Committee then adopted, voting paragraph by paragraph, the draft resolution as amended. (UN document A/AC.72/L.11) For United States Representative Bolton's statement before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on this item, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 23, 1953, pages 728–729.

UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa"

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 7, 1953.

Subject: Treatment of Indians in South Africa

Discussion:

The attached telegram (Tab A) [2] is a reversal of the position recommended by Mrs. Bolton in October and approved by the Department at that time. The only reason for the reversal appears to be Delga 230 [3] (Tab B) which indicates that Mrs. Bolton has shifted her position and now thinks that if the "objectionable" paragraphs cannot be voted down we should abstain from the resolution as a whole rather than vote for it.

We consider this problem to be markedly different from the North African situation in which the issue is between a metropolitan power and its dependent peoples over the question of a larger measure of self-government; the South African problem is essentially a question of civil and human rights involving discriminations on the basis of race and color. We understand that our national policy is opposed to racial discrimination. Our abstention on the resolution would in our opinion be widely interpreted as a step backward and by some a repudiation of the principles which we have widely publicized as guiding our approach to the color problem.

Furthermore, our abstention would be a strong affront to the Indians at a moment when India is performing a highly important role in connection with Korea. The other sixteen powers which tabled the resolution also would find our abstention difficult to understand.

The draft resolution is attached (Tab C).[4]

Recommendation:

That the Department instruct our Delegation to vote for the resolution as a whole regardless of the Delegation's success in obtaining the removal of the paragraphs concerned.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Henry T. Smith, the Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.

[2] Not attached to source text. Presumably, the same as telegram Gadel 67, *infra*.

[3] Not printed. Telegram, marked "for the Secretary", reads: "Mrs. Bolton raises question whether affirmative vote on 17-power resolution (Delga 144) as a whole is consistent: (*a*) With our votes on North African items; and (*b*) With our negative votes on objectionable paragraphs in 17-power resolution. Request you consider again whether taking into account all circumstances US should vote in plenary in favor or abstain. Mrs. Bolton believes on balance we should now abstain. Item will probably be reached in plenary early next week." (845A.411/11-553)

[4] Not attached to source text. Evidently UN document A/AC.72/L.11.

845A.411/11–553 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 9, 1953—5 : 22 p.m.

Gadel 67. Re Indians in South Africa, Delga 230.[2]

On basis GADel's comments Dept has reviewed position.

We assume paragraph-by-paragraph vote, at least to cover objectionable paragraphs discussed Delga 144, will be requested in plenary. Since two-thirds majority will be required for adoption any paragraph, suggest GADel endeavor shift some of abstentions, and possibly even affirmative votes, into negative column. On basis our analysis committee vote, GADel might most profitably concentrate on paragraph 5(*c*),[3] which GADel should make serious effort to have removed. Closest vote (32–15–11) was on this paragraph which introduced only really new element in situation and shift of only two votes could defeat in plenary; Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina were among those abstaining who might be receptive GADel approach. Similar effort on paragraph 5(*b*)[4] might be made, but it is not radical departure from previous GA resolutions.

If GADel's efforts to defeat paragraph 5(*c*) succeed, then Dept believes GADel should, in light considerations previously advanced Delga 144[5] and taken into account Gadel 41,[6] again vote for resolution as a whole. Otherwise GADel authorized abstain.[7]

Although some similarities Dept believes many differentiating circumstances North African cases are such that they should not be considered as close parallel Indians matter.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Brown (UNP), approved by Popper (UNP), and cleared by Raynor (BNA), Smith (SOA), Runyon (L/UNA), and Murphy (G). Brown's initials are shown on all the clearances.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.

[3] Referenced paragraph expressed regret that the Union of South Africa was proceeding with legislation contrary to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as the Immigrants Regulation Amendment Bill.

[4] Referenced paragraph expressed regret that the Union of South Africa was continuing to implement the Group Areas Act, in spite of previous resolutions by the General Assembly.

[5] Dated Oct. 21, p. 1017.

[6] Dated Oct. 24, p. 1018.

[7] On Nov. 11, 1953, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, by a vote of 42 in favor, 1 opposed, with 17 abstentions. There was no vote on individual paragraphs. Although paragraph 5(c) was not deleted, the United States voted in favor of the resolution. For text of resolution 719 (VIII), see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17*, UN document A/2630.

845A.411/11-2453 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

NEW YORK, November 24, 1953—3 : 57 p. m.

Delga 313.

Race conflict in South Africa

Delegates of Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen this morning introduced following draft resolution in *ad hoc* committee on race conflict item:[1]

Verbatim text. The General Assembly

Having considered the report of the United Nations Commission on the racial situation in the Union of South Africa established under Resolution 616 (VII) (Doc. A/2505),

Noting with concern that the commission in its study of the racial policies of the Government of the Union of South Africa, has concluded that these policies and their consequences are contrary to the charter and the universal declaration of human rights,

Noting that the commission has also concluded that:

(*a*) "It is highly unlikely and indeed improbable that the policy of *apartheid* will ever be willingly accepted by the masses subjected to discrimination," and

(*b*) That the continuance of this policy would make peaceful solutions increasingly difficult and endanger friendly relations among nations.

Further noting that the commission considers it desirable that the United Nations should request the Government of South Africa to reconsider the components of its policy towards various ethnic groups,

Considering that in the Commission's own opinion, the time available was too short for a thorough study of all the aspects of the problem assigned to it,

Considering also the commission's view that one of the difficulties encountered by it was the lack of co-operation from the Government of the Union of South Africa and in particular its refusal to permit the commission to enter its territory,

1. *Expresses* appreciation of the work of the commission,
2. *Requests* the commission to continue its study of the development of the racial situation in the Union of South Africa,

(*a*) With reference to the various implications of that situation on the populations affected,

(*b*) In relation to the provisions of the charter and in particular to Article 14, and

(*c*) To suggest measures which would help to alleviate the situation and promote a peaceful settlement;

3. *Invites* the Governments of the Union of South Africa to extend its full co-operation to the commission,

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[1] UN document A/AC.72/L.14.

4. *Requests* the commission to report to the ninth regular session of the General Assembly.

LODGE

Editorial Note

Between November 6 and 12, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly considered the question of South West Africa and adopted two draft resolutions (A and B). Draft resolution A, among other points, recalled the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (July 1950), regretted South Africa's repeated refusal to assist in the implementation of the opinion, continued to maintain that South Africa had no international commitments as a result of the demise of the League of Nations, noted that South Africa had refused to submit information requested by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, and established, until such time as an agreement was reached, a Committee on South West Africa, whose principal tasks were to examine information and documentation on the subject, to prepare a procedure for the General Assembly's examination of reports and petitions, to continue negotiations with South Africa in order to implement the advisory opinion of the Court, and to report annually to the General Assembly. Draft resolution B reiterated previous General Assembly resolutions to the effect that the Territory of South West Africa be placed under the International Trusteeship System. (Report of the Fourth Committee, November 24, 1953, UN document A/2572; for United States Representative Bolton's remarks to the Fourth Committee, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 7, 1953, pages 805–806.)

At its 460th plenary meeting on November 28, 1953, the General Assembly first reduced the number of Committee members from nine to seven, and then adopted draft resolutions A (as amended) and B. The United States voted in favor of both parts of the resolution. (For text of resolution 749 A and B (VIII), see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17*, UN document A/2630.)

UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa"

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON], November 30, 1953.

Subject: U.S. Position on South African Race Conflict Item in UNGA.

Discussion:

1. Last year the General Assembly established a commission to study

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Brown (UNP).

the South African racial situation. The U.S. abstained because it considered this approach wrong. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee is now considering the Commission's report.[2] Seventeen members have introduced a resolution (Tab B)[3] which would continue the commission with increased authority to "suggest measures which would help to alleviate the situation and promote a peaceful settlement."

2. The Delegation in New York desires to abstain on this resolution in order that the U.S. does not appear as supporting racial discrimination.[4]

3. On the basis of our view that the commission approach is not helpful, the U.S. should logically vote against the 17-power text. However, UNA considers that the Delegation's judgment should be taken into account and therefore supports an abstention. SOA believes that an abstention is the least the U.S. should do, taking account of the principles involved and relations with the Arab-Asian states. While I would have preferred a negative vote, it will accept the Delegation's political judgment favoring an abstention. BNA believes that the U.S. should vote against the 17-power draft. It is convinced that the commission's continuation, with broadened terms of reference, is a further step leading up to actual intervention by the UN in a matter of domestic jurisdiction; that an abstention will undermine whatever moderating influence we may have in South Africa; and that liberal South African elements will be further weakened. BNA believes further that a negative vote would be salutary in the UN as indicative of a need for caution in getting into problems involving the domestic affairs of its members.

4. There is no disagreement in the Department regarding the second paragraph of the telegram recommending that the U.S. vote against the South African resolution (Tab C)[5] on competence.

Recommendations:

1. If you determine that the Delegation should be authorized, in accordance with its own recommendation, to abstain on the 17-power resolution, you should sign the attached telegram. (Tab A)[6]

2. If you decide that the Delegation should vote against the resolution, the telegram will be amended accordingly, pointing out to the Delegation that our opposition to racial discrimination can be stated in a speech.

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[2] The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee considered the item, race conflict in the Union of South Africa, between Nov. 20 and Dec. 5, 1953. The Commission's report was submitted to the General Assembly on Oct. 3, 1953. (UN document A/2505 and Add. 1)

[3] Not attached to source text. Draft resolution (UN document A/AC.72/L.14) is printed in telegram Delga 313, Nov. 24, 1953, p. 1022.

[4] Telegram Delga 322 from New York, Nov. 25, 1953. (845A.411/11-2553)

[5] Not attached to source text.

[6] Not attached to source text. Presumably, the same as telegram Gadel 107, *infra*.

845A.411/11-2353 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 1, 1953—5:18 p. m.

Gadel 107. Re *Apartheid* Case (Delgas 312,[2] 313,[3] 322[4]):

1. We continue believe approach in 17-Power Resolution (Delga 313) not appropriate for this problem and consider Commission's operation and report confirm futility of exercise. We do not like proposed new authority for the Commission "to suggest measures which would help to alleviate the situation and promote peaceful settlement". Consequently, we would have considered logical for US to vote against this resolution. We assume from Delga 322 that Delegation's recommendation for abstention motivated by overriding desire not to have US appear as supporting racial discrimination. Therefore Delegation is authorized abstain. If resolution voted paragraph by paragraph, suggest you vote against paragraph 2(*a*) (i) in text A/AC.72/L.14.[5]

2. Department considered South African competence resolution (Delga 312). In view of well established South African position, we are compelled to interpret word "intervene" to include discussion which goes beyond intent of paragraph 2(7). FYI. While we, of course, agree that subjects listed in first paragraph this resolution fall essentially within domestic jurisdiction of member state we are concerned that US human rights action program could never be implemented if UN should be absolutely barred from discussing such matters. End FYI.

We believe Lannung's approach (Delga 312)[6] is basically sound. In our view, matter before GA is not directed toward action on any of specific topics listed, but toward an expression of view by GA on overall South African race policy which is a subject within purview of Charter. Therefore, we feel South African resolution goes too far in implying lack of GA competence to discuss.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Popper (UNP) and Stein (UNP); approved by Popper; and cleared by Phleger (L), Sandifer (UNA), Thacher (SOA), and the Secretary's office.

[2] Not printed. In this telegram, the U.S. Delegation reported that the Union of South Africa had introduced in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee a draft resolution (UN document A/AC.72/L.13), which declared the Committee not competent to deal with the race question item and forwarded a text of the draft. The Delegation noted that the draft did not make clear the scope of the word "intervene" and sought to categorize a whole series of specifically named topics as being within domestic jurisdiction, regardless of possible treaty obligations. (320/11-2353)

[3] Dated Nov. 24, p. 1022.

[4] Not printed. In this telegram, the U.S. Delegation recommended that the United States should abstain on the 17-power draft resolution. (845A.411/11-2553)

[5] Referenced section of the draft resolution reads: "(2) requests the Commission (*a*) to continue its study of the development of the racial situation in the Union of South Africa: (i) with reference to the various implications of that situation on the populations affected."

[6] Not printed. The U.S. Delegation reported that, according to Danish Representative Hermod Lannung, Denmark would probably vote against the South African draft resolution as it appeared to include discussion within the scope of "intervention" and because the General Assembly was considering race conflict in South Africa in general and not considering specific topics listed in the South African draft. (320/11-2353)

We are seriously concerned at recent UN trend towards dealing with domestic matters. However, South African resolution would set up a legal barrier in such broad and vague terms that under its logic, UN activities could be drastically curtailed. For this reason, US Delegation should vote against South African resolution in its present form. Delegation should explain our position, reiterating substance Lodge's statement in General Committee on this case.[7]

DULLES

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[7] On Sept. 16, 1953, Representative Lodge, speaking in the General Committee, said that, while the United States would vote in favor of recommending the inclusion of the race conflict item on the agenda, the item "invited questions about the competence of the Assembly under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. The United States Government has observed with increasing concern the tendency of the Assembly to place on its agenda subjects, the international character of which was doubtful." (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, General Committee, Summary Records of Meetings 15 September–9 December 1953*)

Editorial Note

On December 5, 1953, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, in considering the item, race conflict in the Union of South Africa, rejected a South African draft resolution on competence, adopted an amendment by Chile to the 17-power draft resolution, which added references to previous General Assembly resolutions, and then adopted the 17-power draft as amended. At its 469th plenary meeting on December 8, 1953, the General Assembly rejected a resolution proposed by the Union of South Africa on competence and accepted an amendment by Chile and Uruguay to the 17-power draft resolution which added a paragraph pertaining to the administration of the Commission. The General Assembly then adopted the 17-power draft resolution, as amended, by a vote of 38 in favor, 11 opposed, with 11 abstentions. The United States abstained on this resolution as a whole in both the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and the General Assembly; but, on the paragraph by paragraph vote, the United States switched its vote from "opposed" in the former body to "abstain" in the latter on the provision concerning continuation of the Commission. The text of resolution 721 (VIII) is in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17*, UN document A/2630.

811.05145A/6-2253 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa, at Pretoria

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 7, 1953.

Subject: Program to Stimulate Private Investment in South Africa.

A-31. The Department has given careful consideration to the points raised in the Embassy's despatch No. 573 of June 22, 1953,[1] regarding the advisability of undertaking at this time a program to stimulate private investment in South Africa. The objective analysis of the exceptional situation in the Union is most helpful.

The problem as a whole has been studied in the Department at length and has been discussed also with other interested agencies. While the consensus is that it is in the national interest for the United States Government to move ahead in the direction of lending encouragement and assistance to the development of Africa as a whole, it is believed that the trend of repressive racial policies, and their explosive political and social implications, makes it unwise for this Government to sponsor any accelerated program directed toward American private investment in South Africa at this time. Any additional measures the United States Government might propose to the South African Government, to be carried out jointly with that Government, might well be unproductive economically and, more importantly, could effectively be utilized by the South African Government for political purposes as an indication of United States confidence in South African policies, thus contributing to the defeat of our objective of fostering a change to more liberal racial policies.

For the present, therefore, the function of the United States Government with regard to private investment in South Africa would appear properly to be limited to (*a*) encouraging the creation of conditions favorable to an inflow of foreign private capital; (*b*) negotiation of the FCN treaty; (*c*) continuing the program of assistance to business as outlined in the second paragraph of Embassy despatch No. 573.

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[1] Not printed. The referenced despatch was written in response to the Department's circular airgram CA-183 (Mar. 20, 1953; 811.05100/3-2053) which encouraged recipient posts to intensify programs to stimulate the flow of private American capital into the economic development of overseas areas. The Embassy in Pretoria's response described its current program within the Union of South Africa as follows: "to provide available economic data to visiting United States businessmen when requested, to assist them in making appointments with Government officials and other interested parties, and to express our views discreetly as to political trends and basic problems confronting the Union in the long term. We have neither directly encouraged nor discouraged new investment." Given the tensions arising from the country's racial situation, the Embassy cautioned against an accelerated program which stimulated American investment and thereby indirectly encouraged industrialization in the Union of South Africa. "Experience would suggest," it noted, "that increasing industrialization will aggravate prevailing tensions between White and non-White unless, and we feel that this is of fundamental importance, it is accompanied by a constructive policy of dealing with the root causes of unrest among the Native people." (811.05145/6-2253)

It is believed that the greatest service the Embassy can render to present and potential American investors in the Union is to continue to make every effort to bring influence to bear on the South African Government to moderate the policies which, among other effects, now causing reluctance on the part of United States investors.

The Department has noted with approval the Embassy's preliminary discussions with South African officials regarding the negotiation of an FCN treaty (despatch No. 75, November 2, 1953).[2] Further discussions with regard to the treaty may, in the Ambassador's discretion, provide the opportunity for obtaining information as to the extent of the desire of the Union Government for American private investment. If the foreign capital inflow continues to diminish, the possibility exists that South Africa may make overtures to the Embassy regarding the stimulation of American private investment or, specifically, as to the application to South Africa of the world-wide investment program. In such event, the Embassy would be in a position to discuss possible ways and means of stimulating investment so as to complement, rather than defeat, the broad objectives of the policy now being followed by the Embassy.

Any steps taken by the United States Government to stimulate American interest in investment possibilities in the Union would have to be preceded by a constructive policy by the Union of dealing with the root causes of unrest among the Natives, mentioned by the Embassy as of fundamental importance to the objective of promoting political stability. Were this to occur, the United States would then be able to suggest to the South Africans the following procedure:

1) In cooperation with appropriate members of the Union Government and of the South African business community, and with the participation of the Foreign Service establishments in the Union, implementation of a program to identify sound and practicable investment opportunities in South Africa.

2) The provision and dissemination in the United States on a continuing basis of background information which will keep the American investing community currently abreast of economic developments and of specific opportunities in the Union.

3) The FOA Guaranty Program.

4) The FOA Contract Clearing House System for identifying and disseminating investment opportunities.

Should occasion arise when the judicious advancement of the above program or certain phases of it appears to the Ambassador to be feasible as being possibly consistent with or helpful to our fundamental objective in the Union, the Department would appreciate being informed and more detailed information on the development of the various steps of the program will be forwarded.

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[2] Not printed. (611.45A4/11–253)

SMITH

845A.411/12-1753

Memorandum by Armistead Lee of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1953.

SUMMARY OF ATTACHED MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION [1] BETWEEN AMBASSADOR JOOSTE (SOUTH AFRICA) AND MR. RAYNOR, DIRECTOR BNA ON SOUTH AFRICAN REACTION TO U.S. POSITION ON *APARTHEID* CASE IN UN

During the course of the informal conversation, which was held at the Ambassador's request, he made the following points.

1. He feared that it would now be impossible for South Africa to participate in any future UN discussion of South African cases, including that of Southwest Africa, and would have nothing to do with UN committees or activities. He doubted, for instance, if South Africa could participate in the President's atomic energy proposal since it would be under the aegis of the UN.

2. He recalled South African support for various U.S. objectives in the UN this session, and mentioned two items (Puerto Rico and Forced Labor) on which he had succeeded in getting his own instructions changed to be closer to the U.S. position.

3. This was the third year, he said, that our votes on South African items had been different from what he had been led to expect by members of our delegation (and had accordingly reported to his Government). He implied that this had placed him in a difficult position with his Government, and said that they were also beginning to question U.S. integrity.

4. He was now asked to report on the reasons for our position, and particularly the change in our vote on the clause calling for continuation of the *Apartheid* Commission from negative in committee to abstention in the plenary. In his own reports, he stressed the factor of domestic U.S. politics, but his Government seemed to feel that the main factor was a desire to appease India at the expense of South Africa.

5. In reply, I said that while our awareness of the strong feelings of India and the Arab-Asians was a consideration we must keep in mind, I personally doubted that it was a major consideration. I added, also on a personal basis, that I felt that nothing would do more to help South Africa in world opinion than to plan and announce some dra-

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[1] Not printed. The conversation was held on Dec. 17, 1953. (845A.411/12-1753)

matic native housing development. He said something of this sort was contemplated.

6. Mr. Jooste kept reverting to his dismay at our position on competence and its contrast to that of almost all the NATO and older Commonwealth countries, including Canada. Although he personally still believed in continued cooperation with the UN, he appeared seriously worried about the effect on South Africa's future attitude towards the UN and the U.S.

UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa"

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 31, 1953.

QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR JOOSTE REGARDING U.S. POSITION ON *APARTHEID* CASE AT 8TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Jooste and Mr. Hayden Raynor,[2] which is returned herewith, raises two questions. First, the Ambassador seeks an explanation as to why the United States Delegation "switched from a negative vote in the committee to an abstention in plenary on the provision continuing the commission." Second, he states that he had been assured earlier in New York that the United States would oppose the continuation of the *Apartheid* Commission and had so reported to his Government which now wished to find out the reasons for the change in the United States position.

It is possible that Ambassador Jooste will request an appointment with you for the purpose of further discussion of these two matters. A copy of the resolution involved is attached for your use in any such conversation.[3] It might also be desirable for you to invite Mr. Leonard Meeker, L/UNA, and Mr. Ward Allen, EUR, who were directly concerned with this case in New York, to attend any discussion you may have with Ambassador Jooste.

With respect to the first point raised by Ambassador Jooste, the following facts are relevant:

1. As the result of a Delegation meeting which considered the position paper on this item, a telegram was sent to the Department recommending an abstention on the draft resolution before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.[4] In its reply the Department, on the direct deci-

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Brown (UNP) and cleared in draft by Meeker (L/UNA) and Allen (EUR).

[2] Reference is to the conversation of Dec. 17, 1953, a summary of which is printed, *supra*.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Not printed; telegram Delga 322 from New York, Nov. 25, 1953. (845A.411/11-2553)

sion of the Secretary, authorized the Delegation to abstain but suggested, in the event of a paragraph-by-paragraph vote, that the Delegation vote against paragraph 3(*a*) (i).[5] (This provision, which followed the request that the Commission continue its study of the racial situation in South Africa, asked that it do so "with reference to the various implications of the situation on the populations affected;" the suggestion that the United States vote against this one provision came directly from the Secretary.) Otherwise the Delegation was authorized to abstain on all provisions of the resolution, including that one in effect continuing the commission for another year.

2. Following Delegation consideration of these instructions and before any voting took place in the Committee, the contents of the Department's telegram were fully explained by Mr. Ward Allen to Mr. Jordaan (permanent South African representative to the UN), and the proposed US voting position made clear. Jordaan stated he would, of course, advise Ambassador Jooste immediately.[6]

3. The alleged inconsistency in the United States vote arose from the different way in which the resolution was divided, for purposes of paragraph-by-paragraph voting, in the committee and in the plenary.

> (*a*) *In the committee* the resolution was divided so that the committee vote was taken at one time on *all* of the following parts of paragraph 3: "requests the Commission (*a*) to contine its study of the development of the racial situation in the Union of South Africa (i) with reference to the various implications of the situation on the populations affected." Since the Department had suggested that the Delegation vote against paragraph 3(*a*) (i), the only way in which such a negative vote could be cast in these circumstances was to vote in the negative on the entire clause, even though this seemed also to imply a negative position on the other part of the clause, on which we would have abstained, had it been voted upon separately.
>
> (*b*) *In the plenary*, however, the resolution was divided for purposes of paragraph-by-paragraph voting in a different way. Paragraph 3(*a*) ("Requests the Commission (*a*) to continue its study of the racial situation in the Union of South Africa") was voted upon first, so that the United States abstained on this provision. Then paragraph 3(*a*) (i) ("with reference to the various implications of the situation on the populations affected") was put to the vote, and our Delegation, in accordance with the Department's suggestion, voted in the negative.

(In both Committee and plenary we abstained in the vote on the resolution as a whole.)

4. Following the vote in the plenary the South African Delegation asked our Delegation why the United States had changed its position respecting continuation of the Commission. Mr. Allen pointed out to Mr. Jordaan[6] the difference in the way in which the resolution had been put to the vote in the committee and in the plenary together with the fact that, as previously explained to the South African Delegation, the United States desired to abstain on all parts of the 17-power resolution except for paragraph 3(*a*) (i) on which it voted negatively.

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[5] Telegram Gadel 107 to New York, Dec. 1, 1953, p. 1025.
[6] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

As for the second point raised by Ambassador Jooste, that is, that he was given assurances that the United States would oppose the continuation of the Commission, he was, of course, given no "asssurances". In a preliminary conversation [7] on various South African issues early in the session with Mr. Allen before the Delegation's consideration of the *apartheid* item and before it was reached in the Committee, Ambassador Jooste was advised that the United States did not believe the Commission was useful or helpful (a position publicly stated in Committee by Mrs. Bolton) and that in the Department's view we should oppose its continuance. (This was in accordance with the Department's position paper.)[8] It was agreed that further consultations between the two Delegations would be held when the item was reached in the Committee and specific proposals were made. Contact was maintained with the South African Delegation and when the two draft resolutions were introduced, it was advised that voting instructions had been requested from the Department. As stated above, the South African Delegation was subsequently advised prior to any voting of the United States voting position.

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[7] Presumably, reference is to conversation between Allen and Jooste on Sept. 17, 1953. The memorandum of conversation by Allen, however, stated only that Allen outlined to Jooste the U.S. position on each of the three South African items on the General Assembly's agenda. It contained no specific comments on the Commission in question. (745X.00/9–1753)

[8] Dated Sept. 4, p. 1009.

745A.00/8–654

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRETORIA, August 6, 1954.

No. 45

Subject: Final Summarization of Views on South Africa [1]

This, after almost three years in residence in South Africa, is the final summarization of my views on the South African scene. It will be somewhat repetitious. Much that I have to say I have said before in somewhat more detail in previous despatches. But the fact that there is some repetition may not be without significance. It brings into relief the fact that there are present certain basic situations or problems that stand out and will persist for some time.

The Nationalists

The first fact, as I see it, for those interested in South Africa to face and accept is that the Nationalist Party, now in power, will remain in power for the foreseeable future. The Party's victory of 1948 was very substantially extended in 1953. Following that recent victory, its fortunes have even improved. In the by-elections held since April, 1953, the Nationalists have either held their own or increased their strength. The Opposition, the United Party, following its severe defeat in last year's election, has been weakened still more by the defiance, followed by expulsion, of the so-called "rebels" who brought out into the open the intra-Party dissatisfaction over leadership. Ineffectual leadership caused a still further, and probably in the long run more damaging, defection. That was the withdrawal from the Party of its more articulate liberal wing and formation by it of a separate Liberal Party, leaving the United Party more than ever, vis-à-vis the Nationalists, a mere "me too" party. One has on the one hand the Opposition United Party with weak leadership, divided counsel, and compromising actions; on the other, the Government party, the Nationalists, disciplined, with the rank and file following unquestioningly the Party program, finely organized down to the precinct level with Party workers on the job around the clock, and one real simple tenet of faith, "White supremacy," which actually means Afrikaner supremacy, preached day in and day out to the young, middle aged, and old; one simple, appealing article of faith with which to carry on and keep in power. The way it is tirelessly exploited by Cabinet Ministers on weekends and by the lesser Party devotees during the other five days of the week is indeed impressive.

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[1] Gallman left his post in the Union of South Africa on Aug. 15, 1954. His replacement, Ambassador Edward T. Wailes, presented his credentials to the Union Government on Nov. 29, 1954.

Whoever, therefore, has interests in South Africa or is contemplating acquiring interests in South Africa in the near future had better do his planning and base his calculations on the fact that he will have a Nationalist Government to deal with for quite some time.

The Non-European

This discussion of the non-European is concerned almost exclusively with the largest of the non-European element, the Bantu, or, as he is generally referred to, the Native.

In almost every activity in South Africa the Native plays some part. He works in the home, on the farm, on the streets, highways and railroads, in the mine and factory, and in the building trade. Something in each of these activities is left to him to do. Should he be brought into a nationwide organization with discipline and centralized leadership, no more than a nod from the top could conceivably tie up the economy and public services of the country at large, with incalculable repercussions on the security, health and wealth of the country. Such a calamity is not a present threat, for the requisite organization and leadership do not now exist. Given time, both could emerge. The elements are at hand; that is, fairly wide discontent with living conditions as prescribed by color bars, segregation and pass laws, and some, although numerically limited, Native leadership.

To eliminate this potential threat to the country's stability and security, time is needed to work out a more equitable way of life for European and non-European to carry on side by side. In some quarters, mainly non-Governmental, serious thought is being given to working out such a way of life. Until, it seems to me, this is done with all honesty, cooperatively, by Government and non-Government groups, the prospects for a sound, fair and long-term program are slim. The first prerequisite is the creation of an atmosphere free from present tensions in which to work out calmly and unhurriedly, in consultation with Native leaders, a long-range program. While there are no present indications that within a reasonable time this will come about, there are also no indications that the country now faces the danger of countrywide disaster. For the present, the danger is confined to possible sporadic, scattered disturbances.

Some leadership in passive resistance in the future may, as it did two years ago, come from the Indian element. Some leadership in a general movement of protest may eventually come from the more literate and better educated Colored group. The likelihood of this happening would be increased by discriminatory action against the Coloreds (as, for example, removal from the common electoral roll), the effect of which would be to force them away from cooperation with Europeans into collaboration with the Natives. It is among this more literate, better educated Colored element that, too, no doubt the most effective leadership for the Communist cause could be found, a leadership that would know how to exploit the Natives' discontent even though the Natives' understanding of Communism would be but vague, if not really non-existent, as is generally the case today.

Problems Facing South Africa

The problem of how to work out a stable way of life between Europeans and non-Europeans obviously overshadows every other problem which South Africa has to face. The other problems cannot, however, be ignored.

I once felt that differences within the European camp were a source of serious danger to the country. What I had primarily in mind was the cleavage between the English and the Afrikaner elements or, put in loose political terms, the struggle between the Nationalists and the United Party. While quite often the clashes and struggles between these European groups, as I have witnessed them, are very bitter, I do not think, as I once did, that there is danger of paralysis in the political field arising from them. What I have come to feel is that on any fundamental issue touching the relations of the European community as a whole with non-Europeans, all Europeans will be found, in principle, in agreement. They may not be in entire agreement on ways and means, but they are in agreement, I feel, on the end to be achieved. Still more I have come to feel, particularly in view of the outcome of the 1953 election and its aftermath, that in the narrow field of party struggle the Nationalists have now such a preponderance of power that the dangers of political paralysis are greatly diminished, if not nonexistent.

There are, though, dangers of a subtler kind that South Africans must recognize. They are dangers that all too few of them are conscious of. There are the dangers arising from geographic isolation, a benevolent climate, ready labor to do all menial work, and a too easy source of wealth from rich and varied mineral deposits. Future income from uranium production alone is vast, and that, let it be noted, is weath largely derived from what has until now been a waste product of gold mining.

He lives a rather self-satisfied, isolated existence. He suffers from not having near at hand the stimulation that comes from competition. The world over the past three hundred years has moved on and left him shut off in a fool's paradise of his own creating. All this has made for comparatively low standards. In his thinking and in the work he does, regardless of what field one examines, the South African is not only quite satisfied with something somewhat inadequate and indifferent, but he thinks it is up to, if not superior to, the standards insisted upon in Western Europe and the United States.

In all fairness I must add, however, that one does from time to time find a questioning attitude on prevailing standards among younger South Africans, those in their early thirties and twenties, and even among teenagers, and therein lies some hope for the future.

[Here follow a further exposition of Gallman's views on how climate, geography, and the presence of "near slave labor" had affected the South African character and a description of the South African press, radio, and bookstores.]

South West Africa

While South West Africa is in a sense also a problem for the Union, it has a peculiar importance and should therefore be dealt with, as I am doing here, in a section by itself. I do not think it is recognized by the present Government strictly speaking as a problem, but rather more as a source of annoyance and irritation in its dealings with the outside world, specifically, that is, with the United Nations.

The present Nationalist Government, like its predecessor the Smuts Government, regards South West as an integral part of the Union being administered as such in accordance with the terms spelled out in the original League of Nations mandate. To be called on for an accounting by an international agency is resented. It is coming to be regarded more and more as a challenge to the country's sovereignty and an intrusion into the country's domestic affairs.

Mandates lapsed with the passing of the League. The International Court ruled, in effect, that while South Africa could not unilaterally set up a new system for running the affairs of South West, neither could the new trusteeship be enforced against her will. The result is that she not only keeps administering the country as she did under the mandate, but goes on with certain refinements. South West is now represented in Parliament, and before long no doubt South West Native affairs will be lifted from the Office of the Administrator of South West and lodged in the Union's Ministry for Native Affairs. One might say that the Union is short-sighted in not at least going through the motions of showing some deference to the United Nations by submitting periodically some more or less innocuous report, on the province, to the United Nations. As a matter of fact, I think she could well afford to do that. It would relieve her of being publicly pressed at every General Assembly meeting without in any way loosening her hold on the territory. And even if one could envisage cutting the present ties of the Union with South West, who then would or could step in to administer it? For the present the Union's position is secure and unthreatened. That may, however, not always be the case.

When I visited South West in 1952, two aspects of life there struck me at once and with equal force. One was how strongly the German influence and imprint survived, and the other what a strong sense of local pride and loyalty persisted. I found German widely spoken and German signs everywhere on the shops. In my talks with residents, and I talked with a good cross section of the population, I never once heard the United Nations mentioned, not even in anger, nor, for that matter and that is the significant point, the Union. When "my" or "our" country was mentioned South West was meant; and when the future of South West was touched upon, frequently a future with only slim ties with the Union was obviously envisaged.

When I returned to Pretoria from Windhoek, an official of the present Union Government remarked to me that I had, of course, been impressed with how strongly South West felt to be, and was, part and parcel of the Union. I shall never forget how taken aback he was and how crestfallen he looked when I told him I had found quite the contrary. Far from frequent references to the Union, I told him, I had more often heard talk with a decided autonomous flavor of South West, and of South West's own immediate interests.

Forsyth, Secretary for External Affairs, was during the thirties a magistrate in South West. Not so long ago we were reminiscing, I about the immediate pre-war days in Danzig and he about his experiences at the same time in South West. Nazi agents were very active, he recalled, and it was a disquieting scene. He then commented on Western Germany's impressive recovery since 1945. "And South West," he added, "bears watching, for history might very well repeat itself." This called to my mind the concern expressed to me by Neser, the

Secretary to the Administrator in South West during my stay in Windhoek in 1952. He said he was disturbed by the number of German immigrants who had been coming into the territory since 1945.

I have not been able to get figures on German immigration. I have up to now been able to get only statistics on immigration in general into South West from 1946 through 1950. These figures show a rise from 14 in 1946 to 356 in 1950. It could be that, and I take it from Neser's remark that, most of the 356 were Germans and that there might have been even quite some increase in 1951 and 1952.

What Forsyth and Neser have said to me should be weighed in the light of present South African-German relations in general. Economic relations between South Africa and Western Germany are steadily expanding. Western Germany is showing increased interest in this part of Africa. Within a matter of only a few years Western Germany's representation was stepped up from Consul General to Minister to Ambassador.

What in the long run will be the position of South West? Is it just a question of whether the Union's voice will prevail solely, or with some tempering from the United Nations? Has not the problem been widened by a resurgent Germany, and will it not be necessary in time to give thought to just what the relationship of South West to a resurgent Germany is to be? I would not rule out the eventual necessity of facing that problem.

In any event, as I see it now, the Union in her relations with South West, quite apart from what the United Nations might try to do, is in the long run in for some fairly heavy going.

Republic Issue and Commonwealth Relations

[Here follows a discussion of the Malan government's interest in keeping the Union of South Africa within the British Commonwealth.]

Relations with the United States

There is a very large measure of good will for the United States in South Africa, and this is particularly noticeable among the Afrikaner element. Persons of English descent quite naturally think first of all of England, still largely regarded as the mother country. The Afrikaner's response to an interested, friendly approach is more immediate. He does not feel bound by any overseas ties, and shows his feelings without reservations. Then, too, the English element is to the Afrikaner a reminder of British imperialism, an inimical force he fought against in the Boer War when American sympathies were largely on his side. That he still remembers vividly. But while there is a shade of difference between the response a friendly approach gets from the South African of English background and from the Afrikaner, there is among Europeans generally, with roots in South Africa, an instinctive friendliness for the United States and Americans, and I should say understanding as well. The explanation for this, I think is to be found in a common heritage and experience that have left an identical imprint on the character and outlook of both peoples. Both peoples have their origins in Europe. Both set out from countries plagued by old problems to make new homes in new surroundings. Both faced at the start frontier conditions. Both struggled over the years to force the frontier back. As a result, there is quite prevalent a common outlook or in any case a sympathetic and understanding bond between them. That is most fortunate for us. We have here a very friendly ally. He is solidly with us in our worldwide struggle against Communism, and without haggling has come to mutually beneficial terms with us on the exploitation of the country's rich uranium source and vital mineral wealth generally, making it easier for us not only to meet our own defense and industrial needs but also to meet our promises of aid to the free world at large.

Caution in Passing Judgment

Let us remember that Western civilization was brought to the tip of Africa by the forebears of these friendly people and that they and their descendants, in developing the resources of this part of the world, have given benefits to peoples in many parts of the world. They have done this in the face of all those difficulties that ordinarily have to be contended with in building a new country in virgin territory. And during practically all their history, they have had a most baffling race problem to live with. That problem they have lived with for three hundred years. They have made mistakes and are making mistakes, as so many of them will readily admit, in trying to work out their relations with the Native. Some constructive things have been done. Some wise proposals have come, for example, from academic circles and race relation study groups. A lot of soul searching and thinking are constantly going on. All that should be remembered before we, in our part of the world, judge them. We in the States should above all remember that the reports we see in our newspapers at home are spotty, with all too often only the more sensational events made available, or only the more sensational side of any development. Unfortunately, we are without a single full-time correspondent in South Africa of an American daily newspaper, or American representing one of our news services. We had one of the former here last year during the election period, but right after the elections he went "Mau Mau-ing" in Kenya. Since then he has returned several times from trips farther afield in Africa, but only temporarily. And so the American public as a rule gets only bits from news agency stringers or stories from an occasional special correspondent sent for a very limited time, with directions to concentrate chiefly on some passing, more or less sensational, development.

I want to end on that word of caution.

W. J. GALLMAN

IO files, lot 71 D 440

Department of State Position Paper[1]

CONFIDENTIAL
SD/A/C.1/439

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1954.

RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA RESULTING FROM POLICIES OF *APARTHEID*

The Problem

Thirteen Arab-Asian states submitted for inclusion in the agenda of the Seventh Session in 1952 the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the *apartheid* policy of the Government of the Union of South Africa. The Assembly established a Commission to study the question and the Commission reported to the Eighth Session.

The Eighth Assembly debated the competence issue almost exclusively and rejected South African proposals that would have denied the jurisdiction of the General Assembly on the basis of Article 2(7) to deal with this case in any way. A resolution was adopted noting the Commission's conclusions and providing for it to continue its study. The Commission was also requested to "suggest measures which would help to alleviate the situation and promote a peaceful settlement". The Assembly decided to include this item on the provisional agenda of the Ninth Session. The United States abstained in the vote on this resolution.

The report of the Commission is not yet available.

United States Position

1. The United States should vote for inclusion of this item in the agenda and make a statement in the General Committee following the same line we took last year. (For explanation, see comment below.)

2. While making plain its opposition to racial discrimination, the United States should take the position that the Assembly has discussed the *apartheid* problem, and that the establishment and continuation of the Commission in its present form raises questions whether such Assembly action does not exceed the limits set by Article 2(7). Moreover, we remain unable to see any useful role for the Commission and therefore believe that it should be terminated. Subject

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[1] This paper was prepared for the use of the U.S. Delegation to the Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly.

to the Department's instructions on specific proposals, the Delegation should be guided in voting by these considerations. In particular, it should oppose action continuing the Commission, or endorsing any recommendations that the Commission might make calling for further United Nations action directed specifically at South Africa.

3. The United States may support either a general resolution along the lines of that adopted in 1952, which proclaimed general standards of conduct in the field of human rights, with particular emphasis on race relations, or a resolution providing means within the United Nations for voluntary exchange of experience on racial questions between countries having such problems and any assistance of a technical character any Member may request. In both cases there should be no direct reference to South Africa.

Comment

This item is already included in the provisional agenda as the result of action by the Eighth General Assembly. It was placed in the agenda last year by an overwhelming vote of 46 (United States) to 7 with 7 abstentions; consequently, it would be unrealistic to assume that our opposition to inclusion would result in dropping the item from the agenda. Furthermore, the Eighth Assembly requested the Commission to report to the Ninth Session, and the Assembly has never asked for a report and then refused to consider it by reversing a prior decision to retain the item on its agenda. At the same time our position in the General Committee should lay the groundwork for a firm position in the Assembly looking toward action that will shift from an approach directed exclusively at South Africa to one more likely to obtain more constructive results.

The report of the Commission will undoubtedly indicate failure to make any progress in dealing with the problem. Early in March the Commission addressed a request to all members to inform the Commission of any valuable experience they might have had in the matter of the elimination of inter-racial tension and the gradual removal of discriminatory practices. The United States informed the Commission that it had transmitted to the United Nations for publication in the "United Nations Year Book on Human Rights" annual reports on developments in this country which include material relating to racial discrimination.

Discussion of the report should be utilized to demonstrate that this Commission cannot play a useful role in this case and to underscore our belief that the experience of the past two years with the Commission conclusively demonstrates the undesirability of it's continuation.

In these circumstances, subject to the Delegation's assessment of the negotiating situation, we should consider taking the initiative in urging that the Assembly abandon the present approach.

IO files, lot 71 D 440

Department of State Position Paper [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 7, 1954.

SD/A/C.1/437

TREATMENT OF INDIANS IN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Problem

The Seventh General Assembly established, and the Eighth General Assembly continued, a Good Offices Commission (Cuba, Syria, Yugoslavia) to arrange and assist in negotiations between South Africa and India and Pakistan on the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa. The Commission will presumably again report failure to bring the parties together, but it may also include in its report, pursuant to its instructions from the Assembly, "its own views on the problem and any proposals which in its opinion may lead to a peaceful settlement of it". This item was automatically included in the provisional agenda of the Ninth Session by the Assembly's action last year.

United States Position

1. Resumption of direct negotiations between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Governments of India and Pakistan provides the only hope for a solution.

2. The United States should support a resolution recommending direct negotiations and which follows generally the line of previous Assembly resolutions on this approach to the problem.

3. If the negotiating situation makes it possible, the Delegation should seek to persuade India and Pakistan not to include in their proposals the following features of past resolutions which have hindered the resumption of direct negotiations.

(*a*) reference to the Group Areas Act and to the fact that South Africa has proceeded with its implementation despite Assembly recommendations that implementation be suspended, or to other legislation such as Immigrants Regulation Amendment Bill of 1953;
(*b*) characterization of the policy of *apartheid* in such a way as to imply criticism or condemnation of South Africa;
(*c*) establishment of United Nations commissions or agencies to play a role in the negotiations.

4. The United States should vote against any provision calling for automatic inclusion of the item on the agenda of the Tenth Session, but the inclusion of such a provision should not of itself change the United States vote on the resolution as a whole. In voting on other individual paragraphs of any proposed resolution or proposals that

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[1] This paper was prepared for the use of the U.S. Delegation to the Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly.

the Good Offices Commission may make, the United States Delegation should bear in mind (*a*) the voting pattern it followed on similar provisions at previous sessions (in the past, the United States has abstained or voted against references to the Group Areas Act or similar legislation and has voted for characterization of the *apartheid* policy as being based on doctrines of racial discrimination and for the establishment of United Nations agencies to assist in bringing the parties into direct negotiations); and (*b*) the basic criteria set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) above.

Comment

Last year's resolution, besides continuing the Good Offices Commission, called upon the Union Government to refrain from implementing the Group Areas Act. India, on April 28, 1954 sent to the Secretary General for circulation to all Members a memorandum protesting further measures taken by South Africa to implement the Group Areas Act, and expressing concern over South Africa's policies in this regard. Also, at the request of the Union Government, the office of the Indian High Commission in South Africa was closed on July 1, 1954.

In view of its position denying the competence of the United Nations on the ground that the matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction, South Africa is unlikely to respond affirmatively to any United Nations resolutions. At the same time, for reasons of domestic opinion and national prestige India will not cease pressing its case in the Assembly and may insist upon condemnatory references to the Group Areas Act and the continuation of United Nations machinery to assist in the negotiations. There may be some prospect for bringing the parties together outside the United Nations; it is conceivable that if this year the Assembly adopted a resolution merely calling upon the parties to negotiate, bilateral discussions might be resumed. It is possible that in the light of its discouraging experience of the past two years the Good Offices Commission will itself suggest that the Assembly simply call upon the parties to enter into direct negotiations. It would seem doubtful that the Commission would recommend its own continuation since it has failed to make any progress.

845A.411/10–2154: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NEW YORK, October 21, 1954—8 p. m.

Delga 131. Re treatment of Indians.[1]

Following resolution tabled at this afternoon's *ad hoc* political committee meeting by Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti and Honduras:[2]

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[1] The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee began considering the item, the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, on Oct. 18, 1954.

Begin verbatim text. The General Assembly,

Recalling that it has considered the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa during session after session;

Having noted the report of the United Nations good offices commission (A/2723);

1. Suggests to the governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa that they should seek a solution of the question by direct negotiations or other peaceful means;
2. Suggests, moreover, that the parties concerned should select a government, agency or person for the purpose of assisting them to reconcile their views and to settle the dispute;
3. Decides that, if within the next six months the parties have not reached agreement on the suggestions made in the foregoing paragraphs, the Secretary General shall appoint a person for the purposes specified above.
4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the General Assembly at its next regular session on the results obtained. *End verbatim text.*

While Ecuadoran delegate was making opening statement on behalf of sponsors, he announced that he had just been informed that India will bring forth own resolution. He also mentioned that India was aware of draft being put together by sponsors. Our impression is that Latin American sponsors led to believe that India favorably disposed to their draft. In subsequent intervention by Menon,[3] he appeared back-track somewhat by saying that his government would give LA draft resolution full consideration. Pakistan representative subsequently, by brief intervention, confirmed fact another resolution being worked on and in formative stage.

Would appreciate early expression of Department's views on above resolution.

Lodge

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[2] UN document A/AC.76/L.3.

[3] V.K. Krishna Menon, Representative of India to the General Assembly.

845A.411/10-2254: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 22, 1954—8:10 p. m.

Gadel 62. Re Indians in South Africa.

In Department's view inclusion Paragraphs 3 and 4 LA proposal (Delga 131)[1] virtually certain defeat purposes Paragraphs 1 and 2 which are excellent. We had hoped this year GA, after past frustrations this case, might take new tack, simply appealing to parties to resume negotiations and at most suggesting they might wish utilize mediator. In our view this approach likely to succeed only if GA resolution limited to these two points. Consequently GADel should oppose Paragraphs 3 and 4 as not only unrealistic on basis past experience but also harmful since they diminish still further whatever slight chance of agreement between parties still exists.

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[1] *Supra.*

Fact is that ever since 1950 GA has proposed to parties they utilize mediatory machinery under UN auspices or established by UN. Every such suggestion has failed. South Africa has made plain it is willing to negotiate only outside UN. We believe time has come to test sincerity this avowal. Paragraph 3 closely parallels GA Resolution 511 (VI) which authorized Secretary General, if parties unable agree establishment three-man commission, to lend his assistance to parties in negotiations and further in his discretion and after consulting governments concerned to appoint individual to render assistance. When he explored possibilities this course with parties, South Africa replied that since it did not recognize GA's jurisdiction, it regretted it could not recognize SYG's competence to take above action. SYG then reported to GA that, as result of consultations with parties, appointment of individual not opportune. We see no point in directing SYG to repeat virtually same performance with no prospect success and with what can only be unfortunate effects upon his own prestige and that of UN. Same reasoning is basis Department's views Gadel 53 [2] that UN connection any mediator should be minimized to greatest extent feasible.

In connection earlier discussion of idea of mediator we are unclear as to procedure contemplated, particularly whether GA would name mediator directly or SYG or parties. If majority insistent upon providing method for appointment mediator in event parties unable agree, we are inclined to feel this should be authorization to SYG to assist parties with their consent.

As stated Gadels 53 and 55 [3] we remain convinced mediator's efforts should be unprejudiced by any requirement for GA consideration after specified period. Under this criterion Paragraph 4, as well as time limit Paragraph 3, unacceptable. GADel should point out in strongest possible terms that inclusion such provisions in resolution are probably practical and certainly psychological handicap to mediator's efforts. Furthermore, should developments warrant, nothing prevents any of parties from placing matter again on GA agenda, so paragraph 4 completely unnecessary.

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[2] Not printed. In this telegram, the Department suggested to the U.S. Mission in New York that it follow up the possibility that India might be willing to see this item dropped from future GA agendas if the General Assembly designated a "mediator", perhaps with a neutral title such as liaison officer or good offices representative, whose task would be to assist the parties in resuming direct negotiations. The Department expressed the opinion that a GA action would have a better prospect for success if the individual appointed was simply to be available to the parties upon their initiative, if his UN character was minimized, and if it would be made clear that no further UN action was contemplated unless and until the mediator reported that such action would be fruitful. (845A.411/10–1554)

[3] Referenced telegram reads: "Department has noted Indian desire have US national named mediator but that Menon now says GOI would oppose action to drop matter from GA agenda, thus continuing repetitive and unproductive discussion of matter at each future GA session. GADel should inform Menon we could not consider selection US national if in effect deadline to his efforts set by automatic referral matter next GA. As indicated Gadel 53 we feel strongly if mediator designated there should be no provision for further UN action unless and until mediator himself indicates it could be useful." (845A.411/10–2054)

HOOVER

ODA files, lot 62 D 225, "South West Africa, 1954"

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Gerig) to the Deputy Director of That Office (Robbins) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1954.

DEPARTMENT'S ATTITUDE RE POSSIBLE UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP ON A SOUTH WEST AFRICA COMMITTEE

Following your intimation that there was some disposition to put the United States back on an enlarged Committee on South West Africa, I sounded out various interested Bureaus of the Department.

It is rather strongly felt here that the United States' contribution to this almost insoluble problem can best be made at this stage by not accepting membership on any United Nations committee. It is felt that our best contribution can be made through direct diplomatic channels rather than on a United Nations Committee. Among the reasons for this attitude are the following:

1. The basic positions of the General Assembly and of the Union Government are still so far apart that the two views can not be accommodated at this time.
2. The membership of such a committee would almost certainly include a majority of extremist opinion which would, in fact, weaken and embarrass the United States in its direct bilateral efforts.
3. As the United States served on such a committee for two years, it will be better to leave some other Member, such as Canada or one of the Scandinavian countries, represent the moderate coolheaded point of view.

It is hoped that Senator Smith and Mr. Jackson will share this view unless there are new elements which they see in the picture which would argue to the contrary. If so, the Department, of course, will be very glad to reconsider the position.

Of course, in the unlikely event that the Assembly would adopt much more flexible terms of reference, terms which would go much further in the direction of the Union point of view and terms which would give a liberal and flexible interpretation to the Court's opinion, there might also be need to reconsider our position.

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[1] Presumably, Robbins was attached to the U.S. Delegation to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly, as the memorandum is directed to him at USUN.

The foregoing would be the attitude if the committee were composed of Governments. In the event that it is proposed to set up a committee of individual experts, such as the Permanent Mandates Commission, and if it were proposed to designate an American on such a Committee of experts, the position would also be different.

It is hoped that the Delegation will be rather bearish on any United States participation on any such committee, but particularly on one which is called on to do what the previous committees have been.

845A.411/10–2654 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 26, 1954—6:51 p. m.

Gadel 65. Re: Indians in South Africa.

Draft LA proposal (A/AC.76/L.3)[1] falls within category resolutions on which position paper authorizes GADel in its discretion vote affirmatively or abstain. It closely approximates type of action US has hoped GA would take in past by its emphasis on resumption of direct negotiations. Moreover, proposal is sponsored not by Arab-Asian group led by India but for first time by LA group whose sincere interest in achieving equitable solution this difficult problem cannot be questioned.

Nevertheless resolution, while avoiding many features of past GA resolutions (e.g. references to Group Areas Act and other South African legislation, critical characterization of *apartheid*, condemnation South Africa for disregard GA recommendations), includes certain provisions prescribing methods of settlement that in our view unlikely succeed. As indicated Gadel 62[2] we consider paragraphs 3 and 4 tend defeat purposes first two paragraphs. Therefore suggest GADel should vote negatively or abstain on them. We hope however current informal efforts GADel to induce sponsors delete or substantially modify these paragraphs may succeed.

Even if these two provisions stand, Department inclined believe GADel should vote affirmatively on resolution as a whole. This view takes account of following:

(1) generally favorable reaction to LA proposal, including Indian support and unprecedented South African intention to abstain first two paragraphs; (2) likelihood proposal will be adopted by overwhelming majority; (3) fact that in past US has voted for resolutions

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[1] See telegram Delga 131, Oct. 21, 1954, p. 1042.

[2] Dated Oct. 22, p. 1043.

sponsored by Arab-Asian group which included objectionable features involving substance of dispute; and (4) possibility US abstention for first time on resolution certain to be adopted by GA would be interpreted as unfortunate retrogression in US position both on substantive issue of racial discrimination implicitly involved this case and on procedure of direct negotiations which is fundamental Charter principle.

DULLES

UNP files, lot 60 D 268, "Indians in South Africa, October–December 1954"

United States Delegation Plenary Position Paper

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
US/A/3714

[NEW YORK,] November 3, 1954.

TREATMENT OF PEOPLE OF INDIAN ORIGIN IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: REPORT OF THE *AD HOC* POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/2784)

United States Position

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee recommends adoption of its resolution [1] which (*a*) expresses appreciation of the work and efforts of the Good Offices Commission; (*b*) suggests to the governments of India, Pakistan and South Africa that they seek a solution of the above question by direct negotiations; (*c*) suggests that the parties designate a government, agency or person to assist them in settling the dispute; (*d*) decides that if within six months following the adoption of this resolution the parties have not reached agreement on the suggestions made in the foregoing provisions, the Secretary General should designate an individual for the purposes specified therein; and (*e*) requests the Secretary General to report to the next session of the General Assembly.

The United States should:

A. Move under Rule 91 that the resolution be put to the vote paragraph-by-paragraph; vote in favor of the preambular paragraphs and operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; abstain on operative paragraphs 4 and 5; and vote in favor of the resolution as a whole.

B. Vote against any proposal for a plenary debate of the Committee Report (Rule 68).

C. Make an explanation of vote along the lines of the attached draft.[2]

Committee Action

The resolution outlined above was introduced in the Committee by Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, and

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[1] The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee adopted the draft resolution, as amended, on Oct. 28, 1954. (Report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, Nov. 2, 1954, UN document A/2784)

[2] Not printed. A statement made by Representative Smith in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Oct. 26 and in the General Assembly on Nov. 4 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 22, 1954, pp. 783–784.

Honduras. The sponsors accepted an amendment submitted by Pakistan and India calling for inserting present operative paragraph 1.[3] The resolution as a whole as amended was adopted by 47 votes (US) to 1 (South Africa), with 10 abstentions. In the preceding paragraph-by-paragraph vote, results were as follows:

Preamble was adopted by 52 votes (US) to 0, with 5 abstentions; Operative paragraph 1 by 46 votes (US) to 1, with 10 abstentions; Operative paragraph 2 by 52 votes (US) to 0, with 5 abstentions; Operative paragraph 3 by 47 votes (US) to 1, with 9 abstentions; Operative paragraph 4 by 44 votes to 3, with 11 abstentions (US); and Operative paragraph 5 by 45 votes to 3, with 10 abstentions (US).

Possible Plenary Developments

It is unlikely that any delegation will propose a plenary debate of the Committee's report, but a number of explanations of vote may be made. The resolution will probably be adopted by substantially the same votes as in the Committee.[4]

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[3] Paragraph 1 expressed appreciation of the work and efforts of the Good Offices Commission.

[4] On Nov. 4, 1954, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a vote of 55 in favor, 0 opposed, with 4 abstentions. The United States voted for the resolution. For text of resolution 812(IX), see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21*, UN document A/2890.

Editorial Note

The Committee on South West Africa, established by the General Assembly on November 28, 1953 (resolution 749 (VIII)), issued its report to the General Assembly on June 25, 1954. The report recommended the adoption of two draft resolutions (A and B). Resolution A contained proposed General Assembly procedures for examining reports and petitions on South West Africa and for voting on South West African matters in the Assembly. Specifically, in regard to voting, the Committee recommended that "decisions of the General Assembly on questions relating to reports and petitions concerning the Territory of South West Africa shall be regarded as important questions within the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations" and thereby require a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. The adoption of this provision, in effect, would alleviate the need to conform literally to the voting procedures of the League of Nations, which required a unanimous vote of all present on all matters pertinent to South West Africa except procedural questions. As the Union of South Africa was "the State most directly concerned", the Committee further recommended that the Assembly should adopt the revised voting procedures "subject to the concurring vote of the Union of South Africa." Under Resolution B, if the Union Government failed to support the revisions, which were approved by a majority, then the Committee proposed that the General Assembly should ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on whether, in adopting this rule, the General Assembly was correctly interpreting that part of the Court's opinion of July 1950 concerning Assembly procedure; and, if it did not, what voting procedure should be applied. (Report of Committee on South West Africa, UN document A/2666 and Corr. 1)

The Department of State position paper on the Question of South West Africa, dated September 10, 1954, described the United States position on the Committee's report as follows: The report represented a conscientious and thorough effort on the part of the Committee to fulfill its assigned tasks. Although the report did not require Assembly action per se, the Delegation might support a general resolution, if one were introduced, provided that it was consistent with the 1950 opinion of the International Court of Justice and with the United States position on other matters. As for the recommended resolutions, the Delegation should vote in favor of the proposed Assembly procedures for examining reports and petitions on South West Africa and the proposed voting procedure. If a majority, but not South Africa, accepted the revision in voting procedure, then the Delegation should support the referral to the International Court of Justice. (IO files, lot 71 D 440, SD/A/C.4/131)

On October 4 and 7, 1954, the Fourth Committee considered the Committee's report and recommendations. On the latter date, the Fourth Committee adopted several amendments which clarified the wording of the recommendation concerning General Assembly procedures for examining reports and petitions on South West Africa and for voting on South West African matters in the General Assembly and one which inserted the words "subject to acceptance by the Union of South Africa" in conjunction with the change in voting procedure. The Fourth Committee then adopted the draft resolution as amended and a separate draft resolution, put forward by India, Mexico, Norway, Syria, and the United States, which stipulated that, if a majority but not South Africa accepted the change in voting procedure, the Assembly should pose to the International Court of Justice the questions mentioned in the Committee's report. (Report of the Fourth Committee (Part I), UN document A/2747)

When the General Assembly considered these two draft resolutions on October 11, however, the part of the first resolution which stipulated that the revised voting procedure was "subject to acceptance by the Union of South Africa" failed to obtain a two-thirds majority, and the first draft resolution was adopted without the qualifier. The Assembly also decided that, since the phrase had been deleted, it was unnecessary to put to a vote the second resolution, which sought a referral to the International Court of Justice. (UN document A/PV.494, October 11, 1954)

On October 12, the Fourth Committee began a debate on the general conditions in South West Africa. Following conclusion of the debate on October 19, the Representatives of Norway, Thailand, and the United States announced that, in the absence of a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, they would not participate in the consideration of resolutions emanating from the report of the Committee on South West Africa. In separate actions, Thailand relinquished its membership on the Committee on South West Africa, and Norway announced that its delegation could no longer be associated with the future work of the Committee on South West Africa. Subsequently, the Fourth Committee established a Subcommittee, consisting of Representatives of Brazil, Denmark, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United States, whose task was to "review the whole situation and report back to the Committee on what to do." On November 8, the Fourth Committee considered the Subcommittee's report (UN document A/C.4/274) and rejected a recommendation, by the Subcommittee, that the Fourth Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that it reopen the matter of requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. (Report of the Fourth Committee (Part II), UN document A/2747/Add.1)

745X.021/11–854 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NEW YORK, November 8, 1954—10 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 198. Re South West Africa.

Following rejection of paragraph 14 report Subcommittee of South West Africa by tie roll-call vote 18[–18] (US)–16 today,[1] US was obliged to reconsider quickly its position. In view statement by Senator Smith on October 19[2] that US would not participate in voting on resolutions bearing upon substance report Committee on South West Africa, USDel decided that in Fourth Committee at least we should maintain this position and not participate in voting. Any other action would have been contrary to our stated position and not understood by Committee. New Zealand also did not participate.

According to Mr. Johnson's warning to Fourth Committee earlier today[3] if Subcommittee's report were not adopted, Assembly's position re South West Africa has become vitiated. No member of Subcommittee feels any longer bound by any part of report. USDel intends to make a statement on November 9 to effect that it no longer feels bound by its statement on November 8. It has already been made known to number of delegations that USDel now regards itself as under no obligation to serve on South West Africa Committee in light refusal refer procedural aspects to ICJ.

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[1] Reference is to the vote in the Fourth Committee on the proposal put forward by the Subcommittee on South West Africa, that the General Assembly reopen the matter of referring to voting procedure on the South West African question to the International Court of Justice. See editorial note, *supra*.

[2] Reference is to Smith's statement in the Fourth Committee. For a summation, see UN document A/C.4/SR.409.

Above represents previously stated views of Senator Smith as well as those decided upon today by Mr. Johnson and staff.

WADSWORTH

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[3] For a summation, see UN document A/C.4/SR.424.

IO files

Statement by the United States Alternate Representative (Johnson) in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on November 9, 1954[1]

MR. CHAIRMAN: The action taken yesterday by this Committee in voting not to act favorably on the recommendation of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa has reestablished our position as it existed on October 19.[2] In accord with our stated position on that date, we did not participate yesterday in the voting on resolutions contained in the South West Africa report. We have stated several times that we deemed it unwise not to refer the matter of procedure to the International Court of Justice. No one can say now that members of the Committee have not had an opportunity to weigh carefully the course which has been adopted. We said yesterday that we considered the report of the Sub-Committee to be something we could support in its entirety. However, the action of the Committee in refusing to accept Paragraph 14 has rendered the report meaningless. We consider that Members of the Sub-Committee have now been relieved of any obligation to support it, and in like manner we no longer feel an obligation to serve on the South West Africa Committee should it be continued.[3]

The action of this Committee has convinced us that it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to make any effective contribution to the work of the South West Africa Committee at this time. Mr.

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[1] Issued as press release no. 2015 of the U.S. Delegation to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly. A summation can be found in UN document A/C.4/SR.426.

[2] See editorial note, p. 1048.

[3] At the same meeting, the Representatives of Iraq and Sweden also announced that, as a consequence of the Fourth Committee's refusal to accept the Subcommittee's recommendation, their delegations would be unable to serve on the Committee on South West Africa. The Representatives of Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan, Syria, and Thailand reserved the positions of their governments with respect to their future participation in the Committee on South West Africa. (Report of the Fourth Committee (Part II), UN document A/2747/Add. 1)

Chairman, I quite naturally reserve the position of my Government to follow any future course of action it may deem appropriate.

745X.021/11-1954 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE — NEW YORK, November 19, 1954—8 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 260. Re South West Africa.

Fourth Committee rept (part II) South West Africa L/355 10 Nov 1954[1] contains four resolutions Annex A, B, C and D.[2]

US position in refraining from vote in committee on first three resolutions was predicated on possibility of influencing final decision to refer question of ⅔ voting rule to ICJ. If no such proposal forthcoming and successful in plenary, delegation will be confronted question whether to vote on first three resolutions. Only basis which would then be left for explaining our refraining from vote on resolutions A and B would be legal doubts on part of US as to validity of ⅔ voting procedure. Del legal advisers consider no such doubt should be entertained and believe ⅔ procedure correct in law. As to third resolution, could explain abstention on ground no present prospect of a functioning committee in light statements of various members that committee. Request instructions on whether to refrain on vote and if voting how to vote. Del legal advisers believe we should make explanation of vote, whatever course is followed, so as to make quite clear that US itself entertains no doubts as to legality ⅔ voting procedure.

LODGE

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[1] UN document A/2747/Add.1.

[2] Draft resolutions A and B pertained to petitions concerning South West Africa. Draft resolution C concerned the work of the Committee on South West Africa and its report. Draft resolution D reaffirmed previous General Assembly resolutions concerning status of the Territory of South West Africa. The United States voted for these resolutions in the Fourth Committee.

845A.411/12-354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL — WASHINGTON, December 3, 1954—7:46 p. m.

Gadel 135. Re: *Apartheid.*[2]

Department would favor concluding action this item by adoption suitable generalized resolution and believes GADel should encourage and support any such initiative by others. However, we consider GADel should not take active lead this direction. Preferable in this case that US, while continuing make clear its opposition to any form of racial discrimination, avoid taking position that could result in its active involvement in what might be regarded as partisan capacity in committee situation, procedurally or substantively.

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[1] Telegram drafted by Brown (UNP), approved by Popper (UNP), and cleared by Thoreson (BNA) and Williams (SOA).

[2] The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee began consideration of the item, race conflict in the Union of South Africa, on Dec. 3, 1954.

Resolution discharging Commission with thanks and including general reaffirmation of UN objectives in human rights field reflecting relevant Charter provisions would be entirely acceptable. Since GA has previously spelled out in Resolution 616(VII) B detailed objectives in multi-racial society, as well as made broad declaration regarding "religious and so-called racial persecution" in Resolution 103(I) we see no necessity for going beyond broad reaffirmation of Charter objectives with possible preambular reference to aforementioned resolutions.

Suggest GADel be guided by above views in conversations other delegations, emphasizing that we continue see no useful function for Commission and believe experience past two years indicates every reason to bring its work to graceful conclusion. GADel should also make plain standing US belief that discussion of questions of this character should not be focused on situation in individual member state but rather considered in context of world-wide human rights situation.

Dulles

320.14/12–654 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PRIORITY

New York, December 6, 1954—8 p. m.

Delga 349. Guatemalan delegate (Arenales) intends bring up December 7 morning meeting Fourth Committee question composition South West Africa Committee. Specific question will be willingness Sweden and US serve on committee in place Thailand and Norway.

Procedure will be that following committee discussion, President will be given list seven members, saying matter has been considered in committee and asking him designate members on list submitted. If USDel in committee simply reserves its position, Sweden may be expected to do same. We will then be confronted by list being submitted with US included.

Arenales and Rajan (India) have urged US membership as crucial, explaining that Guatemala, Brazil, India and Mexico, moderate Fourth Committee members at the GA, would not be able to keep South West Africa Committee from taking extreme positions. Obstructionism of Fabregat (Uruguay) regarded as important only if US refuses serve. Indian and Guatemalan Dels have argued that as advisory opinion will take some time, it is doubtful that committee will have much to do in coming year. If US refuses serve, it will be regarded as uncooperative by many non-administrative authorities and as going back on its word by those who fail to recall that US willingness to serve based on subcommittee's report [1] calling for 10 members and broader terms of reference.

Sole (South Africa) approached USDel, saying that US membership would not be understood by his government. He stated politely that US was continuously seeking and receiving his government's support such matters as atomic energy, prisoners of war, etc. Our membership might cause South Africa ask whether such cooperation really profitable. USDel informed Sole one could argue strongly that US membership by providing moderation might in fact be something his government would welcome. Sole replied that the UN would not be able to work out anything with his government on South West Africa, particularly with the government as now constituted. He said only future hope was that something might be worked out with remaining Allied and associated powers.

USDel staff maintains position that it would be preferable if we were not obliged serve on committee, but doubts desirability our refusing to do so. Believe Department should decide matter on basis all factors.

If USDel instructed to accept membership, it is suggested Embassy Pretoria be advised rationale our position.

LODGE

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[1] UN document A/C.4/274. The U.S. Representative served on the Subcommittee.

845A.411/12–654 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

PRIORITY

New York, December 6, 1954—11:58 p. m.

Delga 344. Re *Apartheid*.

Following draft resolution tabled December 6 by Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia: [1]

The GA, having considered the second report of the United Nations Commission on the racial situation in the Union of South Africa supplement No. 16 (A/2719),

Recalling its declaration in Resolution 103 (I) that it is in the higher interest of humanity to put an end to racial persecution and discrimination and its conclusion in Resolutions 395(V) and 511(VI) that a policy of racial segregation (*apartheid*) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination,

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[1] UN document A/AC.76/L.20.

Further recalling that the Commission in its first report, had concluded that the racial policies of the Government of the Union of South Africa are contrary to the Charter and to the universal declarations of human rights,

Noting with regret the adoption of new laws and regulations by the Union Government which in the Commission's view are also incompatible with the obligations of that Government under the United Nations' Charter,

Noting further the profound conviction of the Commission that the policy of *apartheid* constitutes a grave threat to the peaceful relations between ethnic groups in the world,

1. Commends the Commission for its constructive work;
2. Notes with regret that the Government of the Union of South Africa again refused to cooperate with the Commission and that this refusal was in the Commission's opinion the greatest obstacle to the fulfillment of its task;
3. Notes the Commission's recommendations for facilitating a peaceful settlement of the problem contained in paragraphs 368–384 of its report;
4. Invites the Government of the Union of South Africa to conform to its obligation under the United Nations Charter, taking into account the provisions of the Charter and in particular the second and fourth paragraphs of the preamble; paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article 1; Article 2, paragraph 2; Article 13, paragraph 1B; Article 55; Article 56; and Article 62, paragraph 2; and further taking into account the valuable experience of other multi-racial societies as set forth in Chapter VII of the Commission's report;
5. Further invites the Government of the Union of South Africa to take into consideration the suggestions of the Commission for a peaceful settlement of the racial problem, namely those detailed in paragraphs 370–383 of its report;
6. Requests the Commission to keep under review the problem of race conflict in the Union of South Africa;
7. Requests the Commission to report to the General Assembly at its 10th session.

LODGE

845A.411/12–654 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 7, 1954—10:47 a. m.
PRIORITY

Gadel 139. Re: *Apartheid.*

On paragraph-by-paragraph vote 20-power resolution (Delga 344)[2]

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[1] Telegram drafted by Brown (UNP), approved by Key (IO), and cleared in substance by Jernegan (NEA) and Merchant (EUR).

[2] Dated Dec. 6, *supra*.

GADel should vote against operative paragraphs 4, 6 and 7, abstain on all other paragraphs and abstain on resolution as whole, making appropriate explanation of vote.[3]

DULLES

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[3] On Dec. 8, 1954, the Representative of India, in behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution, introduced a revised text, which incorporated several drafting changes. The Indian Representative also introduced an additional amendment, to be added as operative paragraph 8, which provided guidance for the replacement of Commission members when the General Assembly was not in session. During the vote which followed, the Committee rejected an amendment, by Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba, which would have deleted the fifth preambular paragraph; it then adopted the Indian amendment and the 20-power revised draft resolution, as amended. (Report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, Dec. 11, 1954, UN document A/2857) On Dec. 14, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, as amended, in a paragraph by paragraph vote. The United States abstained on the resolution as a whole in both the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the General Assembly. For text of resolution 820 (IX), see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21,* UN document A/2890).

320.14/12–654 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE WASHINGTON, December 8, 1954—4:20 p. m.
PRIORITY

Gadel 145. Re Delga 349[1] Dept concurs conclusion US Delegation to reluctantly accept membership on South West Africa Committee along lines of Gadel 79.[2] Our understanding is that securing flexible terms of reference not procedurally feasible. If securing more flexible terms of reference not possible, Del should nevertheless accept reluctantly but state in Committee that it would approach problem in SWA Committee on more flexible basis.

DULLES

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[1] Dated Dec. 6, p. 1053.

[2] Referenced telegram stated that the Department concurred with the Delegation's inclination not to serve on the South West Africa Committee and hoped that Canada could be persuaded to serve. As long as the latter possibility existed, the Delegation should continue to indicate its unwillingness. If and when the Delegation reached the conclusion that the continued pressure on the United States amounted to a draft, then the Delegation might indicate that the United States was willing to make another effort to cooperate in seeking a solution to the problem and hoped that more flexible terms of reference would provide an avenue for acceptable compromise, although it was not sanguine of success in view of the distance between the positions of the United Nations and the Union Government. (745X.021/10–2954)

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Part 2.